ReporT Ashton
description
Transcript of ReporT Ashton
1
REPORT
CONTRIBUTION OF LOCAL AND
REGIONAL AUTHORITIES TO THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE EASTERN
PARTNERSHIP
FRAMEWORK AND OPPORTUNITIES
The report was written by Aston Centre for Europe – Aston University (Authors: Dr Nathaniel Copsey and Dr Carolyn Rowe)
It does not represent the official views of the Committee of the Regions.
Aston Centre for Europe Aston University Birmingham B4 7ET United Kingdom W: www.aston.ac.uk T: +44 121 204 5170
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION
PAGE
SUMMARY P. 5 INTRODUCTION p. 7
PART 1
Local and Regional Involvement in the Eastern Partnership
p. 9
The Eastern Partnership (EaP) in detail p. 10 Content of the EaP
p. 14
Added-Value of the EaP
p. 15
The Bi-lateral Track of the EAP
p. 16
The Multi-Lateral Track of the EaP
p. 18
Implications for Local and Regional Authorities in the EaP countries
p. 21
Future perspectives on the EaP from the local and regional point of view
p. 23
The European Commission and EEAS Approach to the EaP
p. 26
Conditionality and the Commission EEAS Approach
p. 27
National Approaches to the EaP: The view of the partner countries
p. 29
ARMENIA
p. 29
AZERBAIJAN
p. 32
BELARUS
p. 36
GEORGIA
p. 41
MOLDOVA
p. 45
UKRAINE
p. 49
National Approaches to the EaP: Overall Summary and Assessment p. 53
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PART 2
Policy Options for the CoR and CORLEAP
p. 55
What can CORLEAP do to strengthen local self-government and local democracy?
p. 56
A long-term action plan is required
p. 57
Establishing a role for CORLEAP in the region – a question of “actorness”
p. 63
What can CORLEAP do to increase cooperation between the local authorities and civil society in the EaP countries?
p. 65
What can CORLEAP do to increase cross-border cooperation?
p. 67
PART 3
Inventory of Local and Regional Initiatives in the EaP area
p. 67
Projects supporting cooperation between local authorities and civil society in the EaP countries
p. 68
Projects supporting the strengthening of local self government and democracy in the EaP countries
p. 73
Projects facilitating cross-border cooperation and learning
p. 77
Analysis of EU financial assistance programmes open to local and regional
authority partners in the EaP countries
p. 82
Baltic Sea CBC Programme
p. 82
Lithuania – Latvia – Belarus CBC Programme
p. 88
CUIDAD: Case Study for Ukraine (and Belarus)
p. 91
Twinning Assistance - Case Study for Ukraine
p. 97
Twinning Assistance: Case Study for Azerbaijan
p. 104
CUIDAD: Case Study for Moldova (and Ukraine)
p. 111
References
p.117
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SUMMARY
This report offers an insight into the contribution of local and regional
authorities to the development of the EU’s Eastern Partnership. It sets this
out firstly by analysing the state of play within the EaP of the local and
regional dimension, considering the manner in which local and regional
perspectives are included in the various arenas of debate that support the
EaP agenda. This section acts as an inventory of needs; that is, the report
offers a nuanced analysis of the EaP at the EU level and at the level of the
partner countries, assessing the key areas of concern and setting out clearly
the primary issues of interest for local and regional governance that CoR
and CORLEAP engagement with the EaP can seek to address.
To summarize the needs of CORLEAP’s members across the EaP countries:
• Whilst there are clearly a number of country-specific issues which
hinder the full achievement of the EaP’s goals, there are also a set of
common factors which slow the development of local and regional
democracy across the Eastern Partner countries. These issues form a
cluster of lobby points, which the CoR and CORLEAP can address as
top priority concerns in their own political work. They include:
• Insufficient governmental autonomy and limited financial capacity;
• The slow pace of development of deep local democracy, including
citizen participation;
• Limited awareness of the financial assistance mechanisms available
to local and regional authorities in the Eastern Partner countries
from EU programmes.
Secondly, the report then considers the engagement of the CoR and more
specifically, CORLEAP in the EaP process, analysing where this interaction
is most effective, considering how this relationship can in future be
reshaped to work even more constructively with the various avenues open
to local and regional perspectives in the EaP. This section argues that the
CORLEAP needs to fulfil four roles:
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– (1) A strategic thinker: drawing up long-term plans about where
local and regional government should be heading, with a road-map
for implementation;
– (2) A timely intervener: both at the EU and MS level to ensure that
development assistance goes towards local and regional democracy
promotion projects;
– (3) A skilful advocate:
o Making a convincing case for a role for local and regional
government in drafting territorial reforms;
o Developing an inside track both to the European institutions
(particularly the Commission and EEAS) and the national
governments of the Eastern Partnership;
o Making the case for decentralization of competences; both
policy-making and fiscal competences;
– (4) A high performance cheerleader: showing how to build a high
performance culture at the local and regional level with a focus on
improving the training and skills set of local and regional government
officials.
Finally, the report offers an overview of areas of local and regional
cooperation with Eastern Partners, and an assessment of how EU funding
regimes have been used to underpin actions to improve, enhance and
develop further local and regional governance in the EaP partner countries.
This assessment offers scope to understand the real contribution of EU
assistance at the local and regional level, and showcases instances of best
practice, which could be replicated across other partner states.
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INTRODUCTION
The Eastern Partnership (EaP) offers new scope for European Union actors
to engage with a wide set of actors across the wider Europe to connect in a
process of democratic consolidation that can positively impact on the
future of the continent.
The CoR, through its actions, forums, Opinions and, importantly, through
the new formal vehicle of the Conference of the Regional and Local
Authorities for the Eastern Partnership (CORLEAP), has a strong
opportunity to engage with the ongoing efforts of the European Union to
promote democratic understanding and market transformation in the EaP
countries.
The EaP was originally formulated as an intergovernmental partnership,
launched in 2009. However, it was clear from the outset that a wider set of
stakeholders needed to be engaged in the EaP framework, if it were to
achieve its overarching objectives.
The CoR worked to set up a body which would act as an inter-institutional
platform for dialogue between stakeholders, local and regional
communities of the EU and of the EaP countries. CORLEAP (established
September 2011) has already set out a strong basis for cooperation
between local and regional authorities, providing a valuable component to
the framework of the EaP, offering as it does a real means for better
connecting national authorities and the citizens they serve.
Now that the start-up phase has been completed, and CORLEAP is
furnished with a bureau structure and a strong political leadership, it needs
now to develop its activity profile further, in line with the global EaP
framework. CORLEAP clearly needs to develop both a political dimension
to its activities, and to establish a clear set of objectives which can be
delivered through concerted political actions undertaken by both national
governments and local and regional governments. This must be based on
the experience of local and regional partners in the EaP countries. At the
same time, CORLEAP also has a very clear operational dimension; that is,
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through its ongoing activities as a platform for debate, discussion and the
exchange of perspectives and expertise, it facilitates and fosters stronger
local and regional cooperation with partnership countries. This is a
particularly important element of its remit in the run-up to the 2013
summit.
This report offers an insight into the contribution of local and regional
authorities to the development of the EU’s Eastern Partnership. It sets this
out firstly by analysing the state of play within the EaP of the local and
regional dimension, considering the manner in which local and regional
perspectives are included in the various arenas of debate that support the
EaP agenda. This section acts as an inventory of needs; that is, the report
offers a nuanced analysis of the EaP at the EU level and at the level of the
partner countries, assessing the key areas of concern and setting out clearly
the primary issues of interest for local and regional governance that CoR
and CORLEAP engagement with the EaP can seek to address.
Secondly, the report then considers the engagement of the CoR and more
specifically, CORLEAP in the EaP process, analysing where this interaction
is most effective, considering how this relationship can in future be
reshaped to work even more constructively with the various avenues open
to local and regional perspectives in the EaP. Finally, the report offers an
overview of areas of local and regional cooperation with Eastern Partners,
and an assessment of how EU funding regimes have been used to underpin
actions to improve, enhance and develop further local and regional
governance in the EaP partner countries. This assessment offers scope to
understand the real contribution of EU assistance at the local and regional
level, and showcases instances of best practice which could be replicated
across other partner states.
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Part 1
Local and Regional Involvement in the
Eastern Partnership
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The Eastern Partnership in detail
The “Eastern Partnership” is the name given to the sub-section of the
European Neighbourhood Policy that is concerned with the EU’s European
neighbours to the east of the Union. It is targeted at six countries: Ukraine,
Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus and Georgia. The policy is both bi-
lateral (that is focused on the EU’s relations with one of the eastern
countries), and multi-lateral (that is focused on promoting integration
between all six eastern neighbours as well as the EU). The following section
reviews the policy thoroughly, considering its origins, content and added
value from a local and regional perspective.
Origins of the EaP
The importance of the EU’s policy towards its neighbours was
acknowledged in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), which
included references to security in the ‘EU neighbourhood’ within three of
the Union’s strategic objectives. It mentioned “neighbours who are engaged
in violent conflict, weak states where organized crime flourished,
dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all
pose problems for Europe” (Council of the EU, 2003). Regarding the East, it
was asserted that it was not in the EU’s interest to create new dividing lines
as a result of enlargement to central and eastern Europe (CEE) and,
therefore, the EU should seek to extend “the benefits of economic and
political cooperation (…) while tackling political problems [in the eastern
neighbourhood]” (Council of the EU, 2003). Thus the origins of the EaP can
be traced back to the years immediately prior to the fifth enlargement of
the Union to CEE in 2004/2007 (Commission, 2003, p. 3) which saw the EU
recognise the need to take account of its new geographical boundaries
which brought it closer to the relatively more politically unstable and
economically less developed former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Belarus
and Moldova. Prior to this, the EU’s policy in the region was mainly
concerned with its relations with its CEE candidate Member States on the
one hand, and Russia on the other, with little consideration for other
former Soviet republics.
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The first move by the EU to respond to the geopolitical and security
realities of CEE enlargement came in the form of a proposal made by the UK
in 2002, which became known as the New Neighbours’ Initiative (NNI) and
was initially aimed only at three countries: Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.
A year later, as a consequence of lobbying by the Southern EU states, the
programme was extended to include a number of the EU’s Southern
partners located around the Mediterranean fringe and was renamed as
‘Wider Europe’. The concept was further developed by the Commission in a
Strategy Paper published in May 2004. This subsequently led to yet another
change in the name of the initiative, which from then on became known as
the European Neighbourhood Policy. As argued by a senior official of the
Commission, the novelty of the ENP was based on its new strategic
framework, which was “an example of our foreign policy being more than
traditional diplomacy” (Landaburu, 2006, p. 3), in the sense that it
combined policies from all traditional ‘pillars’ of the EU. Such an approach
was, arguably, more comprehensive than the traditional ones.
From the outset the ENP was widely perceived as an inadequate
mechanism for (1) stabilizing all the EU’s neighbours and (2) setting them
on a path towards much closer economic and political integration with the
European Union, not least because the policy’s scope was so broad:
covering an arc of states from Morocco in the south-west, through north
Africa, the Middle East and the Caucasus to Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus
in the north. Moreover, although the ENP did envisage, at least in the very
long term, a European Economic Area-style relationship for the ENP
countries, at the behest of Member States concerned with absorption
capacity, the policy deliberately made no mention of the possibility of
eventual accession of any of the ENP partners to the European Union. This
lack of a powerful incentive for the ENP states to undertake difficult and
expensive economic and political reforms, curtailed the policy’s
development from the outset. Moreover, the very notion of such a
geographically wide-ranging ENP managed simultaneously to offend the
target countries in both North Africa (who were vexed at being grouped
with former Soviet republics) and in Eastern Europe (who were angered by
being placed on an equal footing with ‘non-European’ countries that, from a
legal or treaty basis, lacked even the possibility of eventual EU accession).
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The question of accession has proven to be of particular importance in the
debate about the future of the ENP for the eastern European states targeted
by the policy. This has challenged official EU rhetoric on the issue and even
though the discourse was somewhat softened and no longer referred to
partnership as a ‘substitute for enlargement’, the Commission clearly stated
that the EU “emphasized that it offers [the ENP as] a means to reinforce
relations between the EU and partner countries, which is distinct from the
possibilities available to European countries under Article 49 of the Treaty
on European Union” (European Commission, 2004, p. 3). On this vital point
the EU’s Member States were strongly divided, with many of the newer,
northern and eastern Member States more strongly in favour, and the
older, particularly southern, Member States far less enthusiastic, and
indeed categorically opposed, to any talk of membership for ENP states.
Whilst the argument could be made under Article 49 of the Treaty on
European Union (1992, TEU) that the European ENP states of Ukraine,
Moldova and Belarus certainly have the theoretical right to apply for EU
membership, it is very doubtful that they would come close to qualifying
for membership in the next decade and a half. As such, it has been argued
that the ENP neither sufficiently confronts “the ghost of enlargement”, nor
seriously addresses problems affecting neighbouring states or achieves
coherence with relations to them. Nonetheless, it was precisely this
difference in the potential future status of the ENP countries to the east
from those in the south that encouraged those EU Member States friendly
towards eastern Europe (led by Poland) to pressurise for a change in the
nature of the relationship between the EU and the eastern ENP countries.
In June 2008, Poland and Sweden jointly proposed to the European Council
the creation of a so-called Eastern Partnership. The European Council in
turn requested a detailed proposal from the Commission, which was
originally scheduled to be unveiled during the Czech Presidency of the
European Union during the first half of 2009.
This small, but important step for the development of the EaP was,
however, soon to take on a more hurried pace with the EaP dramatically
rising in importance on the European foreign policy agenda following
Russia’s intervention in the conflict between Georgia and its breakaway
regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008. This was the first
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time that Russian forces had intervened militarily outside of the Russian
Federation in the ex-Soviet space since 1991. The rapid disintegration of
the Georgian army and the speed of the Russian advance beyond the
territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia towards Tblisi prompted an
emergency meeting of the European Council to discuss the situation. The
feeling that the Union urgently needed to re-enforce its policy toolkit in
what, in August 2008, appeared to be a highly volatile region, led to the
decision to bring forward the launch of the Eastern Partnership to 3
December 2008 (European Commission, 2008 823 final). The resultant
Commission document was endorsed by the 27 Foreign Ministers of the EU
and the six Eastern Partnership (Armenia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Ukraine and Moldova) states in a Joint Declaration following the Prague
Eastern Partnership Summit on 7 May 2009 (European Council 8425/09
(Presse 78)).
As can be noted from the above outline of the origins and development of
the EaP, this partnership was developed at a national level in response to
bilateral concerns between the Eastern Partner countries and the EU. There
has, however, been an increasing focus on expanding the engagement of
non-state actors to the EaP process, and this has opened up enhanced
scope for the development of initiatives and partnerships at the level of
local and regional governmental actors, whose contributions can deliver
key elements of the overall objectives of the EaP strategy:
• The Civil Society Forum of the Eastern Partnership was set up in the
early phase of EaP development in 2009 as a means of fostering the
direct involvement of civil society organisations in delivering the
aims of the EaP.
• The Euronest parliamentary assembly was established in May 2011
as a means to better connect parliamentarians from the European
Parliament and those from EaP countries. Working to facilitate a
better mutual understanding, the Euronest engagement in the EaP
has helped to enhance and strengthen the visibility of the EaP. Its
role has been to lead parliamentary consultations, as well as to
supervise and monitor the Partnership.
• CORLEAP established in 2011, has laid solid foundations for
fostering a regional dimension to the EaP. This particular
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perspective was missing from the original framework for EaP
cooperation, and CORLEAP is regarded as a strong vehicle for
connecting the actions of the EaP with citizens, linking national
authorities with citizens in the fulfilment of the Eastern Partnership
obejctives.
• The European Economic and Social Committee contributes to the
dialogue with civil society in the EaP countries, and plays a
particularly important role in strengthening interaction between
employers’ organisations and trade unions on the one hand and
governmental actors on the other.
Content of the EaP
The EaP came as an addition to a policy area already well-furnished with
aims shared by all Member States, but which was inadequate in terms of
the practical tools required to meet the broad objectives set out with the
shared aims. The EaP’s rhetoric is based on what the Commission called “a
lasting message of EU solidarity” (Commission, 2008, 823 final) between
the EU and the ENP states; but, far more importantly, it also sought to
provide new tools to assist in the achievement of the pre-existing and
longer-standing ENP objectives of nurturing democracy, the rule of law and
the development of free market economies through an open-ended
European integration process that would not necessarily lead to full
accession. Its second area of novelty lay in encouraging the EaP countries to
cooperate multi-laterally between themselves, under the watchful eye of
the European Union; this would provide the motor for regional
cooperation. In addition to the established ENP goal of EEA-style
integration between the EU and the ENP countries, the EaP foresaw the
creation of a regional ‘Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area’ between
the EaP countries as a precursor to deeper economic integration with the
EU – performing a similar function to that of CEFTA for the central
European states in the 1990s. However, in common with the CEFTA
countries in the 1990s, enthusiasm for the idea was somewhat muted –
after all what mattered to the EaP countries was access to the wealthy
single market. For the EU, however, encouraging the EaP countries to work
together was of paramount importance.
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Added-Value of the EaP
The launch of the EaP aimed to send a clear message of solidarity to the
eastern neighbourhood countries and offered the genuine possibility of
much stronger links between them and the European Union through a
‘deep and comprehensive free trade area’ (DCFTA) and eventual visa
liberalization – both of which are highly attractive to the EaP countries.
However, these positive elements should be tempered by the fact that the
DCFTA will prove very hard to negotiate and may not come into existence
for many years, that the visa liberalization remains an ‘aspiration’ – and,
that these goals have been on the agenda for some time. Another criticism
is that the EaP still failed to provide any mention of the possibility of
eventual accession to the Union – which to an extent remained the elephant
in the room although there was no point discussing membership if the
definitive answer was to be ‘no’ for the then foreseeable future. This raises
very specific questions about the added value of the EaP and whether it has
truly moved the issue of EU–Eastern European relations forwards.
In response to this concern, and looking beyond the high politics
aspirations of EU membership, it is possible to observe that the added-
value of the EaP may lie primarily in the fact that the policy set in motion
the development of the Comprehensive Institution Building (CIB)
programme. This was designed to help the EaP countries prepare for
European integration by strengthening their administrative capacity. The
CIB sets modest, achievable targets that should, in theory, lead to progress
in meeting the policy’s stated highline aims and objectives, such as
approximating and successfully implementing key elements of the acquis
communautaire. This process will be monitored annually by the
Commission – as was the case with CEE enlargement during the 1990s and
early 2000s. This depoliticization of the approach towards the eastern
neighbours may prove exceptionally valuable in the future. This is relevant
because the ENP was criticized due to the fact that it proved simply
impossible to separate ‘high’ from ‘low’ politics or technical issues from
politicized aspects, for example, the prospective of membership. This is
reminiscent of similar arguments made in the case of CEE relations with
the EU in the early 1990s following the development of early Association
Agreements.
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Importantly for the EaP states and the pro-enlargement Member States, the
EaP separates the ENP states into potential Member States in the east and
the ‘neighbours of Europe’ in the south. It also represents a modest amount
of progress in the potential depth and quality of relationship with the
Union that the EaP countries can aspire to. Moreover, once they have met
particular objectives, a fresh set of short-term goals can be set – and thus,
little by little, the quality of relations with the EU should improve.
Ultimately, in the view of many interviewees, the EaP’s ‘offer’ to the eastern
ENP states was the best that could have been agreed at that particular point
in time, in 2008 and 2009, given the divisions between the EU’s Member
States on any future enlargement beyond that to the Western Balkans (but
not Turkey, which remains controversial despite its candidate status).
Indeed without the Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008, in the opinion
of one Commission official, the Eastern Partnership might have amounted
to rather less in the way of substance.
The Bi-lateral Track of the EAP
The EaP retained the pre-existing bi-lateral elements of cooperation
between the European Union and eastern Europe, including the upgrading
of relations with the EaP countries to Associate Member, which is
envisaged to take place through the signing of a series Association
Agreements.1 Considerable mention was also made of eventual visa
liberalization necessary to improve the mobility of citizens between the EU
and ENP states – but this was expressed more as a longer-term aspiration
than as something immediate. Enhanced cooperation between the EaP
countries and EU was also proposed in a range of policy areas that
envisaged eventual convergence in areas ranging from Justice and Home
Affairs to education policy. The Association Agreements (one of which, for
example, with Ukraine, has been negotiated and initialled on 30 March
2012 but not signed at the time of writing in 2012) were to be governed by
Association Councils with the power to make decisions that are legally
1 The use of the term Association Agreements was at first contested, with some Member States calling for the
name ‘Enhanced Agreement’ to be employed, implicitly avoiding making a link between the signing of an
Association Agreement and a commitment to eventual accession in the way that followed the signing of the
Association Agreements (also commonly called Europe Agreements) with the central European countries that
joined in the Fifth Enlargement.
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binding on both parties (the EU and the EaP states), which would in a small
way redress the vast imbalance in the power relationship between the EU
and its eastern neighbours. In terms of high-level regular meetings
between the two sides, the EaP promised a twice-yearly summit of Heads of
State and Government from the EU and the EaP that would continue to
provide momentum to the integration process. This would be
supplemented by an annual meeting of foreign ministers and a twice-yearly
meeting of senior officials. These meetings are considered very useful for
the smaller EaP countries which otherwise would struggle to arrange high-
level meetings with EU leaders.
Although the bi-lateral agenda of the Eastern Partnership was theoretically
attractive to the EaP states (barring the low levels of funding available for
policy: around €785 million was earmarked for all the EaP countries
between 2009 and 2013, compared with €67 billion received by Poland
alone in structural and regional funds between 2007 and 20132), it did not
really represent much in the way of new goals and objectives. The true
policy innovation lay in the development of multi-lateral cooperation, lying
on top of the bi-lateral context of the ENP.
The bilateral relationship element of the EaP builds on the previous ENP
funding instruments. This means that the two main instruments of the EaP
on the bilateral level of cooperation are the Association Agenda and the
Association Agreement.
• The Association Agenda is an instrument which replaces the previous
Action Plan, and has been signed with all EaP countries apart from
Belarus;
o The Association Agenda “will prepare for and facilitate the
entry into force of the Association Agreement”.
o This document is based on the joint ownership, responsibility
and monitoring of results, but it is not legally binding
2 ‘Cohesion policy 2007–13: Poland, the biggest beneficiary, has plan and priorities agreed with the
Commission’. Commission Press Release, Reference: IP/07/633, Date: 08/05/2007, available at:
«http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/633&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN
&guiLanguage=en».
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Unlike the former Action Plans, the Association Agenda also includes the
principles of political association and economic integration
The Multi-Lateral Track of the EaP
The second, and arguably, most important innovation in the Eastern
Partnership was the introduction of a multi-lateral integration track for the
six Eastern European countries. The multi-lateral element includes the
following five features:
1. The establishment of common positions in various policy fields Developing common positions between actors is one of the core rationales
of the multi-lateral track. This element offers opportunity for structured
dialogue between the EU and the Eastern Partners with a view to engaging
on many of the issues which shaped the contours of the wider EU approach
to the EaP region.
2. The creation of a structured ‘approximation process’ for the
implementation of EU regulation across the region;
The creation of a structured approximation process is novel because it
mirrors the ‘screening’ of the acquis that was carried out in the early stages
of the integration of the Member States of central and eastern Europe. The
proposals of the Commission to create a sort of multilateral screening-light
should also be an important utility for the EAP countries. While the Union
will certainly not call this facility ‘screening’, it should be remarked that
such a multi-lateral facility was only offered to the new member states in
Central Europe once the negotiations for membership had started.
Probably the Commission did not envisage anything like the intensity of
advice, which was being given to those new Member States in the case of
the EAP. Nevertheless a significant problem for the EAP states will be
ensuring that the legal approximation it undertakes leads to a proper
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implementation of the acquis. This proposed facility might help to solve
this problem.
3. The establishment of four thematic platforms, as follows:
i. democracy, good governance and stability; ii. economic integration and convergence with EU policies;
iii. energy security; iv. contacts between people
The development of this platform-based approach to debates in a set of
policy fields is of particular note within the multi-lateral track. These
platforms, which meet on at least two occasions per year, involve input
from senior officials operating in relevant policy areas. The platforms then
report to the annual meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EaP. It is
therefore very significant that the CoR has been active as a permanent
member in all four of these platforms since November 2011. This
engagement offers real scope for the results of CORLEAP deliberations
to be channelled into ongoing policy thinking about the future shape
and scope of the EaP.
The 2009 Prague Declaration which established the Eastern Partnership
also foresaw the possibility that these platforms might be supported by
further thematic panels, which could develop thematically driven
perspectives on certain sub-policy fields, and offer vital expertise to the
platform deliberations. Thus far, two of the platforms have taken advantage
of this opportunity. Platform 1 has set up three panels, on:
• Integrated Border Management;
• The Fight Against Corruption; and
• Public Administrative Reform
Platform 2 has also established three panels, on:
• Small and Medium-sized Business Enterprises
• Trade Related Regulatory Approximation, linked to DCFTAs
• Environment and Climate Change
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The creation of these panels is of further significance for advancing the
local and regional dimension of the EaP. Of particular note in this regard is
the EaP Panel on Public Administration Reform, which is a core element of
Platform 1. Its establishment responds to the need repeatedly stressed by
the European Commission in its communications on the EaP that public
administration reform is crucial for the strengthening and deepening of
cooperation within the EaP. Indeed, in recent assessments of the progress
of the ENP, the Commission has stressed that “the reform of public
administration remains one of the significant unmet challenges for partner
countries”, and that “the need to encourage good governance remains
pressing, both as a goal in itself, and because it ultimately underpins
political stability and economic growth.”3
In addition there will likely be other opportunities for ongoing CoR and
CORLEAP interventions in a number of other panels, not least that on
environment and climate change, but the CoR presence within the
platforms will allow for an initial assessment of the opportunities
presented by panel working groups.
4. Implementation of key ‘flagship projects’, such as: integrated border management, improved facilities for SMEs, interconnection of regional electricity markets, development of a southern energy corridor and cooperation in management of natural disasters;
The proposed flagship initiatives will depend on the availability of
resources and this is likely to be a matter of dispute between the Member
States, particularly in the run-up to the 2014–20 financial framework
(which is even more fraught than usual as a result of the global financial
crisis).
5. The establishment of a Neighbourhood Economic Community, rather
like the European Economic Area. 3 Taking stock of the European Neighbourhood Policy’. Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council. Brussels, 12/05/2010. COM(2010) 207. P. 4.
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Another interesting element within the multi-lateral track is economic
integration and the idea of the ‘Neighbourhood Economic Community’,
which this could be similar to the EEA. However, the technical problems
involved in creating a regional FTA will be enormous – and it will cost a
great deal of money. It is also not clear what the economic benefits for the
EAP countries would be of integrating between themselves before
integrating with the EU.
Implications for Local and Regional Authorities in the EaP countries
The Committee of the Regions has been closely monitoring the
development of the Eastern Partnership process since its conception, and
has engaged widely in opportunities to foster an enhanced local and
regional dimension.
In April 2009, the CoR responded to the Czech Council Presidency
consultation on the Eastern Partnership. In its Opinion on the “The Role of
Local and Regional Authorities within the Eastern Partnership”, written by
rapporteur Istvan Sertö-Radics.
In 2011, the CoR adopted six opinions covering local and regional
development and cooperation with the European Union in each partner
country. These Opinions explore the extent to which local and regional
authorities are involved in the preparation of bilateral cooperation
agreements with the EU and the implementation of the Eastern Partnership
initiative, including the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI)
and cross-border cooperation, in the respective partner countries. This set
of Opinions on the neighbourhood partner countries also offer insights into
the ways in which the CoR could provide added value in terms of, for
instance, supporting modernisation, administrative reforms or
administrative capacity building at the local and regional level. These are
all issues that have been identified to be common to all six partner
countries.
The CoR Opinion on “The Role of Local and Regional Authorities within the
Eastern Partnership” (CdR 78/2009) prepared by Rapporteur Istvan Sertö-
Radics, outlined a number of key steps which would be useful as a means of
22
institutionalising local and regional cooperation within the framework of
the EaP. This would allow for a wider mainstreaming of local and regional
concerns as the EaP process moved forward.
Many of these proposals from 2009 have by now resulted in concrete
action:
• A call to develop forms of closer cooperation with countries involved
in the Eastern Partnership has resulted in the development of the
CORLEAP partnership initiative itself;
• The recommendation to establish closer relations between the EU
regional and local authorities and the EaP process itself has seen the
CoR now take on a full and active role within each of the four
thematic platforms of the partnership;
• The CoR’s request that future ENPI funding schemes allocate at least
10% of the global budget to cross-border cooperation programmes
was taken on board as a means of enhancing cooperation from the
bottom up.
These successes illustrate that the articulation of local and regional needs
within the framework of the future Eastern Partnership is of real
significance and it is therefore vital that the CoR and CORLEAP present
action points to relevant strategic partners as a means to advance further
the local and regional dimensions of future schemes.
The time has now come, however, to take local and regional engagement in
the EaP process to the next level, and to establish real action points for
cooperation between LRAs within the EU and the partner countries which
can deliver a significant impact into the future scope and operation of the
EaP as a whole.
Local and regional authorities will also have a role to play in the
comprehensive institution building element of the EaP. The policy
recommendations on democracy, good governance and stability are
contained in Part 2 of this report. Local and regional authorities have a vital
role to play in making sure that there is convergence with EU policies at the
local and regional level. They also have a role to play in delivering energy
security through greater energy efficiency. They are the primary engine of
increased contacts between people through pupil and student exchanges,
23
town twinning and cross border cooperation programmes, facilitating the
broader understandings which the EaP, globally, sets out to achieve.
Future perspectives on the EaP from the local and regional point of
view
The Eastern Partnership Roadmap to the autumn 2013 summit4 offers
clear scope for advancing local and regional viewpoints in the Eastern
Partnership process. A new programme, the “Eastern Partnership
Integration and Cooperation” programme (EaPIC) is currently being
established, with an indicative allocation of €130 million for 2012-13. Its
focus on promoting democratic transformation and institution building for
sustainable and inclusive growth, alongside increased confidence building
measures, has clear scope for local and regional input. It is in this aspect of
the future EaP and the “roadmap” that CoR and CORLEAP members can
make a substantial impact to the future shape and scope of this particular
funding instrument.
The Roadmap specifically identifies the CORLEAP initiative as an important
tool through which a regional dimension of the Eastern Partnership can be
enhanced. CORLEAP’s ability to strengthen ties between local authorities
across the EU and EaP areas is regarded by EU leaders and the EU
institutions as an important means of connecting with citizens in the
fulfilment and delivery of the Eastern Partnership’s objectives5. CORLEAP
activities can therefore make a significant contribution to the global
objectives of the EaP.
In addition to new initiatives and proposals developed by CORLEAP as it
continues its work in the run-up to the 2013 summit, there are some
existing areas of cooperation which can yield significant results in the
interim period. Three major instruments have been designed specifically
for implementation at the local and regional level. These are:
1) Pilot Regional Development Programmes
4 Eastern Partnership: A Roadmap to the autumn 2013 summit JOIN (2012) 13 final
5 Eastern Partnership: A Roadmap to the autumn 2013 summit JOIN (2012) 13 final, page 16
24
Pilot Regional Development Programmes (PRDPs) have been developed in
the framework of EU bilateral cooperation with EaP countries. Modelled on
EU cohesion policy, PRDPs focus on tackling significant structural
problems, such as economic and social disparities between regions and
population groups, historical, cultural, ethnic or religious differences. The
new PRDPs allow EaP partner countries firstly to develop but also to
support regional development strategies, with a focus on overcoming
disparities. Projects which are financed under the PRDPs will address
structural deficiencies.
The EU has earmarked €75 million of additional funding for the period
2012–13 to support the implementation of PRDPs in the six eastern
partner countries.
PRDPs have the potential to make a significant contribution to the future
development of local and regional governance capacities in the EaP region.
The CoR and CORLEAP should closely monitor their implementation
and their impact in order to develop recommendations regarding
their future after the initial 2012-2013 funding phase. A point of view
on PRDPs should be developed by the CoR and CORLEAP ahead of the
autumn 2013 Eastern Partnership summit.
PRDPs are supported by regional policy dialogues with EaP countries.
2) The ENPI cross-border cooperation programme
As a key priority of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership
Instrument (ENPI), cross-border cooperation (CBC) is regarded as an
important tool which can significantly enhance the economic and social
development of regions in border areas.
The CBC strategy for the EaP area has four primary objectives:
• To promote economic and social development in border areas;
• To address common challenges on both sides of a national border;
• To ensure efficient and secure border management;
25
• To promote people-to-people cooperation.
In order to achieve these objectives, two types of CBC programmes have
been established:
• Land border programmes between two or more countries sharing a
common border or short sea crossing;
• Multilateral programmes covering a sea basin;
Significantly, priority is given within these programmes to local and
regional authority actors. Not only can CBC establish and strengthen
networks between LRAs in cross-border spaces, but it can also offer a
substantial basis from which to develop a robust regional policy. CBC
supports two main developmental factors, which are pre-requisites for the
roll-out and subsequent successful delivery of a regional policy: CBC is
concerned primarily with practical problem-solving in a broad range of
fields of everyday administrative life. CBC involves a certain stabilization of
cross-border contacts, i.e. institution-building, over time (Perkmann, 2003,
p. 156). This cross-border interaction can facilitate the necessary
institutional learning and administrative capacity building which can
supply the basis on which a regional policy can be delivered successfully
and can lead to regional development in the cross-border space.
Thus it can be seen that the CBC strategy is an integral component of the
overarching EaP framework, supporting and reinforcing other individual
elements, such as the roll out of the PRDPs, for instance.
3) The territorial cooperation programme, which complements the
cross-border initiatives.
Financed through the ENPI programme, the territorial cooperation
programme for the Eastern Partnership countries was set up in response to
the communication on the Eastern Partnership (COM(2008) 823), which
itself had recommended the creation of an effective territorial cooperation
programme between border regions in the Eastern Partnership countries,
modelled on the lines of existing ENPI cross-border cooperation
programmes.
26
The European Commission and European External Action Service
(EEAS) Approach to the EaP
The Commission and the European External Action Service (hereafter
EEAS) approach to the EaP and its local and regional dimension is
structured around the rollout of the flagship initiatives and of the regional
policy facility, which is being delivered in the next few years6. The exact
scope of many of these projects remains unclear; this therefore presents a
real set of opportunities for both CORLEAP, the CoR and local and regional
authority partners in the EaP countries to make a significant difference to
the form many of these implementations will take. Enhanced dialogue
with stakeholders in the EaP countries is necessary to ensure that an
appropriate and effective regional policy can be devised, which meets
the real needs of local and regional actors in these countries.
From the Commission and EEAS point of view, cross-border projects and
those aiming at the stabilisation of frontier regions will probably be
especially welcome. Such projects could help the EaP countries both to
stabilise life along their borders but also to encourage limited economic
development there too.
Potentially there could of course also be dangers in the Eastern
Partnership. One worry is that in an effort to maintain equality across the
region, relations with the EU will progress at the rate of the slowest reform
state in the region. This seems an unlikely outcome. The Commission
proposal underlines that the principle of differentiation will apply: i.e. the
integration of each Eastern European state with the European Union will
proceed at a speed, which suits each particular state. Nevertheless, it will
be important for all EaP countries to ensure that there is no delay to their
progress integrating with the internal market on account of slow progress
elsewhere. A second danger is that because EU foreign ministers are
6 Europe Aid (2011) Update on the Eastern Partnership, Paper presented to the EaP summit, 29-30 September
2011, Warsaw
27
extremely short of time, multilateral political dialogue may be used to
restrict bilateral political dialogue, but this is unlikely.
Conditionality and the Commission EEAS Approach
A key feature of the ENP is conditionality, whereby the EU’s neighbours are
rewarded for undertaking reforms with access to the Single Market on a
progressive basis, and with additional funding (albeit on a modest scale,
given the tasks in hand). This is also known as ‘more for more’. It logically
also follows that countries who violate the EU’s values are not rewarded.
Yet conditionality was previously been applied to states with a realistic
membership perspective. The EaP, by contrast, offers merely the hope of an
ever closer association through substantive deep and comprehensive trade
agreements – although it does not rule membership out. Rather than
focusing cooperation in the Eastern Neighbourhood region simply on
energy cooperation and the energy resources at these countries’ disposal, it
has been argued that European and international partners should make
energy imports conditional upon democratic reform (Askarov, 2010, p. 9).
In the view of the Commission and EEAS, for the moment, all the countries
are continuing to make progress and this is to be commended. There are a
number of roadblocks that need to be overcome for some countries, such as
Ukraine, for progress to be made. In the Ukrainian case, these roadblocks
are: (1) the selective justice problem that is caused by the out-of-date
Ukrainian criminal code and prosecution procedure; (2) the need for free
and fair elections, which are due to be held in October 2012; and (3) the
need to accelerate the reform agenda. Local and regional partnerships
can contribute to this agenda through increased training and
exchange of best practice initiatives which offer capacity building
opportunities to local and regional governments.
The problems of corruption, and poor implementation of democratic
systems of governance continue to shape Commission and EEAS progress
28
reports on development within the EaP states.7 There continues to be
progress in all these areas (with particular progress on public financial
management, intellectual property rights and the business environment),
and neither the Commission, nor the EEAS, are distracted by passing
political spats from the wider integration agenda. CORLEAP would be
advised to do the same, without, however, compromising its values should
the political situation decline any further – which is not expected to be the
case.
Increasingly, European Commission and EEAS reports on the ENP and EaP
have emphasised the important contribution which robust frameworks for
local and regional democracy can make to delivering on the global
objectives of the EaP agenda. They note in particular that “local and
regional authorities have a key role to play in narrowing the gap between
the population and institutions, promoting a culture of political
participation at local level and ensuring that policy decisions take local
needs into account.”8 As the body which best understands the practical
dimension of these issues, CORLEAP therefore needs to work with its
members to outline core measures which can be undertaken to
ensure that these aspirations can become a reality within the EaP
countries.
7 See the latest country progress reports published on 15 May 2012 at:
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm#2 8 European Commission (2012) “Delivering on a new European Neighbourhood Policy”, JOIN(2012) 14 final.
29
National Approaches to the EaP:
The view from the partner countries
ARMENIA
General National Approach to the EaP
Given Armenia’s relatively modest ambition of getting closer to the
European Union, its government views the EaP positively. Armenia sees the
EU as a way to diversify its global contacts and improve its economic
situation. However, Armenia’s position is highly dependent on the regional
context and on Turkey in particular. Armenia’s interest in the EU has grown
since the launch of the EaP in 2009. In contrast to some other countries, the
Armenian authorities, opposition and civil society are optimistic about the
EaP’s potential to generate substantial benefits for their country.9
Strengthening Local Self-Government and Local Democracy
Administratively, Armenia is organised into the city of Yerevan and ten
provinces (marz), which are further divided into communities
(hamaynkner). Armenia’s local self-government is clearly defined by
legislation, instituting representative and executive bodies in all
communities. However, in practice local self-government bodies are not as
strong as they need to be, not always transparent and dependent to an
extent both politically and financially on regional governors, who are in
turn appointed by the central government.10 Often, voters are
(understandably) economically motivated and therefore economic elites
tend to play the role of community leaders. For this reason, the media,
perhaps unfairly, sometimes refer to the country’s leading businesspeople,
many of whom hold seats in parliament or regional administrations, as
“feudal lords”. Little authority is left to local governance bodies, which
often lack transparency, accountability, a clear understanding of the
division of powers, and adequate human resources. Despite constitutional 9 Wolczuk, K (2011) ’Perceptions of, and Attitudes towards, the Eastern Partnership amongst the Partner Countries’ Political Elites, Eastern Partnership Review n°5, Estonian Centre of the Eastern Partnership, available at: http://www.eceap.eu/ul/Review_No5.pdf 10 Structured Dialogue (2011), ‘Local authorities in development for European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries,’ Background document for European Commission seminar in Baku, 11 February 2011, available at: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fpfis/mwikis/aidco/images/3/32/Background_document_ENP_seminar_130111.pdf
30
amendments in 2005 that consolidated the independence of local self-
governance bodies, no improvements have been visible in practice. The
Union of Communities of Armenia, the collective body representing all 915
local self-governing bodies in the country, stresses the need for enhanced
self-governance capacities at the local level, a greater level of financial
autonomy for local authorities in the country, as well as an overall need for
further decentralisation of governmental competences.
Since 2009, the Ministry of Territorial Administration of Armenia has been
making plans to merge communities in order to increase their financial and
managerial potential. On 10 November 2011, the government adopted a
concept for the enlargement of communities and began planning practical
steps for reducing the number of communities to about 200 nationwide
(down from nearly 1000). As regards regional development, the focus of
future Pilot Regional Development Programmes is being discussed with the
government, on the basis of its regional development strategy. Greater
attention to regional policy dialogue with the EU will help Armenia
maximize the benefits of these programmes.11 In June 2011, Yerevan also
hosted a congress of local self-government in Council of Europe member
states, and a conference on “Migration as a Challenge to Local and Regional
Authorities,” which involved over 70 participants. Both these events are
usually held in Strasbourg, but were conducted in Yerevan at the invitation
of the Armenian government as a pledge of the country’s commitment to
developing local self-government.
Co-operation between Local Authorities and Civil Society
Armenian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operate in a generally
favourable legislative climate and are respected in society. Controversial
draft amendments to the Law on Public Organizations were revised in 2010
under pressure from civil society organizations. Armenia’s civil society is
considered to be vibrant and the number of registered organizations is
growing. However, the impact of such public advocacy on government
policy remains limited. The Association of Local Democracy Agencies
(ALDA) is helping to launch a local democracy agency in 2012 supporting
11 See the latest EU progress report: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2012_enp_pack/progress_report_armenia_en.pdf
31
the capacity building of local authorities and civil society in citizens’
participation.12
Cross Border Co-operation
Armenia is engaged in one CBC programme with the EU (the Black Sea
basin programme).13 The scope for CBC programmes is limited by the
absence of a land border with an EU member state, poor relations with
neighbouring Azerbaijan (over Nagorno-Karabakh where border clashes
were seen in June 2012), and historically poor relations with Turkey
(linked especially to the 1915 genocide). There has, however, been some
improvement in cross-border links with Turkey in recent years through the
Eurasia Partnership foundation.14
Within the framework of the Fostering Regional Development in Armenia
and Georgia Through Cross-Border Co-operation project, the National
Association of Local Authorities of Georgia (NALAG) and the Communities
Association of Armenia (CAA), as the project‘s partners, established
EuroCaucas on 15 June 2009 which is the first entity of its kind in the
region. The organisation is based upon the experiences of European
regions with the aim to assist local governments in the Armenian–Georgian
border regions in developing cross-border co-operation initiatives. It is
hoped that EuroCaucas will play an important role of initiator/generator of
activities of cross-border collaboration under the auspices of the EU
Eastern Partnership Policy.
12 Association for Local Democracy Agencies (2011), ‘The Local Democracy Agency in Armenia: a tool for local democracy and citizen participation,’ available at: http://www.alda-europe.eu/newSite/public/doc/353-The-Local-Democracy-Agency-Armenia-200711.pdf 13 See CBC programme website: http://www.blacksea-cbc.net 14 Füsun Özerdem (2011) ‘Turkey’s EU Cross Border Cooperation Experiences: From Western Borders to Eastern Borders,’ Journal of European Perspectives on the Western Balkans, Vol.3, No.2, pp.75-103.
32
AZERBAIJAN
General National Approach to the EaP
European leaders have taken a pragmatic approach towards
democratisation in their relations with Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is lukewarm
towards the EaP and seeks to communicate with the EU on an equal basis,
mostly discussing the initiative’s economic aspects. Within Azerbaijan,
support for the EaP is difficult to secure because of the perceived lack of EU
support for the country’s territorial integrity. Therefore, the EaP is
predominantly seen as a means of asserting the country’s role as a major
regional and international energy player and obtaining the EU’s support for
the development of its strategic energy infrastructure. Azerbaijan’s elites
emphasize their modest aspirations for cooperation with the EU. They ask
to be treated as a self-reliant ‘partner’ rather than a recipient of EU
guidance and assistance.
Strengthening Local Self-Government and Local Democracy
Azerbaijan is organised along 59 districts (rayon), 11 cities and the
Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic (which itself contains 7 districts and 1
city). The districts (rayon), which are directly subordinate or accountable
to the central government are further divided into elected, self-governing
municipalities. In September 2009, the Law on the unification of
municipalities reduced the number of municipalities to 1,766. Authorities
argued that the reform increased the efficiency of local self-government,
especially in territories with a small population. However, this may result
in fewer posts for local representatives.
Municipalities and representations of executive bodies function in parallel,
even in small administrative territorial units, which may lead to less
effective governance and create favourable conditions for the executive
bodies to keep municipalities under informal control.15 Limited progress
has been made in promoting effective local self-government. Contrary to
15 NGO alliance for municipal development (2011), ‘Assessment of conformity of organizational and operational aspects of municipalities in Azerbaijan within the principles and requirements of the European charter: Monitoring report,’ Baku, 2011, available from: http://www.alda-europe.eu/newSite/public/doc/415-Report-Monitoring_ENG_BINA_2011-FINAL.pdf . This report is based on monitoring by local government associations in Azerbaijan.
33
the European Charter for Self Government, local authorities in Azerbaijan
lack both strong political status and significant sources of finance.16
President Ilham Aliyev’s rule has moved Azerbaijan towards
authoritarianism. This trend continued in 2011, with the regime taking a
more systematic approach to cracking down on youth and opposition
activism. Local self-government in Azerbaijan is to an extent heavily
influenced by the executive branch, which in part is the result of a national
governance system dominated by the ruling party.17 Municipalities are
underfunded and lack meaningful responsibilities or decision-making
authority.
In 2001, Azerbaijan ratified the European Charter of Local Self-
Government, which endows municipalities with substantial responsibilities
and decision-making authority. However, in reality, municipalities have few
responsibilities and remain subordinate to the executive.18 There is little
transparency in the work conducted by self-governance structures, and
citizens have only vague ideas about what elected or appointed officials
actually do – although this in practice is common in many countries. As a
consequence, public trust in local self-government structures is low.
Local elections held in December 2009 were condemned by the opposition
as the first ballot in which “the country’s leadership did not even bother to
create a semblance of democracy.”19 The mayor of Baku continues to be
appointed by the president despite strong calls by the CoE to make this an
elected office. In contrast to other municipalities, the exclave of
Nakhchevan enjoys a strong degree of autonomous governance, but is not
always fully observant of democratic standards. The chair of the local
parliament for the past 13 years is Vasif Talibov, who is related by marriage
to the Aliyev family, which indicates the importance of close relationships
16 See the most recent EU progress report: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2012_enp_pack/progress_report_azerbaijan_en.pdf 17 Hug, A. (ed.) (2011) Spotlight on Azerbaijan, London: Foreign Policy Centre. 18 Ibid. 19 ‘Low turnout, alleged violations mar Azerbaijani local elections,’ Caucasus Report, RFE/RL, January 4th, 2010, available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/Low_Turnout_Alleged_Violations_Mar_Azerbaijani_Local_Elections/1920949.html
34
between the governing elite.20 Restrictions on rights and freedoms can be
severe.
Co-operation between Local Authorities and Civil Society
Uncooperative government policies and a strategy of selective funding have
left the still-developing nongovernmental organization (NGO) sector
splintered and without significant impact. Most active organizations are
based in the capital, Baku. A growing number of pro-government NGOs (or
GONGOs21) operate in the country. These organizations have been set up by
the authorities or persons close to them with the aim of creating a third
sector for international funders to work with. Because these compliant
entities usually get better access than groups that are vocally critical, some
donors see them as more effective. The country’s political opposition has
been effectively undermined over the past years; consequently, authorities
have no serious political rivals. Civic and political apathy is widespread,
and self-censorship is prevalent.
The 2008-2015 State Programme of Poverty Reduction and Sustainable
Development in the Azerbaijan Republic contains better mechanisms of
public and state supervision of municipalities’ financial and operational
activities. However, the programme does not specify what these better
mechanisms are. Under the said programme, civil society will be
strengthened and NGOs will be supported so that communities take part
more in addressing local problems and community-based development is
nurtured.22
The NGO Alliance for Municipal Development was established in May 2009
by NGOs operating in the field of better local self-governance in Azerbaijan.
The alliance primarily seeks to develop and implement sound strategies on
better local self-governments (municipalities) and to coordinate the efforts
of and collaboration between national NGOs in order to strengthen the
organizational and institutional capacity of municipalities. The Alliance’s
mission is to support decentralization and democratic processes. ALDA is
20 The original source for this assertion is a leaked diplomatic cable from the U.S embassy in Baku, published on the ‘WikiLeaks’ website. This claim was subsequently circulated through other sources, including the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the Freedom House, Nations in Transit Report (see: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2012/azerbaijan). 21 GONGO is an acronym for government organised non-governmental organisation. 22 NGO alliance for municipal development (2011), p.32
35
taking initial steps to establish a local democracy agency that will support
the capacity building of local authorities and civil society in citizens’
participation.23
Cross Border Co-operation
Azerbaijan was invited to participate in CBC programmes, but elected not
to participate in the Black Sea basin programme as it “refuses to become
involved in joint projects with Armenia.” 24 Prospects for cooperation with
the EU are further hindered by the fact that Azerbaijan has no land border
with an EU member state. It has, however, some limited experience of
cross-border co-operation with Georgia and Turkey, as noted above.
23 Ibid, p.34/ 24 See ENPI programming website news section: http://www.enpi-programming.eu/wcm/en/programming-process/ep-debate-on-the-cross-border-cooperation.html
36
BELARUS
General National Approach to the EaP
By the end of 2011 the Belarusian authorities had not succeeded in
‘capitalizing’ on its policy of normalization of relations with the EU and
confrontation with the Russian administration. Nevertheless, the
Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has, on several occasions, called
upon the European Commission to adopt as soon as possible “accurate and
transparent regulations” for the consideration and further financing of the
submitted projects, and to fill the whole programme with practical
contents, although it appears that Belarus is interested in the material
benefits of participation in the EaP, but not on fulfilling its obligations that
form part of the agreement.25 Indeed, it appears that if the EaP cannot
respond to Belarus’ interests (including aid, investment and trade
preferences) and continues to promote a normative approach towards
Belarus (for example, through non-inclusion of Belarusian
parliamentarians in EURONEST and legitimisation of Belarusian civil
society through the Civil Society Forum), the Belarusian government might
quickly lose its interest in further participation.
In a sign that the regime is growing increasingly frustrated with what it
considers to be excessive demands imposed by the EU, the Belarusian MFA
in September accused the EU of ‘politicising’ the EaP.26 Since then, Belarus
has boycotted recent EaP meetings as relations with the EU have
deteriorated in the face of sanctions following the sustained crackdown
against the domestic political opposition over the course of 2010-11.
Furthermore, the EU’s new Dialogue for Modernization in 2012 is aimed
solely at civil society and political opposition, excluding the Belarusian
authorities (and by implication LRAs) for the time being until political
prisoners are released.27
25 Dzianis Melyantsou (2011), ‘Belarus – EU: Dialogue anticipating the elections,’ available at: http://nmnby.eu/by-2010en/melyancov-en.html 26 ‘Belarusian foreign ministry accuses EU of politicizing Eastern Partnership,’ Belarus News, available at: http://naviny.by/rubrics/english/2011/09/29/ic_news_259_377385/ 27 Andrei Yahorau, Elena Tonkacheva, Ulad Vialichka, Dina Shavtsova, Vladimir Dunaev (2012), European Dialogue on Modernization with Belarus, full text available from: http://eurobelarus.info/en/article/european_dialogue_on_modernisation_with_belarus
37
Strengthening Local Self-Government and Local Democracy
Belarus is administered by the city of Minsk and six regions (voblast),
which are further divided into districts (raion) and
towns/cities/municipalities of regional/district subordination. However, in
practical terms Belarus has seen the complete disappearance of local self-
government and its replacement by local government in which local
authorities are a constituent part of the ‘presidential vertical’, with the
executive branch dominating the representative one (the Soviet model).
LRAs cannot be considered as a separate self-government institution
representing interests of the local community and protecting the latter
from excessive interference from the state. In November 2011, the
president issued the military rank of major-general to the heads of all
[regions] and the city of Minsk, making them responsible for the
deployment of military defence in their territories. This move further
strengthened the subordination of local officials to the president by
assuming a military-like chain of command.
Since January 4th 2010, LRAs have been following the new version of the
law ‘On local government and self-government in the Republic of Belarus’.
The law introduced no decisive changes into the Belarusian system of local
government and self-government. It simply redistributed powers between
local councils of deputies and regional executive bodies that used to be
duplicated at regional and district levels. Nevertheless, state authorities are
taking certain actions to improve local authorities’ work, especially in the
sphere of business. In this area, at least, Belarusian authorities are
liberalizing economic activities at the expense of local authorities: their
financial dependence is growing, the consolidated national budget is
further centralized as local budgetary receipts are reducing.28 This has
further weakened LRAs in Belarus, with local governments often left
drastically underfunded due to the lack of local revenue sources.
Because Belarus is not a member of the Council of Europe (all other EaP
partners are), it is under no obligation to comply with their standards for
local government. Elections to local councils in April 2010 saw only six
opposition members elected among the 21,288 council members 28 Zmicier Kuhley (2010), ‘Local Authorities: Self-government sacrificed to liberalization,’ Belarus News, available at: http://nmnby.eu/by-2010en/kuhley-en.html
38
nationwide, and overall Belarus is classified as a consolidated authoritarian
regime with increased oppression observed throughout 2011. Local
branches of opposition organisations often struggle to register or secure
offices.29 This weakening of the formal powers and representative
functions of LRAs in Belarus has allowed local state functionaries to get
used to controlling the way in which local representative bodies are formed
and have consequently become more unaccountable to local communities
over time.30 Although not democratically elected, the upper house of
parliament, the Council of the Republic (comprising pro-regime
representatives from the regions), has a Council for Cooperation of Local
Self-Government Bodies (http://www.sovreg.gov.by) which is also
involved with links with LRA in other countries
Co-operation between Local Authorities and Civil Society
Because the authorities generally view community-based organizations
acting on local issues as a form of political activity, local political and civic
activists are closely monitored and have less freedom than their
counterparts in Minsk. For these reasons, many local civil society groups
avoid broader political agendas, focusing instead on apolitical issues of
local importance. Indeed, in 2010, many local NGOs chose to pursue a
conspicuously apolitical agenda in order to improve their chances of
engaging with local authorities. This brought mixed results, as in the case of
the Belarusian Association of Regional Development Agencies (Belarda),
whose registration was revoked in 2010, despite its efforts at pursuing a
less overtly political agenda.
It is often difficult to distinguish between civil society and the political
opposition at the local level. The authorities generally view community
organizations focussed on local issues as a form of (anti-regime) political
activity. Moreover, local organizers, many of whom are very young, tend to
develop political profiles and become active in NGOs and political parties at
the same time. Other programmes involving external actors (e.g. EU/UNDP
Local Development programmes) often stipulate active participation of
NGOs, which so far have been treated very unfavourably by Belarusian
29 See Freedom House, Nations in Transit report, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2012/belarus 30 Kuhley (2010).
39
authorities both at the highest and at the local levels. Despite these
constraints, objective circumstances do often compel local officials to
involve NGOs in order to receive help from abroad, including financial help.
In order for the regime to be able to draw upon a reliable source of NGOs
that are often required to access external resources, it has formed pro-
government public associations (or GONGOs) which are gradually
infiltrating the third sector, pushing NGOs that want to stay independent of
the regime into the background. The presence of pro-governmental NGOs
secures legitimization of the ruling establishment, political mobilization,
control over election processes, and helps to establish cooperation with
foreign partners.
Any hints at a softening by the regime have almost disappeared. For
example, for almost two years [from 2009], the Lukashenka administration
presided over an alternative forum for dialogue between government and
civil society. For example, the Public Advisory Council of the Presidential
Administration consisted of 30 members, including prominent critics of the
government. In September 2011, however, it was dissolved having met
only 4 times.
An unintended, although perhaps positive development, was that the
overtly repressive atmosphere of 2011 also encouraged [independent]
NGOs to coordinate their activities more closely, giving new life and
importance to Belarus’s membership in the Eastern Partnership Program’s
Civil Society Forum (CSF). In October 2011 Belarus’s National Platform
elected a steering committee and adopted an official memorandum (or
mission statement), which invited all civil society organizations in Belarus
to sign.31 This was the first formal consolidation of civil society energies
toward a common goal since the 1997. In an effort to build on these fragile
but promising foundations the Association for Local Democracy Agencies
(ALDA) is initiating a project with Belarusian partners to try and mobilise
civil society and LRA to work on civic community projects.32
31 See: http://eurobelarus.info/en/article/belarusian_np_of_the_eap_csf_elected_interim_coordination_committee 32Association of Local Democracy Agencies (ALDA) (2011) Activity Report, available at: http://www.alda-europe.eu/newSite/public/publications/108-ALDA-Activity-Report-2011-web.pdf
40
Cross Border Co-operation
Belarus currently participates in three CBC projects: one sea basin CBC
programme and two land border programmes.33 According to one
assessment, “multilateral cooperation projects within the EaP framework
could be better interconnected with existing, small-scale CBC projects,
including within Euroregions. In fact, Belarusian regions readily cooperate
with their Ukrainian neighbours in the framework of two Euroregions: the
Bug and Dniepr. The EU should seek to work more closely with the
Association of European Border Regions (AEBR), in which Bug is a member
and Dniepr has observer status, to develop these Euroregions’ institutional
capacity.”34
The participation of Belarusian LRAs in cross border cooperation projects
has encountered some serious problems. The most serious obstacles
include: the poor quality of Belarusian partners’ applications, which often
do not comply with established requirements; the difference between the
interests of potential partners in neighbouring states; and the complex,
bureaucratic and time-consuming procedure for project approval from the
Belarusian side. In addition, all projects must be endorsed by the relevant
ministries and agencies in Belarus, and should are then required to seek
the approval of a special committee of the Council of Ministers on
international technical assistance, after which the Prime Minister makes
the final decision. Many joint projects, despite their often smooth and
successful implementation, are usually unable to involve all the potential
interested institutions and civic organizations.
33See programme website: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/regional-cooperation/enpi-cross-border/programmes/index_en.htm 34 Anais Marin (2012), ‘Sociological study on the composition of the Belarusian society,’ External report for the European Parliament, Brussels: European Parliament, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/fr/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=73991
41
GEORGIA
General National Approach to EaP
Georgia appears to be satisfied with the EaP’s bilateral incentives and
opportunities for multilateral cooperation. The political leadership and
society of Georgia are enthusiastic about the EU and see no alternative to
integration with Western structures. The EU, in turn, praised progress
made by Georgia although it did also raise concerns over the extent to
which local electoral processes may be described as democratic, the
dominance of the executive in the political system, and restrictions on the
freedom of the press. The EU offered its full support on the issue of
Georgia’s territorial integrity.35 In general, therefore, Georgia can be
considered to be an enthusiastic participant in the EaP.
Strengthening Local Self-Government and Local Democracy
Georgia is organised into two autonomous republics (Adjara and Abkhazia
– the latter claiming independence) and ten regions (including separatist
South Ossetia, which claims independence), which are further divided into
districts. New amendments to the constitution adopted in 2010 entered
into force in January 2011, establishing a separate chapter on local self-
governance. The new chapter sets and defines some institutional
guarantees for the independence of local governance. However, the ruling
party’s monopoly on power would need to loosen for political competition
to flourish at regional and local levels. Starting in 2013, the constitution
envisages the transfer of the power of appointment so that governors will
be appointed by the central government, and not by presidential decree, as
is currently case.
Adjara remains the only regional entity with limited autonomy. The head of
Adjara’s regional government is elected by the local Supreme Council, but
proposed by the president of Georgia. The president currently has
extensive rights to dismiss Adjara’s parliament and government, but in the
new version of the constitution, effective in 2013, he will be required to
seek the government’s approval in advance. The autonomous republics,
35 Rafał Sadowski (2012), ‘European Neighbourhood Policy Package – Conclusions for the Eastern Partners,’ OSW Commentary, Centre for Eastern Studies, available at: http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2012-05-25/european-neighbourhood-policy-package-conclusions-eastern-partn
42
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, are out of the central government’s control,
since they were declared Russian-occupied territories by the 2008 Law on
Occupied Territories.
The ruling United National Movement party controls all local councils [the
lowest level of self-government], although the opposition increased its
representation in local councils countrywide from 11 percent in 2006 to 14
percent in 2010. The government often uses decentralization as a means
for transferring costs to local budgets. The ruling party’s monopoly on local
councils has diminished political competition on the local and regional
levels, and opposition parties play a limited role in the decision-making
process. Regional governors often specify a work programme to the local
councils and municipal executives under their supervision, with limited
attention from NGOs or media, which remain underdeveloped in most
Georgian regions. Municipal governments depend entirely on the central
government for funding.
Co-operation between Local Authorities and Civil Society
Many observers have pointed to a decline in the impact of the civic sector
following the departure into politics of influential civic activists who
participated in the peaceful demonstrations of 2003. Additionally, some
influential NGOs have refrained from criticizing the new administration,
and international donors have reoriented their programmes towards
government-led projects. It could be argued that this overall drain of
intellectual and other resources has weakened the country’s civil society in
comparison to government institutions.
Institutionally, civil society organizations are protected by law; no formal
or informal obstacles exist to hinder the creation and operation of NGOs in
any form. In fact, many thousands of NGOs are officially registered, and
several hundred operate in all parts of the Georgian territory – this is very
encouraging. Quite a few organizations specialize in the areas such as
public health, environment, gender issues, minority issues, and human
rights. The influence of civil society in policy formulation remains rather
low and is an area perhaps for improvement. This is partially due to a
reluctance of public institutions to engage in systematic public policy
debates with civil society actors. Public officials often fail to see the benefit
43
of involving a wide range of stakeholders in the policy formulation process,
since non-profit organizations are often considered interest-driven and
biased, and their products are seen as unprofessional.
Financial instability remains a major concern for Georgia’s civil society
organizations. While business entities provide funds for charity, they
refrain from funding civic activities. To improve this situation, in 2011
parliament passed several amendments to the law on grants, allowing
ministries to issue grants directly to universities, NGOs and individuals.
According to the State Strategy for Regional Development of Georgia 2010-
2017 “effective regional governance implies a co-ordinated initiative of
central and regional authorities as well as individual or joint efforts of civil
society on the regional level which ensures the effective exercise of the
authorities of governmental bodies and the provision of quality services
to the population.”36 This is to be welcomed.
Cross Border Co-operation
Georgia participates in one EU-sponsored CBC programme, the Black Sea
basin programme.37 In Georgia, though, regional development priorities
were and still are defined by the ministries and state Trustees (Governors)
based upon the information provided to the Government of Georgia. No
legal instrument ensures the involvement and participation of the local
self-governments in the elaboration of regional development programs. At
present local self-governments do not have the right to independently set
an agreement with another country’s local self-government bodies. It
appears that there is a low importance attached to cross-border
co-operation of regions by the Government of Georgia.
In addition, within the framework of the Fostering Regional Development
in Armenia and Georgia Through Cross-Border Co-operation project, the
National Association of Local Authorities of Georgia (NALAG) and the
Communities Association of Armenia (CAA), as the project’s partners,
established EuroCaucas on 15 June 2009 which is the first entity of its kind
36 Government of Georgia (2010), ‘State Strategy for Regional Development of Georgia, 2010-2017,’ available at: http://www.lsg.gov.ge/files/_2335_719149_STATESTRATEGY2010-2017ENG.pdf 37 See CBC programme website: http://www.blacksea-cbc.net
44
in the region. The organisation is based upon the experiences of European
regions with the aim to assist local governments in the Armenian-Georgian
border regions in developing cross-border co-operation initiatives.
EuroCaucas will play an important role of initiator/generator of activities
of cross-border collaboration under the auspices of the EU Eastern
Partnership Policy.38
There remains, however, a perceived need at the local and regional level in
Georgia for further capacity building amongst local government officials,
with regard to making full use of EU funding and partnership opportunities.
38 Davit Narmania and Sargis Grigoryan (2010), Cross-Border Co-operation between Georgia and the Republic of Armenia: Existing Problems and Challenges, available at: http://www.entwicklung.at/uploads/media/20101115_Cross_Border_Study__FINAL.pdf
45
MOLDOVA
General National Approach to EaP
Moldova could perhaps be considered as a candidate for the title of the new
success story of the Eastern neighbourhood. Moldova is more enthusiastic
about the EaP than Ukraine and, indeed, the other EaP partners, viewing it
as ‘the first big step forward towards the EU prospect’. Chisinau hopes that
accelerated integration with the EU will also help speed up the resolution
of the Transnistrian conflict as Moldova will become more attractive due to
increased mobility of its population.39 Indeed, Moldova is considered the
country most keen to embrace the EaP as a vehicle for advancing its ties
with the EU.40 The European Commission identified Moldova as the best
performer among its eastern neighbours. The key challenges that remain
include: the implementation of structural reforms (of the judiciary, the
police and security forces, and the public administration.41
Strengthening Local Self-Government and Local Democracy
Moldova is organised into 32 districts (raioane), three municipalities, the
Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia and the Transnistrian Region. A
new national strategy for decentralization was unveiled during 2011. If
implemented as envisioned, it should significantly increase the autonomy
of local governments by giving local elected officials greater decision-
making autonomy and independent access to resources. Overly centralized
administration has been an ongoing problem in Moldova throughout the
post-socialist period. Local government elections were successfully carried
out in June 2011, and were generally considered free and fair. Local
elections in 2011 were not dominated by the ruling coalition, and still faced
a strong challenge from the opposition communists.42 Indeed, in April 2012
the prospects for Moldovan LRAs were significantly increased when the
parliament adopted a National Decentralization Strategy.43 39 Jos Boostra and Natalia Shapovalova (2010) ‘The UE’s Eastern partnership: One Year Backwards,’ FRIDE Working Paper, available from: http://www.fride.org/download/WP99_EP_ENG_may10.pdf 40 Wolczuk, K (2011), p.12 41 Sadowski, R (2012) 42 Mircea Ticudean ‘Moldova's Communists Remain Leading Party Following Local Elections,’ RFE/RL News, June 7th, 2011, available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/moldova_elections_communists/24227168.html 43Government of the Republic of Moldova (2011) ‘National Decentralization Strategy,’ Chisinau, available at: http://www.descentralizare.gov.md/public/files/temp/The_draft_National_Decentralization_Strategy_eng.pdf
46
At the current time, budgets are largely under the control of central
authorities. Remuneration for those working in local administration is
quite low, undermining professionalism and service delivery. One
important impediment to effective local government is corruption, whether
in the form of misdirected public funds, favouritism in the granting of
contracts, or cronyism. However, popular support for local government is
greater than for central political institutions. Mayors’ offices are perceived
positively by 50.6 percent of the population, well over twice the level of
support received by central bodies.44 One possible explanation for the
higher rating of local officials is that they are better known in their
communities than national leaders, and are not considered responsible for
the ongoing political crisis at the national level. In other words, they are
perceived as doing a good job. This is to be welcomed.
Co-operation between Local Authorities and Civil Society
Civil society organizations continue to play a key role in political life in
Moldova. In critical areas, such as media, justice and local governance,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are active in advancing reform
efforts.45 Indeed, the central government actively engaged with the non-
government sector in the drafting of the decentralisation strategy.46 At the
national level, at the initiative of the Moldovan Government, cooperation
with civil society was strengthened by establishing a permanent platform
for dialogue and consultation called National Participation Council (NPC),
which is composed of 30 non-governmental organizations working in
various fields.47 Over 130 representatives of local and central authorities,
civil society and development partners met at the First National Conference
on Inter-Municipal Cooperation, held on June 5-6, 2012. The event aimed to
expand cooperation between central and local public administration with
the representative associations and all those interested in local and
44 Institutul de Politici Publice [The Public Policy Institute], Barometrul Opiniei Publice Republica Moldova-Noiembrie 2011 [Barometer of Public Opinion: Republic of Moldova, November 2011] (Chisinau: IPP, 16 November 2011), http://www.ipp.md/libview.php?l=ro&idc=156&id=580&parent=0. 45 Freedom House, Nations in Transit report, 2012, available at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2012/moldova 46 Eastern partnership Civil Society Forum, see: http://www.eap-csf.eu/en/news-events/news/national-decentralisation-strategy/ 47 Eastern partnership Civil Society Forum, see:http://www.eap-csf.eu/en/countries/republic-of-moldova/
47
regional development, and to develop cooperation initiatives between local
communities.48
Cross Border Co-operation
Moldova is currently engaged in one sea basin CBC programme and one
land border CBC programme.49 The National Development Strategy of the
Republic of Moldova for 2008-2011 is quite reserved as regards the
mechanisms and actions for developing cross-border cooperation, although
Point 1.4.2 of this document is titled similarly in the EU-Moldova Action
Plan, stating a commitment to intensify cross-border cooperation between
the Republic of Moldova, EU member states and neighbouring countries by:
(i) organizing common Moldovan-Ukrainian state border management; and
(ii) developing regional cooperation between relevant legal authorities
(police, border guards, customs).50
The primary factors restraining the development of cross-border
cooperation in the Republic of Moldova are the following: direct
interdependence of the cross-border cooperation intensification from
political conjuncture emerging in any given period, rather than from
pragmatic effectiveness and urgency; the result of the last territorial-
administrative reform, which led to the fragmentation of the counties in
rayons, which significantly reduced the financial and organizational
capacities of small border regions of Moldova in cooperation with
neighbouring counties of Romania; the need to co-finance joint projects in
the amount of 10 per cent of the budget, which in most cases is a major
constraint for the administration of border areas of Moldova; a major
constraint on the success of projects is the inability of officials and local
entrepreneurs to use the instruments of business planning; and, finally, a
lack of active dialogue aimed at achieving practical goals and tasks
between the management of Euroregions and the central authorities.
48 United Nations Development Programme, ‘Inter-Municipal Cooperation is important for local authorities efficiency and public service quality,’ available at: http://www.undp.md/presscentre/2012/JILDP_5June/index.shtml 49 See ENPI website: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/regional-cooperation/enpi-cross-border/programmes/index_en.htm 50N. Dandis and B. Hasdeau (2010) ‘ Perspectives of cross border cooperation of the Republic of Moldova within the frameworks of the ENPI (2007-2013),’ available at: http://www.euroeconomica-danubius.ro/arhiva/2.Dandis.pdf
48
Some key political steps are required within Moldova in order to ensure the
proper functioning of local self-government. These include: ensuring more
even levels of regional development through specific regional approaches
in order to avoid the increase of social and economic differences, caused by
the greater capacity of already more developed regions to use EU funds; to
build an adequate legal framework – in the context of decentralization –
which will provide regional/local authorities with competencies regarding
CBC; and, finally, to consider and accelerate procedures for accession to the
3rd Protocol to the Madrid Convention of 2009 on establishment of
European Cooperation Groupings (ECGs).
Moldovan local authorities themselves struggle with a very low level of
local autonomy, both at the administrative level and at the financial level. In
fact, in terms of decentralised fiscal capacities, Moldovan local authorities
have only very low levels of discretionary spending. These problems of
local autonomy are further compounded by a lack of human resources at
the local level, and an outmoded, uncorrelated and contradictory legislative
framework.
49
UKRAINE
General National Approach to the EaP
The views of Ukraine on the EaP have evolved from an ideologically
opposed position to a more pragmatic approach. This is to be welcomed.
Ukraine already has an advanced relationship with Brussels; for example, it
is the only state to have completed negotiations with the EU on an
Association Agreement. Thus at first, Ukraine saw the multi-lateral EaP
policy as a distraction from the bi-lateral track. Nonetheless, despite the
government change and the pragmatic shift in foreign policy orientation
since 2010, EU integration remains high on Ukraine’s agenda. It must be
noted, however, that the current EaP offer omits the matters most
important to Ukraine: a clear perspective of full membership of the EU.
Unfortunately this has led to the development of heightened “expectation
gap”51 which has problematized Ukrainian relations with the EaP further at
the national level.
In addition, Ukraine received a critical assessment on its progress towards
European integration from Brussels, primarily as a result of the use of
selective justice, which the EU sees as being politically motivated.52
However, it is clear that the selective justice issue is more complicated than
it appears on the surface. That said, the upcoming parliamentary elections
in autumn 2012 will be an important test for Ukraine–EU relations.
The challenge for Ukraine now is to maintain progress in its relations with
the EU. At the technical level, progress remains excellent and Ukraine is
well on track to integrate successfully through an Association Agenda
which will include transposition and implementation of much of the acquis
communautaire (EU law).
Strengthening Local Self-Government and Local Democracy
Administratively, Ukraine comprises the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol, 24
regions (oblast) and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which are further
divided into districts (raion) and towns/municipalities or regional/district
subordination. There is, however, no clear separation between the
51
CdR 78/2009 “The role of local and regional authorities within the Eastern Partnership”. 52Sadowski, R. (2012)
50
responsibilities of central and local governments. In practice, the scope of
local self-government is limited. Some non-governmental organizations
stress that local governance still remains one of the weakest points in
Ukraine.53
The key problems hindering the development of local self-government
include: the absence of strict delimitation of powers of different self-
governing entities; vagueness of the criteria and procedures for
establishing various territorial units; extreme fragmentation of lower-level
administrative units; absence of an adequate financial basis for local
government budgets through fiscal decentralisation; unfair and inefficient
accumulation of funds by the central government; and poor staffing of local
self-government bodies (UNDP, 2011).
While the Yanukovych government declared its support for placing greater
powers in the hands of local authorities, in practice it has boosted its own
powers, sometimes at the expense of local government. Among other steps,
the national leadership abandoned the previous administration’s attempts
to reform local government, and consolidated power in the executive
branch through the annulment of the 2004 constitutional amendments
(forcing the authorities to start from scratch on the basis of the 1996
constitutional language). That said, the matter of the Ukrainian
constitutional settlement is not closed and developments are awaited with
interest.
A new electoral law was enacted just two weeks before the beginning of the
2010 local election campaign, giving political parties little time to adapt to
the new voting system. Observers noted pressure on independent and
opposition candidates, irregularities during the voting, low turnout, a large
number of votes “against all,” delays in the vote counting, and a wave of
legal challenges (although this last point in particular is a feature of most
Ukrainian elections, mainly due to the shifting nature of the rules on
voting). According to the official results, the ruling Party of Regions won a
nationwide majority. Moreover, the problem of politicized appointments of
local executives reappeared in 2011. Oblast governors are appointed and
dismissed by the president after submission of candidates by the cabinet.
53 See the Local Government and Public Services Reform Initiative, Ukraine country profile, available at: http://lgi.osi.hu/country_datasheet.php?id=181
51
Some posts in local government are similarly political, and do not always
take full account of professional qualities. Administrative reform has
included plans to reduce the size of the bureaucracy by half at the local
level, which could hinder the work of local government.
The functioning of local and regional self-government is affected by the
Soviet legacy of entrenched centralisation and bureaucracy. Shortly after
the reporting period, the Parliament (Rada) adopted a law on the
establishment of a State Fund for Regional Development. Together with the
process of updating the National Regional Development Strategy, this
represents a very positive development, which is to be welcomed.54
Co-operation between Local Authorities and Civil Society
The civil society sector continues a play an important role in Ukraine, and is
often at the forefront of numerous public events in defence of freedom of
assembly, media freedom, electoral rights, and environmental integrity
during 2010 and 2011, and they remained vocal in promoting dialogue
with policymakers to influence legislation and other decisions. However, a
combination of societal apathy and lack of capacity among NGOs prevented
them from effectively resisting the year’s antidemocratic trend. Indeed,
civil society activists increasingly faced various forms of direct pressure
and hostility from the authorities (Stewart, 2009).
There was no significant new state pressure on Ukraine’s relatively robust
civil society sector in 2011. Most functioning NGOs are concentrated in the
cities of Kyiv and Lviv, followed by Zaporizhya, Dnipropetrovsk, and
Odessa. The government, however, continued to engage in dialogue with
civil society in the established formats. Hundreds of civic councils were
established at different levels of government in accordance with a new
regulation (No. 996) adopted by the cabinet in late 2010. The councils
consisted of more than 9,000 people; among those attached to central
government agencies, 39 per cent of the members represented NGOs, 32
per cent trade unions and business associations, and 7 per cent charity
organizations. NGOs have reported an “imitation” of public participation, in
which the government simply declares its will to engage with civil society,
but does so mostly in a selective way. 54See recent ENP progress report, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2012_enp_pack/progress_report_ukraine_en.pdf
52
There was, however, some progress during 2011 on NGO legislation. A
draft law on civil society organizations (No. 7262-1) that had been stuck in
the parliament for several years was advanced in a first reading. If finally
adopted, the law will provide more space for non-profit activity,
liberalizing the registration of new NGOs, removing some artificial
administrative barriers, and addressing most of the negative issues. In
2012, a new government strategy for civil society development was
introduced, including harmonization with European legislation;
participation of CSOs in decision-making and implementation of policies on
national and local levels; delegation of certain competencies in social and
humanitarian spheres from executive bodies to CSOs.55
Cross Border Co-operation
Ukraine participates in one sea basin CBC programme and three land
border CBC programmes. Experts on regional policy recommend that the
government of Ukraine ratify the Third Additional Protocol to the Madrid
Outline Convention on Euroregional Cooperation Groupings, which
established a common legal framework for all regional and local authorities
within the member states of the Council of Europe. This legal act would
foster cooperation between the regional authorities in Ukraine and their
counterparts from the EU.56 In August 2010, the Cabinet of Ministers
approved the Concept of the State Program of cross-border cooperation
development for 2011-2015. (Nr. 1838-r dated 08/15/2010). It is noted
that cross-border cooperation in Ukraine is carried out under considerable
disparities of socio-economic development of border areas, as well as the
level of employment of these Ukrainian territories and border regions of
neighbouring states, which leads to social instability of the subjects of
cross-border cooperation. This is, in effect, an admission of fact and does
not detract from the fact that Ukraine has at least made a positive move by
approving the Concept.
55 UCIPR (2012), ‘On Strategy of Government Policy for Civil Society Development,’ available at: http://www.ucipr.kiev.ua/publications/on-strategy-of-government-policy-for-civil-society-development/lang/en 56 A. Duleba and V. Bilcik (eds.) (2011) Taking stock of the Eastern Partnership, Bratislava: Slovak Foreign Policy Association, available at: http://www.ucipr.kiev.ua/userfiles/SFPA_book2011.pdf
53
National Approaches to the EaP: Overall Summary and Assessment
This overview of national approaches to the EaP on a country-by-country
basis illustrates that whilst there are clearly a number of country-specific
issues, which hinder the full achievement of the EaP’s goals, there are also a
set of common factors which are constraining the development of local and
regional democracy across the Eastern Partner countries. Of course there
are many positive developments across the region that are to be welcomed,
most notably the response both the EaP and CORLEAP which is hugely
encouraging. However, it is the areas for improvement that inevitably
dominate. Positively viewed, these issues form a catalogue of lobby points,
which the CoR and CORLEAP can address as top priority concerns in their
own political work.
1) Local and regional self-government: lack of governmental autonomy
and limited financial capacity
Without an enhanced capacity to exercise real government responsibility at
the local and regional level, supported by an appropriate legal and financial
framework, it will be impossible for Eastern Partner countries to develop a
robust system of multi-level governance. EU financial assistance and
partnership programmes can improve and enhance expertise within
administrations, but further action is required by the CoR and by
CORLEAP at the political level, to ensure that the EaP can address the
domestic framework within which local and regional governments
operate.
2 ) Development of local democracy, including citizen participation
If the Eastern Partnership is to deliver real and substantive improvements
to the security, stability and prosperity of its Eastern partner countries,
then democracy needs to be firmly rooted, from the bottom up. As the
preceding analysis of local and regional perspectives on the EaP within the
six participant Eastern states reveals, democratic infrastructure in these
countries is weak, and is particularly precarious at the local and regional
level. Support mechanisms for local and regional democratic initiatives are
therefore of vital importance, as it is only by building democratic controls
54
from the bottom up that a stable and sustainable democratic governance
model can be established.
The CoR and CORLEAP can foster democratic renewal at the local and
regional through sustained participation in capacity building
programmes, the exchange of expertise and best practice, as well as
offering training to elected local and regional personnel from the
partner countries. This is a real area of need where CoR and CORLEAP
initiatives have the potential to make a substantial difference.
3) Limited awareness of the financial assistance mechanisms available
to local and regional authorities in the Eastern Partner countries
from EU programmes;
Research has shown that associations of local authorities in the Eastern
Partner countries sometimes demonstrate a lack of awareness of the
potential opportunities for project development and cross-border learning
which are presented by the numerous EU financial assistance schemes for
the region. The ENPI instrument is the most well-known EU financial
assistance package; however other opportunities for local and regional
authorities to benefit from these funding schemes remain under-
appreciated. The CoR and CORLEAP can work to heighten awareness of
the potential presented by the full range of EU funding programmes
with opportunities for local and regional authority engagement, not
least through an awareness-raising campaign which focuses on some
of the success stories at the local and regional level in the Eastern
Partner states.
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Part 2
Policy Options for the CoR and CORLEAP
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What can CORLEAP do to strengthen local self-
government and local democracy?
A long-term action plan is required
The establishment of strong and effective local self-government and
democracy in the Eastern Partnership countries is an essential objective
that will build long-term, sustainable democratic stability from the bottom
up within the Eastern partner countries. Local and regional government
needs to be trusted by those it serves, responsive to the needs of the
population and as uncorrupt as possible. These should serve as the guiding
principles of both the CoR and CORLEAP with regard to developing any
future action plan for the EaP.
Varying degrees of progress have been made across the countries of the
Eastern Partnership towards building democracy at the level of the central
state (indeed for much of the region, electoral democracy is now firmly
established), but this also needs to be complemented at the local and
regional level, which will allow local populations to manage their own
affairs, understand participatory governance at the local level and see
governmental institutions in their communities which directly respond to
their individual needs. From the perspective of both the EU and the EaP
countries, this should be regarded as an essential part of a wider
construction of deep democracy.
Local government structures have always existed across the Eastern
Partnership region, but the legacy of the Soviet era meant that they tended
to be organized in a rigid top-down fashion, with a clear chain of command
from the centre to the smallest unit of local government. As the previous
analysis of national approaches to the EaP has highlighted, some hesitant
progress has been made in changing the constitutional structures presently
in place in order to bolster the quality of local government in the region.
However, constitutional and legal changes are only a part of what should
best be regarded as a process, rather than an instant achievement. Change
can take a long time to come into effect as citizens become better
acquainted with new rules and new styles of local democracy. Confidence
in local democracy in particular can take a long time to establish. Delivering
57
real and substantive change in the Eastern Partnership countries at the
local and regional level should therefore be regarded as a long-term
objective of the CoR and of CORLEAP, as the headline objectives will not be
achievable through short-term actions, nor without a wider, multi-faceted
approach which addresses inter-related aspects.
Establishing a role for CORLEAP in the region – a question of
“actorness”
The fundamental question for CORLEAP here, therefore, is what it can do to
support this process. In order to establish itself as an actor in the process of
enhancing local and regional governance in the EaP countries, CORLEAP
can adopt four specific roles which, collectively, can make a substantial
contribution to the quality of local and regional governance. The four roles
are as follows:
– (1) A strategic thinker: drawing up long-term plans about where
local and regional government should be heading, with a road-map
for implementation;
– (2) A timely intervener: both at the EU and MS level to ensure that
development assistance goes towards local and regional democracy
promotion projects;
– (3) A skilful advocate:
o Making a convincing case for a role for local and regional
government in drafting territorial reforms;
o Developing an inside track both to the European institutions
(particularly the Commission and EEAS) and the national
governments of the Eastern Partnership;
o Making the case for decentralization of competences; both
policy-making and fiscal competences;
– (4) A high performance cheerleader: showing how to build a high
performance culture at the local and regional level with a focus on
58
improving the training and skills set of local and regional government
officials.
1 - A Strategic Thinker
It is essential that the responsibility for leadership and pushing forward the
agenda on local and regional governance issues in the EaP must be taken
primarily by local and regional authorities from the Eastern Partnership
countries. In other words, CORLEAP’s participants need to have full
ownership of the reform agenda if it is to acquire the necessary traction. It
should be recognized that there will, at first, be varying degrees of
enthusiasm amongst local government leaders. However, CORLEAP can act
as a beacon for change. Already, CORLEAP has brought together a small
group of pioneering local government leaders. Collectively, these can now
play a strongly pro-active role in driving forward the CORLEAP workplan,
acting as multipliers of change. In this matter, what CORLEAP needs to
identify in the first instance is a wider group of enthusiastic local or
regional government leaders from EaP partner states to play the role of
policy entrepreneur in order to champion CORLEAP’s vision across the EaP
region.
Having found these entrepreneurs, it is vital that CORLEAP is able to
provide them with an essential level of resources to bring their vision
forward. In practice, this could involve support with travel grants,
assistance in setting up meetings with senior European and Member State
officials, MEPs and national parliamentarians and providing a platform for
the pioneering group to bring their message to those will be allies in
helping them deliver it. All of this could be done with a modest level of
well-targeted support.
Local and regional self-governments from the European Union also have a
vital role to play in providing know-how, lessons drawn from past
experience, and encouragement, but the primary holders of responsibility
must be the EaP countries. The CoR and CORLEAP can act as a vehicle for
this exchange of knowledge and expertise between LRA representatives
from the EU member states and LRA representatives from around the
Eastern Partnership area. Thematically centred forums, workshops and
59
seminars on particular issues of interest to EaP countries can facilitate
large-scale learning across a number partner countries, and would be an
excellent starting point for showcasing both CORLEAP as a body and its
agenda for stimulating change at the local and regional level across the
Eastern Partner countries.
2 – A Timely Intervener
In the role of timely intervener, CORLEAP can ensure that development
assistance goes towards local and regional democracy promotion projects.
In the initial phase, CORLEAP can use its relations with partner countries
and associations of local authorities within these states to operate a wide-
scale awareness building programme, with strategic marketing
interventions. Talks, seminars and outreach visits in the countries,
organised in partnership with locally based local and region authority
groupings, offers a means for CORLEAP to act as a multiplier of knowledge
and understanding on EU funding programmes which are operational at
the local and regional level, as well as expertise on how to access these.
Such in-country actions could potentially be supported at the EU level
through themed workshops and seminars hosted at the CoR itself.
Beyond this, CORLEAP also offers a potential mechanism by which to shape
the funding priorities of the EU. By showcasing the substantive impact that
EU financial assistance has made to local and regional authorities in the
Eastern Partner countries, in line with the global objectives of the EaP
itself, CORLEAP can draw attention to the Commission and to EU member
states of the value added of continued and indeed, enhanced, financial
assistance in this area.
Bilateral assistance programmes between individual member states and
EaP states may also benefit from enhanced understanding of how financial
assistance at the local and regional level in Eastern Partner countries has
delivered substantive change. In its role as a timely intervener, CORLEAP
can advise member state actors on both policy priorities, and the methods
most appropriate for delivering them. In many (though by no means all)
cases, these suggestions will be welcomed by officials who may be
struggling to decide on priorities on the basis of inadequate information
60
about the prevailing local conditions. This is something on which CORLEAP
can capitalize.
An obvious starting point for the timely intervener would be those Member
States with substantial bi-lateral assistance programmes to the EaP
countries. Germany and Sweden (via Sida) are the best examples of these,
where significant funding is available. Another obvious place for CORLEAP
to engage as a timely intervener, is those local and regional authorities
within the EU that undertake decentralised development cooperation – in
many cases, these local and regional authorities will be seeking partners
from the EaP countries. Further information on decentralised development
cooperation is readily available on the CoR ATLAS of decentralised
cooperation website.57
3 – A Skilful Advocate
The primary function of the skilful advocate is to make a convincing case
for the inclusion of local and regional authorities in drafting territorial
reforms and for the decentralization of competences, both policy-making
and fiscal. This is the primary political objective of CORLEAP in its
engagement with the countries of the Eastern Partnership.
In the EaP countries, the key audience for these messages are national
governments that are in some measure beyond the reach of the CoR. As a
means of reinforcing this particular message, CORLEAP should use its
ongoing partnerships with the European Commission and with the EEAS to
make the case that local democracy reform and the quality of local
government should serve as a priority for the conditionality that the EU
will impose on the EaP countries in return for access to the Single Market.
This could significantly incentivize the national governments of the EaP
countries towards moving in a positive direction.
Another core opportunity for CORLEAP to act as a skilful advocate for the
advancement of good local and regional governance in the EaP is through
the CoR’s participation in the four thematic platforms of the EaP, most
notably through platform 1, which is focused on democracy, good
57
http://lra4dev.cor.europa.eu/portal/en/atlas/Pages/maps.aspx
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governance and stability. Through this dialogue with senior officials from
both the European Commission and from the partner countries, CORLEAP
has the potential to put forward solutions for lasting change in local and
regional governance within EaP states.
In this capacity, attention should also focus on opportunities for extending
the EU’s twinning programmes to local and regional levels of governance.
4 – A High performance cheerleader
A more prosaic, yet vital role for CORLEAP in strengthening local self-
government and local democracy is in helping to foster a high performance
culture of good governance at the local and regional level. Local democracy
cannot flourish in the Eastern Partnership countries if its practitioners are
under-qualified and insufficiently skilled for carrying out their basic
functions.
To this end, CORLEAP could consider the establishment of a High
Performance Delivery Unit, bringing together trainers and officials from
local and regional government from all CORLEAP countries to undertake
training in the following crucial areas:
– Public service ethics in local government. This module would be at
the heart of any training programme, talking about what it is that
local and regional government do, what their ethical responsibilities
are and how they can contribute to the creation of ‘deep democracy’;
anti-corruption measures would feature on the agenda, as would
managing relations with other sections of the democratic polity
including the national and European levels of government.
– Leadership in local government. This module would target potential
leaders in local government and provide training in the creation of a
high performance culture and what this means for local and regional
government. The focus would be on both individual mentoring and
the development of core leadership skills, as well as working on case
studies of transformation in local government and providing a forum
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for local government leaders to discuss issues of mutual concern and
interest.
– Performance management tools. Local government and the public
sector more generally sometimes struggles to manage its staff in such
a way that they deliver the highest standards of service. This module
would provide an overview of performance management in local
government with a focus on creating positive outcomes.
– Local government and European integration. This module would
explore the relationship between local government and European
integration, explaining what the role of local government is in
pushing forward the EU integration agenda, and how European
integration acts as a supporter of democracy at the local and regional
level.
– Once the above modules had been completed, the ‘graduates’ of the
High Performance Delivery Unit would be invited to take part in
regular Best Practice seminars composed of local government
officials from EU and EaP countries, which would consider topical
matters of interest and provide an international peer group for local
government leaders, whilst helping to refresh and replenish their
leadership skills.
Taken as a whole, this initiative will make a significant and long lasting
impact on the level of governmental capacity at the local and regional level
in the Eastern Partner countries, meeting a real and identified need for
training assistance58.
The scope and budget of the High Performance Delivery Unit will depend
on the share of resources allocated to CORLEAP’s activities. However, it
ought to be possible to set up and run the High Performance Delivery Unit
(HPDU) without excessive outlay, and ideally the project could be funded
from donor assistance. The HPDU could be hosted by a local or regional
authority within an Eastern Partnership country and staffed locally. It is
essential that the HPDU sets – and is seen to set – a high standard for
provision of a service that is both high quality and value for money. This
latter point is particularly important.
58
See Section 2 of this report on “National Approaches towards the EaP”
63
The above-mentioned policy options on improving the quality of local and
regional democracy and self-government in the EaP countries constitute a
plan that will require a sustained period of time, effort and political will to
bring to fruition. Success will depend in part on the quality of the strategic
thinking exercise and long-term planning exercise that needs to be carried
out at the onset.
What can CORLEAP do to increase cooperation
between the local authorities and civil society in the
EaP countries?
Following the example of South-Eastern Europe, CORLEAP could consider
the option of setting up Local Democracy Agencies (LDAs) bringing
together different regions within the same EaP country. The purpose of
these networks could be to bring together local and regional politicians,
alongside local government officials, with the representatives of civil
society to discuss a range of political and policy issues. These meetings
could take the form of a policy forum, with briefing papers circulated in
advance for comment and discussion. These agencies or networks should
begin their work by building coalitions of the willing, and then grow the
networks gradually. Funding for such initiatives need not be enormous. It is
also vital that such networks be co-funded, although the EaP country co-
funding could be in kind (in terms of conference facilities) rather than in
hard cash.
Local Democracy Agencies or Networks could establish working groups to
discuss policy and political challenges, and to propose solutions
appropriate to the locality. Topics for discussion could range from the
essential – including questions of what the state should do and what local
and regional government’s role must be – to the more particular and
practical.
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Political parties
The best means by which cooperation could be boosted between civil
society and local and regional government in the EaP countries is by
helping to establish properly institutionalized political parties. In meeting
this goal, there is an important role to be played by COR members from the
EU-27, in particular from the EU-15. Political parties are vital parts of the
institutions of a vibrant, deep democracy because they represent the
primary means by which the needs and demands of society and particular
segments of society are aggregated and voiced collectively.
One means that CORLEAP could deliver this goal, would be by encouraging
the political groupings within it to organize training and networking events
with their approximate ideological counterparts from the EaP countries. An
annual meeting could be organized over a two-day period, ideally hosted by
a political foundation from one of the EU Member States (such as the
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung or the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung) or by one of the
European political parties. Topics for discussion would vary depending on
the political colours of the organizers, but might include questions such as:
• Ideology and World View – what is a social democracy? What is
Christian democracy? What does it mean to be a liberal in the 21st
century?
• Managing relations between the grassroots and the leadership in the
21st century;
• Fundraising – how can political parties diversify their revenue
streams and avoid capture by a single interest group?
• Fighting local and regional election campaigns – how might
techniques and strategies vary from national campaigns?
• Mobilizing popular support from non-party members – is there a role
for primaries in local and regional elections?
• Relations with other social partners: what is the link between
political parties and business organisations or trade unions?
Some of the democratic challenges facing the EaP countries can be resolved
with better institutional design, but many of the features of deep
democracy can only be addressed through stronger political parties. For
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this reason, we would suggest that CORLEAP gives its consideration to
means of boosting political parties across the EaP countries.
What can CORLEAP do to increase cross-border
cooperation?
In terms of increasing participation in cross-border cooperation
programmes between CORLEAP members, most of the challenge here is
about increasing awareness of the funding streams available – and
demonstrating their limitations so that would-be participants can work
around these. The evidence from the case studies presented in Part 3 of this
report offer insights into good practice in the funding of local and regional
authority projects in the EaP countries.
CBC remains a cornerstone of the EU’s financial assistance package to the
EaP countries, and is the largest single means through which direct support
has been provided to local and regional authorities in the EaP countries.
CBC programmes are widely recognised as fostering social cohesion
through economic interdependence and harmonization, as well as serving
to improve competitiveness by encouraging coherent, viable regions (Deas
and Lord, 2006, p. 1848).
It is also recognised that CBC is more likely to be effective in countries with
a strong tradition of communal autonomy (Perkmann, 2003, p. 165). Thus,
democratic institution-building in Ukraine must go hand in hand with the
development of CBC such as those rolled out under the framework of the
ENPI for the 2007-2013 programming period. CORLEAP must therefore
prioritise political and constitutional reform as well as institution-
building as a key element of its interaction with and support for local
and regional government in the Eastern Partner countries. The two
objectives are therefore mutually reinforcing and thus inextricably linked.
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67
Part 3
Inventory of Local and Regional
Initiatives in the EaP area
68
Local and regional initiatives in the
Eastern Partner countries
This section showcases some examples of projects undertaken with the
assistance of EU financing, at the local and regional level in the countries of
the EaP, with local and regional governments themselves acting as partners
in most instances. Many of these projects offer multiple outputs across a
range of policy areas; for ease of analysis, however, they are clustered
below around the headline deliverable in each instance.
The projects showcased here focus on the following policy goals:
1 Projects supporting cooperation between local authorities and civil society in the EaP countries
2 Projects supporting the strengthening of local self government and democracy in the EaP countries
3 Projects facilitating cross-border cooperation and learning
The second part of this section provides analysis of implementation
procedures in a range of EU-financed projects across the region. Focusing
on issues relating to implementation procedures, funding sources and
project management, this section also offers some suggestions as to how
CORLEAP members can push for further targeted assistance at the local
and regional level, across a number of key policy areas.
1) Projects supporting cooperation between local authorities and
civil society in the EaP countries
TANDEM”: Cooperation for citizen participation and community
development in Belarus
This project was supported by the European Commission’s EuropeAid
team, under the thematic programme “Non-state actors and local
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authorities in development”, which aims to encourage non-state actors and
local authorities, both from the EU and in developing countries, to get more
involved with development issues. All projects financed by means of this
instrument must comply with the terms of Regulation (EC) No. 1905/2006
establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation.
The TANDEM project aims to increase the participation of citizens in
Belarus in nascent processes of local democracy, and to foster their long-
term cooperation with local authorities. Citizen participation at the local
level in Belarus is currently still very limited. The TANDEM project
therefore aims to support the development of local communities and civil
society organisations, and their cooperation with local authorities, both
through technical and financial support. The TANDEM project is at present
in its startup phase, with most projects still at the conceptual stage and few
have yet been launched. TANDEM runs throughout 2011 and 2012.
The TANDEM project has achieved the following:
• It has enabled community groups to participate in training
workshops and to receive information on the role played by local
authorities. This has emphasised clearly the possibilities for citizens
and civil society organisations to cooperate more actively with local
authorities.
• It has provided grants to civic community initiatives which have
undertaken action programmes to ensure sustainable development,
in cooperation with local authorities.
o Two of these initiatives have operated as partnership projects
and have involved cooperation with local authorities from
other countries, who have brought their own knowledge and
experience of cooperation with citizens into the project.
o The project partners are local authorities in EU member states,
ensuring that these initiatives benefit from cross-border
cooperation opportunities and the exchange of expertise and
experience at a territorial level. Both Gulbene municipality in
Latvia and Vilnius in Lithuania are actively involved in these
TANDEM projects.
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Individual funded projects under the TANDEM framework all aim to
support cooperation between local authorities and civil society
organisations and will, in due course, implement activities to create
sustainable development at the community level.
The variety of projects and geographical diversity is remarkable:
• An initiative of a cycling organisation in Minsk which wants to improve
the quality of bike paths in the Belarusian capital and create a micro-
level bicycle infrastructure there.
• The Association of Gomel children and young people (ASDEMO), in
cooperation with the local authorities in Gomel, will create a leisure
activities place for young people in Gomel’s district number 19.
• Another project covering the cultural heritage will be implemented by
the Information and Regional Studies Centre at Golshanskaya Rural
Library District Oshmyany in Northwestern Belarus. The initiative will
set up a virtual museum of the Struve Geodetic Arc, a chain of
commemorative plaques and obelisks which were built along the
meridian line from Norway to Moldova in the 19th century. The project
aims to share the knowledge of the Struve Arc and to disclose the
historical and cultural potential of the regions where the Struve Arc
runs. The Arc became a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2005. This
particular project will be implemented with the support of the Latvian
municipality Gulbene, which is also situated near the line of the Arc.
Overall, the TANDEM project seeks to raise the capacity of civic community
groups to be more active actors in the field of development. At the same
time, the project has raised the awareness of local stakeholders’
understanding of each other and the benefits of cooperating for sustainable
community development.
The TANDEM project is implemented in Belarus by the Association of Local
Democracy Agencies (ALDA), in partnership with the Lev Sapieha
Foundation and the Belarusian Organisation for Working Women. EU
financial assistance was provided through the EU’s Non-State Actors
financing programme.
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“Local self-government in the micro district of “Volotova”, Belarus
This project aimed to create and develop local initiatives which would
overcome a tendency amongst citizens to adopt a passive “wait and see”
strategy with regard to issues of local concern within the city of Gomel. The
main goal of the project was therefore to support individual citizens’
participation in the decision-making process at a micro-district level, with
the involvement of representatives of the local administration and deputies
of the city council.
As a starting point, a meeting was held by Gomel regional administration’s
committee of natural resources and preservation of the environment, with
the primary civil society actor taking part in this initiative, Gomel
Association of Youth and Children (ASDEMO). The focus of the project was
on citizens’ participation in the environmental problem-solving actions
undertaken by local authorities.
The ASDEMO representatives used this meeting to raise concerns about the
proposed expansion of the summer houses area in the city, as plans had
been put forward to build these summer houses on an environmentally
protected site. As a direct result of the meeting, a Commission in charge of
territory monitoring was created, gathering representatives from local
authorities and from civil society, including the Deputy Head of Gomel
district council and the Director of ASDEMO. Following a territorial survey,
an agreement was adopted to put a ban on the allocation of any new plots
of summer houses in this particular district of the city.
Several events were organised as part of this project. Stands and banners
were prepared to provide large-scale information to local people about the
pollution of the birch woods and infringement of the legislation on nature
protection around the Pokaljubichsky water supply point, which would
have been directly affected by these building proposals. A video clip about
people’s irresponsibility in failing to take action was produced and
broadcast on the local television channel “Nireya”, showcasing how citizen
action could make a real impact at the local and regional level. Further,
more than 30 people took part in an action to collect waste in the area.
Rubbish bins and “no litter” signs were put up in schools across the district,
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and an ecological and sporting event was organized in Gomel City Park,
with more than 200 people taking part.
Overall, this particular project saw more than 250 schoolchildren taking
part in meetings aimed at spreading awareness of environmental
protection. At a final showcasing event, a seminar on “Public territorial self
government: from theory to practice” was held, and involved
representatives of LRAs in three EU member states: Sweden, Poland and
Lithuania. This offered an opportunity for critical reflection on the added
value of this project’s implementation in the micro-district of Volotova, and
what EU member states’ own experiences of managing similar projects in
previous years could teach the Ukrainian LRAs about future developments
and project legacy capture.
The primary achievement of this particular project was the development of
favourable conditions and some necessary capacities for the creation, in
future, of local communities of territorial self-government in the micro-
district. In the near future, the project team has plans to further build on
the connections established through the REACT funding and to create
additional self-government bodies.
This project was financed under the REACT – Reinforcing Actions of
Capacity Building for Civil Society in Belarus umbrella initiative, which ran
between 2009 and 2010 and was financed under the EU’s Non-State Actors
programme. Its global aim was to facilitate citizens’ active engagement in
the local development process. It also set out to strengthen cooperation
between local authorities and non-state actors, implementing concrete
actions in this field. The primary focus of the project was the support of
civic initiatives which fostered citizens and civil society organizations in
favour of poverty reduction.
REACT financed a number of successful initiatives at the local and regional
level over the course of its life span, which involved the active participation
of LRAs in Belarus. As such, they have made a lasting impact on the
development of community understandings of local and regional
governance in the country.
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2) Projects supporting the strengthening of local self government
and democracy in the EaP countries
Advancing Healthy Communities through responsive local
governance, Azerbaijan
This project was implemented in Azerbaijan over a period of 3 years from
2009 to 2012, and was funded with an EU grant of €750 000 from the Non-
State Actors programme financing scheme.
Focusing on the notion of global public health, this project set about
improving and ensuring the access to quality primary healthcare in 49
communities across Azerbaijan, working closely with local authority
partners. The project focused on establishing local health committees,
drawn from a wide range of stakeholder groups alongside local
government representatives. These committees then worked with local
medical professionals to compile lists of necessary medicines, equipment
and other related material needs. As a whole, this project has therefor
helped to raise awareness of and build the capacity of civil society
organisations to have a say in the health reform process.
The project, which was delivered by Oxfam, the British voluntary
association, sought to raise awareness amongst local public officials about
good governance in local healthcare service provision and delivery, and
how wider stakeholder engagement can lead to better governance
solutions and public healthcare management. This has strengthened the
capacity of local and regional government participants in understanding
good governance in the field of public health.
One of the key outputs of this project was the creation of a so-called
“Community Based Primary Health Care (CBPHC) model, which ensures
that the poorest people in society can have access to the services they need.
Through education, information and awareness building actions, the
project also brought about changes in health-care seeking practices and
behaviours, which will benefit the most vulnerable people.
This project has also led to better healthcare delivery for citizens, further
showcasing how engagement with European models and standards
through EU funding schemes can have a positive outcome for citizens.
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There is increased communication on new healthcare service schemes and
local medical professionals have been trained using this project’s funding
streams, in order to widen community take-up of these healthcare
opportunities.
Some of the project’s achievements were the following:
• The rehabilitation of 8 health-care centres in rural communities, in
Khoylu, Nizamikend, Balchili, Banovshalar, Qullar, Qarayusfili,
Imamgulubeyli and Kolayir
• 54 outreach visits by trained cardiologists, gynaecologists and
paediatricians were carried out across 49 communities, with roughly
2694 beneficiaries.
• 922 school children received training on “personal hygiene and
healthy lifestyles” and 952 children participated in healthy nutrition
workshops as the result of health awareness sessions.
• A health event to promote environmental issues and encourage
people to protect their communities was held in March 2011,
focusing on the topic of environmental protection. The headline
slogan of this event “A Clean Environment is a Healthy Environment”
raised awareness of individual community action.
• Two regional learning and advocacy meetings were held in Barda and
Tartar districts with representatives from local authorities.
Strengthening the capacity of 20 village municipalities to provide
public services (safe water supplies) in Central Azerbaijan
Funded with an EU assistance grant of €336 605 from the Non-State Actors
programme financing, this project aimed to achieve a core marker of local
government’s ability to provide public services – access to safe water for
communities across Azerbaijan.
The Garabagh lowlands of Central Azerbaijan is the most water-poor region
of the entire country. Access to safe drinking water is one of the most
fundamental challenges in this part of the country; women are particularly
affected by this problem. There are an insufficient number of artesian
wells, an irregular power supply, water pipelines are poorly maintained
and there is an overall lack of public water management.
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This project established the supply of safe drinking water to 20
municipalities from the Agjabedi, Barda and Tartar regions, and ran for
three years from 2010-2013. In addition to providing an essential public
service, the project also contributed to the processes of democratization
and good governance.
Some of the core ouptuts of this project include:
• Supporting better water supply systems in villages, through an
assessment of the water infrastructure and offering options on
improvements
• The development of an effective mechanism of water supply
management through a cost-benefit analysis and a mechanism to
transfer responsibilities to municipalities.
• The construction of 5 water supply systems in Gaynag (Tartar
region), Chelebiler (Barda region), Mollaguller (Agjabedi region),
Eliyanli (Barda region) and Garavelli (Barda region) to improve
water supplies
• Building an efficient funding mechanism by developing strategies and
practices for secure and effective water supply by municipalities
• Providing capacity building on managerial skills of the municipalities,
with a particular focus on women
• The training of 5 municipalities on how to manage the water supply
in their own districts
• Awareness raising of the water issues facing poor rural communities
in the media
• The publication of a book on water supply and effective management
As this project is still ongoing, evaluations are limited, but these indicators
of progress and achievements illustrate the impact that financial assistance
to support governing capacities at the local and regional level in the
neighbourhood area can have on citizens’ lives.
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Supporting Participative Development of Local Authorities in Regions
of Georgia
This project ran for three years from 2009 to 2012, with an EU assistance
grant of €300 000, delivered through the Non-State Actors programme.
The main aim of the project was to support the establishment of an efficient
self-governance institute in Georgia, through the support of civic
involvement, public awareness and accountability. The emphasis was on
raising awareness and understanding amongst citizen communities across
Georgia of the nature and value of local self-governance as a principle of
“good governance”, and how this must be driven by the interests of local
populations.
In detail, this project undertook an analysis of the statutes and regulations
of the units of self-governance in Georgia, with regards to civic
involvement. A further analysis was undertaken of the level of observance
of civil involvement regulations within these statutes pertaining to self-
governance in Georgia. Following on from this analysis, a mapping exercise
was undertaken to examine and understand better the reasons for a
perceived lack of sufficient civic involvement in the activities of self-
governing bodies, setting out some core recommendations to foster
stronger engagement by civil society actors in the work of local authorities
in Georgia.
Some of the key project outputs included:
• The creation of institutional mechanisms fostering cooperation
between local governments, the non-governmental sector and the
general public
• Mechanisms for establishing continuous dialogue between the
population and local authorities
• Tools to improve understanding of citizen engagement and how
community action programmes can be structured
The project was implemented in 4 regions of Georgia: Kakheti, Shida Kartli,
Guria and Adjara. Within this particular project, 151 rural leaders were
selected to act as champions and representatives of local community
77
interests within the local authority structures of self-governance. All were
trained in effective leadership skills.
Additionally, around 1000 local government officials were provided with
training on the management of good community governance practices.
Further outputs included:
• More than 100 public meetings were held between citizens and
representatives of local authorities in the selected regions.
• A cycle of programmes on self-government issues was developed to
generate media debate and discussion about civic participation in
local government.
• Handbooks on local self-government were produced for officials
working within local authority administrations on best practice in
fostering civic and community engagement
• Local public assemblies were set up, involving citizens and civil
society, alongside business representatives
• A short film, entitled “Self-Government: This is You” was produced
and widely distributed to foster awareness of local community
governance
The Project Manager Guranda Romanadze said that the project has
achieved some major outputs. “Compared to the launch of the project, we
now have more active, more informed citizens…Most importantly, the
citizens have acknowledged that they themselves are self-government and
that self-government, it is us59”.
3) Projects facilitating cross-border cooperation and learning
Didactic infrastructure modernization of Poland-Belarus cooperation
in aid of the disabled
Funded under the framework of the Poland-Belarus-Ukraine cross-border
cooperation programme (CBC) for 2007-2013, this particular project which
is operated by the Hajnówka Powiat local authority in Poland and the
Kamianiec District Executive Committee in Belarus has developed an
59
Civil Society Institute, 2012 http://www.civilin.org/Eng/viewtopic.php?id=82
78
innovative co-operative approach to the joint management of the issue of
educational opportunities for people with disabilities, living within the
Poland-Belarus border region. This project has delivered some strong
results and is regarded as a beacon project under this particular EU CBC in
terms of cross-border cooperation capacity between member states and
partners in the neighbourhood area.
Funded for 15 months, this project ran with a total budget of €743 221.
The overarching aim of this project was to develop a better infrastructure
for the education of people with disabilities in the Polish-Belarusian
borderland. A previous lack of training opportunities and prevented this
group of individuals from obtaining the appropriate rehabilitation and
correction treatment required, thereby reducing their opportunity to have
a balanced development in their future lives. This project was specifically
designed to address this need and to address the long-term problem of
lower levels of social integration of people with disabilities in this region.
This particular project therefore set out to introduce a number of new
educational opportunities for these disabled people. Firstly, the project
allowed for the modernisation of two buildings housing educational
centres for people with disabilities: the special education centre for
disabled people in Hajnwka, Poland and the Centre of Developmental
Science and Rehabilitation in Kamianiec, Belarus. The project also allowed
for these new centres to be fully equipped with new state-of –the art
learning technologies.
Another key strand of this project was the financing of a school-level
exchange between these two centres for education of people with
disabilities, as well as the creation of an internet portal for teachers of
disabled children. The Belarusian centre is learning from their Polish
colleagues’ experience of conducting educational lessons for disabled
students; the Polish centre is by way of return learning from the
Belarussian experience of carrying out rehabilitation actions.
“As different as we are”: A 7 ethnia project at the Black Sea
79
This particular project is operated by the District Centre for the
Preservation and Promotion of traditional culture of Vaslui, Romania, a
local authority partner, in collaboration with the District Department for
Culture in Hînceşti, Moldova, together with two NGO partners, the
Romanian Youth Assocation from Basarabia and Bucovina, and the Public
Youth Organisation “New European Generation”, from the Odessa Region in
Ukraine. This innovative cross-border project therefore brings together
both local and regional authority actors as well as NGO actors based in both
EU member states and neighbourhood partner countries, offering a means
to foster both cooperation between the local authorities and civil society,
but also a means to strengthen and enhance cross-border regional
cooperation in this field.
Funded under the “Educational, social and cultural exchanges” measure of
the “People to people co-operation” priority within the Romania-Ukraine-
Moldova ENPI CBC, this particular project sought to promote greater
interaction between people and communities living in the border areas,
foster social cohesion and break down stereotypes amongst different
groups and ethnicities through interaction on a cultural level.
The specific objectives of the project were devised to meet this
fundamental objective. Firstly, the global aim of the project was to increase
the cultural contacts between members of seven ethnic communities from
the cross-border area: Romanians, Ukrainians, Gagauz people, Bulgarians,
Roma, Russians and Lippovans. In addition to fostering cultural exchanges,
the project also emphasised the importance of cultural heritage to
community groups, and showcased best practices in ways in which to
conserve the traditions and cultural practices of ethnic groups. The project
also sought, through community outreach events, to raise awareness of the
social issues facing ethnic communities in the cross-border area. These
events also sought to achieve local, regional and national press coverage, as
a way of reinforcing understanding of the nature and benefit of
multiculturalism for pluri-ethnic societies in border regions, framed within
the headline goal of “unity through diversity”. Over the longer term, this
project also aimed to establish new networks between young people from
around the cross-border area, in order that these contacts may continue for
years to come and would lead to future cross-border cooperation projects
in a wide range of areas.
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Some of the key activities operationalized under this project’s financing
included:
• Cultural festivals, with around 25 000 participants
• Training youth folk ensembles in traditional folk dance from around
the region
• Conferences and debates
• Public information and communications actions (brochures, posters,
banners)
• The filming of one documentary film
This project ran for one year, between March 2011 and March 2012. It was
funded with an EU grant under the ENPI CBC for €149 873. Interim
evaluations have shown that the project did meet its first indicative goal,
that of facilitating and supporting common planning initiatives around the
cross-border region, encouraging the exchange of experience and
establishing cooperation networks in the thematic area (culture and
heritage).
Using the leading European medical practices – the basis of improving
the quality of medical services in the region
This project, funded under the “People to People Cooperation” strand of the
Romania-Ukraine-Republic of Moldova CBC programme, focused
specifically on the needs of local and regional governance and support to
civil society and local communities in the cross border area. The project
brought together the expertise of a city council in an EU member state,
Siret City Council in Romania, and a public institution in a neighbourhood
partner country – Zastavna District Central Hospital, Ukraine. Together,
these partners used the available co-financing to support health care
improvements in the cross-border region. This project had the tangible
outcome of improving the quality of services delivered to citizens in the
cross-border area, and therefore offers a potential showcase of how
interaction between LRAs in border areas at the fringes of Europe can have
a positive impact on the day-to-day lives of citizens.
81
Overall, the project aimed to improve the medical infrastructure of the
region, by creating new networks for cooperation between actors based in
the local community on both sides of the national border. Its main focus
was to facilitate cooperation and exchange of expertise between
practitioners, in order to increase the level of medical awareness of
European standards of medicine and healthcare. In order to do this,
training sessions were provided with the ultimate goal of improving the
theoretical knowledge and practical skills of the target groups, in a number
of healthcare areas.
The project actions included a number of training initiatives for healthcare
professionals across the border region, with information (including 5000
brochures) on European standards in medical services being distributed at
these events. In total, 20 medical staff were trained. The project website
was established as a repository of information on European standards in
medical services, and this was maintained in three languages relevant to
the cross-border community and citizens. The project also financed one
major study into European standards of medical services.
This project ran for 12 months in 2010 and was funded by an ENPI CBC
grant of €132 028.
Initial assessments of the progress of this project found that it had been
very successful in two core areas; firstly, in supporting common planning
initiatives across the cross-border space, facilitating the exchange of
experience, and creating new knowledge and cooperation networks. The
project was also found to have been strong in the establishment of new
permanent social and cultural exchanges. Overall, however, as an example
of cross-border cooperation in action, this particular project was weaker on
the involvement of a wide range of bodies in the cooperation initiatives,
and had held only minimal outreach actions, that is, joint cultural events to
promote regional CBC identity. This programme indicator also suggests
that awareness campaigns can be of particular significance in this respect.
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Analysis of EU financial assistance programmes open
to local and regional authority partners in the EaP
countries
Baltic Sea CBC Programme Website: http://www.eu.baltic.net
Implementation procedures
Programme implementation structure
The Monitoring Committee (MC) is the main decision making body for the
Programme. It is composed of representatives of all eleven states that
participate in the Programme. The MC is responsible for ensuring the
effectiveness and quality of the Programme as well as for the selection of
projects. The work of the MC is supported by the national sub-committees.
The national sub-committees safeguard the information flow to regional
and local authorities, economic and social partners and non-governmental
organisations during the implementation of the Programme.
The Managing Authority (MA) is responsible for managing and
implementing the Programme on behalf of the participating states in
accordance with the relevant Community and national legislation. The MA
is also responsible for the tasks of the Joint Managing Authority defined in
the ENPI Regulations. The participating states have designated
Investitionsbank Schleswig-Holstein (IB) located in Kiel, Germany, to take
over both tasks. Investitionsbank Schleswig-Holstein has also been
designated to act as the Certifying Authority (CA) of the Programme. The
CA is responsible for certifying eligible expenditure to the European
Commission and Norway, as well as requesting payments to be made to the
beneficiaries from the European Commission and Norway.
83
Project development, application and implementation
The Baltic Sea Region Programme 2007-13 is based on the lead partner
principle. This means that each project appoints one organisation to act as
a lead partner to be responsible for the entire project. The lead partner
organisation is located in an EU member state within the Programme area
or, in duly justified cases, in Norway. The lead partner takes full financial
and legal responsibility for the implementation of the entire project,
including all the project partners.
Each project has to involve at least three financially contributing project
partners from three different countries of the Programme area: the lead
partner and at least two project partners. From these two project partners
at least one has to be located on the territory of a EU member state in the
Programme area.
Applications for funding and calls for applications are launched by the JTS.
The admissibility check based on minimum technical requirements is
carried out by the JTS on behalf of the Managing Authority. The assessment
of the strategic relevance of project applications is undertaken by the
Monitoring Committee.
Practical difficulties
The national approval procedure of Belarus was considered to be
cumbersome for the Programme. By 2011 only four out of the eight
projects with ENPI funds approved in June and September 2009 passing
the national approval procedure. Furthermore, none of the five projects
approved under the third call in June/September 2010 had passed the
national approval procedure by the beginning of 2011. Subsequently, the
project start-up in Belarus and involvement of Belarusian partners was
significantly delayed.
During quality assessment, special attention was paid to the evaluation of
the use of ENPI funding by the EU project partners. The lead partners of all
approved projects with ENPI funding were asked to specify if and how the
ENPI funds will be utilised by the EU partners for the benefit of Belarus. All
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Belarusian partners from the projects approved by the Monitoring
Committee were required to pass the Belarusian national approval
procedure of the partners by the Government of Belarus. In Belarus, this
provides a legal basis for the implementation of the project activities as
well as for receiving and using ENPI funding. In order to facilitate the
approval procedure the Managing Authority sent a letter to the
Government of Belarus informing about the projects with partners from
Belarus approved by the Monitoring Committee. In addition, lead partners
and Belarusian project partners received support from the JTS when
preparing for the Belarusian national approval procedure.
The JTS informed the lead partners of concerned projects about the
Belarusian national approval procedure and notified them that ENPI co-
financing was to be transferred to the lead partners’ accounts only after
their Belarusian partners will have passed successfully the national
approval procedure.
Out of the 46 first and second call approved projects 11 projects involving
19 Belarusian project partners with ENPI funding were approved. The
national approval procedure of three first call approved projects took
approximately six months. Until the end of 2009, none of the eight projects
with ENPI funds approved in June and September 2009 had passed the
national approval procedure. Subsequently, the project start-up in Belarus
was delayed as well.
An additional challenge arises from the limited interest and absorption
capacity of Belarusian stakeholders to participate in transnational
cooperation projects. This is partly caused by a lack of experience and
knowledge on the subject as well as by the limited possibilities to
participate in international and, in particular, Programme events where
potential project partners are usually found. Nevertheless, the number of
Belarusian partners applying for funding increased with each call.
Increasing numbers of Belarusian organisations are participating in EU
cooperation Programmes and projects. The successful implementation of
such projects requires advanced knowledge of relevant national and EU
legislation, which could be challenging for beginners. Many Belarusian
85
beneficiaries have little experience in project implementation and it takes
them a lot of time to study all regulations and develop all the necessary
skills, which can postpone the start of project implementation in Belarus.
The JTS aims to improve the situation by organising more events in Belarus
to provide general information about the Programme, to facilitate partner
search, and to support project development and implementation
workshops. CORLEAP can act as an information multiplier in this
regard. Outreach seminars and workshops can be hosted both in-
country and with EU partners, in Brussels.
Costs and funds used
Funding sources
European Regional Development Fund: 208 million EUR
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument: 8.8 million EUR
Norway: 6 million EUR
Total: 222.8 million EUR
plus national co-financing from project partners.
Evaluation
The overall conclusions of the Strategic Evaluation in the Baltic Sea Region
Programme 2007-2013 are as follows:
• EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region.
There are certain limitations caused by some discrepancies between
the Strategy and the Programme. The BSR Programme has the
biggest potential to deliver useful results in all EUSBSR Priority Areas
except for Priority Area 15 (to decrease the volume of, and harm
done by, cross border crime). At the same time ERDF allocation of the
BSR Programme barely reaches 0.5 per cent of the total ERDF and
Cohesion Fund support available for the Strategy under cohesion
policy. Therefore, programmes in the BSR region, if not targeted at
specific areas, are likely to see the contribution of the Programme as
86
too small to be visible and significant to the implementation of the
Strategy.
• Impact of the Programme in the Region.
The outcomes of projects funded by the Programme are most visible
in the field of transport (i.e., Priority 2 of the Programme), closely
followed by Priorities 3, 1 and 4. The approved projects were
considered to have a lower potential of capitalisation effect (added
value for development of BSR) compared to visibility since many of
them focus on softer types of preparatory measures for larger scale
investments (e.g., studies, analysis, business plans, investment
concepts, etc.) that do not provide immediate results and therefore
could not be fully assessed at the time of the evaluation.
• Participation in the Programme
The statistics of the first three calls for proposals of the Programme
reveal that:
• a typical lead partner of the Programme is an academic
organisation or a regional public authority with an average budget of
€350,653 from Germany OR a national or regional public authority
with a budget of €570,339 from Sweden;
• a typical partner of the Programme is a regional or local public
authority with an average budget of €191,642 from Sweden OR a
non- governmental organisation or public equivalent body with an
average budget of €218, 995 from Germany OR a nongovernmental
organisation or academic/scientific organisation with an average
budget of €224,455 from Poland.
Participation of public authorities in the BSR Programme has
decreased in comparison with the predecessor Programme
(INTERREG IIIB) (from 75 per cent to 58 per cent). This is primarily
on account of a more active involvement of academic institutions in
the projects funded by the Programme that seems to be consistent
with the macro-regional nature and desired impact of the
Programme.
87
The main factors stimulating participation of public authorities in
transnational cooperation are access to knowledge through
international networks, developing of common solutions, raising
additional funds for the participating organisation, as well as
belonging to the BSR community.
• Problems
There were three distinct groups of factors that were considered to
have had an adverse impact on the participation of public authorities
in the Programme. They included: (1) financial issues related to
funding of project development, as well as pre- and co-financing of
activity implementation; (2) capacity in terms of available human
resources and management experience; and (3) administrative issues
surrounding the complex reporting procedures. In terms of the
ongoing global financial crisis, the impact has been more pronounced
in the Baltic countries and Poland, but overall has not affected the
Programme significantly. Measures like availability of seed funding,
availability of advance payments for certain beneficiary groups,
simplification of reporting requirements would encourage a more
active participation of public authorities as main beneficiaries in the
Programme.
• Programme Communication Strategy
A wide range of the Programme’s communication tools and activities
implemented during the first half (2007-2010) of the Programme
were considered to have been effective in raising awareness about
the Programme and have contributed to reaching the communication
aims. The implementation of the Programme communication
activities has been cost-efficient, whereas the communication
activities performed by the approved projects was often rather
expensive.
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Lithuania – Latvia – Belarus CBC Programme Website: http://www.enpi-cbc.eu
Implementation Procedures
Programme implementation structure
The following structures are involved in the management of the
Programme:
• Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC): supervising and monitoring the
Programme implementation;
• Joint Managing Authority (JMA): bearing overall responsibility for the
management and implementation of the Programme towards the
European Commission;
• Joint Technical Secretariat (JTS): the joint operational body, assisting
the Joint Managing Authority and the Joint Monitoring Committee in
carrying out their respective duties.
The following National Authorities (NAs) collaborate with the JMA for the
Programme preparation and implementation period, and are responsible
for the coordination of the programming process in Latvia and Belarus:
• National Authority in Latvia: Ministry of Regional Development and
Local Governments;
• National Authority in Lithuania: Ministry of Interior;
• National Authority in Belarus: Ministry of Foreign Affairs jointly with
National Coordinating Unit for the EU Technical Assistance
Programmes.
Project development, application and implementation
Partnerships should consist of at least one organisation from the Programme
area in Lithuania or Latvia, and at least one organisation from the Programme
area in Belarus.
Projects can be of one of three types:
89
(1) an integrated project - where each partner carries out a part of the
activities of the joint action on its own territory;
(2) a symmetrical project - where similar activities are carried out in
parallel in the eligible territory of Latvia and/or Lithuania and in the
eligible territory of Belarus;
(3) a simple project - implemented mainly or entirely in the eligible
territory of Latvia and/or Lithuania or in the eligible territory of Belarus
but for the benefit of all or some of the eligible areas of the other countries
participating in the Joint Operational Programme.
Practical difficulties
Because no projects have been completed during the reported period, it is
difficult to identify challenges and difficulties reported by project
participants. Nevertheless, initial evidence does point to some commonly
reported mistakes made by applicants for funds as part of the project.
These include:
• Applicant or partner is a profit making organisation;
• Applicant or partner is not a legal body (registered operating office is
indicated as an applicant/partner in the application form, which is not a
legal body);
• Poor definition of the problem - detached from objectives, results and
activities;
• Target groups and final beneficiaries defined improperly;
• Absence of cross-border effect;
• Insufficiently detailed/chaotic description of activities;
• Involvement of partners not balanced;
• Absence of objectively verifiable indicators (OVIs) for outputs, results and
objectives;
• Sustainability of results not ensured;
• Exaggerated and unjustified costs;
• Unjustified extensive use of external experts.
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Costs and funds used
Any grant awarded under this Call for Proposals must fall between the
following minimum and maximum amounts:
• Minimum grant amount: EUR 50,000.
• Maximum grant amount: EUR 1,500,000.
• Maximum grant amount under Priority 1 Measure 1.5 “Strengthening of
social-cultural networking and community development” is EUR 225,000.
€ EC funding Co-
financing
Co-financing
rate
Total
funding
Priority 1 18,781,500 1,878,150 10% 20,659,650
Priority 2 18,781,500 1,878,150 10% 20,659,650
Technical
Assistance 4,173,666 1,177,188 22% 5,350,854
Total 41,736,666 4,933,488 11.82% 46,670,154
Not less than 10% of the total eligible costs of the action must be the
applicant’s and/or partner(s) contribution to the action and must be
financed from their resources or from sources other than the European
Community budget or the European Development Fund. The amounts of
such contribution are to be decided between the applicant and its partners
and their indicative distribution is to be indicated in the Application Form
and Partnership Statement.
Evaluation
As projects are still underway, evaluation has yet to take place.
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CUIDAD: Case Study for Ukraine (and Belarus)
Under its Interregional Action Programme 2008 Part III, the European
Union allocated EUR14 million to promote mutual understanding, dialogue
and cooperation between local actors in the EU and in the ENP partner
countries and territories. This was to be achieved through the provision of
capacity building for the modernisation and strengthening of local and
regional government with regard to the use of good governance principles
and, in particular, with regard to the achievement of sustainable, integrated
and long-term urban development planning. Following the Call for
Proposals organised in early 2009, a total of 21 projects have been
awarded a co-financing grant ranging from €400.000 to €650.000 for
projects lasting up to 48 months. The projects began to be implemented in
the first quarter of 2010, after the grant contracts with the European
Commission were signed.
Implementation Procedures
The CIUDAD Supporting Mechanism is a technical assistance project
designed to support the successful implementation of the 21 CIUDAD Grant
Projects. It does this through capacity building, cooperation and exchange
of experience, as well as by providing visibility and communication support
to participating teams and local actors in the EU and in the countries of the
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).
The CIUDAD Supporting Mechanism is tasked with providing support in 6
major areas:
• Supporting and advising the 21 grant beneficiaries in project performance,
e.g. by organizing conferences and workshops on EC procurement and
grant contract procedures, providing mentoring and helpline services,
developing implementation tools and helping identify and prepare a
projects pipeline for the Neighbourhood Investment Facility;
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• Coordination of grant management and implementation between project
beneficiaries, EC HQ, ECD, national governments and other relevant
stakeholders;
• Monitoring of grant projects and assisting with reporting requirements,
including design of a grants management and monitoring web-tools, and
undertaking regular monitoring missions;
• Ensuring dissemination and visibility by designing and implementing a
Dissemination and Visibility Strategy, CIUDAD visibility tools and materials,
and monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of communication
activities;
• Exchange of know-how and information by organising events such as
interregional workshops, thematic working groups and other appropriate
channels;
• Improving and enlarging networks by building national and regional
networks and linking to existing networks.
For the purpose of the project regional offices have been established in the
ENPI East (Kiev).
Project application and implementation
The grant beneficiary has to secure efficient and operational management
of the grant project. In addition to this, an accurate handling of the project
accounts is crucial to the project’s success. After signing the contract with
the Contracting Authority, the lead applicant becomes Beneficiary and
takes the responsibility for the entire project including activities carried
out by all partners. The lead applicant is responsible for timely and correct
reporting to the Contracting Authority. Therefore the lead applicant should
ensure that efficient administrative management and control systems are
established within the operation. The lead applicant is also responsible for
ensuring proper communication with the partners, ensuring that proper
financial management and control procedures are applied and that the EU
contractual procedures concerning financial management and control
(audit) and as well as procurement, information, communication and
visibility activities and rules are respected and observed, also by the
partners.
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For the Sustainable Urban Development Project (Georgia, Belarus and
Ukraine) the lead applicant is Ukrainka Town Council in Ukraine, with
Novolukoml City Council in Belarus as one of the partners. The latest
interim narrative report from the end of 2011 shows an assessment of
implementation of activities.60
Practical Difficulties
The new mayor of Horodok city (Khmelnitsky region) has been elected. The
newly elected city government was presented with the project, its goals
and objectives, and the status of the project in the city. The newly elected
Mayor positively assessed the project and supported its implementation
plan in the city, and approved the members of the working group. Thus,
problems in one of the key cities of the project were avoided. At the
beginning of the project it was unclear how the project would develop in
Novolukoml (Belarus) city in the context of domestic political events in
Belarus. There was a change of government after the local elections and, as
a result, an adjustment process as the project activity was delayed in
connection with obtaining all approvals from the local government (in
effect, though, the central government). The worsening political situation in
Belarus, as well as the legal conditions for the existence of NGOs in this
country, are generally not favourable for the project. The periodic
deterioration of relations between Belarus and the European Union forced
local authorities to be wary of their involvement in projects. In addition,
poor legal conditions for Belarusian NGOs led to the rejection of a grant
program for the non-governmental organizations of Novolukoml. Due to
the lack of financial resources required for the project, the Polish partner,
was proposed to be replaced by the partner from Jurmala City Council
(Latvia). Contract amendments propositions were submitted.
The Project Coordinator for Lublin Regional Center of Local Democracy
Foundation in Poland attended the meeting of project partners in Ukrainka
in April 2011. Unfortunately, the partner did not supply the necessary
60 http://psmr.com.ua/wp-content/files/reports/report2011en.pdf
94
financial contribution. Subsequently, there were numerous attempts to
reach agreement on a joint plan of activities and conditions of financing for
the project through numerous telephone calls and correspondence
between the Board of Ukrainka city and Lublin Regional Center
Development Fund for Local Democracy. In this instance, negotiations were
conducted with representatives of the EU Delegation to Ukraine and
representatives of the CIUDAD programme. Unfortunately, a compromise
has not, so far, been reached and the Polish partner has been replaced.
Jurmala City Council (Latvia) agreed to participate in the project instead of
Lublin Regional Centre for Local Democracy Development Fund.
Costs and funds used
Duration: 36 months
Total budget: EUR 623,224
EU contribution: EUR 498,579
A grant is defined as:
– a project proposed by a potential Beneficiary
– with a co-financing from the Beneficiary of (generally 20 per cent) of the
total eligible costs;
– the EC contribution is for the reimbursement of the actual eligible costs
incurred;
– the Grant Beneficiary is autonomous and owner of the action & its results;
– funds cannot be released retroactively.
Evaluation
The first stage for the new CIUDAD Programme promoting cooperation
between local and regional governments in capacity building for improved
governance in sustainable urban development and planning was launched
in early 2009. As yet, no specific lessons have been learned in relation to its
implementation. However, consideration may be given to additional
95
measures in order to emphasise the inter-regional (East-South) nature and
policy intent of the programme in relation to the promotion of thematic
cooperation in areas such as energy & environment; social cohesion; good
governance and urban planning. The implementation of CIUDAD
complements the actions of the CBC Programme as its aims to strengthen
capacity of local and regional authorities in sustainable and effective
development with particular emphasis on the transfer of knowledge and
experience in good governance, urban planning and accountability
mechanisms. It enables local authorities and regions to reach beyond
partnerships facilitated through CBC country and Sea Basin Programmes
by linking up with experienced inter-urban networks in the areas of key
policy interest.
Evaluation of project activities
The project is fully underway (i.e., the project team has been formed, the
constituent meeting of partners has been held, kick-off events have been
held in the cities participating in the project, all the necessary information
materials about the project have been prepared, the website of the Project
has been created and launched; and 4 cities in Ukraine have been selected
to participate);
The international workshop for representatives of local governments
(municipalities) of the participating cities has been held as well as the
study visit of representatives of local governments with selected small
towns and partner organizations to Poland and Ukrainka city (Ukraine).
12 trainers have been trained for conducting trainings in cities
participating in the project. A training programme has been developed and
six working groups for strategic planning have been formed in the cities
participating in the project. The training programme has been
implemented, under which each of the participating cities conducted four
training sessions.
The grant programme is running, during which the financial support for
their own projects was received by 17 public organizations in cities
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participating in the project (2 organizations of each Ukrainian city, 4 from
Ozurgeti city (Georgia), 5 from Ukrainka (Ukraine). The organizations that
were successful in obtaining funding have received funds and their projects
are in progress at present (although because of the difficulties noted above,
none in Belarus). In addition, expert consultations on strategic planning are
being held.
Work continues on the development of strategic plans of participating
cities. The work for the reporting period so far has focussed on developing
the ‘mission and vision’ for the future of cities participating in the project,
the definition of strategic and operational objectives, and the undertaking
of a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats (SWOT) analysis for each
for the participating cities. So far, there have been five meetings of project
partners. Four issues of a project newsletter have been published and
posted on the official website of the project.61 An experience sharing and
dissemination of positive practice workshop is envisaged for 2012.
At the beginning of the project, strong links were established with national
and regional bodies of state power in Ukraine. Representatives of the
Ministry of Regional Development and Construction of Ukraine,
Department of Regional Development and Local Government Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine, regional state administrations in each of the selected
cities, representative of Embassy of Ukraine in Belarus took part in the
activities of the project.
The project is registered in the Ministry of Economy and a full set of
documents for registration in accordance with the laws of Ukraine has been
prepared, so there were no obstacles to the formal registration of the
project. So far, the projects have proceeded smoothly (with the exception of
Belarus) and this is cited as being a result of close cooperation between
local authorities participants and the state authorities. Local authorities
showed particular willingness to cooperate, especially the mayors of
participating cities. Representatives of local governments were included
into working groups that are working on creation of strategic plans.
61 http://psmr.com.ua/wp-content/files/reports/report2011en.pdf
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The relationship between the Project and public authorities has been
described as “partner and friendly.” Cooperation between beneficiaries and
target groups, such as employees of local government (municipal officials),
local NGOs, community activists, formal and informal community leaders
and the BSP was arranged. Representatives of all these groups are included
in the working groups that are working to create strategies for
participating cities. In addition, local NGOs were involved from this stage,
for which a call for applications for grants has been announced within the
project. As a result of this competition grants for projects were received by
17 non-governmental organizations.
Twinning Assistance - Case Study for Ukraine
Twinning is a form of direct technical co-operation for Ukraine, with
cooperation involving engagement between the public administrations and
mandated bodies of EU Member States and the beneficiary administrations
of Ukraine with the aim of transferring know-how and best practices
between public administrations of EU Member States and their Ukrainian
counterparts. Twinning projects in Ukraine focus on some elements
connected with the approximation of the acquis and also elements of
structural reform. Twinning is considered to be one of the most efficient
tools for implementing administrative reform. There are over fifty
completed projects, ongoing projects, and projects in the pipeline for the
future, with some envisaged to be focused on central state institutions.
Implementation Procedures
Each Twinning project has at least one Resident Twinning Adviser (RTA)
and a Project Leader. The RTA is seconded from a Member State public
administration or from another mandated body in a Member State to work
full time for a minimum of 12 months in the corresponding ministry in
partner country to implement the project. The Project Leader is
responsible for the overall thrust and coordination of the project. They are
supplemented by carefully planned and timed missions of other specialists,
training events, awareness raising visits, etc. to accompany the reform
process towards the targeted results.
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Operators of Twinning projects are non-profit organisations with less
experience of contractual relationship than consulting firms, although they
are becoming increasingly professional with each new Twinning project.
They face human resources constraints since Twinning projects have no
local and medium-term experts (except RTA assistants), although they do
have counterparts to Project Leader and RTAs from Beneficiary
Administrations.
The Twinning project cycle is more demanding in terms of preparation and
a specific competitive selection procedure is used for selection and
evaluation of the potential MS partners. Policy advice (including law
drafting, advice on organisational issues, awareness raising, etc.), training,
study tours and internships are among the activities eligible for Twinning
projects. These activities, together with eligible costs for the Twinning
project implementation and all relevant procedures are described in the
Twinning Reference Manual.62
The Programme Administration Office (PAO) is under the jurisdiction of
the National Agency of Ukraine on Civil Service and is intended to manage
the procedural issues and general coordination of implementation of the
Twinning institution building instrument in Ukraine. The PAO has an
important role in the whole twinning cycle of the project, with its
responsibilities including:
• the drafting of the TORs of the Framework contracts (identification
missions) and the quality control of twinning fiches and contracts
• the PAO acts as the central point of communication between the
Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine and the Beneficiary
Administrations and between the MS Administrations and the
Beneficiary Administration;
• the PAO assists the Delegation to check that the detailed proposals
meet the required standards;
• the PAO checks that the good financial management of the Twinning
project is in compliance with EC rules;
62
See: http://twinning.com.ua/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=19&Itemid=36
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• the PAO receives and analyses twinning project quarterly, annual and
final reports.
Implementation of a Twinning Project
Project implementation commences on the day of receipt of a notification
letter from the Delegation of the European Commission to Ukraine. The
Resident Twinning Advisor is supposed to arrive in the beneficiary country
within three months from the day of notification on signing of the project
contract. During this period, the beneficiary administration is to submit
documents for registration and accreditation of the project. The duration of
a Twinning project may be between 12 to 24 months.
After arrival of the Resident Twinning Advisor to the beneficiary
administration, the preparation process of the official launch of the
Twinning project starts. The official launch of the project is organized to
raise awareness among all Twinning project stakeholders.
The official launch of the project is organized and financed jointly by the
beneficiary administration and the partner administration from the EU
member state. Invitees to the official launch of the project include
stakeholders, such representatives of the Government, Secretariat of the
President of Ukraine, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, other governmental
bodies, representatives of the partner state, Delegation of the European
Commission to Ukraine, European Commission, CSOs, associations, mass
media, etc.
The Resident Twinning Advisor together with the partner in the beneficiary
administration organizes events under the Twinning project in accordance
with the Work Plan of the project. The Resident Twinning Advisor ensures
timely arrival of experts and coordinates their work. The beneficiary
administration ensures implementation of all obligations pursuant to the
Twinning contract.
To control implementation of the Work Plan and timely solution of
problems that emerge during implementation of a Twinning project, a
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Steering Committee is created. Members of the Steering Committee are
Project Leaders from the beneficiary state and the partner state, Resident
Twinning Advisor and his/her Counterpart, project manager from the
Delegation of the European Commission to Ukraine and representatives of
the Program Administration Office. The Steering Committee holds
quarterly meetings.
The Project Leader from the partner state, together with the beneficiary
administration, prepare quarterly reports and submit them to the
Delegation of the European Commission to Ukraine and the Program
Administration Office within a month after the end of the quarter. Project
Leaders from the partner state and the beneficiary state submit the final
project report to the Delegation of the European Commission to Ukraine
and the Program Administration Office before the end of the legal duration
of the Twinning contract.
At the working level, monthly meetings between the Resident Twinning
Advisor, his/her Counterpart and representatives of the Program
Administration Office in cooperation with the Delegation of the European
Commission to Ukraine are hold to monitor the course of project
implementation.
Problems encountered
Instead of collaborative, partnership-building, networking work-
approaches, administrative-bureaucratic–command-driven style of
management is still predominant in some institutions that are central to
the implementation of successful Twinning projects. This management
style is contradictory to the management style necessary for Twinning,
since it jeopardises self-driven collaboration, a key element for successful
Twinning development.
Due to frequent political changes, management and staffing of Ministries is
often changing, and the civil service has proven instable which creates
implementation and cooperation barriers in the Twinning processes.
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Twinning project preparation and implementation capacities are under
developed and/or sometimes lacking in many stakeholders. Problems of
governmental institutional capacities also have a negative impact on the
Twinning project potential.
A low level of motivation among governmental/ministerial staff charged
with implementation is also a problem for Twinning projects. The level of
knowledge of English (foreign) language is generally low and insufficient
for Twinning preparation and implementation. This creates a huge need for
translation and interpretation, and reduces positive impacts of direct
contacts or makes joint work impossible at all.
Moreover, beneficiaries often exhibit a low level of awareness regarding
their own obligations under Twinning projects. Networking and
partnership building to share knowledge and experience - a key component
of any Twinning arrangement - often insufficient or underestimated in
Ukraine.
The additional workload which is imposed by the demands of the Twinning
project participants from Ukrainian Administrations is not supported with
extra compensation. There is no additional person in the staff available for
preparing and implementing Twinning.
More broadly, the implementation of Twinning projects has faced deeper
challenges. These are of systematic nature and negatively affect the
development of partner relationships between Ukraine and EU member-
states. Cited problems include:
– Twinning projects do not enjoy priority and not do not always comply
with the activities of central executive government bodies;
– Public administrations sometimes simultaneously implement several
technical assistance projects with Twinning projects focused on reforming
the relevant public governance sphere. However, the absence of coherent
interaction between projects can hinder the correct sequencing of
structural changes;
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– Public administrations often lack capacity and therefore cannot
guarantee the performance of their commitments undertaken in the course
of Twinning project implementation;
However, in 2008-2009 many of the above problems were addressed. A
Twinning Programme Administration Office now monitors the preparation
of Twinning projects. With the support of the Delegation of the European
Commission to Ukraine and TACIS Project, several additional initiatives
were carried out, including the “Implementation of Twinning Operations in
Ukraine”, and the “Twinning in English / Professional Skills” training
course, which was launched in 2008. The goal of the course is to improve
civil servants’ language and communication skills to facilitate the smoother
implementation of Twinning projects, to and improve the quality of
innovative activities they perform to pursue project goals and objectives.”
Costs and funds used
Twinning may be implemented as a classic Twinning project (up to 24
months) or a light Twinning project (up to 6 months), with a budget of up
to 2 million euros.
The implementation period of a traditional Twinning project is at least 12
months and it envisages the presence of a RTA. Twinning Light projects, on
the other hand, are small scale projects lasting a maximum of 8 months.
The funding cannot exceed EUR 250,000 and it envisages only short term
or medium term experts (i.e., the absence of a RTA). Additionally there is
no detailed Work Plan to be jointly drafted by the partners. Instead, the
beneficiary institution drafts a Project Fiche, where project objectives and
activities are outlined. This approach facilitates the endorsement of the
project in a shorter period of time. There are neither private sector services
nor supplies allowed, except for translation and interpretation.
Consortiums of several Member States are also forbidden. The evaluation
of Twinning Light proposals is based entirely on the written documents
submitted.
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Ukrainian participants do not receive any financial resources directly. Since
they have initiated Twinning projects, they themselves bear some costs
during implementation of the Twinning projects (co-financing in a form of
equipped premises for RTA and STEs). It is however the EC that finances
the costs of involving European partners, as well as the costs of
participation for Ukrainian participants in the project, such as travel costs
to EU countries, costs of organisation of conferences in the EU and Ukraine,
etc. Twinning is thus very much a ‘joint venture’. Both parties are expected
to contribute resources and receive benefits.
Evaluation
A number of general conclusions and recommendations emerged from the
3rd Annual Conference of Twinning Operations in EaP countries in 2009. In
general it was stated that Twinning projects should attain a higher level of
effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability rather than focusing on
merely carrying out the planned activities. For this to happen, the following
recommendations were made:
Recommendations for beneficiary countries:
• Country priorities for foreign assistance application should be clearer.
The governments of Eastern Partnership countries have to set out their
positions and objectives with long-term perspective on the
prioritization of spheres for project implementation, including their
vision on projects’ compliance with wider reforms in the respective
countries;
• The absorption capacity of both current and potential beneficiary
institutions in the Eastern Partnership countries must be strengthened
through training and the involvement of professionals on project
management in public administration. All project participants should
have a clear understanding that Twinning is a two-way process and
should not resemble a teacher-student relationship;
• To ensure the quality of further implementation of Twinning projects
beneficiary administrations should, during the selection/evaluation
process, pay greater attention to assessing EU MS proposals;
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• Internal monitoring and evaluation of Twinning projects and country
programmes, as well as the dissemination of information and good
practices, including e-government initiatives should receive greater
attention in line with the requirements of the 2009 revised Twinning
Manual. Dissemination of information and past experiences of current
or former Twinning beneficiaries would be especially valuable for
‘newcomers’ to Twinning.
Recommendations for the CoR and CORLEAP:
• More efficient implementation of Twinning instruments requires a
reduction in the time required for project preparation. The period of 2-3
years could put the viability of projects at risk. To address the issue of
the extended period of projects’ preparation, large Twinning projects
should be planned with prolonged timeframes for projects and
additional resources of assistance (services, supplies, investments);
• To ensure the smoother adjustment of Twinning/TAIEX implementation
modalities related to the increased amount of assistance Eastern
Partnership countries should receive, more direct responsibility for
management of EU assistance should be assigned to partner institutions
(i.e., a decentralized management system should be created);
• To ensure better results in the implementation of projects Twinning
should be introduced at the regional level. Regional Twinning has to be
complimentary to the Twinning at the central level. CORLEAP can
champion this initiative, based on an understanding of the positive
impact of twinning actions at the national level in the Eastern
Partner countries.
Twinning Assistance: Case Study for Azerbaijan
Twinning is the institutional building instrument based on partnership
cooperation between public administrations of an EU Member State and
Azerbaijan, as a Beneficiary Country. Under Twinning, partners from the
Azerbaijani public institution and from the EU Member State institution
implement a Twinning project based on a jointly agreed work plan.
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Azerbaijan has shown particular interest in making increased use of
twinning and technical assistance. The first twinning Programmes were
launched under the TACIS instrument in late 2009 and there is a
considerable pipeline of requests which are being addressed over the
course of the programme period.
There are eight completed projects for 2008-2011, a further seven
currently being implemented, and another dozen in the pipeline for the
future. However, the weakness of local government in Azerbaijan means
that these projects are focused on central state institutions.
Implementation Procedures
Identification of projects
The Beneficiary Administration (the public institution in Azerbaijan)
identifies its needs within European Union (EU) policy orientations, and in
line with reform priorities of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and drafts
Twinning Fiches with the assistance of the EU Delegation in Baku through a
framework contract, and with the support of the Programme
Administration Office (PAO).
Calls for proposals
The circulation of Twinning fiches by the EU Delegation in Baku to Member
State (MS) National Contact Points highlight mandatory requirements.
Submission of proposals
Member States - alone or in a consortium - prepare and submit a proposal
with the designated Resident Twinning Adviser (RTA) and Project Leader
(PL) explaining the key features of their proposed approach to achieving
the targeted result.
Selection of a Twinning partner
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Azerbaijani Beneficiary Institutions and the EU Delegation in Baku assess
proposals and, following the presentation of a proposal by an MS RTA and
PL, make the final decision
Preparation and finalisation of a Twinning contract
Selected Member States and Beneficiary institutions, with the support of
the PAO, together draw up the Twinning contract with a detailed work plan
and budget.
Project implementation
The Twinning project should be implemented according to the work plan.
The RTA coordinates the execution of the project and is supported by the
PL, the RTA counterpart, the MS administration, and the PAO.
Monitoring and reporting
Progress is monitored by the EU Delegation and the PAO and is reported in
the Interim Quarterly Reports and a Final Report. The EU Delegation and
the PAO participate in Quarterly Steering Committees.
Audit
A Twinning Project may be audited by the European Commission Service
and by the Court of Auditors.
Twinning review missions
Six to twelve months after the Twinning project finalization, it is followed
by a Twinning Review Mission for an assessment of the project’s results,
sustainability, impact, and lessons learned from them.
Stakeholders
Project Leaders (PL): Project Leaders are high-ranking officials - one of the
EU Member State and one from Azerbaijan. They continue to work in their
administrations, but also devote a portion of their time to conceiving,
supervising and coordinating the overall thrust of the project. The EU
Member State Project Leader should devote to the project a minimum 3
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days a month, including a visit to the region every 3 months. Broad
knowledge of Twinning procedures and good leadership skills are required
to be a Project Leader. An Azerbaijani Project Leader acts as the
counterpart of the MS Project Leader and is charged with ensuring close co-
operation from the Azerbaijani side.
The Resident Twinning Adviser (RTA) and the RTA counterpart: The
Resident Twinning Adviser comes from a EU Member State, and should be
based in Azerbaijan for the whole period of the Twinning project. He must
be a civil servant or equivalent coming from the EU Member State
administration involved in the Twinning project. His main task is to
accompany the implementation of the Twinning project, to coordinate the
activities and to ensure the continuity of the implementation of the
Twinning project. The RTA counterpart is appointed by the Beneficiary
administration and he ensures close co-operation in the day-to-day
implementation of the Twinning project.
Programme Administration Office (PAO): PAO is an especially dedicated
unit set up in the Ministry of Economic Development of the Republic of
Azerbaijan to retain in cooperation with the Delegation of the EU the
overall coordination of Twinning projects.
Implementation and Monitoring Procedures
At the implementation stage, the key responsibility rests with the Twinning
Partners: the EU MS Administration and the Azerbaijani BA. They are
required to deliver mandatory results as set out in the Twinning Contract.
Both the EUD and PAO should provide organisational and administrative
support to the Twinning Partners.
Running parallel to implementation activities, stakeholders of a Twinning
project undertake monitoring of project implementation. EU MS and
Azerbaijani Twinning partners normally keep track of how they are
performing in meeting project targets. This check-up is performed through
quarterly reporting. The EUD Task Manager also monitors the
implementation of a Twinning project. In their capacity as the Contracting
Authority, the EUD pays particular attention to contractual, procedural and
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budgetary aspects of Twinning Contract implementation. Monitoring of
project implementation for ongoing Twinning projects constitute a
considerable proportion of PAO activities. However, from the PAO
perspective, the most important aspect is to be sure that the benchmarks
outlined in the original Twinning contract are met.
Practical Difficulties
As with the TAIEX programme and other EU-funded projects, Azerbaijan
has demonstrated slow implementation of the ENPI and experienced
delays in establishing the necessary structures for management of projects.
This is largely due to domestic political constraints and a wider
ambivalence towards European integration.
The Programme Administration Office was established in Azerbaijan at the
end of 2006 as a body to ensure an optimal and overall coordination of
Twinning, TAIEX and SİGMA activities in the country. Since late 2009 it has
been supported by the EU-funded project: “Implementation of Twinning,
TAIEX and Sigma Operations in Azerbaijan” (ITTSO) which entered a new
phase at the end of 2011 (this is also described in the other Azerbaijani
case study).
Capacity building via ITTSO has resulted in:
• Steady increase in the number of TAIEX, SIGMA and Twinning projects;
• The Azerbaijani Government including PAO, line ministries and other
public bodies now receive sufficient information and support on
successful identification, preparation and implementation of Twinning
projects, TAIEX and SIGMA events;
• Awareness increased in the use of the instruments and in the
achievements of EU cooperation towards Azerbaijan;
• Increased capacity of PAO to operate on its own.
Costs and funds used
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The budget for each twinning project is generally around EUR 1 million for
18-24 month projects (with an additional 12-18 months planning in
advance and 12-18 months evaluation and audit afterwards). Azerbaijani
partners do not receive any financial means directly. It is however the EC
that finances the costs of involving European partners as well as the costs
of participation of Azerbaijanis in the cooperation, such as travel costs to
EU countries, costs of organization of conferences in the EU and Azerbaijan
and others. Local officials are paid for their work within their own salaries
and other Azerbaijani incentives, but they are not paid additionally from
the Twinning project budget. They receive benefits in other ways, like
enhanced knowledge and experience, study visits to European countries
and bigger motivation to achieve progress.
Evaluation
A number of general conclusions and recommendations emerged from the
3rd Annual Conference of Twinning Operations in EaP countries in 2009. In
general it was stated that Twinning projects should attain a higher level of
effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability rather than focusing on
merely carrying out the planned activities. For this to happen, the following
recommendations were made:
Recommendations for beneficiary countries:
• Country priorities for foreign assistance application should be clearer.
The governments of Eastern Partnership countries have to set out their
positions and objectives with long-term perspective on the
prioritization of spheres for project implementation, including their
vision on projects’ compliance with wider reforms in the respective
countries;
• The absorption capacity of both current and potential beneficiary
institutions in the Eastern Partnership countries must be strengthened
through training and the involvement of professionals on project
management in public administration. All project participants should
have a clear understanding that Twinning is a two-way process and
should not resemble a teacher-student relationship;
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• To ensure the quality of further implementation of Twinning projects
beneficiary administrations should, during the selection/evaluation
process, pay greater attention to assessing EU MS proposals;
• Internal monitoring and evaluation of Twinning projects and country
programmes, as well as the dissemination of information and good
practices, including e-government initiatives should receive greater
attention in line with the requirements of the 2009 revised Twinning
Manual. Dissemination of information and past experiences of current
or former Twinning beneficiaries would be especially valuable for
‘newcomers’ to Twinning.
Recommendations for the EU:
• More efficient implementation of Twinning instruments requires a
reduction in the time required for project preparation. The period of 2-3
years could put the viability of projects at risk. To address the issue of
the extended period of projects’ preparation, large Twinning projects
should be planned with prolonged timeframes for projects and
additional resources of assistance (services, supplies, investments);
• To ensure the smoother adjustment of Twinning/TAIEX implementation
modalities related to the increased amount of assistance Eastern
Partnership countries should receive, more direct responsibility for
management of EU assistance should be assigned to partner institutions
(i.e., a decentralized management system should be created);
• To ensure better results in the implementation of projects Twinning
should be introduced at the regional level. Regional Twinning has to be
complimentary to the Twinning at the central level. Given the evidence
of learning at the nation state level, CORLEAP should press for an
extension of Twinning arrangements to the local and regional
authority level in the EaP.
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CUIDAD: Case Study for Moldova (and Ukraine)
Under its Interregional Action Programme 2008 Part III, the European
Union has allocated EUR 14 million to promote mutual understanding,
dialogue and cooperation between local actors in the EU and in the ENP
partner countries and territories. This is to be achieved through the
support for capacity building measures to assist in the modernisation and
strengthening of local and regional government so that they are able to act
according to good governance principles and, in particular, to ensure
sustainable, integrated and long-term urban development planning.
Following the Call for Proposals organised in early 2009, a total of 21
projects have been awarded a co-financing grant, ranging from €400,000 to
€650,000 for projects lasting up to 48 months. The projects began in the
first quarter of 2010, after signing of the grant contracts with the European
Commission.
One such project is the ‘Energy Efficient Municipalities’ project (Moldova
and Ukraine). The project is aimed at increasing the energy efficiency of
Chisinau and Sevastopol municipalities, and takes place in the framework
of the CIUDAD Programme (Cooperation in Urban Development and
Dialogue), funded by the European Commission. The overall purpose of the
project is to incorporate the energy efficiency perspective in the
administration of two municipalities (Chisinau, Republic of Moldova and
Sevastopol, Ukraine), institutionalize it, and prepare the ground for
infrastructure investments aimed at improving the energy efficiency, as
well as to create an immediate energy saving impact by improving
behaviour in the area of energy efficiency.
Objectives:
• To promote energy efficiency in the administration of beneficiary
municipalities (Chisinau and Sevastopol) and to institutionalize
efforts at improving energy efficiency;
• To facilitate the utilisation of energy efficient technologies by
improving the regulatory framework and adjusting the relevant
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policies, at the level of both local public authorities and central public
authorities;
• To undertake actions that would enable the municipal authorities to
attract investment in infrastructure with the aim of making them
more energy efficient;
• To promote energy efficient behaviour in public institutions,
especially schools;
• To inform citizens of the opportunities offered by modern energy
saving technologies and the use of renewable energy sources.
Results expected:
• An energy efficiency strategy for the Chisinau municipality will be
developed from scratch, and the legal framework to create better
conditions for investments in the increase of energy efficiency will be
improved;
• In order to promote best practices in energy conservation, a
competition for schools from Chisnau has been be organised, with the
winning institution receiving 100,000 euros for thermal insulation of
its building;
• Feasibility studies and investment plans for infrastructure
development projects will be carried out, as well as the pilot use of
insulation in residential buildings, street illumination and use of
renewable energy sources;
• Consumption of electric and thermal energy in target areas will drop
based on an increased awareness of energy efficiency.
Beneficiaries:
• Schools from Chisinau and Sevastopol municipalities;
• Local Public Authorities of Chisinau and Sevastopol;
• Individual consumers of the two cities who will learn how to save
energy.
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Implementation Procedures
The CIUDAD Supporting Mechanism is a technical assistance project
designed to support the successful implementation of the 21 CIUDAD Grant
Projects. It does this through capacity building, cooperation and exchange
of experience, as well as by providing visibility and communication support
to participating teams and local actors in the EU and in the countries of the
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).
The CIUDAD Supporting Mechanism is tasked with providing support in 6
major areas:
• Supporting and advising the 21 grant beneficiaries in project
performance, e.g. by organizing conferences and workshops on EC
procurement and grant contract procedures, providing mentoring and
helpline services, developing implementation tools and helping identify
and prepare a projects pipeline for the Neighbourhood Investment
Facility;
• Coordinating with regard to grant management and implementation
between project beneficiaries, EC HQ, ECD, national governments and
other relevant stakeholders;
• Monitoring of grant projects and assisting with reporting requirements,
including design of a grants management and monitoring web-tool and
undertaking regular monitoring missions;
• Ensuring dissemination and visibility by designing and implementing a
Dissemination and Visibility Strategy, CIUDAD visibility tools and
materials, and monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of
communication activities;
• Exchange of know-how and information by organising events such as
interregional workshops, thematic working groups and other
appropriate channels;
• Improving and enlarging networks by building national and regional
networks and linking to existing networks.
For the purpose of the project regional offices have been established in the
ENPI East (Kiev). The grant beneficiary is responsible for securing efficient
operational management of the grant project. In addition to this, an
accurate handling of the project accounts is crucial to the project’s success.
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After signing the contract with the Contracting Authority, the lead applicant
becomes Beneficiary and takes the responsibility for the entire project
including activities carried out by all partners. The lead applicant is
responsible for timely and correct reporting to the Contracting Authority.
Therefore the lead applicant should ensure that efficient administrative
management and control systems are established within the operation.
The lead applicant is also responsible for ensuring proper communication
with the partners, ensuring that proper financial management and control
procedures are applied and that the EU contractual procedures concerning
financial management and control (audit) and as well as procurement,
information, communication and visibility activities and rules are
respected and observed, also by the partners.
For the Energy Efficient Municipalities project the lead applicant is
Chisinau City Hall in Moldova and the municipalities of Sevastopol in
Ukraine is one of the partners. Other partners include: the Institute for
Development and Social Initiatives “Viitorul” (Moldova); the ICLEI
European Secretariat GmbH (Germany); and the Union of Municipalities of
the Marmara Region (Turkey).
Practical Difficulties
Programme manager in Chisinau contacted for further details of problems
or lessons learned – no response to date.
Costs and funds used
Duration: 28 months
Total budget: EUR 672,965
EU contribution: EUR 538,372
Grants are disbursed on the basis that:
- a project is one proposed by a potential Beneficiary;
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- co-financing from the Beneficiary of (generally 20 per cent) of the total
eligible costs is required;
- the EC contribution is for the reimbursement of the actual eligible costs
incurred;
- the grant Beneficiary is autonomous and the owner of the action and its
results
Evaluation
The same general information that is used for the Ukraine Twinning case
can be used here. The programme manager in Chisinau was contacted for
any further details of assessment or evaluation, but, alas, there has been no
response to date.
116
117
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