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Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa

JOHN MUKUM MBAKU*, MWANCl S. KIMENYI 'I I

1 I

Introduction

The literature on the political economy of colonialism usually characterises the police and other forms of state coercion as agents of law and order (Bayley, 1969: 97; Clinard and Abbott, 1973: 215-30). The colonial police force is described as the guarantor of peace and protector of property rights and individual liberties and viewed as necessary for guaranteeing demqcratic living in the colonies.

Colonisation was regarded by its proponents as a civilising mission. European countries, it is argued, came to Africa as modernising agents, helping to transform societies both economically and culturally. The colonial state, thus, was regarded as the apparatus through which competing pluralistic interests could be held in equilibrium. The law was the mechan- ism to be used by the state to realise competitive equilibrium, while the police provided the coercive force needed to ensure that provisions of the law were adhered to (see, for example, Tamuno, 1970: 10-15).

Some modernisation theorists have argued that because of human im- perfections, agencies have to be created by the state to guard against behaviour that is harmful to the lives, property, and well-being of society. Although human behaviour is significantly shaped by the civilising influ- ences of the church, the family and schools, these institutions are often incapable of properly discharging their role. To maintain law and order and thus provide for economic and social development, a police force is needed. Fighting crime and maintaining law and order by the police is said

* The authors would like to thank the participants in the Southern Eoonomic Assodation session on 'Public Choice: Rent Seeking' held in Washington, D.C., November 1W2, for their

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to be indiscriminately fair to all people, especially since the activities of the police are subject to the law of the state (Bent, 1974). Thus, the colonial police force was seen by its supporters as providing a stable and peaceful environment needed for the development of the colonies and was expected to fight crime, prevent ethnic violence, protect property rights and guarantee personal liberty, so as to enable the Europeans to efficiently carry out their civilising mission.

In this article, it is argued that the police force, like other organs of violence in colonial Africa, was not an instrument of peace, but rather a

I rent seeking tool used by the colonial governments to ensure orderly transfer of wealth from the colonies to the metropolitan economies. The police was used to help maintain those institutions that fostered the rent seeking activities of European entrepreneurs. Far from maintaining law I

I and order, the police, in many cases, became the agent of violence directed at Africans in order to force them to help Europeans maximise their own political and economic interests in the colonies.-1n German Kamerun, for example, the police played a pivotal role in getting Africans to work as

I labourers on European plantations. Since most Africans preferred the

i traditional occupations of hunting and gathering, it was necessary to use ) 1 force to compel them to provide labour that German plantation owners i desperately needed (see, for example, Rudin, 1968).

The process of colonisation in itself required the subjugation of the i African peoples, the seizure of African property rights, especially in land, t and their subsequent reassignment to European settlers. It could not have i

j t succeeded without state coercion. The police, rather than being agents of s 1 peace and order, used their comparative advantage in the use of violence

I!/ to subdue the indigenous peoples and allow European settlers to maintain t

I! I their political and economic privileges. ' I

1 9: i i' Modernisation Theory and Policing in Developing Countries

. i ,

; According to modernisation theory, the role of the police in each society is I determined by the nature and process of social change. Societies are seen

. as 'self-contained systems which consist of interrelated and interdependent r !' ;!I parts which are mutually supportive of and, compatible with each other'

(Ahire, 1990: 151). In general, societies continue to evolve from smaller i" I[ and simpler forms to larger and more complex ones. The developed

IIj countries of the West have, through this process of continuous evolvement, developed r ' ' 1 I

:I highly differentiated and compatible (i.e. developed) structures which I ) I

the traditional peasant societies in developing countries must emulate if I

I they too are to modernize. Western systems of political organization, 1

law and policing are held to be some of the components of the compatible I

Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonhl Africa] 279

structures needed to stimulate development in backward societies (Ahire, 1990: 151-52).

Modernisation theory views the state as an agent of social and economic development. The state is expected to transfer certain 'universalistic structures and roles from the West to replace largely ascriptive and undifferen- tiated roles in developing societies' (Ahire, 1990: 152) in order to effect development in the latter. The process of modernisation, however, can cause social disruptions and lead to institutional instability. A third party is needed to maintain law and order so as to allow for sustained growth and development. That guardian of stability has been the police force. The process of modernisation, thus, requires the establishment of a highly centralised state, whose job it is to provide a stable political environment needed for efficient and equitable allocation of resources and subsequently, development. Such a state is seen as the 'independent and beneficent guarantor of the evolutionary voyage from pre-modern to modern stages' (Ahire, 1990: 152). Its principal functions include rule making, rule appli- cation, rule adjudication and communication (Almond and Powell, 1966: 129-89). From this discourse, one can see the colonial state as an anent of modernisation, transferring from the developed countries to the colonies, the necessary ingredients to 'civilize' and modernise the African colonies (Ahire, 1990: 151-72; 1991). t

This conception of the state gives modernisation theory a basis for its analysis of law and of policing. Trubek and Galanter (1974: 1071-74) summarised this theory's conception of law in the following manner. Law is used by the state to exercise control over individuals in society. The law is defined as 'bodies of rules that are addressed universally to all individuals similarly situated' (Trubek and Galanter, 1974: 1074). In addition to controlling the behaviour of individuals in a society, the law also constraints the state, thus regulating the extent to which the latter can affect the behaviour of individuals. The making of rules is undertaken 'through a pluralistic process which enables all individuals to secure rules favorable to them, while at the same time ensuring that rules respe'ct the vital interests of all others' (Trubek and Galanter, 1974: 1071). Thus, the process of rule making is expected to insure that no individual or group 'derives systematic advantageddisadvantages by virtue of their specific characteristics' (Ahire, 1990: 153). According to Trubek and Galanter (1974: 1071), the principals in this pluralistic rule making process 'are intermediate groups which aggregate individual interests . . . . No single group, either a minority or majority, dominates the process of formulation of legal rules, and no special characteristics of individuals or groups such as wealth or race, gives them systematic advantages or disadvantages in rule making'. The rules derived through this process are designed to maximise social objectives, and these are believed to be the objectives of society as a

whole and not only those of a single interest group. In other words, the I

rules are designed to maximise some definable 'social welfare' function. I

When these rules are applied, 'they are enforced equally for all citizens, and in a fashion that achieves the purposes for which they were consciously designed' (Trubek and Galanter, 1974: 1072).

According to modernisation theory, however, human imperfection is an

4 indicator that law alone cannot ensure that the behaviour of citizens 1 conforms to the rules and regulations designed by the state. A police force is needed to enforce compliance. In performing its duties, the police force is expected to be 'indiscriminately fair to all citizens, especially as the actions of law enforcers are believed to be subject to these rules. Gener- ally, the police are thought to possess the chief attributes associated with I

the law-benevolence, neutrality and impartiality' (Ahire, 1990: 153; see also Bent, 1974: 1-13). Thus, modernisation theory assumes that the police I

force would be representative of the public interest and would not serve as I an agent of a narrowly defined segment of the population. I

The process of modernisation, it is argued, results in increased levels of criminal behaviour. As agents of law and order, the police are essential for controlling crime and minimising threats to personal freedoms and societal goals. In the process, the police promote economic and social development and democratic living. The police, through their control of criminal behav- hour, are linked to the process of development (Bent, 1974; Ahire, 1990).

In recent years, the-united Nations (UN) agencies engaged in crinie research have been in the forefront of the movement to link crime with the processes of industrialisation and modernisation. Clinard and Abbott (1973: 5-6) agreed with the proposition that the process of modernisation increases criminal behaviour. In their study of the 'major forces and pressures that influence social change' in developing countries, they argued that '[als the less developed nations attempt, in one or two generations, to I

bring about transformations that have culminated from several centuries of development for most of the industrialized nations, severe social repercus- I

sions are often evident'. Mushanga (1976: 5) reiterated this when he said that '[tlhe impact of abrupt social change with emphasis on development without adequate provision for the acquisition of non-delinquent social values has, in Africa, led to a disproportionate rise in crime rates'. Accord- ing to Shelley (1981: xiii), '[mlodernization has affected rates and forms of criminality in the past two hundred years in both capitalistic and socialistic societies'. She further added that 'development, rather than unique cultural and social characteristics, is responsible for observed changes in criminality'.

Given the relationship between crime and development, orthodox . scholars perceive the police as the primary prerequisite for and the guardian of orderly social and economic development. According to Bent (1974: 1):

If all men were perfect there would be no need for formal agencies to guard against human behaviour detrimental to the lives, property, and

Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa / 281

well-being of society. But the human race is not made up of angels, it depends on the civilizing influence of the family, the church, schools, and other institutions to regulate behavior. And where these institutions prove inadequate or incapable of fulfilling their role, especially amid the socially dysfunctional stresses of urban society, the maintenance of order and safety necessitates the creation of police agencies by the State.

Fighting crime is one way by which the police maintain order. According to Bayley (1969), although the police may perform duties that include helping people during natural disasters, sponsoring clubs to help young people learn about citizenship, directing traffic, etc., fighting crime is the police force's primary purpose. He added, '[tlhe criminal is the focus of a police- man's attention' (1969: 97). Clinard and Abbott (1973: 218) viewed law and order (i.e., crime control) as the original function of the police in developing countries. Tamuno's study of the police in Nigeria, suggested that the rise of crime and disorder in colonial Nigeria provided the impetus for the establishment of a ~ol ice force. He noted that social and political

disputes' and 'interethnic cbnflicts7 es and 'had an important bearing on

dern police there' (Tarnuno, 1970: olice force as emerging out of a

desire to stem the growth of crime and disorder. As a result of this characterisation, the colonial police force represented a crime fighting public agency.

Tamuno's interpretation of the origins of the colonial police in Nigeria reinforces the erroneous belief, held by many scholars, that Europeans came to AMca to save the 'natives' from themselves. Colonialism, in this light, is depicted as a civilising mission, designed to prevent African societies from degenerating into anarchy. The colonial police force was supposed to provide the means through which Europeans could bring the perpetually wamng factions together and prevent them from eventually destroying themselves, while at the same time, introducing Africans to European civilisation and its brand of Christianity. Far from being a civilising mission, colonialism was an attempt to maximise the economic interests of Euro- peans. It was an economic 'pact' designed to help Europeans secure raw materials for the factories for the metropolitan economies. In addition, markets were needed to dispose of excess production from European factories. According to Frederick Lugard, who for many years represented British colonial authority in Nigeria, the colonies were essential for the well-being of Great Britain: He stated that commodities from the tropics were vital to Britain's industrial life, and that the African markets represented an important outlet for the sale of British manufactures (Lugard, 1926: 7). Egeiton (1969: 57), a well-known authority on British imperial policy, stated that the 'motives which prompted the European nations to

enter upon the field-sf colonization were in the main two, viz. the desire to win converts for the church, and the desire to win wealth for themselves'. Existing evidence shows that the primary objective of annexation of African Nrritory was economic. According to Ake (1981: 19) colonialism was an economic imperative brought about by the internal contradictions of capitalism in Europe. He stated that

[tlhe transplanting of capitalism arises from those contradictions which reduce the rate of profit and arrest the capitalisation of surplus value. Confronted with these effects, it was imperative that the capitalist, forever bent on profit maximization, would look for a new environment in which the process of accumulation could proceed apace. Capitalists turned to foreign lands attacked and subjugated them and integrated their economies to those of Western Europe.

111 11 Colonialism was alien, it was forced upon the African people and was full of contradictions. Since it involved-forced subjugation bT the local people and abrogation of their property rights, it could only be implemented through force. As a result, the Europeans who brought colonialism to Africa required 'a well-organized group possessing a comparative advantage in the efficient use of violence' (Ahire, 1990: 156) to help them subjugate the Africans. The colonial police force was developed to serve in this role. In fact, most colonial institutions, like the police, were primarily 'structures of exploitation, despotism, and degradation' (Fatton, 1 W : 457). For Crowder (1987: 11-12), 'the colonial state was conceived in violence rather than by negotiation'. The colonial police force provided the coercive force required

' to effect the seizure and abrogation of African property rights, especially in land and their labour services.

The evolution of the colonial police force, thus, must be viewed as a reaction to the constraints imposed on the European colonial officers and colonists by the African peoples. Had the Africans yielded willingly to colonial exploitation, policing in the colonial state would have been radically different from what it turned out to be. The establishment of the colonial police force can also be attributed to the failure of the colonists to rely on markets and freely negotiated and mutually beneficial contracts for the acquisition1 of resources (for instance, land and labour services). Had the colonists relied primarily on markets, instead of state coercion, the character of the colonial police would have been significantly different. Under conditions'of a capitalist wage labour system (as opposed to the forced labour system in existence in many colonies), the police force might have restricted itself to the traditional duties of maintaining law and order among all population groups. As a consequence of the colonists' need to use state coercion as a tool for resource allocation, the police force evolved

Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa1283

as an instrument of violence, used to help Europeans conquer, control, subjugate and exploit Africans (Danns, 1982).

Jeffries viewed the colonial police force as a benevolent public agency whose main duty was 'to act impartially in the interest of the community as a whole, to preserve and re-establish the rule of law and order' (Jeffries, 1952: 198-99). Ahire (1990: 156) remarked that any scholar who views the colonial police as a 'legal and constitutional imperative ignores the fact that the police in these countries were established by force, despite indigenous resistance to them'.

Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa

The Concept of Rent Seeking

Economies which are characterised by a significant level of government regulation, usually pursue public policies which are affected by the behaviour of interest groups seeking government transfers and those of groups supplying the transfers. In such economies, the political equilibrium that results is one in whiuh some groups gain at the expense of others. In the process, politiciaqs, who {act as, wealth brokers, increase their political base. Rent seeking is a type of behaviour most often associated with interest groups in such heavily regulated economies (Tullock, 1967; Tollison; 1982; Kimenyi, 1989; Mbaku, 1991a, 1991b, 1991~).

Rent seeking has been defined as the expending of resources to capture government or artifically-contrived transfers. If, for example, regulators impose a supply restriction on a good or service, then economic agents who have been granted the right to produce the item at supranormal prices will earn far more than the normal profits on their investment. The artificially- contrived scarcity usually creates rent, 'the anticipation of which will induce entrepreneurs to spend resources either to obtain the monopoly rights when they are first created or seek ways to oust the initial recipient' (DeLorme et al., 1986: 414). Government regulators can also impose price ceilings (or prices that are below their competitive equilibrium levels) on markets, allowing consumers who have been given the right to enter the market on the demand side to receive rents. If the state grants access only to some consumers, rents will continue to accrue to the latter. Those consumers who have been denied access to this market will expend resources in an effort to get the state to transfer the government created rights to them. This is also a case of rent seeking behaviour (see, for example, Tollison, 1982: 575-602; Delorme et al., 1986: 413-23).

Rent seeking costs include the expenditure involved in getting laws passed by the government creating the artificial scarcity and those associated with the political competition to capture the newly created rights. If

the primary source of the rents to be competed for is government restrictions on markets, then most entrepreneurs would concentrate their efforts on finding ways to capture the newly created rights. If, however, the rents are derived from the government's tax and spending policies, then rent seeking will involve attempts by economic agents to influence the spending and tax policies of the state in order to maximise their share of the rents (Tollison, 1982: 575-602; Buchanan, 1980b: 315) .

In rent seeking societies, agents may respond to government regulatory activities at three levels. The method used to dispose of the scarcity once it is created will determine the type of response from economio agents. If the state regulators decide to allocate the rights to the scarcity themselves, then agents will lobby to influence bureaucrats in order to obtain the rights. A t this level, lobbying and the payment of bribes represent the most important rent seeking behaviours. Should the state prevent some groups from participating in the political competition for the rights to the scarcity, violence may erupt as the deprived groups attempt to capture the apparatus of government in order to avail themselves of rents (Mbaku and Paul, 1989: 63-72; Mbaku, 1991c: 19-31).

If the government, instead, decides to sell the rights to the scarcity in a competitive market, then there will be an economic response from agents and the state will receive the full market value of the rights. The proceeds from the sale will become part of the state budget. moving rent seeking to a

f . - . - second level, where economic agents struggle to enter job categories with

I access to the rents. If the government returns the rents to the people, say, 1 in the form of transfer payments, then rent seeking will move to a third level, as individuals attempt to influence bureaucrats in order to maximise their share of the rents. If, on the other hand, the state allocates the proceeds from the auction through a random process (such as, a lottery), then there would be no incentive for agents to indulge in rent seeking (see, for example, Tollison, 1982: 575-602; Tullock, 1967: 224-32; Krueger, 1974: 291-303).

The kinds of rent seeking behaviours that dominate a heavily regulated economy are determined by the country's political system. In countries with democratic political systems, lobbying, bribery and the underwriting of the campaigns of politicians represent the major rent seeking behaviours. In societies with non-democratic governments, political violence is usually the predominant mode of competing for rents. In a country with an authoritarian political system, members of the politically dominant group control and dominate resource allocation. Members of locked out groups usually come to view the resource allocation system as one designed to benefit primarily members of the politically dominant group. In these economies, those denied access to markets can only hope to gain entry either by sufficiently threatening the government to force ah attenuation of the latter's property rights or by capturing the apparatus of government.

Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa1 285

Unfortunately, in such societies, constitutional methods of regime change either do not exist, or if they do, do not function properly. As a result, those who aspire to capture the government have to resort to violence. It is little wonder that, in the African colonies, the Europeans who enjoyed a comparative advantage in violence, came to dominate rent seeking and subsequently, resource allocation. The colonial police force provided the colonists the violence potential needed to dominate resource allocation in the colonial economy. The Africans were unable to develop enough resistance to force the Europeans to reform the system of property rights or the system of resource allocation (Mbaku, 1991a: 181-94; 1991b: 25-45; 1991c: 19-31).

Rent Seeking and Property Rights Assignments ,

Many researches have recognised the relationship between rent seeking and property rights. According to Buchanan (1980a: 35947; 1980b: 3-15; 1980c: 183-94; 1983: 71-85) and Benson (1984: 388-400), the process of assigning property rights can result in rent seeking. Rent seeking usually results when the government assumes control of property rights or 'can easilv assign and transfer rights that are supposedlv in private hands' - - * - (Benson, 1984: 396). An entrepreneur who aspires to capture a property right faces three options-purchase the right from its owner through a mutually beneficial voluntary private exchange, or persuade the government to seize the property right from its owner and reassign it to him, or seize the property right from its owner and then appeal to the state to protect and enforce his ownership of the right. In the 16505, White settlers in South Africa confiscated lands belonging to the indigenous peoples and

a then appealed to the colonial state for protection. The state subsequently established pri~ate'propert~ rights in land and assigned them to the settlers, effectively abrogating the rights of Africans in their communal lands (see Fredrickson, 1981; Magubane, 1979). Finally, the entrepreneur can steal the right from its owner. In an attempt to capture a property right, the .economic agent w i ~ choose the method that rninimises his costs of capturing the right.

If the state becomes involved in the process of capturing and reassigning property rights, the process becomes politicised and opportunities arise for individuals to influence the government. Accofding to Benson (1984: 398), rent seeking activities along this line involve attempts by individuals and groups to 'define, reassign, modify or attenuate property rights'. The state can pass laws that result in a direct transfer of property rights. The Natives Land Act passed in South Africa in 1913, for example, and many of the laws that provided colonial land concessions, transferred African property rights in land directly to European settlers (see Burns, 1963; Brace, 1964; Rudin, 1968; Magubane, 1979; Fredrickson, 1981). The state may create

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286 / JOHN MuKL':~ MBAKU, MWANGI S . KIMENYI I

new property rights and assign them to members of the politically dominant groups. The government can also place severe restrictions on the exercise of rights by their legitimate owners. Members of the politically dominant groups may then assume ownership of those rights since the law does not , usually affect the exercise of the rights by these people. Colonisation of Africa represented a process in which the colonial state seized African property rights and reassigned them to European colonists. The police force was used to effect the seizure and subsequently to provide the protection needed to allow the colonists to effectively exercise these rights.

Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa: A General View

The Europeans brought to Africa two institutions that had an important impact on their relationship with the indigenous people. First, was plantation agriculture, which required more land than that used by the average African farmer, and increased the demand for labour. Second, private property rights in land to replace the cornnlunal ownership systems oommon I

among many African groups. In the early days when Europeans purchased 1 products from Africans for shipment to Europe, they relied on markets and voluntary private exchanges in their dealings with Africans. Soon after settlements were established, coercion became increasingly important in European dealings with the indigenous people. In their attempt to secure


was very fertile and suitable for the cultivation of rubber and tea, they sought assistance from the colonial state to oust the Bakwiri who had occupied the land long before official German annexation in 1884. War broke out between the Bakwiri and the colonial state over land use rights. The colonial state, with its superior military force, won the war and the Bakwiri were expelled and their land turned over to German planters. The effective confiscation of the property rights of the Bakwiri in their ancestral lands could not have been successfully carried out without the help

of the police. The police, thus, played an important role in the labour system, forcing Africans to provide cheap labour for the economic activities of White farmers. 1

In German Cameroon (Kamerun), the colonial state attempted to deal I

with the labour problem by imposing a tax on Africans that could only be paid in German marks. On 1 July 1903, the state imposed a head tax of 3 marks per year on all men and unmarried women residing in the colony. According to Rudin (1938: 339), '[tlhe requirement that every grown person, man, woman or unmarried woman, capable of performing work must pay the tax shows the connexion of the tax with the labour system'. Any individual who did not have the money to pay the tax was required to perform public service work. Quite often, offenders were 'sold' to private businessmen, mostly planters, who subsequently forced them to work on their plantations indefinitely. Again, the police were instrumental in protect- ing the property rights of the European farmers and ensuring continued labour services of the Africans to Europeans. Without the coercive force of the police, the forced labour system could not have survived.

The French also established a forced labour system in their colonies. The L

policy, called corvke, consisted of penal labour, prestation labour, and military labour. Prestation was the most important economically. All males between the ages of 18 and 60 years were subject to an annual 'tax' under which everv individual had to ~rovide the colonial state with a certain number of ;lays of free labour each year mandatorily. Affected individuals were allowed to pay the government the equivalent of those services in currencv. Since the maioritv of the indieenous ~ e o ~ l e did not have the - , " I .

currency to pay the government, they were forced into wage labour on European plantations. Again, the police force was instrumental in providing the coercion needed to administer this forced labour system.

In colonial Africa, the police helped European settlers seize African property rights and provided the coercive force needed to prevent Africans from regaining those rights. Although the police did indeed maintain law and order, the performance of such tasks was not intended to improve living standards for Africans but to help Europeans maximise their political and economic objectives in the colonies.

The Origin of the British Colonial Police Force in West Africa

The organisation, development and training of the colonial police in West Africa was carried out with one important objective in view-the minimi- sation of opposition to European political and economic domination of the African peoples. To maximise the flow of resources to the metropole, and to ensure that the colonists retained and effectively exercised the property rights seized from the Africans, the colonial government had to minimise


t h e dissent levels in the colony. Thus, part of the colonial mission was to bring together, usually through force, several African societies to form 'a coercively-imposed colonial market and administrative structure' (Momson et al., 1989: 239). The colonial police force was instrumental in keeping these African groups together in an artificial and peaceful 'global village' in which European entrepreneurs could maintain their.commercia1 monopolies.

Although all European powers in Africa maintained coercively imposed administrative structures, this paper deals primarily with the development of the police in British controlled West Africa, specifically in Nigeria.

The rapid industrialisation of Europe during the first half of the nine- teenth century significantly increased output and led to a scramble between countries for markets to sell excess output. There was an anxiety about raw material supply sources. These factors led to an increase in commercial contacts between Britain and the West African coast. Rivalry between British and other European traders on the Bights of Benin and Biafra forced Britain to think in terms of establishing permanent settlements on the West African coast. In these colonies, British trade and later plantations could be protected, not only from the 'native', but also from other European entrepreneurs. Despite the large volume of trade between Britain and the Nigerian coast dating back to the fifteenth century, British colonial capitalism was not formally established in the region until the events of 1849. In that year, the British government established a consulate at Fernando Po to serve the Bights of Benin and Biafra, and later equipped

'

- the post with a military squadron, whose duty was to monitor activities in the hinterland and ensure that British interests were protected. In 1851, as part of its effort to establish itself as the dominant political and economic force in the area, the British overthrew the king of Lagos and captured his territory. It waS subsequently annexed as a British colony on 6 August 1861 (see, Burns, 1963: 115-39; Ahire, 1991: 33; Tamuno, 1970: 10). Until this point, most British economic activities in the area composed primarily of sporadic exploits by traders, most of whom remained on the mast and were served by several African middlemen. Increased British military exploits and the establishment of a permanent settlement in the area, encouraged expansion of trade and plantations. This rapid expansion of commercial activities provided the context within which a colonial police force emerged in the area. The significantly large number of British merchants located in the area regularly requested the colonial authorities in Lagos to protect them against indigenous and foreign competitors (Rudin, 1968: 17-75; Le Vine, 1964). British missionaries saw the conquest of Lagos and subsequently of the rest of Nigeria as an opportunity to introduce the Christian religion in this part of the world. Like the merchants, the missionaries also requested protection from the colonial state. Newly freed slaves, mostly

from Sierra Leone, Brazil and Cuba, were eager to serve the colonial community (the colonial state, merchants and missionaries) as interpreters, officials and middlemen (see, Smith, 1971; Ahire, 1990).

The colonial police force in Nigeria emerged as a result of the interaction of the colonial community with the African people, and the attempt by the colonial government to regulate this intercourse. Most important was the fact that the bulk of land needed by the colonial state and British entrepreneurs was usually seized from African groups, a process that effectively abrogated the latter's property rights. As a result, some form of coercion was needed: first, to effect this forced transfer of rights, and second, to allow the new owners to safeguard these rights. Missionaries and merchants called for the establishment of a police force because they believed it could be used to eliminate 'obstructive indigenous chiefs and recalcitrant natives', usually individuals whose behaviour was not deemed to be in the interest of European concepts of trade and religion. Missionaries wanted the police to assist them in their task of forced conversion of the local people to Chris- tianity. Merchants expected the police to eliminate indigenous competition and enable them to monopolise trade in the colonies. Smith (1971) and Tamuno (1970) presented evidence to support the contention that both British traders and missionaries encouraged the establishment of a police force and actually suggested what they believed were its proper functions.

Actin8 Governor ~ c ~ o s k r ~ (of the Colony of ~ a ~ o s ) established the first coloqial police force in,the territories later to be designated Nigeria in 1861. It consisted of 25 constables, whose primary function was topatrol British trading posts (Tamuno, 1970: 15). In 1862, McCoskry's successor, Governor Freeman increased the strength of the force to 100 constablas, one Superintendent, four Sergeants and eight Corporals, to form an 'Armed t Police Force' (Tamuno, 1970: 16). He argued that the military-type police force was needed to crush interior wars, pave the way for further British expansion into the interior of Lagos, and provide safe routes for the flow of . I trade from the hinterland. No historical evidence can be traced in support

I

pf the argument suggested by orthodox scholars that the colonial police force was established to control crime and promote democratic living. The communications of the earlier British colonial officers, which have been analysed by several authors (Tamuno, 1970; Anene, 1966; Ahire, 1990,

I 1991) reveal that the police force was established in Lagos to pave the way I for further colonisation of Nigeria, ensure that Africans did not usurp the I I property rights of British entrepreneurs, and to protect British trade i

'> monopolies. In order to assign the colonial police the role of a crime fighter, one would have to reclassify resistance to domination, subjugation and exploitation as crime. Only in this context can one view the colonial police force as a crime fighting entity. The formation of police forces in the interior of Nigeria followed the same pattern as that followed in Lagos. In e the Oil Rivers Protectorate (later renamed the Nigerian Coast Protectorate)

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Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa 1291

and in the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, police forces were established to serve the same functions as those assigned to the police in Lagos: protection of British trade interests, and the subjugation of African traditional rulers to allow for continued British hegemony in the region. Speci- fically, the police provided the coercive force needed to seize African property rights in land and transfer them to Europeans, and enforce these rights once they were assigned to the latter. In fact, in many areas in Nigeria, Africans found themselves unable to pursue their traditional occupations of hunting and gathering because their lands had been seized and assigned to European mercantile companies which used the police force to enforce their property rights in land.'

The arrival of Europeans in the area generally known as the Oil Rivers

The induction of these guards into the NA Police 'deprived them of their ''nativeness", leaving them no less than colonial creations, with a definite role in the administration' of the colony. The NA Police served an important function: providing security for the various indigenous rulers who served as intermediaries between the people and the colonial government in several pre-capitalist pockets of the country. Since many of these chiefs were appointed by the colonial government, and thus, lacked the legitimacy to rule, the NA Police provided the coercive force to enable them to control the people.

The Colonial Police as a Rent Seeking Tool in Nigeria

The government in colonial Nigeria was a dictatorship in which only Europeans were permitted access to political institutions. There was no formal constitutional method for regime change that could provide an opportunity to the Africans to capture the government apparatus. Some African elites, who served in certain administrative positions, were either artificial chiefs whose job was to maintain order in pre-capitalist regions of the territory, or to act as a liaison between the local people and Europeans. African access to economic markets was also sienificantlv restricted. In " most regions of the Nigerian protectorates, especially where British monopoly capital was well established, the system of resource allocation was designed to benefit members of the politically dominant group-the Euro- peans. African activities were designed to maximise European objectives. Eventually, the Africans realised that the only way for them to gain access to markets was to capture the apparatus of government. Since elections and other constitutional forms of regime change did not exist, the only way for Africans to capture the government was through force. British entrepreneurs, who monopolised trade in Nigeria, were aware of this situation, and they encouraged and supported the development of a strong police force to prevent African participation in the economy and to ensure that they did not become strong enough to overthrow the colonial government.

I European entrepreneurs were also aware of the fact that the bulk of the property rights they controlled had not been obtained through voluntary

I private transactions between them and the Africans. These rights had been I seized from the Africans and transferred to the Europeans and coercion

i was needed to maintain them. Thus, the colonial police emerged in Nigeria, I not in response to a need to control crime and encourage democratic living

but to ensure the subjugation of the Africans and to help British entrepreneurs continue to monopolise the colonial economy. Colonial police officers actually committed atrocities against peaceful Africans as part of I

their duty to protect British interests. 1 Bayley (1969: 12-13) argued that the apparatus of government can b

'd , become the instrument of the elite to impose 'its will on a majority of , '


people by use of force'. The police, which is a branch of the government, usually provides the coercive force used by one group to impose its will on the other. Colonialism represented the imposition of the will of a European elite on the mass of the African peoples with the support of the colonial police.

During colonialism, the primary function of the police force, according to Clinard and Abbott (1973: 2161, was to 'protect the property, person, and future prospects of the Europeans and those local groups who were dependent on them for power and livelihood'. The ideas of Sir Robert Peel, which governed the police forces in England under which the police was supposed to be subordinate to the rule of law and accountable to society were not applicable in the colonies. As Clinard and Abbott (1973: 216) observed, the 'exigencies of colonial ~ l e required a much more passive relationship between the police and the public in India than it did in Great Britain'. The relationship between the colonial police and the African peoples of Nigeria was not any different.

According to Bent (1974: 2), the police bureaucracy derives its character from the cultural values of society in .which it operates and law enforcement is to be based on 'culturally and legally defined norms of "proper" behavior'. The colonial police force, like other state institutions of the time, was alien, and consequently did not incorporate the cultural values of the societies it was supposed to serve. Mofeover, normal behaviour in colonial Nigeria was defined by an alien culture and a legal system imposed from above. Thus, behaviour that was normal (when judged by local traditional African standards) was quite often illegal by European (colonial) standards and thus subject to censure. Using the police force to control and subjugate the Africans constituted a misuse and abuse of police powers. The behaviour of ,the colonial, police in Nigeria actually contributed to a rise in criminal activities. By resorting to violence to prevent Africans from voicing legitimate concerns, the police instigated riots and crime. Using the police to abrogate African property rights forced the indigenous people to engage in activities that were labelled by the colonial government as criminal. For example, after h d s belonging to the pepple of Brass in the interior of Nigeria were seized and ceded to the Royal Niger Company, the men of Brass were no longer allowed to hunt and gather firewood on concession. As a result, Africans found 'trespassing' on cothpany lands were treated as criminals and subject tofievere ,penalties (Bent, 1974: 4; Burns, 1963).

The main groups of people in the Lagos Colony in 1861 were traders, missionaries, liberated slaves (from Sierra Leohe, Brazil and Cuba), freed Hausa-speaking slaves of the Islamic faith, Nigerians and British political elites who ruled the colony. Interaction between these. groups and the attempt by the colonial government to regulate that interaction provided the context within which the police force was formed. The nucleus of that

interaction was trade and the control of land. The Africans produced the bulk of the commodities which were transported to the coast and traded for European goods. To guarantee profitability, British entrepreneurs sought to establish monopolies that allowed them to control trade routes into the interior and also markets on the coast. A machinery was needed to regulate trade and protect British monopolies from African encroachment. The police force established by Acting Governor of Lagos, McCoskry (himself a prominent merchant), was designed to protect the monopoly rights of the British merchants. Shortly after it was established, it became the object of scorn and continuous attacks from the public. The local people did not support the police. The mass of the people of Lagos had had no input into the formation of this police force to shape the character of law enforcement agencies, and reduce concentration of power in the police bureaucracy, While European merchants and the colonial administrators may have had significant input into the establishment of the police force in Lagos in 1861, there is no evidence that the ~ f r i c a n people of the colony were consulted and allowed to contribute. The incessant attacks on the new police force were the result of a lack of confidence in it by the people. This agency of


Gambia to Lagos in January 1862, followidg the official annexation of Lagos (Ahire, 1991: 35; Tamuno, 1970: 17-18).

That protection of commerce and of European property rights was the primary duty of the police force is revealed by the activities of the AHPF shortly after it was organised. For example, in August 1864,60 constables of the AHPF were sent to arrest Chief Hunkain Abujoko of Ajido, who had been accused of robbery and violence. He was shot dead for resisting arrest and his village burnt. In April 1865, 118 AHPF, along with 18 officers and marines of the HMS Investigator and HMS Handy and 700 Ikorodu, attacked and destroyed an Egba force which had encamped near Ikorodu, a town that had cordial relations with the colonial government in Lagos (Tamuno, 1970: 18). The Egba had attacked the Ikorodu because the latter had given commercial access to the sea, making it possible for Ibadan traders to avoid paying tariffs to the Egba (Burns, 1963: 134-36). As Burns (1963: 135-36) stated, the dispute between the Egbas and Ibadan that led to the involvement of the AHPF was mainly economic. The 1

l badans wanted to secure a trade route to .the Lagos lagoon so that their I

trade with the European merchants would not have to pass through the Egba territory, where heavy tolls were levied. The straight route was one terminating at Ikorodu, and the people of that town were eager to allow the Ibadan traders to pass, as they would benefit from the traffic. To the I

Egbas such a new trade route meant a loss of revenue. As soon as Ibadan concluded a treaty with Ikorodu, the Egbas attacked Ikorodu. The latter petitibned the Lagos government for help and since '[tlhe trade of Lagos had already suffered considerably' (Bums, 1963: 136), the colonial govern- .

ment sent forces that killed the Egba king and ravaged the town. Once again, the AHPF had demonstrated that its primary duty was to protect British trade and perpetuate British rule over the people of Lagos. Despite this overwhelming evidence, some orthodox scholars still propagate the view that the AHPF was established to 'protect the lives and property of the people' against sporadic attacks by gangs which roamed the trade routes in search of opportunities to enrich themselves (Tamuno, 1970: 19-20).

The participation of the AHPF in the Ijebu wars provides additional evidence in support of the fact that the colonial police served primarily to help the British monopolise both political and economic institutions in the colonies. Located north of Lagos, the Ijebu kingdom enjoyed a strategic position on the trade route to the Lagos lagoon. Its chiefs took advantage of its strategic location and 'closed all trade routes to the coast and required all produce from the interior to be sold in their frontier towns of Ejinrin and Oru at their prices' (Ahire, 1991: 36). Subsequently, British merchants in Lagos found themselves paying significantly higher prices for commodities from the interior. When profits decreased, many of them appealed to the &lonial government for help. In 1892, the Governor of Lagos.

2961 JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, MWANGT S.. KIMENYI

Colony, Denton, ordered Ijebu to give up monopolistic practices and permit 'free and unmolested passage for all traders'. AS this was ignored, Denton sent a force of 500 constables of the AHPF, a detachment of the Gold Coast Hausas, the Second West Indian Regiment and seven special service officers from England, to attack Ijebu on 18 March 1892. The force defeated the kingdom and subsequently inducted the Hausa-speaking soldiers of the Ijebu army into the Armed Hausa Police Force. Ijebu properties were seized by the conquerors (Smith, 1971; Ahire, 1991).

The humiliating defeat of the Ijebu kingdom forced other kingdoms to make peace with the British. In 1893, Governor Carter (who had succeeded Denton) signed friendship treaties with several kingdoms to ensure that no further threats would be made against British com~nercial interests (Ukpabi, 1964; Crowder, 1981). While the colonial government encouraged and facilitated monopolistic trade practices by British merchants, it was willing to go to war to stop such practices by African groups.

Although scholars such as Tamuno (1970: 38-39), appear to realise the main reason for the creation of the colonial police, their failure to accurately conceptualise colonialism and its primary purpose has led to a mistaken belief that the colonial police was created to fight crime. It should be noted, however, that the colonial police did deal with conveptional crime control. However, this was peripheral to its other roles.

The functions performed by the police force in other parts of colonial Nigeria were 'quite similar to those in Lagos. The British began their colonisation of the Bights of Biafra and Benin by establishing a Consulate at Fernado Po. In 1872, that Consulate was transferred from Fernado Po to Old Calabar in the Niger Delta. As was the case in Lagos, struggles between British merchants and indigenous states over property rights and control of commerce provided the context within which the police emerged in this region. The Niger Delta was occupied by a number of independent indigenous kingdoms which included Itsekiri, Ijaw,. Bonny, Kalabari and Efik. No centralised administrative structure was in existence to coordinate relations between these kingdoms. Each kingdom was located at the estuary of a major river, effectively monopolising important trade routes to the coast. Access to the interior was carefully guarded, giving each city-state, considerable monopoly power over a section of Delta trade (Dike, 1956; Anene, 1966; Nair, 1972).

When British merchants arrived at the Niger Delta, there existed intense competition between these city-states for control of the trade of the'region. The British traders and the colonial authorities took advantage of the rivalry between the states to secure a foothold in the region. In the 1850s, British merchants sided with rival chiefs and encouraged wars between the city-states. Eventually the Delta states were weakened considerably and indigenous political authority was virtually eroded. The British then asserted their authority, abolished the authority of the indigenous Delta kings,


seized the property rights of indigenous entrepreneurs, and established 'Courts of Equity' to oversee commercial activities (Anene, 1966). Courts of Equity were trade associations comprising the most important indigenous and British traders in each city-state. The chairman of each association was invariably a British merchant (Anene, 1966: 32-33).

Indigenous political authority in the Delta states continued to weaken, reaching a new low in 1854, as evidenced by the fact that British Consul Beecroft deported William Dappa Pepple (Pepple V), king of Bonny, without resorting to force. Beecroft, however, reported to his superiors that the king had requested for assistance against the powerful chiefs in his kingdom (Anene, 1966: 32). Following the deportation, a puppet ruler was appointed by the colonial government and instructed to serve under the authority of the Court of Equity in Bonny (Anene, 1966: 32-33).

Commercial rivalry in the Delta states ousted several traditional rulers and created other powerful ones. Two of the most influential rulers were Jaja of Opobo and Nana of Itsekiri. Jaja was an ex-slave who had risen to prominence in 1861 as the leader of the House of Opooboo 'the Great' in Bonny (Anene, 1966: 42). Although William Dappa Pepple was the king of Bonny, lqcal European merchants believed that the city-state was actually ruled by Jaja and Oko Jumbo (another ex-slave). Jaja and Jumbo, however, did not cooperate, but continued to quarrel over trade issues and in 1869, this conflict led to a civil war in Bonny (Anene, 1966: 42). When the war ended, Jaja founded his own state at Opobo and was subsequently recognised as its king by the British in 1873.

Nana of Itsekiri established a very successful and powerful trading empire west of the Niger River. The ground for Nana's success had been prepared by his father, Alluma. By 1865, Alluma had overthrown his rival, ;he-son of the queen of Warri aid founded the flourishing stronghold of Ebrohemie. Nana's mother was an Urhobo. Using extraordinary business acumen and administrative skill, Nana etablished control over Itsekiri chiefs and the Urhobo oil producing villages. Because of his wealth and prestige, he rose to be a prominent figure in the commercial and political life of Itsekiri and Urhobo districts (Anene, 1966: 150-51). Both Jaja and Nana imposed, trade regulations that severely restricted the activities of British merchants in their respective kingdoms (Dike, 1956; Anene, 1966; Ikime, 1968; Ahire, 1991).

Frustrated with Jaja's monopolistic trade practices, British merchants appealed to the British Consul for help. They believed that the only way to undermine Jaja's authority and gain access to the highly profitable trade of the region was through the use of force. Consul Johnston, in response to

, took the following measures. First, he ng a fine of 2500 on any British subject

contravening his order. second, h e informed the ~ r i t i s h Foreign Office that Jaja was involved in treasonable activities which included raising a

large army, endangering the lives of British subjects in the Oil Rivers, and making arrangements to cede the territory to France. Finally, in 1887, Johnston extended an invitation to Jaja to come aboard the gun-boat HMS Goshawk for 'an exchange of views' (Anene, 1966: 90). Upon arrival on the gun-boat, Jaja and his chiefs were deported to the Gold Coast (now Ghana) where he faced an illegal trial. We was subsequently deported t o the West Indies where he died on 7 July 1891 (Anene, 1966: 87-95; 14041).

Following Jaja's departure, Consul Johnston created Governing Councils in Opobo, New and Old Calabar, Bonny, Brass and Benin. These councils, expected to fill the Iesdership vacuum created by Jaja's deportation, were constituted with six British merchants, three 'friendly' or puppet chiefs, and the British naval officer in the region, with the resident British Consul acting as the Chairman. These councils were effective in regulating both political and economic activities in the Oil Rivers. They offered little protection to the African peoples. Like the police force that had been used to eliminate Jajp and seize his property rights, the councils were another rent seeking tool used by the British to monopolise commerce in the Oil Rivers.

Johnston's successful removal of Jaja through deceit and force did not end indigenous opposition to British colonial expansion. Nana and several other indigenous rulers along the Cross River had still not been conquered. Since these chiefs were domiciled primarily in the interior, Johnston could not use the military strength of the Preventive Naval Squadron to intimidate them into submission. In 1890, George Annesley, who assumed charge of the protectorate of the Oil Rivers, established a small police force comprising immigrants from Sierra Leone, Liberia and Lagos informing the Foreign

1 , Office that the force was needed 'to prevent any possible atrocities by the natives' (Ahire, 1991: 38). Since the police force was alien, it showed contempt for the local people, their rulers, and their traditions. According to Anene (1966: 106), 'the members of [this] force in fact constituted

I themselves into a new authority which openly showed utter contempt for the local rulers and indigenous standards of social behavior'. This force did not enjoy the support and cooperation of the public as its power was not derived from the people, or its character shaped by significant inputs from the people.lThe police force created by Annesley could not be expected t o perform orthodox police activities and in fact, it was not created to function as an orthodox law enforcement agency. The circumstances leading t o its creation and its composition show that it was never intended to be a crime fighter in the traditional sense. Its main duty was to conquer and subjugate the people of the Cross River and provide British merchants the wherewithal to monopolise the region's commercial activities. Thus, in

I

See Bayley (1969: 11-31) and Bent (1974: 7) on the character of the police.

Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa1 299

March 1890, the Annesley police force attacked Andemeno, king of Enyong, whom Annesley had accused of closing trade routes to British merchants and harassing people friendly to the colonial government. Annesley, shortly after constituting the force on the pretext of stopping atrocities committed by Africans, proceeded to Enyong to commit atrocities against King Andemeno and his people (Tamuno, 1970: 3-4). Annesley, however, did not realise the importance of cooperation and respect of the people of the Oil Rivers Protectorate and believed that through coercion British juris- diction could be strengthened in the territory (Tamuno, 1970: 5). This reveals an important connection between the colonial police and the commercial and political interests of the British.

In 1894, the British established the Niger Coast Protectorate comprising the m territories seized from the Africans. Claude McDonald became Consul- General of the new protectorate. His assistant, Ralph Moor, formerly an Inspector of the Royal Irish Constabulary, founded a military police force called the Oil Rivers Irregulars, consisting of 165 men. The existing police force was expanded from 20 men in 1891 to 450 in 1894 and took the name the Niger Coast Protectorate Constabulary (Tamuno, 1970; Ikime, 1971). These two armed police forces were used to attack King Nana, who at the time was a dominant figure in the Cross River trade. Prior to attacking Nana, the colonial authorities asked the king to enter into a treaty permit- ting British merchants to trade freely in his kingdom and allow English missionaries to freely proselytise in Itsekiri and the neighbouring regions. Nana, a sovereign in his own right, refused to sign the treaty. The British decided to break Nana's trade monopoly. To lay the ground for eventual attack, Acting Consul Ralph Moor .accused Nana of participating in the slave trade, encouraging his people to oppose the British government, and causing breach of the peace. Moor subsequently blamed 'every act of insubordination on the part of any petty chief' on the diabolical influence of Nana (Anene, 1966: 156). With a combined force of the Oil Rivers Irregulars and the Niger Coast Protectorate Constabulary, Moor attacked and defeated Nana. The king was tried and deported for life and his property and that of most of his chiefs seized (Anene, 1966: 151-58).

Shortly after Nana was banished, the law and order situation in the Urhobo country progressively deteriorated, 'demonstrating that Nana's paramountcy did serve an extremely useful purpose in the hinterland involved' (Anene, 1966: 157). His forceful removal was intended to pave the way for British control of commercial activities in the region and not to check criminal behaviour and improve social conditions for the people of the Oil Rivers, as claimed.

The colonial government mistakenly believed that the elimination of Nana would improve trade and permit palm oil to flow freely to the British merchants on the coast. Trade in the hinterland involved a series of middlemen who facilitated the flow of commodities to the coast. Trade

'boys' maintained and financed by Nana had served very successfully as middlemen, purchasing commodities from the hinterland and bringing them to the coast for sale to the British merchants. Besides, Nana's Lieutenants provided security in the different markets, allowing trade to proceed without interruption. The elimination of Nana resulted in the breakdown of law and order in the hinterland markets, significantly affect- ing the flow of palm oil and other products to the coast. Without Nana's middlemen, who 'provided a vital chain which bound together the scattered hinterland markets to the port of export' (Anene, 1966: 158), the flow of commodities to the coast was adversely affected. This account reveals that Moor's police forces (as were the other police units in colonial Nigeria) and the colonial legal system were designed primarily to advance the political and economic interests of the Europeans while undermining those of the indigenous people.

On 1 January 1900 the Protectorate, of Northern Nigeria was established to take over the properties of the Royal Niger Company (RNC), whose charter had been revoked in December 1899. The formation of a police force in the new protectorate followed a pattern similar to that in Lagos and the Niger Delta. Shortly after assuming office as the first High Com- missioner of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, Frederick Lugard selected SO men from the RNC's disbanded constabulary to serve as the nucleus of a civil police force. Lugard also established a supreme court, as well as provincial and native courts. He effectively established a modern bureaucracy to 'enforce the norms of state law and accelerate the dispersal of state authority throughout the superstructure' (Ahire, 1991: 40). By 1902, the strength of the Civil Police was increased to 150 men and a new commander, Major Bain, was appointed. By 1906, Lugard reorganised the Police Force, increased its strength to 30 officers and 1,180 men, and renamed it as the Northern Nigerian Constabulary. The new force was expected to assist the WAFF in preserving law and order throughout the territory (Grantham, 1936: 223-24). The two forces worked side by side: the WAFF undertook military missions to conquer and subdue the Northern Nigerian emirates while the Northern Nigerian Constabulary followed closely behind to provide security to colonial bureaucrats and British entrepreneurs, and help implement the colonial administrative system (Ahire, 1991: 40).

During the early period, when Lugard was reorganising the police forces and establishing a judiciary system, his argument was that the most important task facing his new administration was the completion of the conquest of the remaining Northern Nigerian emirates in order to provide a politically safe environment to British merchants to carry out their commercial activities. He was emphatic that it was impossible to conduct trade satisfactorily unless all the Hausa states were conquered and incorporated into the protectorate. To properly administer such a vast territory, Lugard argued, a well-equipped militia, and particularly a strong police

Rent Seeking and Policing in CoEonial Africa 1301

force was needed. Unlike some of his contemporaries, Lugard truly under- stood colonialism: a business venture involving costs and benefits. Thus, the main problem facing his administration in Northern Nigeria was to minimise costs and maximise the benefits or returns of operating the vast properties captured from the emirates.

In an attempt t o minimise the costs of administering the huge territory, Sir Percy Girouard introduced the 1908 Police Reorganisation Scheme. The new High Commissioner confessed openly that policing in the territory was cruel, oppressive and was not sensitive to the needs of the indigenous people. H e decided to introduce drastic changes in policing in general and in the organisation of the police forces in particular. First, the Northern Nigeria Police was withdrawn from those areas that were said to be 'effectively policed by native police' and was subsequently re-assigned to the so-called 'purely pagan communities' without any specific duties (Ahire, 1991: 42). Second, the police force was withdrawn from prison duties, and third, the control of provincial police detachments was withdrawn from the District Superintendent of Police and vested in the Resident. Many researchers consider the 1908 Reorganisation as very important in colonial policing because for the first time the colonial government recognised the existence, 'within the indigenous society, of an alternative and viable police force' (Ahire, 1991: 42) and incorporated it in the formal organisation. The 1908 Reorganisation and Girouard's pronouncements marked the admission of the colonial authorities for the first time that 'they lacked both the resources and legitimacy effectively to control the activities of the colonized in the pre-capicalist enclaves, and they needed to rely on certain indigenous structures and institutions, and the partnership of indigenous ruling classes' (Ahire, 1991: 42). This realisation provided the impetus for the establishment of the Native Administration (NA) police to facilitate 'indirect rule'.

The British colonial rulers first established the NA police in the Muslim states of Northern Nigeria which had highly centralised pre-colonial social structures. After the holy war (jihad) of 1804, the Sultan of Sokoto appointed emirs (Muslim chiefs) to rule the emirates (Fika, 1978). Before the emergence of colonialism, the emirs possessed a contingent of bodyguards (the dogarai) who delivered edicts, collected faxes, arrested offenders and performed other police duties assigned by the emir. In addition, each emir also had a large number of slaves and servants. This highly organised pre- colonial social structure provided an excellent framework for the imposition of colonial institutions. Perham noted that,

Here, instead of the usual divisive tribalism, there was a high degree of cultural and religious uniformity, a much more developed system of administration than in most of the continent, a docile people which was already under the overlordship of a conquering class with a suzerain at

Sokoto. Nowhere was it easier administratively to impose a higher authority (quoted in Kirk-Greene, 1965: x).

The existing social structure in Northern Nigeria had well-defined channels for the extraction of rents, and thus appealed to the British merchants. In addition, it was based on a culture of domination that attracted the colonial officers. When Lugard was appointed the High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria, he saw the existing system as providing the British with a proper framework to impose their authority. In a speech at Sokoto in 1903, he declared that:

the Fulani in old times under Dan Fodio conquered this country. They took the right to rule over it, to levy taxes, to depose kings and create kings. They in turn have by defeat lost their rule, which has come into the hands of the British. All these things which I have said the Fulani by conquest took the right to do now pass to the British (quoted in Kirk- Greene, 1965: 43-44).

Thus, Lugard intended to maintain the existing social structure but modified it to suit British needs. The protectorate, he argued, would be ruled by two sets of rulers, British and native, both working together to maximise the objectives of the former. Lugard, however, emphasised that the British reserved the right to seize effective political power from any emir, levy taxes of any kind, control assignment of property rights, make new laws and abolish any laws deemed not to promote British interests in the territory, and delegate some authority to commissioned agents. The dele- gation of some authority to commissioned agents represented what came to be known as the principle of 'indirect rule'. Lugard felt that the British government was faced with an enormous task of administering the vast territories of Northern Nigeria. Indirect rule, he believed, would minimise the cost of controlling the protectorate since part of the burden of administration would be transferred to the native authorities without causing any significant loss of overall control by the British. Moreover, he felt that the reforms needed to place colonial officers at the local levels of administration would endanger British legitimacy and make the control of the protectorate more difficult. Indirect rule, according to its founder, thus, was not designed to protect the rights of the indigenous people or to help them develop sustainable democratic institutions. Some scholars mistakenly argue that the principle of indirect rule was designed to assist the indigenous people develop the capacity to eventually rule themselves (Temple, 1%8). Indirect rule was a political expediency, designed to convert pre-colonial institutional frameworks into channels, and the indigenous elites into agents, for the colonial subjugation of the people (Crowder, 1981). Although colonialism was usually imposed by destroying indigenous structures, a compromise


was made in Northern Nigeria. The adjustment in its traditional approach to domination, however, was not a sign of respect for the people, but an attempt to minimise the costs of operations. This is evidenced by the fact that most emirs. In Northern Nigeria were reduced from the position of autonomous paramount rulers to that of paid employees within the colonial state apparatus. It was in this context that the NA police was established in Northern Nigeria. In addition to other duties, the NA police served primarily to help maintain the authority of the indigenous rulers, many of whom were reduced to appendages of the colonial state. The colonial government viewed vagrancy among 'primitive pagans' as a serious threat to trade and order in the protectorate, and so assigned the armed constabulary the task of dealing with it. Conventional crime among the indigenous groups, regardless of its severity, was regarded as less important and so was assigned to the NA police.

In the Southern Provinces of Nigeria, the NA police forces were first established in Abeokuta in 1904, and eventually spread to Ibadan' (1907) and Egbado (1913). In 1918, the Native Authority Ordinance was passed giving indigenous chiefs formal authority to hire native police. Since the indigenous chiefs derived their authority from this ordinance, they were exercising statutory but not traditional authority (Morris and Read, 1972). In addition, the NA police directed most of their power at 'objects which had little relevance to traditional life' (Ahire, 1991: 46). Thus, in carrying out their duties, the NA police spent most of their time in checking possession of firearms, arresting and bringing to prosecution tax offenders, and preventing the cutting of timber. Little attempt was made to perform the traditional functions of the police that contribute to an improvement in social conditions for the people. This change in emphasis is explained by the fact that colonialism had significantly changed the traditionat concept of policing. Since the Native Administration served as a channel 'through which colonial authority filtered through to the colonized' (Ahire, 1991: 46), it was inevitable that the NA police would adopt the colonial concept of policing. Thus, the protection of commercial activities and the pacification of the people became the main duty of the indigenous institutions. In fact, since the colonial authorities reserved the right to 'establish, control and dismiss NA police' (Ahire, 1991: 48), it was a misnomer to call them native institutions. Tamuno (1970: 93-94) naively argued that the NA police forces were established to provide 'better police forces to assist in the maintenance of law and order, the preservation of public safety and the prevention, detection and punishment of crime'. The evidence presented here leads to a different conclusion. The NA police forces were part of the violence potential needed to help the colonial state maintain a monopoly on power and control property rights assignments, and enable British entrepreneurs to control commercial activities in the colonies. These forces were, thus, part of the military might used to help Britain establish political control of colonial Nigeria. Such control was essential for surplus extraction.

The colonial forces, thus, were rent seeking tools used to extract rents in an economy in which violence had become the most important method of rent seeking.

John Mukum Mbaku Department of Economics Weber State University Ogden Utah 84408-3807

Mwangi S. Kimenyi Department of Economics University of Connecticut Storrs Connecticut 06269-1063

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