Renwick, Gunn - 2008 - Demytholigizing the Machine Patrick Geddes, Lewis Mumford

7/30/2019 Renwick, Gunn - 2008 - Demytholigizing the Machine Patrick Geddes, Lewis Mumford

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DEMYTHOLOGIZING THE MACHINE: PATRICK GEDDES, LEWIS MUMFORD,

AND CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

CHRIS RENWICK AND RICHARD C. GUNN

This paper reconsiders the work of the Scottish biologist, sociologist, and town plannerPatrick Geddes and his most famous intellectual disciple: the American independent scholarLewis Mumford. It is argued that existing interpretations of their work, ranging from a dis-missal of the two men as eccentric polymaths to the speculative emphasis on the importanceof psychological theories in Mumfords oeuvre, are fundamentally flawed. Examining theirwritings and the letters they exchanged during their 17-year correspondence, this papershows that the only way we can appreciate the scholarly conventions underpinning Geddessand Mumfords work, as well as the context in which it was produced, is by looking to the

principles of classical sociological theory. 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

In April 1932 the Scottish biologist, sociologist, and town planner Patrick Geddes(18541932) wrote the final letter of his 17-year correspondence with the American inde-

pendent scholar Lewis Mumford (18951990). Aged 78 and in increasingly poor health,

Geddes sensed that he had only a short time left. Remember, he told Mumford, [I] have

none like you, but you, to be my heir . . . so you must take over much of my further Sociology

(Geddes to Mumford, 2 April 1932, Novack, 1995, p. 339). In this paper we will show how

largely neglected statements such as these are crucial for our understanding of Geddess and

Mumfords writings. Our claim is that the conventional scholarly underpinnings of their work

and the often-forgotten context in which it was produced can be appreciated only by looking

to the principles of classical sociological theory.

Both Geddess and Mumfords prodigious output on a wide array of subjects has resulted

in them often being described as polymaths. Geddes began his career in the mid-1870s as a

student of the biological sciences under T. H. Huxleythe archetypal Victorian man of

sciencein London. However, Geddes became widely known for a diverse range of activities.

Amongst the most renowned elements of his work were the popular science publications he

co-authored with his former student J. Arthur Thomson. These writings included their 1889

bookThe Evolution of Sex, which is now viewed as one of the first comprehensive studies of

the role of sex in the organic world. Yet Geddess reputation also stemmed from his work on

a large number of other subjects, including statistics, economics, and art criticism, as well as

his role as one of the most important figures in British sociology at the beginning of the twen-

tieth century. However, it is for his impact on town planning in the United Kingdom that he is

most celebrated, with his 1915 bookCities in Evolution now being seen as hugely significant

in shaping the field. In that monograph, Geddes outlinedcivics: a theory of town planning he

regarded as a form of applied sociology, which called for minds to be focused on the social

Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 44(1), 5976 Winter 2008

Published online in Wiley Interscience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/jhbs.20282

2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

CHRIS RENWICK is a graduate student working towards a PhD in the School of Philosophy atthe University of Leeds, United Kingdom. His research interests are in the history of the social

sciences and his doctoral dissertation examines the early disciplinary history of sociology in Britain.E-mail: C.P.M. [email protected]

RICHARD C. GUNN is a graduate student in the School of Philosophy at the University of Leeds,United Kingdom. His research interests are in the philosophy of technology, including the work of Karl

Marx and Max Weber. He is currently completing his doctoral dissertation examining the concept ofmachine with particular focus on theories of bureaucracy E-mail: Richardcgunn@hotmail com


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60 CHRIS RENWICK AND RICHARD C. GUNN

consequences of the poor condition of the urban environments inhabited by large numbers of

people in the post-Industrial Revolution age. Embracing so many f ields during a period that

is often understood as one of professionalization and specialization, Geddes is, historio-

graphically speaking, a polarizing figure. As Alex Law has noted, Geddes has come to be such

an inspiration for some scholars that their assessments of his achievements often border onthe hagiographic (Law, 2005). Yet for others, Geddes is someone to be dismissed as either an

amateur or an eccentric (Abrams, 1968; Hawthorn, 1976). Consequently, there is a lack of his-

torically sophisticated or critically engaged analyses of Geddess work.

Scholars have also struggled in similar ways to make sense of Mumford, who was the

most famous of Geddess disciples. Like Geddes, Mumford is known in a number of fields,

including literary criticism and history and philosophy of technology, and, partly as a conse-

quence of his decision to work outside the institutional confines of the academy, he is consid-

ered to be somewhat of a dilettante. The concerns with which he is most frequently associated,

though, are architecture and city development. Mumford first signalled his interest in these

areas in 1923, when he helped found the Regional Planning Association of America, and thenin 1931, when he began what would turn out to be a 32-year role as the writer of the Skyline

column for theNew Yorkermagazine. The burgeoning reputation he had earned through those

activities as a historically-minded commentator on contemporary issues was confirmed during

the highly productive middle years of his life when he published a quartet of books he called

the Renewal of Life series, which appeared between 1934 and 1951 and featured the celebrated

Technics and Civilization andThe Culture of Cities. Then, in the later stages of his career,

mainly through his critique of what he calledMegatechnicalsociety, Mumford became popu-

lar with political radicals. As a consequence, he has come to be regarded as a polemicist whose

writings are bound up with a paranoid opposition to the state in Cold War America. This per-

ception of Mumford, however, obscures the fact that much of his most famous work conformed

to the highest standards of the respectable fields of which they were a part. Indeed, Mumford

demonstrated his scholarly pedigree when he was awarded the prestigious American National

Book Award for non-fiction, in 1962, for his workThe City in History.

While the impact that Geddes had on Mumford has been well documented (Mumford,

1982; Novack, 1995), the subtle yet significant way that Geddess sociology shaped Mumfords

work has largely passed without comment. Scholars have been content to look no further than

Mumfords use of Geddesian vocabulary and instead have attempted to find other sources to

provide a structure for his writings. Eugene Rochberg-Halton, for example, argues that, while

Mumfords ideas can be located within a recognizable sociological context, they should be

understood only as an organicist alternative to structuralism, post-modernism, and classical the-

ory (Rochberg-Halton, 1990). Alternatively, more recent attempts to understand Mumfords

work suggest that his interpretation of psychological theories were of the utmost importance in

shaping his writings, especially those on technology. Greg Morgan-Swer argues that it is only

through an appreciation of Sigmund Freuds ideas that we can fully grasp how Mumfords

Megamachine operates (Morgan-Swer, 2003, 2004). Even more speculatively, Adam Green

suggests that it is in fact Carl Jung who provides the key to interpreting Mumfords work on

Megatechnics (Green, 2006). While these accounts may tell us something of what Mumford

read, they completely ignore the Geddesian roots of Mumfords organicist sociology. The result

of such a glaring oversight is that little is known about the theoretical assumptions underpinning

not just Mumfords work on technology but also his canon in its entirety.

In the following five sections of this paper, we will challenge existing interpretations of

Geddes, Mumford, and their relationship by demonstrating that we can only understand these


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DEMYTHOLOGIZING THE MACHINE 61

the historiography of Geddes and early British sociology through our rejection of the idea that

sociologists in the United Kingdom eschewed the theoretical principles embraced by their

more celebrated European counterparts. Contrary to those who maintain that he failed to sep-

arate the subject from other sciences (Meller, 2000, p. 39), we will show that Geddes possessed

a systematic framework of sociology. In this respect, our argument shares common groundwith the work of Maggie Studholme, who has recently called for Geddes to be reclaimed by

sociologists as one of their own (Studholme, 2007). However, our account differs from

Studholmes through its systematic consideration of the underlying features of Geddess writings,

particularly his ontology of the social, which parallel those of sociologys classical canon.

Second, by drawing on their correspondence, we will highlight the deficiencies in the accounts

of Geddess and Mumfords relationship by showing how sociology was a major concern and

subject of discussion for them both. Having reconsidered their relationship in this way, we will

then contribute to the scholarship on Mumford by demonstrating that he must be thought of as

a writer who systematically employed the theories, methods, and ontology of classical sociology.

In the second section, we will explore Geddess sociology and demonstrate that, throughhis engagement with the problem of defining the subject matter of the field, he developed a

sophisticated framework for his sociology that shared important theoretical assumptions with

his more celebrated contemporaries, such as Emile Durkheim. In the third section, we will

outline how a deep interest in sociology manifested itself not only in Geddess and Mumfords

lengthy exchange of letters but also in Mumfords subsequent work. By drawing attention, in

section four, to a distinction between Mumfords pre- and post-World War II writings, we

then show that his later work, particularly hisMyth of the Machine series, was reliant upon

the same ontological assumptions as classical sociology. These continuities with classical

theory, we will conclude, were the result of Mumfords immersion in Geddess approach to

social investigation. However, so that its significance can later be seen, we must first explain

what we mean when we refer to classical sociological theory.

1. CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Sociology is not the appendage of any other science, wrote Emile Durkheim, it is itself

a distinct and autonomous science (Durkheim, 1895/1982, p. 162). This attempt to explicitly

define sociology as a scientific discipline in its own right reflects the most fundamental aim

of the fields classical approach. Such a science, argued Durkheim and his contemporaries,

including Max Weber and Ferdinand Tnnies, could study the means by which social stabil-

ity and change come about. In this sense, contemporary sociologists often portray classical

sociologists and their desire to look beyond exclusively materialist explanations as respond-

ing to Karl Marxs understanding of social and economic change. However, to conceive of

classical sociology as dealing with solely economic change and its effects is far too narrow

an understanding.

In the broadest sense of the term, classical sociology takes as its subject matter the social in-

stitution: be it the city, the family, or religion. However, the classical sociologist does not study

the institution as an end in itself but uses it to locate the underlying structural features of a given

society. For example, Durkheims analyses of suicide and the division of labor reveal the im-

port of social solidarity, while Webers study of bureaucracy demonstrates the nature of power

and rationality. The classical sociologist argues that it is through these structural principles that we

can understand how social order is maintained, particularly in the face of rapid social change.

Central to this classical approach to analyzing society is the belief that a distinct class of


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Durkheim who most famously attempted to substantiate this particular ontology by demon-

strating, inRules of Sociological Method(1895/1982), what constitutes thesocial, and how it

should be studied. Sociology operates, he argued, at a supra-individual level and only as such

can it be considered distinct from other sciences including biology and psychology

(Durkheim, 1982, pp. 3940). According to Durkheims account, sociology is simply the sys-tematic method of studying social facts, which he defined as external forces that act upon the

individual and constrain his or her action. The significant ontological point about

Durkheimian social facts is that they have a distinct reality and, he argued, should be treated

as such (Durkheim, 1982, p. 60).

In Suicide, his most important sociological work, Durkheim demonstrated how social

facts should be considered as things existing at a social level (Durkheim, 1897/1952). While

that volume can be viewed as an exemplar of statistical methods and quantification, such a

description grasps only Durkheims methodology and not his overall concerns. Like The

Division of Labour(1893/1984), Suicides substantive theme is social solidarity and how it is

maintained in the face of rapid social change. Social solidarity is sustained by the coercivepower of social forces acting upon individuals and therefore it is a concern that cannot be sep-

arated from Durkheims methodological and ontological commitments. Psychological moti-

vations are unable to account for the constancy of the suicide rate in society and thus his main

premise is that suicide is not simply an individual act but a social phenomenon. Through this

approach, it becomes apparent that social solidarity has an objective status and can be studied

as a social fact equivalent to any physical phenomenon. As a consequence, Durkheims analysis

operates at a level that is only capable of comprehending the individual as part of a larger

social whole: the individual is confined and constrained by forces and ideas not of his own

making (Durkheim, 1982, pp. 5052). Ontologically, we can therefore see him as a realist

about things such as social forces and collective representations.

The Durkheimian method is typical of classical sociological theory in that it permits gen-

eralizations and broad distinctions among categoriessomething that was exemplified in The

Division of Labourwith Durkheims distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity

(1984, chaps. 23). This kind of approach is also key in Webers ideal type methodology where

typical features of the bureaucracy are outlined and distinctions made between, for example,

traditional and legal-rational types of domination (Weber, 1956/1968, pp. 215216). Such gen-

eralizations are also employed extensively in Tnniess distinction between community and

society in which formalized, contractual relations of society come to replace the informal ties

of communities (Tnnies, 1887/1955, pp. 3739). Given that the late nineteenth-century societies

these thinkers were studying had been subject to sweeping changes in short periods of time,

the making of broad generalizations is only to be expected. As a method of social investigation,

sociology was expected to possess the methodological and ontological tools to grasp such pre-

vailing trends in collective life. Classical sociological theorists therefore became dedicated to

outlining the underlying principles that demarcated the new industrialized society from any

previous form. In so doing, sociologists forged the identity of their science by offering a spe-

cific understanding of these social phenomena. Turning now to the work of Patrick Geddes, we

will show how these characteristics of classical sociology manifested themselves in the writ-

ings of someone often thought of as far removed from the classical canon.

2. PATRICKGEDDES AND CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGY

In France and Germany of the early twentieth century, wrote the prominent American



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society and tried to envisage modern society within the species of all the societies known to

history. In Britain, however, Shils continued, sociology gathered the soft dust of libraries

and bathed in the dim light of ancestral idolatry. Here and there during these sociologically

sterile decades, there was a momentary pulse of life but it never spread and the air of death soon

reasserted itself (Shils, 1985, p. 166). Since the publication of Talcott Parsonss The Structureof Social Action in 1937 there has been a persistent view of British sociology as the inferior

relation to its European and American counterparts. Absent from all U.K. universities except

the London School of Economics before the end of World War II, British sociology has been

seen as theoretically bankrupt and portrayed by some as evidence of a national failing

(Anderson, 1968). Indeed, the writings of British sociologists are still rarely studied abroad

because, as the French sociologist Dominique Schnapper recently put it, the United Kingdom

does not have any of the founding fathers who institutionalised the discipline. There are no

Britons among the turn of the century generation . . . i.e., Weber, Durkheim or Pareto

(Schnapper, 2005, p. 109).

While it is true that British sociologys strength has always been empirical investigations,the historical picture with regard to the fields theoretical concerns is somewhat more com-

plicated than received views suggest.1 During the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-

turies, the British were enthusiastic participants with an international outlook in the Europe-wide

debate about the methods, scope, and aims of sociology. For example, at the Sociological

Society, founded in 1903, social and natural scientists came together at the recently estab-

lished London School of Economics in an effort to formulate and promote a program, for

sociology in the United Kingdom. As well as receiving contributions from key British

thinkers, including the eugenicist and biostatistician Francis Galton and the first British pro-

fessor of sociology, L. T. Hobhouse, the Society heard contributions from such luminaries as

Durkheim and Tnnies. Indeed, as Stefan Collini and Sandra Den Otter have both shown, an

important part was played in those discussions by the British Idealists, a large and important

group of thinkers and writers, including Bernard Bosanquet, who were inspired by the Oxford

philosopher T. H. Green to develop organicist political and social philosophies (Collini, 1978;

Den Otter, 1996). Moreover, as Lawrence Goldmans recent historical survey has shown,

scholars such as Anderson have often failed to appreciate that many of the celebrated conti-

nental thinkers of the classical period were envious of their British counterparts in sociology

(Goldman, 2007).

Alongside Galton and Hobhouse, Patrick Geddes was, as R. J. Halliday and Philip

Abrams showed some time ago, one of the most important f igures involved in the early shap-

ing of sociology in the United Kingdom (Halliday, 1968; Abrams, 1968). Although Geddes

had begun his career in the late 1870s as a biologist, he had become widely known from the

1880s onwards as a writer on the social sciences. Having immersed himself in the writings of,

1. Clarification must be given here concerning Herbert Spencer, whom many regard as the only Briton worthy of aplace in the history of sociology. As the multi-volume Synthetic Philosophy series more than amply demonstrated,Spencer was a great theorizer, and thus his work further supports our refutation of the claim that British sociologywas entirely empirical. However, he belongs to the generation of writers preceding that under consideration here.Spencer and his contemporaries, including August Comte, are considered important by current sociologists as writerswho helped to establish and popularize the idea of a distinct science of society called sociology. Durkheim, Weber,and others writing at the very end of the nineteenth century are perceived by current sociologists to be the first to

systematize the subject matter and methods of the discipline as it is now understood. Spencers role in the history ofsociology is thus different in kind to those examined here. While sympathetic re-readings of Spencer should addfurther depth to the particular aspect of our argument forwarded here, it is in essence a diversion from our main aims


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among others, August Comte, Herbert Spencer, and the French social surveyor Frdric Le

Play, Geddess greatest interest was sociology and he dedicated much of his early work to

the contemporary debates around it.2 Believing that the development of the subject was of

huge importance, Geddes argued that sociology was dependent on the ability of sociologists

to explain how it was distinct from existing ways of studying social phenomena. He insistedthat it was sociologys subject matter that differentiated it from other social sciences includ-

ing biology and psychology. All that concerns only the objective and bodily side of a man is

purely biological, Geddes explained in 1884, and this may be summed up for a number of

men, looked at simply as a herd or mass, without leaving the field of pure biology. Sociology,

however, dealt with a specific aspect of human existence that could not be studied by such

existing sciences. Sociology, he asserted, concerns itself with individualities of a higher

order:with aggregates of men integratedinto wholes for definite functions; as firm, bank,

company, regiment, post office, and only considers the individual components in relation to

these (Geddes, 18821884, p. 964).

While we now tend to think of him as a town planner whose activities were based aroundempirical social surveys, Geddesprofessor of sociology and civics at the University of

Bombay from 1919 to 1924was engaged for most of his life with the development of a

deeply sophisticated sociological theory that he believed would embrace all of his activities and

writings. As he told the Sociological Society in 1903, his work was a study of the community

as an integrate [sic], with material and immaterial structures and functions, which we call the

city (Geddes, 1904, p. 104). Geddes believed that there are a set of mutually dependent parts

that make society what it is: an industrial base, a set of institutions, and what he called an

associated system of ideals (Geddes, 1915, p. 66). Together these components form a com-

plex that affects people and their environment in a variety of ways, including in terms of

language, laws, and physical infrastructure, such as architecture or methods of transport.

Writing at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, Geddes

was, like many of his contemporaries in sociology, concerned with the effect of industrializa-

tion on the social order. Drawing an analogy with how we once thought of there being a single

Stone Age and later came to employ the terms Palaeolithic and Neolithic to distinguish

between eras with different characteristics, Geddes made one of his most important innovations

2. Geddess biographers all give accounts of the wide range of writings and groups, including the Positivist Churchin London, which he eagerly immersed himself in as a young man. See Defries (1927); Kitchen (1975); Mairet(1957); Boardman (1978); Meller (1990); Welter (2002). An exploration of these formative sources of inspiration is,

however, unnecessary for the purposes of our argument in this paper. It is worth noting, though, that one should notassumeas his biographers and other commentators often havethat because he read Comte, for example,Geddess subsequent intellectual life was somehow influenced by a passive acceptance of the positivist philosophy.Despite his divergence from strictly biological enquiries at the beginning of the 1880s, Geddes always thought ofhimself as being in some sense a biologist. As Mumford put it, it is not as a bold innovator in urban planning, butas an ecologist, the patient investigator of historic filiations and dynamic biological and social interrelationships, thatGeddes most important work on cities was done (Mumford, 1955, p. 111). Indeed, Geddess final monograph wasthe massive two-volume workLife: Outlines of General Biology (1932), which was co-authored with J. ArthurThomson. We must thus appreciate that throughout his life, Geddess assessment of the ideas he came into contactwith was always mediated by the framework of evolutionary naturalism he f irst developed as a young biologist. Forexample, his testimony (Geddes, 1926) and a letter sent by Richard Congreve, head of the London Positivist Church,to the Comtean political economist J. K. Ingramin which Congreve states that Geddes disagreed with him over

biological evolutiondemonstrate that Geddes exercised caution towards positivism because of the movementsscepticism of doctrines of biological evolution (Congreve, 1883). Moreover, the Le Playist triad of Place, Work,

Folk, which scholars see as being especially important to him, was frequently presented by Geddes asEnvironment, Function, Organism. Given the number of Comtes ideas appropriated by Herbert Spencer, it mayvery well be advisable for scholars to look to the Synthetic Philosophy, which was saturated by evolutionary thought,


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in social theory when he argued that there were two phases to industrialization. The neologisms

he coined to describe these industrial ages werePaleotechnic andNeotechnic: terms that have

subsequently become of huge importance in the study of technology.

According to Geddess analysis in his 1915 bookCities in Evolution, the Paleotechnic

and Neotechnic phases are associated systems of ideals of the kind described above. Theyhave specific technologies, industries, and forms of social organization associated with them,

and these manifest themselves in the world of ideas through particular political and social

doctrines. The Paleotechnic phase, he wrote, was made up of

collieries . . . together with the steam engine, and most of our staple manufactures . . . therailways and the markets, and above all the crowded and monotonous industrial towns towhich all these have given rise. . . . Their corresponding abstract developments have beenthe traditional political economy on the one hand, and on the other that general body ofpolitical doctrine and endeavour which was so clearly formulated, so strenuously appliedby the French Revolution and its exponents, but which in [Britain] has gone on bit by bitin association with our slower and longer Industrial Revolution. (Geddes, 1915, p. 64)

This relationship between material and immaterial sociological elements was one that

Geddes expended much time and effort trying to articulate. One of his favored methods was

what he calledthinking machines: a pedagogical tool he first created in 1879 as a new way of

understanding and visually representing the dynamic relationship between different objects

of study through systematising them on paper. A second and reciprocal of Geddess approaches

was the museum-style exhibition, which, in his hands, eschewed the conventional emphasis on

artifacts and instead took the form of a three-dimensional thinking machine. These exhibitions

were first conceived and developed by Geddes during the 1890s in a building called the

Outlook Tower. Located in the heart of Edinburgh and described in theAmerican Journal of

Sociologyby the Chicago-based sociologist Charles Zueblin as the worlds f irst sociologicallaboratory (Zueblin, 1899), the Outlook Tower was Geddess headquarters, which he used as

a venue to host activities and events promoting civics. In Figure 1, we can see a diagrammatic

representation of one of Geddess exhibitions at the Outlook Tower in 1910, which was drawn

by one of his closest associates, Victor Branford, who has recently received long-overdue schol-

arly attention from John Scott and Christopher T. Husbands (Branford, 1926; Scott and

Husbands, 2007).3 This exhibition was an example of Geddess attempt to elaborate on the

constituent parts of Paleotechnics and Neotechnics, including the transition between the two.

On the top left-hand side of the diagram, next to political economy, we can see the prominent

position of the natural sciences in the Paleotechnic order. Geddes believed the natural sciences

to be one of the most important developments of the Paleotechnic order but his assessment of

3. For more on thinking machines, including numerous reproductions, see Boardman (1976, pp. 465484). The di-agram of the exhibition used here first appeared in Victor Branfords paper The Background of Survival andTendency as Exposed in an Exhibition of Modern Ideas (1926), which was part of a special collection, includingan article by Geddes, entitled Coal: Ways to Reconstruction. Branford explained in a note at the beginning of the

paper how though now published for the first time, it was a work that dated back to lectures he had given inAmerica in 1911. The thesis of the paper, he wrote, was based on an Exhibition of material laid out by ProfessorGeddes at the Outlook Tower, Edinburgh, in 1910 (Branford, 1926, p. 207n). While this diagram was probablydrawn by Branford, it is a clear expression of Geddess ideas and work, specifically through its use of Geddess dis-tinctive sociological vocabulary (Eutopia, biotechnics, etc.); a structuring of ideas identical to those found in histwentieth-century private notes and published writings (for example: town-science-industry and the positioning of

electrical power in neotechnics); as well as the naming of writers, such as John Ruskin and William Morris, whosework Geddes admired and thought important enough to publish on. The diagram, as we present it here, thus servesas a visual representation of Geddes ideas about technics. See Branford (1926) for a description of the experience


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FIGURE 1


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its effects was always qualified. In an analysis that independently reflects the same concerns

as Webers important sociological work on the iron cage of instrumental rationality in modern

bureaucracy, Geddes described science as being very largely a matter of the advance of

notations. But a notation is not simply a thought-help; it also only too easily becomes a

thought-cage, hard to escape from (Geddes, 1915, p. 68). Aided by science, the Paleotechnicsocial mind is driven by a desire to count, weigh, and measure everything, and it considers that

which cannot be dealt with in such a way unimportant. As Paleotects, Geddes wrote, we

make it our prime endeavour to dig up coals, to run machinery, to produce cheap cotton, to

clothe cheap people, to get up more coals, to run more machinery, and so on; and all this

essentially towards extending markets (Geddes, 1915, p. 74).

The right and middle areas of the diagram of Geddess exhibition, shown in Figure 1, dis-

play the corresponding areas of political thought and social institutions. On the right we can

see how individuals, such as Thomas Hobbes, Thomas Malthus, David Hume, and Immanuel

Kant, and ideas or fields, such as imperialism and finance, are identified as having con-

tributed to the political doctrines that had dominated thought since the French and IndustrialRevolutions. What these various strands of political thought had in common, Geddes argued,

was their prioritization of the individual and his or her relationship to the state. The effect of

this focus of political and social thought was an atomized conception of society that had been

reinforced and promoted by a mutually supportive set of social institutions that are listed on

the diagram as school, prison, barrack, and factory.

Geddes own sociological analysis was developed as a challenge to the atomized social

thought he saw as being both mistaken and prevalent in his own time. In his view, the indi-

vidualist Paleotechnic order, regardless of its seeming financial success, creates a set of

circumstances that result in the deterioration of humans, the environment, and society. As he

wrote in 1915,

our industry but maintains and multiplies our poor and dull existence though we thushave produced, out of all this exhaustion of the resources of Nature . . . whole new conur-bations, towns, and pseudo-cities, these are predominantly . . . of Slum character . . . andin these the corresponding development of the various types of human deterioration con-gruent with such environment. (Geddes, 1915, pp. 7475)

This connection between economics, technology, ideas, and the social sphere is one that

Geddes represented in the top left-hand area of the exhibition, shown in Figure 1. He believed

that these aspects of the Paleotechnic age were dominated by a philosophy of competition that

created markets and ultimately led to the decaying city slum. Unemployment and constant

pressure to make ends meet were regular experiences for many people in such an environ-

ment and the consequences were phenomena such as crime and alcoholism. All of these things,

Geddes argued, were logically connected, inseparably connected, like the symptoms of a

disease (Geddes, 1915, p. 86). Hence, to those who are struggling with disease and pain,

with ignorance and defect, with vice, and with crime, he wrote, it is time to say that all these

four evils are capable of being viewed together, and largely even treated together (Geddes,

1905, p. 96).

As a reaction to the deterioration of society in the Paleotechnic age, Geddes believed that

there was an incipient order built around new industries, technologies and ideas about social

organization. This new phasethe Neotechnicwas to be characterized, he suggested, by the

better use of resources and population towards the bettering of man and his environmenttogether (Geddes, 1915, p. 73). The Neotechnic order has its roots in a realization that



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himself created. Instead of competing with one another in the ruthless drive to extend the

Paleotechnic market, the Neotechnic citizen understands that it is through cooperation that

quality of life increasessomething that is difficult to quantify and, therefore, has no place in

the Paleotechnic mind. People of the Neotechnic order, Geddes argued, control the resources

at their disposal for positive long-term benefits aimed at improving themselves and the worldaround them. This shift can be illustrated, he wrote, by the Neotechnic economist, who,

beginning with his careful economisation of national resources, his care, for instance, toplant trees to replace those that are cut down, and if possible a few more, is occupiedwith real savings. His forest is a true Bank, one very different from Messrs Rothschildscredit. (Geddes, 1915, p. 70)

As we can see in the bottom half of the diagram in Figure 1, this coming order was out-

lined by Geddes in terms of both the potential and the more concrete developments of his own

time. For example, we can see on the rightnext to the Neotechnic imperative of

Conservation of Resourceselectric power. Geddes thought that electric power would

eliminate the polluting aspects of Paleotechnic industry and therefore lead the way towards a

new world. Indeed, this was an argument of Geddess later taken on by Mumford that would

hold some sway in the debates about electrification in early twentieth-century America (Carey

& Quirk, 1979). By building a new set of industries based on a new power source, a new

associated system of ideals would arise, leading to what he called Eutopiaa place that was

like a utopia in every respect except that it really existedwhich we can see on the top left

of the Neotechnic half of the exhibition.

For Geddes, the crucial aspect of the Neotechnic order was the fact that it could only

come into being if people wanted it to. The route out of the Paleotechnic age was not a pas-

sive one, and it depended on a new and better understanding of the forces that shape society.

In this respect, the social sciences were of particular importance because they offered humans

the potential to comprehend and therefore guide the forces that mould them. Following this

conviction of Geddess, we can see, on the bottom right-hand side of Figure 1, that he posi-

tioned sociology within the Neotechnic order. Because it explained society at its very highest

level of organization, sociology was the science that he believed would play one of the most

significant roles in the transition from Paleotechnics.

This examination of Geddess writings has demonstrated that while many regard him as an

eccentric polymath, there was a well thought-out foundation to his wide-ranging work.

Furthermore, we must remind ourselves that, in developing the ideas that have been discussed in

this section, Geddes thought of himself as a sociologist. Presenting his work in forums such as

the Sociological Society, his writings show that he considered sociology to be an autonomousdiscipline with its own subject matter. Moreover, in arguing for an anti-atomistic sociology, as

well as asserting that the material and immaterial both have a distinct and equal reality, Geddess

conclusions were the same as classical sociologists such as Durkheim, whom we can find posi-

tioned on the bottom right of Figure 1. In the next section, we will examine the impact of these

ideas on Mumford, but in preparation for that analysis we will initially explore how he first came

to know Geddess writings. We will show that, while Geddes was active in a number of fields,

Mumford read and interpreted his work not as empirical town planning but as sociology.

3. GEDDES AND MUMFORD

According to his autobiography, the day that Mumford picked up a copy ofEvolution in



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Geddes had co-authored the popular science book with J. Arthur Thomson for the Home

University series, Mumford identified without difficulty the writer whose voice called him.

Whereas Thomson wrote in a supple English style, Mumford observed that Geddess prose

was more crabbed and cryptic: his was the audacity of an original mind, never content

blindly to follow established conventions, still less fashions of the moment (Mumford, 1982,p. 145). Captivated by these writings, Mumford set about trying to find the author himself by

writing to the Outlook Tower in 1915. Explaining how to Edinburgh I have been attracted

by the sociological work of Professor Geddes, Mumford initially exchanged letters with the

architect F. C. Mearsone of Geddess principal assistants in Edinburghas Geddes had

recently relocated to India (Mumford to Outlook Tower, 15 November 1915, Novack, 1995,

p. 43). In 1917, however, Geddes wrote back to Mumford, beginning a relationship that would

last until Geddess death in 1932.

While the correspondence between Geddes and Mumford has been commented on

frequently, there is one important aspect of it that has largely gone without note: what Geddes

termed our main common interest of Sociology and Civics (Geddes to Mumford, 10 January1920, Novack, 1995, p. 61). As their relationship developed after 1917, Mumford increasingly

became part of Geddess circle in British sociology, even serving as editor of the Sociological

Review for six months in 1920 when he was living in Britain (see Mumford, 1982, pp. 252281).

With Geddes approaching the age of 70 at the beginning of the 1920s, he frequently discussed

with his enthusiastic American disciple what sociology would be like after he had passed. While

still enthralled by the master, as he often addressed Geddes in his letters, Mumford was con-

cerned both with the legacy that the increasingly cantankerous Scotsman seemed intent on

leaving and with how he expected others to deal with it. Mumford had come to consider the

Edinburgh School of Sociologyan aspirational term coined by Branford to describe

the group formed around Geddesto be intellectually unhealthy. Their problem, Mumford

diplomatically wrote to Geddes, was

the weakness of the Aristotelian school after Aristotle: the work of the founder has beenso comprehensive and magnificent and inspiring that it has in appearance left nothingfor the scholars to do except to go over and annotate and dilute the masters work.(Mumford to Geddes, 9 May 1921, Novack, 1995, p. 100)

This flaw was exacerbated by the fact that Geddes had never produced a sustained

and focused piece of work on sociological methodology, la Durkheims Rules of the

Sociological Method. Always a reluctant writer of books, managing only one as sole

author in his lifetime, Geddes constantly talked about his intention to produce a lengthy work

on sociology, but never did. This prolonged failure frustrated Mumford and he regularly

attempted to coerce Geddes into action. In 1921, for example, we find Mumford telling

him to

at least get the analysis of society articulated, and the method itself established, fromthis starting point the [social scientists] . . . may set forth, each following the directionas far as the method will carry them. (Mumford to Geddes, 31 July 1921, Novack, 1995,p. 108)

Mumford thought it important that peoples work was infusedwith the sound sociolog-

ical method, and illuminated by the general outlook, that [Geddes had] developed and his

own early writings can be understood in such terms (Mumford to Geddes, 9 May 1921,

Novack, 1995, p. 101). This interpretation was most clearly evidenced by Technics and



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publishing until after Geddess death.4 While Mumford never felt bound to respect the mere

letter of [Geddes] teaching, he did feel the necessity of avoiding conflict with his master as

he expanded on Geddess phases of technics (Mumford, 1940, p. 497). As well as adding a

third age called the Eotechnicthe forms of pre-industrial production characterized by the

use of wind and water as power sources and wood and stone as the main building materialsMumfords historiography of technology provided a far more detailed account of the

Paleotechnic phase than Geddes ever managed to produce. Addressing the specific techno-

logical advances that characterize the period and elaborating on its general worldview,

Mumford emphasized the significance of immaterial elements such as routinization and order

(Mumford, 1934, pp. 4142). Examining mechanical ways of thinking and avoiding the con-

ventional focus on artifacts, Mumfords history of technology was Geddesian in its concern

with modes of thought and social organization as fundamental to the stages of technics.

Even more than in Technics and Civilization, Mumford wrote in The Culture of Cities,

his first monograph on the subject, my chief intellectual debt is to my master, Patrick

Geddes (Mumford, 1940, p. 497). Utilizing the phases of technics, Mumford divided thehistory of the city into three stages: Eotechnic village life; the Paleotechnic industrial city,

which ultimately leads to the vast Megalopolis; and Neotechnic cities based on organic

principles and a more human scale. While this account was far more detailed than Geddess

own work, Mumford claimed, somewhat humbly, that his understanding of the city only

exceeded Geddess in one respect. With The Culture of Citiesbeing published over a quarter

of a century afterCities in Evolution, Mumford believed that he, unlike Geddes, had been able

to witness the development and growth of Neotechnic methods (Mumford, 1940, p. 498).

In both Technics and Civilization and the Culture of Cities, Mumford engaged in a

critique of the Paleotechnic world and welcomed the rise of Neotechnics. As with Geddess

writings, the normative aspect in Mumfords work therefore equates to a call for a renewalof life within a new phase of technics. The theme of organicism, as Robert Casillo quite

rightly claims, can be seen as stemming directly from Mumfords interpretation of Geddess

work (Casillo, 1992, pp. 9495). Indeed, as Leo Marx argues, at the most general level one

can understand all of Mumfords work as incorporating a single overriding ideal: the cham-

pioning of the organic over the mechanical (Marx, 1990, pp. 167, 172). Drawing on Geddess

observation that the Paleotechnic worldview is typified by a mechanistic, instrumentally

rational mode of thought, Mumford wrote at length about the rise in Europe of the

Mechanical Philosophy and the regimented armed forces, followed by the birth of industrial

methods. These factors constitute what Mumford termed the machine in his early work. He

argued that the rise of the machine was accompanied by the rise of the city, resulting in the

process of urban agglomeration, the formation of Megalopolis and, consequently, in the great

4. It would be uncontroversial to suggest that Mumfords output in the 1920s was not explicitly sociological in natureas he wrote on subjects such as American literature, utopias [sic], and architecture. One could interpret these worksas an expression of the young Mumfords desire to strike out on his own and not to be bound by the teachings of hismaster. Christopher Lasch argues that Mumford chose at that point in time to become a writer rather than a soci-ologist (Lasch, 1980, p. 7). This observation does hold true for Mumfords work in the 1920s but it would be wrongto talk of a careerchoice as such, especially given Mumfords output immediately following Geddess death. Indeed,Lasch admits that Mumford remained true to the sociologicalmode of thought, eschewing [a] humanistic retreatthroughout his work by concerning himself with the problems of modernity (Lasch, 1980, p. 28). In Laschs own

words, Mumford went on to deal with the concrete historical problems associated with the rise of capitalism, thespread of the scientific worldview, the growth of industrial methods, the industrial revolution, and the eventual emer-gence of a bureaucratic, managerial type of capitalism that organizes even leisure and consumption along industrial


13/19


urban decay. However, his hope was for Neotechnic methods to ultimately temper the rise of

the machine and reassert the primacy of the organic.

Mumfords early work on technology and the city is, then, clearly Geddesian in terms of

both scope and content. If one is to accept that Geddes was a sociologist in the classical tradi-

tion then one must also accept that Mumford, in his pre-World War II work, was employing thesame theoretical assumptions as his master. However, what we will now show is that

Mumfords later and less explicitly Geddesian work also relied upon the principles of classical

sociological theory.

4. THE MYTH OF THE MACHINE AS A SOCIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON

Paralyzed like a monkey in the coil of a python, Mumford wrote in the Pentagon of

Power, the immediate post-Hiroshima generation, unable to utter a rational sound, shut its

eyes and waited for the end (Mumford, 1970, p. 267). It is perhaps in terms of statements

such as thesefull of Cold War paranoia, railing against the authoritarian statethat the laterMumford is best known as a prophet of doom. However, in this final section, we will

demythologize Mumford and show that conventional theoretical assumptions underpin his

post-World War II work, specifically the two volumes that comprise The Myth of the Machine

collection: Technics and Human Development(1967) andThe Pentagon of Power(1970). The

received reading of these books is that Mumford undertook a project that can be broadly

termed a philosophy of technology, but with obvious historical and anthropological dimen-

sions. While this interpretation is not inaccurate, it does not tell the full story, as Mumford

adopted a number of assumptions, including an ontology of the social, that we have already

identified with classical sociological theory.

The relevance of classical sociology to Mumfords work has previously been considered

by Eugene Rochberg-Halton (1990), who came to conclusions rather different to those we are

arguing for here. Quite correctly, Rochberg-Halton claims that Mumford can be seen as work-

ing within the tradition of social theory. However, Rochberg-Halton goes on to suggest that

major schisms exist between Mumford and the likes of Durkheim, with Mumfords critique of

modernity setting him apart from the classical canon (Rochberg-Halton, 1990, pp. 127129).

Rochberg-Halton argues that we should instead see Mumford as providing an organic,

biocosmic alternative to classical theory (Rochberg-Halton, 1990, p. 150). This reading of

Mumford and the classical tradition in general is rather odd. For the most part, classical

sociological theory provides an analysis of modernity that is largely ambivalent: Its arrival

is unavoidable, and it creates new possibilities, but it also has certain costs. Such a view is

evident throughout Mumfords writings where Paleotechnics is a necessary condition for the

arrival of Neotechnics. Even in theMyth of the Machine, Mumford is not opposed to moder-

nityper se, but to particular modes of thought and organization found in specific societies.

Yet to concentrate on such matters is to miss the broader picture, as one must look to the

theoretical assumptions that underpin Mumfords work rather than to the individual claims he

makes.5

5. For instance, Rochberg-Halton argues that the main difference between Weber and Mumford is that the former citesthe importance of Protestantism, while the latter cites the importance of Catholicism, particularly the monastery, in the

birth of capitalism (Rochberg-Halton, 1990). If one looks to broader themes in the work of both writers, one sees thatboth Weber and Mumford understand the power of ideas in shaping social organization. Religious belief is key in reg-ulating and ordering human behavior, be it in the monastery or Protestant enterprise. As Weber notes, the asceticism of


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On reading The Myth of the Machine, one is struck immediately by its theoretical

vocabulary. Mumford jettisoned the Geddesian stages of technics and instead chose to base

his analysis around two dimensions of the technological world: what he called the

Megamachine and the Myth of the Machine. These features comprise what Mumford terms

Megatechnics, which is characterized by highly organized authoritarian societies in whichpolitical and technical projects are indistinguishable. In Technics and Human Developmenthe

focused on the ancient world, while in The Pentagon of Powerhe looked to Cold War society,

particularly that of the United States. In so doing, Mumford makes two key claims: first, that

the highly ordered authoritarian society is not unique to the modern world; second, that the

history of the modern authoritarian society can be traced through the European philosophical

tradition from the twelfth century onwards. To support these claims, Mumford focuses

throughout both volumes on the material and immaterial elements of Megatechnics. The

material aspects of Megatechnics are manifested in the Megamachine: an elaborately orga-

nized system of animate and inanimate parts. The immaterial elements are found in the Myth

of the Machine: the ideological underpinnings that inspire the creation and legitimate the con-tinued existence of the Megamachine. Megamachine is a term employed literally by

Mumford, and he implores the reader not to be limited by any preconceptions of machines as

inanimate artifacts and to think of it as the big machine (Mumford, 1967, p. 191; 1970, p. 240).

As his analysis subsequently makes clear, the Megamachine is a vast social machine

comprised of human and non-human parts, capable of undertaking large-scale socio-technical

projects, first instantiated in the pyramid building projects of Ancient Egypt and most recently

in the nuclear superpower.

What is obviously noticeable about Mumfords study is his desire to deal with social

totalities and to consider the big questions concerning power and order, which we earlier

discussed with regards to classical sociological theory. In an analysis that one could argue is

Weberian in its scope, Mumford expresses his concern with power and order through an

examination of hierarchical organization and the legitimate nature of domination. The

Megamachine, he argued, is a means of regimenting and directing an entire society toward

given collective ends. Thus, from the perspective of social theory, it is clear that Mumford was

not merely engaging in theoretical abstraction but attempting to explain a distinct sociological

phenomenon with particular social relations.

Of course, it is not difficult for Mumford to be a realist about the Megamachine when

he can point to particular physical instantiations of the phenomenon such as the pyramids of

Egypt, space rockets, or the Pentagon itself (Mumford, 1970, pp. 300311). However, its

material components are both human and inanimate, and one can only understand the

artifacts produced by the Megamachine in terms of the human organization at its core. Indeed,

Mumford stresses that the Megamachine of Ancient Egypt was invisible insofar as the

power relations within the machine can now only be reconstructed from the visible physical ev-

idence (Mumford, 1967, pp. 188189). The ideas held by those human parts are always

invisible, yet one can only appreciate how the Megamachine operates by considering its

ideological underpinnings.

In turning to the Myth of the Machinethe immaterial elements upon which the

Megamachine is reliantwe again see Mumfords theoretical and ontological commitments

to be those common to classical sociological theory. In Ancient Egypt, the Myth of the

Machine operated in a rudimentary form as a shared belief in the divinity of the Pharaoh that

ensured his commands would be obeyed. Religious faith was essential in facilitating the

operation of the Megamachine because, as Mumford explains, coercion alone is not sufficient



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social function is perhaps not a particularly controversial claim when applied to pyramid

building. However, when applied to the twentieth century it appears to be far more radical as

the modern Megamachine must also rely upon belief. Mumford argues that the modern Myth

of the Machine exists as a faith in technological and scientific progress. There is no need to

coerce people, nor are traditional religious forms of belief necessary, because the Myth ofthe Machine [has] taken hold of the modern mind (Mumford, 1970, p. 237). Moreover, it has

done so because it operates at the collective level. When an ideology conveys such univer-

sal meanings and commands such obedience, he argued, it has become, in fact, a religion,

and its imperatives have the dynamic form of a myth (Mumford, 1970, p. 157). The Myth of

the Machine, in Mumfords analysis, is no abstraction or metaphor, nor is it a tendency or

a trend. It is a belief that has a particular social reality and, for Mumford, it is no less real than

the Megamachine.

Having abandoned his commitment to Geddess phases of technics, Mumford was also

able to trace the historical origins of highly organized machine production to a period long

before the industrial age. Nevertheless, Mumford still drew on Geddesian principles such asthe associated system of ideals: the claim that a particular age will be expressed in particular

ways of thinking, which will be manifested, in turn, in various facets of the human world. This

ontological commitment to the reality of ideas as things was something Mumford recognized

as being a distinct and important part of the Geddesian intellectual tradition he saw himself as

working in. Indeed, recent reinterpretations of Mumfords work seem even less plausible

when we examine his autobiography and find his account of how Geddess philosophic

structure had taken form before the publication of Freuds Interpretation of Dreams: for

Geddes dreams, myths and esthetic symbols were as real as atoms or Roentgen rays

(Mumford, 1982, p. 147).

At the most general level, then, we must think of Mumfords analysis of Megatechnical

society as upholding the Geddesian distinction between the immaterial and the material. It is

a mistake to consider the Megamachine, as some scholars have, as somehow primary and the

Myth of the Machine as secondary. The process of mechanization was furthered, Mumford

wrote, by an ideology that gave absolute precedence and cosmic authority to the machine

itself (Mumford, 1970, p. 157). It is in this sense that Mumfords philosophy of technology

may confound those who expect a more conventional ontology. However, as we demonstrated

earlier, such an ontology is conventional within the classical sociological approach. We can,

therefore, see Mumfords reliance upon the same assumptions as Durkheim. In other words,

the Geddesian ontology used by Mumford can be clearly understood in Durkheimian terms.

The focus on Durkheim also allows us to appreciate Mumfords work in terms of the role

played by collective belief in maintaining social order. In Mumfords account of ancient

Megatechnics, religion upheld the legitimacy of the Egyptian Megamachine by producing

shared belief that maintained social stability. The Myth of the Machine performs the same

social function in the modern instantiation of Megatechnicsonly traditional religious belief

is replaced by faith in the Megamachine itself. This analysis has clear and obvious similarities

to Durkheims argument in The Division of Labour, in which secular ideology based around

the cult of the individualcomes to replace the traditional religious order (Durkheim, 1984,

p. 85). For Durkheim, social solidarity is maintained through shared belief that upholds the

legitimacy of the given social order, a phenomenon he termed the conscience collective

(Durkheim, 1984, pp. 4243, 8485). Thus, both Mumford and Durkheim chart how traditional

religious beliefs are replaced by a secular ideology that comes to serve a similar function. For

both writers, collective belief is necessary to maintain social order in traditional and modern



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It is only by examining ontological commitments such as these that one can truly understand

Mumford as working in the classical sociological tradition. It is clear that the Myth of the

Machine is not simply the sum of individual beliefs, but has a distinct reality. Thus, in

Durkheimian terms, we can recognize the Myth of the Machine as a social factin that it has

recognizable effects and explanatory value, and is external to the individual. Not only doesMumford explain, through the Myth of the Machine, why human beings come to submit to

conditions of existence that are seemingly harmful, but he also explains the legitimacy of

Megatechnic organization by way of the collective hold that the Myth of the Machine has.

With the Myth of the Machine acting as a technological consciousness that operates over and

above the level of the individual, it is clear that Mumford makes similar ontological commit-

ments to the reality of social phenomena as both Geddes and Durkheim.

5. CONCLUSION

One objection a critic could attempt to level at the argument we have offered in this paperis that we have imposed an arbitrary framework on Patrick Geddes and Lewis Mumford.

However, in grounding our analysis in the writings and letters of each man, we have faithfully

recaptured the context in which their work was produced. We have shown that the conse-

quences of this underused approach to studying Geddes and Mumford are new and valuable

insights into the thought of both men as well as the nature of the relationship between them.

It is in this sense that our reading of Geddes and Mumford is one rooted in the primary factors

and concerns that shaped their writings rather than in the secondary issues that have

dominated scholarship up until now.

By focusing on Mumford solely as a philosopher of technology or theorist of the city,

scholarship has tended to avoid asking whether there are issues that persist throughout his

oeuvre. What we have shown is that he constantly aimed to explain how social order is main-

tained in his work on technology and the city from the 1930s onwards. In exploring this issue,

Mumford regularly made a distinction between the material and the immaterial but, crucially,

also insisted on their ontological equivalence. We have argued that, in this respect, he can be

understood as employing the assumptions of classical sociology. Moreover, we have demon-

strated that the reason for Mumfords use of these sociological tools was his intentional ap-

propriation of the ideas of his single greatest intellectual inspiration: Patrick Geddes. Indeed,

we have also shown how the common perception of the declining importance over time of

Geddes to Mumfords writings is thoroughly misguided. Although the theoretical vocabulary

Mumford deployed in his later work may have fundamentally altered, the Geddesian theoret-

ical principles upon which he relied did not.

In order to produce a more rounded picture of Mumford the thinker, it may be in some

sense fruitful, as recent scholarship has suggested, to consider the role of writers other than

Geddes in shaping his work. However, looking to Freud or Jung reveals little about the fun-

damental assumptions that underlie Mumfords later publications on technology. Quite simply,

reference to the Megamachine and the Myth of the Machine without recognizing Mumfords

specific ontology of the material and immaterial is an oversight that has impaired our under-

standing of his writings. The question that one can ask is why this feature of Mumfords work

has been overlooked. Although we can only speculate on possible answers here, we suggest an

unfamiliarity with the basics of sociological theory and with Geddess thought on the part of

those who have thus far attempted to unravel Mumfords writings on technics.

However, one reason why Mumfords grounding in classical sociology has been ignored



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do, it is almost never as a theorizer on a par with those who founded their discipline. While it

is not our intention to suggest that Geddes was someone who should be considered an equal

of Durkheim, Weber, or Tnnies in terms of shaping sociology, we do believe that he and

his work are worthy of a long overdue reappraisal. As we showed in section two, Geddes was

deeply concerned with the kinds of questions about the nature of sociology that the luminariesof the classical canon are celebrated for having asked. An examination of Geddess rarely

studied writings shows that he possessed a theoretical framework that was explicitly thought-

out in terms of sociology as an independent and autonomous science. Indeed, in many of his

conclusions about the nature and maintenance of social order, he was in total agreement with

Durkheim, Weber, and classical sociology in general.

The importance of this dimension of Geddess thought is one that must be appreciated

not just in terms of its implications for our understanding of Mumford but also for the history

of sociology in general. Because sociologists have almost exclusively been responsible for

writing the history of their field, the standard view of how sociology developed has been often

deeply misleading. While one consequence of this received history is an embracing ofthinkers and writers, including Karl Marx, who would not have described themselves as

sociologists, another is an exclusion of others, such as Geddes, who not only understood

themselves as sociologists but also engaged with the very same problems as their more cele-

brated contemporaries. Although there is still much to be done in terms of bringing better his-

torical sensibilities to bear on the history of sociology, our close study of Geddes and

Mumford has shown that to do so will yield important results.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We must firstly recognize the financial assistance of the Arts and Humanities Research

Council and the School of Philosophy, University of Leeds, United Kingdom. We are mostgrateful to Christopher Kenny, Jonathan Hodge, Steven Lovatt, and two anonymous reviewers

for reading earlier drafts of this article and making many valuable suggestions for improve-

ment. Our thanks must also go to everyone who attended the Leeds History and Philosophy

of Science Informal Seminar and the 2006 HAPSAT conference at the University of Toronto,

where earlier versions of this research were presented. Finally, we wish to thank Andrew

Campbell for his help in locating sources.

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Renwick, Gunn - 2008 - Demytholigizing the Machine Patrick Geddes, Lewis Mumford

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