Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA...

Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 70_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-1 Log #4917l NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Caleb M. Ferris, Chadwick Electric

Add a diagram table after the scope of each article similar to the one in Article 430.For NEC user cost make the table layout diagram in 430.8 standard throughout the code.

The submitter has not provided text or an example to be added after the scope of each article. Thisproposal does not meet the requirements of 4.3.3(c) of the NFPA Regulations Governing Committee Projects.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-2 Log #614k NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Paul Guidry, Fluor Enterprises, Inc.

Change terms "high voltage" and "medium voltage" to correlate with new proposed definitions inArticle 100.This is a companion proposal to a proposal to add definitions for low voltage, medium voltage, and high voltage to

Article 100.If the proposal for adding the definitions in Article 100 is accepted, this proposal must be accepted as

well to correlate between all chapters of the NEC.

The terms “high voltage” and “medium voltage” are used in many US and international standards,but the definitions of these terms are inconsistent within these standards. Defining these terms in NFPA 70 will merelyadd another set of definitions to the wide array of definitions already in existence. Currently, 490.2 defines "highvoltage" as more than 600 V, nominal. For the purposes of the requirements in NFPA 70, this definition is adequate,since “medium voltage” and “high voltage” systems are treated similarly throughout the NEC with respect to installationrequirements.The terms low voltage, medium voltage, and high voltage may apply in different contexts as they relate to systems andequipment addressed throughout the scope of the NEC. These different contexts are reflected in different standardsand in the nature of the requirements within the NEC.For example, IEEE 100, The Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms, indicates that:• Low voltage can mean either 24 volts or less, supplied from a transformer, converter, or battery, or a class of nominalsystem voltages 1000 or less.• Medium voltage can mean either 601 to 15,000 V, or a class of nominal system voltages greater than 1000 V and lessthan 100,000 V.• High voltage can mean either a class of nominal system voltages equal to or greater than 100,000 V and equal to orless than 230,000 V or voltage levels that are greater than 1000 V.The proposal is not consistent with ANSI/NEMA C84.1, Electric Power Systems and Equipment – Voltage Ratings, andwith many product standards such as ANSI/UL 347, Safety of High Voltage Industrial Control Equipment, or ANSI/UL60947-1, Safety of Low-Voltage Switchgear and Controlgear. The panel concludes that acceptance of the proposalwould not provide benefit and would confuse users of the NEC because of the various definitions that are in use.This issue is outside the jurisdiction of Panel 13 and, since it affects the entire NEC, it is an NEC TCC issue. CMP-13requests that the TCC direct CMP-1 to comment on this proposal and a task group be formed if necessary.

1Printed on 1/29/2009

Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 70_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-3 Log #4415 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Mark C. Ode, Underwriters Laboratories Inc.

Revise text to read as follows:

This article covers the installation location, marking, overcurrent protection, internal bushing requirements, terminalhousings and disconnecting means for generators and the ampacity of conductors from the generator terminal to thefirst disconnecting means with overcurrent protection.

Article 445 does not cover the installation of generators, as much as it covers the location, marking,overcurrent protection, ampacity sizing of conductors from the terminal housings to the disconnecting meansincorporating overcurrent protection. Making this change to the scope will more accurately describe the coverage ofArticle 445, rather than describing the article as only the requirements for installation of generator.This proposal was developed by a Task Group composed of Task Group Chairman Paul Casparro and Chair of Panel

3 (NJATC); Jim Wiseman at Square D Schneider-Electric and Panel 15 (NEMA); John R. Kovacik with UnderwritersLaboratories, Panels 10, 13 and the NEC TCC (UL); Richard Owen with City of St Paul, Minnesota, Panel 3, and theNEC TCC (IAEI); and Mark C. Ode with Underwriters Laboratories, Panels 3, 13, and the NEC TCC (UL).

This article contains installation and other requirements for generators.The panel action provides a more general statement than recommended. This would preclude

having to revise the scope each time new requirements are added to the article. The committee understands that scopestatements are the responsibility of the NEC TCC and recommends that they accept this action.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-4 Log #4240 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Donald R. Cook, Shelby County Development Services

Add new text as follows:445.5 Equipment Approval. The equipment required or permitted by this Article shall be acceptable only if approved.

The basis for that approval shall include listing where required by other NEC provisions. Where listing is not required byother NEC provisions, the basis for approval shall be determined by one of the following methods:(1) Equipment listing or labeling(2) Evidence of equipment evaluation from a qualified testing laboratory or inspection agency concerned with product

evaluationNEC 110.2 currently indicates all conductors and equipment shall be acceptable only if approved

(acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction). Authorities must have a basis for that approval and while listing is thepreferred basis for approval, listing is not available or has not been provided for some equipment. While someequipment historically has not been listed, a basis for approval of this equipment is needed. The proposed text allows forthree options as the basis for equipment approval. Item 1 recognizes listed equipment, the preferred method of manyenforcement departments as a basis for approval. Item 2 recognizes field evaluations by testing labs or other locallyapproved agencies concerned with product evaluation of unlisted equipment. While very few enforcement agencieshave internal equipment evaluation departments, this option would recognize evaluations by those departments as anacceptable basis for approval. This item would also allow certification of manufactured homes, RV's, and manufacturedbuildings that are typically evaluated by state agencies that evaluate those facilities to a combination of standardsincluding the HUD Standards. Local inspectors generally do not have access to product standards, test equipment,required training, nor time for evaluation of equipment construction and internal wiring. The proposed text requires anoutside party to provide the equipment evaluation.

See the panel action and statement on Proposal 13-8.






evaluation(3) Evidence acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction such as a manufacturer's self-evaluation or an owner's

engineering judgmentNEC 110.2 currently indicates all conductors and equipment shall be acceptable only if approved

(acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction). Authorities must have a basis for that approval and while listing is thepreferred basis for approval, listing is not available or has not been provided for some equipment. While someequipment historically has not been listed, a basis for approval of this equipment is needed. The proposed text allows forthree options as the basis for equipment approval. Item 1 recognizes listed equipment, the preferred method of manyenforcement departments as a basis for approval. Item 2 recognizes field evaluations by testing labs or other locallyapproved agencies concerned with product evaluation of unlisted equipment. While very few enforcement agencieshave internal equipment evaluation departments, this option would recognize evaluations by those departments as anacceptable basis for approval. This item would also allow certification of manufactured homes, RV's, and manufacturedbuildings that are typically evaluated by state agencies that evaluate those facilities to a combination of standardsincluding the HUD Standards. Item 3 recognizes other possible methods as a basis for approval of unlisted equipment.Enforcement agencies across the country currently have a variety of "other" options used for their basis of approval forunlisted equipment including product evaluation by a local professional engineer or review of manufacturers test data.The procedures and parameters used by those enforcement agencies vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Some requirethe non-test-lab certifiers to include the standard used to evaluate the equipment and an explanation of the processused to determine compliance. Some require peer review of the local evaluation. Some require the evaluation report tobe sealed by a State Registered professional Engineer. Item 3 the evidence to be acceptable to the authority havingjurisdiction which gives the local authority the ability to determine what type of evaluation and documentation isacceptable. While item 3 is very similar to simply requiring the equipment to be "approved", it does give the AHJ theNEC text that requires evaluation of the equipment by someone other than the local inspector. Local inspectorsgenerally do not have access to product standards, test equipment, required training, nor time for evaluation ofequipment construction and internal wiring. The proposed text requires an outside party to provide the equipmentevaluation.





Add new text as follows:445.5 Equipment Approval. The equipment required or permitted by this Article after December 31, 2016 shall be

acceptable only if listed.NEC 110.2 currently indicates all conductors and equipment shall be acceptable only if approved

(acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction). Authorities must have a basis for that approval. While some equipmenthistorically has not been listed, a basis for approval of this equipment is needed. Very few enforcement agencies haveinternal equipment evaluation departments with access to product standards, test equipment, required training, nor timefor evaluation of equipment construction and internal wiring. At the end of the two code cycles, the proposed textrequires listing of all equipment covered by this Article by a qualified testing agency as defined in Article 100. Theproposed text provides time (two code cycles) for equipment manufacturers with unlisted equipment to submit theequipment and time for third party certification agencies to complete the evaluation and listing of that equipment.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-7 Log #4243 NEC-P13


Add new text as follows:445.5 Equipment Approval. The equipment required or permitted by this Article shall be acceptable only if listed.

NEC 110.2 currently indicates all conductors and equipment shall be acceptable only if approved(acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction). Authorities must have a basis for that approval. While some equipmenthistorically has not been listed, a basis for approval of this equipment is needed. Very few enforcement agencies haveinternal equipment evaluation departments with access to product standards, test equipment, required training, nor timefor evaluation of equipment construction and internal wiring. The proposed text requires an outside party to provide theequipment evaluation.







evaluation(3) Through January 1, 2017, evidence acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction such as a manufacturer's

self-evaluation or an owner's engineering judgmentNEC 110.2 currently indicates all conductors and equipment shall be acceptable only if approved

(acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction). Authorities must have a basis for that approval and while listing is thepreferred basis for approval, listing is not available or has not been provided for some equipment. While someequipment historically has not been listed, a basis for approval of this equipment is needed. The proposed text providestime (two code cycles) for equipment manufacturers with unlisted equipment to submit the equipment and time for thirdparty certification agencies to complete the evaluation of that equipment. The delayed implementation allows localenforcement agencies the flexibility to utilize any methods currently in place such as; product evaluation by a localprofessional engineer or review of manufacturers test data; as the basis for approval of equipment. Local inspectorsgenerally do not have access to product standards, test equipment, required training, nor time for evaluation ofequipment construction and internal wiring. At the end of the two code cycles, evaluation of all equipment covered bythis Article would be required by a qualified testing laboratory or inspection agency concerned with product evaluation.

The recommended text is unnecessary based on existing requirements in 90.7, 110.2, and 110.3.Section 110.2 already states that electrical equipment or conductors required or permitted by the NEC must beapproved so repeating this text is unnecessary. Section 90.4, as well as 90.7, provides a method for the authorityhaving jurisdiction (AHJ) to use “listing” as a means of accepting electrical equipment, especially where the AHJ doesnot have access to the listing standards, does not have the qualifications, or does not have the time for evaluation of theelectrical equipment. Where electrical equipment is one of a kind or not listed at time of installation, Sections 90.4 and90.7 permit field equipment evaluation, making this text unnecessary.Permitting manufacturer’s self-evaluation or an owner’s engineering judgment may permit equipment to be installed asunevaluated, untested, and uninspected equipment to be installed since many states only have electrical inspection inthe major metropolitan areas, not counties or unincorporated areas.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-9 Log #366 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________James M. Daly, Upper Saddle River, NJ

Revise text to read as follows:“rated revolutions/minute revolutions per minute”

This revision will comply with the recommendations in the NEC Style Manual and the Manual of Stylefor NFPA Technical Committee Documents and provide consistency throughout the Code. “Per” is not an appropriateterm for a standard.

The context in which "per" is used is acceptable in accordance with the NEC Style Manual list ofacceptable terms.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________Eugene F. Swisher, City of Tampa / Rep. Tampa Area Apprenticeship Training

Add the following new sentence at end of paragraph:The manufacturer's nameplate shall also include the minimum distance from combustible materials and the minimum

distance from door and window openings.With the dramatic increase in the use of permanently installed whole house generator systems, I find

many of them installed in close proximity to door and window openings, thus, allowing hazardous amounts of exhaustfumes to enter the house. Also, if hot exhaust is too close to combustible material (wood siding) it is a fire hazard.

The location of the generator should remain with the engineer, the installer, and the authority havingjurisdiction as a field decision based on the construction of any structures as well as the type and amount of fuel storedin or with the generator. Generators are built for various types of fuel and various exhaust system configurations. Eachdifferent fuel and exhaust configuration may require a different distance from combustible materials and from windowand door openings so providing manufacturers’ data for all the possible distances would be almost impossible. Inaddition, the various types of construction may combine noncombustible materials, such as block or brick, withcombustible frames for doors and windows. The location of the generator should remain with the engineer, the installer,and the authority having jurisdiction as a field decision based on the construction of any structures as well as the typeand amount of fuel stored in or with the generator.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________Rick Lorenz, Cummins Power Generation

Revise text to read as follows:445.12 Overcurrent Protection

Constant-voltage generators, except ac generator exciters, shall be protected fromoverload overcurrent by inherent design, circuit breakers, fuses, protective relays or other acceptable overcurrentprotective means suitable for the conditions of use.445.13 Ampacity of Conductors

With the advent of boosted excitation systems it is now possible for modern constant voltagegenerators to produce current over time in excess of generator and conductor thermal damage curves, unlike shuntexcited generators produced in the past. The recommended change would also make generator feeder conductorprotection consistent with feeder overcurrent protection in Article 215 and Article 240.

The panel accepts in part the recommended revision of 445.12(A) and the resultant text is to read as follows:Constant-voltage generators, except ac generator exciters, shall be protected from

overload overcurrent by inherent design, circuit breakers, fuses, protective relays, or other acceptable overcurrentprotective means suitable for the conditions of use.The panel rejects the recommendation to revise the exception to 445.13.

The panel does not accept the deletion of "inherent design" from 445.12(A) because this is aprotective technique currently employed by generator manufacturers. The panel rejects the changes to the exception in445.13 because there has been no technical substantiation presented to change the rating from 100 percent of thenameplate of the generator to 100 percent of the overcurrent protective device. The conductors do not have overcurrentprotection on the line side of the overcurrent protective device and may have to carry the full value of the generatorrating.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-12 Log #2596 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Dan Leaf, Seneca, SC

Add text: "or damage to equipment or process" after "greater hazard to persons".Edit. The provision should also apply where failure to operate would cause damage to equipment or

processes.

The submitter has failed to provide any technical substantiation to support the recommendation. Theexception covers installations where generators should be permitted to operate to failure to prevent a greater hazard topeople, not to equipment or processes. This section does not deal with failure to operate. For example, where agenerator is providing power to a critical branch for an operating room in a hospital, installing an overload-sensingdevice that would shut the generator down during an overload would endanger the patient. This exception permits anannunciator to be installed that would provide an alarm rather than shutting the system down.




Change "acceptable" to "identified".Edit. Acceptable is not the same as identified.

The submitter has not provided technical substantiation to support the recommendation. Thesubmitter's use of the term "identified" is incorrect in the context of this requirement. The correct word is "acceptable".

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-14 Log #457 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Lanny G. McMahill, Phoenix, AZ

Change the existing Exception to Exception Number 1 and add new Exception Number 2 asfollows:Where the conductors are installed in accordance with the requirements of Sections 240.21(C)(2), (3), (4), and (6).

This change is intended to allow some flexibility in the connection of tap conductors from generatorterminals. In particular, the change will allow for the installation of multiple sets of conductors to be connected to thegenerator terminals — similar to what is allowed for transformer secondary conductors. Generally, there should be nomajor differences in what is currently allowed for transformer secondary conductors and generator conductors. Logically,the conductors do not care if they receive their supply source from a transformer or a generator. A transformer andgenerator can be separately or non-separately derived systems — grounding and bonding requirements are generallythe same. As presently worded, Section 445.13 requires that all conductors from the generator terminals be sized at 115per cent of the nameplate current rating of the generator. This is over restrictive where the need for multiple generatortaps is necessary, such as taps for emergency systems and optional standby systems. This change is well overdue and has no impact on safety. It simply provides further flexibility in the installation and use of generator feeder tapconductors. No different than what is presently allowed for the installation of other tap conductors from separatelyderived systems!

The proposal fails to recognize the possibility of short circuits or ground faults between the source ofsupply and the first overcurrent protective device with the conductors having to carry the full current of the generator.Generators and transformers, using the same grounding electrode and bonding conductor sizing and installation rules,is really not the issue here since the size of the conductors from the generator source to the first overcurrent protectivedevice must be large enough to carry the nameplate current of the generator, even in a short circuit (does not involvegrounding or bonding issues since the fault may be between two phase conductors). There was no technicalsubstantiation provided to permit the use of the requirements in 240.21(C) for conductors from the generator to the firstovercurrent protective device.




Revise last sentence: Neutral conductors of dc generators that must carry ground-fault currentsshall not be smaller than the minimum size of have an ampacity not less than the largest conductor.

Ampacity should be the criterion; equal sizes of conductors of different material and insulation do nothave the same ampacity.

Conductors are rated in ampacity and sized based on this rating. The existing text using the words“not smaller than the minimum size” is technically correct. In addition, the submitter has proposed revising from "notsmaller than the minimum size" to "not smaller than the maximum size", with no technical substantiation for the change.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-16 Log #3002 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Ryan Jackson, West Valley City, UT

Revise text to read as follows:445.13 Ampacity of Conductors.The ampacity of the conductors from the generator terminals to the first distribution device(s) containing overcurrent

protection device shall not be less than 115 percent of the nameplate current rating of the generator. It shall bepermitted to size the neutral conductors in accordance with 220.61. Conductors that must carry ground-fault currentsshall not be smaller than required by 250.30(A). Neutral conductors of dc generators that must carry ground-faultcurrents shall not be smaller than the minimum required size of the largest conductor.Exception: Where the design and operation of the generator prevent overloading, the ampacity of the conductors shall

not be less than 100 percent of the nameplate current rating of the generator.The term “distribution device containing overcurrent protection” is the root of many debates. It can

easily be argued that this means the conductors from the generator to the first panelboard must be rated 115%,although this would not make any sense. This proposal helps clarify that the conductors in the generator to the breakerin the generator must be 115%.

The existing text is clear that the size of conductors from the source at the generator to the firstovercurrent protective device at the point of distribution, on the generator as mentioned in the substantiation, within aswitchboard, or within a panelboard, must be 115 percent of the rating of the generator. If a short circuit occurs beforethe overcurrent protective device at that point of distribution, the source conductors must be able to carry the full ratingof the generator, hence the sizing at 115 percent.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-17 Log #1012 NEC-P13


Revise text as follows:Live parts of generators operated at more than 50 volts to ground shall not be exposed to accidental contact where

accessible to unqualified persons.Depending on conditions, 50 volts or less may not always be safe re: electric shock, arcing, and fire

ignition.

The submitter has provided no technical substantiation to support deleting the more than 50-voltrequirement.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________

Kurt Eckroth, Waukesha County Technical CollegeProposal 13-11 should be rejected.

702.6 requires the use of a transfer switch to connect a portable generator to premises wiring. Theproposed addition to Article 445 would require GFCI protection on all outlets of all portable generators. Unfortunately,GFCI protected generators are incompatible with currently available transfer switch technology. If the proposed additionto Article 445 is approved, users may be encouraged, if not forced, to connect their new GFCI protected generator totheir premises wiring by ungrounded backfeeding. Backfeeding is a notoriously dangerous practice, and the reason forthe NEC transfer switch requirement in the first place. It is illogical to institute a change to Article 445 thatforces/encourages users to violate Article 702. Therefore, the proposal should be rejected.

523.23(C) prohibits GFCI protection of egress lighting at carnivals, circuses, fairs and similar events. These eventsare commonly powered by portable generators. The proposed addition to Article 445, which would require GFCIprotection on all outlets of all portable generators, would be in direct conflict with 523.23(C). It is illogical to institute achange to Article 445 that requires users to violate Article 523. Therefore, the proposal should be rejected.The exception to 590.6(A) exempts GFCI protection of circuits in temporary installations where a greater hazard sold

be created if power were interrupted. The proposed addition to Article 445, which would require GFCI protection on alloutlets of all portable generators, would be in direct conflict with 590.6(A). It is illogical to institute a change to Article445 that requires users to create safety hazards anticipated by Article 590. Therefore, the proposal should be rejected.The proposed addition to Article 445 would require GFCI protection on all outlets of all portable generators. The GFCI

protection would only function if the portable generator was properly grounded to a properly installed grounding rod. It iscommon knowledge that a significant percentage of users of portable generators do not ground the generator. It isillogical to require the addition of a "safety" device to a portable generator that, in many instances, will not function, butonly provide the user with the illusion of safety and a false sense of security. Therefore, the proposal should berejected.

Ground-fault circuit-interrupter protection on generators is not incompatible with available transferswitches technology. A generator connected to a 2-pole transfer switch for a 120/240-volt single-phase groundedservice will trip the GFCI protection on the generator. However, a 3-pole transfer switch (switching both phases and theneutral as a separately derived system) will provide proper isolation of the GFCI and permit the GFCI device on thegenerator to operate properly.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________Mark C. Ode, Underwriters Laboratories Inc.

Add new text to read as follows:All

125-volt, single-phase, 15- 20-, and 30-ampere receptacle outlets, that are a part of a 15 kW or smaller, portablegenerator, shall have ground-fault circuit interrupter protection for personnel integral to the generator or receptacle.

Small portable generators, sized at 15 kW or smaller, are used for many different purposes, such aspower on camping trips; on construction sites for temporary power for electrical equipment, such as table saws,pressure washers, and hand-held tools as well as lighting and similar purposes; for temporary connection of electricalcircuits in a home or for small commercial buildings; and for power during emergency situations for all different types ofinstallations due to natural disasters. In all of these applications, there are many potential hazards associated with thesetemporary installations, such as cut and abraded wire and cable, standing water and wet locations, and similarhazardous applications.During power outages from storms and other natural disasters, persons who may not be familiar with adequate safety

procedures often use these generators to supply power in less than optimal conditions. Requiring all 125-volt, singlephase, 15-, 20-, and 30-ampere on 15 kW or smaller generators to be integrally GFCI protected will help eliminate thepossibilities of shock hazards from damaged circuits, damaged equipment, or use of equipment in wet locations.This new section will ensure that portable generators will have adequate personnel protection for these receptacles

wherever these generators are used. By limiting GFCI protection to only 15-, 20-, and 30-ampere, single phase, 120volt circuits, these small generators can still be used for supplying standby power for non-GFCI protected 20-ampere,30-ampere, and larger 120/240 single phase, 3-wire with ground as well as 3-phase circuits of all sizes for houses andsmall commercial buildings. Providing the proper transfer switch or transfer method with the proper compliance with therequirements in Article 250 for separately derived systems or non-separately derived systems is incumbent upon theinstaller of the system.This proposal was developed by a Task Group composed of Task Group Chairman Paul Casparro and Chair of Panel

3 (NJATC); Jim Wiseman at Square D Schneider-Electric and Panel 15 (NEMA); John R. Kovacik with UnderwritersLaboratories, Panels 10, 13 and the NEC TCC (UL); Richard Owen with City of St Paul, Minnesota, Panel 3, and theNEC TCC (IAEI); and Mark C. Ode with Underwriters Laboratories, Panels 3, 13, and the NEC TCC (UL).

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-20 Log #4230 NEC-P13














_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-22 Log #4232 NEC-P13





(acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction). Authorities must have a basis for that approval and while listing is thepreferred basis for approval, listing is not available or has not been provided for some equipment. While someequipment historically has not been listed, a basis for approval of this equipment is needed. The proposed text allows forthree options as the basis for equipment approval. Item 1 recognizes listed equipment, the preferred method of manyenforcement departments as a basis for approval. Item 2 recognizes field evaluations by testing labs or other locallyapproved agencies concerned with product evaluation of unlisted equipment. While very few enforcement agencieshave internal equipment evaluation departments, this option would recognize evaluations by those departments as anacceptable basis for approval. This item would also allow certification of manufactured homes, RV's, and manufacturedbuildings that are typically evaluated by state agencies that evaluate those facilities to a combination of standardsincluding the HUD Standards. Local inspectors generally do not have access to product standards, test equipment,required training, nor time for evaluation of equipment construction and internal wiring. The proposed text requires anoutside party to provide the equipment evaluation.









_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-25 Log #1010 NEC-P13


Change "power" to "circuits supplying".Edit. A power interruption in itself will disconnect the power. Intent appears to require disconnecting

means of circuit conductors.

The proposed text would only require disconnection of multiple circuits. The phase converter maysupply a single circuit to a single piece of equipment.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________Stephen McCluer, APC by Schneider Electric

Revise text to read as follows:Storage Batteries Stationary Batteries.

The focus of Article 480 should be on stationary battery systems that might be viewed as part of thepremises wiring. The Standards Correlating Committee is requested to consider change to the title and scope of Article480.Per the IEEE Stationary Battery Committee/ Glossary WG:“Storage battery” is another name for a “secondary battery,” which is the preferred term.A is “an electrochemical cell that is capable of being discharged and then recharged.”A is “a battery designed for service in a permanent location.”Stationary batteries are, almost without exception, secondary (or storage) batteries, but not all secondary batteries are

stationary.Secondary batteries can be portable (e.g., AAA) or stationary.See proposals on 480.1 (scope) and 480.2: (storage battery definition.)The IEEE Stationary Battery Committee/Codes Working Group is made up of members who are battery manufacturers,

battery integrators, battery users, utilities, battery service organizations, battery testing companies, and consultingengineering firms. Current members at the time of this proposal include: Samuel Aguirre / FAA; Phyllis Archer / C&DTechnologies ; Curtis Ashton / Qwest Communications; Gary Balash / East Penn Mfg ; Tim Bolgeo / SouthernCompany ; Allen Byrne / Interstate Batteries ; Thomas Carpenter / Arnold AFB ; Richard Hassick / Dekka; DanLambert / Schneider Electric; Daniel Levin / New York Port Authority; Ronald Marts / Telcordia; Dan McMenamin /consultant; Stephen McCluer / APC; Russell Miller / Douglas Battery; John Polenz / Emerson Electric; Chris Searles /BAE Batteries.

The scope of the article specifies that the article applies to stationary installations of storagebatteries. The key is the stationary installation, not a stationary battery or a secondary battery as alluded to in thesubstantiation. The article title of storage battery is correct.The panel understands that article titles and scope statements are under the jurisdiction of the Technical CorrelatingCommittee and any action to revise an article title or scope statement by this panel is only advisory. Additionally, theterm "storage battery" is used in NFPA 111,

and acceptance of this recommendation creates a correlation problem between the NEC and that standard.CMP-13 requests the TCC to work with IEEE in developing a joint NEC/IEEE task group to work toward harmonizationbetween terminology used in the NEC Article 480 requirements and the terminology used in IEEE standards.




Revise text to read as follows:The provisions of this article shall apply to all stationary installations of storage batteries rechargeable

batteries intended for service in a permanent location.480.1(A) Covered:(1) Rechargeable batteries or cells rated over 20 Ampere-hours or 50 volts nominal.480.1(B) Not covered:(1) portable batteries(2) primary (non-rechargeable)batteries(3) starting batteries(4) motive (fork lift) batteries.

This proposal clarifies that Article 480 covers rechargeable batteries above a certain size. It shouldnot cover primary batteries or small secondary batteries such as those in small, plug-in electronic systems (e.g.,personal computers or desktop UPS systems), even though they be intended to stay in one place once installed.The IEEE Stationary Battery Committee/Codes Working Group is made up of members who are battery manufacturers,

battery integrators, battery users, battery service organizations, battery testing companies, and consulting engineeringfirms.

The existing scope is more definitive than the suggested change to “rechargeable batteriesintended for service in a permanent location.” The phrase “intended for service” in the NEC denotes utility suppliedpower and may cause confusion for the user of the NEC. While there is no argument that small batteries in a personalcomputer or a desktop UPS system are not covered in Article 480, there was no technical substantiation to justify theampere-hour size or voltage change in the proposal. Referencing portable batteries, non-rechargeable batteries, startingbatteries, and forklift batteries in Article 480 is unnecessary because this article only applies to stationary installations ofstorage batteries. Storage batteries are defined as a battery comprised of one or more rechargeable cells of thelead-acid, nickel-cadmium, or other rechargeable electrochemical types, not internal to equipment.This Panel would appreciate it if the IEEE Stationary Battery Committee/Code Working Group would provide technicaldata for the suggested changes. The NEC cannot be changed without sufficient technical substantiation. Anyrecommendations to revise the scope are first submitted to the responsible code-making panel whose action is subjectto the approval of the NEC TCC.




Add new text to read as follows:– A system that consists of these interconnected subsystems:

- stationary batteries;- battery chargers- a collection of inverters, converters, and associated electrical equipment as required for a particular application.

The term “battery system” is used in several places within Article 480, yet it has not been defined.The proposed definition is derived from NFPA-1 Paragraph 3.3.22, except that it is suitable for all types of batteriesincluding (but not limited to) lead-acid batteries.The IEEE Stationary Battery Committee/Codes Working Group is made up of members who are battery manufacturers,

battery integrators, battery users, utilities, battery service organizations, battery testing companies, and consultingengineering firms.

Revise text to read as follows:Battery System. Interconnected battery subsystems consisting of storage batteries, battery chargers, inverters,

converters, and associated electrical equipment.Based on the NEC Style Manual, a definition cannot use mandatory phrases (“as required for a

particular application”) and cannot use the definition as part of the definitive portion (“a system”).

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-29 Log #374 NEC-P13


Revise Nominal Battery Voltage as shown:“The voltage calculated on the basis of 2 volts for each per cell for the lead-acid type and 1.2 volts for each per cell for

the alkali type.This revision will comply with the recommendations in the NEC Style Manual and the Manual of Style

for NFPA Technical Committee Documents and provide consistency throughout the Code. “Per” is not an appropriateterm for a standard.




Revise text to read as follows:- The voltage calculated on the basis of 2 volts per cell for the lead-acid type and 1.2 volts

per cell for the alkali type.value assigned to a cell or a battery (as opposed to its actual voltage at any given moment) forthe purpose of conveniently designating its voltage as appropriate to its electrochemistryFPN: The most common nominal cell voltages are; 2 volts per cell for the lead-acid systems, 1.2 volts per cell for

alkali systems, and 4 volts per cell for Li-ion systems.This proposal changes the NEC definition to be consistent with IEEE preferred definition. It clarifies

that “nominal voltage” can be applied to either a cell or a complete battery. For example, a nominal 48-volt lead-acid“battery” would be made up of 24 nominal 2-volt “cells.” This proposal moves product-specific examples to a Fine PrintNote (FPN).The IEEE Stationary Battery Committee/Codes Working Group is made up of members who are battery manufacturers,


Revise the existing definition in 480.2 to read:Nominal Battery Voltage. The voltage calculated on the basis of 2 volts for each cell for the lead-acid type, 1.2 volts for

each cell for the alkali type, and 4 volts for each cell for lithium-ion type.

The panel accepts only the inclusion of the information on lithium ion batteries in the existingdefinition and rejects the remainder of the recommendation. The existing definition provides the user of the NEC withvoltage specific levels for the battery types covered in Article 480.




Revise text to read as follows:. A sealed cell or battery is one: One that has no provision for the routine addition of water or

electrolyte or for external measurement of electrolyte specific gravity. The individual cells shall be permitted to contain aventing arrangement as described in 480.10(B).

A “battery” is made up of multiple “cells.” The provisions for pressure relief valves apply only to thecells, not to the entire battery. The proper term for such cells is “valve-regulated.”The word “routine” is added because some recovery activities do provide a way to re-hydrate a dried out VRLA cell,

even though such practice was not intended in the original design.This proposed definition is consistent with the IEEE stationary battery committee definition -

A cell that is designed not to allow release of gas to the atmosphere during normal operation. “Valve-regulated cells, as the name implies, are technically not “sealed.” Although valve regulated cells “function” as

sealed cells under normal operation, they are designed with a safety mechanism to permit release of gas under excessinternal pressure.See related proposal: 480.10(B)The IEEE Stationary Battery Committee/Codes Working Group is made up of members who are battery manufacturers,


Revise the existing definition to read:Sealed Cell or Sealed Battery. A cell or battery that has no provision for the addition of water or electrolyte or for

external measurement of electrolyte specific gravity and may contain pressure relief venting.The deletion of the phrase “A sealed cell or battery is” was accepted to comply with the NEC Style

Manual to not repeat the defined words in the text of the definition. “Sealed” was added to the title and to the text toindicate the definition applies to both sealed cells and sealed batteries. The “shall be permitted to” was eliminated, aswell as the reference to 480.10(B), and “may” was added to conform to the NEC Style Manual to not contain mandatorytext in a definition.




Revise text to read as follows:A secondary battery designed for service in a permanent location, and comprised of one

or more rechargeable cells. of the lead-acid, nickel-cadmium, or other rechargeable electrochemical types. Individualcells may be contained in either single-cell or multi-cell containers.

See proposal on paragraph 480.“Secondary battery,” is the preferred term over “Storage battery,” which is often used interchangeably but incorrectly.Per the IEEE Stationary Battery Committee/ Glossary WG:

An electrochemical cell that is capable of being discharged and then recharged.”A “ ” is:“A battery designed for service in a permanent location.” Stationary batteries are, almost without exception, secondary

batteries.Secondary batteries can be portable (e.g., AAA) or stationary. The focus of Article 480 is on stationary battery systemsthat might be viewed as part of the premises wiring.The IEEE Stationary Battery Committee/Codes Working Group is made up of members who are battery manufacturers,


The proposed definition uses the phrase “secondary battery” that is not defined but “storagebattery” is a more common phrase than "secondary battery". The scope of the article already states that storagebatteries are for stationary installations so adding "permanent location" into the definition is unnecessary. “Designed forservice” is a misapplication in the NEC since the word “service” denotes utility company power. The phrase “individualcell” can only denote a single cell, not multi-cells. This panel would appreciate it if the IEEI Stationary BatteryCommittee/Code Working Group would provide technical data for the suggested changes. The NEC cannot be changedwithout sufficient technical substantiation.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-33 Log #4896 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Leo F. Martin, Jr., Martin Electrical & Technical Training Services

Add a fine print note as follows:FPN: See 240.21(H) for information on the location of the overcurrent device for battery conductors.

To reference other code section containing information on battery conductor overcurrent protection.

Move the recommended fine print note to Section 480.5.This information is more appropriately located as a fine print note to Section 480.5.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________James E. Brunssen, Telecordia Technologies Inc. / Rep. Alliance for Telecommunications Industries

Solutions (ATIS)Delete entire section 480.5 as follows:

A disconnecting means shall be provided for all ungrounded conductors derived from astationary battery system over 30 volts. A disconnecting means shall be readily accessible and located within sight ofthe battery system.

Section 480.5 should be deleted for the following reasons:(1) The assignment of the 30 volt threshold, above which a disconnect for stationary batteries is required, is

arbitrary and is in conflict with requirements elsewhere in the NEC. For example, Article 690,, Sections 690.71(E) and (F) require a “disconnecting means” for battery circuits of more than 48 volts, nominal.

Hence, there is a correlation issue between 690.71(E) and (F), and 480.5. Section 480.4, the directly precedingsection, cites 50 volts at which an action must be taken.(1) Section 480.5 will serve to confuse the reader or AHJ regarding the term “disconnecting means”. Article 100

defines “Disconnecting Means” as “A device, or group of devices, or other means by which the conductors of a circuitcan be disconnected from their source of supply”. Clearly the definition implies a switch or similar device. Stationarybatteries are typically connected via bolted connections; switches introduce reliability concerns.(2) The concern for isolation of a stationary battery for shock hazard is flawed as 480.5 addresses only “all

ungrounded conductors”. This would not protect a technician from electrical shock hazard or from hazards associatedwith a ground fault while maintaining the battery system.(3) Concern over explosive gases is invalid. Battery rooms are vented and exhausted to prevent the accumulation

of explosive gas. Further, if explosive gas is a concern, a disconnect would not necessarily prevent accidental arcing orsparking during battery maintenance.(4) Section 480.5 makes no mention of the energy level of the battery, i.e. the ampere-hour rating. Any “hazard” is

directly proportional to the stored (potential) energy within the battery.

The submitter has provided no technical substantiation for deleting the disconnecting meansrequirement in 480.5. The voltage difference between 480.5 and the requirements in 690.71(E) and (F) is permittedbased on 90.3 where Chapter 6 can modify or supplement the requirements in Chapters 1 through 4. Section 480.5does not mention hazardous locations; however, lead-acid batteries can generate hydrogen, and without properventilation based on 480.9(A) the battery area could be a classified location. The panel action on Proposal 13-28 meetsthe intent of the recommendation with respect to the second paragraph of the submitter's substantiation. The newdefinition of “battery system” will clarify that the required disconnecting means is for the “battery system” conductors andnot for individual cells or batteries.





This section shall apply to stationary battery containers storage batteries having cells connected so as to operate at anominal battery voltage of not over 250 volts.( Cells and multicomparment batteries (and single containers with more than one cell)

with their covers sealed to containers of nonconductive heat-resistant material shall not require additional insulatingsupport.

Cells with covers sealed to jars of nonconductive, heat-resistant material shallrequire no additional insulation support. Cells in jars containers of conductive material shall be installed in trays or onracks of nonconductive material with not more than 20 cells (24 volts, nominal) in the series circuit in any one tray.

Rubber Jars. Cells in rubber or composition containers shall require no additional insulating support where the totalnominal voltage of all cells in series does not exceed 150 volts. Where the total voltage exceeds 150 volts, batteriesshall be sectionalized into groups of 150 volts or less, and each group shall have the individual cells installed in trays oron racks.

Sealed Cells or Batteries. Sealed cells and multicompartment sealed batteries constructed of nonconductive,heat-resistant material shall not require additional insulating support. Batteries constructed of a conducting containershall have insulating support if a voltage is present between the container and ground.

The term “multicompartment batteries” is not a recognized term. A “battery” consists of multiple“cells”. A container can consist of one or more cells, and a battery usually consists of multiple containers. So byaddressing sealing of the cells, the proposal automatically addresses the entire battery.The term “heat-resistant” is deleted because battery materials are typically plastic that is not rated by heat resistance;

they are classified by their flammability and mechanical ratings.The term “heat-resistant” is deleted because battery materials are typically plastic and are classified by their

flammability and mechanical ratings.The term “jar” is a slang term. The preferred term is “container.”We are aware of no technology that permits cells to be installed in containers made of conductive material. However,

there are containers that are steel encased. We are not sure of the intent of this section, what problem it attempts tosolve, or how the existing language mitigates the problem. We request that the panel consider deleting the finalsentence. Cells in jars of conductive material shall be installed in trays of nonconductive material with not more than 20cells (24 volts, nominal) in the series circuit in any one tray.

Delete this requirement. Rubber or composition containers are no longer available.The requirements for insulation of cells & batteries of conductive material are already covered in 480.6 (A) & (B).

There are no known batteries manufactured with containers of conductive material.The IEEE Stationary Battery Committee/Codes Working Group is made up of members who are battery manufacturers,


The panel accepts the deletion of the term “multi-compartment” and replacing it with “multi-cell” to read as follows:(A) Vented Lead-Acid Batteries. Cells and multi-cell batteries with covers sealed to containers of nonconductive,

heat-resistant material shall not require additional insulating support.The panel rejects the remainder of the recommendation.

By deleting “not over 250 volts,” this section could apply to unlimited voltage cells. There was notechnical substantiation provided for deleting “not over 250 volts.” The existing text in 480.6(A) concerning“heat-resistant” battery containers is retained since the intent is to require the battery containers to be manufacturedfrom a material that will withstand a level of heat without distortion, warping, or leaking and does not allude toflammability rating. The term “jar” and “container” are interchangeable and the electrical industry is familiar with the term“jar” and these jars can be hard rubber or glass but also can be nickel-plated steel containers. The submitter has statedthat rubber or composition battery containers are not available but does not provide any information whether there areexisting rubber or composition systems still in use so deletion of the text must not be done until this issue can bedetermined from a study or a technical review.


Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 70The submitter stated that the reason for deleting 480.6(D) was that there are no known batteries manufactured withcontainers of conductive material but states in (B) of the substantiation that there are containers that are steel encased.These two statements are in conflict with each other so the text in 480.6(D) should not be deleted until the submitterprovides more technical substantiation. Deleting existing text in the NEC must be based on technical substantiation, notjust based on perception that something is not “available” anymore.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-36 Log #2857 NEC-P13


Delete the following text:

The provisions of 480.6 shall apply to storage batteries having the cells connected so as to operate at a nominalvoltage exceeding 250 volts, and, in addition, the provisions of this section shall also apply to such batteries. Cells shallbe installed in groups having a total nominal voltage of not over 250 volts. Insulation, which can be air, shall be providedbetween groups and shall have a minimum separation between live battery parts of opposite polarity of 50 mm (2 in.) forbattery voltages not exceeding 600 volts.

DELETE 480.7The intent of this requirement is not clear. There is no evidence that the separation or insulating material required by

this section creates any safety benefit.For example, let's say we have a nominal 480 volt battery consisting of (240) two-volt cells. The voltage or fault

potential between cells 125 and 126 will not change just because we have added a 2" separation. It only increases thecost and complexity of installation and introduces failure points. The voltage on all cells past the mid-point will still behigher than 250 volts. The voltage at the end of the string will still be 480 volts.The IEEE Stationary Battery Committee/Codes Working Group is made up of members who are battery manufacturers,


There was no technical substantiation provided for deleting this text. The substantiation states thesubmitter does not understand the intent of this requirement and that there is no safety benefit. This simple statement isnot a technical reason for deleting existing text.This Panel would appreciate it if the IEEI Stationary Battery Committee/Code Working Group would provide technicaldata for the suggested changes. The NEC cannot be changed without sufficient technical substantiation.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________Bobby J. Summerville, Metropolitan Atlanta Transit Consultants

Add:FPN: For large installations requiring ventilation see Article 500.5 Classification of Locations (B) Class I Locations (2)

Class I, Division 2 (2) in which ignitable concentrations of gases or vapors are normally prevented by positivemechanical ventilation and which might become hazardous through failure or abnormal operation of the ventilatingequipment, or

Article 500.5 (B)(2) is clear, but much misunderstanding is caused by a FPN to the NEC Handbookwhich states that ventilating battery rooms eliminates the need to classify these areas. I have provided articles for moreinformation.Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.

There was no technical substantiation provided by the proposal for the recommended fine printnote. With proper ventilation provided and/or a combustible gas detection system installed that would activate amechanical ventilation limiting the hydrogen level to no more than 25 percent of the lower flammable limit, a hazardous(classified) location can be avoided. There are also batteries available that can be installed that have self-containmentof gases and do not constitute a hazard of gas ignition.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-38 Log #2858 NEC-P13



. Provisions appropriate to the battery technology shall be made for sufficient diffusion and ventilation ofthe any gases from the battery to prevent the accumulation of an explosive mixture.<<NEW>>FPN: See IEEE / ASHRAE Std 1635,

Some battery technologies do not require ventilation greater than that required for human habitation.A new FPN references a new standard, created jointly by the Stationary Battery Committee of the Institute of Electrical

and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the American Society of Heating, Refrigeration, and Air-conditioning Engineers(ASHRAE), which provides guidelines for calculating gassing hazards on battery systems.

The IEEE Stationary Battery Committee/Codes Working Group is made up of members who are batterymanufacturers, battery integrators, battery users, battery service organizations, battery testing companies, andconsulting engineering firms.

The existing text already provides the requirement for ventilation to keep the accumulation ofgases to an appropriate level. The battery technology used in the installation would determine the amount of ventilationnecessary to keep the accumulation of gases to 25 percent of the lower flammable limit based on Article 500 of theNEC. The referenced standard is not available from IEEE, ASHRAE, or ANSI. If the standard is to be referenced in afine print note the panel needs verification that it can be obtained.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________Bobby J. Summerville, Metropolitan Atlanta Transit Consultants

Add:FPN: For large installations requiring ventilation see 500.5 Classification of Locations (B) Class I Locations (2) Class I,

Division 2 (2) in which ignitable concentrations of gases or vapors are normally prevented by positive mechanicalventilation and which might become hazardous through failure or abnormal operation of the ventilating equipment.

500.5(B)(2) is clear, but much misunderstanding is caused by a FPN to the NEC Handbook, 480.9Battery Locations (A) Ventilation, which states that ventilating battery rooms eliminates the need to classify these areas.Please refer to the articles I have provided for more information.Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-40 Log #1008 NEC-P13


Revise text as follows:Guarding of Live parts shall comply with 110.27 not be exposed where accessible to other than qualified persons.

This article applies to stationary installations which generally involve industrial or commercialoccupancies. Banks of batteries at 50 volts or less can provide substantial arcing current and shock hazard undercertain conditions.

The submitter has not provided technical substantiation to indicate there have been specific safetyrelated problems in systems under 50 volts. The recommendation is based on supposition and does not providedocumentation that the current requirement is inadequate.





Each vented cell shall be equipped with a flame arrester that is designed to prevent destruction ofthe cell due to ignition of gases within the cell by an external spark or flame under normal operating conditions.

Sealed cells shall comply with (B)(1) or (B)(2).(1) Sealed battery or cells shall be equipped with a pressure-release vent to prevent excessive accumulation of gas

pressure shall be permitted.(2) Sealed cells or batteries without pressure-release vents or the battery or cell shall be designed to prevent minimize

scatter of cell parts in event of a cell explosion.A “battery” is made up of multiple “cells.” The provisions for pressure relief valves apply only to

the cells, not to the entire battery. The proper term for such cells is “valve-regulated.”Cells that have no mechanism for release of gas are truly “sealed.” Explosions in sealed stationary batteries are

extremely rare, but let’s assume that such an event could occur (typically as a result of being consumed by fire,puncture, or a severe short circuit). Some stationary batteries, such as lithium-ion, might be (but typically are not)encased in an enclosure which could mitigate the consequences of an explosion, but cannot prevent the spread ofdebris altogether in all circumstances.

The IEEE Stationary Battery Committee/Codes Working Group is made up of members who are batterymanufacturers, battery integrators, battery users, utilities, battery service organizations, battery testing companies, andconsulting engineering firms.

The submitter has not provided sufficient technical substantiation to support a significant reductionin the level of safety provided by the current wording. The existing text in 480.10(B) requires a pressure-release vent forsealed batteries or sealed cells while the proposed text in (B)(1) makes it permissive, not mandatory. Where apressure-release vent is not installed, the sealed batteries or sealed cells must be designed to prevent the scatter of cellparts. This design would normally require an enclosure that would surround the sealed battery or sealed cell. Thiswould prevent scatter of parts, not just minimize the scatter. The recommended reorganization of 480.10(B) does notimprove the clarity of this section.








_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-46 Log #4213 NEC-P13







_______________________________________________________________________________________________


Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 70



James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.Revise the text of the TCC write-up in the A2007 ROP to read as follows.

Include NEC_L70_R.doc

The recommended text is based upon the TCC write-up in the A2007 ROP.Revisions are also per the NEMA Explanation of Negative Vote Comments printed in the NEC ROP.Revisions are also per R. Swayne's Explanation as follows:



Include NEC_L70_S.doc

The panel has looked at this proposed revision of Article 695 as a collective body of work anddetermined that there are too many correlation, style, and technical issues that cannot be resolved within the time frameof the ROP meeting. This proposal is similar in nature to Proposal 13-77 for the 2008 NEC, which also proved toocumbersome for the panel to act on and ensure proper technical correlation with NFPA 20. To that end, CMP-13 hasacted on Proposals 13-60a, 13-77a, and 13-95a to provide correlation between important sections of NFPA 20 andArticle 695. These actions are based on the recommended changes for the 2010 edition of NFPA 20 as accepted bythe NFPA 20 technical committee in their ROP and ROC actions.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________



Jim Pauley, Square D CompanyThis Proposal should remain Rejected.

The TCC was correct to return this proposal back to the panel. It has so many problems introduced bythe revision that the panel should not try to salvage any type of significant rewrite during the comment phase. The panelshould revisit the individual proposals for Article 695 and review each one based on its merit for inclusion in Article 695.The revision proposed by Proposal 13-77 is completely unacceptable for the NEC.




_______________________________________________________________________________________________



Barry F. O’Connell, Tyco Thermal ControlsContinue to Reject.

The material introduces new confusion to an Article that was already confusing, as pointed out in theNEMA negative comment.




_______________________________________________________________________________________________James S. Nasby, Skokie, IL

If the extracted text relating to power supplies cannot be made to agree with the 2007 Edition ofNFPA-20 it should be deleted, leaving only the text relating to Installation that is native to NFPA-70 (the NEC).

1) The Extant Article 695 extracted text is from the 2003 Edition of NFPA-20 which has beenextensively rewritten in the 2007 Edition.2) 90.9(C)(2), although related to Units of Measure requires that extracted text not be compromised.3) Since I don’t know the status of the work by the NFPA-20 – NEC task group on this topic, I’m submitting this Public

Proposal as a contingency proposal.4) The statement in the Scope that the text is extracted from NFPA 20-2007 is not correct. It’s still at the 2003

version.Note that I’m also submitting another Public Proposal to synchronize (update) the extracted text. This is an important

life safety issue. There is significant confusion in the field due to the substantial difference between the two documents.

The submitter has not provided specific text. This proposal does not meet the requirements of4.3.3(c) of the NFPA Regulations Governing Committee Projects.




Synchronize (update) the extract text from 2007 Edition of NFPA-20 Chapter 9 in accordance withCMP-13 Panel Meeting Action on my Public Comment # 13-103, Log, # 1037 of the A2007 Report on Comments.Revise text as shown below with updated NFPA-20 Reference clause numbering:

FPN: Rules that are followed by a reference in brackets contain text that has been extracted from NFPA 20-2007 3,. Only editorial changes were made to the extracted

text to make it consistent with this .

This article covers the installation of the following: (1) Electric power sources and interconnecting circuits (2) Switching and control equipment dedicated to fire pump drivers (3) Associated fire pump accessory equipment which includes wiring and overcurrent protection of other loads

connected to the power supply.This article does not cover the following:

(1) The performance, maintenance, and acceptance testing of the fire pump system, and the internal wiring of thecomponents of the system (2) Pressure maintenance (jockey or makeup) pumps FPN: See NFPA 20-2003 2007, for further

information.

Those control circuits either entering or leaving the fire pump controllerenclosure, which if broken, disconnected, or shorted will not prevent the controller from starting the fire pump from allother internal or external means and may cause the controller to start the pump under these conditions. [NFPA20:3.3.7.2]

The normal supply of electric power for the site that is expected to be constantlyproducing power. [NFPA 20:3.3.34]

A facility producing electric power on site as the alternate supply of electric power. Itdiffers from an on-site power production facility, in that it is not constantly producing power. [NFPA 20:3.3.35]

Electric motor-driven fire pumps shall have a reliable source of power. [NFPA 20:9.2.1] FPN: NFPA 20-2007, covers characteristics of

reliable of reliable sources. Also see the cross-reference in Annex J.Where reliable, and where capable of carrying indefinitely the sum of the locked-rotor current

of the fire pump motor(s) and the pressure maintenance pump motor(s) and the full-load current of the associated firepump accessory equipment when connected to this power supply, the power source for an electric motor-driven firepump shall be one or more of the following.

A fire pump shall be permitted to be supplied by a separate service, or from aconnection located ahead of and not within the same cabinet, enclosure, or vertical switchboard section as the servicedisconnecting means. The connection shall be located and arranged so as to minimize the possibility of damage by firefrom within the premises and from exposing hazards. A tap ahead of the service disconnecting means shall comply with230.82(5). The service equipment shall comply with the labeling requirements in 230.2 and the location requirements in230.72(B). [NFPA 20:9.2.2]

A fire pump shall be permitted to be supplied by an on-site power productionfacility. The source facility shall be located and protected to minimize the possibility of damage by fire. [NFPA 20:9.2.3]

A dedicated feeder shall be permitted where it is derived from a service connection asdescribed in 695.3(A)(1).

Where reliable power cannot be obtained from a source described in 695.3(A), power shall besupplied one of the following:

from a An approved combination of two or more of either of such sources the sourcesfrom 695.3(A).

An approved combination of one or more of the sources in 695.3(A) and an


Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 70on-site generator complying with 695.3(D). or from an approved combination of feeders constituting two or more powersources as covered in 695.3(B)(2), or from an approved combination of one or more of such power sources incombination with an on-site standby generator complying with 695.3(B)(1) and (B)(3).

Where the sources in 695.3(A) are not practicable and the installation ispart of a multibuilding campus style complex, feeder sources shall be permitted where approved by the authority havingjurisdiction and installed in accordance with (1) or (2).

Two feeders shall be permitted as more than one power source where such feeders areconnected to or derived from separate utility services. The connection(s), overcurrent protective device(s), anddisconnecting means for such feeders shall meet the requirements of 695.4(B).

A feeder shall be permitted as a normal source of power when an alternate sourceof power independent from the feeder is provided. The connection(s), overcurrent protective device(s), anddisconnecting means for such feeders shall meet the requirements of 695.4(B).

An on-site generator(s) used to comply with this section shall be of sufficient capacity to allownormal starting and running of the motor(s) driving the fire pump(s) while supplying all other simultaneously operatedload. Automatic shedding of one or more optional standby loads in order to comply with this capacity requirement shallbe permitted. A tap ahead of the on-site generator disconnecting means shall not be required. The requirements of430.113 shall not apply. [NFPA 20:9.6.1]

This section applies to multibuilding campus-style complexes with fire pumps at one or morebuildings. Where sources in 695.3(A) are not practicable, and with the approval of the authority having jurisdiction, twoor more feeder sources shall be permitted as one power source or as more than one power source where such feedersare connected to or derived from separate utility services. The connection(s), overcurrent protective device(s), anddisconnecting means for such feeders shall meet the requirements of 695.4(B). [NFPA 20:9.2.5.3]

The power sources shall be arranged so that a fire at one source will not cause an interruption at theother source. [NFPA 20:9.2.5.1]

An Where an on-site generator(s) is used to comply with this sectionas an alternate source of power. The following shall apply:

The generator shall have shall be of sufficient capacity to allow normal starting and running of themotor(s) driving the fire pump(s) while supplying all other simultaneously operated load. Automatic shedding of one ormore optional standby loads in order to comply with this capacity requirement shall be permitted. [NFPA 20:9.6.1.1]

A tap ahead of the on-site generator disconnecting means shall not be required. [NFPA 20:9.6.1.2] The requirements of 430.113 shall not apply.

Phase converters shall not be permitted to be used in the fire pump circuit. [NFPA 20:A.9.9.2]{Note that 695.3(D)(4) as 695.19 should be renumber as 695.19 (or 695.8, or 695.9 or 695.13. Phase Converters arenot related to gen-set alternate power. I've used 695.19 in the cross reference} [NFPA 20:A.9.9.2]

The power sources shall be arranged so that a fire at one source will not cause an interruption atthe other source. [NFPA 20:9.2.5.1]The normal source of power required in 695.4(A) and its routing shall be arranged in accordance with one of the

following:(1) Service connection dedicated to the fire pump installation.(2) On-site power production facility connection dedicated to the fire pump installation.(3) A dedicated feeder connection derived directly from the dedicated service to the fire pump installation.(4) As a feeder connection where all of the following conditions are met:a. The protected facility is part of a multi-building campus style arrangement.b. A back-up source of power is provided from a source independent of the normal source of power.c. It is impractical to supply the normal source of power through arrangement 695.3(E)(4)(a), 695.3(E)(4)(b),

695.3(C)(4)(c) or 695.3(E)(4)(e).d. The arrangement is acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction.e. The overcurrent protection device(s) in each disconnecting means shall be selectively coordinated with any other

supply side overcurrent protective device(s).(5) A dedicated transformer connection directly from the service meeting the requirements of Article 695.5. [NFPA

20:9.2.2]

Circuits that supply electric motor-driven fire pumps shall be supervised from inadvertent disconnection as covered in695.4(A) or 695.4(B). (A) Direct Connection. The supply conductors shall directly connect the power source to either a listed fire pump

controller or listed combination fire pump controller and power transfer switch. [NFPA 20:9.3.2.2.2]An electric motor driven fire pump shall be provided with a normal source of power as a


Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 70continually available source. [NFPA 20:9.2.1]

A single disconnecting means and associated overcurrent protective device(s) shall bepermitted to be installed between a remote power source and one of the following: (1) A listed fire pump controller (2) A listed fire pump power transfer switch (3) A listed combination fire pump controller and power transfer switch For systems installed under the provisions of 695.3(B)(2) only, such additional disconnecting means and associated

overcurrent protective device(s) shall be permitted as required to comply with other provisions of this . Overcurrentprotective devices between an on-site standby generator and a fire pump controller shall be selected and sizedaccording to 430.62 to provide short-circuit protection only. All disconnecting devices and overcurrent protective devicesthat are unique to the fire pump loads shall comply with 695.4(B)(1) and 695.4(B)(2). through (B)(5). [NFPA 20:9.2.3]

The overcurrent protective device(s) shall be selected or set to carry indefinitely thesum of the locked-rotor current of the fire pump motor(s) and the pressure maintenance pump motor(s) and the full-loadcurrent of the associated fire pump accessory equipment when connected to this power supply. The requirement tocarry the locked-rotor currents indefinitely shall not apply to conductors or devices other than overcurrent devices in thefire pump motor circuit(s). [NFPA 20:9.2.3.4]

Disconnecting Means. The disconnecting means shall comply with all the following:Be identified as suitable for use as service equipmentBe lockable in the closed positionNot be located within equipment that feeds loads other then the fire pumpBe located sufficiently remote from other building or other fire pump source disconnecting means such that

inadvertent contemporaneous operation would be unlikelyDisconnect Marking. The disconnecting means shall be marked "Fire Pump Disconnecting Means." The letters

shall be at least 25 mm (1 in.) in height, and they shall be visible without opening enclosure doors or covers.Controller Marking. A placard shall be placed adjacent o the fire pump controller, stating the location of this

disconnecting means and the location of the key (if the disconnecting means is locked).The disconnecting means shall be supervised in the closed position by one of the following

methods: (1) Central station, proprietary, or remote station signal device (2) Local signaling service that causes the sounding of an audible signal at a constantly attended point [NFPA

20:9.2.3.3](3) Locking the disconnecting means in the closed position (4) Sealing of disconnecting means and approved weekly recorded inspections when the disconnecting means are

located within fenced enclosures or in buildings under the control of the owner. [NFPA 20:9.3.2.2.3]For fire pump installations using the arrangement of 695.3(E)(4)(a), 695.3(E)(4)(b), 695.3(E)(4)(c),

695.3(E)(4)(e), for the normal source of power, no more than one disconnecting means and associated overcurrentprotection device shall be installed in the power supply to the fire pump controller. [NFPA 20:9.2.3]

Where the disconnecting means permitted by 695.4(C) is installed, the disconnectingmeans shall meet all of the following:(1) Identified as being suitable for use as service equipment.(2) Lockable in the closed position.(3) Located remote from other building disconnecting means.FPN: This is to avoid the inadvertent simultaneous operation of the building and fire pump disconnect switches.(4) Located remote from other fire pump source disconnecting means.FPN: This is to avoid the inadvertent simultaneous operation of the disconnect switches of other fire pumps.(5) Marked "Fire Pump Disconnecting Means" in letters that are no less than one inch (25 mm) in height and that can

be seen without opening enclosure doors or covers. [NFPA 20:9.2.3.1]Where the disconnecting means permitted by 695.4(C) is installed, a placard shall be placed adjacent to

the fire pump controller stating the location of this disconnection means and the location of any key needed to unlock thedisconnect.

Where the disconnecting means permitted by 695.4(C) is installed, the disconnect shall besupervised in the closed position by one of the following methods:(1) Central station, proprietary or remote station signal device(2) Local signaling service that will cause the sounding of an audible signal at a constantly attended location(3) Locking the disconnecting means in the closed position(4) Sealing of disconnecting means and approved weekly recorded inspections where the disconnecting means are

located within fenced enclosures or in buildings under the control of the owner. [NFPA 20:9.2.3.3]


Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 70Where the overcurrent protection permitted by 695.4(C) is installed, the overcurrent

protection device shall be selected or set to carry indefinitely the sum of the locked-rotor current of the fire pumpmotor(s) and the pressure maintenance pump motor(s) and the full-load current of the associated fire pump accessoryequipment. The next standard overcurrent device shall be used in accordance with 240.6. The requirement to carry thelocked-rotor currents indefinitely shall not apply to conductors or devices other than overcurrent devices in the fire pumpmotor circuit(s). [NFPA 20:9.2.3.4]

Where the service or system voltage is different from the utilization voltage of the fire pump motor, transformer(s)protected by disconnecting means and overcurrent protective devices shall be permitted to be installed between thesystem supply and the fire pump controller in accordance with 695.5(A) and (B), or (C). Only transformers covered in695.5(C) shall be permitted to supply loads not directly associated with the fire pump system.

Where a transformer supplies an electric motor-driven fire pump, it shall be rated at a minimum of 125percent of the sum of the fire pump motor(s) and pressure maintenance pump(s) motor loads, and 100 percent of theassociated fire pump accessory equipment supplied by the transformer.

The primary overcurrent protective device(s) shall be selected or set to carry indefinitelythe sum of the locked-rotor current of the fire pump motor(s) and the pressure maintenance pump motor(s) and thefull-load current of the associated fire pump accessory equipment when connected to this power supply. Secondaryovercurrent protection shall not be permitted. The requirement to carry the locked-rotor currents indefinitely shall notapply to conductors or devices other than overcurrent devices in the fire pump motor circuit(s).

Where a feeder source is provided in accordance with 695.3(B)(2), transformers supplying the firepump system shall be permitted to supply other loads. All other loads shall be calculated in accordance with Article220, including demand factors as applicable.

Transformers shall be rated at a minimum of 125 percent of the sum of the fire pump motor(s) and pressuremaintenance pump(s) motor loads, and 100 percent of the remaining load supplied by the transformer.

The transformer size, the feeder size, and the overcurrent protective device(s) shall becoordinated such that overcurrent protection is provided for the transformer in accordance with 450.3 and for the feederin accordance with 215.3, and such that the overcurrent protective device(s) is selected or set to carry indefinitely thesum of the locked-rotor current of the fire pump motor(s), the pressure maintenance pump motor(s), the full-load currentof the associated fire pump accessory equipment, and 100 percent of the remaining loads supplied by the transformer.The requirement to carry the locked-rotor currents indefinitely shall not apply to conductors or devices other thanovercurrent devices in the fire pump motor circuit(s).

Power circuits and wiring methods shall comply with the requirements in 695.6(A) through (H), and as permitted in230.90(A), Exception No. 4; 230.94, Exception No. 4; 230.95, Exception No. 2; 240.13; 230.208; 240.4(A); and 430.31.

Supply conductors shall be physically routed outside a building(s) and shall beinstalled as service entrance conductors in accordance with Article 230. Where supply conductors cannot be physicallyrouted outside buildings, they shall be permitted to be routed through buildings where installed in accordance with230.6(1) or 230.6(2). Where a fire pump is wired under the provisions of 695.3(B)(2), this requirement shall apply to allsupply conductors on the load side of the service disconnecting means that constitute the normal source of supply tothat fire pump.

Service conductors and conductors supplied by an on-sitepower production facility shall be physically routed outside a building(s) and shall be installed as service conductors inaccordance with 230.6, 230.9 and Part III and Part IV of Article 230. Where supply conductors cannot be physicallyrouted outside of buildings, they shall be permitted to be routed through the building(s) where installed in accordancewith 230.6(1) or 230.6(2).

Where a fire pump is wired under the provisions of 695.4(B)(4), allsupply conductors on the load side of the service disconnecting means that constitute the normal source of supply tothat fire pump shall be physically routed outside a building(s) and shall be installed as outside feeder conductors inaccordance with Article 225. Where the feeder conductors cannot be physically routed outside of buildings, they shall bepermitted to be routed through the building(s) where installed in accordance with 230.6(1) or 230.6(2).

(B) Fire pump supply conductors onthe load side of the final disconnecting means and overcurrent device(s) permitted by 695.4(B) or conductors thatconnect directly to an onsite generator shall comply with all the following:

Independent Routing. The conductors shall be kept entirely independent of all other wiring.


Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 70Associated Fire Pump Loads. The conductors They shall supply only loads that are directly associated with the fire

pump system.Protection From Potential Damage. The conductors and they shall be protected to resist potential damage by fire,

structural failure, or operational accident.Inside a Building. When routed through a building the conductors They shall be permitted installed to be routed

through a building(s) using one of the following methods: (1) Be encased in a minimum 50 mm (2 in.) of concrete (2) Be within an enclosed construction protected by a fire rated assembly listed to achieve a minimum fire rating of two

hours and dedicated to the fire pump circuit(s). and having a minimum of a 1 hour fire resistive rating(3) Be a listed electrical circuit protective system with a minimum 1 2-hour fire rating

FPN: UL guide information for electrical circuit protective systems (FHIT) contains information on proper installationrequirements to maintain the fire rating.

Conductors supplying a fire pump motor(s), pressure maintenancepumps, and associated fire pump accessory equipment shall have a rating not less than 125 percent of the sum of thefire pump motor(s) and pressure maintenance motor(s) full-load current(s), and 100 percent of the associated fire pumpaccessory equipment.

Conductors supplying only a fire pump motor shall have a minimum ampacity inaccordance with 430.22 and shall comply with the voltage drop requirements in 695.7

Power circuits shall not have automatic protection against overloads. Except forprotection of transformer primaries provided in 695.5(C)(2), Branch branch-circuit and feeder conductors shall beprotected against short circuit only. Where a tap is made to supply a fire pump, the wiring shall be treated as serviceconductors in accordance with 230.6. The applicable distance and size restrictions in 240.21 shall not apply.

All wiring from the controllers to the pump motors shall be in rigid metal conduit, intermediatemetal conduit, liquidtight flexible metal conduit, or liquidtight flexible nonmetallic conduit Type LFNC-B, listed Type MCcable with an impervious covering, or Type MI cable.

Where wire connectors are used in the fire pump circuit, the connectors shall be listed. A firepump controller or fire pump power transfer switch, where provided, shall not be used as a junction box to supply otherequipment, including a pressure maintenance (jockey) pump(s). A fire pump controller and fire pump power transferswitch, where provided, shall not serve any load other than the fire pump for which it is intended.

All wiring from engine controllers and batteries shall be protected against physicaldamage and shall be installed in accordance with the controller and engine manufacturer's instructions.

Ground fault protection of equipment shall not be permitted for firepumps.

Where the power source is supplied by on-site generator(s),the supply conductors shall connect to a generator disconnecting means dedicated for the purpose of serving the firepump. The disconnecting means shall be located in a separate enclosure from other generator disconnecting means.

The voltage at the controller line terminals shall not drop more than 15 percent below normal (controller-rated voltage)under motor starting conditions. The voltage at the motor terminals shall not drop more than 5 percent below the voltagerating of the motor when the motor is operating at 115 percent of the full-load current rating of the motor.

The voltage at the controller line terminals shall not drop more than 15 percent belownormal (controller-rated voltage) under motor starting conditions.

The requirements of 695.7(A) shall not apply to emergency- run mechanical starting.. The voltage at the motor terminals shall not drop more than 5 percent below the voltage

rating of the motor when the motor is operating at 115 percent of the full-load current rating of the motor. [NFPA 20:9.4]



Diesel engine fire pump controllers, electric fire pump controllers, electric motors, fire pump power transfer switches,foam pump controllers, and limited service controllers shall be listed for fire pump service. [NFPA 20:9.5.1.1, 10.1.2.1,12.1.3.1] . [NFPA 20:9.5.1.1, 10.1.2.1, 10.8.3.1, 12.1.3.1]

(A) Single Conductors. Where single conductors (individual conductors) are used, they shall be terminated in aseparate junction box in accordance with this Code. [NFPA 20:9.3.7.1]FPN This is to avoid violating the enclosure type rating, and/or the controller short-circuit (withstand) rating. See also

300.20 and Article 322. [NFPA 20:A.9.3.7.1](B) Single conductors (individual conductors) shall not enter the fire pump enclosure separately. [NFPA 20:9.3.7.2]C) Smoke Seal. Where required by the listing of the electrical circuit protective system, the raceway between a

junction box and the fire pump controller shall be sealed at the junction box end as required and per the instructions ofthe manufacturer or listing agency. [NFPA 20:9.3.7.2]FPN When so required, this seal is to prevent flammable gases from entering into the fire pump controller. [NFPA

20:A.9.3.7.2](D) Standard wiring between junction box and controller is acceptable. [NFPA 20:9.3.7.3]

Electric motor-driven fire pump controllers and power transfer switches shallbe located as close as practicable to, and within sight of, the motors that they control. [NFPA 20:10.2.1]

Engine-drive fire pump controllers shall be located as close as is practical to, and withinsight of, the engines that they control. [NFPA 20:12.2.1]

Storage batteries for fire pump engine drives shall be supported above the floor, securedagainst displacement, and located where they are not subject to physical damage, flooding with water, excessivetemperature, or excessive vibration. [NFPA 20:11.2.5.2.5]

All energized equipment parts shall be located at least 300 mm (12 in.) above the floorlevel. [NFPA 20:11.2.5.2.6]

Fire pump controllers and power transfer switches shall be located or protectedso that they are not damaged by water escaping from pumps or pump connections. [NFPA 20:10.2.2, 12.2.2]

All fire pump control equipment shall be mounted in a substantial manner on noncombustible supportingstructures. [NFPA 20:10.3.2, 12.3.2]

External control circuits that extend outside the fire pump room shall be arranged so thatfailure of any external circuit (open or short circuit) shall not prevent the operation of a pump(s) from all other internal orexternal means. Breakage, disconnecting, shorting of the wires, or loss of power to these circuits could causecontinuous running of the fire pump but shall not prevent the controller(s) from starting the fire pump(s) due to causesother than these external control circuits. All control conductors within the fire pump room that are not fault tolerant shallbe protected against physical damage. [NFPA 20:10.5.2.6, 12.5.2.5]

No undervoltage, phase-loss, frequency-sensitive, or other sensor(s) shall be installed thatautomatically or manually prohibit actuation of the motor contactor. [NFPA 20:10.4.5.6]

No remote device(s) shall be installed that will prevent automatic operation of the transferswitch. [NFPA 20:10.8.1.3]

All wiring between the controller and the diesel engine shall be stranded and sizedto continuously carry the charging or control currents as required by the controller manufacturer. Such wiring shall beprotected against physical damage. Controller manufacturer's specifications for distance and wire size shall be followed.[NFPA 20:12.3.5.1, 12.6.4.1]

All electric motor-driven fire pump control wiring shall be in rigidmetal conduit, intermediate metal conduit, liquidtight flexible metal conduit, liquidtight flexible nonmetallic conduit Type B(LFNC-B), listed Type MC cable with an impervious covering, or Type MI cable.

Control conductors installed between the fire pump power transfer switch andthe standby generator supplying the fire pump during normal power loss shall be kept entirely independent of all otherwiring. They shall be protected to resist potential damage by fire or structural failure. They shall be permitted to berouted through a building(s) encased in 50 mm (2 in.) of concrete or within enclosed construction dedicated to the firepump circuits and having a minimum 1-hour fire resistance rating, or circuit protective systems with a minimum of 1-hourfire resistance. The installation shall comply with any restrictions provided in the listing of the electrical circuit protectivesystem used. [NFPA 20:A.9.2.4(3)]


Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 70Except for an arrangement described in 695.15(C), at least one alternate source of power shall

be provided when the height of the structure is beyond the pumping capacity of the fire department apparatus or whenrequired by the AHJ. The alternate source shall, as a minimum, comply with the requirements of this section. [NFPA20:9.3.1]FPN: Local codes and/or AHJ often require alternate power for certain occupancies, such as high rise buildings,

places of assembly and etc. These alternate power sources are considered to be the Emergency Source of Power for amotor driven fire pump as opposed to the Normal Source of Power.

Except for an arrangement described in 695.15(C), at least one alternate source of power shallbe provided where the normal source is not reliable. [NFPA 20:9.3.2]FPN: See Alternate Power, Other Sources in NFPA-20,

, for specifics. [NFPA 20:A.9.3.2]An alternate source of power is not required where a back-up engine driven or back-up steam

turbine driven fire pump is installed in accordance with this standard. [NFPA 20:9.3.3]FPN: See NFPA-20 for requirements of engine driven or steam turbine fire pumps. In either case, operation of the

pump is intended to be independent of the source of electrical power.When provided, the alternate source of power shall be supplied from one of the following

sources:(1) A generator installed in accordance with 695.16.(2) One of the sources identified in 695.3(E)(4)(a), 695.3(E)(4)(b), 695.3(E)(4)(c) or 695.3(E)(4)(e) when the power is

provided independent of the normal source of power. [NFPA 20:9.3.4]When provided, the alternate supply shall be arranged so that the power to the fire pump is not

disrupted when overhead lines are de-energized for fire department operations. [NFPA 20:9.3.5]

(1) Where on-site generator systems are used to supply power to fire pump motors to meet the requirements of695.15(B), they shall be of sufficient capacity to allow normal starting and rung of the motor(s) driving the fire pump(s)while supplying all other simultaneously operated load(s) while meeting the requirements of 695.7 [NFPA 20:9.6.1](2) A tap ahead of the on-site generator disconnecting means shall not be required.

These power sources shall comply with 695.7 and shall meet the requirements of Level 1, Type 10 emergency powersystems. [NFPA 20:9.6.2.1]FPN: Type 10 systems are required to make emergency power available in 10 or less seconds. See NFPA-110

for definition of Level 1Emergency Power System. See NFPA-20for fuel capacity requirements. [NFPA 20:9.6.2.2]

Automatic sequencing of the fire pumps shall be permitted as a means of meeting the voltage droprequirements of 695.7. [NFPA 20:9.6.3]

Transfer of power to the fire pump controller between the normal supply and one alternatesupply shall take place within the pump room.

Where protective devices are installed in the on-site power source circuits at the generator,such devices shall allow instantaneous pickup of the full pump room load. [NFPA 20:9.6.4]FPN: This is to prevent any Generator Protective Devices from tripping when the fire pump load is transferred to the

generator. The generator will instantaneous pickup the full pump room load, including the starting any and all connectedfire pumps in the across-the-line (direct on line) full voltage staring mode. This is always the case when the fire pump(s)is running by use of the Emergency Mechanical Operator of the fire pump controller(s). (See NFPA-20 9.6 On-SiteStandby Generator Systems).

Where fire pump wiring to or from a fire pump controller is routed through a junction box, thefollowing requirements shall be met. [NFPA 20:9.3.6]

The junction box shall be securely mounted. [NFPA 20:9.3.6(1)]Mounting and installing of a junction box shall not violate the enclosure type

(NEMA) rating of the fire pump controller(s). [NFPA 20:9.3.6(2)]Mounting and installing of a junction box shall not violate the integrity of

the fire pump controller(s) and shall not affect theshort-circuit rating of the controller(s). [NFPA 20:9.3.6(3)]

As a minimum, a Type 2, dripproof enclosure (junction box) shall be used. The enclosure shall belisted for the subject to match the fire pump controller enclosure Type rating. [NFPA 20:9.3.6(4)]FPN See Article 430.91 Motor Controller Enclosure Types for further information. See UL-50,

, for requirements.


Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 70Terminals, junction blocks, splices, and the like, when used, shall be listed. [NFPA 20:9.3.6(5)]

Listed conduit hubs shall be used to terminate raceway (conduit) to the fire pump controller. [NFPA20:9.3.8.1]

The type rating of the conduit hub(s) shall be at least equal to that of the fire pump controller. [NFPA20:9.3.8.2]

The installation instructions of the manufacturer of the fire pump controller shall be followed. [NFPA20:9.3.8.3]

No alterations other than installation of raceway(s) and multiconductor cable(s) shall bemade to the fire pump controller. [NFPA 20:9.3.8.4]

1) The Extant Article 695 extracted text is from the 2003 Edition of NFPA-20 which has beenextensively rewritten in the 2007 Edition.2) Article (Clause) 90.9(C)(2), although related to Units of Measure requires that extracted text not be compromised.3) Since I don’t know the status of the work by the NFPA-20 – NEC task group on this topic, I’m submitting this Public

Proposal as a contingency proposal.4) The statement in the Scope that the test is extracted from NFPA 20-2007 is not correct. It’s still at the 2003

version.Note that I’m also submitting another Public Proposal to eliminate the extracted text if it can not, or will not, be made to

agree with that in NFPA-20 since the difference is causing field confusion. This is an important life safety issue.

The panel has looked at this proposed revision of Article 695 as a collective body of work anddetermined that there are too many correlation, style, and technical issues that cannot be resolved within the time frameof the ROP meeting. This proposal is similar in nature to Proposal 13-77 for the 2008 NEC, which also proved toocumbersome for the panel to act on and ensure proper technical correlation with NFPA 20. To that end, CMP-13 hasacted on Proposals 13-60a, 13-77a, and 13-95a to provide correlation between important sections of NFPA 20 andArticle 695. These actions are based on the recommended changes for the 2010 edition of NFPA 20 as accepted bythe NFPA 20 technical committee in their ROP and ROC actions.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-52 Log #4308 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________James S. Nasby, Columbia Engineering

If the extracted text relating to power supplies can not be made to agree with the 2007 Edition ofNFPA-20 it should be deleted, leaving only the text relating to Installation that is native to NFPA-70 (the NEC).

1) The Extant Article 695 extracted text is from the 2003 Edition of NFPA-20 which has beenextensively rewritten in the 2007 Edition.2) Article (Clause) 90.9(C)(2), although related to Units of Measure requires that extracted text not be compromised.3) Since I don’t know the status of the work by the NFPA-20 – NEC task group on this topic, I’m submitting this Public

Proposal as a contingency proposal.4) The statement in the Scope that the test is extracted from NFPA 20-2007 is not correct. It’s still at the 2003

version.Note that I’m also submitting another Public Proposal to synchronize (update) the extracted text. This is an important

life safety issue. There is significant confusion in the field due to the substantial difference between the two documents.

The submitter has not provided specific text. This proposal does not meet the requirements of4.3.3(c) of the NFPA Regulations Governing Committee Projects.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________James E. Degnan, Sparling


This article covers the installation of the following:(1) Electric power sources and interconnecting circuits.(2) Switching and control equipment dedicated to the fire pump drivers.(3) Pressure maintenance (jockey or makeup) pumps, when these pumps are connected to the same utility service

connection as the fire pump.. This article does not cover the following

(1) The performance …(retain text)…the system.(2) Pressure maintenance (jockey or makeup) pumps, when these pumps are not connected to the same utility service

connection as the fire pump.Section 695.1 (B) now states that Article 695 does not apply to the pressure maintenance pump. This

is appropriate because the pressure maintenance pump does not require the same level of integrity under variouscircumstances that is needed by the fire pump. However there is text throughout Article 695 covering the pressuremaintenance pump. This change clarifies when the text in 695 applies to the pressure maintenance pump. In effect, itleaves the choice of feeding the pressure maintenance pump from the same source as the fire pump up to the designengineer.

The choice of the power supply for the jockey pump remains with the designer, installer, orinspector. A jockey pump can be treated as any other motor, based on Article 430, and does not require the separationand continuity of power requirements based on Article 695 for the fire pump and other related critical loads.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________

James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.Suggested revision:

Replace (3) with "Wiring, Overcurrent Protection and other aspects of loads connected to the power supply orinterconnecting circuits."

Direction of the TCC to clarify panel action. Suggested wording.The intent is to indicate that there is proscriptive code regarding other connected loads, but, not the loads themselves.

Also note that most, but not all, fire pump systems have pressure maintenance (jockey) pumps which may or may notbe connected to the fire pump power supply.

The suggested text covering overcurrent protection is already adequately covered in the scope inexisting (A)(1) and (2) so the additional text is unnecessary. See the panel action and statement on Proposal 13-54.The panel understands that their actions on scope statements are advisory to the Technical Correlating Committee.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________

Joseph C. Warren, Joseph C. Warren Electrical Consulting ServicesRevise text to read as follows:

695.1 Scope.(A) Covered. This article covers the installation of the following:

(1) Electric power sources and interconnecting circuits.(2) Switching and control equipment dedicated to fire pump drivers.(3) Pressure maintenance (jockey or makeup) pumps.(4) Associated fire pump accessory equipment for alarms that signal an alarm for improper conditions that exist in a

fire pump.(B) Not Covered. This article does not cover the following:

(1) The performance, maintenance, and acceptance testing of the fire pump system, and the internal wiring of thecomponents of the system

(2) Pressure maintenance (jockey or makeup) pumps.We DO need to state that jockey or makeup pump motors are covered because they do exist in fire

pump installations. The present language, by not including them, is a very bad format even if we do go to Article 430 forjockey pumps. Accessory equipment also needs to be covered because the alarms that are part of the fire pumpinstallation indicate improper conditions in fire pump equipment if something occurs that is wrong. 695.5(A), (B), and(C)(2) tell us to include jockey and makeup pumps in load calculations.

The suggested text covering overcurrent protection is already adequately covered in the scope inexisting (A)(1) and (2) so the additional text is unnecessary. See the panel action and statement on Proposal 13-54.The panel understands that their actions on scope statements are advisory to the Technical Correlating Committee.Adding a new (4) covering associated fire pump accessory equipment for alarm is already covered in existing (2) forswitching and control equipment dedicated to fire pump drivers. The alarm equipment is part of the accessoryequipment for the fire pump controller.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________

James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.Suggest revision:

Replace (3) with "Wiring, Overcurrent Protection and other aspects of loads connected to the power supply orinterconnecting circuits."

Direction of the TCC to clarify panel action. Suggested wording.The intent is to indicate that there is proscriptive code regarding other connected loads, but, not the loads

themselves.Also note that most, but not all, fire pump systems have pressure maintenance (jockey) pumps which may or may not

be connected to the fire pump power supply.

The suggested text covering overcurrent protection is already adequately covered in the scope inexisting (A)(1) and (2) so the additional text is unnecessary. See the panel action and statement on Proposal 13-54.The panel understands that their actions on scope statements are advisory to the Technical Correlating Committee.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________

Technical Correlating Committee on National Electrical Code®,The Technical Correlating Committee advises that Article Scope statements are the responsibility of

the Technical Correlating Committee and the Technical Correlating Committee rejects the Panel Action until the PanelAction has been clarified regarding the deletion of (B)(2) and acceptance of the underlined (4).The Technical Correlating Committee directs the Panel to clarify the Panel Action relative to the addition of Item 4,

associated fire pump accessory equipment, since that equipment appears to be related to mechanical equipment ratherthan the electrical installation.This action will be considered by the panel as a public comment.

This is a direction from the National Electrical Code Technical Correlating Committee in accordancewith 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 of the Regulations Governing Committee Projects.

The suggested text covering overcurrent protection is already adequately covered in the scope inexisting (A)(1) and (2) so the additional text is unnecessary. See the panel action and statement on Proposal 13-54.The panel understands that their actions on scope statements are advisory to the Technical Correlating Committee.The committee notes that this is a recommendation from the Technical Correlating Committee.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-58 Log #1411 NEC-P13


Change "may" to "can".Edit. "May" is subjective and a term to be avoided per the Style Manual. "Can" is more readily

determined.

The submitter has not provided specific reasons that the term “may” is incorrect in the context it isused in 695.2. The NEC Style Manual does not prohibit the use of the term “may” provided it is not used to denote arequirement.





A facility producing electric power electricity on site as the alternate supply of electricemergency source of power. It differs from an on-site power production facility in that it is not constantly producingelectrical power.

The term "On-Site Standby Generator" is used in NFPA 20,, however the term "Standby" has unwanted linkage to Article 702.

The desired linkage is to Article 700, see Section 700.1, FN 3. In Section 700.12 the closest term is "emergencysource of power". This proposal provides a clearer link between Article 695 and Article 700, while retaining ties to theterms in NFPA 20.In NFPA 110, , the closest formal term is "Energy Converter", although

"generator" is also used. "Energy Converter" is not recommended due to the complexity of the definition.

The correct term is an “on-site standby generator.” The fact that the standby generator supplies anemergency system does not impact the name of the power source. The panel disagrees that there is confusion withArticle 702. The panel notes that this definition in the NEC correlates with Section 3.3.35 in the 2007 edition of NFPA20.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-60 Log #3956 NEC-P13



A facility producing electric power electricity on site as the alternatesupply of electric emergency source of power. It differs from an on-site power production facility in that it is notconstantly producing electrical power.695.3(B) Where reliable…(retain existing text)…in combination with anemergency on-site standby generator complying with 695.3(B)1) and (B)(3).Similarly: " emergency on-site standby generator" where it appears in the balance of Article 695.

The term "On-Site Standby Generator" is used in NFPA 20,, however the term "Standby" has unwanted linkage to Article 702.

The desired linkage is to Article 700, see Section 700.1, FN 3. In Section 700.12. The term "Emergency Generator"provides a clear link to Article 700. This moves away from NFPA 20. The term "On-Site" is superfluous when it comesto emergency generators.In NFPA 110, , the closest formal term is "Energy Converter", although

"generator" is also used. "Energy Converter" is not recommended due to the complexity of the definition.



Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 70_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-60a Log #CP1300 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Code-Making Panel 13,

Revise Section 695.3 to read:Electric motor-driven fire pumps shall have a reliable

source of power.Where reliable, and where capable of carrying indefinitely the sum of the locked-rotor current

of the fire pump motor(s) and the pressure maintenance pump motor(s) and the full-load current of the associated firepump accessory equipment when connected to this power supply, the power source for an electric motor driven firepump shall be one or more of the following.

A fire pump shall be permitted to be supplied by a separate service, or from aconnection located ahead of and not within the same cabinet, enclosure, or vertical switchboard section as the servicedisconnecting means. The connection shall be located and arranged so as to minimize the possibility of damage by firefrom within the premises and from exposing hazards. A tap ahead of the service disconnecting means shall comply with230.82(5). The service equipment shall comply with the labeling requirements in 230.2 and the location requirements in230.72(B). [20:9.2.2(1)]

. A fire pump shall be permitted to be supplied by an on-site power productionfacility. The source facility shall be located and protected to minimize the possibility of damage by fire. [20:9.2.2(3)]

A dedicated feeder shall be permitted where it is derived from a service connection asdescribed in 695.3(A)(1). [20:9.2.2(3)]

If reliable power cannot be obtained from a source described in 695.3(A), power shall besupplied by one of the following:[20:9.3.2]

An approved combination of two or more of the sources from 695.3(A).An approved combination of one or more of the sources in

695.3(A) and an on-site standby generator complying with 695.3(D).[20:9.3.4]If the sources in 695.3(A) are not practicable and the installation is part

of a multibuilding campus style complex, feeder sources shall be permitted if approved by the authority havingjurisdiction and installed in accordance with (C)(1) through (C)(3).

Two or more feeders shall be permitted as more than one power source if such feeders areconnected to or derived from separate utility services. The connection(s), overcurrent protective device(s), anddisconnecting means for such feeders shall meet the requirements of 695.4(B).

A feeder shall be permitted as a normal source of power if an alternate source ofpower independent from the feeder is provided. The connection(s), overcurrent protective device(s), and disconnectingmeans for such feeders shall meet the requirements of 695.4(B).

The overcurrent protection device(s) in each disconnecting means shall be selectivelycoordinated with any other supply side overcurrent protective device(s).

An on-site standby generator(s) used as an alternate source ofpower shall comply with (D)(1) through (D)(3):[20:9.6.2.1]

The generator shall have sufficient capacity to allow normal starting and running of the motor(s) drivingthe fire pump(s) while supplying all other simultaneously operated load(s). [20:9.6.1.1]Automatic shedding of one or more optional standby loads in order to comply with this capacity requirement shall bepermitted.

A tap ahead of the generator disconnecting means shall not be required. [NFPA 20:9.6.1.2]The requirements of 430.113 shall not apply.

All power supplies shall be located and arranged to protect against damage by fire from within thepremises and exposing hazards. [NFPA 20:9.1.4]Multiple power sources shall be arranged so that a fire at one source will not cause an interruption at the other source.

This revision incorporates the concepts contained in the public proposals on which the panel acceptedin whole, in part or in principle. The revision provides correlation and proper extract attribution between Article 695 andthe recommendation for Chapter 9 in the 2010 edition of NFPA 20 based on the ROP and ROC actions of the NFPA 20Technical Committee.



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Technical Correlating Committee on National Electrical Code®,The Technical Correlating Committee directs that the Panel clarify the Panel Action on this

Proposal. It was the action of the Technical Correlating Committee that further consideration be given to the commentsexpressed in the voting.This action will be considered by the Panel as a Public Comment.


Add the following text as a new first level subdivision at the end of 695.3. It is the intent of the panel that this be thelast first level subdivision that appears in Section 695.3.Phase Converters. Phase converters shall not be permitted to be used for fire pump service. [20:9.1.7]

The panel accepts the TCC direction to clarify their action. This action correlates with NFPA 20 toprohibit the use of phase converters for fire pump service. This requirement was accepted unanimously by the NFPA 20committee on Proposal 20-54 in the ROP for the 2010 edition of NFPA 20. No comments were submitted to supplement,modify, or reject the unanimous action of the NFPA 20 TC to prohibit the use of phase converters for fire pump service.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-62 Log #78 NEC-P13

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James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.Continue to Accept in Principle per CMP-13 Panel Action. Do not Reject the proposal.

This proposal does meet the requirements of Section 4-3.3 Regulations Governing CommitteeProjects since five pages of supporting material were on file with the NFPA as stated in the ROP. This material was partof the proposal material sent to CMP-13 members. This material is essentially identical with the text proposed inProposal 13-77.I don't know why the TCC changed the Panel vote from AIP to Reject. TCC doesn't state how 4.3.3 is violated.

The submitter has not provided text to be added after the scope of each article. This proposal doesnot meet the requirements of 4.3.3(c) of the NFPA Regulations Governing Committee Projects.



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Jim Pauley, Square D CompanyRevise 695.3 from the ROP Draft to read as follows:

Electric motor-driven fire pumps shall have a reliablesource of power.

Where reliable, and where capable of carrying indefinitely the sum of the locked-rotor currentof the fire pump motor(s) and the pressure maintenance pump motor(s) and the full-load current of the associated firepump accessory equipment when connected to this power supply, the power source for an electric motor driven firepump shall be one or more of the following.

A fire pump shall be permitted to be supplied by a separate service, or from aconnection located ahead of and not within the same cabinet, enclosure, or vertical switchboard section as the service


Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 70disconnecting means. The connection shall be located and arranged so as to minimize the possibility of damage by firefrom within the premises and from exposing hazards. A tap ahead of the service disconnecting means shall comply with230.82(5). The service equipment shall comply with the labeling requirements in 230.2 and the location requirements in230.72(B). [NFPA 20:9.2.2]

. A fire pump shall be permitted to be supplied by an on-site power productionfacility. The source facility shall be located and protected to minimize the possibility of damage by fire. [NFPA 20:9.2.3]

A dedicated feeder shall be permitted where it is derived from a service connection asdescribed in 695.3(A)(1).

Where reliable power cannot be obtained from a source described in 695.3(A), power shall besupplied one of the following:

from a An approved combination of two or more of either of such sources the sourcesfrom 695.3(A).

An approved combination of one or more of the sources in 695.3(A) and anon-site generator complying with 695.3(D). or from an approved combination of feeders constituting two or more powersources as covered in 695.3(B)(2), or from an approved combination of one or more of such power sources incombination with an on-site standby generator complying with 695.3(B)(1) and (B)(3).

Where the sources in 695.3(A) are not practicable and the installation ispart of a multibuilding campus style complex, feeder sources shall be permitted where approved by the authority havingjurisdiction and installed in accordance with (1) or (2).

Two feeders shall be permitted as more than one power source where such feeders areconnected to or derived from separate utility services. The connection(s), overcurrent protective device(s), anddisconnecting means for such feeders shall meet the requirements of 695.4(B).

A feeder shall be permitted as a normal source of power when an alternate sourceof power independent from the feeder is provided. The connection(s), overcurrent protective device(s), anddisconnecting means for such feeders shall meet the requirements of 695.4(B).

An on-site generator(s) used to comply with this section shall be of sufficient capacity to allownormal starting and running of the motor(s) driving the fire pump(s) while supplying all other simultaneously operatedload. Automatic shedding of one or more optional standby loads in order to comply with this capacity requirement shallbe permitted. A tap ahead of the on-site generator disconnecting means shall not be required. The requirements of430.113 shall not apply. [NFPA 20:9.6.1]

This section applies to multibuilding campus-style complexes with fire pumps at one or morebuildings. Where sources in 695.3(A) are not practicable, and with the approval of the authority having jurisdiction, twoor more feeder sources shall be permitted as one power source or as more than one power source where such feedersare connected to or derived from separate utility services. The connection(s), overcurrent protective device(s), anddisconnecting means for such feeders shall meet the requirements of 695.4(B). [NFPA 20:9.2.5.3]

The power sources shall be arranged so that a fire at one source will not cause an interruption at theother source. [NFPA 20:9.2.5.1]

An Where an on-site generator(s) is used to comply with this sectionas an alternate source of power. The following shall apply:

The generator shall have shall be of sufficient capacity to allow normal starting and running of themotor(s) driving the fire pump(s) while supplying all other simultaneously operated load. Automatic shedding of one ormore optional standby loads in order to comply with this capacity requirement shall be permitted.

A tap ahead of the on-site generator disconnecting means shall not be required.The requirements of 430.113 shall not apply.

The power sources shall be arranged so that a fire at one source will not cause an interruption atthe other source. [NFPA 20:9.2.5.1]

This comment is to revise the layout and arrangement of 695.3 to provide a more logical approach tothe power sources. The following list explains each of the revisions:1. 695.3(A)(1) and (2) are unchanged from the present text2. 695.3(A)(3) is new and intended to pick up the provision that recognizes a feeder derived from a service connection.

The reference to 695.3(A)(1) would recognize that the feeder may come from a dedicated service (but the serviceconductors don’t go directly to the FP controller) or from a tap ahead of the main. This is the same provision acceptedby the panel in Proposal 13-77 as 695.4(B)(3)3. 695.3(B) is rearranged to create a list of the two provisions dealing with combinations of sources. Item 1 captures

the combination of two of the sources recognized in 695.3(A). Item 2 captures the basic combination of a 695.3(A)source and an on-site generator. The provisions for the generator are moved to create a new 695.3(D), so thatreference is given here. These two provisions of this list are recognized in the current text of 695.3(B).


Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 704. 695.3(C) is a new section to cover the multi-building campus installations with more clarity. The intro paragraph

captures the three requirements in the present text that the sources in 695.3(A) are not practicable, that the AHJapprove the use of the feeder source and that you have a multi-building campus application. The paragraph then allowseither of two options to be used

a. Item (1) covers the application of two feeder sources. This provision is already allowed in the current 695.3(B) andrecognizes that you can utilize two feeders from separate utility services as more than one power source. The provisionthat any disconnects and overcurrent devices comply with 695.4(B) is captured.

b. Item (2) will recognize a feeder along with an alternate source. This provision was accepted by the panel inProposal 13-77 as section 695.4(B)(4). This addition will correct what has been a significant issue in Article 695 sincethe present article did not recognize a feeder and on-site generator as an acceptable combination. It should be notedthat the text maintains the panel accepted text (from Proposal 13-77) of “alternate power source independent of thefeeder” instead of referencing an on-site generator specifically.

c. It is also important to point out that the provision from Proposal 13-77 regarding selective coordination of theovercurrent devices is specifically omitted. This provision (regardless of whether it is in NFPA 20 or not) createssignificant technical concern. Keep in mind that the overcurrent devices in the fire pump feeder must be capable ofcarrying locked rotor current. So a 100A fire pump would have a 600A overcurrent device upstream. If for example, thiswere an 800A service, the next feeder device upstream (which may be shared with other parts of the system) may haveto be 1200A to gain pure selectivity. This could potentially require that the entire system be much larger than needed forthe installation, just to accomplish selective coordination. There is no technical basis for requiring that the fire pumpfeeder be selectively coordinated.5. The “Generator Capacity” section is moved from 695.3(B)(1) to become 695.3(D). This section is also editorially

rearranged to break the three requirements of the generator into three sections titled “Capacity”, “Connection” and“Adjacent Disconnects”.695.3(E) is the old 695.3(B)(3) regarding arrangement of the power sources. This placement will allow it to apply to the

multiple sources of both (B) and (C).

The panel action on panel proposal 13-60a meets the intent of the recommendation.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-64 Log #80 NEC-P13

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James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.Continue to Accept the Proposal to prohibit phase converters.

Phase converters are prohibited by NFPA-20. My substantiation is confusing; but, the NFPA-20Technical Committee via Action on Proposal 20-71 (Log #59) and on Comments 20-8 (Log #38) and 20-42 Log #37prohibits phase converters as unsuitable for fire pump service. One reason is imbalances that occur with varying loads.Another is adding another energy converter in the critical path. Another problem is keeping the controller energized atall times.This is consistent with Panel Action on Proposal 13-77 and also with my Comment suggesting revisions to 13-77.

The panel action on Proposal 13-61 meets the intent of the recommendation.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________

Technical Correlating Committee on National Electrical Code®,It was the action of the Technical Correlating Committee that this Proposal be reconsidered and

correlated with the Technical Correlating Committee action on Proposal 13-77. This action will be considered by thePanel as a Public Comment.


The panel affirms their actions on the subject proposal and comment from the 2008 NEC revision cycle.The panel accepts the recommendation of the TCC to review their action on Proposal 13-83 and

Comment 13-119 in the 2008 NEC ROP and ROC, and the panel continues to reject the proposal and comment.Section 695.1 contains a fine print note referencing NFPA 20, and it is unnecessary to create repetitive fine print notes.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-66 Log #82 NEC-P13

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James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.Continue to Accept in Principle Public Proposal 13-83.

At the risk of a small amount of redundancy, this reference back to NFPA-20 on characteristics of a"reliable power source" is vital and a source of daily confusion and conflicts. The intent is to aid plan approval andinspection agencies and other AHJs in resolving conflicts. Note that the submitter of Proposal 13-81, F. Hartwelll, isboth an AHJ and is also very familiar with fire pump installations; but, is seeking this additional guidance. This is alsoimportant since NFPA-70 has far wider distribution than NFPA-20. Hopefully, this reference will lead readers toNFPA-20 clause A.9.3.2 which has several paragraphs of guidance on this topic.

See the panel statement on Proposal 13-65.



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James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.Continue to Reject this proposal.

This is extract text from NFPA-20. The proposal should go to the NFPA-20 Technical Committee.Five methods are now allowed for supplying fire pump controllers. Included is the transformer connection which can beand is used at low voltage, medium voltage and high voltage.

This panel action is to reject the concept recommended in Proposal 13-84 in the 2008 NEC ROP.The panel continues to reject the intent of Proposal 13-84. The power supply for a fire pump is under the purview ofNFPA 20. A single feeder is not considered a reliable source of power.A single feeder supply from a site wide power distribution system must still have appropriate reliability and this reliabilityis not dependent upon an industrial facility or any other facility. The reliability is determined on the power source andhow often loss of power occurs.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-68 Log #84 NEC-P13

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James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.Continue to Reject this proposal.

This is extract text from NFPA-20. The proposal should go to the NFPA-20 Technical Committee.Five methods are now allowed for supplying fire pump controllers. Included is the transformer connection which can beand is used at low voltage, medium voltage and high voltage.The issue of deviation being justified by a redundant pump is proper matter for the AHJ and the specific installation.




_______________________________________________________________________________________________

Michael P. Walls, American Chemistry CouncilAdd text to read as follows:

695.3(A)(3) In industrial establishments only, where the conditions of maintenance and supervision ensure that onlyqualified persons service the installation, a fire pump controller shall be permitted to be supplied power by a singlefeeder from disconnect dedicated to the fire water pump in a site-wide power distribution system located sufficientlyremote from the facilities served as to minimize the possibility of damage to the fire pump service by fire from within thefacilities.

This comment modifies the original proposal to address comments concerning security, segregationand safety of the feeder to the fire pump controller during a fire. The intent of this change is to address the needs oflarge industrial concerns which purchase power at a high voltage where a second disconnect and transformer for a firepump service as required 695.3(A)(1) is impractical while still maintaining the ability of the fire fighters to quickly isolatepower to the facility on fire while retaining a power supply to the fire pumps. This proposal permits these large industrialconcerns to provide service to fire water pumps which is identical physically to that used by concerns which purchasepower at a medium voltage. This modified proposal adds the requirement that the service be separate from thedisconnect for power to the facilities and is sufficiently remote from the facilities to not be at risk of damage by the fire.Since power purchased at higher voltage is generally more reliable and the additional high voltage disconnect andtransformer are not required, this installation is actually more reliable than what is permitted.




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695.3 (A)(3) An alternative source of power to the electric fire pump motor is not required where a back-up engine orback-up steam turbine driven fire pump is installed. [NFPA 20:9.3.3]

The revised wording is a direct quote from NFPA 20 and addresses part of the intent of the originalproposal.

The requirements of Article 695 cover electrically driven fire pumps. Coordination between thepower supply performance requirements in Chapter 9 of NFPA 20 with the electrical installation requirements in Article695 has to occur during the design phase of the project. NFPA 20 contains several performance based requirements inaddition to the one that is being proposed. Approval of fire pump installations is typically not the sole responsibility ofthe electrical AHJ.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-71 Log #87 NEC-P13

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Patrick Gaffney, Ronk Electrical Industries, Inc.New text as proposed in Proposal 13-95 should be Accepted. "Reliable" sources are defined in

695.3(A). All other sources by definition, are not "reliable", and, therefore, require multiple sources. If no utility suppliedthree-phase source is available but a single-phase source is, a phase converter could be utilized as one of the"unreliable" multiple sources, either as back-up or primary to the generator source(s). Many rural or suburban areas donot have readily available three-phase sources of utility power available, and at least with a phase converter, they wouldhave a utility supplied source available. Also, the proposal limits their use, by stating "where the only source of utilitypower is a single-phase source,...".

Generators, unless considered an "on-site power production facility" [per 695.3(A)], are alsoconsidered "unreliable" by definition. If multiple sources are required, wouldn't a utility supplied source be preferable tomultiple generators? Maintenance of generator systems is not always as it should be, and even if it is, that is not alwaysa guarantee of proper performance. Phase converters at least give the option of using a utility supplied source as eithera back-up (or primary) source to a generator system. Phase converters have been utilized in many pumping systems,including fire pumps, for many decades with success, and are a recognized part of the code (Article 455).

See panel actions and statements on Proposals 13-61 and 13-64. NFPA 20 prohibits the use ofphase converters for fire pump service. This requirement is under the purview of the NFPA 20 technical committee andany action on this requirement has to be addressed to the committee.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________Harold F. Willman, Colorado Code Consulting

Revise text to read as follows:(1) Generator Capacity. An onsite generator(s) used to comply with this section shall be of sufficient capacity to

indefinitely carry the locked-rotor current of the fire pump motors(s) and the pressure maintenance pump motor(s) andthe full-load current of the associated fire pump accessory equipment allow normal starting and running of the motor(s)driving the fire pump(s) while supplying all other simultaneously operated load. Automatic shedding of one or moreoptional standby loads in order to comply with this capacity requirement shall be permitted. A tap ahead of the onsitegenerator disconnecting means shall not be required. The requirements of 430.113 shall not apply. [20:9.6.1]

The current text of 695.4(B)(1) requires the overcurrent protective device(s) to be the sum of thelocked-rotor current of the fire pump motor(s) and the pressure maintenance pump motor(s) and the full-load current ofthe associated fire pump accessory equipment. The generator cannot provide this amount of power if the capacity isonly normal starting and running of the motor(s) driving the fire pump(s). Why would the capacity of the generator not beat least equal to the overcurrent protective device requirements? When the generator also supplies other emergencyloads with separate transfer switches, the generator should not fail if the fire pump goes into a locked-rotor condition.

Section 9.6.1.1 of NFPA 20-2007 does not require a standby generator to carry locked rotor currentindefinitely.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-73 Log #2318 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Dale Rooney, Municipality of Anchorage

Add a second paragraph to read - Where an on-site standby generator also supplies anEmergency System, a legally Required Standby System or both the generator capacity shall not be less than 225% ofthe fire pump motor plus 100% the calculated loads of the required systems.

The present language, based on NFPA 20, is only intended to insure operation of the fire pump itselfand does not recognize the importance of protecting other systems. This prescriptive requirement will provide a marginof safety that will help protect required systems.

Requirements for standby generators supplying emergency and legally required standby systemsare addressed in Articles 700 and 701. The substantiation does not provide the technical basis for the recommendedsizing requirements.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________Thomas Guida, TJG Services, Inc.

Revise text to read as follows:An onsite generator(s) used to comply with this section shall be of sufficient capacity

to allow normal starting and running of the motor(s) driving the fire pump(s) while supplying all other simultaneouslyoperated load. Automatic shedding of one or more optional standby loads in order to comply with this capacityrequirement shall be permitted. A tap ahead of the onsite generator disconnecting means shall not be required. Therequirements of 430.113 shall not apply. [ 9.6.1]

695.4(A) requires a dedicated disconnect at the generator source, which implies a tap ahead of thegenerator disconnecting means is required.

The purpose of not requiring a tap ahead of the generator disconnecting means is so the generatorcomplies with the requirements in Section 445.18 for disconnecting the power from the generator for maintenancepurposes. A single disconnect can be installed in the generator and the feeder to the fire pump transfer switch can besupplied from the load side of the generator disconnecting means. See the panel action on Panel Proposal 13-77a.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-75 Log #4043 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Michael Kirchner, Generac Power Systems

Revise text to read as follows:(1) Generator Capacity. An on-site generator(s) used to comply with this section shall be of sufficient capacity to allow

normal starting and running of the motor(s) driving the fire pump(s) while supplying all other simultaneously operatedload. Automatic shedding of one or more optional standby loads in order to comply with this capacity requirement shallbe permitted. A tap ahead of the on-site generator disconnecting means shall not be required. The on-site generatorovercurrent protective device(s) for the electric-drive fire pump are not required to be sized for locked-rotor current of thefire pump motor(s). Rather, the circuit components of the alternative source are permitted to be sized according toArticle 430, provided they are selected or set to allow instantaneous pickup and running of the fire pump load. Therequirements of 430.113 shall not apply.

As a generator manufacturer, we see a significant amount of confusion on this section of code in themarket. We receive numerous requests for fire pump breakers on the generator that are mag-only or thermal magneticbreakers sized to carry locked rotor amps indefinitely. We believe that this confusion is caused by the various otherstatements in 695 seeming to call for this action. In particular, statements like "set to carry indefinitely the sum of lockedrotor current" (695.4(B)(1)) and "power circuits shall not have automatic protection against overloads...conductors shallbe protected against short circuit only" (695.6(D)) are driving the confusion about breaker(s) sizing from the generatorsource to the fire pump controller. In general, it is our opinion that the market is not understanding that the requirementsfrom the alternative generator source are significantly different than the utility source.We are particularly concerned that the market is often using mag-only breakers in fire pump applications. This

concerns us because mag-only breakers are only UL listed to be used in motor starters which utilize associatedovercurrent protection.To rectify this confusion, we are requesting that the text that has been in the NEC handbook since 1996 be moved into

the code to clarify the codes intent in relative to overcurrent devices from the alternative power source.

In the second to the last sentence in the second paragraph of Section 695.4(B), it is already stated:“Overcurrent protective devices between an on-site standby generator and a fire pump controller shall be selected andsized according to 430.62 (for motor feeder applications) to provide short circuit protection only," so adding therecommended text to 695.3(B)(1) is unnecessary.




Revise text of as follows:(1) An onsite generator(s) used to comply with this section shall be of sufficient capacity capable of allowing normal

starting and running of the motors...". (remainder unchanged).(3) The power sources shall be located arranged so that a localized fire or other occurrence at one source is not likely

to cause an interruption at the other source or the circuits supplied from it.Occurrences other than fire should be included. Locations cannot ensure that a fire at one source will

not spread to another location. "Likely" is a term used in many sections.

The existing text in (1) is the text from Section 9.6.1.1 in NFPA 20-2007 covering “sufficientcapacity” and is necessary for continuity between the two documents on this issue. The proposed changes to (3) arespecifically dealing with fire at a power source not affecting another source. There was no technical substantiationprovided to justify these changes.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________Jim Pauley, Square D Company/Schneider Electric

Replace the text of 695.3(B)(2) with the following:The normal power source to supply a fire pump installation shall be permitted to be a feeder in

accordance with a or b [20:9.2.2]:a. Dedicated Feeder. Where the feeder is dedicated to the fire pump and the feeder derived from a service that is

dedicated to the fire pump. b. Multi-Building Campus Style Arrangements. Where installed in accordance with all of thefollowing conditions:1. The protected building is part of a multi-building campus style arrangement.2. An additional power source is supplied that is independent of the normal power source3. It is impractical to supply the normal source of power through arrangement specified in 695.3(A)4. The arrangement is acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction.

The provisions for 695.3(B) are currently out of sync with the requirements of NFPA 20. Originally inFNPA 20, there were a number of convoluted rules involving feeder sources to fire pumps that were carried over to theNEC. Since that time, the NFPA 20 committee has revised the feeder requirements to be more practical but the NECprovisions have not been revised.This proposal will replace the current NEC text dealing with feeder sources with text extracted from NFPA 20. The

extract reference is shown directly after the main paragraph language in proposed (2).Item “a” is added to recognize that a fire pump can be supplied by a dedicated service, but through a feeder

arrangement. This is what happens each time a service connection specified in 695.3(A)(1) becomes a supervisedconnection with a disconnect and overcurrent device as recognized in 695.4(B). When the OCP is placed in the circuit,it now becomes a feeder and this new text simply recognizes that as an acceptable source.Item “b” becomes the multi-building campus arrangement text. In the current NEC, the text requires that you have two

feeders for the single normal power source. This need for two feeders is now eliminated from NFPA 20 and the texthere can be simplified. The list of items 1 through 4 comes directly from NFPA 20 9.2.2(4).This greatly simplifies the feeder source requirements and makes it consistent with NFPA 20.It is important to note that there is an additional 5th provision in NFPA 20 9.2.2 that was not extracted. The provision

states: “The overcurrent protection device(s) in each disconnecting means shall be selectively coordinated with anyother supply side overcurrent protective device(s).”The rational for not extracting this provision into the NEC is that it creates significant electrical system issues. Keep in

mind that that Article 695 requires that devices installed in the circuit dedicated to the fire pump be sized at locked rotorcurrent. So for a 100A fire pump the first overcurrent device upstream would be a 600A circuit breaker. If this 600acircuit breaker was being supplied from an 800a service (which is not impractical a size for a building with a 100A firepump) – you would have to upsize the entire service to the building just to accommodate the selective coordinationaspect of the fire pump. This is a huge expense for absolutely no gain in safety. When would the selectivityrequirement add any value? The fire pump controller already handles overloads and even high short circuits that wouldoccur on the fire pump itself. If the actual normal feeder is the source of the fault, selectivity for purposes of the firepump is irrelevant because either the 600A CB is going to open or the main is going to open. Either way, there is still nonormal power to the fire pump.In short, this provision needs to be removed from NFPA 20 – not extracted into the NEC. The NFPA 20 committee has

created a rule that significantly impacts the balance of the electrical system which is outside of their committee scope.

The panel accepts the recommendation to revise 695.3(B). See the panel action on panel proposal13-60a. The selective coordination requirement exists as part of the performance requirements in Section 9.2.2 inNFPA 20, and this panel cannot amend those requirements.




Revise Section 695.4 to read:

Circuits that supply electric motor-driven fire pumps shall be supervised from inadvertent disconnection as covered in695.4(A) or (B).

The supply conductors shall directly connect the power source to either a listed fire pumpcontroller or listed combination fire pump controller and power transfer switch.

A single disconnecting means and associated overcurrent protective device(s) shall be permitted to beinstalled between the fire pump power source(s) and one of the following: [20:9.1.2](1) A listed fire pump controller(2) A listed fire pump power transfer switch(3) A listed combination fire pump controller and power transfer switch

For systems installed under the provisions of 695.3(B)(2) only, additional disconnecting meansand associated overcurrent protective device(s) shall be permitted as required to comply with other provisions of thisCode.

Where an on-site generator is used to supply a fire pump, an additionaldisconnecting means and associated overcurrent protective device(s) shall be permitted.

Overcurrent protective device(s)shall be selected or set to carry indefinitely the sum of thelocked-rotor current of the fire pump motor(s) and the pressure maintenance pump motor(s) and the full-load current ofthe associated fire pump accessory equipment when connected to this power supply. Where the locked rotor currentvalue does not correspond to a standard overcurrent device size, the next standard overcurrent device size shall beused in accordance with 240.6. The requirement to carry the locked-rotor currents indefinitely shall not apply toconductors or devices other than overcurrent devices in the fire pump motor circuit(s).[20:9.2.3.4]

Overcurrent protective devices between an on-site standby generator and a firepump controller shall be selected and sized to allow for instantaneous pickup of the full pump room load, but shall not belarger than the value selected to comply with 430.62 to provide short-circuit protection only. [20:9.6.1.1]

All disconnecting devices that are unique to the fire pump loads shall comply with items athrough d. [20:9.2.3.1]

The disconnecting means shall comply with all of the following:(1) Be identified as suitable for use as service equipment(2) Be lockable in the closed position(3) Not be located within equipment that feeds loads other than the fire pump(4) Be located sufficiently remote from other building or other fire pump source disconnecting means such that

inadvertent operation at the same time would be unlikelyThe disconnecting means shall be marked “Fire Pump Disconnecting Means.” The letters

shall be at least 25 mm (1 in.) in height, and they shall be visible without opening enclosure doors or covers.[20:9.2.3.1(5)

A placard shall be placed adjacent to the fire pump controller, stating the location of thisdisconnecting means and the location of the key (if the disconnecting means is locked). [20:9.2.3.2]

The disconnecting means shall be supervised in the closed position by one of the following methods:[20:9.2.3.3](1) Central station, proprietary, or remote station signal device(2) Local signaling service that causes the sounding of an audible signal at a constantly attended point(3) Locking the disconnecting means in the closed position(4) Sealing of disconnecting means and approved weekly recorded inspections when the disconnecting means are

located within fenced enclosures or in buildings under the control of the owner [20:9.2.3.3]This revision incorporates the concepts contained in the public proposals on which the panel accepted

in whole, in part or in principle. The revision provides correlation and proper extract attribution between Article 695 andthe recommendation for Chapter 9 in the 2010 edition of NFPA 20 based on the ROP and ROC actions of the NFPA 20


Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 70Technical Committee.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-78 Log #464 NEC-P13


Delete text to read as follows:(A) Direct Connection. The supply conductors shall directly connect the power source to either a listed fire pump

controller or listed combination fire pump controller and power transfer switch. Where the power source is supplied byon-site generator(s), the supply conductors shall connect to a generator disconnecting means dedicated for thepurposes of serving the fire pump. The disconnecting means shall be located in a separate enclosure from the othergenerator disconnecting means.

The above text (strikethrough) was added to this section during the 2008 NEC process. Unfortunately,it was placed under direct connection and is in conflict with the intent and requirements of the section. The section isspecific to a direct connection. Once a disconnecting means is placed in the circuit, it is no longer a direct connection.More appropriately, it is a supervised connection. The requirements for a supervised connection are noted in Section695.4(B). In addition, the general requirements of the strikethrough text are already noted in subsection (B), so this isredundant text (See Section 695.4(B)(2)). If necessary, this text should have been incorporated into subsection (B) forSupervised Connection.

See the panel action and statement on panel proposal 13-77a.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-79 Log #2157 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________James W. Carpenter, International Association of Electrical Inspectors

Revise text as follows:(A) Direct Connection. The supply conductors shall directly connect the power source to either a listed fire pump

controller or listed combination fire pump controller and power transfer switch. Where the power source is supplied byon-site generator(s), the supply conductors shall connect to a generator disconnecting means dedicated for thepurposes of serving the fire pump. The disconnecting means shall be located in a separate enclosure from the othergenerator disconnecting means.

The above text (strikethrough) was added to this section during the 2008 NEC process. Unfortunately,it was placed under direct connection and is in conflict with the intent and requirements of the section. The section isspecific to a direct connection. Once a disconnecting means is placed in the circuit, it is no longer a direct connection.More appropriately, it is a supervised connection. The requirements for a supervised connection are noted in Section695.4(B). In addition, the general requirements of the strikethrough text are already noted in sebsection (B), so this isredundant text (See 695.4(B)(2)). If necessary, this text should have been incorporated into subsection (B) forSupervised Connection.

See the panel action and statement on panel proposal 13-77a.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________Lawrence W. Forshner, Town of Natick

Add an exception at the end of the second paragraph of 695.4(A):Exception: Individual disconnect enclosures, shall not be required when a single enclosure, factory or field installed,

on gen-sets, containing two or more circuit breakers supplying feeders, are equipped with barriers, that provideseparation for the load side conductors.

It is common practice to have multiple feeder breakers mounted on the side of Gen-Set alternators.There are space limitations making it difficult to comply with the requirements for separate enclosures. The line side ofthe multiple feeder disconnects are fed with short feeder tap conductors from a common bus on the generator alternator.They are common in the alternator housing which is the common voltage source. I am in agreement with the addition of700.9(B (5)c. to the 2008 Code, however, how far back to the source is it practical to require separation. Partitioning onthe load side of the breakers, separating the load side feeder conductors, satisfies the intent of this section.

The text added in the 2008 NEC cycle is removed. There is no need for this exception. See panelaction on Proposals 13-78 and 13-79.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________


correlated with the Technical Correlating Committee action on Proposal 13-77.This action will be considered by the Panel as a Public Comment.


The panel accept the recommendation of the Technical Correlating Committee to review the action on Proposal 13-89from the 2008 NEC revision process and accepts the recommendation of that proposal in principle.

The intent of the recommendation of Proposal 13-89 from the 2008 NEC revision cycle is met bythe panel action on panel proposal 13-77a. The panel notes that the revisions made in 13-77a are based on the 2008edition of the NEC.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________

Jim Pauley, Square D CompanyAccept the Proposal as submitted.

Rather than attempt to rewrite the entire article through a panel proposal or comment, the panel shouldaccept proposals that were submitted to correct deficiencies in the current Article. Proposal 13-89 provides a logicalrearrangement of the current text to make the article easier to use and to remove some ambiguity in the text. Thesubstantiation to make these changes is well detailed.

The intent of this recommendation is met by the panel action on panel proposal 13-77a. The panelnotes that the revisions made in 13-77a are based on the 2008 edition of the NEC.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________

James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.Continue to Accept in Principle Public Proposal 13-89.

The Proposer, J. Pauley proposes clarification of extant Article 695.4(B) "Supervised Connection."However, this is extracted text and is part of the Power Supply section which has been completely re-written andsubmitted as Proposal 13-77. My Public Comment in P13-77 hopes to clarify the new text sufficiently to satisfy theproposer.

The intent of this recommendation is met by the Panel action on Panel Proposal 13-77a. The panelnotes that the revisions made in 13-77a are based on the 2008 edition of the NEC.




Delete text to read as follows:For systems installed under the provisions of 695.3(B)(2) only, such additional disconnecting means and associated

overcurrent protective device(s) shall be permitted as required to comply with other provisions of this Code. Overcurrentprotective devices between an on-site standby generator and a fire pump controller shall be selected and sizedaccording to 430.62 to provide shortcircuit protection only. All disconnecting devices and overcurrent protective devicesthat are unique to the fire pump loads shall comply with 695.4(B)(1) through (B)(5).

The above text (strikethrough) is unnecessary and in conflict with the last sentence of the paragraphthat requires the overcurrent protective device to comply with sections 695.4(B)(1) through (B)(5). In particular,subsection 695.4(B)(1) requires that “The overcurrent protective device(s) shall be selected or set to carry indefinitelythe sum of the locked-rotor current of the fire pump motor(s) and the pressure maintenance pump motor(s) and thefull-load current of the associated fire pump accessory equipment when connected to this power supply.” Allowing anyovercurrent protection in the motor circuit that is sized at less than required by this section is a code violation. It can alsocause conflicts with selective coordination issues noted in Articles 700 and 701, and conflicts with feeder installations,such as for multibuilding campus-style complexes. In addition, the allowance to size per 430.62 can create a violationwhen a transformer is inserted into the system too (see Section 695.5(B)) — does the more restrictive requirement fortransformers apply or the less restrictive requirement as presently allowed apply? In the interest of consistency in codeenforcement, eliminate the confusing and conflicting text of this section. Removing this text will not change minimumcode requirements! It will also correlate with requirements of NFPA 20 for Fire Pump Installations.

Section 9.6.1.1 of NFPA 20-2007 does not require a standby generator to carry locked rotor currentindefinitely.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-85 Log #2319 NEC-P13


Delete the second sentence in the second paragraph which starts with 'Overcurrent protectivedevices between and on-site standby generator...'Add a second paragraph to sub-section (B)(1) to read... 'Overcurrent devices between an on-site standby generator

and a fire pump controller shall not be smaller than 225 % of the full load current of the fire pump but shall not exceedthe maximum permitted by 430.62.

The present language referring to 430.62 provides a maximum size overcurrent device but not aminimum size and creates confusion since the last sentence also refers to sub-part (B)(1). Based on present languageany device that exceeds the overload requirements of 430.32 could be construed as meeting the requirement of onlyproviding short current protection. This change will specify a minimum OCP for generator supplied fire pumps and clarifythat the locked rotor requirement should not apply to on-site stand-by generators.

The minimum and maximum sizing will be determined by the requirements in 430.62. There wasno technical substantiation provided for the 225 percent minimum size overcurrent protective device.




Revise 695.4(B) as shown below to read as follows:

A single disconnecting means and associated overcurrent protective device(s) shall be permitted to beinstalled between a remote the fire pump power source(s) and one of the following:(1) A listed fire pump controller(2) A listed fire pump power transfer switch(3) A listed combination fire pump controller and power transfer switch

For systems installed under the provisions of 695.3(B)(2) only, such additional disconnectingmeans and associated overcurrent protective device(s) shall be permitted as required to comply with other provisions ofthis Code.

Where an on-site generator is used to supply a fire pump, an additional disconnectingmeans and associated overcurrent protective device(s) shall be permitted to be located on or at the generator.

The overcurrent Overcurrent protective device(s), other than those installed between the on-site generatorand the fire pump controller or fire pump transfer switch, that are unique to the fire pump loads shall be selected or setto carry indefinitely the sum of the locked-rotor current of the fire pump motor(s) and the pressure maintenance pumpmotor(s) and the full-load current of the associated fire pump accessory equipment when connected to this powersupply. Where the locked rotor current value does not correspond to a standard overcurrent device size, the nextstandard overcurrent device size shall be used in accordance with 240.6. The requirement to carry the locked-rotorcurrents indefinitely shall not apply to conductors or devices other than overcurrent devices in the fire pump motorcircuit(s).

Overcurrent protective devices between an on-site standby generator and a firepump controller shall be selected and sized to allow for instantaneous pickup of the full pump room load, but shall not belarger than the value selected to comply with according to 430.62 to provide short-circuit protection only.

All disconnecting devices and overcurrent protective devices that are unique to the firepump loads shall comply with items a through d. 695.4(B)(1) through (B)(5).a. (2) [keep existing 2008 text from 695.4(B)(2)]b. (3) [keep existing 2008 text from 695.4(B)(3)]c. (4) [keep existing 2008 text from 695.4(B)(4)](5) [keep existing 2008 text from 695.4(B)(5)]

The objective of this proposal is to provide the user with an easier means to find the rules applicable toa supervised disconnect and overcurrent device. The current language of 695.4(B) mixes the following elements in anunclear manner:1) Number of disconnecting means allowed (B – main paragraph)2) Overcurrent protection for generator supplied circuits (B – last paragraph)3) Feeder requirements (B – last paragraph)4) Overcurrent protection (again) – (B)(1)5) Disconnecting means features and markings (B)(2), (3), (4) and (5)The user is left with a few potential conflicts and some gaps to fill. For example, the requirement for generator OCP

sizing is in conflict with (B)(1) – which applies. It is unclear whether the “single disconnecting means” requirementincludes or excludes a disconnect that may be on the generator itself.The proposal is an effort to rearrange the material to make it more usable and remove the perceived conflicts. Titles

have been provided to better direct the user to the specific rule they are looking for. In the existing text, it is very difficultto even find the requirement for sizing the overcurrent devices between the stand-by gen set and the FP controllerbecause it is buried in a paragraph at the end of 695.4(B) main text, even though the issue deals with OCP sizing whichis covered in (B)(1).Here is a synopsis of the changes:1) The requirements are split into three basic sets of rules. Those for the number of disconnecting means, those for

the overcurrent protection and those for the disconnecting means itself. They are split in this manner to avoid havingmore than three levels of subdivision which is prohibited in the style manual.


Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 702) Number of disconnecting means is split into the General Requirements and uses the existing text from 695.4 (B).

The words “remote” were deleted from the source because it is redundant. All sources are remote unless the electricfire pump generates its own power.3) The “Feeder Source” provisions that were in the last paragraph of 695.4(B) are now their own sublevel and the text

from the existing code is used. The word “such” is deleted because it is no longer needed since the text is in its ownidentified rule.4) A new item “c” is added to clarify that the “single disconnecting means” is not intended to prohibit the on-site

generator from having its own disconnect. This is a point of confusion today. If you interpret the current languageliterally, a disconnect would not be permitted downstream of the generator supplied disconnect. The generalinterpretation today is that the “single disconnecting means” referred to in the main rule is in addition to a disconnect atthe generator.5) Proposed (B)(2) is intended to cover the rules applicable to overcurrent protective devices. The main rule in item “a”

is the existing rule requiring that the OCP be sized to carry locked rotor current. The additional underlined wording inthis rule is to eliminate the conflict between locked rotor sizing and 430.62 sizing for the generator circuit OCP. Inaddition the words “that are unique to the fire pump loads” come from the last sentence of 695.4(B) last sentence. Textis also added to clarify the requirement to round up to the next standard overcurrent device. Currently, the text just saysuse the next standard size – what if the LRC equals a standard size? The revision applies the rule as it is appliedelsewhere – if the calc results in a nonstandard size, you round up.6) New item (B)(2)b is a relocation of the text from the second sentence of existing 695.4(B) last paragraph regarding

the sizing of the OCP in the generator circuits. A revision has been made to this text to pick up the requirement in NFPA20 [9.6.5] that the OCP in the generator circuit be sized to pick up the instantaneous pump room load. However, themaximum sizing of the OCP should still be directed by the reference to 430.62 as in the present code.7) New item (B)(3) is to pick up all of the rules associated with the Disconnecting Means itself. The main paragraph is

the text from the last sentence of the last paragraph of 695.4(B). The text has been modified to remove the reference toovercurrent protection since it is now covered in (B)(2).8) The existing 695.4(B) (2), (3), (4) and (5) now become items a, b, c and d under new item (3). Since all of these

rules deal with the disconnecting means in some manner, this relocation is appropriate. The text from the 2008 NECremains in all of these sections. The title “Features and Location” was chosen for item “a” because the list of itemsapply to the features expected of the disconnect and the location of the disconnect.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-87 Log #91 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________


correlated with the Technical Correlating Committee action on Proposal 13-77.Technical Correlating Committee understands that the Panel Action was to add a new second sentence in 695.4(B)(1)

and the existing second sentence now becomes the third sentence.This action will be considered by the panel as a public comment.





_______________________________________________________________________________________________Stephen W. Drayton, Eastern Idaho Electrical JATC / Rep. IBEW

Revise text to read as follows:695.4(B) A single disconnecting means and associated overcurrent protective devices(s)

shall be permitted to be installed between a remote power source and one of the following:(1) a. A listed fire pump controller(2) b. A listed fire pump power transfer switch.(3) c. A listed combination fire pump controller and power transfer switch.

It was discovered in class that if you were to reference section 695.(4)(B)(1), a NEC user would havetwo places with the same section identifiers. If the list items under 695.4(B) are changed to small case letters as wasdone in 240.4(D)(1)(2)(a.-c.) it would eliminate this confusion.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-89 Log #4473 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Darrel Miller, LSW Engineers Arizona, Inc.

Revise text to read as follows:The overcurrent protective device(s) shall be selected or set to carry

indefinitely the sum of the locked-rotor current of the fire pump motor(s) and the pressure maintenance pump motor(s)and the full-load current of the associated fire pump accessory equipment when connected to this power supply. Thenext standard overcurrent device shall be used in accordance with 240.6. The requirement to carry the locked-rotorcurrents indefinitely shall only not apply to conductors or devices other than overcurrent devices in the fire pump motorcircuit(s). Where the alternate source is an on-site standby generator, the alternate source disconnecting means andthe alternate source overcurrent protective device(s) for the electric-drive fire pump shall not be required to be sized forlocked-rotor current of the fire pump motor(s).

NFPA 20 (2007 edition) handles the “normal” supply and the “alternate” supply differently than NFPA70-article 695. NFPA 20-9.2 deals with the requirements for the “Normal Power”, while 9.3 deals with the “AlternatePower”. NFPA 70 article 695 has been updated to better align with the requirements listed in NFPA 695 over the lastcouple of code cycles and has generally accomplished that. However, NFPA 70 article 695 has overlooked theparagraph hierarchy in NFPA 20, 9.2 and 9.3 and lumped all the requirements for the “normal” and “alternate” powerinto a single set of requirements. This has effectively lost the intention set forth in NFPA 20, 9.2 & 9.3.Specifically, NFPA 20, 9.2.3.4 indicates the normal source …”overcurrent protective device shall be selected or set to

carry indefinitely the sum of the locked-rotor current of the fire pump motor(s) and the pressure maintenance pumpmotor(s) and the full load current of the associated fire pump accessory equipment.” NFPA 20, 9.3 applying to thealternate source does not contain the locked-rotor sizing requirement.The NEC 2008 Handbook supports the position of NFPA 20, refer to handbook page 1093, 695.3(B)(1) comment.To align NFPA 70 with NFPA 20, NEC-695.4(B)(1) should be changed as proposed.

The intent of the recommendation is met by the existing requirements in Section 695.4(B)(1).




Revise text to read as follows:The overcurrent protective device(s) shall be selected or set to carry

indefinitely the sum of the locked-rotor current of the fire pump motor(s) and the pressure maintenance pump motor(s)and the full-load current of the associated fire pump accessory equipment when connected to this power supply. Thenext standard overcurrent device shall be used in accordance with 240.6. The requirement to carry the locked-rotorcurrents indefinitely shall only not apply to conductors or devices other than overcurrent devices in the fire pump motorcircuit(s). Where the alternate source is an on-site standby generator, the alternate source disconnecting means andthe alternate source overcurrent protective device(s) for the electric-drive fire pump shall not be required to be sized forlocked-rotor current of the fire pump motor(s).

This section has regionally been a challenge since there are conflicts between the applicablestandards. NFPA 20 (2007 edition) handles the “normal” supply and the “alternate” supply differently than NFPA 70article 695. NFPA 20-9.2 deals with the requirements for the “Normal Power”, while 9.3 deals with the “Alternate Power”which is further defined in 9.6 “On-Site Standby Generator Systems”. NFPA 70 article 695 has been updated to betteralign with the requirements listed in NFPA 695 over the last couple of code cycles and has generally accomplished that.However, NFPA 70 article 695 has overlooked the paragraph hierarchy in NFPA 20, 9.2 and 9.3 and lumped all therequirements for the “normal” and “alternate” power into a single set of requirements. This has effectively lost theintention set forth in NFPA 20, 9.2 & 9.3 which is further supported in 9.6.5.Specifically, NFPA 20, 9.2.3.4 indicates the normal source …”overcurrent protective device shall be selected or set to

carry indefinitely the sum of the locked-rotor current of the fire pump motor(s) and the pressure maintenance pumpmotor(s) and the full load current of the associated fire pump accessory equipment.” NFPA 20, 9.3 applying to thealternate source does not contain the locked-rotor sizing requirement.NFPA 20, 9.6.5 states “where protective devices are installed in the on-site power source circuits at the generator,

such devices shall allow instantaneous pickup of the full pump room load.” This specific requirement makes no mentionof sizing protective device(s) to handle continuously the lock-rotor current of the fire pump motor(s).The NEC 2008 Handbook supports the position of NFPA 20, refer to handbook page 1093, 695.3(B)(1) comment.The proposed text will better align NFPA 70 with NFPA 20.

The intent of the recommendation is met by the existing requirements in Section 695.4(B)(1).



_______________________________________________________________________________________________


The original comment was modified to include the requirement for metal clad equipment addressingthe need for a secure enclosure. The addition of separate switchgear, cable/bus , six cable terminators and busconnections to meet the "not located within equipment that feeds other loads..." requirement added in 2005 actuallylowers the installation's reliability in these industrial installations since additional equipment must be connected to thebus.

The purpose of the existing text in 695.4(B)(2)(3) is to provide separation for the fire pumpdisconnect from equipment supplying other loads. This requirement provides increased reliability for the fire pumpcircuit because an incident within a shared equipment enclosure could affect adversely impact the overcurrent protectivedevice for the fire pump.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-92 Log #1409 NEC-P13


Revise text to read as follows:(3) Not be located within enclosures that contain equipment or conductors that feeds loads other than not associated

with the fire pump.Delete (B)(2)(4).

All equipment and conductors whether or not feeding other loads should be included in (3). Thedisconnecting means is required to be marked and lockable, and those provisions make inadvertent (accidental)operation very unlikely. "Sufficiently" is subjective and a term to be avoided per the Style Manual. "...at the same timedoes not necessarily mean simultaneously; one PM on Monday is the same time as one PM on Tuesday.

Section 695.4(B)(2) applies to disconnecting means, not conductors or other equipment thereforethe proposed changes are not appropriate for the text in this section.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________Justin B. Biller, Roanoke County Office of Building Safety / Rep. NFPA Building Code Development

Committee (BCDC)Add new text as follows:

695.4 Continuity of Power.Circuits that supply electric motor-driven fire pumps shall be supervised from inadvertent disconnection as covered in

695.4(A) or 695.4(B).......(2) Disconnecting Means. The disconnecting means shall comply with all of the following:

(1) Be identified as suitable for use as service equipment(2) Be lockable in the closed position(3) Not be located within equipment that feeds loads other than the fire pump(4) Be located sufficiently remote by a minimum distance of 1.8 m (6 ft) from other building or other fire pump source

disconnecting means such that inadvertent contemporaneous operation at the same time would be unlikelyThe current language in these sections is vague and permits a large variation of interpretations from

AHJs on what would be considered remote. By codifying a specific distance, the code user and enforcers can applyspecific language to determine remoteness of disconnects to ensure that fire pumps, emergency systems, legallyrequired or optional standby power systems are not inadvertently operated simultaneously. The use of 1.8 m or 6 ft issomewhat arbitrary, but would be considered an acceptable distance for an individual that would be servicing equipmentor an emergency responder to be unable to physically operate both sets of disconnects. This proposal is also intendedto establish dialogue for the code-making panel to consider alternative minimum dimensions based on other quantifiabledata.See also similar proposal to 230.72(B).

There is insufficient technical substantiation to support the minimum 6-foot distance. Establishing aparticular distance, noted in the substantiation as an arbitrary distance, would then require exceptions to take intoconsideration architectural appurtenances, landscaping, and other installation differences for the fire pumpdisconnecting means. The existing text here is consistent with the text in 230.72(B) for separation of the fire pumpdisconnect from other service disconnecting means.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________

Lawrence A. Bey, Cummins Power GenerationChange "full pump room load" to "fire pump" so that the clause reads: "sized to allow for

instantaneous pickup of the fire pump" (same wording to the end of the sentence).Each fire pump is required to have a dedicated transfer switch and other loads are not allowed to be

connected to it. Therefore, the generator feeder overcurrent device is sized based on the fire pump only. Where thereare additional fire pump rooms loads (jockey pumps, lighting, etc.), they must be served by a separate feeder andtransfer switch.

In Section 695.4(B)(2), the overcurrent protection device unique to the fire pump loads include thefire pump motor or motors, the pressure maintenance pump motor, plus associated fire pump accessory equipment.Only the locked rotor size requirement applies to the fire pump, but the overcurrent device must be able to handle thefire pump and accessory loads.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________

Lawrence A. Bey, Cummins Power GenerationChange "All disconnecting devices" to "All disconnecting devices except standby generator

disconnects" (same wording to the end of sentence).Confusion exists between service supplied feeders and on-site generator set feeders. Use of the term

"all disconnects" in this section is read by some to apply to both. The intent of Proposal 13-89 is to clear up theconfusion, but it does not address this point.

The proposal provided no substantiation to exclude the on-site generator disconnect fromcompliance with the four provisions to be suitable for use as service equipment, be lockable in the closed position, notbe located within equipment supplying other loads, and be located sufficiently remote preventing inadvertentdisconnection. See the panel action and statement on panel proposal 13-60a.




Revise Section 695.6(A) to read:

Service conductors and conductors supplied by on-site powerproduction facilities shall be physically routed outside a building(s) and shall be installed as service entrance conductorsin accordance with 230.6, 230.9 and Parts III and IV of Article 230. Where supply conductors cannot be physicallyrouted outside of buildings, the conductors shall be permitted to be routed through the building(s) where installed inaccordance with 230.6(1) or 230.6(2).

Fire pump supply conductors on the load side of the final disconnecting means and overcurrent device(s)permitted by 695.4(B) or conductors that connect directly to an on-site standby generator shall comply with all of thefollowing:

The conductors shall be kept entirely independent of all other wiring.The conductors shall supply only loads that are directly associated with the fire

pump system.The conductors shall be protected from potential damage by fire, structural

failure, or operational accident.When routed through a building, the conductors shall be installed using one of the following

methods:(1) Be encased in a minimum 50 mm (2 in.) of concrete(2) Be protected by a fire-rated assembly listed to achieve a minimum fire rating of 2 hours and dedicated to the fire

pump circuit(s).(3) Be a listed electrical circuit protective system with a minimum 2-hour fire rating

Where a fire pump is wired under the provisions of 695.3(B)(2), allsupply conductors on the load side of the service disconnecting means that constitute the normal source of supply tothat fire pump shall be physically routed outside a building(s) and shall be installed as outside feeder conductors inaccordance with Article 225. Where the feeder conductors cannot be physically routed outside of buildings, they shallbe permitted to be routed through the building(s) where installed in accordance with 230.6(1) or 230.6(2).

Delete existing 695.6(B) and renumber the existing (C) through (H) to become (B) through (G).This revision incorporates the concepts contained in the public proposals on which the panel accepted

in whole, in part or in principle. The revision provides correlation and proper extract attribution between Article 695 andthe recommendation for Chapter 9 in the 2010 edition of NFPA 20 based on the ROP and ROC actions of the NFPA 20Technical Committee.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________

Jim Pauley, Square D CompanyThe panel should reconsider and Accept the Proposal.

The proposal provides a logical rearrangement of the existing material making it easier to use. Ratherthan attempt a complete rewrite at the comment stage, the better path would be to accept proposal the clean up thelanguage and arrangement in the existing Article 695. This proposal would help to reduce a number of questions thatarise from the present text.




_______________________________________________________________________________________________John R. Kovacik, Underwriters Laboratories Inc.

Add new paragraphs (I) and (J) to existing 695.6 as follows;

Power circuits and wiring methods shall comply with the requirements in 695.6(A) through (H) (K), and as permitted in230.90(A), Exception No. 4; 230.94, Exception No. 4; 240.13; 230.208; 240.4(A); and 430.31. (Remainder unchanged)

Where single conductors (individual conductors)are used, the following requirements shall be met:(1) The conductors shall be terminated in a separate junction box. Single conductors (individual conductors) shall not

enter the fire pump enclosure separately.(2) Where required by the manufacturer of a listed electrical circuit protective system or by the listing, or as required

elsewhere in this Code, the raceway between a junction box and the fire pump controller shall be sealed at the junctionbox end as required and in accordance with the instructions of the manufacturer.(3) Standard wiring between the junction box and the controller shall be permitted.

Where fire pump wiring to or from a fire pump controller is routed through a junction box, thefollowing requirements shall be met:(1) The junction box shall be securely mounted.(2) Mounting and installing of a junction box shall not violate the enclosure type rating of the fire pump controller(s).(3) Mounting and installing of a junction box shall not violate the integrity of the fire pump controller(s) and shall not

affect the short circuit rating of the controller(s).(4) As a minimum, a Type 2, dripproof enclosure (junction box) shall be used. The enclosure shall be listed to match

the fire pump controller enclosure type rating.(5) Terminals, junction blocks, and splices, when used, shall be listed.

Where raceways are terminated at a fire pump controller, the following requirements shallbe met:(1) Listed conduit hubs shall be used.(2) The type rating of the conduit hub(s) shall be at least equal to that of the fire pump controller.(3) The installation instructions of the manufacturer of the fire pump controller shall be followed.(4) Alterations to the fire pump controller, other than conduit entry as allowed elsewhere in this Code, shall be

approved by the authority having jurisdiction.The added text represents electrical installation requirements from NFPA 20, Standard for the

Installation of Stationary Pumps for Fire Protection. The text is essentially verbatim from NFPA 20, Sections 9.3.6, 9.3.7and 9.3.8. These installation requirements are needed to supplement those already in Article 695.


Electrical circuit protective system installation shall comply with any restrictions provided in the listing of the electricalcircuit protective system used and the following:(1) A junction box shall be installed ahead of the fire pump controller a minimum of 12 in. beyond the fire-rated wall or

floor bounding the fire zone.(2) Where required by the manufacturer of a listed electrical circuit protective system or by the listing, or as required

elsewhere in this , the raceway between a junction box and the fire pump controller shall be sealed at the junctionbox end as required and in accordance with the instructions of the manufacturer. [ 9.8.2](3) Standard wiring between the junction box and the controller shall be permitted. [ 9.8.3]

Where fire pump wiring to or from a fire pump controller is routed through a junction box, thefollowing requirements shall be met:(1) The junction box shall be securely mounted. [ 9.7(1)](2) Mounting and installing of a junction box shall not violate the enclosure type rating of the fire pump controller(s).

[ 9.7(2)](3) Mounting and installing of a junction box shall not violate the integrity of the fire pump controller(s) and shall not

affect the short circuit rating of the controller(s). [ 9.7(3)](4) As a minimum, a Type 2, drip-proof enclosure (junction box) shall be used where installed in the fire pump room.

The enclosure shall be listed to match the fire pump controller enclosure type rating. [ 9.7(4)]


Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 70(5) Terminals, junction blocks, wire connectors, and splices, where used, shall be listed. [ 9.7(5)](6) A fire pump controller or fire pump power transfer switch, where provided, shall not be used as a junction box to

supply other equipment, including a pressure maintenance (jockey) pump(s).Where raceways are terminated at a fire pump controller, the following requirements shall

be met: [ 9.9](1) Listed conduit hubs shall be used. [ 9.9.1](2) The type rating of the conduit hub(s) shall be at least equal to that of the fire pump controller. [ 9.9..2](3) The installation instructions of the manufacturer of the fire pump controller shall be followed. [ 9.9.3](4) Alterations to the fire pump controller, other than conduit entry as allowed elsewhere in this , shall be

approved by the authority having jurisdiction. [ 9.9.4]Revise existing 695.6(F) to read:

A fire pump controller and fire pump power transferswitch, where provided, shall not serve any load other than the fire pump for which it is intended.

The panel action adds requirements from existing Section 695.6(F) to the recommendation forclarity. Revisions for compliance with the NEC Style Manual have been made. The panel action incorporates theparent text and item (1) as recommended in Proposal 13-105 into Section 695.6(I). The panel notes that the extractreferences are based on the recommended actions by the NFPA 20 Technical Committee in their ROP and ROCactions for the 2010 edition of that standard.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-98 Log #2675 NEC-P13


Revise:SERVICE SUPPLY CONDUCTORS. Where practicable, supply conductors shall be physically routed outside a

building or structure and shall be installed as service conductors in accordance with 230.6, 230.9 and Parts III and IV ofarticle 230. (remainder unchanged).

Edit. The supply conductors may not be service conductors. "Where practical" removes a conflictbetween the first and second sentence. The provision should apply to structures not deemed "buildings" and not belimited to installation as service-entrance conductors but include other supply conductors such as service laterals. Allapplicable provisions of Article 230 should apply, as inferred by the requirement to be installed as service conductors.The heading should be "Supply" since that includes conductors supplied by other than services. (695.3(A)(2) and(B)(1)).

Accept the change from “Service Conductors” to “Supply Conductors” in the title to (A) and reject the remainder of theproposal.

There is not a conflict between the first sentence and the second sentence. The first sentencestates the conductors must be routed outside the building. If that is not possible, then the conductors must be installedunder 2 in. of concrete inside the building encased in 2 in. of concrete or brick. Adding “where practicable” to the firstsentence could cause confusion to the user. The suggested deletion of the references to Sections 230.6 and 230.9 andParts III and IV of Article 230 were not deleted since these references are necessary to provide installation requirementsto treat these conductors, even though the conductors may be feeders, as service conductors. Structure was notaccepted since there was no technical substantiation provided to include structures in these requirements. The intent isto protect the fire pump supply conductors to and through the building to ensure operation of the fire pump for peoplesafety.




Revise 695.6(A) as shown below:

Service conductors and supply conductors supplied by anon-site power production facility shall be physically routed outside a building(s) and shall be installed as serviceentrance conductors in accordance with 230.6, 230.9 and Parts III and IV of Article 230. Where supply conductorscannot be physically routed outside of buildings, they shall be permitted to be routed through the building(s) whereinstalled in accordance with 230.6(1) or 230.6(2).

Where a fire pump is wired under the provisions of 695.3(B)(2), thisrequirement shall apply to all supply conductors on the load side of the service disconnecting means that constitute thenormal source of supply to that fire pump shall be physically routed outside a building(s) and shall be installed asoutside feeder conductors in accordance with Article 225. Where the feeder conductors cannot be physically routedoutside of buildings, they shall be permitted to be routed through the building(s) where installed in accordance with230.6(1) or 230.6(2).

Fire pump supply conductors onthe load side of the final disconnecting means and overcurrent device(s) permitted by 695.4(B) or conductors thatconnect directly to an on-site generator shall comply with all of the following:

The conductors shall be kept entirely independent of all other wiring.They The conductors shall supply only loads that are directly associated with the

fire pump system., and they The conductors shall be protected to resist potential damage by

fire, structural failure, or operational accident.When routed through a building, they the conductors shall be installed be permitted to be

routed through a building(s) using one of the following methods:(1) Be encased in a minimum 50 mm (2 in.) of concrete(2) Be protected by a fire-rated assembly listed to achieve a minimum fire rating of 2 hours and dedicated to the fire

pump circuit(s).(3) Be a listed electrical circuit protective system with a minimum 2-hour fire rating

In addition,Delete existing 695.6(B) and renumber the existing (C) through (H) to become (B) through (G).

The objective of this proposal is intended to rearrange the material in 695.6(A) and (B) to make it clearto the user how the rules apply. The present text mixes rules for service conductors (the first two sentences of 695.5(A))with feeder rules (last sentence of 695.6(A)) and then has “other conductors” in item (B). This creates confusionbecause the exception in (A) deals with feeders only (because it applies on the load side of the automatic connection),but is located in a manner that is being interpreted to apply to service conductors.The rearrangement breaks the paragraph into services, multi-building campus applications and finally supervised

connections. The following is a summary of the changes:1) The wording has been revised to specifically apply (1) to both service conductors and the conductors from an on-site

power production facility. This clears up the confusion in the present text where the title says “service conductors”, butthe text starts out with “supply conductors”. It would appear that the conductors in question are either serviceconductors, supply conductors from an on-site supply (which are not service conductors by definition).2) The campus distribution provision is broken out into its own section and given a title. Feeders which are covered in

(A)(2) for the campus style distribution permission in 695.3(B)(2) or feeders covered by 695.6(B) which are on the loadside of the supervised disconnect. In addition, since these are by definition feeder conductors so a reference has beenadded to Article 225 to ensure that the wiring methods and installation are covered. Finally, a sentence has been addedto allow routing through the building in accordance with 230.6(1) or (2) to parallel the provision for services.


Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 703) The exception is now placed under (A)(2) and is modified to specifically note what it applies to. The wording “for

routing outside of the building” has been added to make it clear what is being “excepted” by the exception.4) The old 695.6(B) now becomes 695.6(A)(3) so that all of the conductor routing rules appear in a single subsection.

Text has been added to the main paragraph to make it clear that the provisions not only apply on the load side of thefinal disconnecting means, but also to the conductors that connect directly to a gen set that has no overcurrentprotection. Article 445 would allow a direct connection to the generator if the conductors are sized at 115% of the fullload current. Presently it is not clear what should be done with the conductors from a generator. In addition, therevision applies to “direct connection” since the assumption would be that a gen set that has OCP and a disconnectwould already be covered by the language “on the load side of the final disconnecting means”.5) The main paragraph presently contains four separate provisions (independent routing, associated loads, protection

from damage and routing inside a building) that are applicable to these conductors. The revision breaks these elementsout into separately numbered items so that they are clearly identified.6) The exception modified to make it clear that it applies to (3)(d) which covers the 1 hour fire rating issue.7) 695.6(B) is deleted because it is now part of (A)(3) and the remaining sections are renumbered.




_______________________________________________________________________________________________




Accept Proposal 13-97 from the 2008 NEC ROP in principle.The panel accepts the direction of the NEC Technical Correlating Committee to reconsider. The

panel action on panel proposal 13-95a meets the intent of the original recommendation.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________

James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.Revise text to read as follows:

Re-consider Accepting, or Accept in Principle or Accepting In Principle in Part Proposal 13-97. However, do notcompletely eliminate extant 695.6(B) "Conductor Size."

This Proposal was considered by the panel to be part of the consolidation of Public Proposals onsections of Article 695 into the rewrite of Proposal 13-77 in error. This largely my oversight. In fact, these clauses arenot extract text. Note that extant section 695.6 changes to 695.7 under the 13-77 re-write. This section is otherwiseuntouched by 13-77. The information in extant 695.6(B)(1) regarding other loads is vital. The Voltage Drop informationin 695.6(B)(2) is also important since this is a very frequent problem with the Transformer Connection and also with theAlternate Supply.

The panel action on panel proposal 13-95a meets the intent of the original recommendation.




Revise text to read as follows:Fire pump supply conductors on the load side of the final disconnecting means and

overcurrent device(s) permitted by 695.4(B) shall be kept entirely independent of all other wiring. They shall supply onlyloads that are directly associated with the fire pump system, and they shall be protected to resist potential damage byfire, structural failure, or operational accident. They shall be permitted to be routed through a building(s) using one of thefollowing methods:(1) Be encased in a minimum 50 mm (2 in.) of concrete

(2) Be protected by a fire-rated assembly listed to achieve a minimum fire rating of 2 hours and dedicated to the firepump circuit(s).(3) Be a listed electrical circuit protective system with a minimum 2-hour fire ratingFPN: UL guide information for electrical circuit protective systems (FHIT) contains information on proper installation

requirements to maintain the fire rating.

Methods (2) and (3) are 2 hour fire ratings. Method (1) should be changed to be consistent, hence theaddition of the 2 hour rating. In various applications e.g. slabs versus columns or with different concrete, e.g.lightweight, siliceous, or carbonate; different concrete thickness may be required to meet the rating, hence the deletionof the 2 inches of concrete.

The 2 in. of concrete has provided the industry with a prescriptive benchmark that has served theindustry well. The substantiation does not demonstrate that use of 2 in. of concrete has compromised the integrity of thecircuit. The recommendation does not provide an alternative prescriptive requirement that can be easily applied.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-103 Log #3986 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Michael Brennan, Draka Cableteq USA

Delete text as follows:(B) Circuit Conductors. .. They shall be permitted to be routed through a building(s) using one of the following

methods:(1) Be encased in a minimum of 50 mm (2 in.) of concrete(2) Be….

50 mm (2 in.) of concrete has not been proven to provide sufficient protection from fire for standardcables in conduit to survive a building fire for 2 hours as recognized in the other acceptable methods in this section.

The 2 in. of concrete has provided the industry with a prescriptive benchmark that has served theindustry well. The substantiation does not demonstrate that use of 2 in. of concrete has compromised the integrity of thecircuit.




Revise text as follows:(B) Circuit Conductors. .. They shall be permitted to be routed through a building(s) using one of the following

methods:(1) Be encased in a minimum of 50 mm (2 in.) 130 mm (5 in.) of concrete(2) Be….

50 mm (2 in.) of concrete has not been proven to provide sufficient protection from fire for standardcables in conduit to survive a building fire for 2 hours as recognized in the other acceptable methods in this section.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-105 Log #2905 NEC-P13


Add new text as follows:Be a listed electrical circuit protective system with a minimum 2-hour fire rating.

Electrical circuit protective system installation shall comply with any restrictions provided in the listing of the electricalcircuit protective system used and the following:(1) A junction box shall be installed ahead of the fire pump controller a minimum of 12 in. beyond the fire-rated wall or

floor bounding the fire zone.(2) The raceway between the junction box and the fire pump controller shall be sealed at the junction box end with an

identified compound in accordance with the instructions of the manufacturer of the electrical circuit protective system.(3) Standard wiring between the junction box and the controller is acceptable.

The introductory wording is from 695.14(F) and notes that there are other restrictions to electricalcircuit integrity systems. This is similar to wording presently in NFPA 20-2007 section 9.3.7 and section 9.3.7.2 modifiedto be like that proposed for the NFPA 20-2010. Single conductors may require cutting of slots per 300.20(B) and mayviolate the NEMA rating, which is what is noted in NFPA 20 section 9.7.3.1. Since a junction box is being required for aseal in NFPA 20 section 9.7.3.2, section NFPA 20 section 9.7.3.1 was modified to just require a junction box. Thewording on 12 inches into the fire zone is from the UL system listings.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-106 Log #3854 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Bill McGovern, City of Plano

Revise text as follows:

This is only an editorial change to correct the exception to the 2008 NEC from 1-hour to 2-hour.

The panel accepts only the revision of "1-hour" to "2-hour" and rejects the remainder of the recommendation.There are recommended text changes that have not been substantiated. The accepted portion of

the recommendation has been incorporated into the panel action on panel proposal 13-95a.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________Robert Konnik, South Windsor, CT

Add text to read as follows:695.6(C) Conductor Size.(1) Fire Pump Motors and Other Equipment. Conductors supplying a fire pump motor(s), pressure maintenance

pumps, and associated fire pump accessory equipment shall have a rating not less than 125 percent of the sum of thefire pump motor(s) and pressure maintenance motor(s) full-load current(s), and 100 percent of the associated fire pumpaccessory equipment. Table 310.16 shall be used to determine the conductor size.

NFPA 20 references NEMA standards publication ICS 14, 2.1.1c), suggests conductors to be sizedper NEC 310.15 and Table 310.16. The 75C column is used, but 110.14(c) must be complied with as well. Breakersare qualified using a cable sized per table 310.16, and the conductor is a heat sink in this qualification. Grounding maybe undersized if other means to size ampacity are used. The conductor may be undersized for short circuitconsiderations and may melt. Under emergency conditions, the cable may be hot enough to cause damage to otherequipment or cause a fire to start (300% load).

Based on Section 90.3 of the NEC, Chapters 1 through 4 apply except as supplemented oramended by Chapters 5, 6, or 7. Because there is no modification of the requirements, Section 110.14, 310.15 and theappropriate Tables in 310.15, such as Table 310.16, apply without adding the proposed text to 695.6(C). The concernexpressed in the substantiation for undersized conductors and wire melting has not been supported with technicaldocumentation.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-108 Log #1283 NEC-P13


Revise text to read as follows:Insert "ampacity" ahead of "rating."

Edit for clarity and specificity.

The rating is determined based on the full-load current of the fire pump motor, pressuremaintenance motor, and the accessory equipment, making the existing text very clear and concise so the change isunnecessary.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-109 Log #1426 NEC-P13


Revise penultimate sentence: Where a tap is made to supply a fire pump in accordance with695.3(A)(1) the wiring shall be treated as service conductors in accordance with 230.6.

Edit. Proposal clarifies where the tap is made.

Because the conductors being referenced in 695.6(D) are power conductors, Section 695.6(A)already applies to these conductors, so the proposed reference is unnecessary.




Revise text to read as follows:(D) Overload Protection. Power circuits shall not have automatic protection against overloads. Except for protection of

transformer primaries provided in 695.5(C)(2), branch-circuit and feeder conductors shall be protected against shortcircuits and ground-faults only. Where a tap is made to supply a fire pump, the wiring shall be treated as serviceconductors in accordance with 230.6. The applicable distance and size restrictions in 240.21 shall not apply.Exception No. 1: Text to remain unchanged.Exception No. 2: Text to remain unchanged.

Protection against short circuits but not ground-faults is extremely difficult, if not impossible.

In the last sentence of Section 240.4(A), it is stated that conductor overload protection is notrequired but short circuit protection is required where interruption of the circuit would create a hazard. A ground faultmay or may not be an issue since the first ground fault to an ungrounded system would not necessarily create a hazard,as noted in 250.4(B)(4), but a second ground fault would then create a phase- to phase-fault.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________Timothy M. Croushore, Allegheny Power / Rep. Edison Electric Institute/Electric Light and Power NEC Task

ForceRevise text to read as follows:

Power circuits shall not have automatic protection against overloads. Except forprotection of transformer primaries provided in 695.5(C)(2), branch-circuit and feeder conductors shall be protectedagainst short circuit only. Where a tap is made to supply a fire pump, the wiring shall be treated as service-entranceconductors in accordance with 230.6. (The remaining text is unchanged.)

Separate Proposals have been submitted to change the definitions of Service Cable, ServiceConductors, and Service Equipment. This Proposal is intended to provide the Panel with information about theproposed changes and to provide a means to update corresponding affected text using the defined terms. The followingis a listing of the proposed changes to the definitions and the technical substantiation for those changes:

Service-entrance conductors made up in the form of a cable.The conductors from the service point to the service disconnecting means.

The necessary equipment, usually consisting of a circuit breaker(s) or switch(es) and fuse(s) andtheir accessories, connected to the load end of service-entrance conductors to a building or other structure, or andotherwise designated area, and intended to constitute the main cutoff and control of the supply.The aspect of Service and what constitutes Service, and related issues, has been the subject of comments and

revisions for the last several code cycles. That issue has also been debated by Panel 1 vis-à-vis the NEC Section90.2(B)(5) over the last several cycles and it was finally clarified in the 2005 NEC. The primary concept that has beencarried forth is that only utilities supply service. That has also been carried forth via the definitions of “service drops”and “service laterals”. Those, too, are utility installed extensions of the services. What comes after the “point ofdelivery” or “the point of connection” are “service-entrance conductors,” either underground or overhead.It is recognized, however, that the definitions of “service entrance conductors” (either overhead and/or underground)

need to have the concept of “service point” added to ensure further clarity of the issue. As the TCC noted in itscomments in the ROP for the 2008 NEC, the concept of "Service Drop" and "Service Lateral" are "by current definitionsand code requirements, not limited to the 'utility company side of the service point'." These revised definitions (andcorresponding changes to related NEC Sections that use these terms as well as "Service Drop" and "Service Lateral")will clarify the application of NEC requirements.By changing these definitions (and the corresponding Sections where the affected terms are used), these terms will be

updated to correlate with existing definitions related to services and service entrances and capture the stated intent andunderstanding in the NEC.

The recommendation is contingent on the acceptance of proposals to CMP-4, which intend tomodify service-related definitions. The global implications of such a change would require task group action to correlatethe use of these terms throughout the document. CMP-13 requests that the TCC direct CMP-4 to comment on thisproposal and a task group be formed if necessary.




Revise:Conductors between storage batteries used for starting and control and the engine of an engine-driven fire pump shall

not require be provided with overcurrent protection or disconnecting means other than the terminal connections.Clarification of conductors and engine. Present wording does not prohibit overcurrent protection or

disconnecting means.

There was no technical substantiation provided to revise the text from permissive to a mandatoryrequirement that no protection be provided. Section 240.21(H) is also non-mandatory (permissive) overcurrentprotection for battery cables that permits overcurrent protection of the cables.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-113 Log #98 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________

Andre R. Cartal, Princeton Borough Building Dept. / Rep. Princeton Borough Building Dept.Please reconsider and accept the proposal.

348.12(1) permits flexible metal conduit in wet locations when the conductors are approved for thespecific conditions and a "W" type conductor would be required. The Panel seems to feel that the installation of asprinkler head creates a wet location. If that's the case, then we have a problem with all the electrical equipment in thefire pump room and throughout the building.

Based on a change in 348.12(1) in the 2008 NEC, flexible metal conduit is no longer acceptable ina wet location. It is not the panel's position that the presence of a sprinkler head in the fire pump room necessitates thearea be designated as a wet location.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-114 Log #99 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________

Andre R. Cartal, Princeton Borough Building Dept. / Rep. Princeton Borough Building Dept.Please review and reconsider the proposal.

The Panel expresses concern that the EMT from the controller to the pump should not be permitted asEMT does not have "sufficient mechanical strength to prevent damage to the conductors". However, 695.6(B)Exception, does not restrict the use of EMT to supply the controller so where is the logic that the inspector needs forenforcement?



_______________________________________________________________________________________________

William A. Wolfe, Steel Tube Institute of North AmericaThis Proposal should be Accepted.

The concern in 695.6(E) is for physical protection of the conductors between the controller and thepump. Article 358 allows the use of electrical metallic tubing in areas where it is not exposed to physicaldamage. MC cable, even with an impervious covering, is not allowed where subject to any physical damage. Theimpervious covering only protects the MC against corrosive conditions. The Panel should really remove the permissionfor MC cable but if they continue to allow that use, EMT should certainly be allowed.The physical properties of EMT are more robust than those of MC cable. Chapter 3 allows the use of EMT where

exposed to physical damage but does not allow the use of MC cable where so exposed. The 1999 NEC was very clearabout the use of MC cable. Section 334-3 Uses Permitted stated:

During the 2002NEC cycle, the cable articles were reformatted, leading to current language that causes confusion about the use of MCcables where exposed to physical damage.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-116 Log #956 NEC-P13


Add: "electrical metallic tubing" after "intermediate metal conduit".EMT is as suitable as LFMC and FNMC.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-117 Log #1425 NEC-P13


Revise latter part: "...listed Type MC with an impervious covering cable complying with330.10(A)(11) or Type MI cable." (See my proposal for 330.10(A))

Edit. "Impervious" is defined as not capable of damaged or harmed. Type MC cable is not imperviousto damage with or without covering material. Section 330.12 indicates Type MC cable shall not be installed wheresubject to physical damage.

The text in Section 330.10(A)(11) uses the term “impervious” with the intent to help protect the MCcable from corrosion and other deleterious effects. Deleting this term and simply referencing the section is notuser-friendly and does not add anything useful to this section.

100Printed on 1/29/2009



Add Text from NFPA-20-2007 Clause , except for the two annex items, andrenumber to the NEC Manual of Style.A copy of the proposed text to be added from NFPA-20 is on sheet two of this submittal.

Although this text is in NFPA-20, it is installation related and proper material to be extracted to theNEC.Problems occur in the field when junction boxes are installed in a manner not suitable for the environment or in a

manner which is deleterious to fire pump controllers.Note that there are two other companion Public Proposals related to this topic.Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.

The panel action on Proposal 13-97 meets the intent of the recommendation. The submitter shouldbe aware that Section 4.3.3 of the NFPA Rules and Regulations Governing Committee Projects requiresrecommendation to contain the actual text to be inserted into the NEC, in the proper format. It is not the panel’s job todo the conversion.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-119 Log #3828 NEC-P13


Add Text from NFPA-20-2007 Clause, and renumber to the NEC Manual of Style.

A copy of the proposed text to be added from NFPA-20 is on sheets two and three of this submittal.Although this text is in NFPA-20, it is installation related and proper material to be extracted to the

NEC.Problems and questions occur in the field when types MI and MC are installed in a manner not suitable for the

environment or the application or in a manner which is deleterious to a fire pump controller. Also note that the splicebetween solid conductor MI type cable and stranded wire suitable for landing in a fire pump controller Isolating Switch(usually a Molded Case Switch) can also be made in the junction box. Molded Case Switch lugs are not rated for solidwire of the sizes used in fire pump circuits.Note that there are two other companion Public Proposals related to this topic.Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.


101Printed on 1/29/2009



Add Text from NFPA-20-2007 Clause , and renumber to the NECManual of Style.A copy of the proposed text to be added from NFPA-20 is on sheet two of this submittal.

Although this text is in NFPA-20, it is installation related and proper material to be extracted to theNEC.Problems occur in the field when junction boxes are installed in a manner not suitable for the environment or in amanner which is deleterious to fire pump controllers.Note that there are two other companion Public Proposals related to this topic.Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-121 Log #794 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Carol Pafford, City and County of Denver

Revise text to read as follows:The voltage drop at the fire pump controller line terminals shall not drop more than 15 percent below normal

(controller-rated voltage) under motor surge conditions.The existing language is modified to eliminate confusion between the fire pump controller and any

other controllers associated with the fire pump system, such as the foam pump controller and limited service controller.This particular section specifically refers to the fire pump controller.

The panel accepts the inclusion of the term "fire pump" and rejects the remainder of the recommendation.The word “drop” was deleted as unnecessary within the context of the sentence.

102Printed on 1/29/2009

Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 70_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-121a Log #2320 NEC-P13


Add parts (A) and (B) as follows...(A) Starting, (existing text from first sentence) Exception: (existingtext from exception) (B) Running, (existing text from second sentence).

This change will better reflect the requirements and exceptions included in NFPA 20. The exceptionshould not apply to voltage drop requirements while a fire pump is running.

Revise Section 695.7 to read:

The voltage at the fire pump controller line terminals shall not drop more than 15 percent below normal(controller-rated voltage) under motor starting conditions.

This limitation shall not apply for emergency run mechanical starting. [ 9.4.2]The voltage at the motor terminals shall not drop more than 5 percent below the voltage rating of the

motor when the motor is operating at 115 percent of the full-load current rating of the motor.This limitation shall not apply for emergency run mechanical starting. [ 9.4.2]

The panel action includes the recommendation of Proposal 13-121. In addition, the actionreorganizes the recommendation to clearly demonstrate the text to which the exception applies.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-122 Log #101 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________




The panel accepts in principle the recommendation of Proposal 13-107 contained in the 2008 NEC ROP.The panel accepts the direction to reconsider the recommendation of Proposal 13-107 contained in

the 2008 NEC ROP. The panel action on Panel Proposal 13-95a meets the intent of the recommendation.

103Printed on 1/29/2009


_______________________________________________________________________________________________

James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.Continue to Accept in Principle.

This was already correlated with 13.77. It is now clause 695.9(E). Note: This proposal originatedwith NEMA SC-10, Sub-committee on Fire Pump controllers. This requirement is not the same as the requirement tocarry locked rotor current indefinitely. 1) Starting a single Design "B" Code "F" or "G" motor can incur first half cycleoffset currents of over 12 times motor FLC (FLA). 2). The OCP in the Emergency (Alternate) power supply path mustbe able to start a fire pump motor in the Across-the-Line (Full Voltage Starting) mode regardless of whether or not thefire pump controller is of the reduced inrush starting type, due to the use of the Manual Mechanical EmergencyOperator. 3) The same OCP must be able to start all such pumps plus any other connected loads. This is especiallyvital where fire pumps are connected either in series (high rise) or in parallel (large facilities such as aircraft hangers).


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-124 Log #1280 NEC-P13


Revise text:Storage batteries for starting and control for fire pump engines drives shall be supported above the floor, secured

against displacement, and located where they are not likely to be subject to physical damage, flooding with water,excessive temperatures for which they are not suited, or excessive vibration likely to cause damage to the batteries.

Edit. "Likely" is defined as a nature or circumstance to make something probable and is used in manysections. Proposal clarifies use of batteries. "Excessive" is not defined.

The recommended text does not provide additional clarity, and the substantiation containsabsolutely no technical substantiation proved to support the recommendation.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-125 Log #2674 NEC-P13


Revise text:Fire pump controllers, power transfer switches, and other controls shall be located or enclosed or protected by

identified means so they are not likely damaged to be subject to damage by water escaping from pumps or pumpconnections piping.

Edit. All controls should be included. The means of protection should be identified for the use. "Likely"is defined as such a nature or circumstance as to make something probable and is used in many sections.

The recommended text does not provide additional clarity, and the substantiation containsabsolutely no technical substantiation proved to support the recommendation.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________




Accept Proposal 13-109 from the 2008 NEC ROP in principle.The panel accepts the direction of the NEC TCC to reconsider the action from the 2008 NEC

revsion cycle. The panel action on Proposal 13-97 meets the intent of the recommendation.

105Printed on 1/29/2009


_______________________________________________________________________________________________

James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.Continue to Accept in Principle Proposal 13-109.

This proposal was/is correlated with Proposal 13-77 as clause 695.10.This is extracted text. This text was added to NFPA-20 due to substantial numbers of compromised installations andconfusion in the field over this topic. Junction boxes are frequently used due to the prohibition of using the fire pumpcontroller as a junction box. Numerous controllers have been ruined or compromised regarding both reliability andpersonnel safety due to the high short circuit ratings -- usually 100,000 Arms Sym., but up to 200 Ka -- of typicalcontrollers. Countless others are in the same condition; but, are unknown. This is to give both guidance and clout toinspection personnel.


106Printed on 1/29/2009


_______________________________________________________________________________________________





revision cycle. The panel action on Proposal 13-97 meets the intent of the recommendation.

107Printed on 1/29/2009


_______________________________________________________________________________________________


This proposal was /is correlated with Proposal 13-77 as clause 695.12.This is extracted text. This text was added to NFPA-20 due to substantial numbers of compromised installations and

confusion in the field over this topic. Numerous controllers have been ruined or compromised due to flooding becauseof inadequate raceway (conduit) terminations. Numerous others are vulnerable to the same problem, especially the useof star nuts on 3" and larger top entry or exit conduit. One instance known which nearly required the evacuation of thetop two thirds of a high rise hotel due to a flooded middle zone controller. This is a pervasive problem. Fire protection isoften interrupted when a sole source controller needs extensive repair or replacement. This is exacerbated by the factthat many, if not most of these controllers are used as service entrance equipment.


108Printed on 1/29/2009


_______________________________________________________________________________________________

Elliot Rappaport, Electro Technology ConsultantsReject the proposal.

The proposed text gives the AHJ authority that neither the manufacturer or the testing agency wouldaccept without appropriate testing. Alterations to the structure should void the listing.

Sections 110.2, 90.4, and new 695.6(K)(4) of the NEC already provides the inspector with thisauthority so the substantiation is incorrect. See the panel action and statement on Proposal 13-97.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-131 Log #2911 NEC-P13


Revise text to read as follows:Control conductors installed between the fire pump power transfer

switch and the standby generator supplying the fire pump during normal power loss shall be kept entirely independent ofall other wiring. They shall be protected to resist potential damage by fire or structural failure. They shall be permitted tobe routed through a building(s)

encased in 50 mm (2 in.) of concreteor within enclosed

construction dedicated to the fire pump circuits and having a minimum 1-hour fire resistance rating,or circuit protective systems with a minimum of 1-hour fire resistance. The installation

shall comply with any restrictions provided in the listing of the electrical circuit protective system used.

This will make the format and wording the same as what is proposed for 695.6(B) in a companionproposal. Note, this also corrects the control wiring to a 2 hour rating to be the same as 695.6(B).

The panel rejects the recommendation for 695.14(F)(1). The panel accepts the remainder of the recommendation.See the panel action and statement on Proposal 13-102.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________





revision cycle. The panel action on Proposal 13-97 meets the intent of the recommendation.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________


This proposal was/is correlated with Proposal 13-77 as clause 695.11.This is extracted text. This text was added to NFPA-20 due to substantial numbers of compromised installations andconfusion in the field over this topic. Numerous controllers have been ruined or compromised due major hacking(modifications by way of large cut-outs to accommodate individual conductors. An unknown number of others exist.This is a poorly understood area. Use of individual conductors is increasing. This is partly due to the placement of firepumps in the middle of high rise buildings. Both the Normal Source and the Emergency Source are so connected inmany cases. Guidance is needed for both installers and inspection agencies. This is a matter of both reliability of theequipment, protecting it from flooding, and personal safety due to the high short circuit ratings of typical fire pumpcontrollers.


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_______________________________________________________________________________________________

Elliot Rappaport, Electro Technology ConsultantsReject the proposal.

The proposal would prohibit the use of conduit and wire to a controller and only permit cable. Thesubstantiation does not address any problem with conduit and wire, but only discusses problems with terminating solidconductors.

Sections 110.2, 90.4, and new 695.6(K)(4) of the NEC already provides the inspector with thisauthority so the substantiation is incorrect. See the panel action and statement on Proposal 13-97.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-135 Log #1281 NEC-P13


Revise:MECHANICAL PHYSICAL PROTECTION. All wiring from engine controllers and batteries shall be protected against

where likely to be subject to physical damage and shall be installed in accordance with any instructions of the controllerand engine manufacturers instructions.

Edit. Proposal clarifies uses of batteries. "Likely" is defined as such a nature or circumstance as tomake something probable and it used in many sections.

The panel understands this proposal to be on 695.6(G). The physical protection could be an NECwiring method or the mechanical protection could be within the engine controllers or the fire pump itself. The proposedtext does not have any technical substantiation for the change and is unnecessary.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Troy Meissner, Douglas County, Colorado

Add new text as follows:

Part II covers the installation for one- and two-family dwellings.Electric motor-driven fire pumps shall have a reliable source of power.

A fire pump shall be permitted to be supplied by a separate service, or from aconnection location ahead of and not within the same cabinet, enclosure, or panelboard as the service disconnectingmeans. The connection shall be located and arranged so as to minimize the possibility of damage by fire from within thepremises and from exposing hazards. A tap ahead of the service disconnecting means shall comply with 230.82(5). Theservice equipment shall comply with the labeling requirements in 230.72(B).

A fire pump shall be permitted to be supplied by an on-site power productionsource. Where this source is a generator, the generator shall comply with 695.3(B)(1).

Circuits that supply electric motor-driven fire pumps shall be installed to preventinadvertent disconnection.

The supply conductors shall directly connect the power source to the fire pump disconnect.The supply conductors shall be continuous without a splice.Where the power source is supplied by on-site generator(s), the supply conductors shall comply with 695.4(A).

The overcurrent protective device(s) shall comply with 695.4(B)(1). If theovercurrent protective device is a breaker, it shall be provided with a lock on device.

The disconnecting means shall comply with all of the following:(1) The disconnecting means shall comply with 695.4(B)(2)(2) The disconnecting means shall be marked per 695.4(B)(3)

Power circuits and wiring methods shall comply with the requirements in 695.23(A) and695.23(B).

Conductors supplying a fire pump motor(s) shall comply with 695.6(C)(1) or 695.6(C)(2).Cable shall be installed within finished wall cavities. Conductors in accessible areas shall be

installed in an approved raceway as per 695.6(E).The voltage at the motor terminals shall not drop more than 5 percent below the voltage rating

of the motor when the motor is operating at 115 percent of the full-load current rating of the motor.All equipment used for the fire pump(s) system shall be listed.

Equipment for feeder circuits shall be located in spaces fully protected by approvedautomatic fire suppression systems (sprinklers) or in spaces with one hour fire resistance rating required by 700.9(D)(2).

All energized equipment parts shall be located at least 300 mm (12 in.) above the floorlevel. All energized equipment parts shall be located or protected so that they are not damaged by water escaping frompumps or pump connections.

All fire pump control equipment shall be mounted in a substantial manner on supporting structures.External control circuits that extend outside the fire pump room shall be arranged so that

failure of any external circuit (open or short circuit) shall not prevent the operation of a pump(s) from all other internal orexternal means.

More and more single family dwellings are installing Fire Suppression systems that require pumps.This extraction language from Article 695 2008 NEC, is proposed to assist and clarify an important requirementnecessary to the designer, user and enforcer of the NEC. It will further harmonize the NFPA family of codes and providethe information necessary to comply with the installation standard.

Fire pumps covered within the scopes of NFPA 13 and NFPA 20 must comply with all of therequirements of Article 695. Requirements for water pumps and associated equipment used for fire protection, such asthose that are covered in NFPA 13D, are not appropriate for inclusion in Article 695.

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Add the words '(Life Safety)' after the word 'Emergency' in the title and throughout Article 700.The words 'emergency system' are misused extensively by those who don't know it's specific meaning

within the NEC and frequently by those who should. This change is intended to be the first step in a three cycle process(similar to the process used for Luminaires) which will rename Article 700 and more clearly identify the purpose forwhich the system is used. It will allow the term 'Emergency System' to encompass the combined 700, 701 and 702system which is in line with the way the term is used in Article 517. The extended process will allow related standards toadapt their language.

The submitter has not provided specific locations throughout the article where new text is to beadded. This proposal does not meet the requirements of 4.3.3(b) of the NFPA Regulations Governing CommitteeProjects.

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Renumber Article 700 as follows:I. General700.1 Scope.The provisions of this article apply to the electrical safety of the installation, operation, and maintenance of emergency

systems consisting of circuits and equipment intended to supply, distribute, and control electricity for illumination, power,or both, to required facilities when the normal electrical supply or system is interrupted.Emergency systems are those systems legally required and classed as emergency by municipal, state, federal, or

other codes, or by any governmental agency having jurisdiction. These systems are intended to automatically supplyillumination, power, or both, to designated areas and equipment in the event of failure of the normal supply or in theevent of accident to elements of a system intended to supply, distribute, and control power and illumination essential forsafety to human life.FPN No. 1: Text to remain unchanged.FPN No. 2: Text to remain unchanged.FPN No. 3: Emergency systems are generally installed in places of assembly where artificial illumination is required for

safe exiting and for panic control in buildings subject to occupancy by large numbers of persons, such as hotels,theaters, sports arenas, health care facilities, and similar institutions. Emergency systems may also provide power forsuch functions as ventilation where essential to maintain life, fire detection and alarm systems, elevators, fire pumps,public safety communications systems, industrial processes where current interruption would produce serious life safetyor health hazards, and similar functions.FPN No. 34: For specification of locations where emergency lighting is considered essential to life safety, see NFPA

101®-2006, Life Safety Code®.FPN No. 45: For further information regarding performance of emergency and standby power systems, see NFPA

110-2005, Standard for Emergency and Standby Power Systems.700.2 DefinitionEmergency System.Emergency systems are those systems legally required and classed as emergency by municipal, state, federal, or

other codes, or by any governmental agency having jurisdiction. These systems are intended to automatically supplyillumination, power, or both, to designated areas and equipment in the event of failure of the normal supply or in theevent of accident to elements of a system intended to supply, distribute, and control power and illumination essential forsafety to human life.FPN: Emergency systems are generally installed in places of assembly where artificial illumination is required for safe

exiting and for panic control in buildings subject to occupancy by large numbers of persons, such as hotels, theaters,sports arenas, health care facilities, and similar institutions. Emergency systems may also provide power for suchfunctions as ventilation where essential to maintain life, fire detection and alarm systems, elevators, fire pumps, publicsafety communications systems, industrial processes where current interruption would produce serious life safety orhealth hazards, and similar functions.700.2 700.3 Application of Other Articles. Text to remain unchanged.700.3 700.4 Equipment Approval. Text to remain unchanged.700.4 700.5 Tests and Maintenance. Text to remain unchanged.700.5 700.6 Capacity.(A) Capacity and Rating. Text to remain unchanged.(B) Selective Load Pickup, Load Shedding, and Peak Load Shaving. The alternate power source shall be permitted to

supply emergency, legally required standby, and optional standby system loads where the source has adequatecapacity or where automatic selective load pickup and load shedding is provided as needed to ensure adequate powerto (1) the emergency circuits, (2) the legally required standby circuits, and (3) the optional standby circuits, in that orderof priority. The alternate power source shall be permitted to be used for peak load shaving, provided these conditionsare met.Peak load shaving operation shall be permitted for satisfying the test requirement of 700.5(B) 700.4(B), provided all

other conditions of 700.5 700.4 are met.A portable or temporary alternate source shall be available whenever the emergency generator is out of service for

major maintenance or repair.

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Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 70700.6 700.7 Transfer Equipment. Text to remain unchanged.700.7 700.8 Signals. Text to remain unchanged.700.8 700.9 Signs. Text to remain unchanged.II. Circuit Wiring700.10 700.9 Wiring, Emergency System.(A) Identification. Text to remain unchanged.(B) Wiring. Text to remain unchanged.(C) Text to remain unchanged.(D) Fire Protection. Emergency systems shall meet the additional requirements in 700.9(D)(1) and (D)(2) in assembly

occupancies for not less than 1000 persons or in buildings above 23 m (75 ft) in height with any of the followingoccupancy classes: assembly, educational, residential, detention and correctional, business, and mercantile.(1) Feeder-Circuit Wiring. Feeder-circuit wiring shall meet one of the following conditions:(1) Text to remain unchanged.(2) Text to remain unchanged.(3) Text to remain unchanged.(4) Text to remain unchanged.(5) Text to remain unchanged.(6) Text to remain unchanged.(2) Feeder-Circuit Equipment. Text to remain unchanged.(3) Generator Control Wiring. Control conductors installed between the transfer equipment and the emergency

generator shall be kept entirely independent of all other wiring and shall meet the conditions of 700.10(D)(1)700.9(D)(1).III. Sources of Power700.12 General Requirements. Text to remain unchanged.(A) Storage Battery. Text to remain unchanged.(B) Generator Set.(1) Prime Mover-Driven. For a generator set driven by a prime mover acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction and

sized in accordance with 700.6 700.5, means shall be provided for automatically starting the prime mover on failure ofthe normal service and for automatic transfer and operation of all required electrical circuits. A time-delay featurepermitting a 15-minute setting shall be provided to avoid retransfer in case of short-time reestablishment of the normalsource.(2) Internal Combustion as Prime Movers. Text to remain unchanged.(3) Dual Supplies. Text to remain unchanged.(4) Battery Power and Dampers. Text to remain unchanged.(5) Auxiliary Power Supply. Text to remain unchanged.(6) Outdoor Generator Sets. Text to remain unchanged.(C) Uninterruptible Power Supplies. Text to remain unchanged.(D) Separate Service. Text to remain unchanged.(E) Fuel Cell System. Text to remain unchanged.(F) Unit Equipment. Text to remain unchanged.(1) Text to remain unchanged.(2) Text to remain unchanged.(3) Text to remain unchanged.(4) A relaying device arranged to energize the lamps automatically upon failure of the supply to the unit equipmentThe batteries shall be of suitable rating and capacity to supply and maintain at not less than 87½ percent of the

nominal battery voltage for the total lamp load associated with the unit for a period of at least 1½ hours, or the unitequipment shall supply and maintain not less than 60 percent of the initial emergency illumination for a period of at least1½ hours. Storage batteries, whether of the acid or alkali type, shall be designed and constructed to meet therequirements of emergency service.Unit equipment shall be permanently fixed in place (i.e., not portable) and shall have all wiring to each unit installed in

accordance with the requirements of any of the wiring methods in Chapter 3. Flexible cord-and-plug connection shall bepermitted, provided that the cord does not exceed 900 mm (3 ft) in length. The branch circuit feeding the unit equipmentshall be the same branch circuit as that serving the normal lighting in the area and connected ahead of any localswitches. The branch circuit that feeds unit equipment shall be clearly identified at the distribution panel. Emergencyluminaires that obtain power from a unit equipment and are not part of the unit equipment shall be wired to the unitequipment as required by 700.10 700.9 and by one of the wiring methods of Chapter 3.Exception: Text to remain unchanged.

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Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 70IV. Emergency System Circuits for Lighting and Power700.15 Loads on Emergency Branch Circuits. Text to remain unchanged.700.16 Emergency Illumination. Text to remain unchanged.700.17 Circuits for Emergency Lighting. Text to remain unchanged.700.18 Circuits for Emergency Power. Text to remain unchanged.V. Control — Emergency Lighting Circuits700.20 Switch Requirements. Text to remain unchanged.700.21 Switch Location. Text to remain unchanged.700.22 Exterior Lights. Text to remain unchanged.700.23 Dimmer Systems. Text to remain unchanged.VI. Overcurrent Protection700.25 Accessibility. Text to remain unchanged.700.26 Ground-Fault Protection of Equipment.The alternate source for emergency systems shall not be required to have ground-fault protection of equipment with

automatic disconnecting means. Ground-fault indication of the emergency source shall be provided per 700.8(D)700.7(D).700.27 Coordination. Text to remain unchanged.

This proposal is part of a series of proposals intended to create a parallel numbering system forArticles 700, 701 and 702.

Panel 13 recommends rejecting the proposed action since, even though the existing text in 700.1appears to be a definition of emergency systems, there are too many “existing” definitions of emergency systems soadding another one that is different from the others is not productive. For example, there is a definition for emergencysystem in 517.2 as it applies to health care facilities and the origin is from NFPA 99, the health care standard. Theproposed parallel numbering system for Articles 700, 701, and 702 is unnecessary since the articles are not large andcomplex articles. While there are some common titles and text, there are also titles and text that are different from onearticle to another.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-139 Log #2900 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Wendell Whistler, Whistler Consulting & Technical Services

Add new text to read as follows:Relocate text to a 700.2 are those systems legally required and classed as emergency by

municipal, state, federal, or other codes, or by any governmental agency having jurisdiction. These systems areintended to automatically supply illumination, power, or both, to designated areas and equipment in the event of failureof the normal supply or in the event of accident to elements of a system intended to supply, distribute, and control powerand illumination essential for safety to human life.

Move definition of emergency system from 700.1 to 700.2 as the definitions should be in this sectionaccording to the style manual.

Panel 13 recommends rejecting the proposed action because, even though the existing text in700.1 appears to be a definition of emergency systems, there are too many “existing” definitions of emergency systemsso adding another one that is different from the others is not productive. For example, there is a definition for emergencysystem in 517.2 as it applies to health care facilities and the origin is from NFPA 99, the health care standard.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Walter N. Vernon, IV, Mazzetti & Associates Inc.

Delete text to read as follows:The provisions ... (retain existing text) ... human life.

FPN No. 1: for further information regarding performance and maintenance of emergency systems in healthcarefacilities, see Article 517.FPN No. 2: for further information regarding performance and maintenance of emergency systems in healthcare

facilities, see NFPA 99.205, Standard for Healthcare facilities.FPN No. 31: Emergency systems are generally installed in places of assembly where artificial illumination is required

for sage exiting and of panic control in buildings subject to occupancy by large numbers of persons, such as hotels,theaters, sports arenas, healthcare facilities and similar institutions. Emergency...

The electrical distribution systems in health care facilities are different from those in other kinds ofbuildings, and they are called on to perform differently than those in other kinds of buildings, and they are called on toperform differently than those in other kids of buildings. Accordingly, the general requirements for emergency systems in700, good as they are, do not, in many cases, work when applied to health care facilities. Indeed, as noted in otherproposals, they can often compromise the performance of the very systems they seek to protect. Accordingly, it is vitalto ensure the proper definition of performance of these systems clearly and distinctively so as to meet the manycomplicated demands on the systems. Exactly these issues are the subject of much debate on the Electrical SystemsTechnical Committee of NFPA 99, which I chair. That committee, composed of many electrical engineers with hundredsof years of experience designing and operating health care facilities between them, together with the medical expertisein the form of physicians on the committee allow that committee to focus on, and best define the peculiar needs of thesebuildings. This proposal will bring NFPA 70 into conformance with NFPA 99, and thus, reduce confusion.

The panel rejects the recommendation because removing the references to Article 517 and NFPA99 and not applying any of the requirements in Article 700 to Article 517 health care installations would leave Article 517emergency systems (life safety and critical branches) and equipment systems without any requirements for emergencygenerators. The life safety system branch in Part III of Article 517 uses all of the requirements in Article 700, with thecritical branch using much of the requirements in Article 700. This is a broader issue than what Panel 13 has jurisdictionover and should be cleared up at the NEC Technical Correlating Committee level and the NFPA Standards Council.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Walter N. Vernon, IV, Mazzetti & Associates Inc.

Revise text to read as follows:The provisions...(retain existing text)...human life.

FPN No. 1: For further information regarding performance and maintenance of emergency systems in healthcarefacilities, see Article 517.FPN No. 2: For further information regarding performance and maintenance of emergency systems in healthcare

facilities, see NFPA 99 205, Standard for healthcare facilities.FPN No. 31: Emergency systems are generally installed in places of assembly where artificial illumination is required

for safe exiting and of panic control in buildings subject to occupancy by large numbers of persons, such as hotels,theaters, sports arenas, healthcare facilities and similar institutions. Emergency...

The electrical distribution systems in health care facilities are different from those in other kinds ofbuildings, and they are called on to perform differently than those in other kinds of buildings. Accordingly, the generalrequirements for emergency systems in 700, good as they are, do not, in many cases, work when applied to health carefacilities. Indeed, as noted in other proposals, they can often compromise the performance of the very systems theyseek to protect. Accordingly, it is vital to ensure the proper definition of performance of these systems clearly anddistinctly so as to meet the many complicated demands on the systems. Exactly these issues are the subject of muchdebate on the Electrical Systems Technical Committee of NFPA 99, which I chair. That committee, composed of manyelectrical engineers with hundreds of years of experience designing and operating health care facilities between them,together with the medical expertise in the form of physicians on the committee allow that committee to focus on, andbest define the peculiar needs of these buildings. This proposal will bring NFPA 70 into conformance with NFPA 99,and, thus, reduce confusion.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-142 Log #2811 NEC-P13


Delete this section and associated text700.2 Application of Other Articles.Except as modified by this article, all applicable articles of this Code shall apply.

NEC 90.3 indicates Chapters 1 - 4 apply generally and Chapters 5, 6, and 7 supplement or modify thegeneral requirements. The text in 700.2 repeats the requirement previously expressed in 90.3 and serves no additionalpurpose. It should also be noted that other "Special" articles do not include a similar requirement. Inconsistentapplication of the text could also lead to confusion.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________David A. Williams, Delta Township

Revise text to read as follows:700.2 Application of Other Articles Requirements.Except as modified by this article, all applicable articles of this Code shall apply. Emergency systems shall be installed

in accordance with this Code and NFPA 110 and NFPA 111.The provisions of NFPA 110 and 111 are very important to the installations of emergency systems and

these requirements should be referenced in the NEC. The International Building and Fire Codes have similar wording inSection 2702. Electrical installers need to be aware of these requirements.

The proposed reference to NFPA 110 and NFPA 111 is not in compliance with Section 4.2 in theNEC Style Manual that states, “references to other standards shall not be in mandatory text. References to otherstandards shall be in the fine print notes.”

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-144 Log #4676 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Frederic P. Hartwell, Hartwell Electrical Services, Inc.

Add the following sentence: “The requirements in this article do not supersede specificrequirements and allowances in Part III of Article 517 regarding emergency systems within the scope of that article.”

Conflicts between articles in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 must be reciprocally correlated or the result is astand-off. It is now abundantly clear, for example, that small hospitals are not going to give up the common transferswitch allowance in 517.30(B)(4) which directly conflicts with the dedicated transfer switch rule in 700.6(D). Thisproposal provides a vehicle to eliminate the conflict. As a matter of Code administration, articles covering specificoccupancies must usually be allowed, subject to the review of the TCC, to write specialized rules that may modifygeneral rules. Remember that the reach of an occupancy article will always be more limiting than the reach of a specialcondition article such as Article 700, which applies everywhere unless specific exception is taken.

Section 517.26 addresses the concern expressed in the recommendation. This requirement thatArticle 700 applies except as amended by Article 517 already accomplishes the recommendation. In addition, the panelaction on Proposal 13-142 deletes Section 700.2.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Steven R. Terry, Electronic Theatre Controls Inc.

Add new section to Article 700 and renumber the balance of sections to accommodate a newsection as follows:

A device listed for use as Emergency Lighting and Power Equipment and used toenergize switched or normally-off emergency equipment from an emergency supply in the event of loss of the normalsupply, and to de-energize or return the equipment to normal status when the normal supply is restored.

Stand-alone Automatic Load Control Relays are a new class of device that has been introduced in thelast few years. In my separate proposal for , the Automatic LoadControl Relay is introduced to the NEC. Therefore, a definition of the device is required. This definition should be inArticle 700 and not Article 100 because these devices are only used for emergency applications. The proposeddefinition is in alignment with the definition of this device in UL924. In addition, the definition must make clear that thedevice is listed as Emergency Lighting and Power Equipment so that the reader can determine which standard in AnnexA applies to these devices.

Revise the recommendation to read:A device listed for use as Emergency Lighting and Power Equipment and used to

energize switched or normally-off emergency lighting equipment from an emergency supply in the event of loss of thenormal supply, and to de-energize or return the equipment to normal status when the normal supply is restored.

The panel action to revise the definition meets the requirement of Section 2.2.2 of the NEC StyleManual regarding definitions containing requirements.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-146 Log #187 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Bryan P. Holland, City of North Port

Delete the following text:700.3 Equipment Approval. All equipment shall be approved for use on emergency systems.

This section is redundant and unnecessary. Sections 90.7, 110.2, and 110.3 already contain thisprovision. There is no special listing, labeling, or marking which identifies equipment as suitable for this type of system,thus, no special evaluation beyond 90.7, 110.2, and 110.3 is needed.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-147 Log #3027 NEC-P13


Revise text to read as follows:700.4 Tests and Maintenance.(A) Conduct or Witness Test. The authority having jurisdiction shall conduct or witness a test of the complete system

upon installation and periodically afterward.The requirement for periodic testing is already in 700.4(B), so the proposed deletion is simply

removing redundant text.

The existing text requires the AHJ to actually witness the initial and subsequent tests. Theproposed revision simply requires the AHJ to approve the testing schedule for periodic testing. It is the intent of thepanel to ensure that the AHJ conducts or witnesses both the initial and approved periodic testing.

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Revise:CAPACITY and RATINGS. An emergency system shall have adequate capacity and rating(s) not less than required

for all loads to be operated simultaneously.Edit. "Capacity" is not Code-defined. "Adequate" is subjective and a term to be avoided per the Style

Manual. Proposal is specific and conforms to Code language.

There was no technical substantiation provided to change the existing text. Adequate capacity forall loads to operate simultaneously is very clear so change is unnecessary.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-149 Log #2009 NEC-P13


Revise text: An emergency system shall have adequate capacity and ratings not less than requiredfor all loads to be operated simultaneously. The emergency system equipment shall be suitable identified for themaximum available fault current at its terminals.

Edit. "Adequate" and "suitable" are subjective and terms to be avoided per the Style Manual.

There was no technical substantiation provided to change the existing text. Adequate capacity forall loads to operate simultaneously is very clear so change is unnecessary.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-150 Log #3329 NEC-P13


Revise:BYPASS ISOLATION DEVICES SWITCHES. Identified means shall be permitted to bypass and isolate the transfer

equipment and approved identified means shall be provided to prevent parallel operation.Edit. Circuit breakers can also be used for this function. The means for bypass, isolation, and parallel

operation should be identified for the use. "Approved" is not necessarily the same as "identified".

Section 110.3 provides general requirements for the use of the equipment for the function of abypass isolation device, and the word “identified” may cause confusion and is unnecessary in this requirement.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Merv Lapp, Hillsboro, OR

Revise text to read as follows:700.7 Signals.Audible and visual signal devices shall be provided, where practicable, for the purpose described in 700.7(A) through

(D).This wording is not enforceable. All new installations can be purchased with the needed contacts to

provide the signal.NOTE: Related section NEC 701.8.

“Where practicable” leaves the decision up to the authority having jurisdiction and thecircumstances of being able to see and hear the signaling devices. Many of the new systems are linked to computerssystems and can be transferred through these systems to security, the building engineer's office, and other similarlocations, so the word “practicable” provides the ability to signal these alternative locations.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-152 Log #2922 NEC-P13



(D) (E).(E) Generator Trouble. To provide a generator trouble signal to the Fire Alarm Panel.

This addition will permit the generator to be supervised 24/7 the same as the rest of the Fire Alarm LifeSafety equipment. The existing generator remote annunciator is normally located in the Fire Command Room that is notmanned 24/7. A problem may exist for several days, stopping the generator from functioning, which could jeopardize thelives of the building occupants.NOTE: Related section NEC 701.8.

Many of the new systems are linked to computers systems and can be transferred through thesesystems to security, the building engineer's office, and other similar locations, so monitoring by the fire alarm system isnot required but certainly can be done. It is permissible by the existing NEC, and there was no technical substantiationprovided to justify requiring monitoring by the fire alarm panel.

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(D).(A) Derangement. To indicate derangement of the emergency source.(1) Generator main circuit breaker to be alarmed in the off position (Not-in-Auto).

Clarification of the derangement signal: The generator engine control can be in the auto position,indicating it is in the ready state, when the main circuit breaker is in the open, or off, position. In this mode, you do nothave an emergency generator available to power the Life Safety Systems; Egress Lighting, Fire Pumps, Pressurizationfans.NOTE: Related section NEC 701.8(A).

A signal is already required to indicate the disruption of the generator, so the proposed new text isunnecessary. In addition, emergency systems must be tested periodically and must be maintained on a regular basis.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Michael A. Anthony, University of Michigan Business Operations

Add text to read as follows:The area around the service equipment and emergency

switchgear in non-dwelling unit occupancies 200 amperes and above shall be automatically illuminated upon loss ofpower. For a period of 90 minutes illumination levels shall be 1-footcandle on the egress path from the switchgear and3-footcandles on the vertical surfaces of the service equipment.

The need for illumination during power outages should be intuitive. It provides illumination for a) theelectrician who is working in the service equipment area without a flashlight, b) for the maintenance mechanic who mayneither be an electrician nor familiar with the electric service equipment to work on it in the dark.Electric service panels are not always installed along either the primary or secondary egress path required by the Life

Safety Code and CMP-1 should not leave it to other standards to assert this requirement.Other NFPA documents have been examined and a short summary of this examination appears below. [Underline

emphasis has been added]NFPA 101

There is no provision for any emergency illumination other than egress illumination for occupant safety in Section 7.8 ofNFPA 101-2009. Egress safety for the occupants of an electrical room is not specifically addressed. In some cases,the cause of a building outage originates in the electrical service switchgear area. In any case, it is likely that there willbe activity to and from the electrical service equipment area during a power outage.

NFPA 110An excerpt from this standard is copied below for your convenience:

The Level 1 or Level 2 EPS equipment location(s) shall be provided with battery-powered emergency lighting.This requirement shall not apply to units located outdoors in enclosures that do not include walk-in access.

The emergency lighting charging system and the normal service room lighting shall be supplied from the loadside of the transfer switch.

Although this standard is seen four times in the NEC, all appearances are Fine Print Notes, and may be unenforceableat the local level, even if it is known to be applicable.

NFPA 70EAn excerpt is copied below for your convenience:130.6 Other Precautions for Personnel Activities.

(B) Blind Reaching. Employees shall be instructed not to reach blindly into areas that might contain exposedenergized electrical conductors or circuit parts where an electrical hazard exists.

(C) Illumination.(1) General. Employees shall not enter spaces containing electrical hazards unless illumination is provided that

enables the employees to perform the work safely.(2) Obstructed View of Work Area. Where lack of illumination or an obstruction precludes observation of the work to

be performed, employees shall not perform any task within the Limited Approach Boundary of energized electricalconductors or circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more or where an electrical hazard exists…Without this specific provision, emergency illumination “falls between the cracks” and remains a design option.

There was no technical substantiation provided justifying the foot-candle level for all electricalservice equipment and emergency switchgear. There was no indication of whether these requirements applied to indooror outdoor locations. There was no technical explanation for the required illumination for the service switchgear.Service switchgear is covered in Article 230, not in Article 700.

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Revise latter part: ........that shall identify all emergency and normal other sources and theirlocation connected grounded at that location.

"Normal" is not defined; does it include photovoltaic systems, optional standby systems, legallyrequired standby systems, fire pump services, electric welder services? Location of sources should be provided.

There are emergency sources, and all other sources are considered normal sources. Normalsources could include photovoltaic sources, utility supplied sources, or any other normal source of power that is notemergency. The suggested change in text is unnecessary.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-156 Log #4677 NEC-P13


Revise to read as follows: “Where the removal of a main or system bonding jumper interrupts thecontinuity of the grounding connection to an alternate source grounded conductor, a permanent sign shall be installedon or at the equipment in which the bonding jumper is installed identifying all alternate sources having groundedconductors connected to ground through the main or system bonding jumper.”

With changes in grounding terminology, the intent of this section is being lost. Some think this is abouta connection between a grounding electrode and a grounding electrode conductor, for example. This requirementresulted from an actual case where the emergency source was supplying power, and during that period maintenancepersonnel disconnected the normal source grounded conductor for testing purposes. The personnel did not realize thatthey were also disconnecting the grounding connection for the emergency source at the same time, since the groundedsystem conductor was only connected to the grounding electrode conductor in the main switchboard. This rewrite makesthe intent very clear.

The suggested text is much more complex than is necessary in applying this requirement. Therecommended text does not identify at which electrical equipment the sign is to be installed. The recommended text isnot user friendly and the change is unnecessary since the existing text is clear and concise in the requirements forsignage.

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There is no provision for any emergency illumination other than egress illumination for occupant safety in Section 7.8 ofNFPA 101-2009. Egress safety for the occupants of an electrical room is not specifically addressed. In some cases,the cause of a building outage originates in the electrical service switchgear area. In any case, it is likely that there willbe activity in the electrical service equipment area during a power outage.




The intensity of illumination in the separate building or room housing the EPS equipment for Level 1 shall be32.3 lux (3.0 ft-candles), unless otherwise specified by a requirement recognized by the authority having jurisdiction.Although this standard is seen four times in the NEC, all appearances are Fine Print Notes, and may be unenforceable

at the local level, even if it is known to be applicable.NFPA 70E

An excerpt is copied below for your convenience:130.6 Other Precautions for Personnel Activities.

… (B) Blind Reaching. Employees shall be instructed not to reach blindly into areas that might contain exposedenergized electrical conductors or circuit parts where an electrical hazard exists.

(C) Illumination.(1) General.

(2) Obstructed View of Work Area. Where lack of illumination or an obstruction precludes observation of the work tobe performed, employees shall not perform any task within the Limited Approach Boundary of energized electricalconductors or circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more or where an electrical hazard exists…Without this specific provision, emergency illumination “falls between the cracks” and remains a design option.


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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Brian E. Rock, Hubbell Inc.

Add text to read as follows:

All boxes and enclosures (including transfer switches, generators, and power panels) for emergencycircuits shall be permanently marked so they will be readily identified as a component of an emergency circuit or system.The identification marking shall not be permitted to include the word “Standby”, unless otherwise permitted in (B)(1)through (B)(5).

Manufacturers of surface raceways, both metal ( ® Article 386) and nonmetallic ( ® Article388), and of multi-outlet assemblies ( ® Article 380) derived from surface raceways have had numerous inquiriesfrom specifiers and installers for applications of surface raceways where used for Emergency Systems ( ® Article700) AND for either Legally Required Standby Systems ( ® Article 701) or Optional Standby Systems ( ® Article702) AND for other general wiring (power, lighting, signaling) in the same installation. Despite the requirement of900.9(B), these specifiers and installers are believed to be marking raceways with “EMERGENCY STANDBY”, withoutdistinction between “EMERGENCY” ( ® Article 700 circuits) and “STANDBY” ( ® Article 701 or Article 702circuits), leading to confusion as to the identity of the circuit ( ® Article 700 or Article 701 or Article 702) within thesingle-channel or multiple-channel surface raceway (or multi-outlet assembly) overall or within a specific channel of amultiple-channel surface raceway.

The substantiation is based on applying identification to raceways. The requirement in 700.9(A)applies to boxes and equipment enclosures. Article 700 does not require raceways to be marked. The AHJ isresponsible for approval of the required marking on boxes and equipment enclosures.

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Wiring of two or more emergency circuits supplied from the same source shall be permitted in the sameraceway, cable, box, or cabinet. Wiring from an emergency source or emergency source distribution overcurrentprotection to emergency loads shall be kept entirely independent of all other wiring and equipment, unless otherwisepermitted in (1) through (5):(1) Wiring from the normal power source located in transfer equipment enclosures(2) Wiring supplied from two sources in exit or emergency luminaires(3) Wiring from two sources in a common junction box, attached to exit or emergency luminaires(4) Wiring within a common junction box attached to unit equipment, containing only the branch circuit supplying

the unit equipment and the emergency circuit supplied by the unit equipment(5) Wiring from an emergency source to supply any combination of emergency, legally required, or optional loads

in accordance with (a), (b), and (c):a. From separate vertical switchboard sections, with or without a common bus, or from individual disconnects

mounted in separate enclosures.b. The common bus or separate sections of the switchboard or the individual enclosures shall be permitted to be

supplied by single or multiple feeders without overcurrent protection at the source.

c. Legally required and optional standby circuits shall not originate from the same vertical switchboard section,panelboard enclosure, or individual disconnect enclosure as emergency circuits.For the purpose of keeping emergency system wiring entirely independent of all other wiring and equipment, the

separate channels, whether adjacent or not, of multiple-channel raceway sharing any common enclosure components(raceway enclosure base, raceway enclosure cover, or contiguous barrier) other than supporting means and containingother wiring other than emergency system wiring shall not be considered as entirely independent equipment.

Manufacturers of surface raceways, both metal ( ® Article 386) and nonmetallic ( ® Article388), and of multi-outlet assemblies ( ® Article 380) derived from surface raceways have received numerousinquiries from specifiers and installers for applications of surface raceways where used for Emergency Systems ( ®Article 700) AND for either Legally Required Standby Systems ( ® Article 701) or Optional Standby Systems ( ®Article 702) AND for other general wiring (power, lighting, signaling) in the same installation. Despite the requirement of900.9(B), some of these specifiers and installers not versed in “ -speak” chose to focus on keeping the emergencysystem wiring “independent of all other wiring” (ignoring “equipment” as encompassing the multiple-channel racewayshared in common as being a violation) and are believed to be installing ® Article 700 circuits in raceway channelseparate from channels of the SAME raceway used for ® Article 701 or Article 702 circuits or for circuits of othergeneral wiring (power, lighting, signaling). A Formal Interpretation Request was submitted to get an answer inblack-and-white (see attached), but definitive clarification in the would resolve these misinterpretations in a morevisible and uniformly enforceable manner.Note: Supporting Material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.

The term "entirely independent" precludes the use of a compartmentalized raceway sharing acommon base and/or cover. The recommended text does not provide additional clarity in the application of therequirement of Section 700.9(B).

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Revise text to read as follows:. Emergency system wiring includes any wiring between the emergency source and any transfer switch.

Emergency system wiring includes one or more emergency transfer switches dedicated to emergency loads, and thewiring from the emergency transfer switch(es) to the emergency load(s). Wiring of two or more emergency circuitssupplied form the same source shall be permitted in the same raceway, cable , box or cabinet. Wiring from anemergency source or emergency source distribution overcurrent protection device to emergency loads shall be keptentirely independent of all other wiring and equipment, unless otherwise permitted in (1) through(5):(1) Wiring from…(retain text to end of (4))…the unit equipment.(5) Wiring of two or more emergency circuits supplied from the same source in the same raceway, cable, box or

cabinet.(5) Wiring from and emergency source to supply any combination of emergency, legally required, or optional loads. in

accordance with (a), (b), and (c).a. From… (Delete the rest of the text in a, b, and c)….emergency circuits.

The first two sentences help to define the emergency wiring system, something that is not explicitlydone in 700.1 through 700.9.The third sentence (previously the first sentence) is simply relocated from the opening down to where it should be,

given the structure of the sentence that follows it.Paragraph 700.9(B)(5) should be deleted. Some of the reliability and intent of this paragraph is met by insertion of thefirst two sentences in (B) Wiring noted above. The intent to require separation of emergency distribution systems aheadof the transfer switches should not be required because if these systems are all considered part of the emergencysystem they will retain the reliability offered by separating them from the normal power system. The emergency sourcehas to be split apart at some point, this point should be at the transfer switches, and not as currently required in theNEC, for the following reasons:1. It would be an extremely rare event that a fault on one emergency system feeder would propagate and affect

multiple emergency feeders. No record of these events was included in the substantiation that added this requirementto the 2008 NEC.2. Even if the separation in the switchboard is constructed it may not achieve what it is intended to. Most faults result

in some consumption of material with associated vaporization, hazardous gasses, etc. The materials often leavedeposits throughout a switchboard, compromising components in adjacent sections and often throughout the room.3. The proposed language notes that group mounted switches comply with the code. Considering the expense and

space requirements of switchboards, using a wireway to serve individual overcurrent devices is a cost effectivealternative to switchboard vertical sections.. However, a wireway with field made taps to switches, has a much betterchance of erroneous assembly than a regulated product like a panelboard or even a single switchboard section. Theattempt to improve reliability may result in a less reliable system.4. The code language requires separate vertical sections but is not really clear on the degree of isolation that the

vertical sections are suppose to offer. Switchboards can be constructed with separate vertical sections that are notbarriered between the sections. If barriers are the intent, then do they extend all the way to the rear and across thehorizontal bus or is it adequate to just isolate the feeders? At some point there still must be a separate definition ofemergency system vs legally required, where does this occur?This section of the 2008 NEC forces an increase in building size and electrical cost against no historical record of

performance problems.

The referenced change in the 2008 NEC was the result of a task group comprised of NEC Panel 13members, NFPA 99 health care members, and NFPA 110, Standard for Emergency and Standby Power committeemembers. The submitter did not provide any technical substantiation for deleting the text that was developed as a resultof the task group. There was substantiation provided that indicated there was a safety issue with feeders from thegenerator source supplying a switchboard with common busing and separate vertical sections. The action on thisproposal in the 2008 NEC revision cycle clarified that the required separation of emergency system wiring from wiring ofother systems in switchboards is accomplished through the use of barriers to separate the vertical sections.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Michael S. Shulman, Underwriters Laboratories Inc.

Revise text as follows:700.9 Wiring, Emergency System.

. (no change)Wiring of two or more emergency circuits supplied from the same source shall be permitted in the same

raceway, cable, box, or cabinet. Wiring from an emergency source or emergency source distribution overcurrentprotection device to emergency loads shall be kept entirely independent of all other wiring and equipment, unlessotherwise permitted in (1) through (5):(1) Wiring from the normal power source located in transfer equipment enclosures(2) Wiring supplied from two sources in exit or emergency luminaires(3) Wiring from two sources in a common junction box, attached to or supplying only exit or emergency luminaires(4) Wiring within a common junction box attached to unit equipment, containing only the branch circuit supplying the

unit equipment and the emergency circuit supplied by the unit equipment(5) (no change)

(no change)(no change)

700.9(B) 3 currently only allows junction boxes physically attached to emergency luminaires to includeboth normal and emergency wiring. But the physical attachment of the junction box to the luminaire is not a very relevantfactor. The likelihood of emergency lighting system disruption due to a fault on the normal power system is based onproximity of the two systems’ wires within the common junction box and not on the physical location of the junction boxitself.It has become a desirable building feature to use (UL 924) Listed load control relays within wall mounted switch boxes,

to control ceiling mounted emergency luminaires. This promotes energy conservation by allowing luminaires for sectionsof buildings that are frequently unoccupied for extended periods of time to be de-energized. It also allows (emergency)luminaires within rooms used for presentations to be dimmed. In both situations, the Listed load control relay willautomatically restore full emergency lighting levels upon loss of normal power or activation of a fire alarm. The UL 924requirements provide for electrical and physical separation between normal and emergency power circuitry of the loadcontrol relay and of its wiring terminals.These wall mounted lighting control boxes are not physically “attached to” the luminaires they control but do not

present any more risk of emergency lighting disruption than boxes mounted directly to the luminaire. The proposedrevision would make installation of these physically ‘remote’ but electrically connected common junction boxespermissible by the Code.As an editorial-only matter, the word “device” seems needed in the base paragraph of 700.9(B).

Revise text for (3) to read:(3) Wiring from two sources in a listed load control relay supplying exit or emergency luminaires or in a common

junction box attached to exit or emergency luminaires.Reject the addition of “device” in the first paragraph.

Wiring installations utilizing a listed load control relay must have both normal and emergency circuitconductors enter into the relay enclosure, but only the emergency circuit conductors exit from the enclosure to supplythe exit lights or emergency lights. Addition of this text correlates with the panel action on Proposal 13-188. The panelhas rejected the recommendation to add "device" because it does not improve clarity.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Gordon Pierret, Ring & DuChateau, Inc. / Rep. WHEA Code and Advocacy Committee, Tim O'Rorke

Revise text to read as follows:(B) Wiring. Wiring of two or more emergency circuits supplied from the same source shall be permitted in the same

raceway, cable, box, or cabinet. Wiring from an emergency source or emergency source distribution overcurrentprotection to emergency loads shall be kept entirely independent of all other wiring and equipment, unless otherwisepermitted in (1) through (5):(1) Wiring from the normal power source located in transfer equipment enclosures(2) Wiring supplied from two sources in exit or emergency luminaires(3) Wiring from two sources in a common junction box, attached to exit or emergency luminaires(4) Wiring within a common junction box attached to unit equipment, containing only the branch circuit supplying the

unit equipment and the emergency circuit supplied by the unit equipment(5) Wiring from an emergency source to supply any combination of emergency, legally required, or optional loads in

accordance with (a), (b), (c) and (d):(a) From separate vertical switchboard sections, with or without a common bus, or from individual disconnects

mounted in separate enclosures.(b) The common bus or separate sections of the switchboard or the individual enclosures shall be permitted to be

supplied by single or multiple feeders without overcurrent protection at the source.Exception to (5)(b): Overcurrent protection shall be permitted at the source or for the equipment, provided the

overcurrent protection is selectively coordinated with the downstream overcurrent protection.(c) Legally required and optional standby circuits shall not originate from the same vertical switchboard section,

panelboard enclosure, or individual disconnect enclosure as emergency circuits.(d) For large facilities with large alternate power system (greater than 500 kW), an additional generator distribution

point(s) shall be permitted if the distribution point is supplied by redundant feeders. The redundant feeders shall followtwo separate routes and not supported from the same building structural member. The additional generator distributionpoint shall comply with the requirements of (a), (b) and (c) above. If the generator system voltage is greater than theutilization voltage, redundant step-down transformers shall be provided. See Exhibit 700.5a and 700.5b.

The above proposal would allow the alternate power distribution system to either easily expand as thebuilding expands.Example: An office building is originally built with a small generator just to provide the minimum code required

emergency and legally required power. The building is expanded and new larger alternate power system is required tosupply the building and its emergency, legally required and optional standby loads. This proposal also allows for largecampus style installations where there is a central generating plant serving either a very large single building or multiplebuildings in a campus style installation.Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.

Based on the recommended text and the drawings, the NEC does not prohibit this type ofinstallation, especially where installed in accordance with 700.9(B)(5); therefore the recommendation is unnecessary.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Vince Baclawski, National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA)

Revise the Exception to read as follows:

In the CMP-13 Panel Statements to Comment 13-157 in the 2007 ROC, the CMP stated that: "Item(5)(b) gives permission to omit the overcurrent protection in the supply feeders, with the subsequent Exception to (5)(b)allowing overcurrent protection as long as the protective devices are selectively coordinated." It continued, "Selectivecoordination has nothing to do with the objectives of 700.9, and furthermore, selectivity is not a substitute for circuitseparation." Certainly, if selective coordination is not a substitute for circuit separation, it is also certain that selectivecoordination should not be included in 700.9 unless all the exceptions of are included. 700.9 isimproved by linking the Exception to (5)(b) to 700.27 where the concept of selective coordination is fully outlined.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Gordon Pierret, Ring & DuChateau, Inc. / Rep. WHEA Code and Advocacy Committee, Tim O'Rorke

Revise text to read as follows:(B) Wiring. Wiring of two or more emergency circuits supplied from the same source shall be permitted in the same

raceway, cable, box, or cabinet. Wiring from an emergency source or emergency source distribution overcurrentprotection to emergency loads shall be kept entirely independent of all other wiring and equipment, unless otherwisepermitted in (1) through (5):(1) Wiring from the normal power source located in transfer equipment enclosures(2) Wiring supplied from two sources in exit or emergency luminaires(3) Wiring from two sources in a common junction box, attached to exit or emergency luminaires(4) Wiring within a common junction box attached to unit equipment, containing only the branch circuit supplying the

unit equipment and the emergency circuit supplied by the unit equipment(5) Wiring from an emergency source to supply any combination of emergency, legally required, or optional loads in

accordance with (a), (b), and (c) and (d):(a) From separate vertical switchboard sections, overcurrent device in individually barriered compartments of

distribution equipment, with or without a common bus, or from individual disconnects mounted in separate enclosures.(b) The common bus or separate sections of the switchboard distribution equipment or the individual enclosures shall

be permitted to be supplied by single or multiple feeders without overcurrent protection at the source.Exception to (5((b): Overcurrent protection shall be permitted at the source or for the equipment, provided the

overcurrent protection is selectively coordinated with the downstream overcurrent protection.(c) Legally required and optional standby circuits shall not originate from the same vertical switchboard section,

panelboard enclosure, unbarriered distribution equipment or individual disconnect enclosure as emergency circuits.

The above proposal revises the language "separate vertical switchboard sections" to "overcurrentdevice in individually barriered compartment of distribution equipment". The purpose of this proposed revision is to:1. Provide flexibility by allowing the overcurrent devices serving multiple branches (emergency, legally required, or

optional loads) to be located in common vertical sections but requiring compartmentalization for each overcurrentdevice.2. Requiring that all overcurrent devices serving common branches (emergency, legally required, or optional loads) to

be compartmentalized, therefore enhancing the level of protection between these devices.3. The present code language does not reflect current industry design and equipment manufacturing methods.

Emergency distribution additions at many current facilities would in many cases impracticable.

There was no technical substantiation provided to permit emergency overcurrent protective devicesto be installed in the same vertical section as legally required standby or optional standby devices. The substantiationdid not address the availability of switchgear to be manufactured with individual barriers for separation of these deviceswithin the same vertical section. In addition, there is no reason to require individual barriers where only legally requiredand optional standby are in the same vertical section.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Lawrence W. Forshner, Town of Natick

Add exception after 700.9(B)(5)c. to read as follows:Exception: Individual disconnect enclosures, shall not be required when a single enclosure, factory or field installed,

on gen-sets, containing two or more circuit breakers supplying feeders, are equipped with barriers, that provideseparation for the load side conductors.

It is common practice to have multiple feeder breakers mounted on the side of Gen-Set alternators.There are space limitations making it difficult to comply with the requirement for separate enclosures. The line side ofthe multiple feeder disconnects are fed with short feeder tap conductors from a common bus on the generator alternator.They are common in the alternator housing which is the common voltage source. I am in agreement with the addition of700.9(B)(5)c. to the 2008 Code, however, how far back to the source is it practical to require separation? Partitioning onthe load side of the breakers, separating the load side feeder conductors, satisfies the intent of this section.

The proposed exception does not provide any information on the types of barriers to be installedwithin the single enclosure and the installation requirements of these barriers.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-166 Log #2912 NEC-P13


Add new paragraph below:Emergency wiring circuits shall be designed and located so as to minimize the

hazards that might cause failure due to flooding, fire, icing, vandalism, and other adverse conditions.Where emergency wiring circuits are installed below the level of the 100-year floodplain, the

circuit conductors shall be listed for use in a wet location in accordance with 310.8(C) and be installed in a wiringmethod that is permitted for use in wet locations.

This is equivalent to wording in 708.10(C)(3) to protect cables and wiring methods for cables to befunctional in a wet location.

The panel concludes that the level of protection contained in the recommendation is not necessaryfor emergency system wiring installed in locations that are not wet, but are included in the 100 year flood plain. For allindoor and outdoor installations that are in wet locations, the present requirements of Article 300 apply.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________

Edward Walton, Draka CableteqAdd new text to 700.9(D) as follows:

(3) Branch Circuit Wiring. Branch circuits that originate in a location remote from the area being served shall meet oneof the following conditions:(1) Be installed in spaces or areas that are fully protected by an approved automatic fire suppression system(2) Be a listed electrical circuit protective system with a minimum 1-hr fire rating(3) Be protected by a listed thermal barrier system for electrical system components(4) Be protected by a fire-rated assembly listed to achieve a minimum fire rating of 1 hr(5) Be embedded in not less than 50 mm (2 in.) of concrete(6) Be a cable listed to maintain circuit integrity for not less than 1 hr when installed in accordance with the listing

requirements.Revise reference in 700.9(D) to read:700.9(D)(1), (D)(2), and (D)(3)Optional. Add FPN as follows:FPN: A remote location is defined as an area separate from the Emergency System Circuit load such as a different

floor in a multistory building or a different fire zone in a place of assembly or stadium.This proposal has been modified to resolve the panel's concern that this "level of protection" is not

warranted for all branch circuits. The branch circuit for which this protection is required is now defined as a remotelylocated branch circuit.5-a. Even though a fire caused circuit failure would be more catastrophic for the feeder cable, the remotely located

branch circuit is far more vulnerable if it is run through the protected premises before connected to the load.5-b. Presently the emergency branch circuit panel could be located in the basement of a multistory building (7 stories

or higher) or on the opposite side of an assembly hall or stadium far from the emergency circuit load and without therequired fire protection of 700.9(D).5-c. One code user misinterpretation is that the feeder-circuit wiring terminates at the transfer switch and anything

beyond that does not require fire protection. Adopting this proposal would help clarify this misinterpretation.I have included an optional FPN if the panel feels it needs to define remote location.This proposal could be located in Section IV if the panel believes this is a more proper location.

The submitter has not provided sufficient technical substantiation to require all emergency branchcircuits in assembly occupancies for not less than 1000 persons or in buildings above 75 ft in height with any of thefollowing occupancy classes: assembly, educational, residential, detention and correctional, business, and mercantile.The stipulation that this only applies to branch circuits that originate in a location remote from the area being served bythe branch circuit would result in confusion in application. The suggested definition of remote location is not clear, as “anarea separate from the emergency system circuit load” is not definitive.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________L. Keith Lofland, IAEI

Revise text to read as follows:Emergency systems shall meet the additional requirements in 700.9(D)(1) through (D)(3) in

assembly occupancies for not less than 1000 persons or in buildings above 23 m (75 ft) in height with any of thefollowing occupancy classes: assembly, educational, residential, detention and correctional, business, and mercantile.

700.9(D)(3) dealing with generator control wiring was added for the 2008 NEC. This is an additionalrequirement that emergency system feeder-circuit wiring is required to meet. Previous language only required theseemergency system feeders to meet 700.9(D)(1) and (D)(2).

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-169 Log #3913 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Edward Walton, Draka Cableteq, USA

Add the following new text:(3) Branch Circuit Wiring. Branch circuits that originate in a location remote from the area being served shall meet one

of the following conditions:(1) Be installed in spaces or areas that are fully protected by an approved automatic fire suppression system(2) Be a listed electrical circuit protective system with a minimum 1-hour fire rating(3) Be protected by a listed thermal barrier system for electrical system components(4) Be protected by a fire-rated assembly listed to achieve a minimum fire rating of 1 hour(5) Be embedded in not less than 50 mm (2 in.) of concrete(6) Be a cable listed to maintain circuit integrity for not less than 1 hour when installed in accordance with the listing

requirementsRevise reference in 700.9(D) to read: 700.9(D)(1), (D)(2) and (D)(3)Add FPN as follows:FPN: A remote location is defined as an area separate from the Emergency System Circuit load such as a different

floor in a multistory building or a different fire zone in a place of assembly or stadium.This proposal has been modified to resolve the panel's concern that this "level of protection" is not

warranted for all branch circuits. The branch circuit for which this protection is required is now defined as a remotelylocated branch circuit.a. Even though a fire caused circuit failure would be more catastrophic for the feeder cable, the remotely located

branch circuit is far more vulnerable if it is run through the protected premises before connected to the load.b. Presently, the emergency branch circuit panel could be located in the basement of a multistory building (7 stories or

higher) or on the opposite side of an assembly hall or stadium far from the emergency circuit load and without therequired fire protection of 700.9(D).c. One code user misinterpretation is that the feeder-circuit wiring terminates at the transfer switch and anything

beyond that does not require fire protection. Adopting this proposal would help clarify this misinterpretation.


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_______________________________________________________________________________________________James Kelley, Sargent & Lundy

Revise text to read:Emergency systems shall meet the additional requirements in 700.9(D)(1) and (D)(2) in assembly

occupancies for not less than 1000 persons or in buildings above 23 m (75 ft) in height with any of the followingoccupancy classes: assembly, educational, residential, detention and correctional, business, andmercantile.FPN For the definition of see Section 6.1 of NFPA

Feeder-circuit wiring shall meet one of the following conditions:(1) Be installed in spaces or areas that are fully protected by an approved automatic fire suppression system(2) Be a listed electrical circuit protective system with a minimum 1-hour fire rating

FPN: UL guide information for electrical circuit protection systems (FHIT) contains information on proper installationrequirements to maintain the fire rating.

(3) Be protected by a listed thermal barrier system for electrical system components(4) Be protected by a listed fire-rated assembly that has a minimum fire rating of 1 hour and contains only emergency

wiring circuits.(5) Be embedded in not less than 50 mm (2 in.) of concrete(6) Be a cable listed to maintain circuit integrity for not less than 1 hour when installed in accordance with the listing

requirementsEquipment for feeder circuits (including transfer switches, transformers, and

panelboards) shall be located either in spaces fully protected by approved automatic fire suppression systems (includingsprinklers, carbon dioxide systems) or in spaces with a 1-hour fire resistance rating.

Editorial change for the placement of the Fine Point Note (FPN) that follows 700.9(D)(2) to berelocated to follow 700.9(D). Though the 2003 National Electrical Code Style Manual amended January 15, 2003 doesnot address the placement of FPNs, their placement should, like those of "Exceptions" (Ref. Style Manual in 2.6.1),"immediately follow the main rule to which they apply." In the case of the subject FPN, which provided additionalinformation about Occupancy Classification, it would be better served following 700.9(D) because of its mention of"occupancy classes".

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Delete method 6 as shown below.Emergency systems shall meet the additional requirements in 700.9(D)(1) and (D)(2) in


Feeder-circuit wiring shall meet one of the following conditions:(1) Be installed in spaces or areas that are fully protected by an approved automatic fire suppression system(2) Be a listed electrical circuit protective system with a minimum 1-hour fire ratingFPN: UL guide information for electrical circuit protection systems (FHIT) contains information on proper installation

requirements to maintain the fire rating.(3) Be protected by a listed thermal barrier system for electrical system components(4) Be protected by a listed fire-rated assembly that has a minimum fire rating of 1-hour and contains only emergency


requirements.Item (6) is encompassed by item (2). A “listed cable to maintain circuit integrity” is covered as a listed

electrical circuit protective system for power. All UL FHJR fire resistive cables are listed as an electrical circuitprotective system (FHIT).

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Revise text as follows:Emergency systems shall meet the additional requirements in 700.9(D)(1) and (D)(2) in


Feeder-circuit wiring shall meet one of the following conditions:(1) Be installed in spaces or areas that are fully protected by an approved automatic fire suppression system(2) Be a listed electrical circuit protective system with a minimum 21-hour fire ratingFPN: UL guide information for electrical circuit protection systems (FHIT) contains information on proper installation

requirements to maintain the fire rating.(3) Be protected by a listed thermal barrier system for electrical system components

(4) Be protected by a listed fire-rated assembly that has a minimum fire rating of 21-hour and contains only emergencywiring circuits.(5) Be embedded in not less than 50 mm (2 in.) of concrete

(6) Be a cable listed to maintain circuit integrity for not less than 1 hour when installed in accordance with the listingrequirements.

This proposal increases the time from 1 hour to 2 hours as was done last code cycle in 695.6(B). Theextended time is to allow occupants to exit the building as well as give fire fighters additional time to operate the firefighting equipment once people exit the building by extending the time the emergency circuits operate.Method (3) adds the duration of the fire rating and the same wording as method 4.Method (5) has deleted the 2 inches because in various applications e.g. slabs versus columns or with different

concrete, e.g. lightweight, siliceous, or carbonate; different concrete thickness may be required to meet the rating.Method (6) is encompassed by method (2). A “cable listed to maintain circuit integrity” is covered as a listed electrical

circuit protective system for power. All UL FHJR fire resistive cables are listed as an electrical circuit protective system(FHIT).

The panel accepts the recommended revisions to 700.9(D)(1)(2), (4), and (6) and accepts in principle therecommended revision to 700.9(D)(1)(3). The panel rejects the remainder of recommended revisions.

See the panel action on Proposal 13-173 relative to the panel action on 700.9(D)(1)(3). In regard tothe rejected portion of the recommendation on 700.9(D)(1)(5), the 2 in. of concrete has provided the industry with aprescriptive benchmark that has served the industry well. The substantiation does not demonstrate that use of 2 in. ofconcrete has compromised the integrity of the circuit. The recommendation does not provide an alternative prescriptiverequirement that can be easily applied.

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Revise text as follows:(1) Feeder- Circuit Wiring. Feeder -circuit wiring shall meet one of the following conditions:(1) Be installed in spaces or areas that are fully protected by an approved automatic fire suppression system.(2) Be a listed electrical circuit protective system with a minimum 2-hour fire rating.(3) Be protected by a listed thermal barrier system for electrical system components with a minimum 2-hour fire rating(4) Be protected by a listed fire-rated assembly that has a minimum fire rating of 2-hour and contains only emergency

wiring circuits.(5) Be embedded in not less than 50 mm (2 in.) of concrete(6) Be a cable listed to maintain circuit integrity for not less than 2 hours when installed in accordance with the listing

requirements.This will provide occupants necessary time for safe egress from the occupancy classes where this is

required. 1 hour is not sufficient time for high rise buildings or large assemblies of people to safely evacuate.

The panel accepts the recommended action except for that proposed for 700.9(D)(1)(6).The panel notes that the panel action on Proposal 13-171 deletes 700.9(D)(1)(6).

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-174 Log #3989 NEC-P13


Revise text as follows:(1) Feeder- Circuit Wiring. Feeder -circuit wiring shall meet one of the following conditions:(1) Be installed in spaces or areas that are fully protected by an approved automatic fire suppression system.(2) Be a listed electrical circuit protective system with a minimum 2-hour fire rating.(3) Be protected by a listed thermal barrier system for electrical system components with a minimum 2-hour fire rating(4) Be protected by a listed fire-rated assembly that has a minimum fire rating of 2-hour and contains only emergency

wiring circuits.(5) Be embedded in not less than 130 mm (5 in.) of concrete(6) Be a cable listed to maintain circuit integrity for not less than 2 hours when installed in accordance with the listing

requirements.This will provide occupants necessary time for safe egress from the occupancy classes where this is

required. 1 hour is not sufficient time for high rise buildings or large assemblies of people to safely evacuate.

The panel rejects the recommendation for 700.9(D)(1)(5). The panel accepts the remainder of the recommendation.The panel action on Proposal 13-171 deletes 700.9(D)(1)(6). In regard to the recommendation for

700.9(D)(1)(5), the 2 in. of concrete has provided the industry with a prescriptive benchmark that has served the industrywell. The substantiation does not demonstrate that use of 2 in. of concrete has compromised the integrity of the circuit.The recommendation does not provide an alternative prescriptive requirement that can be easily applied.

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Revise text as follows:(1) Feeder- Circuit Wiring. Feeder -circuit wiring shall meet one of the following conditions:(1) Be installed in spaces or areas that are fully protected by an approved automatic fire suppression system.(2) Be a listed electrical circuit protective system with a minimum 1-hour fire rating.(3) Be protected by a listed thermal barrier system for electrical system components.(4) Be protected by a listed fire-rated assembly that has a minimum fire rating of 1-hour and contains only emergency


requirements.50 mm (2 in.) of concrete has not been proven to provide sufficient protection from fire for standard

cables in conduit to survive a building fire for 2 hours as recognized in the other acceptable methods in 695.6 (B).

The 2 in. of concrete has provided the industry with a prescriptive benchmark that has served theindustry well. The substantiation does not demonstrate that use of 2 in. of concrete has compromised the integrity of thecircuit. The recommendation does not provide an alternative prescriptive requirement that can be easily applied.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-175a Log #CP1303 NEC-P13


Revise Section 700.9(D)(2) to read:(2) Feeder-Circuit Equipment. Equipment for feeder circuits (including transfer switches, transformers, and

panelboards) shall be located either in spaces fully protected by approved automatic fire suppression systems (includingsprinklers, carbon dioxide systems) or in spaces with a 1 2-hour fire resistance rating.FPN: For the definition of Occupancy Classification, see Section 6.1 of NFPA 101-2006, Life Safety Code.

The recommendation to revise 1-hour to 2-hour correlates the equipment space protectionrequirement with the revisions to the wiring method/system protection requirements resulting from the panel's actions onProposals 13-172, 13-173, and 13-174.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Daniel J. Wheeler, Wheeler’s Electric

Add new text as follows:Electrical rooms, telephone rooms, elevator machinery rooms and mechanical rooms: These rooms should have a

requirement that at least one light source and one convenience outlet be available on emergency power if the buildinghas an emergency source of power.

In the event of a total power failure in a building, the electrical rooms, mechanical rooms, telephonerooms and elevator machinery rooms, should have lighting in that room and at least one convenience outlet wired to anemergency source of power provided that the building has such a source. If the building does not have a/an emergencysource of power, then a battery powered emergency light(s) should be installed so as to provide a source of lighting inthe event of a total power failure and maintain a source of light for 1 ½ hours as per NFPA 101 7.9.2.1.

The emergency circuits are designated for systems intended to supply, distribute, and controlpower and illumination essential for safety to human life. The illumination and receptacles proposed in therecommendation is more suited for legally required standby power than for emergency since these lights andreceptacles are for maintenance purposes. The requirements for the areas to be supplied with emergency power areoutside the scope of the NEC.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Michael A. Anthony, University of Michigan Business Operations / Rep. Association of Education Facilities

ExecutivesAdd FPN 3 to the list as shown below:

Current supply shall be such that, in the event of fauilure of the normal supply to, or within, the building or group ofbuildings concerned, emergency lighting, emergency power, or both shall be available within the time required for theapplication but not to exceed 10 seconds. The supply system for emergency purposes, in addition to the normalservices to the building and meeting the general requirements of this section, shall be one or more of the types ofsystems described in 700.12(A) through (E). Unit equipment in accordance with 700.12(E) shall satisfy the applicablerequirements of this article.In selecting an emergency source of power, consideration shall be given to the occupancy and the type of service to be

rendered, whether of minimum duration, as for evacuation of a theater, or longer duration, as for supplying emergencypower and lighting due to an indefinite period of current failure from trouble either inside or outside the building.Equipment shall be designed and located so as to minimize the hazards that might cause complete failure due to

flooding, fires, icing, and vandalism.Equipment for sources of power as described in 700.12(A) through (E) where located within assembly occupancies for

greater than 1000 persons or in buildings above 23 m (75 ft) in height with any of the following occupancy classes —assembly, educational, residential, detention and correctional, business, and mercantile — shall be installed either inspaces fully protected by approved automatic fir suppression systems (sprinklers, carbon dioxide systems, and so forth)or in spaces with a 1-hour rating.FPN No. 1: For the definition of Occupancy Classification, see Section 6.1 of NFPA 101-2006, Life Safety Code.FPN No. 2: Assignment of degree of reliability of the recognized emergency supply system depends on the careful

evaluation of the variables at each particular installation.FPN No. 3: Quantitative methods provide more consistent results in reliability studies. For further information see

ANSI/IEE Standard 493: Recommended Practice for the Design of Reliable Industrial and Commercial Power Systems.The IEEE "Gold Book" is the most comprehensive document on quantitative methods for reliability in

the world. Since reliable power systems are as important to life safety as fire safety, all NFPA committees and NECusers should become more familiar with the terms and art of reliability engineering.

Fine Print Note No. 2 already provides the assignment of the degree of reliability for the evaluationof the variables making the addition of this new FPN No. 3 unnecessary.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-178 Log #3939 NEC-P13


Revise text to read as follows:Where internal combustion engines are used as the prime mover,

an on-site fuel supply shall be provided with an on-premises fuel supply sufficient for not less than 2 hours' full-demandoperation of the system. Where power is needed for the operation of the fuel transfer pumps to deliver fuel to agenerator set day tank, this pump shall be connected to the emergency power system.

Editorial change for the insertion of "Engines" in the title of 700.12(B)(2) because it is the subject andthis would be consistent with the title of a parallel topic in 701.11(B)(2).

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Revise text to read as follows:Prime movers shall not be solely dependent on a public utility gas system for their fuel supply

or municipal water supply for their cooling systems. Means shall be provided for automatically transferring from one fuelsupply to another where dual fuel supplies are used.

Editorial change for the insertion of "Fuel" in the title of 700.12(B)(3) because it is the adjective of thesubject and this would be consistent with the title of a parallel topic in 701.11(B)(3).

The requirement covers other than fuel supplies.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-180 Log #3454 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Joseph A. Ross, Haverhill, MA

Revise 700.12(B)(6) and add a new as follows:Where an outdoor housed generator set, equipped with a readily accessible disconnecting means, is located within

sight of the building or structure supplied, an additional disconnecting means shall not be required where ungroundedconductors serve or pass through the building or structure. The disconnecting means shall meet the requirements of225.36 be marked to identify it as being suitable for use as service equipment.

We are aware of the concerns that CMPs 10 and 13 have had with this issue. The concept of thisproposal is to address confusion in the field. The first sentence clarifies that it's the generator set (housed or nothoused) that is to be "within sight" of the building and not the disconnecting means. Over zealous AHJs have hadgenerator sets lifted and rotated so the disconnecting means faced the building. The second sentence clarifies thatconductors from the generator may be "outside feeders" (225.36) or could be "service conductors" (230.66), therefore,the revision. The Exception gives practical relief to some establishments that may desire to locate the generator at theedge of their parking lots and not in the middle of it (premium space, snow plowing, noise pollution, etc.). Also, thegenerator may serve more than one building (alarm systems, etc.).

The intent is for the generator disconnecting means to be in line of sight of the building, not thegenerator. The recommendation changes the intent of the existing requirement. The output conductors of the generatordo not involve service conductors, as alluded to in the substantiation. The output conductors of a generator are feederconductors and, if the generator is located outside the building and assuming the generator is a structure, the feedersand their disconnecting means are covered by Part II of Article 225. Where the generator is located in a parking lot notin close proximity to the building, an additional disconnecting means must be installed at the building to comply with PartII of Article 225. No technical substantiation was provided to permit the disconnecting means to not be located at thepoint where the feeder enters into the building in accordance with 225.32 with the accompanying four exceptions thatwould permit alternatives to this requirement.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Clyde V. Carl, North Carolina Dept. of Administration/State Construction Office

Delete text as follows:The disconnecting means shall meet the requirements of 225.36.

The sentence that was added to 700.12(B)(6) is superfluous with consideration to the requirements ofUL 869A and UL 2200. The physical requirements that determine a disconnecting means to be "suitable for use asservice equipment" are not found in NEC®. Consequently, the mandate that equipment must be suitable for use aservice equipment, without clear definition of how equipment may be suitable, may foster misunderstandings about howthe requirement may be satisfied. This is the thesis by which the proposed fine print note should be added to 225.36 tomitigate a misapplication for the "suitable for service equipment" requirement of 700.12(B)(6) that was revised for the2008 edition of the NEC®.In UL 869A, fourth edition, one learns in Section 14.2, Insulated neutral,

Paragraph 14.2.1, that, "Equipment having a neutral insulated from the enclosure, intended for use as serviceequipment, and that can accommodate not more than six main disconnecting means shall be marked "Suitable for useas service equipment." The NEC® definition for service equipment expands on UL 869A by stating, "The necessaryequipment, usually consisting of a circuit breaker(s) or switch(es) and fuse(s) and their accessories, connected to theload end of service conductors to a building or other structure, or an otherwise designated area, and intended toconstitute the main control and cutoff of the supply." The problem is that generator sets are, by the NEC® definition,separately derived systems. A separately derived system is, "A premises wiring system whose power is derived from asource of electrical energy or equipment other than a service. Such systems have no direct electrical connection,including a solidly connected grounded circuit conductor, to supply conductors originating in another system." Agenerator set is a separately derived system, therefore, there is no justification for 700.12(B)(6) to require thedisconnecting means of a generator set to be suitable for service equipment. 700.12(B)(6) is ambiguous in another way.In UL 2200, Section 25 discusses overcurrent protection, a requirement of

equipment suitable for service equipment, and output circuit grounding. UL 2200 does not specifically call out arequirement for a neutral that is insulated from the generator set enclosure, but Section 14, Output Circuit Grounding, inparagraph 14.1.2 requires that "an output alternating current power circuit shall be grounded" when in sub-paragraph (a)"the circuit has no electrical connection, including a solidly connected grounded circuit conductor, to supply conductorsoriginating in another wiring system." Conversely, the alternating current output power circuit must be insulated fromground at the generator if the circuit shares a neutral conductor ground reference with another system, or a service. Ifthe grounded conductor is not to be shared with another system, or service, UL 2200 goes on in paragraph 14.1.4 todescribe the application and sizing of a bonding jumper to ground conductors of output circuit configurations listed inparagraph 14.1.3. A bonding jumper would not be required if a generator output circuit was bonded to ground at thefactory. If this were the case, the generator set output, though a separately derived system, could only be utilized in themanner of service entrance equipment, and if UL 2200 was similar to UL 869A, it would require the generator set to belabeled, "Suitable only for use as service equipment", unless its output enclosure can accommodate more than sixdisconnecting means, and then it would be required to be labeled. "Suitable only for use as service equipment. Installnot more than six main disconnecting means."

In the substantiation the submitter states that as far as the NEC is concerned, generators areseparately derived systems and that is incorrect. To determine whether the generator is a separately derived system,both the transfer switch and the bonding and grounding within the generator must be determined. If the generator ismanufactured with the neutral isolated from the frame, then the transfer switch can either switch all of the conductors,including the neutral, if there is one, or switches only the phase conductors and not the neutral. Where the neutral is nottied down and not switched by the transfer switch, the system is not separately derived so Section 250.30 is notfollowed. Where the neutral is tied internal to the generator and not accessible to the installer to isolate, the generatormust be installed as a separately derived system and must comply with 250.30 with the neutral switched by the transferswitch, if there is a neutral. These issues are key to the generator feeder (generators are not considered by the NEC tobe services) disconnecting means, and critical to that issue is whether the neutral, where provided, is able to be isolatedfrom the frame of the disconnecting means at the building. Compliance with 225.36 is essential to the disconnectingmeans to be able to have the neutral isolated from the disconnect enclosure or not, depending upon whether thegenerator is a separately derived system, so deleting the last sentence is not acceptable.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Robert G. Fahey, City of Janesville

Add new text as follows:700.12(F)Exception No. 1: In a separate and uninterrupted area supplied by a minimum of three normal lighting circuits, a

separate branch circuit for unit equipment shall be permitted if it originates from the same panelboard as that of thenormal lighting circuits and is provided with a lock-on feature.Exception No. 2: Unit equipment located on the exterior of buildings, outside of exit doors shall be permitted to be on

the same emergency lighting circuit as is the unit equipment illuminating the area immediately inside the same exit door.The addition of the 2nd Exception will allow a practice which is commonly done in the State where I

inspect electrical wiring, this practice also appears to take place in other areas of the United States, as ElectricalEngineers from other areas of the United States designs include this concept. The present wording in 700.12(F) requiresthe outside unit equipment to be supplied off of the outside lighting circuit, the common practice is to use the unitequipment inside the exit door, typically an exit/emergency light with the capability of supplying remote heads, thus theelectrician will install 2 remote lights outside the exit door, utilizing the emergency lighting circuit inside the building andnot the lighting circuit which supplies the outside lights, normally wall packs. This exception would, in my mind, notreduce safety, as when the interior normal lighting circuit is compromised, the interior emergency lights will activate boththe emergency lights inside and outside the exit door(s), giving the occupants a safe passage to the exit and away fromthe building.


The panel action clarifies the intent of the recommendation.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-183 Log #2244 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Mark T. Rochon, Peabody, MA

Add new text to read as follows:The branch circuit feeding the unit equipment shall be the same branch circuit as that serving the normal lighting in the

area and connected ahead of any local switches without energizing unit equipment in other lit areas.In a large new building, the emergency battery units where not wired on the normal lighting branch

circuit. The problem was resolved by adding many relays, wired that when any circuit tripped or was shut off all theemergency battery units would energize in that area, room or corridor when the normal lighting was on draining theother battery units that were not needed.

The third sentence in the second paragraph of 700.12(F), clearly requires the branch circuit feedingthe unit equipment to be the same branch circuit as that serving the normal lighting in the area and connected ahead ofany local switches. The other unit equipment in those other areas must be connected to the lighting branch circuit inthat area so the proposed additional is unnecessary and misleading.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Stanley J. Folz, Henderson, NV


This lockable disconnect concept is used through the code. One definition in Article 100 wouldharmonize its use in all Articles. This proposal was developed by a Task Group that was appointed by the NECTechnical Correlating Committee and consisted of Stanley J. Folz, Chair, Monte Ewing, Ralph Pritchard, Sondra Todd,and Randy Yasenchak.A companion proposal has been submitted to Article 100 containing a new definition for "Disconnecting Means,

Lockable."

The substantiation does not support the recommended change. The current text is clear as to theintended function of this device.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-185 Log #111 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________

Samuel Goble, Department of General Services / Rep. Commonwealth of VirginiaRevise text to read:

"...failure of any individual lighting element component such as the burning out of a light bulb lamp or ballast, cannot...".The term "element" is often confused for a "filament". Using an example can often confuse the intent of

the code section, such as in this example. Replacing the word "element" with "component" does not change the intent ormeaning of this code section and replaces a layman's term such as the "element" often misused as the filament of alamp. Using the term "component" covers all parts of all types of luminaries.

The phrase “light bulb” was replaced with the word “lamp” in the 2008 NEC. The proposed changefrom “element” to “component” can be misleading and confusing. There was no technical substantiation for adding“ballast” to the requirement for the failure of any one element. A ballast is not an element of individual lighting.Acceptance of this proposed text would require redundant ballast for no reason.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-186 Log #656 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Samuel J. Goble, Just Good Electrical Code Training

Revise text to read as follows:"...failure of any individual lighting element component such as the burning out of a lamp or ballast cannot...".

The term "element" is often confused for a "filament". Using an example can often confuse the intent ofthe code section, such as in this example. Replacing the word "element" with "component" does not change the intent ormeaning of this code section and replaces a layman's term such as the word "element" often misused as the "filament"of a lamp. Using the term "component", covers all parts of all types of luminaries.


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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Mark R. Hilbert, Wolfeboro, NH

Revise 700.17 as follows:700.17 Branch Circuits for Emergency Lighting.Branch circuits that supply emergency lighting shall be installed to provide service from a source complying with

700.12 when the normal supply for lighting is interrupted. Such installations shall provide either of the following:(1) An emergency lighting supply, independent of the general normal lighting supply, with provisions for automatically

transferring the emergency lights upon the event of failure of the general normal lighting system branch circuit, supply(2) Two or more branch circuits supplied from separate and complete systems with independent power supply sources.

One of the two power sources and systems shall be part of the emergency system and the other shall be permitted to bepart of the normal power source and system. each Each system shall provide providing sufficient current for emergencylighting purposes.Unless both systems are used for regular lighting purposes and are both kept lighted, means shall be provided for

automatically energizing either system upon failure of the other. Either or both systems shall be permitted to be a part ofthe general lighting system of the protected occupancy if circuits supplying lights for emergency illumination are installedin accordance with other sections of this article.

Revising this section as proposed will clarify that the requirements of the section are branch circuitlevel requirements and how these branch circuits are installed. Although the term "branch circuit" is used in the openingsentence, including it in the title of the section will heighten the awareness that this section provides information forbranch circuits supplying emergency lighting.Section 700.17 is often misunderstood and the proposed revisions to (1) and (2) should provide a clearer

understanding of how branch circuits for emergency lighting purposes should be installed and operate.By replacing the words "general" with "normal" and adding the term "branch circuit" as indicated in 700.17(1) will make

it clear that the emergency lighting supply must be independent of the normal lighting supply and that it mustautomatically operate when there is a failure of the branch circuit supplying the normal lighting. The fact that theemergency lighting must operate upon a failure of the normal lighting branch circuit is often overlooked.Revising 700.17(2) as recommended will clarify that the requirement of this section is for the area requiring the

emergency lighting to be supplied by a minimum of two branch circuits that originate from separate systems withdifferent power sources. These facts and the fact this section is also addressing times when the normal power ispresent are often overlooked. Unlike 700.17(1) where a failure of the normal lighting branch circuit will activate theemergency lighting supply, an area supplied by only one emergency lighting branch circuit will be in total darkness ifthere is a failure of that branch circuit. For example; it is not uncommon to find installations where a single branch circuitfrom an emergency lighting branch circuit panelboard, which is being used as part of the general lighting, has been runto a stairwell (means of egress). In this example, any time there is a failure of the branch circuit supplying the stairwell,the stairwell would be in total darkness. If two branch circuits from separate systems had been run to the stairwell asrequired by 700.17(2) and there is a failure of one branch circuit, the other would still provide the necessary lighting.The word "systems" has been removed from the last paragraph as indicated to provide a clearer understanding that

both systems are actually permitted to provide general lighting for the protected occupancy.

Revise the recommendation to read:

Branch circuits that supply emergency lighting shall be installed to provide service from a source complying with 700.12when the normal supply for lighting is interrupted. Such installations shall provide either of the following:(1) An emergency lighting supply, independent of the general normal lighting supply, with provisions for automatically

transferring the emergency lights upon the event of failure of the general normal lighting system branch circuit, supply(2) Two or more branch circuits supplied from separate and complete systems with independent power supply sources.

One of the two power sources and systems shall be part of the emergency system and the other shall be permitted to bepart of the normal power source and system. each Each system shall provide providing sufficient power current foremergency lighting purposes.Unless both systems are used for regular lighting purposes and are both kept lighted, means shall be provided for

automatically energizing either system upon failure of the other. Either or both systems shall be permitted to be a part ofthe general lighting system of the protected occupancy if circuits supplying lights for emergency illumination are installedin accordance with other sections of this article.”

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Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 70The remainder of the proposed text accepted as is.

The panel has replaced the term "current" with "power" to ensure that proper voltage is maintainedat the equipment being supplied.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Steven R. Terry, Electronic Theatre Controls Inc.

Add new section as follows:700.24 (new) Emergency Lighting Automatic Control. Where an emergency lighting load is automatically energized

upon loss of the normal supply, an automatic load control relay shall be permitted to energize the load. Where anemergency lighting load is automatically energized, upon loss of the normal supply, by transferring the load from anormal supply branch circuit to a different, unswitched, emergency supply branch circuit, an automatic transfer switchshall be used for such energization.

Two new classes of device have emerged in the last few years:1. Listed stand-alone Automatic Load Control Relays. This device was traditionally part of emergency unit equipment

but UL now lists stand-alone devices under UL924.2. UL 1008-listed Automatic Transfer switches of one to 48 circuits specifically designed for transferring emergency

loads between a normal branch circuit and a different, emergency branch circuit. Previously, listed ATSs were usedprimarily in feeder applications, not on branch circuit loads.There is ongoing confusion in the specification and installation community concerning the proper application of these

two devices on branch circuits. The UL924 Load Control Relay is often misapplied as an Automatic Transfer Switch in abranch circuit application. UL has publicly asserted that UL924 Load Control Relays are not to be used to transfer a loadbetween two non-synchronous power sources, and that only a UL1008 device is suitable for this application. In theSpring 2005 issue of "The Code Authority" (UL's newsletter on Code issues), the article "Focus on Emergency LightingEquipment " appears on page 3 (see Exhibit A provided with this proposal). In the second paragraph, that article states:

In addition the UL white book clearly differentiates Automatic Transfer Switches (product category WPWR) andAutomatic Load Control Relays (product cateory FTBR).Nevertheless, misapplication of these devices continues, perhaps because it is so easy to misunderstand the

limitations of Load Control relays. This is not helped by the fact that at least 3 manufacturers of stand-alone UL924 LoadControl Relays describe these products as "Transfer" devices in their literature (see Exhibit B provided with thisproposal). Such literature also encourages misapplication of these devices as transfer switches through installationdiagrams that show transfer of the load between normal and emergency sources, in direct contravention to UL'sstatement above.Load Control Relays are not suitable for transfer between two non-synchronous power sources because:A. They do not have mechanisms required by UL1008 to prevent inadvertent connection of the normal and emergency

sources, andB. They do not undergo fault-current evaluation that is required of UL1008 transfer switches.Because it is so easy for engineers and installers to misapply Load Control Relays as transfer devices on branch

circuits, Article 700 should clarify the correct application of these two devices. Efforts by UL alone have beenunsuccessful in preventing field misapplication of Load Control Relays as transfer switches.I have made a separate proposal in this cycle to add a definition of Automatic Load Control Relays in 700.2(new).Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.

Revise text to read as follows:If an emergency lighting load is automatically energized upon loss of the

normal supply, a listed automatic load control relay shall be permitted to energize the load. The load control relay shallnot be used as transfer equipment.

The panel action clarifies the permitted use of this equipment and that this type of equipmentcannot be used as transfer equipment. The action also imposes a requirement for this type of equipment to be listed.

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Revise text to read as follows:Change “per” to “in accordance with”.

This revision will comply with the recommendations in the NEC Style Manual and the Manual of Stylefor NFPA Technical Committee Documents and provide consistency throughout the Code. “Per” is not an appropriateterm for a standard.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Christopher G. Walker, Eaton Corp.

Add new text to read as follows:(A) FeedersWhere ground-fault protection has been provided for the operation of the service disconnecting means or feeder

disconnecting means as specified by 230.95 or 215.10, an additional step of ground-fault protection shall be provided inall next level feeder disconnecting means downstream toward the load.

Such protection shall consist of overcurrent devices, current transformers, or other equivalent protective equipmentthat shall cause the feeder disconnecting devices to open.The additional levels of ground-fault protection shall NOT be installed as follows:1. On electrical systems that are not solidly grounded wye systems with greater than 150 volts to ground, but not more

than 600 volts phase-to-phase.2. On electrical systems where a non-orderly shutdown of power will introduce additional or increased hazards.Where ground-fault protection has been provided for the operation of service level or feeder level disconnecting

means, these means shall be selectively coordinated such that the feeder level device, but not the service level device,shall open on ground faults on the load side of the feeder level device.A 6-cycle minimum separation time between the service and feeder ground fault trip response bands shall be provided.

Ground faults are typically believed to be the most common type of fault experienced in operatingenergized electrical systems, per ANSI/IEEE Std 242-1986 Buff book, chapter 7. Professional design engineers tellstories of ballast or small motor failures that have caused main or feeder devices to open. Why is this so? In someinstances, a ground fault condition existed that went undetected and precipitated the protective device to open. In othercases, ground fault protective devices were improperly set, or not set at all. In others, a selective coordination study maynot have been done, or may have been done improperly.Therefore, with the goal of using selective coordination as the process by which electrical systems may achieve

maximum uptime, it is important that all he key areas of impact are addressed in the design of these electrical systems.The NEC has for many years required ground fault protection of equipment, but only at the service disconnect level

(with noted special exceptions), per Article 230.95. The relatively recent 2005 and 2008 NEC versions, requiresselective coordination in applications related to life safety, public safety, and/or national security applications wherereliable electrical power systems are required.These relatively new requirements for selective coordination in these types of applications are needed throughout the

entire service level, feeder and branch levels of the electrical system.With the goal in mind of maximizing the reliability and uptime of electrical systems, and giving consideration that the

most common types of faults are ground fault related, it becomes a reasonable approach that whenever selectivecoordination is required by the Code, that the requirements for ground fault protection of equipment be extended to allappropriate areas in the electrical system beyond just the service level.This proposal mirrors a similar requirement for ground fault protection of equipment that currently exists in NEC Article

708.52 for Critical Operations Power Systems (COPS). This proposal therefore recommends enhancing the reliability ofthe electrical system by requiring ground fault protection of equipment in all appropriate levels of the system wheneverthere are also requirements for selective coordination in that system.

Section 700.26 permits the alternate source for emergency systems to not have ground-faultprotection of equipment with automatic disconnecting means. Where it alarms, the ground-fault indication of theemergency source must be provided in accordance with 700.7(D). This means that the GFP would alarm and notify thefacility-engineering department or other designated entity so there is no reason to require an additional level of GFP asis required for health care facilities in 517.17.It seems to be the intent of this proposal to make sure that the emergency system remains selectively coordinated for allfault conditions, including ground faults. The selective coordination required by 700.27 already includes all types ofovercurrent, including, but not limited to, phase-to-phase and three phase faults, and phase-to-ground, doublephase-to-ground, and three phase-to-ground faults. As such, the intent of this proposal is already met in the existingtext, since total selective coordination is already required for all types of overcurrent, including ground faults in 700.27.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Malcolm Allison, Ferraz Shawmut / Rep. National Electric Fuse Association (NEFA)

Add a second paragraph.Ground fault relays on the normal source side (line side of the transfer switch) that supply emergency systems are

permitted to be restrained from operating for ground faults on the loadside of the transfer switch if the system complieswith both of the following:(A) Ground fault protection relays on the normal source side (line side of the transfer switch) are not restrained from

operation for ground faults on the normal source side (line side of the transfer switch)(B) Audible and visual signal devices indicate whenever a ground fault relay has been restrained. Instructions on the

course of action to be taken in the event of an indicated ground fault shall be located at or near the sensor location.For life-safety purposes and system reliability for the prevention of blackouts, it is desirable that a

ground-fault on the load side of a transfer switch in an emergency system not take out the ground fault protection on thenormal source. This proposal allows the ground fault protection on the normal source to be restrained from operatingand taking down all or large portions of the normal system because of a ground fault on the load side of the transferswitch. For these critical life-safety-related applications, it requires both audible and visual signaling that a ground faulthas occurred and that it is being restrained. Restraining the normal system ground fault protection relays for faults onthe load side of the transfer switch is consistent with the concept of continuity of service for emergency systems (700.26& 700.7(D)), legally required standby systems (701.17), and healthcare essential electrical systems (517.17(B).Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.

There was no technical substantiation provided for installing ground fault protection relays on thenormal source side of the transfer switch. Determining the fault on the emergency (load) side of the transfer switchrequires specialized sensors and ground fault protection relays with a design system and additional equipment notprovided as part of the substantiation. This technical information must be provided to the panel with operational designinformation, safety features, and other technical information to ensure the proper operation of this sensing system.

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Revise 700.26.700.26 Ground-Fault Protection of Equipment.(A) Alternate Source. The alternate source for emergency systems shall not be required to have ground-fault protection

of equipment with automatic disconnecting means. Ground-fault indication in the emergency (alternate) source shall beprovided per 700.7(D).(B) Normal Source. Ground-fault protection shall not be required for a disconnecting means in the normal source

supplying an emergency system where the disconnecting means supplies only fire pumps, emergency systems, orlegally required standby systems. Ground-fault indication in the emergency (normal) source shall be provided per700.7(D).

Where a disconnecting means supplies only fire pumps, emergency loads, and legally requiredstandby loads, that disconnecting means should be allowed to operate as long as possible during a ground-fault, withoutopening the life-safety-related loads. Keep the loads on as long as possible. Because ground-fault operation of thedisconnecting means would not be required, signaling would be necessary. This proposal provides the same ''safetylogic" for the normal source as the Code already provides for the alternate source.700.7(D) does not need to change if this proposal is accepted, since 700.7(D) now requires the sensor to be located

ahead of the disconnecting means for the "emergency source", and the source for the emergency system can be eitherthe 'normal" or the 'alternate" source.

The requirements of Section 695.6(H) already addresses ground-fault protection of equipment inthe normal and alternate supplies to a fire pump. However, short circuit and ground fault protection still must beprovided for the normal circuit supplying other critical loads. A ground fault or a short circuit anywhere in the feeder oron a branch circuit could cause loss of the entire power source, such as a generator, a UPS system, a fuel cell system,or similar power source, resulting in the loss of more than just the one feeder.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-193 Log #4908 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________James Brozek, Acton, MA

Delete 700.26 entirely. This is a companion proposal in association with a proposal covering new240.27 and 240.28, which consolidates requirements from 240.13, 230.95, 700.26, 215.10, 517.17, and 708.52.

If the proposal for new 240.27 and 240.28 is accepted, 700.26 will no longer be necessary.

Sections 240.27 and 240.28 are not under the jurisdiction of Panel 13; therefore, there is noinformation on what is covered by the “companion” proposals or what action Panel 10 will have taken on theseproposals. In addition, the submitter has not provided any technical substantiation to support his recommendation.

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Add new text to read as follows:Overcurrent devices shall be selected by a qualified person to optimize selective coordination and arc flash protection

(NFPA 70E).Designing electrical systems with overcurrent protective devices that are to be selectively coordinated

involves using data from the device manufacturers, and conducting analyses of the various conditions that the electricalsystem may experience. The choice of overcurrent protective devices involves the study and analysis of both phase andground fault currents, and cover currents that ranges from low level overloads up to high short circuit fault current levels.In addition, there are applications that are justified per NFPA 70E-2004 that allow installation and maintenance

personnel to perform work close to energized conductors. For these applications where personnel are working in closecontact with energized conductors, design studies are to be conducted to determine the possible levels of arc flashenergy that personnel may be exposed to, and the subsequent levels of protective equipment that should be in place.It should be evident that the correct selection of protective devices is very important to minimize damage to equipment,

minimize the loss of power in key electrical systems, and minimize the arc flash energy exposure to personnel wheneverelectrical fault conditions occur. The correct selection of the protective devices that will satisfy these conditions must bedone by persons that are qualified to perform the appropriate types of analysis and studies. A thorough analysis isneeded to ensure optimal selection of protective devices, otherwise, it may result in excessive equipment damageand/or personnel injury.The current National Electric Code specifies the types of systems that require selective coordination. The Code does

not identify who is responsible for ensuring that the electrical systems meet the selective coordination requirements.Therefore, this proposal simply adds verbiage to clarify who is responsible for ensuring that the electrical systems meet

the current selective coordination requirements, while also addressing equipment protection and personnel safety.

In Section 215.5, an authority having jurisdiction (AHJ) can require a diagram showing feederdetails prior to the installation of the feeders and then can require a certain level of expertise for the design of thesefeeders. Section 240.12 already permits selective coordination for orderly shutdown of the system as a permissive rule.Section 110.16 requires a sign be posted at the distribution equipment, panelboards, switchboards, and similar

equipment warning qualified personnel of the potential electric arc flash hazard. The NEC covers the installation of theelectrical system, and NFPA 70E provides coverage once the system has been energized. There may be manyreasons a designer provides a particular type of overcurrent protective device for a certain system, with arc flash as oneof the many considerations and selective coordination as another.

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Revise text to read as follows:Emergency system(s) overcurrent devices shall be selectively coordinated with all emergency

system supply side overcurrrent protective devices for faults with a duration of 0.1 seconds and longer.The text used in the comment is preferred over the original text for the following reasons:

1. Language similar to this language is being utilized by some states, for example Oregon & Florida, as a means toapply the intent of selective coordination.2. Article700.1 states that the scope of Article 700 is: "The provisions of this article apply to the electrical safety of the

installation, operation and maintenance of emergency systems ….to required facilities when the normal electrical supplyor system in interrupted." If the normal system has been interrupted there is no need for the emergency system toselectively coordinate with it. Changing "all supply side" to "all emergency system supply side" will make this intentclear.This clarification also prevents mandating the complete use of fuses on facilities that have over 100,000 amperes of faultcurrent available on the normal side. If normal side fault current exceeds 100,000 amperes automatic transfer switchesmust have fuses on the supply side. Almost always, once a current limiting fuse is used in a selectively coordinatedsystem, every overcurrent protective device downstream must also be a fuse.3. The addition of the 0.1 second criteria will permit the use of interchangeable data to determine selective

coordination that is not dependent on a single manufacturer. When analysis is done for fault currents in excess of 0.1seconds, graphic time current curves can be used to determine selective coordination. When time periods are shorterthan 0.1 seconds, and especially when they are shorter than a quarter cycle, manufacturers must be consulted todetermine if devices selectively coordinate. These manufacturers will only provide proprietary selective coordinationdata, limiting competition.4. The addition of the 0.1 second criteria will make energized electrical systems safer to work on than what is obtained

with the present language. If circuit breakers are used for selective coordination the upstream circuit breakers must relyon delayed tripping to give downstream circuit breakers the opportunity to trip first. Delaying the tripping of circuitbreakers increases the amount of arc flash energy that is delivered to a fault. Calculations comparing the arc faultcurrent and associated requirements for personal protective equipment worn by electricians on a selectively coordinatedsystem and a partial selectively coordinated system are shown in the following Table. The partial selectivelycoordinated system does not delay the instantaneous tripping of circuit breakers, but is selectively coordinated for faultconditions lasting longer than 0.1 seconds.

***Insert Table 1 Here***

Table 1. Personal Protective Equipment Requirements for Two Systems at Various Fault Current Intervals.Table Notes:1. On this model system there is 100 feet of wire between each of the circuit breaker sizes indicated in the first

column. Calculations were made per IEEE 1584 using software furnished by SKM. Similar results are obtained usingNFPA 70E for faults rated below 50,000 amperes.2. Fault current levels are indicated by 10kA=10,000 amperes, 100kA=100,000 amperes, etc.3. The goal of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is to limit injury to if the wearer

experiences an arc flash. PPE Category 0 clothing approaches everyday construction clothing in appearance, PPECategory 4 is a completely enclosing jumpsuit. There is no protective clothing available above Category 4, hence thesesituations are designated as dangerous.4. This table is a single example, but gives an appropriate indication of overall trends. There will be various

alternatives and exceptions that comprise a minority of applications.5. Worker safety distance increases with the rating of the protective device.The Table clearly shows that PPE hazard Cat 3 and Cat 4 conditions are far more prevalent on a fully coordinated

system.Emergency systems are always required in larger facilities and many of these facilities operate 24 hours a day.

Although working on live systems is to be avoided wherever possible, maintenance and modification of energized

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Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 70switchboards and panelboards in large facilities is often risked to avoid interrupting usage. Some maintenance andinspection activities such as voltage checks and infrared scans can only be done while the equipment is energized.Electricians working on energized equipment and any others that are within the arc flash boundary may be subject toinjury if a fault occurs.Although selective coordination of the emergency system was added to NFPA 70 in 2005, it is still too early to track anddirectly attribute an increase of electrician injuries on selectively coordinated systems. Large projects that weredesigned to the 2005 NEC are just now completing construction and it will be some years before these systems requiresignificant maintenance or will undergo modifications. However some selectively coordinated systems are starting toappear and the potential for injury to electricians is increasing. Arc flash hazards affect the lives of electricians (andothers that work in the vicinity of electricians) everyday, the following information was taken from various NFPApublications:●

(NFPA Catalog Website, July 2008)●

("Hey Electricians" NFPA Electrical Section Website October, 2008.)● (NON- FIRE

ELECTRICAL RESCUE INCIDENTS REPORTED TO FIRE DEPARTMENTS IN 2003, Jennifer D. Flynn, NFPA, August2007)●

(IBEW statement in NFPA 70 2002 ROC 1-152, regarding an accepted proposal to add Section110-116 Flash Protection to NFPA 70)Additional information on electrical injuries and deaths can be found by searching "electrician" on OSHA's website. It'sclear from historical records that electrical systems are hazardous, that people become exposed to live electricalsystems even though they are not suppose to be, and that injuries and deaths occur. It is also evident from the abovecalculations that selective coordination will increase the amount of energy available to injure or kill, and accordingly wewill eventually see additional deaths and more severe injuries in the work place.Circuit breakers are used for the examples in this substantiation statement, which the author finds to be the predominantchoice of those that own and operate facilities. If a facility owner prefers to have fuses throughout their system, theissues identified in this substantiation are still present, but to a lesser extent.5. When selective coordination was added to NFPA 70 in 2005 there was no documentation citing historical injuries or

loss of life as a result of electrical systems that were not selectively coordinated, hence the consequences of reducingthe selective coordination requirements of 700.27 to what is stated herein are minimal.Note that the proposed comment also applies to NEC 701.18.

The 0.1 second limit in this proposal could reduce the level of safety by limiting the types ofovercurrents that would need to be isolated to the nearest upstream device. Requiring selective coordination down toonly 0.1 seconds will cover only overloads and a few minor phase-to-phase and minor ground faults.

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Revise text to read as follows:Emergency system(s) overcurrent devices shall be selectively coordinated with all supply side

overcurrrent protective devices. The first emergency system branch circuit overcurrent protective device upstream ofoutlets or utilization equipment shall selectively coordinate with all upstream overcurrent protective devices. Additionalselective coordination is not required between overcurrent protective devices that are upstream of the first overcurrentprotective device that serves outlets and utilization equipment.

1. Real world overcurrent conditions most commonly occur near the load, for example too many itemsof equipment plugged into electrical outlets or a short circuit occurring during a light fixture change out.. This proposalfocuses selective coordination language where it is needed most.2. This proposal also reduces arc flash hazards. It does not do so as completely as the "0.1 second criteria" does, but

there is some benefit. There is only one layer of delay, not multiple cascading layers. By limiting the selectivecoordination to the first node, subsequent supply side overcurrent protective devices don't need cascaded operationaldelays, with an associated increase of the arc flash hazard3. By limiting the extent of selective coordination this proposal permits facility power system designers some flexibility

in how distribution panels are configured and placed. System maintenance, arc flash hazards and economics can beconsidered with selective coordination.4. This proposal offers benefits to circuit breaker manufacturers who won't have to resort to ANSI rated switchgear to

achieve selectively coordinated systems. One fuse manufacturer recently introduced a combination circuit breaker andfuse branch circuit panelboard that can be used to an advantage under this proposal, because applying fuses to the firstovercurrent protective device will make coordination with all upstream overcurrent protective devices easier to achieve.If this proposal is accepted a similar proposal should be made for Section 701.18.


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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Malcolm Allison, Ferraz Shawmut

Amend 700.27 as follows.

Normal system overcurrent protective devices on the supply side of the emergency systemovercurrent protective devices shall not be required to be selectively coordinated with other supply side, normal systemovercurrent protective devices.

Emergency system(s) overcurrent devices shall be selectively coordinated with all supplyside overcurrent protective devices unless one of the following conditions in (1) through (5) are met.(1) Transformer Overcurrent Protective Devices. Between transformer primary and secondary overcurrent protective

devices, where only one overcurrent protective device or set of overcurrent protective devices exists on the transformersecondary.(2) Overcurrent Protective Devices of the Same Size. Between overcurrent protective devices of the same size

(ampere rating) installed in series.(3) Expansion of an Existing Emergency System - Existing Overcurrent Protective Devices. Between existing

emergency system overcurrent protective devices and any existing supply side overcurrent protective devices, wherethe emergency system is expanded.(4) Expansion of an Existing Emergency System - New Overcurrent Protective Devices. Between new emergency

system overcurrent protective devices and any existing supply side overcurrent protective devices, where theemergency system is expanded.(5) Designed Under Engineering Supervision. Where a licensed professional engineer, engaged primarily in the design

of electrical installations, provides stamped documentation showing the specific circuit that cannot be selectivelycoordinated, and substantiation of the design alternatives that were analyzed in the failed attempt to achieve selectivecoordination. This documentation shall be available to those authorized to design, install, inspect, maintain, and operatethe system.FPN: These are several techniques that help to selectively coordinate an electrical distribution

system(a) Where transfer switches are utilized, utilizing several smaller transfer switches rather than one larger transfer

switch, and moving the transfer switches down in the system, closer to the loads.(b) Utilizing short-time delay(c) Utilizing devices with an adjustable instantaneous trip(d) Utilizing smaller downstream devices(e) Utilizing several smaller downstream devices rather than one larger downstream device(f) Utilizing upstream devices with larger frame sizes(g) Utilizing fuse manufacturers' ratio charts(h) Utilizing circuit breaker manufacturers' selective coordination charts(i) Utilizing differential relays(j) Utilizing isolation transformers(k) Minimizing the number of levels in a distribution system(I) Utilizing a greater number of smaller feeders, rather than a smaller number of larger feeders(m) Utilizing impedance grounded systems(n) Utilizing high-instantaneous trip circuit breakers

***Insert Figure 700.27 Clarification of Selective Coordination Requirements***

This proposal is an attempt to clarify the confusion concerning selective coordination requirements.(1) Figure 700.27 has been added to clarify which devices are emergency side devices, and which are normal side

devices. This figure should be included in the NEC® text. Figure 700.27 was based upon a figure from an necdigest®article, Keep The Power On For Vital Loads, by Evangelos Stoyas, December 2007Copyright© 2007, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA.(2)"(A) Normal System" was added because there have been questions about the need for selective coordination of

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Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 70the overcurrent devices on the normal side, on the line side of the transfer switch. Since Devices 5 and 6 are not reallypart of the emergency system, 700.27 does not apply, and therefore 5 and 6 dc not need to selectively coordinate witheach other.(3)"(B) (1)" and "(B)(2)" are taken from existing text. No changes made(4) "(B)(3)" was added because there have been questions about the need for existing devices to selectively

coordinate when an emergency system is expanded or modified. This proposal clarifies that existing devices do nothave to be replaced if they do not already selectively coordinate.(5) "(B)(4)" was added because there have been questions about the need for new devices to selectively coordinate

with existing devices when an emergency system is expanded or remodeled. This clearly states that new devices do nothave to selectively coordinate with the existing devices.(6) "(B)(5)" was added for those few cases where selective coordination is simply not possible. It is not meant to be a

"blank check" to allow designers to avoid their responsibility to provide a selectively coordinated system. Therequirements are very similar to those found in 240.86 and are meant to ensure that all reasonable attempts have beenmade to achieve the objective. Once all attempts have been exhausted, the engineer simply documents the circuit inquestion and shows the techniques that were attempted.(7) The FPN was added to provide some of the common methods that experienced engineers utilize to obtain selective

coordination. It is not all-inclusive, and has been carefully worded so as not to include any requirements.

The proposal for “(A) Normal System” covers devices in the normal source that are outside thescope of Article 700. While the concept is correct, the additional text is unnecessary. The proposed figure is alsounnecessary.While the concepts in (B), (B)(1), and (B)(2) are basically unchanged from the 2008 NEC, the change is not neededbecause all other portions of this proposal are also rejected.(B)(3) is rejected because 700.27 is not retroactive for existing systems.(B)(4) is rejected because no technical substantiation was provided to justify the reduced continuity of service that

would result from the elimination of the requirement of new devices to selectively coordinate with upstream existingdevices.(B)(5) is rejected because no technical justification was provided as to why selective coordination cannot be achieved

in all situations. In addition, no information was provided as to which or how many design alternatives the consultingengineer needs to analyze and submit in the required documentation.The FPN is rejected because technical substantiation was not provided for any of the 14 listed techniques.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Dan Giblin, National Electric Fuse Assn. (NEFA)


(Keep present text and add the following at the end)Selective coordination is required for the full range of overcurrents up to the highest available short-circuit current

available at the lineside of each overcurrent protective device. The consideration shall include evaluation for theavailable short-circuit current from the normal supply and alternate supply as well as the transfer switch type.

The purpose of this addition is to clarify that selective coordination is for the full range of availableovercurrents. Some people in the industry have contended that the present requirement is not clear on the range ofovercurrent that must be considered. When 700.27 was voted as a requirement during the 2005 NEC cycle and thenreaffirmed during the 2008 cycle, Code Making Panel 13 substantiated that this requirement is for the full range ofovercurrents. For instance, Comment 20-13 in part “…

The available short-circuit current must be considered for the worst case from the normal source, alternate source, orboth for a closed transition transfer switch. If a fault occurs on an emergency load being supplied by the normal sourceand both the emergency branch circuit overcurrent protective device and emergency feeder overcurrent protectivedevice open, then when the power is transferred to the alternate source, loads supplied by the affected feeder willunnecessarily be interrupted.There is no simple alternative to use other than for the full range of available short-circuit currents. Some in the

industry are advocating changing the selective coordination requirement to only times greater than 0.1 second. Theparagraphs below illustrate why this is not viable.Permitting the selective coordination requirement to be for times only greater than 0.1 second will allow

non-coordinated operation of multiple levels of overcurrent protective devices (cascading) under short-circuit current(fault) conditions, which reduces the reliability of the system to deliver power to vital loads. Requiring selectivecoordination for times only greater than 0.1 second provides coordination for only overloads and does not provideassurance that typical ground faults and arcing faults will not cascade multiple levels of overcurrent protective devices,thereby unnecessarily losing power to critical loads. While both overloads and short-circuits occur on branch circuits,the predominance of overcurrent interruptions on feeder and service circuits are short-circuits (of all types). Graphs Aand B depict the time-current curves of the same 30A, 200A, and 800A system. Graph A shows the portion of the circuitbreaker time-current curves that would be analyzed for selective coordination for times only down to 0.1 seconds.Graph B depicts the circuit breaker curves showing the crossover of the circuit breakers in their instantaneous tripregion. The cross over is a lack of selective coordination for overcurrents at that level and greater. Graph B shows alack of coordination between the 30A and 200A circuit breakers for ground, arcing, and any combination of phase faultsas low as 800A. Any type of fault as low as 2200A can take out the 800A circuit breaker as well. These are lowavailable fault currents, easily achieved in almost every essential electrical system via a line-ground fault, line-line faultor three phase fault.All circuit breakers with an instantaneous trip will open in less than 0.1 seconds when fault current is above the

instantaneous trip setting. Requiring selective coordination for times only greater than 0.1 second will permit the designof vital electrical systems without regard to proper engineering attention being given to the instantaneous trip region.Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.

The existing text of 700.27 already requires selective coordination for the full range of overcurrents,from overloads through the available short-circuit current, with all upstream devices. Specific additional text is notnecessary. Substantiation was not provided for the reference to the transfer switch type.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Alan Manche, Square D Company/Schneider Electric

Add a new sentence to the end of the main paragraph of 700.27:Emergency system(s) overcurrent devices shall be selectively coordinated with all supply side overcurrent protective

devices. A means to intentionally defeat selectivity shall not be permitted.Although no data was presented during the 2005 or the 2008 NEC to support the requirement for

selective coordination, the panel clearly acted to include the requirement for life safety reasons. Establishing selectivelycoordinated systems can increase the arc-flash hazard when maintenance is performed on the system depending uponthe design of the system. The concern of increased arc-flash hazard was presented to the panel in past cycles and thepanel accepted those risks in favor of the benefit of selectivity on these systems. Some system designers are nowincluding a means to defeat selectivity by installing systems that can turn the selectivity off by temporarily changingbreaker settings via a switch or sensor in order to protect the electrical worker. There is no prohibition established in theNEC to restrict defeating selectivity, or the life safety aspect for which it was installed, in order to protect the electricalworker.Unfortunately the enhanced protection for the electrical worker can be a trade-off by defeating the life safety function of

the selectively coordinated system in the emergency system. The most likely time for an incident to happen that wouldrequire the system to be selective is when a working is doing maintenance on the system. If the selectivity is defeated,an arc event small or large could initiate a fire hazard or take down lighting, ventilation, or emergency circuits in ahospital leaving a system inoperable which places the life safety of others in a dangerous position.There are solutions available to support the reduction of arc-flash in selectively coordinated system without

intentionally defeating selectivity to enhance worker safety.

The panel supports the use of energy reduction means for the protection of personnel duringperiods of maintenance of energized equipment. Use of these types of devices should be left to the discretion of thefacility operator. The panel recognizes that the selective coordination is not available in the system at the time theenergy reduction means is operational.

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Revise text to read as follows:Emergency system(s) overcurrent devices shall be selectively coordinated with all supply side

overcurrent protective devices. Selectivity shall meet the requirements of (A), (B), or (C).(A) Selectivity shall be established, in the form of an engineering study, by a licensed professional engineer engaged

regularly in the design or maintenance of coordinated electrical systems. The study shall be stamped by a licensedprofessional engineer and at a minimum include overcurrent device settings, supporting documentation, and a summaryof limitations. This study shall be available to those authorized to design, install, inspect, maintain, and operate thesystem.(B) Selectivity shall be established under engineering supervision by use of the selected overcurrent device

manufactures tables and charts derived from tested combinations of devices. Applicability for each table and chartutilized shall be rigidly adhered to. All tables and charts shall be from the same manufacturer as the installedovercurrent devices.(C) Selectivity shall be established under engineering supervision in existing installations. The engineer shall

determine the extent of selectivity achievable based on review of the existing conditions. Use of methods (A), (B), orcombination of each shall be permitted. A summary of limitations and recommendations shall be stamped by a licensedprofessional engineer and submitted to the authority having jurisdiction prior to the start of construction. Once accepted,the recommendations will establish the extent of retrofit required.

FPN: Overcurrent protective devices used for emergency circuit protection, where coordinated to optimize selectiveoperation of the circuit overcurrent protective devices when a short circuit or ground fault occurs, increase overallreliability of the system. A similar increase in overall reliability can be experienced on the normal power system side.

Present text restricts the design professional from making appropriate judgments and technicaldecisions necessary to effectively coordinate the overcurrent protective devices. Historically, the design professionalhas had the responsibility of evaluating and selecting the appropriate equipment based on the individual projectcircumstances, refer to the ANSI/IEEE color series of recommended practice manuals. The modifications proposedloosen the prescriptive mandate which is creating compliance difficulties. It will also restore the design professionals’freedom to select the appropriate overcurrent devices for use within the emergency, legally required standby, and criticaloperations power systems. As you will see in the following discussions, coordination has never been expected to be100% selective. There are often circumstances that are just “best case” even in the most highly coordinated systems.The ANSI/IEEE repeatedly uses language which conveys this understanding.Many jurisdictions have considered and adopted codification of a 0.1 second fault duration time to establish a

reasonable coordination point. In fact, until published Time-Current Curves (TCC’s) are available from the majority ofmanufactures starting at a time line less than the 1st half cycle, 0.0083 seconds, this approach would provide a designbasis that is universally workable. We understand the argument that this is an arbitrary point at which to startcoordination. Accordingly, we have taken a different approach. The text presented was modeled after NEC 240.86.This article establishes a method for the design professional to make judgment for existing systems. We have provideoptions in stead of a one size fits all mentality, which is know to have issues; as evidenced by the large number ofproposals surrounding this issue. The real concern is with the existing NEC text. It puts the engineer in a position thatis contrary to other equally important recommended practices, of which we are also held accountable. The professionalengineer does want to follow and is concerned with compliance with all applicable codes. In Arizona, as with otherstates, Rules of Professional Conduct have been established for the professional registrant. He/she is charged withprotecting the public safety, much like the inspections departments are. By the nature of granting a license to practiceengineering, the grantor (State) is agreeing that the professional registrant is competent to make such decisions.In the proposed change, the issue of existing conditions and implementation has been addressed.Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.

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Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 70Proposed (B) contains unenforceable language, such as “rigidly adhered to” and “selectively shall

be established.” The text in (C) is outside the normal application of the NEC since the authority having jurisdiction, themunicipality, and the licensing board for engineers have control over the issues covered within this proposed text, suchas what is necessary to be done before the start of construction. The designer, engineer, AHJ, electrical contractor, andowner may often be involved in the decisions related to selective coordination. The submitter states in his substantiationthat the professional engineer has the mandate to select the appropriate overcurrent device and thus would be the soledecision-maker on the selective coordination. Again, this procedure is under the jurisdiction of the AHJ, the municipality,and the licensing board. The recommended FPN does not provide any additional information and is unnecessary.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-201 Log #3718 NEC-P13


Add a fine print note to read as follows:

Fault and over current conditions may result from a variety of conditions that range from the rare anddifficult to achieve bolted three phase fault to the more probable arcing single phase ground fault. Nevertheless it is acommon oversight to consider phase protection selectivity and ground fault protection selectivity separately. A phaseprotective device considers all current over threshold to be an overload whereas ground fault devices are able toseparate a ground current from other current. Because of this, in the case of the more probable ground faults, bothdevices may operate simultaneously or with either device ahead of the other if ground fault selectivity between the twodevices is not planned. Hence, a well-coordinated system must consider ground fault protection and standard phaseovercurrent protection simultaneously.

Automatic opening of overcurrent protective devices under a ground-fault condition is not requiredby Article 700.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-202 Log #1162 NEC-P13


Proposed change deletes Exceptions 1 & 2 and replaces them as shown below:Exception: Selective coordination shall not be required in (1) or (2):(1) Between transformer primary and secondary overcurrent protective devices, where only one overcurrent protective

device or set of overcurrent protective devices exist(s) on the transformer secondary, or(2) Between overcurrent protective devices of the same size (ampere rating) in series.Exception: Selective coordination shall not be required between two overcurrent devices in series with one another

when no loads are connected in parallel with the downstream device.The intent of selective coordination is to have only the overcurrent device closest to the fault (first

upstream device) to open to clear that fault. This prevents unnecessary outages to other loads on the electricalsystems.The exceptions were added as 2 specific examples where no additional loads are affected if a second upstream device

also opens.The intent of this proposal is to clarify that so long as no additional loads are affected by the opening of the second

upstream device, selective coordination offers no additional benefit, and should not be required.


The changes are editorial to improve clarity and not intended as technical changes.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Frederic P. Hartwell, Hartwell Electrical Services, Inc. / Rep. Mass. Electrical Code Advisory Committee

Designate the existing exception as Exception No. 1 and add a second exception and fine printnote to read as follows:Exception No. 2: Where the emergency system design is under the control of a licensed professional engineer

engaged in the design or maintenance of electrical installations, the selection of overcurrent protective devices shall bepermitted to coordinate to the extent practicable. The design shall be documented, stamped by the professionalengineer, and made available for review by the authority having jurisdiction.FPN: Overcurrent protective devices used for emergency circuit protection, where coordinated to optimize selective

operation of the circuit overcurrent protective devices when a short circuit or ground fault occurs, increase overallreliability of the system.

The current NEC rule is being improperly used to drive the market share of a particular species ofovercurrent protective device, often frustrating legitimate design objectives of the engineering community, and withoutany documented loss experience to justify such a consequence. We have received compelling testimony from engineersthat have been subjected to extraordinary hardship resulting from the lack of flexibility in the current NEC provisions.This proposal is consistent with NFPA 110 (which language underlies the fine print note) and provides the necessaryflexibility to allow competent engineering work that maintains selective coordination as an important element in theelectrical design process, but not to the exclusion of all other issues.

Revise Section 700.27 to read:Emergency system(s) overcurrent devices shall be selectively coordinated with all supply side

overcurrent protective devices. The selectively coordinated devices shall be selected by a licensed professionalengineer engaged primarily in the design or maintenance of electrical installations. The selection shall be documentedand stamped by the professional engineer. This documentation shall be available to those authorized to design, install,inspect, maintain, and operate the system.

The panel action rejects the wording "where practicable" as this is not defined and subjective. Therecommendation on the qualifications for those who design the system has been revised to use the text from 240.86 asthis provides a more definitive description of those who can design these systems.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-204 Log #2322 NEC-P13


Add '(Essential Safety)' after the word 'Standby' in the title and throughout Article 701.This change is a companion to a proposal for Article 700 and is intended to be the first step in a three

cycle process (similar to the process used for Luminaires) which will more clearly identify the purpose for which thesystem is used. The extended process will allow related standards to adapt their language.

Article titles and scope statements are the jurisdiction of the NEC Technical Correlating Committee.Panel 13 can only make recommendations to the TCC on proposed revisions. Panel 13 recommends rejecting theproposed action because adding “essential safety” does not add any more meaning than the present title. See thepanel action and statement on Proposal 13-137.

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Revise text to read as follows:ARTICLE 701 Legally Required Standby SystemsI. General701.1 Scope. Text to remain unchanged.701.2 Definition. Text to remain unchanged.701.3 Application of Other Articles. Text to remain unchanged.701.4 Equipment Approval. Text to remain unchanged.701.5 Tests and Maintenance for Legally Required Standby Systems.Text to remain unchanged.701.6 Capacity and Rating. Text to remain unchanged.701.7 Transfer Equipment. Text to remain unchanged.701.8 Signals. Text to remain unchanged.701.9 Signs.(A) Text to remain unchanged.Exception: A sign shall not be required for individual unit equipment as specified in 701.12(G) 701.11(G).(B) Grounding. Where the grounded circuit conductor connected to the legally required standby power source is

connected to a grounding electrode conductor at a location remote from the legally required standby power source,there shall be a sign at the grounding location that shall identify all legally required standby power and normal sourcesconnected at that location.II. Circuit Wiring701.10 701.11 Wiring Legally Required Standby Systems. Text to remain unchanged.III. Sources of Power701.12 General Requirements.701.11 Legally Required Standby Systems.Current supply shall be such that, in the event of failure of the normal supply to, or within, the building or group of

buildings concerned, legally required standby power will be available within the time required for the application but notto exceed 60 seconds. The supply system for legally required standby purposes, in addition to the normal services tothe building, shall be permitted to comprise one or more of the types of systems described in 701.11 701.12(A) through(F). Unit equipment in accordance with 701.11 701.12(G) shall satisfy the applicable requirements of this article.In selecting a legally required standby source of power, consideration shall be given to the type of service to be

rendered, whether of short-time duration or long duration.Consideration shall be given to the location or design, or both, of all equipment to minimize the hazards that might

cause complete failure due to floods, fires, icing, and vandalism.FPN: Assignment of degree of reliability of the recognized legally required standby supply system depends on the

careful evaluation of the variables at each particular installation.(A) Storage Battery. Text to remain unchanged.(B) Generator Set. Text to remain unchanged.(C) Uninterruptible Power Supplies. Uninterruptible power supplies used to provide power for legally required standby

systems shall comply with the applicable provisions of 701.11 701.12(A) and (B).(D) Separate Service. Text to remain unchanged.(E) Connection Ahead of Service Disconnecting Means. Text to remain unchanged.(F) Fuel Cell System. Text to remain unchanged.(G) Unit Equipment. Text to remain unchanged.IV. Overcurrent Protection701.25 701.15 Accessibility. Text to remain unchanged.701.26 701.17 Ground-Fault Protection of Equipment. Text to remain unchanged.701.27 701.18 Coordination. Text to remain unchanged.


The proposed parallel numbering system for Articles 700, 701, and 702 is unnecessary since thearticles are not large and complex articles. While there are some common titles and text, there are also titles and text

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Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 70that are different from one article to another. Code Making Panel 13 recommends rejection of the renumbering of Article701.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-206 Log #2812 NEC-P13




_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-207 Log #3626 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________David A. Williams, Delta Township

Revise text to read as follows:701.3 Application of Other Articles Requirements.Except as modified by this article, all applicable articles of this Code shall apply. Legally required standby systems

shall be installed in accordance with this Code and NFPA 110 and NFPA 111.The provisions of NFPA 110 and 111 are very important to the installations of emergency systems and

these requirements should be referenced in the NEC. The International Building and Fire Codes have similar wording inSection 2702. Electrical installers need to be aware of these requirements.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-208 Log #4292 NEC-P13


Delete this section.701.3 Application of Other Articles.Except as modified by this article, all applicable articles of this Code shall apply.

NEC 90.3 indicates Chapters 1-4 apply generally and Chapters 5, 6, and 7 supplement or modify thegeneral requirements. The text in 701.3 repeats the requirement previously expressed in 90.3 and serves no additionalpurpose. It should also be noted that other "Special" articles do not include a similar requirement. Inconsistentapplication of the text could also lead to confusion.

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Delete the following text:701.4 Equipment Approval. All equipment shall be approved for the intended use.

This section is redundant and unnecessary. Sections 90.7, 110.2, and 110.3 already contain thisprovision. There is no special listing, labeling, or marking which identifies equipment as suitable for this type of system,thus, no special evaluation beyond 90.7, 110.2 and 110.3 is needed.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-210 Log #1407 NEC-P13


Revise first paragraph as follows: A legally required standby system shall have adequate capacityand rating(s) not less than required for the supply of all equipment intended to be operated simultaneously. at one time.Legally required standby systems shall be suitable identified for the maximum available fault current at its terminals.(1) Where the alternate means has adequate capacity ratings not less than required to handle supply all connected

calculated loads(2) Where automatic selective load pickup and load shedding is provided that will ensure adequate continuous power

to the legally required standby system circuits.Edit. "Adequate" and "suitable" are subjective and terms to be avoided per the Style Manual.

"Connected" loads are not identified. The provision should apply to calculated loads whether or not actually connectedequipment.

The panel rejects all of the proposed editorial revisions. While the NEC style manual may list termsto be avoided, it is not a prohibition of those terms. The context of this section is clear and the suggested revisions donot improve clarity.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-211 Log #3029 NEC-P13


Revise text to read as follows:701.6 Capacity and Rating.A legally required standby system shall have adequate capacity and rating for the supply of all equipment intended to

be operated at one time. Legally required standby system equipment shall be suitable for the maximum available faultcurrent at its terminals.Remainder of text to be unchanged.

This requirement is already found in 110.9/110.10, and a similar requirement is not found in 700.5. Forthe purposes of consistency, if nothing else, this sentence should be removed.Alternatively, it could be added into 700.5. A similar proposal is being made to 702.5 for correlation.

No substantiation has been provided for removing "and Rating" from the title. For purposes ofconsistency, the second sentence should not be removed, as 700.5 contains the same language.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Wendell Whistler, Whistler Consulting & Technical Services

Add new text to read as follows:701.7 Transfer Equipment.(A) General. Transfer equipment, including automatic transfer switches, shall be automatic and identified for standby

use and approved by the authority having jurisdiction. Transfer equipment shall be designed and installed to prevent theinadvertent interconnection of normal and alternate sources of supply in any operation of the transfer equipment.Transfer equipment and electric power production systems installed to permit operation in parallel with the normalsource shall meet the requirements of Article 705.(B) Bypass Isolation Switches. Means to bypass and isolate the transfer switch equipment shall be permitted. Where

bypass isolation switches are used, inadvertent parallel operation shall be avoided.(C) Automatic Transfer Switches. Automatic transfer switches shall be electrically operated and mechanically held.

Automatic transfer switches, rated 600 VAC and below, shall be listed for legally required standby system emergencyuse.

UL white book references emergency use transfer switch, however, the legally required standbysystem refers you back to emergency use.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-213 Log #1406 NEC-P13


Delete "inadvertent" in (A).Revise last sentence of (B) as follows: Where bypass operation switches or circuit breakers are used inadvertent

parallel operation in the closed position shall be avoided prevented by approved identified means.Edit. (A) should apply whether or not interconnection is "inadvertent". (B) should include circuit

breakers, and parallel operation should be prevented.

Legally required standby power sources can be connected to the utility company power grid asinterconnected electric power production sources in accordance with Article 705. The word “inadvertent” emphasizesthat the power source must not be inadvertently connected in a parallel with the normal source unless the system isdesigned as an interconnected electric power production source.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-214 Log #2923 NEC-P13


Revise text to read as follows:701.8 Signals.Audible and visual signal devices shall be provided, where practicable, for the purpose described in 701.8(A), (B), and

(C).This wording is not enforceable. All new installations can be purchased with the needed contacts to

provide the signal.NOTE: Related section NEC 700.7.

There may be older equipment still in operation without the necessary contacts for this functions;therefore, “where practicable” must remain.

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(C) (D).(D) Generator Trouble. To provide a generator trouble signal to the Fire Alarm Panel.

This addition will permit the generator to be supervised 24/7 the same as the rest of the Fire Alarm LifeSafety equipment. The existing generator remote annunciator is normally located in the Fire Command Room that is notmanned 24/7. A problem may exist for several days, stopping the generator from functioning, which could jeopardize thelives of the building occupants.NOTE: Related section NEC 700.7.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-216 Log #2924 NEC-P13



(C).(A) Derangement. To indicate derangement of the standby source.(1) Generator main circuit breaker to be alarmed in the off position (Not-in-Auto).

Clarification of the derangement signal: The generator engine control can be in the auto position,indicating it is in the ready state, when the main circuit breaker is in the open, or off, position. In this mode you do nothave an emergency generator available to power the Life Safety Systems; Egress Lighting, Fire Pumps, Pressurizationfans.NOTE: Related section NEC 700.7(A).


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-217 Log #1405 NEC-P13


Substitute "supplying" for "carrying".Edit.

"Edit" is not sufficient substantiation and does not explain the need for this change.

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Add new 701.8(D) as follows:701.8(D) Ground Fault. To indicate a ground fault in solidly grounded wye legally required standby systems of more

than 150 volts to ground and circuit-protective devices rated 1000 amperes or more. The sensor for the ground-faultsignal devices shall be located at, or ahead of, the main system disconnecting means for the legally required standbysource, and the maximum setting of the signal devices shall be for a ground-fault current of 1200 amperes, Instructionson the course of action to be taken in event of indicated ground fault shall be located at or near the sensor location.FPN: For signals for generator sets, see NFPA 110-2005, Standard for Emergency and Standby Power Systems.

Companion proposal has been submitted to section 701.17 to require ground-fault indication for legallyrequired standby systems. For general applications, ground fault protection of equipment is required for grounded wyefeeders, 1,000 amperes or greater for nominal 480Y/277 volt systems. The basis for the general requirement in 215.10is the unusually high number of burndowns reported on feeders in this voltage range. While the requirement toautomatically disconnect the circuit has been relaxed in Article 700 for emergency systems, provisions for indication andpotential actions are required for these emergency systems. Currently, Article 701 would allow a ground-fault to occurwithout shut down or even an indication.

The panel understands that the existing fine print note is to be relocated to follow the recommendedtext.

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The need for illumination during power outages should be intuitive. It provides illumination for a) theelectrician who is working in the service equipment area without a flashlight, b) for the maintenance mechanic who mayneither be an electrician nor familiar with the electric service equipment to work on it in the dark.Electric service panels are not always installed along either the primary or secondary egress path required by the LifeSafety Code and CMP-1 should not leave it to other standards to assert this requirement.Other NFPA documents have been examined and a short summary of this examination appears below. [Underline


There is no provision for any emergency illumination other than egress illumination for occupant safety in Section 7.8 ofNFPA 101-2009. Egress safety for the occupants of an electrical room is not specifically addressed. In some cases,the cause of a building outage originates in the electrical service switchgear area. In any case, it is likely that there willbe activity to and from the electrical service equipment area during a power outage.An excerpt from this standard is copied below for your convenience:





NFPA 70EAn excerpt is copied below for your convenience:130.6 Other Precautions for Personnel Activities.(B) Blind Reaching. Employees shall be instructed not to reach blindly into areas that might contain exposed

energized electrical conductors or circuit parts where an electrical hazard exists.(C) Illumination.

(1) General. Employees shall not enter spaces containing electrical hazards unless illumination is provided thatenables the employees to perform the work safely.



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Revise latter part: That shall identify all legally required standby system and normal other sourcesand their location(s) that are grounded connected at that location.

Edit. Location of the sources is an important consideration. There may be other sources than "normal"such as fire pump and emergency systems.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-221 Log #4679 NEC-P13





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Add text and a new Fine Print Note to read as follows:

The legally required standby system wiring shall be permitted to occupy the same raceways, cables, boxes, andcabinets with other general wiring.All boxes and enclosures (including transfer switches, generators, and power panels) for legally required standby

circuits shall not be permitted to be marked with the words “Emergency” or “Emergency Circuit” or “Emergency System”,so that they will be readily distinguishable from those boxes and enclosures identified as a component of an emergencycircuit or system, unless otherwise permitted in 700.9(B)(1) through 700.9(B)(5).FPN: See 700.9(A) for identification of an emergency circuit or system.

Manufacturers of surface raceways, both metal ( ® Article 386) and nonmetallic ( ® Article388), and of multi-outlet assemblies ( ® Article 380) derived from surface raceways have had numerous inquiriesfrom specifiers and installers for applications of surface raceways where used for Emergency Systems ( ® Article700) AND for either Legally Required Standby Systems ( ® Article 701) or Optional Standby Systems ( ® Article702) AND for other general wiring (power, lighting, signaling) in the same installation. Despite the requirement of900.9(B), these specifiers and installers are believed to be marking raceways with “EMERGENCY STANDBY”, withoutdistinction between “EMERGENCY” ( ® Article 700 circuits) and “STANDBY” ( ® Article 701 or Article 702circuits), leading to confusion as to the identity of the circuit ( ® Article 700 or Article 701 or Article 702) within thesingle-channel or multiple-channel surface raceway (or multi-outlet assembly) overall or within a specific channel of amultiple-channel surface raceway.Editorial: Comma added in title, consistent with the similar title in Article 700.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-223 Log #1403 NEC-P13


Revise text as follows:(A) A storage battery shall be suitable have ratings not less than required to supply and maintain...". (remainder

unchanged).In (B)(4) insert "identified" in lieu of "suitable"In (G) revise the first sentence of the last paragraph: Unit equipment shall be permanently fixed in place (i.e., not

portable) and shall have all supply wiring installed in accordance with the requirements of any of the wiring methods ofChapter 3 with an identified wiring method.Revise the last sentence of (G): Legally required standby Luminaires and lampholders that obtain power from a unit

equipment and are not an integral part of the unit equipment shall be wired to the unit equipment by one of the anidentified wiring method(s) of Chapter 3.

Edit. "Suitable" is subjective and a term to be avoided per the Style Manual. "Any wiring method" canbe construed as modifying "not permitted uses". Lampholders should be included in (G). Remote luminaries are a part ofthe unit equipment, but not an integral part.

There was no technical substantiation for the proposed changes. The term “suitable” is more thandescriptive enough to provide the user with the description of the type and size of battery necessary for the applicationand the proposed text, therefore, is unnecessary. The definition of “identified” uses the term “suitable.” Thesubstantiation has not identified a problem with the use or misuse of the term “suitable” in this particular application. Thephrase “in accordance with the wiring methods of Chapter 3” provides the user of the NEC specific direction on whatwiring methods to use and where to obtain the requirements for the wiring methods, whereas the suggested text doesnot. There was not technical substantiation to include lampholders with luminaires.

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Add the following sentence: “Where power is needed for the operation of the fuel transfer pumps todeliver fuel to a generator set day tank, this pump shall be connected to the legally required standby power system.

This rule now appears in 700.12(B)(2) for emergency systems it only seems to be a matter of commonsense that a legally-required system should have the same protection. A generator without fuel is no standby source atall.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-224a Log #CP1304 NEC-P13


Revise the title of the section to read:(3) Dual Fuel Supplies.

This section covers water supplies in addition to fuel supplies. This action correlates with similaractions taken on proposals for Articles 700 and 708.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-225 Log #1309 NEC-P13


Revise second sentence:The legally required standby service shall be sufficiently separated from the normal main all other service(s)

disconnecting means to prevent minimize the likelihood of simultaneous interruption of supply through due to anoccurrence in another electrical supply system within for the building(s) or premises or groups of buildings served.

For reliability, separation should apply to all other services. Separation can minimize simultaneousinterruption, but not prevent it (such as caused by utility power outage). Separation should apply to the entire service(such as service drops) not just the disconnecting means. 702.12 for example does not limit failure to within the building.

The Panel accepts only the word “minimize” to replace "prevent" and rejects the remainder of the recommendation.Use of the phrase "the likelihood of" does not provide additional clarity. There is insufficient

substantiation to support the remainder of the recommendation, and the proposed editorial revisions do not improve theclarity of the existing requirement.

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Revise text as follows:Where acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction, a legally required standby system shall be permitted to be

supplied by connections located ahead of and not within the same cabinet, enclosure, or vertical switchboard or motorcontrol section as the normal service disconnecting means. Shall be permanent. The legally required standby serviceshall be sufficiently separated from the normal other services disconnecting means except at the point of connection tothe normal service to prevent minimize the likelihood of simultaneous interruption of supply through due to anoccurrence in any other service within the buildings or groups of buildings served.

Connections should be specified as ahead of the "normal" service disconnecting means since"service" can include emergency or fire pump services. Separation should apply to all other services and can minimizesimultaneous interruption but not prevent interruption due to power outages. Subsection (D) uses the word "minimize".Separation should be intended to minimize interruption of power whether or not the "occurrence" is within the buildingserved.

The panel accepts the only the word “minimize” to replace "prevent" and rejects the remainder of the recommendation.Use of the phrase "the likelihood of" does not provide additional clarity. The title of the Section

701.11 contains the term “legally required standby system”; and it is not necessary to repeat it in 701.11(E). It is notnecessary to add "motor control" because it is encompassed by the terms "enclosure" and "cabinet". The substantiationdoes not support the remainder of the recommended revisions and does not demonstrate that the intent of the currenttext is misunderstood. See the panel action and statement on Proposal 13-225.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-227 Log #1586 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Stanley J. Folz, Henderson, NV


This lockable disconnect concept is used through the code. One definition in Article 100 wouldharmonize its use in all Articles. This proposal was developed by a Task Group that was appointed by the NECTechnical Correlating Committee and consisted of Stanley J. Folz, Chair, Monte Ewing, Ralph Pritchard, Sondra Todd,and Randy Yasenchak.A companion proposal has been submitted to Article 100 containing a new definition for "Disconnecting Means,

Lockable."


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Revise text as follows:701.17 Ground-Fault Protection of Equipment.The alternate source for legally required standby systems shall not be required to have ground-fault protection of

equipment with automatic disconnecting means. Ground-fault indication of the legally required standby source shall beprovided per 701.8(D).

Companion proposal has been submitted to add new section 701.8(D) that is similar to text currentlylocated in 700.7(D) for ground-fault indication. For general applications, ground fault protection of equipment is requiredfor grounded wye feeders, 1,000 amperes or greater for nominal 480Y/277 volt systems. The basis for the generalrequirement in 215.10 is the unusually high number of burndowns reported on feeders in this voltage range. While therequirements to automatically disconnect the circuit has been relaxed in Article 700 for emergency systems, provisionsfor indication and potential actions are required for these emergency systems. Currently, Article 701 would allow aground-fault to occur without shut down or even an indication.

Revise the recommendation to read:The alternate source for legally required standby systems shall not be

required to have ground-fault protection of equipment with automatic disconnecting means. Ground-fault indication ofthe legally required standby source shall be provided in accordance with per 701.8(D).

The panel action meets the NEC Style Manual and correlates with the panel action on Proposal13-189.

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Add new text to read as follows:(A) FeedersWhere ground-fault protection has been provided for the operation of the service disconnecting means or feeder

disconnecting means as specified by 230.95 or 215.10, an additional step of ground-fault protection shall be provided inall next level feeder disconnecting means downstream toward the load.

Such protection shall consist of overcurrent devices, current transformers, or other equivalent protective equipmentthat shall cause the feeder disconnecting devices to open.The additional levels of ground-fault protection shall NOT be installed as follows:1. On electrical systems that are not solidly grounded wye systems with greater than 150 volts to ground, but not more

than 600 volts phase-to-phase.2. On electrical systems where a non-orderly shutdown of power will introduce additional or increased hazards.Where ground-fault protection has been provided for the operation of service level or feeder level disconnecting

means, these means shall be selectively coordinated such that the feeder level device, but not the service level device,shall open on ground faults on the load side of the feeder level device.A 6-cycle minimum separation time between the service and feeder ground fault trip response bands shall be provided.

Ground faults are typically believed to be the most common type of fault experienced in operatingenergized electrical systems, per ANSI/IEEE Std 242-1986 Buff book, chapter 7. Professional design engineers tellstories of ballast or small motor failures that have caused main or feeder devices to open. Why is this so? In someinstances, a ground fault condition existed that went undetected and precipitated the protective device to open. In othercases, ground fault protective devices were improperly set, or not set at all. In others, a selective coordination study maynot have been done, or may have been done improperly.Therefore, with the goal of using selective coordination as the process by which electrical systems may achieve

maximum uptime, it is important that all he key areas of impact are addressed in the design of these electrical systems.The NEC has for many years required ground fault protection of equipment, but only at the service disconnect level

(with noted special exceptions), per Article 230.95. The relatively recent 2005 and 2008 NEC versions, requiresselective coordination in applications related to life safety, public safety, and/or national security applications wherereliable electrical power systems are required.These relatively new requirements for selective coordination in these types of applications are needed throughout the

entire service level, feeder and branch levels of the electrical system.With the goal in mind of maximizing the reliability and uptime of electrical systems, and giving consideration that the

most common types of faults are ground fault related, it becomes a reasonable approach that whenever selectivecoordination is required by the Code, that the requirements for ground fault protection of equipment be extended to allappropriate areas in the electrical system beyond just the service level.This proposal mirrors a similar requirement for ground fault protection of equipment that currently exists in NEC Article

708.52 for Critical Operations Power Systems (COPS). This proposal therefore recommends enhancing the reliability ofthe electrical system by requiring ground fault protection of equipment in all appropriate levels of the system wheneverthere are also requirements for selective coordination in that system.


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Revise 701.17.701.17 Ground-Fault Protection of Equipment.(A) Alternate Source. The alternate source for legally required standby systems shall not be required to have

ground-fault protection of equipment.Ground-fault indication in the legally required standby (alternate) source shall be provided per the requirements in

700.7(D).(B) Normal Source. Ground-fault protection shall not be required for a disconnecting means in the normal source

supplying a legally required standby system where the disconnecting means supplies only fire pumps, emergencysystems, or legally required standby systems. Ground-fault indication in the legally required standby (normal) sourceshall be provided per the requirements in 700.7(D).

Where a disconnecting means supplies only fire pumps, emergency loads, and legally requiredstandby loads, that disconnecting means should beallowed to operate as long as possible during a ground fault, without opening the life-safety-related loads. Keep theloads on as long as possible.Because ground-fault operation of the disconnecting means is not provided, signaling would provide an extra degree ofsafety. This proposalprovides the same "safety logic" for the normal source as the Code already provides for the alternate source.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-232 Log #3935 NEC-P13


Add a second paragraph.Ground fault relays on the normal source side (line side of the transfer switch) that supply legally required standby

systems are permitted to be restrained from operating for ground faults on the loadside of the transfer switch if thesystem complies with both of the following:(A) Ground fault protection relays on the normal source side (line side of the transfer switch) are not restrained from

operation for ground faults on the normal source side (line side of the transfer switch)(B) Audible and visual signal devices indicate whenever a ground fault relay has been restrained. Instructions on the

course of action to be taken in the event of an indicated ground fault shall be located g or near the sensor location.For life-safety purposes and system reliability for the prevention of blackouts, it is desirable that a

ground-fault on the load side of a transfer switch in a legally required standby system not take out the ground faultprotection on the normal source. This proposal allows the ground fault protection on the normal source to be restrainedfrom operating and taking down all or a large portion of the normal system because of a ground fault on the load side ofthe transfer switch. For these critical life-safety-related applications, it requires both audible and visual signaling that aground fault has occurred and that it is being restrained.Restraining the normal system ground fault protection relays for faults on the load side of the transfer switch is

consistent with the concept of continuity of service for emergency systems (700.26 & 700.7(D)). legally required standbysystems (701.17), and healthcare essential electrical svstems (517.17(B)).Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.


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Revise text to read as follows:Legally required standby system(s) overcurrent devices shall be selectively coordinated with all

legally required and emergency system supply side overcurrrent protective devices for faults with a duration of 0.1seconds and longer.

The text used in the comment is preferred over the original text for the following reasons:1. Language similar to this language is being utilized by some states, for example Oregon & Florida, as a means to

apply the intent of selective coordination.2. Article701.1 states that the scope of Article 701 is: "The provisions of this article apply to the electrical safety of the

installation, operation and maintenance of emergency systems ….to required facilities when the normal electrical supplyor system in interrupted." If the normal system has been interrupted there is no need for the emergency system toselectively coordinate with it. Changing "all supply side" to "all legally required and emergency system supply side" willmake this intent clear.3. The balance of the substantiation is the same as is listed in my proposal on Section 700.27.

The 0.1 second limit in this proposal could reduce the level of safety by limiting the types ofovercurrents that would need to be isolated to the nearest upstream device. Requiring selective coordination down toonly 0.1 seconds will cover only overloads and a few minor phase-to-phase and minor ground faults.

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Amend 701.18 as follows.

Normal system overcurrent protective devices on the supply side of the legally required standbysystem overcurrent protective devices shall not be required to be selectively coordinated with other supply side, normalsystem overcurrent protective devices.

Legally Required Standby System(s) overcurrent devices shall be selectivelycoordinated with all supply side overcurrent protective devices unless one of the following conditions in (1) through (5)are met.(1) Transformer Overcurrent Protective Devices. Between transformer primary and secondary overcurrent protective


(ampere rating) installed in series.(3) Expansion of an Existing Legally Required Standby System - Existing Overcurrent Protective Devices. Between

existing legally required standby system overcurrent protective devices and any existing supply side overcurrentprotective devices, where the legally required standby system is expanded.(4) Expansion of an Existing Legally Required Standby System - New Overcurrent Protective Devices. Between new

legally required standby system overcurrent protective devices and any existing supply side overcurrent protectivedevices, where the legally required standby system is expanded.(5) Designed Under Engineering Supervision. Where a licensed professional engineer, engaged primarily in the design

of electrical installations, provides stamped documentation showing the specific circuit that cannot be selectivelycoordinated, and substantiation of the design alternatives that were analyzed in the failed attempt to achieve selectivecoordination. This documentation shall be available to those authorized to design, install, inspect, maintain, and operatethe system.FPN: These are several techniques that help to selectively coordinate an electrical distribution system(a) Where transfer switches are utilized, utilizing several smaller transfer switches rather than one larger transfer


***Insert Figure 701.18 Clarification of Selective Coordination Requirements***

This proposal is an attempt to clarify the confusion concerning selective coordination requirements.(1) Figure 701.18 has been added to clarify which devices are legally required standby side devices, and which are

normal side devices. This figure should be included in the NEC® text. Figure 701.18 was based upon a figure from annecdigest® article, Keep The Power On For Vital Loads, by Evangelos Stoyas, December 2007 Copyright© 2007,National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA.(2)"(A) Normal System" was added because there have been questions about the need for selective coordination of

the overcurrent devices on the normal side, on the line side of the transfer switch. Since Devices 5 and 6 are not really

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Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 70part of the legally required standby system, 701.18 does not apply, and therefore 5 and 6 do not need to selectivelycoordinate with each other.(3)"(B) (1)" and "(B)(2)" are taken from existing text. No changes made(4) "(B)(3)" was added because there have been questions about the need for existing devices to selectively

coordinate when a legally required standby system is expanded or modified. This proposal clarifies that existing devicesdo not have to be replaced if they do not already selectively coordinate.(5) "(B)(4)" was added because there have been questions about the need for new devices to selectively coordinate

with existing devices when a legally required standby system is expanded or remodeled. This clearly states that newdevices do not have to selectively coordinate with the existing devices.(6) "(B)(5)" was added for those few cases where selective coordination is simply not possible. It is not meant to be a






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The available short-circuit current must be considered for the worst case from the normal source, alternate source, orboth for a closed transition transfer switch. If a fault occurs on an emergency load being supplied by the normal sourceand both the emergency branch circuit overcurrent protective device and emergency feeder overcurrent protectivedevice open, then when the power is transferred to the alternate source, loads supplied by the affected feeder willunnecessarily be interrupted.There is no simple alternative to use other than for the full range of available short-circuit currents. Some in the





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Add a new sentence to the end of the main paragraph of 701.18:Legally required standby system(s) overcurrent devices shall be selectively coordinated with all supply side overcurrent

protective devices. A means to intentionally defeat selectivity shall not be permitted.Although no data was presented during the 2005 or the 2008 NEC to support the requirement for

selective coordination, the panel clearly acted to include the requirement for life safety reasons. Establishing selectivelycoordinated systems can increase the arc-flash hazard when maintenance is performed on the system depending uponthe design of the system. The concern of increased arc-flash hazard was presented to the panel in past cycles and thepanel accepted those risks in favor of the benefit of selectivity on these systems. Some system designers are nowincluding a means to defeat selectivity by installing systems that can turn the selectivity off by temporarily changingbreaker settings via a switch or sensor in order to protect the electrical worker. There is no prohibition established in theNEC to restrict defeating selectivity, or the life safety aspect for which it was installed, in order to protect the electricalworker.Unfortunately the enhanced protection for the electrical worker can be a trade-off by defeating the life safety function of

the selectively coordinated system in the emergency system. The most likely time for an incident to happen that wouldrequire the system to be selective is when a working is doing maintenance on the system. If the selectivity is defeated,an arc event small or large could initiate a fire hazard or take down lighting, ventilation, or critical circuits leaving asystem inoperable which places the life safety of others in a dangerous position.There are solutions available to support the reduction of arc-flash in selectively coordinated system without



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Revise text to read as follows:Legally requires standby system(s) overcurrent devices shall be selectively coordinated with all

supply side overcurrent protective devices. Selectivity shall meet the requirements of (A), (B), or (C).(A) Selectivity shall be established, in the form of an engineering study, by a licensed professional engineer

engaged regularly in the design or maintenance of coordinated electrical systems. The study shall be stamped by alicensed professional engineer and at a minimum include overcurrent device settings, supporting documentation, and asummary of limitations. This study shall be available to those authorized to design, install, inspect, maintain, andoperate the system.(B) Selectivity shall be established under engineering supervision by use of the selected overcurrent device



FPN: Overcurrent protective devices used for legally requires standby circuit protection, where coordinated to optimizeselective operation of the circuit overcurrent protective devices when a short circuit or ground fault occurs, increaseoverall reliability of the system. A similar increase in overall reliability can be experienced on the normal power systemside.

***** NEC_L4423_S *****

Proposed (B) contains unenforceable language, such as “rigidly adhered to” and “selectively shallbe established.” The text in (C) is outside the normal application of the NEC since the authority having jurisdiction, themunicipality, and the licensing board for engineers have control over the issues covered within this proposed text, suchas what is necessary to be done before the start of construction. The designer, engineer, AHJ, electrical contractor, andowner may often be involved in the decisions related to selective coordination. The submitter states in his substantiationthat the professional engineer has the mandate to select the appropriate overcurrent device and thus would be the soledecision-maker on the selective coordination. Again, this procedure is under the jurisdiction of the AHJ, the municipality,and the licensing board. The recommended FPN does not provide any additional information and is unnecessary.

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Fault and over current conditions may result from a variety of conditions that range from the rare anddifficult to achieve bolted three phase fault to the more probable arcing single phase ground fault. Nevertheless it is acommon oversight to consider phase protection selectivity and ground fault protection selectivity separately. A phaseprotective device considers all current over threshold to be an overload whereas ground fault devices are able toseparate a ground current from other current. Because of this, in the case of the more probable ground faults, bothdevices may operate simultaneously or with either device ahead of the other if ground fault selectivity between the twodevices is not planned. Hence, a well-coordinated system must consider ground fault protection and standard phaseovercurrent protection simultaneously.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-239 Log #1164 NEC-P13


Proposed change deletes Exceptions 1 & 2 and replaces them as shown below:Exception: Selective coordination shall not be required in (1) or (2):(1) Between transformer primary and secondary overcurrent protective devices, where only one overcurrent protective

device or set of overcurrent protective devices exist(s) on the transformer secondary, or(2) Between overcurrent protective devices of the same size (ampere rating) in series.Exception: Selective coordination shall not be required between two overcurrent devices in series with one another

when no loads are connected in parallel with the downstream device.The intent of selective coordination is to have only the overcurrent device closest to the fault (first

upstream device) to open to clear that fault. This prevents unnecessary outages to other loads on the electrical system.The exceptions were added as 2 specific examples where no additional loads are affected if a second upstream device

also opens.The intent of this proposal is to clarify that so long as no additional loads are affected by the opening of the second

upstream device, selective coordination offers no additional benefit, and should not be required.


The changes are editorial to improve clarity and not intended as technical changes.

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701.18. Designate the existing exception as Exception No. 1 and add a second exception and fineprint note to read as follows:Exception No. 2: Where the legally required standby system design is under the control of a licensed professional

engineer engaged in the design or maintenance of electrical installations, the selection of overcurrent protective devicesshall be permitted to coordinate to the extent practicable. The design shall be documented, stamped by the professionalengineer, and made available for review by the authority having jurisdiction.

FPN: Overcurrent protective devices used for legally required standby circuit protection, where coordinated to optimizeselective operation of the circuit overcurrent protective devices when a short circuit or ground fault occurs, increaseoverall reliability of the system.


Revise Section 700.18 to read:Legally required standby system(s) overcurrent devices shall be selectively coordinated with all

supply side overcurrent protective devices. The selectively coordinated devices shall be selected by a licensedprofessional engineer engaged primarily in the design or maintenance of electrical installations. The selection shall bedocumented and stamped by the professional engineer. This documentation shall be available to those authorized todesign, install, inspect, maintain, and operate the system.

The panel action rejects the wording "where practicable," as this is not defined and subjective. Therecommendation on the qualifications for those who design the system has been revised to use the text from 240.86, asthis provides a more definitive description of those who can design these systems.

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Revise text to read as follows:ARTICLE 702 Optional Standby SystemsI. General702.1 Scope. Text to remain unchanged.702.2 Definition. Text to remain unchanged.702.3 Application of Other Articles. Text to remain unchanged.702.4 Equipment Approval. Text to remain unchanged.702.6 702.5 Capacity and Rating. Text to remain unchanged.702.7 702.6 Transfer Equipment. Text to remain unchanged.702.8 702.7 Signals.Audible and visual signal devices shall be provided, where practicable, for the following purposes.(1) Derangement. Text to remain unchanged.(2) Carrying Load. To indicate that the optional standby source is carrying load.Exception: Signals shall not be required for portable standby power sources.702.9 702.8 Signs. Text to remain unchanged.II. Circuit Wiring702.9 Wiring Optional Standby Systems.Text to remain unchanged.III. Grounding702.11 702.10 Portable Generator Grounding. Text to remain unchanged.702.12 702.11 Outdoor Generator Sets. Text to remain unchanged.


The proposed parallel numbering system for Articles 700, 701, and 702 is unnecessary since thearticles are not large and complex articles. While there are some common titles and text, there are also titles and textthat are different from one article to another. Code Making Panel 13 recommends rejection of the renumbering of Article701.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-242 Log #2815 NEC-P13




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_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-244 Log #189 NEC-P13


Delete the following text:702.4 Equipment Approval. All equipment shall be approved for the intended use.

This section is redundant and unnecessary. Sections 90.7, 110.2, and 110.3 already contain thisprovision. There is no special listing, labeling, or marking which identifies equipment as suitable for this type of system,thus, no special evaluation beyond 90.7, 110.2 and 110.3 is needed.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-245 Log #1402 NEC-P13


In (A) change "suitable" to "identified".Revise first sentence of (B)(1) as follows: Where manual transfer equipment is used, an optional standby system shall

have adequate capacity ratings not less than required for the supply of all equipment intended to be that is operatedsimultaneously at one timeRevise (B)(2)(b) as follows: Load Management. Where a system is employed that will automatically manage(s) the

connected load, the standby source shall have a capacity sufficient to ratings not less than those required to supply themaximum computed load that will be is connected by the load management system.

"One time" is not necessarily the same as "simultaneously." "Adequate" and "sufficient" are subjectiveand terms to be avoided per the Style Manual. "Capacity" is not defined; "ratings" include voltage, ampere, frequency,etc. "Connected" load is not defined; some loads are computed even though no current utilizing equipment is connected.

The panel rejects all of the proposed editorial revisions. While the NEC Style Manual may list termsto be avoided, it is not a prohibition of those terms. The context of this section is clear, and the suggested revisions donot improve clarity.

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Revise text to read as follows:702.5 Capacity and Rating.(A) Available Short-Circuit Current. Optional standby system equipment shall be suitable for the maximum available

short-circuit current at its terminals.(B) System Capacity. The calculations of load on the standby source shall be made in accordance with Article 220 or

by another approved method.(1) (A) Manual Transfer Equipment. Where manual transfer equipment is used, an optional standby system shall have

adequate capacity and rating for the supply of all equipment intended to be operated at one time. The user of theoptional standby system shall be permitted to select the load connected to the system.(2)(B) Automatic Transfer Equipment. Where automatic transfer equipment is used, an optional standby system shall

comply with (B)(1) or (B)(2). (2)(a) or (2)(b).(a)(1) Full Load. The standby source shall be capable of supplying the full load that is transferred by the automatic

transfer equipment.(b)(2) Load Management. Where a system is employed that will automatically manage the connected load, the

standby source shall have a capacity sufficient to supply the maximum load that will be connected by the loadmanagement system. Remainder of text to be unchanged.

This requirement is already found in 110.9/110.10, and a similar requirement is not found in 700.5. Forthe purposes of consistency, if nothing else, this sentence should be removed.Alternatively, it could be added into 700.5. A similar proposal is being made to 701.6 for correlation.

The same sentence appears in 700.5(A) and in 701.6. There are installers of generators andsimilar back up power that do not read the text in 110.9; therefore, providing mandatory text requiring maximumavailable fault rating for the equipment is re-emphasized in 702.5.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Chris Turner, Generac Power Systems


The calculations of load on the standby source shall be made in accordance with Article 220 orby another approved method. An optional standby system shall have adequate capacity and rating for the supply of allequipment intended to be operated at one time. The user of the optional standby system shall be permitted to select theload connected to the system.

Where manual transfer equipment is used, an optional standby system shall haveadequate capacity and rating for the supply of all equipment intended to be operated at one time. The user of theoptional standby system shall be permitted to select the load connected to the system.

Where automatic transfer equipment is used, an optional standby system shallcomply with (2)(a) or (2)(b).(a) Full Load. The standby source shall be capable of supplying the full load that is transferred by the automatic

transfer equipment.(b) Load Management. Where a system is employed that will automatically manage the connected load, the standby

source shall have a capacity sufficient to supply the maximum load that will be connected by the load managementsystem.

Where automatic transfer equipment is used, it is recommended that the optionalstandby system incorporate internal protective systems that monitor against overload conditions. These systems shalleither automatically manage the load or shutdown the system. Systems that do not incorporate overload protections,must be sized per Article 220.

In a review of the ROPs submitted prior to the latest code change, 702.5 requirements becamesomewhat blurred. It is important to remember that this sectionrefers to optional standby systems.The increase in generator installations, while are somewhat related to recent natural disasters, can mostly be attributed

to the lowering of the cost of product and the ease of installation created by many manufacturers. As the quality anddependability of the utility is dropping the product category of optional standby systems is becoming more familiar tohome owners. In attempts to maintain the quality of life expected by those home owners and their families more andmore optional standby systems are being installed. Some users value high levels of system reliability and installredundant generators. Some users value the ability to support load growth and install upsized generators. And someusers select generators to meet there most basic operational needs. It has been the long tradition of Article 702 to allowthe user to best make this value decision relative to selecting the best sized generator to meet their unique operationneeds.Listed standby systems have been tested under overload conditions to ensure that component temperatures are the

within limits of the standards being tested to and that the risk of fire is non existent.In reviewing the ROPs that resulted in the changes to 702.5, we noticed that the primary focus was directed at the

residential market. The residential market is driven by consumer choice that is significantly impacted by installed capitalcosts. The residential automatic standby market is dominated by air-cooled generators that cap-out at 20 Kw. The nextstep-up in power output moves customers into liquid cooled generators that are twice the cost. So even though themarket freely offers larger generators, the market choice finds it generally unpalatable due to a significant reduction inthe benefit/cost ratio. By requiring optional standby system customers to comply with utility sizing requirements asestablished in Article 220, the code is forcing the majority of the whole house, standby system market to transitionacross the 20 Kw barrier.There is substantial data available that shows the average electrical load profile of a residential home is very low. See

the table below which provides average max hourly power consumption for typical residences around the country. Thisshows even smaller optional standby systems are still sizable based on typical power consumption.

***Insert Table Here***

The unintended consequences of this code change are that many customers may not be able to afford an inherentlysafe, pre-wired, automatically fueled backup system. They will instead choose to burn candles and attempt to safely useportable, gasoline powered generators. At Generac Power Systems we feel the decision as to the safest course of

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Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 70action, in the big picture, is to allow the market to select and size optional standby systems based on end-useroperational needs.If an optional standby system has overload protection systems built in what harm can come from the system being

connected to a whole house application? What fire and/or electrical hazards present themselves if the system isoverloaded but then shuts itself down?

Deleting the requirements in 702.5(B) for proper sizing of the optional standby system feederconductors and basing that deletion upon an automatic overload sensing device to shut the power down does notrecognize the long history of safety provisions for feeders in Articles 215 and 240 and branch circuits in Articles 210 and240, as well as the calculation requirements for sizing the system based on Article 220. Feeder circuits supplyingpanelboards and branch circuits supplying loads of all kinds must be calculated based on their anticipated usage basedon Parts I and II of Article 220 (for branch circuits) and Parts I and III of Article 220 (for feeders) or the optionalcalculations based on Parts I and IV of Article 220. Section 90.3 requires compliance with Chapters 1 through 4 unlessspecifically modified by Chapter 7 (Article 702) in this case. Even if the existing first sentence was deleted as indicatedin the proposed recommendation, feeders and branch circuits must still comply with Article 220 as the proposal text iswritten. Nowhere in the NEC is it permissible to intentionally overload a feeder or a branch circuit, and 240.4(B)intentionally requires the conductors to be protected at their ampacity with permission up to 800 amps to increase to thenext size overcurrent protective device where the size of conductor doesn’t correspond to a standard size device. Thesuggested change in proposed (B)(1) is already permissible based on the existing NEC as automatic load pickup andshedding systems with overload protection designed into the optional standby source.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-248 Log #3085 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Mike Holt, Leesburg, FL

Revise text as follows:702.5 Capacity and Rating.(A) Text to remain unchanged.(B) System Capacity. A load calculation shall not be required for optional standby systems.(1) Manual Transfer Equipment. Where manual transfer equipment is used, an optional standby system shall have

adequate capacity and rating for the supply of all equipment intended to be operated at one time. The user of theoptional standby system shall be permitted to select the load connected to the system.(2) Automatic Transfer Equipment. Where automatic transfer equipment is used, an optional standby system shall

comply with (2)(a) or (2)(b).(a) Full Load. The standby source shall be capable of supplying the full load that is transferred by the automatic

transfer equipment.(b) Load Management. Where a system is employed that will automatically manage the connected load, the standby

source shall have a capacity sufficient to supply the maximum load that will be connected by the load managementsystem.

The functionality of an optional standby system should not be of concern in the code, as per the“practical safeguarding” intent of 90.1(A). If the optional standby system is inadequate, there is not a safety issue likethere is for an emergency or legally required standby system.

The code is an installation document, not a product design document. As a result, it is not possibleto determine whether an automatic standby system has been designed safely enough to allow the standby source to bedeliberately and repeatedly overloaded without resulting in some safety hazard. Therefore, the requirement to size theload properly or provide automatic “resizing” in the form of load management is appropriate.

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Delete "inadvertent".Edit. The provision should apply whether interconnection is inadvertent (accidental) or deliberate.

The use of the term “inadvertent” is necessary for this requirement. The deletion of this term doesnot improve clarity.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Timothy Croushore, Allegheny Power

Delete the Exception.Deleting this exception removes the NEC permission to temporarily connect a generator to premises

wiring without the use of a transfer switch. A home owner in Alabama has already killed a lineman by back feeding hishome electrical wiring with a portable electrical generator without a transfer switch. Lets not continue this permissionthrough the exception in the NEC. See the news article below.Lineman Killed By Generator Back Feed - Victim Helping Restore Power in AlabamaAlabama, July 14, 2005 - Sumter Electric Cooperative (SECO) officials report that a South Carolina lineman helping to

restore power in Alabama after the damage caused by Hurricane Dennis was killed late Tuesday, reportedly by animproperly installed customer generator.According to SECO Director of Public Affairs Barry Bowman, the lineman was helping to restore power lost during

Hurricane Dennis to customers in Alabama. The report Bowman received indicated the lineman was working on a powerline that was supposed to be dead. It was not.“Tragically, the line this technician was working on was not dead,” said Bowman, “The line he was trying to repair had

been re-energized by a customer who had improperly hooked up a generator and created a back feed of electricity fromthe generator into the supposedly dead line. The death of a lineman who was there to help the victims of HurricaneDennis was the horrible result.”Bowman noted that the lineman’s name was not immediately released, but he was from South Carolina and worked for

Pike Electric, Inc. in North Carolina.Alabama authorities are looking for the person responsible and indicate that charges are pending.“This could happen to any lineman, anywhere, if generators are improperly used or hooked up during a power outage.

That’s why we caution homeowners and businesses about the proper use of generators. And, why we continually stressgenerator safety awareness with our SECO employees.I don’t think anybody wants to be responsible for the death ofanother human being,” said Bowman.SECO’s Director of Public Affairs noted that SECO also has 32 workers helping to restore power in the Panhandle and

offered the following generator safety advice:– Do not hook up (hard wire) a generator directly to your home or business electric panel. If you want to hard wire a

generator to home or shop have a licensed electrician install a double-pole, double-throw transfer switch. This willassure that no back feed of electricity will travel out over a supposedly de-energized power line. The installation shouldmeet the requirements of the National Electrical Code and local ordinances. Improper installation can result in seriousinjuries or deaths.– One of the safest ways to use portable generators is to plug appliances, etc. directly into the generator itself rather

than trying to hard wire the generator to the house. When plugging items into the generator make sure not to useundersized extension cords, keep animals and people away from the generator, and place the generator in a clean, dry,and very well ventilated area. This will avoid overheating and the potential for carbon monoxide poisoning. Installingcarbon monoxide detectors in adjacent areas is a good additional safety precaution.“We want our customers to know of the very serious consequences of improper generator use and the terrible death in

Alabama underscores the importance of that type of awareness,” concluded Bowman.

Not having this exception in the NEC would not have affected the outcome of this tragic event sincethe homeowner did not follow the requirements in the exception and probably had no idea that the exception was evenin the NEC. The exception permits “temporary connection of a portable generator without a transfer switch whereconditions of maintenance and supervision ensure that only qualified persons service the installation and where thenormal supply is physically isolated by a lockable disconnecting means or by disconnection of the normal supplyconductors.” The homeowner was probably not qualified and did not have the normal supply physically isolated fromthe generator source.

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Add text to read as follows:The area around the service equipment and optional standby





There is no provision for any emergency illumination other than egress illumination for occupant safety in Section 7.8 ofNFPA 101-2009. Egress safety for the occupants of an electrical room is not specifically addressed. In some cases,the cause of a building outage originates in the electrical service switchgear area. In any case, it is likely that there willbe activity going to and from the electrical service equipment area during a power outage.





NFPA 70EAn excerpt is copied below for your convenience:130.6 Other Precautions for Personnel Activities.(B) Blind Reaching. Employees shall be instructed not to reach blindly into areas that might contain exposed energized

electrical conductors or circuit parts where an electrical hazard exists.(C) Illumination.(1) General.



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_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-253 Log #737 NEC-P13


Add text and a new Fine Print Note to read as follows:

The optional standby system wiring shall be permitted to occupy the same raceways, cables, boxes, and cabinets withother general wiring.All boxes and enclosures (including transfer switches, generators, and power panels) for optional standby circuits shall

not be permitted to be marked with the words “Emergency” or “Emergency Circuit” or “Emergency System”, so that theywill be readily distinguishable from those boxes and enclosures identified as a component of an emergency circuit orsystem, unless otherwise permitted in 700.9(B)(1) through 700.9(B)(5).FPN: See 700.9(A) for identification of an emergency circuit or system.

Manufacturers of surface raceways, both metal ( ® Article 386) and nonmetallic ( ® Article388), and of multi-outlet assemblies ( ® Article 380) derived from surface raceways have had numerous inquiriesfrom specifiers and installers for applications of surface raceways where used for Emergency Systems ( ® Article700) AND for either Legally Required Standby Systems ( ® Article 701) or Optional Standby Systems ( ® Article702) AND for other general wiring (power, lighting, signaling) in the same installation. Despite the requirement of900.9(B), these specifiers and installers are believed to be marking raceways with “EMERGENCY STANDBY”, withoutdistinction between “EMERGENCY” ( ® Article 700 circuits) and “STANDBY” ( ® Article 701 or Article 702circuits), leading to confusion as to the identity of the circuit ( ® Article 700 or Article 701 or Article 702) within thesingle-channel or multiple-channel surface raceway (or multi-outlet assembly) overall or within a specific channel of amultiple-channel surface raceway.Editorial: Comma added in title, consistent with the similar title in Article 700.


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Delete the following text:702.10 Portable Generator Grounding.(A) Separately Derived System. Where a portable optional standby source is used as a separately derived system, it

shall be grounded to a grounding electrode in accordance with 250.30.(B) Nonseparately Derived System. Where a portable optional standby source is used as a nonseparately derived

system, the equipment grounding conductor shall be bonded to the system grounding electrode.This section is not needed, as compliance with Article 250 is not optional (90.3). Furthermore, there is

no reason to require the connection of the equipment grounding conductor to an electrode for a nonseparately derivedsystem, as this is accomplished automatically through the neutral in the transfer switch (otherwise it would be separatelyderived).

There are installers of generators and similar back up power that do not read the text in 250.30 forseparately derived systems and may not understand that portable generators not separately derived must have theequipment grounding conductor from the generator connected to the grounding electrode system; therefore, providingmandatory text references back to the information in Article 250 is re-emphasized in 702.10. The last statement in thesubstantiation is not necessarily correct for portable generators. The submitter should review Section 250.34.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-255 Log #4574 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Mike Flegel, Reliance Controls Corp.

(C) For portable generators with an output of 15 kilowatts or less and 250 volts or less used as a non-separatelyderived system, bonding of the grounded conductor to the equipment grounding conductors can occur in two places, atthe generator and at the service entrance.

For small portable generators, this means the equipment grounding conductor will carry some of theunbalanced neutral current from the service entrance to the generator. Depending on the load, the voltage rise at thegenerator frame in minimal, 3 to 4 volts in most cases. There would be no voltage rise in the equipment groundingsystem in the premises wiring as the dual path exists only between the generator and the service entrance. Manypeople do not know to switch the neutral when using a bonded neutral generator to power their house and many havedone this in the past without a problem. People realize this error when they try to use a portable generator with GFCIprotection to power their house. The tendency then is to disconnect the equipment grounding conductor from thegenerator since most generator manufacturers do not have a means to unbond the generator in the field. This leads tothe undesirable condition of a generator frame without any equipment ground.

If the grounded conductor opened on the line side of the service disconnecting means, theequipment grounding conductor and all conductive parts connected to it would carry the neutral current, raising thepotential to ground of exposed metal parts not intended to carry current. For this reason, the Code continues to prohibitthe creation of parallel paths for normal neutral current to flow with very few exceptions, some of which only apply toexisting installations. Improper installations are not sufficient justification for changing requirements intended toincrease the safety of the installation.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Clyde V. Carl, North Carolina Dept. of Administration/State Construction Office

Delete text as follows:The disconnecting means shall meet the requirements of 225.36.

The sentence that was added to 700.12(B)(6) is superfluous with consideration to the requirements ofUL 869A and UL 2200. The physical requirements that determine a disconnecting means to be "suitable for use asservice equipment" are not found in NEC®. Consequently, the mandate that equipment must be suitable for use aservice equipment, without clear definition of how equipment may be suitable, may foster misunderstandings about howthe requirement may be satisfied. This is the thesis by which the proposed fine print note should be added to 225.36 tomitigate a misapplication for the "suitable for service equipment" requirement of 700.12(B)(6) that was revised for the2008 edition of the NEC®.In UL 869A, fourth edition, one learns in Section 14.2, Insulated neutral,

Paragraph 14.2.1, that, "Equipment having a neutral insulated from the enclosure, intended for use as serviceequipment, and that can accommodate not more than six main disconnecting means shall be marked "Suitable for useas service equipment." The NEC® definition for service equipment expands on UL 869A by stating, "The necessaryequipment, usually consisting of a circuit breaker(s) or switch(es) and fuse(s) and their accessories, connected to theload end of service conductors to a building or other structure, or an otherwise designated area, and intended toconstitute the main control and cutoff of the supply." The problem is that generator sets are, by the NEC® definition,separately derived systems. A separately derived system is, "A premises wiring system whose power is derived from asource of electrical energy or equipment other than a service. Such systems have no direct electrical connection,including a solidly connected grounded circuit conductor, to supply conductors originating in another system." Agenerator set is a separately derived system, therefore, there is no justification for 700.12(B)(6) to require thedisconnecting means of a generator set to be suitable for service equipment. 700.12(B)(6) is ambiguous in another way.In UL 2200, Section 25 discusses overcurrent protection, a requirement of

equipment suitable for service equipment, and output circuit grounding. UL 2200 does not specifically call out arequirement for a neutral that is insulated from the generator set enclosure, but Section 14, Output Circuit Grounding, inparagraph 14.1.2 requires that "an output alternating current power circuit shall be grounded" when in sub-paragraph (a)"the circuit has no electrical connection, including a solidly connected grounded circuit conductor, to supply conductorsoriginating in another wiring system." Conversely, the alternating current output power circuit must be insulated fromground at the generator if the circuit shares a neutral conductor ground reference with another system, or a service. Ifthe grounded conductor is not to be shared with another system, or service, UL 2200 goes on in paragraph 14.1.4 todescribe the application and sizing of a bonding jumper to ground conductors of output circuit configurations listed inparagraph 14.1.3. A bonding jumper would not be required if a generator output circuit was bonded to ground at thefactory. If this were the case, the generator set output, though a separately derived system, could only be utilized in themanner of service entrance equipment, and if UL 2200 was similar to UL 869A, it would require the generator set to belabeled, "Suitable only for use as service equipment", unless its output enclosure can accommodate more than sixdisconnecting means, and then it would be required to be labeled. "Suitable only for use as service equipment. Installnot more than six main disconnecting means."


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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Brendan A. Foley, Eaton Corp.

Add new text to read as follows:702.11 Outdoor Generator SetsWhere an a permanently -mounted outdoor housed generator set is equipped with a readily accessible disconnecting

means located within sight of the building or structure supplied, an additional disconnecting means shall not be requiredwhere ungrounded conductors serve or pass through the building or structure. The disconnecting means shall meet therequirements of 225.36.702.12 Provisions for Connection of Portable Generator SetsWhere provisions such as inlets, or connection cabinets are installed for the connection of a portable generator set, a

disconnecting means shall be required at the point of connection. If the inlet device or receptacle is rated 100 amps orgreater, the inlet receptacles shall either be rated as a disconnect, or shall be interlocked with the disconnecting meansto prevent access to the connection inlets under load.

The existing requirement which permits omission of an additional disconnection means when thegenerator is within sight, should be restricted to permanently mounted generators only. Portable generators are capableof being connected in situations where they will not be within sight. Since there is no way of definitely knowing whichsituation might exist in the future because the portable generator and it's connections can easily change, the presentallowance should be permitted only for permanently mounted generators.Due to recent storms around the country and legislation in the state of Florida, there are more installations of

provisions for the connection of a portable generator. Many of the devices that are being installed to allow the generatorconnection to the building electrical system that are being installed are unsafe and could result in catastrophic failureand loss of life.This code change is to address the unsafe nature of these installations and to provide a means of personnel protection

that is missing from the current NEC.Additionally, many of these installations consist of readily accessible boxes — even boxes accessible to the general

public. These boxes are supplied with accessible non-load break devices such as Cam-Loks as the inlet connection.There is no safeguard to prevent the disconnection of these cables under load. If the receptacle inlet is not a load breakdevice, the receptacle inlets should be barriered or interlocked in such a way that they may not be disconnected from aclosed circuit.

A suitable disconnecting device is always available with a portable generator – the act of shutting itdown. When the prime mover rolls to a stop, it is “off” more reliably than can be done with any other form of disconnect.Many plug and receptacle combinations are listed with horsepower ratings and are acceptable as disconnecting meansfor motors up to and including 60 amperes 3-phase at 120/208 volts. Pin and sleeve combination units are rated formuch higher ampacities with at least one type that has an internal switch combination that switches the load off beforethe twist-lock cord cap can be removed. There are many different methods that can be utilized to disconnect theportable generator than the method suggested in the proposed recommendation.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Michael Kirchner, Generac Power Systems

702.12 "New Section"Ground-Fault Protection of EquipmentThe alternate source of optional standby systems shall not be required to have ground-fault protection of equipment.

Generator cabling is defined as a feeder in Article 100. As a feeder, the generator disconnect isrequired to have ground fault protection when the conditions of 215.10 are met (1000 amps and greater than 150 voltsto ground). The requirements for 215.10 are based upon the requirements of a service to have ground fault protection(230.95) which is directly referenced in 215.10.The requirement for 1000 amp, 480 volt (greater than 150 volts to ground) services to have ground fault protection was

added in 1971 because of the unusual number of fire incidences for services in this size range. It should be noted that800 amp and below services don't have this requirement nor do 240 or 208 volt services. Given that the utility is theprimary source of power, 99.9 percent of the time and the optional standby power system is powering the load 0.1percent of the time, the risk of fire incidences from an 800 amp utility service must be at least 100 times greater than anoptional standby power system feeding a 1000 amp feeder. The reasoning behind requiring ground fault protection onoptional standby systems becomes illogical when comparing relative fire risks.Optional standby systems play an incredibly important role in supporting our country's infrastructure and commerce. In

many ways, optional standby systems utilized in data and telecommunication applications are as important as manylegally required systems which don't require ground fault protection. Given the importance of continuity of power formany mission critical optional standby applications and the relatively low fire risks, removing the ground faultrequirements seems prudent.

There was no technical substantiation provided to relax the requirement in 215.10 for providingground fault protection on feeders that are 1000 amperes or greater at 277/480 volts for optional standby systems. Thedata provided in the recommendation was anecdotal and was without any scientific basis. Ground fault protection ofthese large circuits is as important with feeders from generators as feeders supplied from utility company power sincehigher voltages can cause continued arcing of a ground fault and subsequent fire and arcing damage to the equipment.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-259 Log #4472 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Dustin Priemer, Priemer & Associates

In Article 702 add New Part V and Section 702.27 to read as follows:V. Overcurrent Protection.702.27 Selective Coordination. Optional standby system(s) overcurrent devices shall be selectively coordinated with all

line side overcurrent devices that additionally supply emergency system(s) or legally required standby system(s).It is recognized through the inclusion of selective coordination requirements in articles 700 & 701 that

ensuring availability of power to these systems is vitally important. A loss of power to these loads can jeopardizelife-safety, create hazards and hamper fire-fighting operations. For alternate power systems where emergency, legallyrequired standby and optional standby systems are all supplied through a common overcurrent device, a fault on theoptional standby system could potentially open this common overcurrent device resulting in a power outage toemergency system(s) and/or legally required standby system(s). This requirement prevents a fault on the optionalstandby system from causing unnecessary power outages on the emergency and legally required standby system(s).

Optional standby power can be supplied by emergency or legally required standby power systems;however, 700.5(B) and 701.6(2) allow automatic load shedding of the optional standby system where connected toemergency or legally required standby systems. This will handle any possible overload for the systems. Overcurrentprotective devices on the optional standby systems must be able to handle any short circuit or ground fault on thesystem without taking the emergency or legally required system off line. Section 240.12 provides selective coordinationfor these systems already, and no further selective coordination is necessary.

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The provisions of this article shall apply to new construction and shall apply to the installation, operation, monitoring,control, and maintenance of the portions of the premises wiring system intended to supply, distribute, and controlelectricity to designated critical operations areas (DCOA) in the event of disruption to elements of the normal system.

The second paragraph of the Scope suggests (implicitly, not explicitly) that any “municipal, state,federal, or other code by any governmental agency having jurisdiction” can declare (perhaps arbitrarily) that a facility is aDCOA and therefore must meet the provisions of Article 708. It would be unusual for such designation to find itsauthorization in the Electrical Code. The Scope implies that such designation could (and probably would?) be applied toan existing facility. Some sites might be able to meet Article 708 requirements, but the great majority probably wouldnot be able to do so without some level of renovation. In many cases (perhaps most?), the work required to come intocompliance with 708 could be prohibitively expensive, disruptive, and /or impossible. For example, you can’t move yourbuilding to a different floodplain. The Code should clearly state that Article 708 should not be applied retroactively.

The National Electrical Code (Article 708 included) is an installation code and applies only when anelectrical installation is initially installed, is upgraded or is renovated. Article 708 applies only where mandated by otherentities as is clearly conveyed 708.1 It is not within the scope of the NEC or Article 708 to prevent, for example, thefederal government from requiring an existing installation meet the requirements of Article 708. Many existing facilitieshouse systems with objectives vital to public safety. Annex F under Improving Availability states "The appropriatemethods to use for improving availability depend on whether the facility is being designed or is already in use." Theannex offers three methods for improving availability for existing facilities where the current level of availability isunacceptable. Therefore, existing sites unable to meet Article 708 requirements in their entirety are offered alternativesand can still meet the objective of improving availability.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-261 Log #1117 NEC-P13


Solutions (ATIS)Insert the following FPN No. 2:

FPN No. 2: The provisions of Chapter 8, , cover communications circuits and equipment notdeemed to serve designated critical operations areas (DCOA).Renumber existing FPNs 2 through 8 as FPNs 3 through 9.

NEC users, including AHJs, may misinterpret new Article 708 as applying to communications circuitsand equipment that, in their view, are critical. They should be reminded that the first place to look for communicationscriteria is in Chapter 8. To avoid misapplication of Article 708, the user needs to be fully aware of the distinctionbetween the “normal” communications provisions of Chapter 8 and the more stringent, specialized provisions of 708.The proposed FPN helps to reinforce that distinction.

The COPS systems and circuits are determined by municipal, state, federal, or other codes by anygovernmental agency having jurisdiction or by facility engineering documentation as stated in the scope. In addition,90.3 states that Chapter 8 is not subject to the requirements of Chapters 1 through 7, except where the requirementsare specifically referenced in Chapter 8, and since Article 708 is not referenced in Chapter 8, the requirements in Article708 need not apply. The new fine print note is not needed.

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Add new text as follows:FPN No. 8: See Annex G F for information on Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Availability and Reliability for

Critical Operations Power Systems; and Development and Implementation of Functional Performance Tests (FPTs) forCritical Operations Power Systems.FPN No. 9: See Annex G for information on Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition.

Insert a Fine Print Note (FPN) to refer to Annex F. Insertion is preferred instead of adding at the end toprovide orderly arrangement of the references to the alphabetically arranged annexes.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-263 Log #1263 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Robert Schuerger, EYP Mission Critical Facilities, Inc.

Add new text as follows:Category I – Systems that have been designated to remain operational for emergency services to function.Category II – Systems that have been designated to significantly contribute to the delivery of emergency services or

are essential for disaster recovery.Category III – Systems that have significant impact on the protection of life and property, but are not immediately

essential for providing emergency services. Category III systems are typically restorable to operation within 24 hours.Category IV – Critical systems that have significant impact on the protection of life and property, but are not

immediately essential, as there are multiple facilities providing the same function. Category IV systems are typicallyrestorable to operation within 24 hours of the time utility power, water and sewage disposal are available to the facility.

Having categories of critical systems provides a method to align the importance of the COPS to theprotection of life and property. The definitions are needed for several companion proposals that provide a gradient scaleof requirements.The classifying governmental agency having jurisdiction would benefit from a gradient level of criticality, which provides

a means to ensure the most critical systems have the resources allocated to them so that they are available whenneeded to deliver emergency services and provide for disaster recovery. Without a gradient scale, fewer systems canbe addressed because they would all require the most extensive amount of resources.

Article 708 provides minimum electrical installation requirements for electrical systems designatedby another entity as being critical. It is not within the scope of Article 708 to determine and or specify categories ofinstallations with respect to their being critical. Section 708.4(A) provides the necessary provisions for conducting riskassessments, and the submitter has identified one method of conducting risk assessment, and it is not the intent of thisarticle to restrict the risk assessment to a single method.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Stanley Kaufman, CableSafe Inc.

Revise as follows:An electronic system that provides monitoring and controls for

the operation of the critical operations power system. This can include the fire alarm system, security system, control ofthe HVAC, the start/stop/monitoring of the power supplies and electrical distribution system, annunciation andcommunications equipment to emergency personnel, facility occupants, and remote operators.

Article 100 has a definition for communications equipment, not communication equipment.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-265 Log #2816 NEC-P13


Delete this section and associated text708.3 Application of Other Article.Except as modified by this article, all applicable articles of this Code shall apply.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-266 Log #4290 NEC-P13




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Solutions (ATIS)Insert the proposed FPN following 708.3:

FPN: See Chapter 8 for non-DCOA communications applications.NEC users, including AHJs, should be reminded that the first place to look for communications criteria

is in Chapter 8. To avoid misapplication of Article 708, the user needs to be fully aware of the distinction between the“normal” communications provisions of Chapter 8 and the more stringent, specialized provisions of 708. The proposedFPN helps to reinforce that distinction.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-268 Log #1265 NEC-P13


Add new text to read as follows:In critical operations power systems, risk assessment shall be performed to identify hazards, the likelihood of their

occurrence, and the vulnerability of the electrical system to those hazards. The thoroughness of the risk assessmentshall be appropriate to the Category of the systems as follows:(1) Category I risk assessment shall include probabilistic modeling, such as fault tree or reliability block diagram (RBD)

for the electrical power to the Category I systems to verify an availability of 0.9999 and a mean time to repair of lessthan 1.0 hours. The probabilistic modeling shall also include naturally occurring hazards, such as earthquakes, floods,hurricanes and snow/ice storms to the extent that weather data is available. For hazards listed in 708.4 (B) for whichthere is no data available, such as human-caused events, the risk assessment shall include a systematic methodanalysis, such as a fault tree. The analysis shall include what types of human-caused events are most likely to causethe COPS to be taken out of service with a mitigation strategy to minimize the probability of it occurring.(2) Category II risk assessment shall include probabilistic modeling, such as fault tree or reliability block diagram (RBD)

for the electrical power to the Category I systems to verify an availability of 0.9995 and a mean time to repair of 4.0hours or less. The probabilistic modeling shall also include naturally occurring hazards, such as earthquakes, floods,hurricanes and snow/ice storms to the extent that weather data is available. For hazards listed in 708.4 (B) for whichthere is no data available, such as human-caused events, the risk assessment shall include a systematic methodanalysis, such as a fault tree. The analysis shall include what types of human-caused events are most likely to causethe COPS to be taken out of service with a mitigation strategy to minimize the probability of it occurring.(3) Category III risk assessment shall include probabilistic modeling, such as fault tree or reliability block diagram

(RBD) for the electrical power to the Category I systems to verify an availability of 0.9973 and a mean time to repair of24.0 hours or less. For hazards listed in 708.4 (B) the analysis shall include what types of events are most likely tocause the COPS to be taken out of service with a mitigation strategy to minimize the probability of it occurring.(4) Category IV risk assessment shall include what types of events are most likely to cause the COPS to be taken out

of service with a mitigation strategy to minimize the probability of it occurring. Probabilistic modeling is not required.The requirement for the various types of critical systems needs to align with the importance of the

system to the protection of life and property. A set of specific requirements for the various levels of criticality needs tobe included in the article to provide design criteria and for consistent application.A gradient level of risk assessment with probabilistic modeling provides a quantitative method to ensure the most

critical systems have designed sufficiently robust so that they are available when needed to deliver emergency servicesand provide for disaster recovery.


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Add new text to read as follows:A commissioning plan shall be developed, documented and align with the criticality of the COPS as follows:(1) Category I shall include the performance and documentation of electrical acceptance testing of the components in

the critical electrical distribution system, startup and functional testing of the major subsystems such as generators,automatic transfer switches, UPS systems and the mechanical equipment for the cooling system of the critical load. AnIntegrated Systems Test shall also be performed in which load banks are connected to the critical distribution panelsand the operation of the electrical and mechanical systems are verified under critical electrical design load conditions.(2) Category II shall include the performance and documentation of electrical acceptance testing of the components in

the critical electrical distribution system, startup and functional testing of the major subsystems such as generators,automatic transfer switches, UPS systems and the mechanical equipment for the cooling system of the critical load.(3) Category III shall include the performance and documentation of startup and functional testing of the major

subsystems such as generators, automatic transfer switches, UPS systems and the mechanical equipment for thecooling system of the critical load.(4) Category IV shall include the performance and documentation of startup and functional testing of the major

components in the critical electrical distribution system and the mechanical equipment for the cooling system of thecritical load.

The requirement for the various types of COPS should align with the importance of the critical systemsto the protection of life and property. A set of specific requirements for the various levels of criticality provides a meansfor consistent application.The classifying governmental agency having jurisdiction would benefit from a gradient level of criticality, which provides

a means to ensure the most critical systems have the resources allocated to them so that they are available whenneeded to deliver emergency services and provide for disaster recovery. Without a gradient scale, fewer systems canbe addressed because they would all require the most extensive amount of resources.


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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Michael A. Anthony, University of Michigan / Rep. Assn. of Education Facility Executives - APPA.ORG

REVISE TEXT AS SHOWN BELOW:

All boxes and enclosures (including transfer switches, generators, and power panels) forcritical operations power system circuits shall be permanently marked so they will be readily identified as a componentof the system.

, the cover plates for the electrical receptacles or the electricalreceptacles themselves supplied from the COPS shall have a distinctive color or marking so as to be readilyidentifiable.

Requiring special outlet marking for COPS outlets in a building that is entirely a DCOA is costly anddoes not contribute to the safety objectives of this section.

Revise the recommendation of 708.10(2) to read:In a building in which COPS are present with other types of power systems described in

other sections in this article, the cover plates for the receptacles or the receptacles themselves supplied from the COPSshall have a distinctive color or marking so as to be readily identifiable.

The panel action clarifies the recommendation.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-271 Log #4821 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Robert Konnik, South Windsor, CT

Add text to read as follows:708.10(C)(1)(1) Rigid metal conduit, intermediate metal conduit, Type MC cable that employs a continuous,

gas/vaportight metal sheath and is listed as an electrical circuit protective system or Type MI cable.In just about all areas of the code, MC cable is allowed to be used where MI cable is used. The

exception is in hospitals some areas of hospitals. 517.61(B)(1) allows MC cable with that employs a continuous,gas/vapor-tight metal sheath to be used. Fire rated MC cable is used in hospitals where allowed by the AHJ. Thisproposal only allows a small subset of MC cable that has additional positive benefits, that is ability to survive in a fire.

Section 330.12(1) does not permit MC cable to be installed where subject to physical damage;therefore, inserting this wiring method into 708.10(C)(1) is inappropriate.

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Add a new (d) as follows:Where provisions must be made for flexibility at equipment connection, one or more of the following

shall also be permitted:(a) Flexible metal fittings(b) Flexible metal conduit with listed fittings(c) Liquidtight flexible metal conduit with listed fittings(d) Wiring methods in accordance with article 645 when a critical operations data system is within the DCOA.

Information Technology Equipment Rooms are addressed in Article 645 (and in NFPA 75). IT spacesalready incorporate methods and procedures to assure the highest levels of continuous operation and serve as a modelfor COPS. Because ITE rooms are characterized by the need for frequent and rapid expansion and relocation, therequirements for conduit beyond what is already stipulated in Article 645 would impose onerous conditions on a systemthat has already proven to work well. The term “critical operations data system” has already been proposed and definedin a separate proposal for Article 645.

The recommendation does not provide specific wiring methods from Article 645 that may providephysical protection; therefore, the recommended text would not be enforceable.

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Revise Text as follows:708.10(C)(2) Feeders shall meet one of the following conditions:(1) Be a listed electrical circuit protective system with a minimum 21-hour fire rating when installed in accordance with

the listing requirement(2) Be protected by a fire-rated assembly listed to achieve a minimum fire rating of 21 hour(3) Be embedded in not less than 50 mm (2 in.) of concrete

(4) Be a cable listed to maintain circuit integrity for not less than 1 hour when installed in accordance with the listingrequirement.

This proposal increases the time from 1 hour to 2 hours as was done last code cycle in 695.6(B). Theextended time is to allow occupants to exit the building as well as give fire fighters additional time to operate the firefighting equipment once people exit the building by extending the time the emergency circuits operate.Method (3) has deleted the 2 inches because in various applications e.g. slabs versus columns or with different

concrete, e.g. lightweight, siliceous, or carbonate; different concrete thickness may be required to meet the rating.Method (4) is encompassed by method (1). A “cable listed to maintain circuit integrity” is covered as a listed electrical

circuit protective system for power. All UL FHJR fire resistive cables are listed as an electrical circuit protective system(FHIT).The cautionary note about the listing requirements from method (4) was moved to method (1).

Revise text to read as follows:Feeders shall meet one of the following conditions:

(1) Be a listed electrical circuit protective system with a minimum 2-hour fire rating.FPN: UL guide information for electrical circuit protection systems (FHIT) contains information on proper installation

requirements to maintain the fire rating(2) Be protected by a listed fire-rated assembly that has a minimum fire rating of 2 hours(3) Be embedded in not less than 50 mm (2 in.) of concrete.

The 2 in. of concrete has provided the industry with a prescriptive benchmark that has served theindustry well. The substantiation does not demonstrate that use of 2 in. of concrete has compromised the integrity of thecircuit. The recommendation does not provide an alternative prescriptive requirement that can be easily applied. Therecommendation was revised for consistency with similar requirements in section 700.9(D) and for clarity. The inclusionof the fine print note provides desirable information on electrical circuit protective systems.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________James R. Steed, Malcolm Pirnie, Inc.

Add text as follows:

In many types of installations feeders are distributed through areas where the threat of fire andpropagating the fire is minimal. For example, in water and wastewater treatment plants the buildings are commonly ofconcrete construction and the contents are equipment and piping. In these types of installations it is not uncommon forthe buildings to be linked by underground utility tunnels hundreds of feet long that carry only piping. Frequently,electrical feeders are also routed through these tunnels. Requiring fire protection for feeders in areas where there isminimal threat to the feeders results a minimal safety improvement at a large expense.

Section 708.10(C)(2) involves fire protection for feeders. These feeders must meet therequirements for special protection with a minimum 1-hour fire rating or be imbedded in at least 2 in. of concrete forsurvivability. No technical substantiation was provided to relax these requirements.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-275 Log #2025 NEC-P13


Revise: Where COPS feeders insulated conductors are installed below the level of the 100 yearfloodplain, the conductors shall be listed for use in wet locations and be installed in a wiring method that is permittedidentified for the use.

Edit. All conductors should be included such as branch circuits and equipment grounding and bondingconductors (if insulated). "Permitted" may be at the discretion of the AHJ; "identified" is more specific and covers allconditions not just wet locations.

The intent of the submitter is met in the present text of the NEC. All branch circuit and feederconductors are covered by the present requirement. Branch circuits are already included per 708.10(D)(a).

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-276 Log #141 NEC-P13


Revise as follows:(1) Signal and communications cables wires shall use shielded twisted pairs.(2) Shields of signal and communications cables wires shall be continuous.

Article 800 has definitions for communications cable and communications wire. This section apparentlydeals with cables, not wires. See 800.2.


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Revise Text as Follows:All conductors

or cables shall be installed using any of the metal wiring methods permitted by 708.10(C)(1) and in addition shall complywith 708.14(1) through 708.14(8) as applicable.(1) All cables for fire alarm, security, sSignal systems and emergency communications wires shall be use shielded

twisted pairs cables.(2) Shields of cables for fire alarm, security, signal systems and emergency communications signal and communication

wires shall be continuous.(3) Fiber optic cables shall be used for connections between two or more buildings on the property and under single

management.(4) Listed secondary protectors shall be provided at the terminals of the communication circuits.(5) Conductors for all control circuits rated above 50V shall be installed with wire rated not less than 600V.(6) Communications, fire alarm, and signaling circuits shall use relays with contact ratings that exceed circuit voltage

and current ratings in the controlled circuit.(7) Riser All cables for fire alarm, security, signal systems and emergency communications communication cables shall

be riser- rated and shall be 2-hour fire resistive cable or a listed 2-hour electrical circuit protective system.(8) Control, monitoring, and power wiring to HVAC systems shall be 2-hour fire-resistive cable or a listed 2-hour

electrical circuit protective system.To clarify which cable types require shielded twisted pairs, and which require riser rating.

Two hour fire resistive cable in conduit as required by 708.10(C) (1) is an electrical circuit protective system.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Thomas P. Hammerberg, Automatic Fire Alarm Association, Inc.

Revise text as follows:708.14 Wiring of HVAC, Fire Alarm, Security, Emergency Communications, and Signaling Systems.All conductors or cables shall be installed using any of the metal wiring methods permitted by 708.10(C)(1) and in

addition shall comply with 708.14(1) through 708.14(8) as applicable.(1) Signal and communication wires shall use shielded twisted pairs.(2) Shields of signal and communication wires shall be continuous.(3) Fiber optic cables shall be used for connections between two or more buildings on the property and under single

management.(4) Listed secondary protectors shall be provided at the terminals of the communication circuits.(5) Conductors for all control circuits rated above 50V 70V shall be installed with wire rated not less than 600V 300V.(6) Communications, fire alarm, and signaling circuits shall use relays with contact ratings that exceed circuit voltage

and current ratings in the controlled circuit.(7) Riser communication cables shall be 2-hour fire-resistive cable or a listed 2-hour electrical circuit protective system.(8) Control, monitoring, and power wiring to HVAC systems shall be 2-hour fire-resistive cable or a listed 2-hour

electrical circuit protective system.Not all systems can use shielded twisted pair wires. Many systems today have been designed not to

use shielding to allow a various types of wiring designs. Section 708.14 (1) should be deleted and the subsequent () berenumbered.

The panel accept the recommendation for 708.14(1) and rejects the recommendation in (5). There was no technicalsubstantiation provided to change the voltage rating of the above 70-volt conductors from 600-volts to 300-volts.

The recommendation does not provide sufficient technical substantiation to support relaxation ofthe current requirements in 708.14(1) and (5). The shielding requirement in (1) was discussed significantly during the2008 NEC cycle, and it was the opinion of the committee that the shielding provided a higher level of protection againstinterference on control circuits for critical equipment. If there is equipment or systems that are incompatible with the useof shielded cables the panel would request such information be put forth in a comment.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Sanford E. Egesdal, Egesdal Associates PLC

Revise 708.14708.14 Wiring of HVAC, Fire Alarm, Security, Emergency Communications, and Signaling Systems.

All conductors or cables shall be installed using any of the metal wiring methods permitted by 708.10(C)(1) and inaddition shall comply with 708.14(1) through 708.14(8) as applicable.(1) Signal and communication wires shall use shielded twisted pairs.(2) Where used, sShields of signal and emergency communication wires shall be continuous.(3) Fiber optic cables shall be used for connections between two or more buildings on the property and under single

management. This requirement shall become effective July 2014.(4) Listed secondary protectors shall be provided at the terminals of the communication circuits, unless the circuits are

installed in optical fiber cable.(5) Conductors for all control circuits rated above 50V shall be installed with wire rated not less than 600V. in

compliance with the requirements of Parts I and Part III of Article 725 or Article 760.(6) Emergency cCommunications, fire alarm, and signaling circuits shall use relays with contact ratings that exceed

circuit voltage and current ratings in the controlled circuit.(7) Riser emergency communication cables shall be 2-hour fire-resistive cable or a listed 2-hour electrical circuit

protective system. This requirement shall become effective July 2014.(8) Control, monitoring, and power wiring to HVAC systems shall be 2-hour fire-resistive cable or a listed 2-hour

electrical circuit protective system. This requirement shall become effective July 2014.The recommended changes are an attempt to better align the requirements with available products.

Some of the present requirements would inhibit installation of some products, or products may not be available.(1) This requirement is deleted because some products would have significant installation limitations due to the

increased inter-wiring capacitance caused by a shield. Also, some temperature control systems use twisted triplets(conductors in conduit, or cable).(2) Shields may not be appropriate for some cables.(2), (6), & (7) Where “communication” appears change to “emergency communication” to avoid confusion with

“communications” covered by Article 800.(3) Adding an effective date for this requirement provides time for manufacturers to develop product to meet the

requirement.(4) Optical fiber cables do not need secondary protectors.(5) Control circuits for HVAC systems and fire alarm systems may have voltage greater than 50 volts, but are powered

by a power source not greater than 100VA.(7) & (8) A 2-hour fire-resistive cable or a listed 2-hour electrical circuit protective system must be installed in

accordance with the product listing. The product listing may not match the requirement set forth in 708.10(C)(1), whichreads as follows: “Protection Against Physical Damage. The wiring of the COPS system shall be protected againstphysical damage. Wiring methods shall be permitted to be installed in accordance with the following: (1) Rigid metalconduit, intermediate metal conduit, or Type MI cable. Adding an effective date for this requirement provides time formanufacturers to develop product to meet the requirement.

See the panel action and statement on Proposal 13-278. There was no technical substantiationprovided to indicate that manufacturers don’t have these products available and, in fact electrical circuit protectivecircuits are available so the effective dates are not necessary. The proposed changes in (5) were rejected since725.31(A) require Class 2 or 3 circuits involving life safety issues to comply with the requirements for Class 1 circuitsand 725.49(B) requires 600-volt insulation. Emergency was not added to (7) and (8) since the circuits are covered inChapter 8 and are not labeled as “emergency” in any of the articles.

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Revise (2): Shields of signal and communication wires shall be continuous (unbroken) betweenequipment(s).

Edit. Proposal clarifies that "continuous" does not include splicing.

The recommendation creates redundant language rather than promoting clarity as Webster'sdefines "continuous" as "unbroken."

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-281 Log #142 NEC-P13


Revise as follows:(3) Fiber optic Optical fiber cables shall be used for connections between two or more buildings on the property and

under single management.Article 770 uses the term “optical fiber cables,” not “fiber optic cables”. NEC terminology should be

consistent.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-282 Log #143 NEC-P13


Revise as follows:(4) A listed primary protector shall be provided on all communications circuits. Listed secondary protectors shall be

provided at the terminals of the communications circuits.The fine print note in section 800.90(D) warns that secondary protectors are not intended to be used

without primary protectors.

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Solutions (ATIS)Add text as follows:

(4) Listed secondary protectors shall be provided at the terminals of the communications circuits. Where acommunications circuit is exposed to accidental contact with electric light or power conductors operating at over 300volts to ground, or there exists a lightning exposure, a listed primary protector shall be utilized with each listedsecondary protector.FPN No. 1: Secondary protectors on communications circuits exposed to accidental contact with electric light or power

conductors operating at greater than 300 volts to ground are not intended for use without primary protectors.FPN No. 2: See 800.2 for the definition of ‘exposed to accidental contact’.FPN No. 3: See 800.90(A) FPN No. 2 for information on lightning exposure.

Secondary protectors are not intended for use without primary protectors where there is an exposureto accidental contact with electric light or power conductors operating at over 300 volts to ground (see 800.90 (D) FPN).The present text is incomplete and may lead to the misapplication of secondary protectors beyond their listing criteria.The added text and FPN No. 1 correlates with 800.90 (D) and the listing criteria for secondary protectors. AdditionalFPN Nos. 2 and 3 will help the reader to better understand exposure to power and to lightning.

The panel accepts in principle the revision to 708.14(4) and rejects the inclusion of the new fine print notes.The panel action on Proposal 13-282 meets the intent of the recommendation in regard to the use

of a primary protector with secondary protectors. Article 708 requirements transcend the minimum requirements inother code articles. Those minimum requirements already apply, so the fine print notes are not needed.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-284 Log #144 NEC-P13


Revise as follows:(7) Riser communication cables shall Type CMR-CI be 2-hour fire-resistive cable or a listed 2-hour electrical circuit

protective system.A riser communications cable with a 2-hour fire-resistive rating is a Type CMR-CI. See 800.179(G) for

the listing requirements for circuit integrity (CI) communications cables.

It is not necessary to provide the level of specificity that the recommendation proposes. Cables thatmeet the requirements of this section are covered in Chapters 7 and 8.

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MOVE A CHUNK OF TEXT REGARDING VENTILATION FROM 708.22 AND RE-INSERT IT IN708.20 AS SHOWN BELOW:

A COPS shall have capacity and rating for all loads to be operated simultaneously forcontinuous operation with variable load for an unlimited number of hours, except for required maintenance of the powersource. A portable, temporary, or redundant alternate power source shall be available for use whenever the COPSpower source is out of service for maintenance or repair.

The alternate power source shall be permittedto supply COPS emergency, legally required standby and optional loads where the source has adequate capacity orwhere automatic selective load pickup and load shedding is provided as needed to ensure adequate power to (1) theCOPS and emergency circuits, (2) the legally required standby circuits, and (3) the optional standby circuits, in thatorder of priority. The alternate power source shall be permitted to be used for peak load shaving, provided theseconditions are met. Peak load-shaving operation shall be permitted for satisfying the test requirement of 708.6(B), provided all otherconditions of 708.6 are met.

The alternate power source shall be capable of operating the COPS for a minimumof 72 hours at full load of DCOA with a steady-state voltage within ±10 percent of nominal utilization voltage.

DELETE FROM 708.22 (D) ABOVE AND RE-INSERT IN 708.20 AS SHOWN BELOW:

Current supply shall be such that, in the event of failure of the normal supply to the DCOA,critical operations power shall be available within the time required for the application. The supply system for criticaloperations power, in addition to the normal services to the building and meeting the general requirements of this section,shall be one or more of the types of systems described in 708.20(D) through (H). FPN: Assignment of degree of reliability of the recognized critical operations power system depends on the careful

evaluation in accordance with the risk assessment. Where located within a building, equipment for sources of power as described in 708.20(D)

through (H) shall be installed either in spaces fully protected by approved automatic fire suppression systems(sprinklers, carbon dioxide systems, and so forth) or in spaces with a 1-hour fire rating.

All sources of power shall be grounded as a separately derived source in accordance with 250.30.

Surge protection devices shall be provided at all facility distribution voltage levels. An automatic battery charging means shall be provided. Batteries shall be compatible with the

charger for that particular installation. For a sealed battery, the container shall not be required to be transparent.However, for the lead acid battery that requires water additions, transparent or translucent jars shall befurnished. Automotive-type batteries shall not be used.

CLEARER GROUPING OF REQUIREMENTS IS POSSIBLE WITH A REVISION THAT RELOCATESTHE 708.22 REQUIREMENTS FOR VENTILATION WITH OTHER GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR POWERSOURCES IN 708.20.

217Printed on 1/29/2009

Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 70The panel accepts the recommendation in principle and relocates the text and associated fine print note as a new

Section 708.21.

The panel agrees with the recommendation but more clarity is achieved by locating this provisionas a separate requirement.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-286 Log #3947 NEC-P13


Revise text to read as follows:Current supply shall be such that, in the event of failure of the normal supply to the DCOA,

critical operations power shall be available within the time required for the application. The supply system for criticaloperations power, in addition to the normal services to the building and meeting the general requirements of this section,shall be one or more of the types of systems described in 708.20(DE) through (H).

The change is to correct the reference to the types of systems beginning with (E) Storage Batterybecause (D) Surge Protection Devices are not a type of power supply system.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-287 Log #3949 NEC-P13


Revise text to read as follows:( Where located within a building, equipment for sources of power as described in 708.20(DE)

through (H) shall be installed either in spaces fully protected by approved automatic fire suppression systems(sprinklers, carbon dioxide systems, and so forth) or in spaces with a 1 hour fire rating.

The change is to correct the reference to the types of systems beginning with (E) Storage Batterybecause (D) Surge Protection Devices are not a type of power supply system.

Revise text to read as follows:( Where located within a building, equipment for sources of power as described in 708.20(E)

through (H) shall be installed either in spaces fully protected by approved automatic fire suppression systems(sprinklers, carbon dioxide systems, and so forth) or in spaces with a 1 2-hour fire rating.

The panel agrees with the recommendation and in addition has revised "1-hour" to "2-hour" tocorrelate with similar actions taken on Section 708.10.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-288 Log #3944 NEC-P13


Revise text to read as follows:Prime movers shall not be solely dependent on a public utility gas system for their fuel supply

or municipal water supply for their cooling systems. Means shall be provided for automatically transferring from onefuel supply to another where dual fuel supplies are used.

Editorial change for the insertion of "Fuel" in the title of 708.20(F)(3) because it is the adjective of thesubject and this would be consistent with the title of a parallel topic in 701.11(B)(3).

The requirement covers other than fuel supplies.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Michael A. Anthony, University of Michigan Business Operations / Rep. APPA Higher Education Fac.

ExecutivesAdd new (8) as follows:

F) Generator Set.(1) Prime Mover-Driven. Generator sets driven by a prime mover shall be provided with means for automatically

starting the prime mover on failure of the normal service. A time-delay feature permitting a minimum 15-minute settingshall be provided to avoid retransfer in case of short-time reestablishment of the normal source.(2) Power for fuel transfer pumps. Where power is needed for the operation of the fuel transfer pumps to deliver fuel to

a generator set day tank, this pump shall be connected to the COPS.(3) Dual Supplies. Prime movers shall not be solely dependent on a public utility gas system for their fuel supply or

municipal water supply for their cooling systems. Means shall be provided for automatically transferring from one fuelsupply to another where dual fuel supplies are used.(4) Battery Power and Dampers. Where a storage battery is used for control or signal power or as the means of

starting the prime mover, it shall be suitable for the purpose and shall be equipped with an automatic charging meansindependent of the generator set. Where the battery charger is required for the operation of the generator set, it shall beconnected to the COPS. Where power is required for the operation of dampers used to ventilate the generator set, thedampers shall be connected to the COPS.(5) Outdoor Generator Sets. Where an outdoor housed generator set is equipped with a readily accessible

disconnecting means located within sight of the building or structure supplied, an additional disconnecting means shallnot be required where ungrounded conductors serve or pass through the building or structure.(6) Mean for Connecting Portable or Vehicle-Mounted Generator. Where the COPS is supplied by a single generator, a

means to connect a portable or vehicle-mounted generator shall be provided.(7) On-Site Fuel Supply. Where internal combustion engines are used as the prime mover, an on-site fuel supply shall

be provided. The on-site fuel supply shall be secured and protected in accordance with the risk assessment.(8) Cogeneration. Where a combined heat and power system is used as the COPS prime mover, a dual source of

make-up water for the thermal network shall be available.Cogeneration systems require water for cooling the gen set but also for condensate makeup

associated with the heating and/or cooling loads.

The recommendation is better accomplished through the risk assessment process specified inSection 708.4.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-290 Log #4698 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Michael A. Anthony, University of Michigan / Rep. Association of Education Facilities Executivies

Revise text to read as follows:Microturbines used as the sole source of power for COPS shall comply with all applicable industry

standards and conform to all other performance requirements in this Article.These machines are gaining increasing acceptance and the NEC should recognize their prospect for

accomplishing the goals of this Article.

The equipment described is a type of generator and the use of such equipment is not prohibitedprovided it meets all of the operational requirements of this article.

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Revise text to read as follows:(C) Duration of COPS Operation. The alternate power source shall be capable of operating the COPS for a minimum of

72 hours at full load of DCOA with a steady-state voltage within ±10 percent of nominal utilization voltage as follows:.(1) Category I is required to remain operational throughout the disaster or immediately restorable to service at the end

of the event; any equipment that shuts off during the disaster can be restarted without requiring equipment repair.On-site generation capable of supporting the DCOA for 72 hours with only refueling and minor servicing (no loss ofpower to the DCOA while servicing) is required.(2) Category II is required to survive the disaster or be restored to operation with on-site parts within 4 hours. On-site

generation would normally be required, unless the utility infrastructure was sufficiently robust that utility power would berestored in 4 hours.(3) Category III is required to be restorable to operation within 24 hours. Temporary or on-site generation would be

required if utility power could not be restored in 24 hours.(4) Category IV is required to be restorable to operation within 24 hours of the time utility power, water and sewage

disposal are available to the facility. Temporary or on-site generation would not be required.The requirement for the various types of critical systems needs to align with the importance of the

system to the protection of life and property. A set of specific requirements for the various levels of criticality needs tobe included in the article to provide design criteria and for consistent application.The classifying governmental agency having jurisdiction would benefit from guidelines to use in determining which

systems in their jurisdiction should be included as COPS. A gradient level of criticality provides a method to ensure themost critical systems have the resources allocated to them so that they are available when needed to deliver emergencyservices and provide for disaster recovery.


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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Marcelo C. Algrain, Caterpillar, Inc.

Delete text as follows:708.22 Capacity of Power Sources(A) Capacity and Rating. A COPS shall have capacity and rating for all loads to be operated simultaneously for

continuous operation with variable load for an unlimited number of hours, except for maintenance of the power source.A portable, temporary, or redundant alternate power source shall be available for use whenever the COPS powersource is out of service for maintenance or repair.

The requirement for operating power sources for an unlimited number of hours is not enforceable. Allpower sources have finite service life. In the case of engine driven generator sets, the predicted service life depends onthe type of rating selected for the application, i.e., standby, prime, or continuous. This selection should be made basedon load factors and durations for the given application. If operation for an unlimited number of hours (unattainablefigure) were to be required, it would force the selection of prime rated power sources over standby ones. This will have asignificant negative economic impact on COPS facilities that would not require prime ratings otherwise. Furthermore,the duration of COPS operation is already covered in section 708.22(C), "minimum of 72 hours at full load", making itunnecessary and inconsistent to be specified in section 708.22(A) as an unlimited amount of time. Finally, the intent ofthis article is to cover disruptions to elements of the normal systems, arisen from emergency and disaster situations,which are not to occur on a regular basis. Hence, the proposal to remove the language "for an unlimited number ofhours, except for maintenance of the power source" is respectfully submitted.

The code does not indicate the extent of maintenance of the power source. The intent of Article708.22 (A) is to assure that the entire system is not subject to life expectancy issues, and that the power source isrepairable and has no unintended availability issues, as might be the case with solar, wind, or hydroelectric powersources.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-293 Log #3942 NEC-P13


Revise text to read as follows:The alternate power source shall be

permitted to supply COPS emergency, legally required standby and optional loads where the source has adequatecapacity or where automatic selective load pickup and load shedding is provided as needed to ensure adequate powerto (1) the COPS and emergency circuits, (2) the legally required standby circuits, and (3) the optional standby circuits, inthat order of priority. The alternate power source shall be permitted to be used for peak load shaving, provided theseconditions are met.Peak load-shaving operation shall be permitted for satisfying the test requirement of 708.6(B), provided all other

conditions of 708.6 are met.Editorial correction of spelling that resulted in the word "Sharing" instead of "Shaving"

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Timothy Crnko, Cooper Bussmann

Delete Section 708.52 Ground-Fault Protection of Equipment.The selective coordination requirement in 708.54 includes ground faults and therefore 708.52 is

unnecessary and too prescriptive. There are design circumstances where selective coordination for all types ofovercurrents can be achieved between a feeder overcurrent protective device and a ground fault relay on the servicewithout a ground fault relay on the feeder. For these circumstances it should not be required to install another level ofground fault relay protection.

The recommendation to delete all of the requirements of this section would then require compliancewith only the requirements of 215.10 and 230.95, which do not require additional levels of ground-fault protection.Because this equipment is critical to the operation of COPS systems, a more appropriate approach might be to apply theprovisions of 700.7(D) and 700.26 by prohibiting automatic opening of the circuit and requiring signal indication of theground fault.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-295 Log #3694 NEC-P13











222Printed on 1/29/2009



Amend 708.54 as follows:

Normal system overcurrent protective devices on the supply side of the critical operations powersystem overcurrent protective devices shall not be required to be selectively coordinated with other supply side, normalsystem overcurrent protective devices.

Critical operations power system(s) overcurrent devices shall be selectivelycoordinated with all supply side overcurrent protective devices unless one of the following conditions in (1) through (5)are met.(1) Transformer Overcurrent Protective Devices. Between transformer primary and secondary overcurrent protective


(ampere rating) installed in series.(3) Expansion of an Existing Critical Operations Power System - Existing Overcurrent Protective Devices. Between

existing critical operations power system overcurrent protective devices and any existing supply side overcurrentprotective devices, where the critical operations power system is expanded.(4) Expansion of an Existing Critical Operations Power System - New Overcurrent Protective Devices. Between new

critical operations power system overcurrent protective devices and any existing supply side overcurrent protectivedevices, where the critical operations power system is expanded.(5) Designed Under Engineering Supervision. Where a licensed professional engineer, engaged primarily in the design

of electrical installations, provides stamped documentation showing the specific circuit that cannot be selectivelycoordinated, and substantiation of the design alternatives that were analyzed in the failed attempt to achieve selectivecoordination. This documentation shall be available to those authorized to design, install, inspect, maintain, and operatethe system.FPN: These are several techniques that help to selectively coordinate an electrical distribution system(a) Where transfer switches are utilized, utilizing several smaller transfer switches rather than one larger transfer


***Insert Figure 708.54 Clarification of Selective Coordination Requirements Here***

This proposal is an attempt to clarify the confusion concerning selective coordination requirements.(1) Figure 708.54 has been added to clarify which devices are critical operations power system side devices, and

which are normal side devices. This figure should be included in the NEC® text. Figure 708.54 was based upon a figurefrom an necdigest® article, Keep the Power On For Vital Loads, by Evangelos Stoyas, December 2007 Copyright©2007, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA.(2)"(A) Normal System" was added because there have been questions about the need for selective coordination of

the overcurrent devices on the normal side, on the line side of the transfer switch. Since Devices 5 and 6 are not really

223Printed on 1/29/2009

Report on Proposals – June 2010 NFPA 70part of the critical operations power system, 708.54 does not apply, and therefore 5 and 6 do not need to selectivelycoordinate with each other.(3)"(B) (1)" and "(B)(2)" are added to correlate with existing 700.27 and 701.18.(4) "(B)(3)" was added because there have been questions about the need for existing devices to selectively

coordinate when a critical operations power system is expanded or modified. This proposal clarifies that existing devicesdo not have to be replaced if they do not already selectively coordinate.(5) "(B)(4)" was added because there have been questions about the need for new devices to selectively coordinate

with existing devices when a critical operations power system is expanded or remodeled. This clearly states that newdevices do not have to selectively coordinate with the existing devices.(6) "(B)(5)" was added for those few cases where selective coordination is simply not possible. It is not meant to be a






224Printed on 1/29/2009







The available short-circuit current must be considered for the worst case from the normal source, alternate source, orboth for a closed transition transfer switch. If a fault occurs on an COPS load being supplied by the normal source andboth the COPS branch circuit overcurrent protective device and COPS feeder overcurrent protective device open, thenwhen the power is transferred to the alternate source, loads supplied by the affected feeder will unnecessarily beinterrupted.There is no simple alternative to use other than for the full range of available short-circuit currents. Some in the





225Printed on 1/29/2009



Add a new sentence to the end of the main paragraph of 708.54:Critical operations power system(s) overcurrent devices shall be selectively coordinated with all supply side

overcurrent protective devices. A means to intentionally defeat selectivity shall not be permitted.Establishing selectively coordinated systems can increase the arc-flash hazard when maintenance is

performed on the system depending upon the design of the system. The concern of increased arc-flash hazard waspresented to the panel in past cycles and the panel accepted those risks in favor of the benefit of selectivity on thesesystems. Some system designers are now including a means to defeat selectivity by installing systems that can turn theselectivity off by temporarily changing breaker settings via a switch or sensor in order to protect the electrical worker.There is no prohibition established in the NEC to restrict defeating selectivity, or the life safety aspect for which it wasinstalled, in order to protect the electrical worker.Unfortunately the enhanced protection for the electrical worker can be a trade-off by defeating the life safety function of

the selectively coordinated system in the critical operations electrical system. The most likely time for an incident tohappen that would require the system to be selective is when a working is doing maintenance on the system. If theselectivity is defeated, an arc event small or large could initiate a fire hazard or take down lighting, ventilation, or criticalcircuits leaving a system inoperable which can place the life safety of others in a dangerous position.There are solutions available to support the reduction of arc-flash in selectively coordinated system without



226Printed on 1/29/2009



Revise text to read as follows:Critical Operations Power System(s) overcurrent devices shall be selectively coordinated with

all supply side overcurrent protective devices. Selectivity shall meet the requirements of (A), (B), or (C).(A) Selectivity shall be established, in the form of an engineering study, by a licensed professional engineer

engaged regularly in the design or maintenance of coordinated electrical systems. The study shall be stamped by alicensed professional engineer and at a minimum include overcurrent device settings, supporting documentation, and asummary of limitations. This study shall be available to those authorized to design, install, inspect, maintain, andoperate the system.(B) Selectivity shall be established under engineering supervision by use of the selected overcurrent device



FPN: Overcurrent protective devices used for Critical Operations Power circuit protection, where coordinated tooptimize selective operation of the circuit overcurrent protective devices when a short circuit or ground fault occurs,increase overall reliability of the system. A similar increase in overall reliability can be experienced on the normal powersystem side.

***** NEC_L4421_S *****

Proposed (B) contains unenforceable language, such as “rigidly adhered to” and “selectively shallbe established.” The text in (C) is outside the normal application of the NEC since the authority having jurisdiction, themunicipality, and the licensing board for engineers have control over the issues covered within this proposed text, suchas what is necessary to be done before the start of construction. The designer, engineer, AHJ, electrical contractor, andowner may often be involved in the decisions related to selective coordination. The submitter states in his substantiationthat the professional engineer has the mandate to select the appropriate overcurrent device and thus would be the soledecision-maker on the selective coordination. Again, this procedure is under the jurisdiction of the AHJ, the municipality,and the licensing board. The recommended FPN does not provide any additional information and is unnecessary.

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Fault and over current conditions may result from a variety of conditions that range from the rare anddifficult to achieve bolted three phase fault to the more probable arcing single phase ground fault. Nevertheless it is acommon oversight to consider phase protection selectivity and ground fault protection selectivity separately. A phaseprotective device considers all current over threshold to be an overload whereas ground fault devices are able toseparate a ground current from other current. . Because of this, in the case of the more probable ground faults, bothdevices may operate simultaneously or with either device ahead of the other if ground fault selectivity between the twodevices is not planned. Hence, a well-coordinated system must consider ground fault protection and standard phaseovercurrent protection simultaneously.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-301 Log #1165 NEC-P13


Add a new exception as shown.

Critical operations power system(s) overcurrent devices shall be selectively coordinated with all supply sideovercurrent protective devices.

In the CMP-20 Panel Statement to Comment 20-13 in the 2008 ROC the CMP stated: "The overridingtheme of Article 585 is to keep the power on for vital loads. Selective coordination is obviously essential for thecontinuity of service required in critical operations power systems. Selective coordination increases the reliability of theCOPS system."This panel statement supports the Scope of Article 708 which reads: "The provisions of this article apply to the

installation, operation, monitoring, control, and maintenance of the portions of the premises wiring system intended tosupply, distribute, and control electricity to designated critical operations areas (DCOA) in the event of disruption toelements of the normal system."The Scope and the panel statement clearly state that the intent of this Article is to ensure continuity of service for those

circuits required for critical circuits. The purpose of requiring selective coordination is to ensure that these criticalcircuits operate if the normal supply is disrupted. Selective coordination up to the alternate source of supply ensuresthat there is no service disruption to these critical circuits regardless of what happens to the normal supply. Requiringselective coordination of the critical circuits back through the normal source is of little value in this regard and addsnothing to the level of reliability which is only ensured through the alternate supply.It should also be noted that incorrect interpretations which extend the application of this requirements to non-critical

circuits in the normal supply are beyond the Scope of Article 708.

Reliable operation of the critical operations circuits is necessary regardless of the source of powerfor the circuits. The panel is not aware of other requirements in the NEC that would be subject to the recommendedexception.

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Add the following exception and fine print note:Exception: Where the critical operations power system design is under the control of a licensed professional engineer

engaged in the design or maintenance of electrical installations, the selection of overcurrent protective devices shall bepermitted to coordinate to the extent practicable. The design shall be documented, stamped by the professionalengineer, and made available for review by the authority having jurisdiction.

FPN: Overcurrent protective devices used for critical operations power systems, where coordinated to optimizeselective operation of the circuit overcurrent protective devices when a short circuit or ground fault occurs, increaseoverall reliability of the system.


Revise Section 708.54 to read:Critical operations power system(s) overcurrent devices shall be selectively coordinated with all

supply side overcurrent protective devices. The selectively coordinated devices shall be selected by a licensedprofessional engineer engaged primarily in the design or maintenance of electrical installations. The selection shall bedocumented and stamped by the professional engineer. This documentation shall be available to those authorized todesign, install, inspect, maintain, and operate the system.

The panel action rejects the wording "where practicable," as this is not defined and subjective. Therecommendation on the qualifications for those who design the system has been revised to use the text from 240.86, asthis provides a more definitive description of those who can design these systems.

229Printed on 1/29/2009




A facility with a COPS shall have documented an emergency operations plan. The plan shall consider emergencyoperations and response, recovery, and continuity of operations.FPN: NFPA 1600-2007, , Section

5.7, provides guidance for the development and implementation of emergency plans.

Buildings, or sections of buildings, containing elements of critical operations power systems that, in the opinion of theauthority having jurisdiction, may be vulnerable to human-made damages if the technical characteristics were known tothe general public, shall be permitted to restrict access to information regarding such characteristics of the criticaloperations power system.

A great deal of homeland security and local emergency management information is available to thegeneral public that may compromise the security of DCOA’s. Adoption of this proposal will permit the AHJ to make adetermination how much information should be available.A recent change to 230.205 regarding circumspect placement of disconnecting means on private property is a move in

the right direction as far as power source security is concerned. Information about the specifics of prime mover fuelsupply, for example, should also be managed carefully.

The recommended text is addressed by the general risk assessment provisions in Section 708.5. Itis not necessary to enumerate all of the different risk exposures that may threaten a facility.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-304 Log #3943 NEC-P13


Revise text to read as follows:The final step in the successful commissioning plan is testing and proper

execution of system-integrated tests.The FPTs can be implemented as various systems become operative (i.e., test for the

generator system) or when the entire system is installed. However, the final "pull the plug" test is performed only after allsystems are completely installed. If the electrical contractor (or subcontractor) implements the FPTs, a witness mustinitial each step of the test. The electrical contractor cannot employ the witness directly or indirectly.

. If the system fails the test, the problem must be resolved and the equipment or systemretested or the testing requirements re-analyzed until successful tests are witnessed. Once the system or equipmentpasses testing, it is verified by designated commissioning official.

"System-integrated tests" should be defined.The acronym FPT is incorrect for "Perform Tests"; therefore, stricken provided the intent was to discuss the act of

performing tests.

The intent of the annex provisions are clear as written in the current text.

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Revise text to read as follows:System/component tests or functional performance tests (FPTs)

are developed from submitted drawings, systems operating documents (SODS) and systems operation andmaintenance manuals (SOMMs), including large component testing (i.e., transformers, cable, generators, UPS), andhow components operate as part of the total system. The commissioning authority develops the test and cannot be theinstallation contractor (or subcontractor).As the equipment/components/systems are installed, quality assurance procedures are administered to verify that

components are installed in accordance with minimum manufacturers' recommendations, safety codes, and acceptableinstallation practices. Quality assurance discrepancies are then identified and added to a "commissioning action list" thatmust be rectified as past part of the commissioning program. These items would usually be discussed duringcommissioning meetings. Discrepancies are usually identified initially by visual inspection.

According to the 2003 National Electrical Code Style Manual amended January 15, 2003, 3.2.3, allacronyms and any abbreviations that are not in common use shall be spelled out with the abbreviation [or acronym]following in parenthesis for the first use of the term in the body of each article.Though the acronym FPT, familiar to the commissioning community, is spelled out ahead of its use in the title of the

article, the comment is for the body of the article.The acronym SOD is not in common use. A search for the meaning of this acronym yielded a term used in government

or military language. One case where this was found spelled out was in the Army Corp of Engineers Technical Manual5-694 meaning "systems operating document".The acronym SOMM is not in common use. A search for the meaning of this acronym yielded a term used in

government or military language. One case where this was found spelled out was in the Army Corp of Engineersdocument ER 25-345-1 meaning "Systems Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Manual".Editorial correction of spelling that resulted in the word "past" instead of "part".

The panel accepts the recommendation other than to use the term "functional performance tests" in the text of theprovision.

The use of only the acronym in the text is appropriate as it is explained in the title.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-306 Log #2950g NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Mark T. Rochon, Peabody, MA

Add new text to read as follows:Annex: Informational Purposes Only.Annex A Product Safety.Annex B Application Information for Ampacity Calculation.Annex C Conduit and Tubing Fill Tables for Conductors and Luminaire Wires of the Same Size.Annex D Examples.Annex E Type of Construction.Annex F About Critical Operations Power System.Annex G Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition.Annex H Administration and Enforcement.

A description of the Annexes would be very helpful in searching for the informational headings makingthe code easier to use.

The panel recommends that the titles of Annexes A through H be added to the table of contents.The panel understands that the table of contents is a staff editorial function. The panel concurs

with the recommendation that the annex titles are useful information that can be added to the list of annexes in the tableof contents.

231Printed on 1/29/2009

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