Religio Unbiased Discussion

X X / 2 0 1 2 / 1 / T é m a

Introduction to the Discussion “Religious Studies as a Scientific Discipline: A Delusion?”

DaviD Zbíral

Thepaper“ReligiousStudiesasaScientificDiscipline:ThePersistenceof aDelusion” byLutherH.Martin andDonaldWiebe1was originallypresentedatthetenthannualconferenceoftheEuropeanAssociationfortheStudyofReligions(EASR)heldinBudapest,Hungary,from18to22September2011. I amveryhappy thatReligio: Revue pro religionistiku can now publish a revised version of this paper, andwish to thank theeditoroftheJournal of the American Academy of Religionwhosepermis-sionmadethispossible.ThepaperbyMartinandWiebemakestheclaimthatatrulyscientific

study of religion “is not ever likely to occur”.2Unlike various scholarsdiscussing the “ideologization” of the study of religions, however, theauthorsdonotseektheexplanationofbiasinindividualorcollectivein-terests, but in evolutionary mechanisms. “[R]eligiousness,” they assert,“willcontinuetoconstraintheacademicstudyofreligionevenasitwillcontinuetodominatetheconcernsofHomo sapiensgenerally.”3Ifsomehopestillremains,4itistobesought,accordingtotheauthors,inthecog-nitivescienceofreligion.5

Religiopublishesfiveresponsestothispaper,asvariedastherespectivebackgroundsofthedifferentauthors.HansGeraldHödl(UniversityofVienna)deliberatelyfocusesmoreon

Martin andWiebe’s assumptions thanon their reasoning.6Primarily, hediscussestheirviewofscienceandthedefinitionofreligiontheyuse,andarguesthattherearegoodreasonstopreferwiderdefinitionsofreligiontothosebasedon theconceptof superhumanagency.Moreover, forHödl,

1 LutherH.Martin–DonaldWiebe,“ReligiousStudiesasaScientificDiscipline:ThePersistenceofaDelusion”,Religio: Revue pro religionistiku20/1,2012,9-18.

2 Ibid.,9. 3 Ibid.,14. 4 Ibid.,13. 5 Ibid.,14,16. 6 HansGeraldHödl,“IsanUnbiasedScienceofReligionImpossible?”,Religio: Revue

pro religionistiku20/1,2012,19-26:19.

6 David Zbíral

religious bias is only one among others in the study of religion,7 anda“cleardemarcationlinebetweenobjectlanguageandmeta-language”8ismuchmorehelpfulinavoidingsuchbiasthantherealisticepistemologyadoptedbyMartinandWiebe.HubertSeiwert(UniversityofLeipzig)developsaninsightfulreflection

onthestatusoftheacademicstudyofreligionandonitshistory.Evenifheisnotoverlyoptimisticaboutthehistoricaldevelopmentofthedisci-pline,theimagehegivesissomewhatdifferentfromMartinandWiebe’s.9 Seiwertalsoarguesthattheproblemsfacingthestudyofreligionareun-specific,sharedwithotherdisciplinesfromthehumanities,10andthaton-tologicalnaturalismdoesnotofferaplausiblesolutiontotheseproblems.11 Radek Kundt (Masaryk University) shares the main assumptions of

MartinandWiebe,theirbackgroundinthecognitivescienceofreligion,aswellastheircriticalviewofthediscipline’shistoryandofconstructivistepistemology.However,hequestionstheextensionoftheirargument,andhighlights the possibilities of conscious reasoning, which is capable ofreducingtheimpactofunconsciousevolutionarymechanisms.12TomášBubík(UniversityofPardubice)frameshisresponsebyabrief

reviewofthestudyofreligionsincentralandeasternEurope,itsrelation-shiptotheology,andtheproblemofthesocialrelevanceofthehumanities.LikeHödlandSeiwert,Bubíkpointsoutyetotherbiasesthanthereligiousone,includingforexampleanti-religiouspropaganda.13Ontheotherhand,hestressesthatgoodworkhasbeendoneinthestudyofreligionsbytheo-logiansand/orattheologicalfaculties.14According toKockuvonStuckrad (UniversityofGroningen),Martin

andWiebeunderestimatetheacademicrigorofmanyundertakingsinthestudyofreligions,and,atthesametime,overestimatetherigorofnatural-istic approaches, including the cognitive “science” of religion.15 In the

7 Ibid.,24. 8 Ibid.,23. 9 Hubert Seiwert, “The Study of Religion as a Scientific Discipline:A Comment on

Luther Martin and DonaldWiebe’s Paper”, Religio: Revue pro religionistiku 20/1,2012,27-38:28-30.

10 Ibid.,30. 11 Ibid.,34. 12 RadekKundt,“AScientificDiscipline:ThePersistenceofaDelusion”, Religio: Revue

pro religionistiku20/1,2012,39-42:40. 13 TomášBubík,“RethinkingtheRelationshipbetweentheStudyofReligions,Theology

andReligiousConcerns:AResponsetoSomeAspectsofWiebeandMartin’sPaper”, Religio: Revue pro religionistiku20/1,2012,43-53:44-45.

14 Ibid.,45-46. 15 KockuvonStuckrad,“StrawMenandScientificNostalgia:AResponsetoLutherH.

MartinandDonaldWiebe”,Religio: Revue pro religionistiku20/1,2012,55-61:57.

7 Introduction to the Discussion…

author’swords,MartinandWiebeadopt“unreflectivebeliefinscience”,16 and they simplify the critique of realistic epistemology in 20th-centurythought by reducing it to a merely “postmodernist” and anti-scientificstance.ShouldtheEASRconferenceinBudapest,wherethepaperbyLuther

H.Martin andDonaldWiebewas originally given, be indicative of thestateofthediscipline,wemightassumethatthephilosophyofreligionandaquasi-theologicalkindofphenomenologyofreligionareagainmakingtheirwayintotheEuropeanstudyofreligions.Istillhopethisisnotthecase,butamoreactiveattitudewillmostlikelybenecessaryifthisdevel-opmentistobehalted.Atthesametime,arelativelynewplayer,thecog-nitivescienceof religion, ismoreandmorevisible in the field,anden-gages in fierce conflicts with the humanistic tradition of the study ofreligions in its “evolutionary” struggle for life space and recognition.Therefore Ibelieve thatdiscussionabout the standardswhichshouldbefollowedinthestudyofreligions–ifitistobeconsideredacademic,orevenscientific–hasbecomehighlytopicalonceagain.

16 Ibid.,58.

8 David Zbíral

SUMMARY

Introduction to the Discussion “Religious Studies as a Scientific Discipline: A Delusion?”

Inthistext,IintroducethespecialfeatureofReligio: Revue pro religionistiku20/1,2012,“ReligiousStudiesasaScientificDiscipline:ADelusion?”.Ibrieflysummarizethemainargumentoftheoriginalarticle“ReligiousStudiesasaScientificDiscipline:ThePersistenceofaDelusion”byLutherH.MartinandDonaldWiebe,andthoseofthefiveresponsesbyHansGeraldHödl,HubertSeiwert,RadekKundt,TomášBubík,andKockuvonStuckrad.Attheend,IreturntotheEASRconference2011inBudapest,Hungary,whereMartinandWiebe’spaperwasoriginallypresented,andcommentonthisevent.

Keywords: study of religions; religious studies; science; humanities; EASR conference2011inBudapest.

Ústavreligionistiky DaviD ZbíralFilozofickáfakultaMasarykovauniverzita [email protected]áka160200BrnoCzechRepublic

X X / 2 0 1 2 / 1 / T é m a

Religious Studies as a Scientific Discipline: The Persistence of a Delusion

luther h. Martin – DonalD Wiebe *

The title of our paper might well be taken as a gloss on that ofFreud’sThe Future of an Illusionor,perhaps,onthatofDawkins’The God Delusion.However,ourpaperisnotfocusedonthetheoreticalobjectofthestudyofreligion;ratheritisareflectivecommentonourownaspira-tionsforthefieldtowhichwehavecommittedourcareers.Thehistoricalrecord,wemaintain,showsthatnoundergraduatedepart-

mentsofReligiousStudieshavefullyimplementedascientificprogramofstudyandresearchsincesuchanapproachwasfirstadvocatedinthelatenineteenthcentury–muchlesshastherebeenanybroadestablishmentofsuchadisciplinaryfieldofstudy.Andweargue–onscientificgrounds–thatsuchstudyisnoteverlikelytooccurinthatoranyothersetting.Inour judgment, therefore, toentertainahope that suchadevelopment is,pragmatically speaking, possible, is to be in the grip of a false andun-shakeable delusion.And we “confess” that we ourselves have been sodeluded.

Assumptions

Ourargumentrestsonseveralassumptionswhichweholdtohaveaninitialplausibilityandaredefensibleeventhoughwewillnotpresentargu-ments in defenseof themhere.Our first assumption is that themodernwesternresearchuniversityisapurpose-designedinstitutionforobtainingknowledgeabout theworld.Thepursuitof thisknowledge issuccessfulonly when it is not in service of ideological, theological and religiousagendas.Rather,itsprimaryobjectiveisscientific,thatis,togainpublic(intersubjectivelyavailable)knowledgeofpublic(intersubjectivelyavail-able)facts.Our second assumptionisthatthestudyofreligionisthestudyofhumanbehaviorsthatareengagedinbecauseof,orsomehowrelatedto,abelief inagents thatarebeyond identificationbywayof thesensesor

* ThispaperwasfirstpresentedattheannualmeetingoftheEuropeanAssociationfortheStudyofReligions,Budapest,22September2011.TheeditorsofReligio: Revue pro religionistikuwishtothanktheeditoroftheJournal of the American Academy of Religion for his kind permission to republish this article, which will appear in theJournal of the American Academy of Religion80/2,2012.

10 Luther H. Martin – Donald Wiebe

scientificmetric.Our third assumption is that religions are intersubjec-tivelyavailableforanalysisandthat,asMaxWeberputit,noincalculableforces need come into play in explaining these phenomena.1 In otherwords,ascientificallyrespectableknowledgeofreligionandreligionsislogicallypossible.Our fourth assumptionisthatthecurrentanti-theoreti-calandanti-scienceposturingsofpostmodernismhavenotunderminedthecredibilityofmodernscienceasapeculiarlysuccessfulinstrumentofin-quiryintothecharacteroftheworld,eithernaturalorsocial.Our fifth and final assumption is thatcomprehensivescientificstudyofreligionisnotlikelytobeachievedbyscatteredscientificstudiesofoneoranotheras-pectof religious thoughtandbehaviorby those individualscholarswhoarecommittedtoscientificresearchonreligiousthoughtandbehavior.

The Historical Argument

It seems to us beyond question that what has come to be known asReligiousStudies–thatis,astudyofreligionsacademicallylegitimatedinseparate departments in modern western research universities – is theproductofaseriesofintellectualadvancesinEuropeanthoughtfromtheseventeenth through the twentieth century. These developments are al-readyevidentintheimplicitcritiqueofreligioninJeanBodin’sColloquium of the Seven about the Secrets of the Sublime (1683),adialogueamongseveneducatedmenrepresentingvariousreligions,confessionsandphilo-sophical schools of thought. By debating the fundamentals of religion,thesesevendisputantsbringreligionintodoubtandsuggesttheneedfortolerance,which,inturn,encouragedthe“comparative”studyofreligions.SomefiftyyearsafterBodin’s“interreligiousdialogue”,aseven-volumeworkonThe Religious Ceremonies and Customs of All the Peoples of the WorldbyJeanFredericBernardandillustratedbyBernardPicart(Englishedition 1733-1739) presented religions and their institutions as culturalpractices,whichhelpedmakepossibleasecularunderstandingofreligion.As historians of science Lynn Hunt, Margaret Jacob, and WijnandMijnhardt point out in their volume, The Book that Changed Europe: Picart and Bernard’s Religious Ceremonies of the World,Bernard’s andPicart’streatmentofreligion“encouragedreaderstodistancethemselvesfromreligiousorthodoxyofallkinds[totheextentthat][r]eligiousbeliefandpracticebecameanobjectofstudyforthesemenratherthananun-

1 MaxWeber,“ScienceasaVocation”,in:MaxWeber–HansHeinrichGerth–CharlesWrightMills,From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress1981(firstpublished1919).

11 Religious Studies as a Scientific Discipline: The Persistence…

questionedwayoflife”.2Thesepublicationsconstitutedamajorintellec-tualshiftintheconceptualizationofreligioninEurope.An evenmore important development for the re-conceptualizationof

religionwasthereconstructionofthenotionofreasonitselfintheseven-teenthandeighteenthcenturies.Thisnewmodeof thought involved thedissociationof knowledge andvirtue as essential components of reasonandreplaceditwiththenotionofreasonasanon-moralinstrumentofin-quiry that is equivalent to our contemporary understanding of scientificreasoning.ThiswasanessentialelementoftheEuropeanEnlightenmentthatcontributedtoafurtherre-conceptualizationofreligionbyseparatingitfromthepowerofthestate.InhisExplaining Religion: Criticism and Theory from Bodin to Freud,SamuelPreusclearlyshowsthatanewpara-digmfor the studyof religionemergedoutofEnlightenment rationalityanditscriticismofreligion.3Morerecently,GuyStroumsahaspointedoutinhisA New Science: The Discovery of Religion in the Age of Reasonthatthese intellectual developmentsmadepossible a scholarly and scientificstudyofreligionthatpredatestheestablishmentofuniversitydepartmentsforthatpurpose.4Itis,then,thenewscientificethosthatmadeitpossibleforscholarsin

themid-tolate-nineteenthcenturytoattemptanemancipationofthestudyof religion from religious constraints and to institutionalize anew,non-confessionalandscientificapproachtothestudyofreligions.TheiraimindoingsowasclearlytodistinguishknowledgeaboutreligionandreligionsfromthedevotionalandthetheologicalgoalsofreligionthatearlierheldswayinEurope’suniversitiesandotherinstitutionalsettings.ThefoundingfiguresinthatdevelopmentaregenerallyrecognizedtobeFriedrichMaxMüller inEngland andCornelisPetrusTiele in theNetherlands.Müllerfirstproposedtheideaofa“scienceofreligion”–aReligionswissenschaft,5 andTieleseemstohavebeenthefirsttohavesuccessfullyensconcedsuch

2 LynnHunt–MargaretJacob–WijnandMijnhardt,The Book that Changed Europe: Picart and Bernard’s Religious Ceremonies of the World, Cambridge: HarvardUniversityPress2010,27.

3 SamuelPreus,Explaining Religion: Criticism and Theory from Bodin to Freud,NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress1987.

4 Guy Stroumsa, A New Science: The Discovery of Religion in the Age of Reason,Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress2010,170,n.13.

5 FriedrichMaxMüller, Introduction to the Science of Religion, London: Longmans,Green and Co. 1870; id., “Essays on the Science of Religion”, in: id.,Chips from a German Workshop I, NewYork: Charles Scribner’s Sons 1881; id., “Science ofReligion:ARetrospect”,Living Age219,1898,909-913.

12

adisciplineinauniversitysettingonthebasisofacleardemarcationofitsintellectualactivitiesfromthoseofthescholar-devotee.6In reviewing the subsequent history of this newly founded scientific

enterprise, it is clear that by themiddle of the twentieth century – andespeciallysoafterthe1960swiththeaccelerateddevelopmentofdepart-mentsofReligiousStudiesinEuropeandNorthAmerica–thescientificobjectives of the newdiscipline had become seriously compromised byextra-scientificandnon-epistemicagendas.Asdisappointingasthismaybe,itis,inhindsight,notaltogethersurprisinggiventhatthematrixoutofwhich the field emerged was not simply the new intellectual ethos.Theologicalconcernswithmeaningandvaluespersistednotonlyinsoci-etyatlargebutalsowithininstitutionsofhighereducationthemselves,thesuccessors of the medieval Christian university. While the modern re-searchuniversityopeneditsdoorstoReligiousStudies,itdidsobysituat-ingsuchstudyin,orconnectedwith,pre-existingdepartmentsoftheologywhere Religious Studies flourished as a liberalized form ofGlaubenswissenschaft.Modern researchuniversities also establishedvarious facultiesofhu-

manitiesandotherinstitutionalstructurescharged,atleastimplicitly,withsimilarly inculcating values to undergraduates and providing themwithstructuresofmeaning.DepartmentsofReligiousStudieswherefacultiesoftheologydidnotpreviouslyexist–mostlyintheUS–weremostoftenassociatedwith thosesame“humanistic”objectiveswhich theyengagedby teaching what can only be characterized as “religion appreciation”courses.Donald Wiebe first documented this crypto-religious trend in the

growth and development of “Religious Studies” departments in theEnglish-speakingworldmorethanaquarterofacenturyagoinhisarticleon“TheFailureofNerveintheAcademicStudyofReligion”,7andpro-videdfurtherevidenceofthecontinuationofthisstateofaffairstwodec-adesagoinhisThe Politics of Religious Studies: The Continuing Conflict With Theology in the Modern University.8Thisassessmentmostrecentlyfinds strong confirmation in the material found in Religious Studies: A Global View, edited by Gregory Alles.9 The surveys of “Religious

6 CornelisPetrusTiele,Elements of the Science of Religion I: Morphological,Edinburgh:WilliamBlackwood 1897; id.,Elements of the Science of Religion II: Ontological,Edinburgh:WilliamBlackwood1897.

7 DonaldWiebe,“TheFailureofNerveintheAcademicStudyofReligion”,Studies in Religion 13, 1984,401-422, reprinted in: id.,The Politics of Religious Studies: The Continuing Conflict with Theology in the Academy,NewYork:St.Martin’sPress1991,141-162.

8 D.Wiebe,The Politics of Religious Studies… 9 GregoryAlles(ed.),Religious Studies: A Global View,London:Routledge2007.


13

Studies”inthisvolumeallrevealacontinuinginfluenceoftheologyonthefieldworld-wide.Itshowsthatinbothapoliticalandinstitutionalsense,theologyhasbeen,andtoalargeextentremains,thematrixoutofwhichtheacademicstudyofreligionhasemerged.Further,itshowsthattheaca-demicstudyofreligionremainssubservienttotheology,inhoweversubtleornuancedafashion,bycontinuingtosupporta learnedpracticeand/orappreciationofreligionratherthanbyanyscientificstudyofreligion.Werecognizeandemphaticallyacknowledgetheincreasingnumbersof

scholarsengagedinascientificstudyofreligionasindicated,forexample,bythelargenumberofunsolicitedscientificpapersandpanelssubmittedforpresentationattheXXthCongressoftheInternationalAssociationforthe History of Religions in Toronto in 2010.And, there are a growingnumberofinstitutesandprogramsdedicatedtosuchresearch,albeitpri-marilyatthegraduateandpost-graduatelevel(oftencompromised,how-ever, by funding from such religiously oriented sources like the JohnTempleton Foundation).10 However, there are depressingly few departments devoted to the study of religion from a naturalistic perspective –ahandfulatbest–muchlessanyfullycommittedtoascientificstudyofreligion.Itisalmostneedlesstosay,therefore,thatahistoryofthedevelopment

ofReligiousStudiesasascientificenterpriseinthemodernuniversityisanincoherentcontradictionthatrevealstensionsbetweenputativeclaimstoacademicstatusandtheactualrealityofcontinuinginfiltrationsofex-tra-scientificagendasintothefield.Anditisthisincoherencethatwehopetoexplainhere.

The Scientific Argument

Despiteourratherbleakhistoryofthescientificstudyofreligion,therehaveactuallybeenafewnotableattemptstoestablishsuchastudy.Inthemid-nineteenthcentury,anumberofscholarsofreligionrespondedquitefavorably to the publication of Darwin’sOn the Origin of the Species (1859).11Theirinitialattemptstounderstandthehistoryofreligionsinanevolutionaryframework,however,are tobedifferentiatedfromthemis-guidedembraceof“socialDarwinism”,primarilybyanthropologists.TheresultingcollapseofevolutionarytheoryinreligiousstudiescreatedwhathistorianofreligionSveinBjerkedescribesasa“nomotheticanxiety”,that

10 Cf. Donald Wiebe, “Religious Biases in Funding Religious Studies Research?”,Religio: Revue pro religionistiku17/2,2009,125-140.

11 LutherH.Martin,“Evolution,Cognition,andHistory”,in:LutherH.Martin–JesperSørensen(eds.),Past Minds: Studies in Cognitive Historiography,London:Equinox2011,1-10.

Religious Studies as a Scientific Discipline: The Persistence…


is,thefearofmovingbeyondpositivefactstogeneralization,whichcon-tinuestocharacterizethefieldtoday.12Inthelatenineteenthcentury,ofcourse,anacademicstudyofreligion

flourishedinthecontextofcomparativeandscientificphilology,apursuitstill profitably employed by textual scholars, though, perhaps,with de-creasing theoretical consequence. In themid-twentieth century, rationalchoicetheoryattractedasmallfollowing,thoughthisapproach,basedonclassic economic theory, has been challenged by behavioral economics,theimplicationsofwhich,toourknowledge,havenotbeenexploredbyscholarsofreligion.Thepromisingfieldofbehavioraleconomicsbuilds,inturn,upontheinsightsofresearchinthecognitivesciences,whichalsooffersthemostpromisingcontemporaryopportunityfordevelopingathe-oreticallycoherentscientificstudyofreligion.Interestingly,theapproachofthecognitivesciencesforthestudyofreligionwasalreadyanticipatedin1909bytheCambridgeclassicistJaneHarrison.CitingDarwin’sexpec-tations for the future of psychology,Harrison proposed an evolutionaryhistoryofreligionthatwouldfocuson“thenecessaryacquirementofeachmentalcapacity[forspecificreligiouspracticesandideas]bygradation”.13 Her proposal for understanding religion as a suite of evolved behavioralfeatures presciently articulated the agenda of contemporary evolutionarypsychologistsandcognitivescientists.Thecognitivesciencesnowofferanempirical,experimentallybased,

paradigmforthestudyofreligioninbothitscomparativeaswellasinitshistoricaldomains(asofculturalphenomenagenerally).Ironically,how-ever, it is the cognitive scienceswhich predict precisely the continuingsituationwehavedescribedforthehistoryofReligiousStudies.Topara-phraseNicholasHumphrey’sconclusionaboutreductionisttheorygener-ally,oneofthestrengthsofcognitiveresearchisthatitcanexplainhowtheexperienceofreligiousnessaddstopeople’slivesbyconvincingthemthatanyalternativeexplanationmustbefalse.14Inotherwords,religious-nesswillcontinue toconstrain theacademicstudyofreligionevenas itwill continue to dominate the concerns ofHomo sapiens generally.Asepitomized in the title ofRobertMcCauley’s newbook, this is because

12 Svein Bjerke, “Ecology of Religion, Evolutionism and Comparative Religion”, in:LauriHonko(ed.),Science of Religion: Studies in Methodology,TheHague:Mouton1979,237-248:242.

13 JaneE.Harrison,“TheInfluenceofDarwinismontheStudyofReligions”,in:A.C.Seward (ed.), Darwin and Modern Science: Essays in Commemoration of the Centenary of the Birth of Charles Darwin and of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Publication of the Origin of the Species,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress1909,494-511:497.

14 Nicholas Humphrey, Soul Dust: The Magic of Consciousness, Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress2011,204.


“religion”,fromanevolutionaryandcognitiveperspective,“isnaturalandscienceisnot”.15Onlybynotingthenaturalinterestsandanxietiesofor-dinaryhumanbeingscanwebegintoseetheraison d’êtreforthisstateofaffairs.Most briefly, ordinary evolutionary and cognitive defaults of human

brainshavebeenidentifiedbycognitivescientistsasunderlyingtheirreli-giousexploitation.Theseinclude,attheircenter,agentcausality.Humansareveryadeptatidentifyingagency–andwedosopre-reflectively,oftenonthebasisofminimalsensorystimuli.Thus,wearespontaneouslystar-tledby“bumpsinthenight”,byshadowymovementindarkandunfamil-iarplaces,byvagueandunfamiliarshapes,etc.Suchreflexiveresponses,which presumably arose during the proverbial “environment of [our]evolutionaryadaptedness”,endowedourspecieswithasurvivaladvantage–namely, aprecautionary readiness to respond topredatoryattack.Ourevolutionaryhistoryhas,inotherwords,endowedourspecieswithade-velopmentallyearlyproclivityforexplainingourworldintermsofagentcausality.Thishistoryhasresultedinamentalproclivityforinferringthepresenceofagentsevenwheretherearenone,forexample,theimaginarycompanionsclaimedbysome65%ofchildrenbetweentheagesof2and8world-wide,16thecross-culturalandtrans-temporalubiquityofghosts,thepopulationsof“littlepeople”universallyreportedinfolklore,aswellas theclaims tospiritsanddeitiesdocumentedgloballybyhistoriansofreligion.17And,ofcourse,ourdefaulthumanpenchantforagentcausalitymotivatesanunderstandingofreligioustraditionsintermsofaquestfortheactionsand“authentic”teachingsofreconstructedphantomfounders.Versionsofagentcausality,wesuggest,continuetoinformnotjustthe

studyofreligion,buthumanisticandsocial“scientific”studygenerally–forexample,byinvokingintentionality,aprimaryattributeofagency,toexplain and understand textual productions or behavioral motivation.18 Andassociatedwithintentionality,ofcourse,areteleologicalinferencesof

15 RobertMcCauley,Why Religion is Natural and Science is Not, NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress2011.Cf.id.,“TheNaturalnessofReligionandtheUnnaturalnessofScience”, in Frank C. Keil – RobertA.Wilson (eds.),Explanation and Cognition,Cambridge,MA:TheMITPress2000,61-85.

16 MarjorieTaylor, Imaginary Companions and the Children Who Create Them, NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress1999,32,156;MarjorieTaylor–StephanieM.Carlson–Bayta L.Maring – LynnGerow –CarolynM.Charley, “TheCharacteristics andCorrelatesofFantasyinSchool-AgeChildren:ImaginaryCompanions,Impersonation,andSocialUnderstanding”,Developmental Psychology40/6,2004,1173-1187.

17 StewartGuthrie,Faces in the Clouds: A New Theory of Religion,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress1993.

18 Andrew Shryock – Daniel Lord Smail, Deep History: The Architecture of Past and Present, Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress2011,8-11.


purposeormeaning,anotherdevelopmentallyearlycognitivedefaultthathasbeenidentifiedforourspecies.19Despiteadvancesinscientificknowl-edge,whicharecharacterizedbythereplacementofagentcausalitywithnaturalcausality,mostpeople–includingscientistsandscholars–never-thelessstilltendtofallbackonagentcausalitytomakeeverydaysenseofthe world. For example, various surveys indicate that some 40% ofAmericansrejectthescientifictheoryofevolutionwithitsmechanismofnatural selection in favor of some form of creationism,20 although inEuropeonlysome20%doso21–amorereasonablebutstillsignificantnumber.Suchnaturalisticreversionstopsychic“instincts”contributeatheoreti-

caldimensiontoourunderstandingaboutwhyWeber’spredictionofreli-gion’s deflation under conditions ofmodernization has largely failed tomaterialize.And,theseatavisticinferencesfromthoseordinarycognitivedefaultsexploitedbyreligionsofferanexplanationforthelargenumberofotherwiseveryintelligentpeople–includingleadingscientists–whoper-sist in retainingandexpressing rathernaïve religiousbeliefsevenwhilesuccessfullycultivating theirowncircumscribedcraft.AsHumphrey in-sightfullyconcludes,“[w]hat[really]mattersispsychologicalimpact,notphilosophicalrectitude.And,psychologically,theresultisthat[weall]…inhabitanenchantedworld”.22Wecanreferhere to thosescientistsandscholarswhoseemobligedtoofferthepublictheirstillenchantedviewsofreligion,23orotherwisebeguilingsentimentsaboutthemeaningoflife,typicallyinthefinalchapteroftheirspecializedstudies–butthat’sastoryforanothertime.Ourspecies’anti-scienceproclivityisastrueofprofessionalscholarsof

religionasofotherintellectuals,perhapsespeciallyso,giventheirsubjectof study.For such scholars are as susceptible as are specialists in otherfieldstocognitivelydefaultunderstandingsofreligiosity,andhavespent

19 Deborah Kelemen, “Are Children Intuitive Theists?”, Psychological Science 15/5,2004,295-301;PaulBloom,“IsGodanAccident?”,The Atlantic Monthly,December2005, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/12/is-god-an-acci-dent/4425/>[4May2012].

20 E.g., Doug Mataconis, “40% Of Americans, Majority Of Republicans, RejectEvolution”,<http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/40-of-americans-majority-of-republi-cans-reject-evolution/> [4May 2012]; “DespiteMedia Insistence,ManyAmericansRejectEvolution”,<http://www.opposingviews.com/i/despite-media-insistence-many--americans-reject-evolution>[4May2012].

21 E.g.,JamesOwen,“EvolutionLessAcceptedinU.S.ThanOtherWesternCountries,Study Finds”, <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2006/08/060810-evolution.html>[4May2012].

22 N.Humphrey,Soul Dust…,177,seealso202. 23 LutherH.Martin,“‘Disenchanting’theComparativeStudyofReligion”,Method and

Theory in the Study of Religion16,2004,36-44.


their livesinthestudyofreligionundertheinfluenceofwhatwemightterman“approbationbias”,thatis,apositive–evenapologetic–evalua-tion of religion.24This bias,which explains the teaching of religion as“appreciation courses”, exemplifies a “theory shyness” identified forReligiousStudiesalreadybyHansPennerandEdwardYonansomefortyyears ago in their article, “Is a Science ofReligion Possible?”.25 In nootherdepartmentof themodernuniversitydoresearcherssystematicallyavoidcriticalstudiesandtheoreticallybasedexplanationsoftheirsubjectof study (except,ofcourse, in the studyof literature–at least inNorthAmerica).Inthefaceofsuchcognitivedefaultsandthereflexiverespons-es theyprefigure,havingthemindofascientist requiresareflectivere-solvetodoso–andconsiderableeffortexplicitlytocultivatethecogni-tive, social, andmaterial conditions necessary to activelymaintain thatresolve.

Conclusion

We conclude with a close paraphrase of Dan Sperber’s and DeidreWilson’s critique of the semiotic program, which, we consider, appliesaptlytoReligiousStudiesaswell.Likesemiotics,thehistoryofReligiousStudieshasbeenoneofsimultaneousinstitutionalsuccessandintellectualbankruptcy.Ontheonehand,therearenownumerousdepartments,insti-tutes,associations,congressesandjournalsdedicatedtoReligiousStudies.Ontheotherhand,theacademicstudyofreligionhasfailedtoliveuptoearlierpromisesof theoreticalcoherenceandscientific integrity; indeed,such promises have been severely undermined.This is not to deny thatmanyinthefieldhavedonevaluableempiricalwork,andareincreasinglydoingso.However,itdoesnotfollowthat“ReligiousStudies”as a field hasbeenproductive,letalonetheoreticallysound;merelythatithasnotbeenentirelysterile.26Three decades ago, after reviewing the literature in the field,Wiebe

concludedthat“allthesignspointinthedirectionoffutureresearchinthefieldofreligiousstudiesbeingincreasinglytheoretical,and,concomitant-ly,increasinglyfruitful”,27aconclusion,withwhichMartinalsoagreedat

24 LutherH.Martin,“TheUses(andAbuse)oftheCognitiveSciencesfortheStudyofReligion”,CSSR Bulletin37,2008,95-98.

25 Hans Penner – Edward Yonan, “Is a Science of Religion Possible?” Journal of the American Academy of Religion52/2,1972,107-133.

26 ThisargumentisadaptedfromDanSperber’sandDierdreWilson’sobservationscon-cerning the current state of semiotics: Dan Sperber – Dierdre Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition,Oxford:Blackwell21995,7.

27 DonaldWiebe,“TheoryintheStudyofReligion”, Religion13,1983,283-309:305.

18

thattime.Wewerewrong.Wenowunderstandthatwewerebothdeludedbyouroverly-optimisticbutcognitivelynaïveexpectationsforthedevel-opmentofatrulyscientificfieldforthestudyofreligioninthecontextofamodern,researchuniversity.Thecognitivesciences,themostpromisingapproach to date for developing a coherent research paradigm for suchastudy,notonlyoffersinsightintothefailureofanysuchdevelopmentinthe150yearhistoryofour field,despiteinitialresolvestothecontrary,butaffordsus–WiebeandMartin–anexplanatorypalliativeforourpersistentdelusionaboutanypossibilitiesforsuchascience.

SUMMARY

Religious Studies as a Scientific Discipline: The Persistence of a Delusion

ThehistoricalrecordshowsthatnoundergraduatedepartmentsofReligiousStudieshavefullyimplementedascientificprogramofstudyandresearchsincesuchanapproachwasfirstadvocatedinthelatenineteenthcentury–muchlesshastherebeenanybroadestablish-mentofsuchadisciplinaryfieldofstudy.Andweargue–oncognitive-andneuro-scientif-icgrounds–thatsuchstudyisnoteverlikelytooccurinthatoranyothersetting.Inourjudgment,therefore,toentertainahopethatsuchadevelopmentis,pragmaticallyspeaking,possible,istobeinthegripofafalseandunshakeabledelusion.Andwe“confess”thatweourselveshavebeensodeluded.

Keywords: religious studies; history of religions; scientific study of religion; cognitivescience;methodology.

DepartmentofReligion luther h. MartinUniversityofVermont481MainStreet [email protected],Vermont05405USA

TrinityCollege DonalD WiebeFacultyofDivinityUniversityofToronto [email protected],OntarioCanadaM5S1H8


X X / 2 0 1 2 / 1 / T é m a

Is an Unbiased Science of Religion Impossible?

hans GeralD höDl

Myresponsetotheessay“ReligiousStudiesasaScientificDiscipline:ThePersistenceofaDelusion”byLutherH.MartinandDonaldWiebe1isdivided intosevenparagraphs.Paragraph1and2giveanoutlineof theargumentMartinandWiebehavebroughtforthandashortdescriptionofwhatthefocusofmycriticalremarkswillbe.Inparagraph3-5,Idiscussthemainassumptionsthatthelineofthoughtofthearticleunderconsid-erationrestsupon.Paragraph6sumsupthequestionsraised.Inparagraph7,IaddsomefurtherreflectionswithrespecttothebroaderframeworkofReligious Studies. My critical comment is not intended to be a fully-fledged analysis of the essay in question, but rather aims at pointing tosomerelevanttopicsthatcouldbetakenintoconsiderationbytheauthorsinordertofurtherdeveloptheirargument.(1)Theauthorsclaimthattheestablishmentofanunbiased,scientific

StudyofReligionswillinevitablyfacegreatdifficulties,becausethereli-giousworldviewisrathermorethanlessastandardfeatureofhumanna-ture. If they are right, they have found a scientific explanation for thepersistenceof“theologically”informedstudiesofreligionswithintheaca-demicfieldandoutside“theologyproper”.Thereisironyofhistory(ofouracademicfield)toit,sincethetwoauthorsexplainreligionasastandardfeatureofhumanbeingsinaratherdifferentwaythanthepropagatorsofa“science”ofreligionbaseduponthestandardsui generisdefinitionofreligiondid.(2)Todiscusstheirpapermeanseithertodiscusstheassumptionstheir

reasoningrestsonorthesoundnessoftheirreasoning.Iwillconcentrateonthefirsttask.Asitisnotpossibleheretoexamineindetailthefiveas-sumptions theauthorsnameat thebeginningof thepaper (p.9-10)andsome further definitions they use, Iwillmainly restrictmyself to somehints concerningwhat an in-depth analysis of these assumptions shouldtakeintoconsideration.(3)Assumption1and4 seem todefine thenatureof “science”asan

undertaking to accumulate knowledge about theworld, both the natural

1 LutherH.Martin–DonaldWiebe,“ReligiousStudiesasaScientificDiscipline:ThePersistenceofaDelusion”,Religio: Revue pro religionistiku20/1,2012,9-18.Allre-ferencesinthetext,unlessotherwisenoted,aretothisarticle.

20

andthesocial.Theauthorsareconvincedthat,theoretically,scientificre-searchcanbeundertakeninanunbiasedway.Thefirstassumptiongivesa“minimaldefinition”of theobjectiveofscientific research thathardlyanyonewillreject:gainingintersubjectivelyaccessibleknowledgeofin-tersubjectivelyaccessiblefacts.2Disagreementwillprobablyemergewhenanattemptismadetodefineboththeadjective“intersubjective”andtheconceptof“fact”Tomaketheirpointclear,intheirfourthassumptiontheauthorsrejectwhattheycall“theanti-scienceposturingsofpostmodern-ism”(p.10).TouseaphrasecoinedbyHansH.PennerandEdwardA.Yonan, this strikesmeas sortof“Fabian tacticsofwinningamethodo-logicalbattlebyavoidingit”.3Onedoesnothavetobea“postmodernist”–whateverthatmaybe–tounderstandthatinsciencetherearenobarefactsoutsidetheirconstructionbythemethodologicalapproach.Inscienceit is always a certain– and thereforedefined– sectorof reality4 that isresearched by using at least one specified method. The establishing ofastudysubjectthereforeinvolvesaconstructionof“facts”.Thisconstruc-tionrestsonatheory(atleast,animplicitone).Thisway,therearenofactsoutsidethetheory.5Accordingly,theminimalrequirementforintersubjec-tivitymeansthatdefinitions,sources,hypotheses,assumptionsandsoon,onwhich the theory rests, aswell as themethodological steps taken toarriveattheconclusion(s)(“knowledgeaboutfacts”),arelaidopen.Giventhat,everyoneisabletocheckthewaythatagivenresearcherhasarrivedatcertainconclusions,atleasttheoretically.Therefore,“facts”constructedbymeanstheoreticallynotopentobecheckedbyeveryone–forexample,intuition, innerexperience,channellingand the like–cannot,bydefini-tion,becountedasvaluablesourcesofscientifictheories.6Nevertheless,thenamedallegedwaysofgainingknowledge, likechannelling, canbemadesubjectsofscientificinquiry.Thisdistinctionhasbeenthenerveofcriticalargumentsagainsttheoriesinthefieldthatclaimasui generis sta-tusforreligion,inasfarasthoserecurtoreligiousexperience.

2 Withmyreservationstotheconceptofa“barefact”inmind,Iwouldprefertosubsti-tute“knowledge”by“theory”.

3 HansH.Penner–EdwardA.Yonan,“IsaScienceofReligionPossible?”,The Journal of Religion52/2,1972,107-133:133.

4 Sureenough,thiscanalsobetheinteractionbetweendefinedsectorsofreality. 5 Forthefieldof“StudyofReligions”thispointhasbeenparadigmaticallyformulated

inthefamousintroductionofJonathanZ.Smith,Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown,Chicago–London:UniversityofChicagoPress1988,XI-XIII.

6 In contrast to facts established by the archetype of scientific inquiry in themodernsense, theexperiment: tochangeonevariableofasettingandtorecord thereactioncausedthereby.

Hans Gerald Hödl

21

(4)WhileIfullyagreewiththeauthorsthatscientificinquiryin itselfis– ideally – anunbiasedundertaking, I neither share their descriptionofpossiblebiases,northeideatheyseemtohold,thatscientificinquiryissetwithinanunbiasedframework.Certainly,CliffordGeertzisrightincalling“disinterestedobservation”acentralcharacteristicofthescientificattitudetowardstheworldandapossiblesourceofconflictbetween“science”asaculturalsystemandother,morebiasedculturalsystemslike“ideology”.7 Nevertheless,“ideology”cannotsolelybereducedtothereligiouspointofview, and history providesmore examples of science being utilised byvariousideologiesthanwecannamehere.8Astheauthorsputit,univer-sity is “apurpose-designed institution”and thepurposeof it is “knowl-edge”(p.9).Buttherearemanifoldinterests(ofthesocietyasawholeorof special groups within the society) behind the scientific project. Thecognitiveinterestveryrarelyisbutcognitive.9Naturalandtechnicalsci-ences,forexample,aremostlyundertakenwiththeinterestofgeneratingmoreeffectivewaysofcontrollingtheenvironment.Whatcouldtheinter-estbehinda“scienceofreligion”possiblybe?(5)Theauthorsdefinereligionas“humanbehaviorsthatareengagedin

becauseof,orsomehowrelatedto,abeliefinagentsthatarebeyondiden-tificationbywayofthesensesorscientificmetric”(p.9-10)10andderivethehumanbeing’s inclination to explain theworldby “agent causality”fromphylogeny.Thisapproachraisestwoquestions:a)Althoughthereishardlyareligiontobefound,inwhichsuperhumanagentsplaynoroleatall,canwereallyreducereligiontoasystemofexplainingtheworldbyrecurringtothoseagentsandsystemsofinteractingwiththem?b)Evenifso,doesourproclivitytoexplaintheworldbyagentcausalityhinderustostudythesephenomena?Ada):Thisisnottheplacetodiscussthemanywaysinwhichreligion

hasbeendefined.Almostallofthedefinitionsproposedhavetheirstrongpointsandtheirshortcomings.Thereareessentialistandsocialfunctional-

7 SeeCliffordGeertz,The Interpretation of Cultures,NewYork:BasicBooks1973,111,330-333.

8 Forexample,seeWernerDostal,“SilenceintheDarkness:GermanEthnologyintheNationalSocialistPeriod”,Social Anthropology2,1994,251-262.

9 This has been reflected by Nietzsche in his “philosophy of science”; see BabetteBabich,Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science on the Ground of Art and Life,Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress1994.

10 ThisisveryclosetothecurrentdefinitioninCognitiveScienceofReligion:religionbeinglookedatasessentiallythebeliefinsuperhumanagents,see,forexample,JesperSørensen,“ReligioninMind:AReviewArticleoftheCognitiveScienceofReligion”,Numen52,2005,465-494:466-467,470.


22

istdefinitions(thatstresstherolereligionplaysforsociety),11thosethatcentreontheroleofreligionascognitivesystems,12descriptivedefinitions– as brought forth by Kurt Rudolph13 – and the dimensional models.Awidely knownof the latter type isNinianSmart’s sevendimensionalmodel, as put forth in the introduction to the second edition of The World’s Religions.14Inaway,dimensionalmodelsareasub-genreofde-scriptivedefinitions,astheyratherattempttodefinereligionbydelineat-ingthephenomenonthantogiveonecentralfeature.Theirbestuseis,inmyopinion,heuristic,buttheyleaveuswiththequestion:whatisit,then,thatmakesallthesefeaturesreligiousones?Bylookingatonedimensionindetail,weareonlyleftwiththequestion:“Whatexactlyisitthatmakesritualactivity,narrativesabout theoriginof theworld,doctrines,ethicalsystemsandsoonreligious ones?”MartinandWiebeproposethatitistherolethat“agentcausality”playsinthefieldsodescribed,whilstRudolphprefers a more general wording, naming “superhuman or supernaturalforcesofvariouskinds”.15Rudolph’sanswersseemsmoreapttomethanthedefinitionbyWiebeandMartin:thedimensionof“ritual”isakindofumbrellatermforvariouskindsofactivity,whichcan,butdonothaveto,referto“superhumanbeings”,takeforexampleinitiationritesorcalendri-calrites.16Creationmythsdonotineverycaseinvolve“superhumanbe-

11 Prevalent in sociologyandanthropology,moreor less in the traditionofDurkheim,MalinowskiorRadcliffe-Brown.RobinHorton,Patterns of Thought in Africa and the West: Essays on Magic, Religion and Science,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress1993,19,hasdescribedthisapproachaslookingatreligionas“aclassofmetaphoricalstatements and actions obliquely denoting social relationships and claims to socialstatus”.

12 In the tradition of Tylor’s minimal definition, “belief in spiritual beings”. RobinHorton,Patterns of Thought in Africa and the West…,31-32,givesaninterestingdefi-nition that somewhat combinesTylor’s approachwith a central aspect of the socialfunctionalistview:“…anextensionofthefieldofpeople’ssocialrelationshipsbeyondtheconfinesofpurelyhumansociety…inwhichthehumanbeingsinvolvedseethem-selvesinadependentpositionvisàvistheirnon-humanalters”.

13 „DervoneinerTraditionbestimmteGlaubeeinerGemeinschaftodereinesIndividuumsandenEinflußübermenschlicheroderüberirdischerwirksamerMächteunterschiedli-cherArtaufdasnatürlicheundgesellschaftlicheGeschehenunddiedarausresultieren-deVerehrung derselben durch bestimmteHandlungen, die von derGemeinschaft infestenFormenüberliefertwerden(Tradition),undumdiesicheinBestandvonlehrhaf-ten, schriftlich oder mündlich tradierten Vorstellungen gruppiert“ (Kurt Rudolph,Geschichte und Probleme der Religionswissenschaft,Leiden–NewYork–Köln:E.J.Brill1992,44).

14 NinianSmart,The World’s Religions,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress21998,19-28.

15 „übermenschliche[r] oder überirdische[r]wirksame[r]Mächte unterschiedlicherArt“(K.Rudolph,Geschichte und Probleme der Religionswissenschaft…,44).

16 Fortypesofritual,onegoodoverviewstillisCatherineBell,Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions,Oxford–NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress1997,93-137.

Hans Gerald Hödl

23

ings”,unlessonewantstoincludeants,spiders,thesunandarchetypicalhumanbeingswithin that category (see theNavajo creationmyth),17 orwomenthathavebeenkilledwiththeoutcomethattheirbodilypartshavebeentransformedtothebasiccropsofagiveneconomy.18Itseemsmoreplausibletometointerpretthesemythsnotwithreferenceto“agentcau-sality”, but to analogies –metaphors andmetonymies – to parts of thehumanbodyortheenvironment,usedtoconstructtheclassificationsthatordertheworld.19Inotherwords,Idonotthinkthatsemioticsshouldbedischargedofintheanalysisofreligiousthoughtforthesakeofcognitivescience.Adb):Take,forexample,thedefinitiongivenbyMelfordSpirointhe

sameveinastheonebytheauthors,accordingtowhichreligionis“acul-turalsystemconsistingofculturallypatternedinteractionwithculturallypostulatedsuper-humanbeings”.20Thisdefinitionusesaclearlydefinedmeta-language to religious language,and inmuchof thewritingsof re-searchersinthefieldwecanfindthissortofmeta-language.Noneofthewordsusedstemsdirectlyfromareligiousframework,asitisthecaseinmuchofthewritingsofthoseauthorsthatarerightlydismissedasbeingthe propagators of a religiousworld-view in the disguise of being aca-demic(intheMartinandWiebe’ssenseoftheword)scholarsofreligion.Some of the definitions rendered above alsomeet that requirement. Toreturn to semiotics oncemore, aminimal requirement of scientific lan-guage,when itcomes to theory, is that there isacleardemarcation linebetweenobjectlanguageandmeta-language.Oneoftheshortcomingsofreligiouslybiased“studyofreligions”isthatithasblurredthisdemarca-tion line, tosay the least.Therehavebeencritics to thatattitude.There

17 Trudy Griffin-Pierce, Earth is My Mother, Sky is My Father: Space, Time, and Astronomy in Navajo Sandpaintings,Albuquerque:UniversityofNewMexicoPress1992, 30-35; Charles H. Long, Alpha: The Myths of Creation, NewYork: GeorgeBraziller1963,53-57.

18 As for example in the Hainuwele myth from Ceram (Seram), as recorded by theFrobeniusexpeditionandinterpretedbyAdolfE.Jensen,Hainuwele: Volkserzählungen von der Molukkeninsel Ceram,FrankfurtamMain:Klostermann1939,39-43;id.,Das religiöse Weltbild einer frühen Kultur,Stuttgart:Schröder1948.Aninterpretationofthatmythregardingitasalateradaptationofanoldcreationmythinordertocopewitha“cargosituation”isgivenbyJonathanZ.Smith,Map Is Not Territory: Studies in the History of Religions,Chicago–London:UniversityofChicagoPress21993,302-308,takingupalineofthoughtalsodevelopedinid.,Imagining Religion…,96-101.

19 Fortheuseofreligiousrituals,taboosandtheliketoconstructandsustainthebasicclassifications inanysociety,seeMaryDouglas,Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo,NewYork:Praeger1966.ThereisalsoareferencetoLévi-Straussinthisremark.

20 MelfordE.Spiro,“ReligionandtheIrrational”,in:JuneHelm(ed.),Proceedings of the 1964 Annual Spring Meeting of the American Ethnological Society,Seattle:UniversityofWashingtonPress1964,102-115:103.


24

have been definitions of religion – like the ones bySpiro andRudolphquotedabove–thatdonotfallintothattrap.Thisis,forme,aproofthathumanbeingsarecapableofmakingtheverydistinctionbetweenspeakingaboutreligionandreligiousspeech.Sowhereistheallegedimpossibilitytoleavethereligiouspointofviewwhentalkingaboutreligion?(6)Conclusion:Questions to be examined inmore detail in order to

proveordisprovetheauthors’propositionasoutlinedin(1):a)Ifthedelu-siontheauthorstalkaboutwasanecessaryoneinthestrictsenseoftheword–thatmeans:humanbeingshadtofallintobecauseoftheirbiologi-calorganisationacquired inphylogeny,determining theiroutlook to theworld–howcouldtheyeverfindoutthiswasadelusion,eveniftheythinkitisinevitable(see5b)?b)Isittrue,thatreligionisinitsessenceabeliefinandinteractionwithsuperhumanbeingsofthekindthatispostulatedintheterm“agentcausality”(see5a)?c)Istheresomethinglikeanunbiasedscienceinthestrictsenseoftheword?Whatotherbiasesthanthereligiousone,asconceivedofbytheauthors,couldtherebe(see4)?d)Whatisthenatureofscientificinquiry(see3)?(7)TherearesomeotherquestionsIcouldhavebroughtforth,butfor

thesakeofbrevityhaveleftout.Thereisalsoan“answer”Ihavecometo,withrespecttothenatureofreligion.Importantasthebeliefinsuperhu-manbeingsandagentcausalitymaybeforthereligiousworld-view,Idonotthinkthatwewillhavedoneawaywiththemainquestionsthatreli-gions(purportto)giveananswertobysimplyleavingsuperhumanbeingsout.Veryoften,religionisdefinedwithreferencetotranscendence.Thisneed not to be an essentialist definition, as the example of Luckmannshows.Thisalsoholds for thedefinitionof religionasbrought forthbyCliffordGeertz,21whatever its shortcomingsmight be.22Humanbeingslive inaworldofmeaning.Science in itself (thedisinterestedpositivistsearchforknowledge)cannotprovidemeaning;itisbutatool.Religionseemstobeaculturalsystemamongothers(likeart)thatprovidemeaninginamoregeneralsense than, forexample,personal relationships.Therearesomequestionsthat,asfarasweknow,amongthelivingcreaturesonourplanet,onlyhumanbeingsput,because theyare theonlyonescon-scious of death and able to construe the concept of an “absolute”.23 Religionsgiveananswertothatquestions,andaslongashumanbeings

21 C.Geertz,The Interpretation of Cultures…,87-125. 22 See the critical discussion by NancyK. Frankenberry – Hans H. Penner, “Clifford

Geertz’s Long-Lasting Moods, Motivations, and Metaphysical Conceptions”, The Journal of Religion79,1999,617-640.

23 Anditwouldbeimprecisetosimplysubsumetheideaoftheabsoluteunderthecate-goryof“superhumanbeing”,althoughtheabsolutecanbeconceivedinananthropo-morphicway.

Hans Gerald Hödl

25

willaskthatquestions,anunbiasedstudyofreligionsseemsimpossible,not because of a religious determination of human beings based in thestructureoftheirbrains,but,becauseofthesimple“fact”thatanswerstothesequestionscannotbegivenbysciencein itself.24Howevertheseques-tionswill be answered,whether the religiousway or not, therewill bea“bias”thatisbasedinanattitudedistinctfromthatofthe“disinterestedscientist”.Incasethattheauthorsarerightwiththeirdefinitionofreligionasbeingbuiltupontheassumptionof“agentcausality”,Iwouldsay,thereligiousstateofhumanityistobedescribedasthestateinwhichhumanbeingshavegivenananswertothesequestionsbyuseofthemetaphorofhumanagents.25

24 ThisisaKantianargumentthatIcannotdevelopintheframeworkofthisshortreply. 25 Mostsuperhumanagentsareanthropomorphicinnature.


26 Hans Gerald Hödl

SUMMARY


InthispaperIpresentacriticaldiscussionoftheessay“ReligiousStudiesasaScientificDiscipline:ThePersistenceofaDelusion”byLutherH.MartinandDonaldWiebe(Religio: Revue pro religionistiku20/1,2012,9-18).Thefocusoftheargumentationliesontheas-sumptionstheauthorsadopt.Theauthors’understandingofthenatureofscience,concern-ingbothmethodologyandthetheoryofscience,istakenintoconsideration,andtheirdefini-tionofreligionisdiscussedonthebackgroundofotherdefinitionsavailable.Asanoutcome,fourquestionsareformulatedthatshouldbetakenintoaccountinfurtherdiscussionsofthetopic.Finally,someremarksconcerningthenatureofreligionsareadded.Ithinkthatthe“Tylorian”definitionofreligionusedbytheauthorsistoonarrowandIoptforanunder-standingofreligionasbasedonthecentralquestionsfacinghumanbeingsaboutthemean-ingoflifethatreligionspurporttogiveanswersto.Thepersistenceofreligionisbetterex-plainedbytheabilityofthehumanbeingtoasksuchquestionsthanbytheevolutionarilyacquiredproclivitytowards“agentcausality”.Itrytoshowthatthiscanbeachievedatthelevelofmeta-languagethatisclearlydelineatedfromreligiousobjectlanguage.

Keywords:definitionofreligion;natureofscientificinquiry;agentcausality;religionandmeaning.

InstitutfürReligionswissenschaft hans GeralD höDlUniversitätWienSchenkenstrasse8-10 [email protected]

X X / 2 0 1 2 / 1 / T é m a

The Study of Religion as a Scientific Discipline: A Comment on Luther Martin and Donald Wiebe’s Paper

hubert seiWert

LutherMartinandDonaldWiebecharacterizetheirpaper1asareflec-tivecommentontheiraspirationsfor thefieldofReligiousStudies theyhavecommitted their careers to (p.9).As it turnsout, theseaspirationshavebeenfrustratedbydevelopmentsinthefieldinrecentdecades.ThemainreasonforthisisthesupposedinfluenceoftheologicalandreligiousagendasinReligiousStudies(p.12-13).However,theauthorsgofurtherthan complaining. They argue that a scientific programme of ReligiousStudies“isnoteverlikelytooccur”(p.9)andthattoentertainthehopeforit“istobeinthegripofafalseandunshakeabledelusion”(p.9).To support this central thesis, the authors develop two lines of argu-

ment:The “historical argument” tries to show that the studyof religionactuallywasascientificenterprise in thenineteenthcentury,although itlaterbecamecompromisedbynon-scientificagendas.The“scientificargu-ment”reliesontheoriesproposedbytheCognitiveScienceofReligiontoexplainwhytheybelievethatReligiousStudieswillneversucceedines-tablishingatrulyscientificprogramme.Atthesametime,andsomewhatincontradiction,theyrecommendthecognitivesciencesasthemostprom-isingmeansofdevelopingatheoreticallycoherentscientificstudyofreli-gion.BeforeIcommentonthispaperIshouldmakeclearinthefirstplace

thatIbelieveitisapolemicpamphletaimedatprovokingandcriticisingbutnotatelaboratingsophisticatedargumentsdemandingdetaileddiscus-sion.ButastheeditorsofReligio: Revue pro religionistikuconsiderthisprovocativepaper anopportunity to launchadebateon thedisciplinarystatusofReligiousStudies,Iamhappytoparticipate.As things stand,Martin andWiebe’s paper is the point of reference.

IshallthereforeroughlyfollowitsoutlineandfirstconsiderthehistoricalargumentbroughtforwardtosubstantiatethethesisthatReligiousStudiesare not a scientific discipline, nor are they ever likely to become one.

1 LutherH.Martin–DonaldWiebe,“ReligiousStudiesasaScientificDiscipline:ThePersistenceofaDelusion“,Religio: Revue pro religionistiku20/1,2012,9-18.Allre-ferencesinthetext,unlessotherwisenoted,aretothisarticle.

28

AlthoughIsharemanyoftheirviews,Idisagreewiththeideathatreligionisasubjectsui generisandtheStudyofReligionisthereforesubstantiallydifferent from other scientific disciplines. The second point deals withtheir “scientific argument”, which relies on insights from the cognitivescience of religion to support their thesis. Finally Iwillmake some re-marksonthepitfallofontologicalnaturalismastheoreticalapproachtotheStudyofReligion,whichisabouttosubstituteoneideologicalagendainReligiousStudiesbyanother.

Religious Studies as an Academic Discipline: Historical and Institutional Aspects

Theauthorsstartwiththeobservationthatnoundergraduatedepartmentof Religious Studies has fully implemented a scientific programme ofstudyandresearch(p.9).Theyexplaintheobjectiveofscientific researchasbeing“togainpublic(intersubjectivelyavailable)knowledgeofpublic(intersubjectively available) facts” (p. 9). Given this explanation, it ap-pears strange tomaintain that Religious Studies hitherto have not beenengaged inascientificresearchprogramme.Unlessweregardhistoricalresearchasfictionwriting,weshouldthinkthatitisdealingwithintersub-jectively available facts to gain intersubjectively available knowledge.HistoryofReligionshasfordecadesbeenacommondesignationforthedisciplinefromwhichtheStudyofReligionemerged,ascanbeseenfromthenamestillbeingusedbytheInternationalAssociationfortheHistoryofReligions(IAHR).Historicalstudiesarenotascience,butIwouldnotagreethatthehistoryofreligionsgenerallyhasbeenorisintheserviceofideological,theologicalorreligiousagendas;anditishardtoimaginethatLutherMartin,whoseworks includemany fine pieces of historical andcomparativestudies,wouldconsiderthehistoryofreligionsafutileenter-prise.Their“historicalargument”suggeststhatinthenineteenthcenturythere

emergedascientificprogrammetostudyreligion,whichhasbeencompro-misedbymore recentdevelopments (p.12).Although theirviewof themythicancestorsofthedisciplinesuchasFriedrichMaxMüllermaybeidealized, Iconcede thatmuchwhichnowadaysrunsunder thenameof“ReligiousStudies”inNorthAmericaincludesteachingandresearchwithideological, theological, religious and political agendas. “ReligiousStudies”isnotanacademicdisciplinebutacatch-alltermfordealingwithreligioninallkindofacademicfashions.Thus,partoftheproblemister-minological.ReligiousStudiesisnottheheiroftheacademicancestorstheauthors refer to, but a conglomeration of – well – religious studies.“Religionswissenschaft” to some extent is better off as a discipline, al-

Hubert Seiwert

29

thoughitshistoryinGermanyandothernorthEuropeancountrieshasbeenheavilyinfluencedbyliberalProtestanttheology.Still,itiseasiertoarguefor theautonomyand integrityofReligionswissenschaft asanadademicdisciplinethantodefinetheboundariesofReligiousStudies.Itisintrigu-ingthattheterm“scienceofreligion”,whichwascoinedbytheGerman-bornOxfordprofessorFriedrichMaxMüller,didnotgaincurrencyintheEnglish-speakingworld.AscanbeseeninGermany,tohaveanunambiguousnameishelpfulfor

establishingtheStudyofReligionasanacademicdisciplinedistinctfromotherreligiousstudies,althoughitisnotsufficient.AnumberofchairsforReligionswissenschaftatGermanuniversitiesbelongtofacultiesoftheol-ogyanditisanon-goingproblemthatthechairholdersmustbemembersofChristianchurches.EvenifthissituationisslightlydifferentfromNorthAmericanuniversitieswhereReligiousStudiesarelinkedtopre-existingdepartmentsof theology, it isobviousthatdisciplinaryidentitydemandsinstitutionalisationasanautonomousdiscipline.Ontheinternationallevel,theInternationalAssociationfortheHistoryofReligionswasarathersuc-cessful attempt at institutionalising a field of religious researchwithoutatheologicalorreligiousagenda.Despiteitsformerdominationbyliberaltheologiansandunavoidableinternaldifferences,itusedtogivetheStudyofReligionaninstitutionalisedidentitydistinctfromreligiouslyengagedreligiousstudies.InNorthAmericaattemptsat institutionalising thediscipline seem to

havesufferedasetback.In1985theNorthAmericanAssociationfortheStudy ofReligion (NAASR)was foundedwith a similar agenda as theIAHRandbecameoneofitsmemberassociations.AsLutherMartinandDonaldWiebe,twoofitsfounders,explainedtwentyyearslater,NAASRhad been established out of frustration with theAmericanAcademy ofReligion’s (AAR) inability to encourage the development of a genuinescientificapproachtothestudyofreligion,freefromreligiousinfluence.2 Thus, thirtyyearsagothesituationwasmoreorlesssimilar towhattheauthorscomplainabout in theirpaper today.Possiblybecausehopes forbetterment had proven futile, theNAASR capitulatedwhen in 2008 itsrepresentatives– includingLutherMartin andDonaldWiebe– stronglyadvocatedaffiliatingtheAARwiththeIAHR,whichwasaccomplishedattheXXthWorldCongressoftheIAHRinTorontoin2010.HistorygoesonandwecannotbutwaittoseehowtheIAHRwillchangeundertheinflu-enceoftheAAR.ItcouldwellbethattheNorthAmericanunderstandingofReligiousStudies,whichaccordingtoWiebeandMartinhasbeen“seri-

2 LutherH.Martin–DonaldWiebe,“EstablishingaBeachhead:NAASR,TwentyYearsLater”,<http://www.naasr.com/Establishingabeachhead.pdf>[11February2012],2.

The Study of Religion as a Scientific Discipline…

30

ously compromised by extra-scientific and non-epistemic agendas”(p.12),andthesheernumberofAARprofessionalsfollowingsuchagen-daswillfinallydrivetheIAHRinthesamedirection.Nevertheless,Idonotthinkthathistoricalconsiderationsaresufficient

tosupportthepessimisticthesisthattheStudyofReligioncannotdevelopasascientificdiscipline.Ifhistoryteachesusanythingthenitisthatthingschange.Theacademicstudyofreligionandreligionswasfordecadesthefield of theologians and a very small number of historians of religion.Nowadaysreligionhasmovedclosertothecentreofacademicinterestandwefindthatsociologists,politicalscientists,economists,historians,psy-chologistsandcognitivescientistshaveunexpectedlydiscoveredreligionasanimportantareaofresearch.Arewesupposedtobelievethattheyallhave the sameagenda; that they all ask the samequestions anduse thesamemethodology?Obviouslytherearepeopleinterestedinreligionbe-causetheybelievethatreligionissomethinggoodorthatitissomethingbad.Wecannotandprobablyshouldnotstopthemdoingsoeveniftheypursuetheirinterestinacademia.Butthisdoesnotpreventusfrompursu-ingotheragendassuchasstudyingreligionscientifically.Todeclareitadelusiontoexpectthatreligioncouldbestudiedscien-

tifically because humans are naturally religious and their “religiousnesswillcontinuetoconstraintheacademicstudyofreligion”(p.14)istore-verttotheargumentthatreligionisasubjectsui generis.Itimpliesthatwecanscientificallystudypolitics,economics,artorgender,butnotreligion.However,suchsubjectspresentexactly thesameproblemsforscientificresearchasreligiondoes.Politicalscienceisnolesspronetoideologicalorpoliticalagendasthanreligiousstudiesarepronetoideologicalorreli-giousones.Itisacommonissuethatonlyalimitednumberofscholarsinhumanitiesandsocialsciencessubmittoscientificprinciples.Thisisbe-cause their subjects usually are not enclosed in laboratories but are in-volvedineverydaylife.Itwouldbesurprisingifmostpeopleshouldbeableorwillingtoabandontheirpersonalinterestsinpoliticalorreligiousmatters in order to dealwithpolitics or religion as if theywereuncon-cerned.Idonotthinkthatthissituationhaschangedverymuchduringthepastfewhundredyears.TheancestorsofthescienceofreligionmentionedbyMartinandWiebeprobablywereevenmoreanacademicminoritythanarethescholarsengagedinscientificresearchinreligiontoday.

The Cognitive Science of Religion

Notonly thehistoricalargument isunconvincingbutalso the“scien-tificargument”,whichreliesontheoriesofthecognitivesciencestoshowthattheStudyofReligioncanneverbeestablishedasascientificdiscpline.

Hubert Seiwert

31

Tounderstand the argument, let us accept the idea that believing in theexistenceofagentsthatarebeyondidentificationbywayofthesensesorscientificmetrichassomethingtodowithreligion(p.9-10).Letusfurthersupposethattheauthorsarerightinassumingthatevolutionaryandcogni-tivedefaultsofthehumanbrainmakeitnaturaltolookforagentcausalityandtoinferthepresenceofagentsevenwhentherearenone(p.15);andletusfinallyaccepttheassumptionthatthisoffers“anexplanationforthelargenumberofotherwiseveryintelligentpeople–includingleadingsci-entists – who persist in retaining and expressing rather naïve religiousbeliefsevenwhilesuccessfullycultivatingtheirowncircumscribedcraft”(p.16).Whatwouldthatmeanforthepossibilityofstudyingreligionsci-entifically?Nothinginparticular!Itwould justexplainwhypresumablymostpeoplearemoreinclinedtounderstandtheworldreligiouslyinsteadofscientifically.Butthiswouldbethecasenotonlywhentheyarestudy-ingreligionbutunderallcircumstances.Thereisnoreasontobelievethatit is easier for scientists todesist from their religiousbeliefswhen theystudy the physical aspects of theworld thanwhen they study its socialaspects.Religionisnotasubjectsui generisandtostudyitscientificallydemandsmethodologicaltraininganddisciplinenolessthanthescientificstudyofanyothersubject.Thefactthatnotmanypeoplehavethistraininganddisciplineshowsthatpracticingscienceisaspecialcraft,butnotthatascienceofreligionisimpossible.The two authorsmake a case for the cognitive sciences,which they

believeoffer“themostpromisingcontemporaryopportunityfordevelop-ing a theoretically coherent scientific study of religion” (p. 14). Theycontrastthecognitivescienceofreligionwithhumanisticandsocialscien-tificstudies,whichclingtoversionsofagentcausalityandthereforearedeclarednot tobetrulyscientific.This isbecausehumanitiesandsocialsciences invoke“intentionality,aprimaryattributeofagency, toexplainand understand textual productions or behavioral motivation” (p. 15).Theyarethereforeblamedforignoring“advancesinscientificknowledge,whicharecharacterizedbythereplacementofagentcausalitywithnaturalcausality”(p.16).IfIgraspthiscorrectly,itmeansthathistoricalstudiesofreligionthatusuallytrytounderstandthemeaningthattextshadorhavefortheirauthorsorreadersdonotproducescientificknowledgebecausetheyrefertointentionsinsteadofnaturalcauses.Andconversely,thecog-nitive science of religion offers a scientifically sound theoretical pro-grammebecauseitresortstonaturalcausality.What theauthorsareadvocatingisascienceofreligionthatnotonly

tries to gain intersubjectively available knowledge of intersubjectivelyavailablefacts,butalsoreduceshumanbehaviourtoits“natural”causes.Theythussubscribetothemethodologicalandontologicalnaturalismof


32

the natural sciences. Unfortunately, they are not explicit in stating thattheir use of the term “scientific” refers to the natural sciences (and ex-cludesthesocialsciences).Hadtheydoneso,therewouldbenoreasontodoubttheirthesisthata“scientific”studyofreligionisimpossible.Itisinfactimpossibletostudyreligionwithmethodsofthenaturalsciencesbe-causethesemethodscannotidentifyreligiousbehaviour.Accordingtotheauthors, the studyof religion is “the studyof humanbehaviors that areengagedinbecauseof,orsomehowrelatedto,abeliefinagentsthatarebeyondidentificationbywayofthesensesorscientificmetric”(p.9-10).However,whetherhumanbeingsmaintainsuchabeliefcannotbediscov-eredbymethodsofthenaturalscienceswithoutrelyingonhermeneutics.Wehavetounderstandthemeaningofwhatpeoplesay,writeorexpressinsomeotherway,andwehavetoassumetheyhaveintentions.Withoutunderstandingmeaningsandintentions,thereisnowayofdiscerningreli-giousbehaviour.Wecannotknowifdepositingflowersinfrontofanin-scribedstoneissomehowrelatedtobeliefsinsupernaturalagentsornot,whenwe ignoremeanings and purposes.Only afterwe have identifiedreligious behaviour hermeneutically canwe start trying to explain it bynaturalcauses.Evenifwegrantedcognitivescientiststheprivilegeofmakinguseof

naïvehermeneutics,whichsimplytakelinguisticexpressionsatfacevalue,theywouldnotbeinapositiontostudyreligionwithout thehumanisticandsocialsciences.Atleasttheyneedtheconceptofreligion;theyhavetoimportitfromsomewhereunlesstheyusetheterm“religion”inacom-pletelydifferent sense thanhumanities and social sciences. In this case,however,itwouldbegratuitousforReligiousStudiestotakenoticeofthecognitive science of religion because both were dealing with differentsubjects.Ironically,itappearsthatthecognitivescienceofreligionhasbeenin-

fluencedbyatraditionofReligiousStudiesthatconsidersreligionaphe-nomenonsui generis.Whyelseshouldonepaymuchattentiontocogni-tions that froma“scientific” (ontologicallynaturalist)pointofviewaresimplyincorrectconceptionsoftheworld?Tobelieveinagentsthatdonotreallyexistisamistakenbelief,buttherearenumberlessfalseideasabouttheworld thathavebeenexpressed inhumanhistoryand inourpresenttime.Manyideasprocessedinhumanbrainsareincorrect,possiblyinclud-ingtheideathatwecanexplainhumanbehaviourwithouttakingintoac-counttheintentionsandpurposesofagents.3Therecouldbeacognitive

3 I adhere to the conventional theory that authors have some intentionswhenwritingatextandthattheseintentionscanbeunderstoodormisunderstood.AdmittedlyIhesi-tatedtorespondtoWiebeandMartin’spaperafterunderstandingthattryingtocom-prehenditsmeaningandpurposewasathoroughlyunscientificrelapsetotheideaof

Hubert Seiwert

33

scienceof falsebeliefs (provided thecognitive scienceshadmethods todiscernwhichideasarewrongorright),butwhysingleoutbeliefsthatareconsidered religious? From a purely cognitive scientific point of view,religiousbeliefsdeservenomoreattentionthanothermistakenideasun-lessitwassupposedthattheyareinsomewaydifferent.Althoughmostcognitivescientistsofreligioninsistondenyingthatinthecognitivesys-temthereisanydifferencebetweenreligiousandotherideas,theyinvestenergyindoingresearchintocognitionsthatcannotbeidentifiedbytheirscientificmethods.Hence,theirinterestinreligiousbeliefsmustbebasedontheoriesotherthanthoseofthecognitivesciences.Theseappeartobetheoriesthatsupposethatreligionissomethingspecial,ifnotsui generis,thusattheleastdeservingtheparticularattentionofscientists.If there shouldbean interfacebetween thecognitive scienceof false

beliefs and the Study of Religion then it is the supposition that beliefsconsideredreligiousareindeeddifferentfromordinary“falsebeliefs”inthat theycan influencehumanbehaviour toanastonishingextent.Theyinducehumanstoinvestconsiderablematerialandintellectualresourcestoengageinbehaviourthatfroma“scientific”pointofviewiscompletelyuselessbecause it reliesonmisconceptionsof theworld.But toexplainsuchwastefulbehaviour,thecognitivesciencesfirstneedthehumanisticstudiesofreligiontellingthemthatbuildingacathedralorsacrificingapigcountsasreligiousbehaviourwhilebuildingapalaceorbutcheringanoxdoesnot.4Whenweexcludeconsideringintentionsandmeanings,thereisnotmuchleftforthescientificstudyofreligiousbehaviour.

Science and Ideology

ItwillbeclearbynowthatIamnotconvincedbytheproposalofsecur-ingthescientificcharacteroftheStudyofReligionbymakingthecogni-tive science of religion its theoretical paradigm. Cognitive studies addanewperspectiveandtheoreticalapproachtothestudyofreligionbutformethodological and epistemological reasons cannot replace humanisticand social scientific studies.A similarly basic objection toWiebe andMartin’spaperconcernstheirunderstandingofscienceandtheaxiomaticassumptions onwhich they base their argument.They assume “that the

agent causality. The dilemma can be resolved by realising that this discussion onReligiousStudiesisnotascientificenterprisebutpartofhumanisticstudies,andthatinthiscontexttheideaofagentcausalityisunavoidableifwearenottorefrainfromanydiscussionsincludingonscientificissues.

4 See alsoKockuvonStuckrad, “StrawMenandScientificNostalgia:AResponse toLutherH.Martin andDonaldWiebe”,Religio: Revue pro religionistiku 20/1, 2012,55-61:59.


34

modernwestern researchuniversity isapurpose-designed institutionforobtaining knowledge about the world” (p. 9). This obviously is not anempiricalstatement,forotherwisetherewouldbenoreasontodeplorethestateofthemodernwesternresearchuniversity.Itisanormativestatementexpressing thebeliefof the twoauthors that theuniversityshouldbeaninstitutionsuchasthis–possiblyonhistoricalgrounds.Theyfurtherbe-lieve that it is possible togain scientificknowledgeof intersubjectivelyavailablefacts.Andtheyassume“thatthecurrentanti-theoreticalandanti-scienceposturingsofpostmodernismhavenotunderminedthecredibilityofmodernscienceasapeculiarlysuccessfulinstrumentofinquiryintothecharacteroftheworld,eithernaturalorsocial”(p.10).Isharetheseassumptionsinprinciple.ButIthinkthattheauthorsare

usingargumentsthatunderminetheirowncomprehensionofscienceanduniversity.Theyblamemodernuniversitiesfor“inculcatingvaluestoun-dergraduatesandprovidingthemwithstructuresofmeaning”(p.12).Thiscannotbemeantasaseriousargument;whatelsecan teachersdowhentheytrytoconveytotheirstudentsascientificethosandexplainthemthemeaning and purpose of science and the university? It appears that theauthorsarefallingvictimtotheirbeliefthatdoingscienceistosubscribetoafundamentalistversionofnaturalism,forwhichmeaningsandinten-tionsareanathema.Thustheyignorethattheirownunderstandingofwhatthescientificstudyofreligionshouldberestsontheassumptionofpur-poses (“purpose-designed institution”) and historical contingencies thatcannotbeexplainedbynaïvenaturalism.I designate this version of naturalism “naïve” because it undermines

critical scientific thinking with folk epistemology believing that our“sensesorscientificmetric”(p.9)provideuswithknowledgeabouttheworld.All theyprovideuswithissomeinputintoourneuronalsystemswhereitisprocessedbyalgorithmsshapedbyphylogeneticevolutionandontogenetic learning.To take theoutcomeof thisprocessasknowledgeabouttheworldmaybeacceptableasacommonconvention,buttoregarditastrueknowledgeisnaïve.Thehumanbrainispronetoproducingallkindofwronginterpretationsofsensations.Thus,weneededabitmorethan our “senses and scientific metric” to know what exists and whatdoesn’t.Ifweignorethis,wearerunningtheriskoftransformingscienceintoametaphysical ideology that isunawareof itsownepistemologicallimitations.IagreethatReligiousStudiesareparticularlysusceptibletoideological

interestsandprejudices.Itseemstobedifficultdodealwithreligionwith-outfeelingobligedtotakeapositionfororagainstit.Inonecampwefindthedefendersofreligionwithan“approbationbias”criticisedbyDonaldWiebeandLutherMartin(p.17),whoinsteadjointheothercampofthose

Hubert Seiwert

35

who feel compelled topoint to theerroneousbeliefsmaintained in reli-gions.Bothpositionsarejustifiedasexpressionsofpersonalbeliefsandconvictions;butnoneofthemishelpfulforstudyingreligionscientificallybecausetheybringinvaluejudgments,whichaddnothingtoourknowl-edgeaboutreligionbutdistortunbiasedscientificreasoning.In the case at hand, the value judgements of the authorsmake them

blind to the limitationsof scientificknowledgeand turn scientific argu-mentsintoideologicalstatements.Atthesametimetheyjeopardisetheirown cognitive scientific approach. Subscribing to an ideology of onto-logicalnaturalism, theybelieve thatsciencecanproduceunquestionableknowledgeabouttheworld,whichcanbetakenasagaugetomeasurethetruthofreligiousbeliefs.Whiletheyseeclearlythatthefunctioningofthehuman brain is conditioned by phylogenetically evolved neuronal algo-rithmsthatforinstanceinducehumanstoinferthepresenceofagentsevenwheretherearenone(p.15),theyignorethefactthatthereareotheralgo-rithmsconditioningitsfunctioningaswell.Oneofthemistoconjecturethatthingshavecausesinthefirstplace.Whenaccordingtothecognitivescienceofreligiontheproclivitytoassumethepresenceofagentsiscon-sideredthenatural,i.e.,biologicalbasisof“religious”beliefs,wecantakethehumanpenchantforsupposingcausesingeneralaselementaryformof“scientific”thinking.Hence,“religion”probablyisnomorenaturalthan“science”ifwereducetheminasimplisticwaytobasicfunctionsofthebrain.Evolutionhasnotequippedhumanswithacognitiveapparatusforob-

tainingknowledgeabouttheworld.Thefunctioningofthehumanbrainisshapedbyalgorithms,whichhaveevolvedtoadapthumanbehaviour totheenvironmentsofourstone-ageancestors.Humansarenottheprideofcreationthathasbeenendowedwithreasontogain“knowledge”.Withoutdoubt, theabilitytothinklogicallyisbasedonneuronalhardwiringthathasevolvednaturally–abasisitshareswiththeabilitytomaintainreli-giousbeliefs.Thus,“science” isasmuchaby-productof thebiologicalevolutionof the brain as is “religion”.And in the formof the “modernwestern researchuniversity” itquiteobviouslyalso is theby-productofrathercontingentculturaldevelopments.Onwhatgroundscanwebesure that this formofknowledge,which

happens tobeourown,givesamoreaccuratepictureof theworld thanothers; that religious beliefs are rather naïve (p. 16) whereas scientificbeliefsareenlightened?Cognitivescientificresearchcouldprobablyshowthattherearecognitivealgorithmsmakinghumansinclinedtothinkthattheirownperceptionoftheworldistrueandothersarefalse.Butwedonotneedthecognitivesciencesforthat;itsufficestostudythehistoryofreligionsandthehistoryofscience.


36

Whatargumentscanthecognitivescienceofreligionoffertosubstanti-ate thebelief thatof all things it ismodern science thatgivesus a trueunderstandingofreality?Notmany,Iguess.Whatwecansayisthatwepreferscientificknowledgetoreligiousbeliefs,butthisisnotascientificargumentbutanormativedecision.Wecouldjustifyourpreferencewiththeconsiderationthatscientificknowledgeoftenprovestobequiteuseful–thoughoccasionallydisastrous–,butthesamecanbesaidofreligiousbeliefs.There is noway out of the dilemma that advocating science oraparticularunderstandingofitcannotbegroundedonscientificargumentsbutnecessarily refers tonormativepositionsandsubjectivepreferences.Thisisnotupsettingaslongasweareawareofit.If however we believe or make others believe that science delivers

somehowobjectiveorunquestionableknowledgeabouttheworld,wearedeceivingothersorourselves.Inthiseventwemakescienceanideology.Tobesure,thecognitivemechanismsthatpromptustobelieveinourownconvictions are stronger than those enabling us to critically reflect onthem,whichmakesitmore“natural”tothinkideologicallythancritically.Andperhapsscholarsofreligionareespeciallysusceptibletoideologicalthinking,giventhesubjectoftheirstudy.Forreligionisadisputedconceptthat ineverydaylifeis loadedwithvaluejudgments,betheypositiveornegative;itisunnaturaltocultivateadisciplinethatdemandsleavingbe-hindone’severydayconvictions.Wecannotreasonablyexpectmanypeo-pletosubmittosuchadiscipline.Afterall,whyshouldthey?

Conclusion

IstheStudyofReligionpossibleasascientificdiscipline?IbelievethatLutherMartinandDonaldWiebearerightinstatingthatitwouldbeade-lusiontothinkthatReligiousStudiesastheyareunderstoodandpracticedinNorthAmerica are a scientific discipline. I also agree thatReligiousStudiesingeneralarepronetoideologicalagendas.Althoughthismakesitdifficulttopracticetheacademicstudyofreligion,Idonotsubscribetotheirargumentthatitisimpossibletoconceiveanddevelopsuchadisci-pline.Inparticular,Icontesttheclaimthatthedifficultiesinstudyingreligion

scientifically are due to the peculiarities of the subject and to cognitiveproclivitiestowardsinterpretingtheworldreligiously.Itisnolesspossibletoscientificallystudyreligionthantoscientificallystudyanyotheraspectofhumanculture;anditfacessimilarmethodologicalandtheoreticalchal-lenges.Overcomingthesechallengescallsfordiscipline.Astheauthorsputit,

“havingthemindofascientistrequiresareflectiveresolvetodoso–and

Hubert Seiwert

37

considerableeffortexplicitlytocultivatethecognitive,social,andmate-rial conditionsnecessary to activelymaintain that resolve” (p. 17). It istruethatpracticingthisdisciplineisdifficult,butitisnotimpossible.Asanyacademicdisciplineorscience,theStudyofReligionisahis-

toricallycontingentculturalproduct. Itdoesnothaveanyunchangeableessence,butitsboundariesarenegotiatedanddefinedbyhumanagents.Tooptforaparticularunderstandingof“scientific” isanormativedecisionthatcannotbejustifiedscientificallysothatitmustbeexplainedbyotherreasons.ProvidedthattheStudyofReligionisconsideredanempiricalscience,

it demands rational methodology and empirical arguments to maintainatheory.Thetheorythatreligioncanbestudiedscientificallywithouttak-ing intoaccount themeaning thathumansattribute to theirbehaviour ismethodologicallywrongbecauseitprecludesdistinguishingbetweenreli-giousandnon-religiousbehaviour.Thus,theStudyofReligionasascien-tificdisciplinenecessarilyincludes“humanistic”approaches,whichcan-notbereplacedbymethodsofthenaturalsciences.Religionis“natural”inthatitcanbereducedtothebehaviourofhu-

manswithin the limitsof theirbiologicalnature.Although theStudyofReligionaimsat explaining theuniversal conditionsof religiousbehav-iour, explaining theparticularconditionsofhistoricaldevelopmentsandempiricalfindingsislikewisepartoftheacademicdiscipline.Thiscallsforconsideringfactors thatareexternal to the individualsexhibitingcertainbehaviour,whichamountstostudyingculturesandsocieties.I thereforeconclude that theStudyofReligionasanacademicdisci-

plineispossibleasacombinationofvariousmethodologicalandtheoreti-calapproaches.ItdonotbelievethatthecognitivescienceofreligioncanbeasolutiontothemainissuethatpreventsReligiousStudiesfrombeingascientificenterprise,whichistheproclivitytowardsjudgingthevalueofreligiousbehaviour and the truthof religiousbeliefs. In the formadvo-catedbyDonaldWiebeandLutherMartin,thecognitivescienceofreli-gionappearsinsteadtoonlyreplaceonenormativeposition–appreciatingreligion–byanother–depreciatingreligion.


38

SUMMARY

The Study of Religion as a Scientific Discipline: A Comment on Luther Martin and Donald Wiebe’s Paper

The article discussesDonaldWiebe andLutherMartin’s paper “Religious Studies asaScientificDiscipline:ThePersistenceofaDelusion”.Thecentralthesisofthetwoauthorsis thatReligiousStudiesarenotandprobablycanneverbea“scientific”discipline. It isarguedthatthereasonsgivenbythetwoauthorstosupporttheirthesisareunconvincingandcontradictory.Theirsuggestionthatthestudyofreligionshouldsubscribetoanunderstand-ingofsciencethatabandonstheconceptofagencyandreduceshumanbehaviourto“natu-ral”causesiscriticisedontheoreticalandmethodologicalgrounds.Infact,itisnotpossibletocompletelyforsakehermeneuticsandtostudyreligionusingthemethodsofthenaturalsciencesbecausethesemethodsdonotallowustoidentifyreligiousbehaviour.Therefore,theStudyofReligion,ofcourse,cannotbeadisciplineofthenaturalsciences.However,asasocialscience,theStudyofReligionisnolesspossiblethanthesocialscientificstudyofanyothersubject.

Keywords:ReligiousStudies;studyofreligion;cognitivescienceofreligion;methodology;theory;ideology.

ReligionswissenschaftlichesInstitut hubert seiWertUniversitätLeipzigSchillerstraße6 [email protected]

Hubert Seiwert

X X / 2 0 1 2 / 1 / T é m a

A Scientific Discipline: The Persistence of a Delusion?

raDek kunDt*

In their academic “confession” “Religious Studies as a ScientificDiscipline:ThePersistenceofaDelusion”,1LutherH.MartinandDonaldWiebeofferthispithy,provocativestatement:“[R]eligiousnesswillcon-tinuetoconstraintheacademicstudyofreligionevenasitwillcontinuetodominatetheconcernsofHomo sapiensgenerally”(p.14).WhilethefirstpartofMartinandWiebe’sargument,concerningthehistoryofourdisci-pline,isempiricallytestable(somestateofaffairshasorhasnotoccurred),thequestionofactualpossibility(ifnotlogicalpossibility)ofascientificstudy of religion ismostly philosophical. In this response, I argue thatMartin andWiebe’s claimwould, in fact, interferewith all existing sci-ences.Consideringthefirstpartofthestatement,presentedin“TheHistorical

Argument” sectionofMartin andWiebe’s paper (p. 10-13), I couldnotagreemore.When judging the overall state of our field of study2 fromabroaderperspective,3takingintoaccountitshistoryaswellasitscurrentstate, I share the very same view and think that it is valid not only onaglobalscaleorforNorthAmericanReligiousStudies(astheyhavetheirspecifics),butalsowithintheEuropeanorCzechcontext.Thatsaid,myresponseisnottosecondorapplaudMartinandWiebe’sview,butratherexpress my reservations about the authors’ conclusions, even thoughIsharealltheirassumptions(p.9-10).ThisbringsmetothesecondpartofMartinandWiebe’sstatement (“TheScientificArgument”,p.13-17),aswellasthesecondpartofmyresponse.ThoughIseenothingwrongwiththelogicoftheargumentpresentedin

“TheScientificArgument”partofMartinandWiebe’spaper,orwiththeevidence from the cognitive sciences used to support the argument; thetroublelieswithintheextension/reachofthisargument.Forifeverything

* IwouldliketothankEvaKundtováKlocová,MartinLang,JakubCigán,DanielShawandJeffreyNorquistfortheircommentsonearlierdrafts

1 LutherH.Martin–DonaldWiebe,“ReligiousStudiesasaScientificDiscipline:ThePersistence of a Delusion”,Religio: Revue pro religionistiku 20/1, 2012, 9-18.Allreferencesinthetext,unlessotherwisenoted,aretothisarticle.

2 Iamusingthetermfield of studydeliberatelyasopposedtodisciplineorscience. 3 Iintentionallyomitthoserarecentersanddepartmentsthatarededicatedtoscientific

approachastheyaretooexceptional.

40

fallsintopredefinedcategory,4thatcategorybecomesredundantandcanbeputasidetomakeroomforsomethingmorespecificthatwouldenrichourknowledge.AndthisisexactlywhatbefallsMartinandWiebe’sargu-mentin“TheScientificArgument”section.Canunconsciousmechanismsreallyplaysuchadominantroleinprocessessoconscious,soexplicitandunnaturalas isascientificendeavor?Comingfromcognitivescienceofreligion’sbackgroundmyself,Idonottendtounderestimatethepowerofunconsciousprocesses.However, fromtheverysamebackgroundIalsoknowthatthehumanmindisabletooperateondifferentlevels5andthatgiventimeandeffortonemightbeabletoconsciouslyprocessknowledgeabout how unconscious levels operate, trace those mechanisms, makethem(ortheirresults)explicitand,inamannerofspeaking,“throwthemaway”onaformalconsciouslevel.6Ifnot,logicwouldnotbepossibleandwewould be forever doomed tomake all judgments on account of ourheuristicsalone.Wewouldhavenowayofknowingthatopticalillusionsare illusions.Wewould all have tobeopenly racist and tribalist, aswewouldhavenogroundonwhichtocorrectournaturalinclinations.Infact,wewouldnotbeabletounderstandMartinandWiebe’sargumentastheyare indeed using the same conscious reasoningwhen trying to unmaskunconsciousmechanismsthatcauseourinabilitytostudyreligionscien-tifically.Mostofall,andherecomesthemainpointofmyresponse,wewouldhavenoscienceatall,asitwouldnotbepossibletoachieveoneinthe realworld. For example, the samewould have to be true about theconsequencesofournaturalinclinationtotribalismontheoryaswellasmethodsofmathematics,andwewouldthereforefavorcertainnumbers.Another example can be taken from physics: astrophysicists should bebiasedagainstgalaxiesthatdifferinshapefromourowngalaxy.Forbrev-ity,theauthorsnamejustoneoftheseunconsciousmechanisms,the“pro-clivity for explaining ourworld in terms of agent causality” (p. 15). Isphysics therefore foreverdoomed to fallbackonagent causality, as arehumanswhentryingtomakeeverydaysenseoftheworld?Itisobviouslynot,oratleastnotintheauthors’view,astheyclearlystate:“Despitead-vances in scientific knowledge,which are characterized by the replace-mentofagentcausalitywithnaturalcausality…”(p.16). Itisthisincoher-encethatIwanttopointout;thateventhoughbothtypesofscientistsfallback on unconscious mechanisms in their everyday online reasoning,

4 Inthiscontextauthorscreatedacategorythatdenotessimplyanyscientific endeavor affected by unconscious mechanisms.

5 Cf.Dual-ProcessingAccountsofReasoning.(Iamusingthistermsimplistically,asallmyotherexamplesandanalogies,forthesakeofargument.)

6 Idonotarguethatwecanswitchthemoffentirely,justthatwecanbeawareofthemonformalconsciouslevelandnottolettheminterferethere.

Radek Kundt

41

whenitcomestoscientificendeavors,scientists-physicistsarenotunderthesamespellasscientists-scholarsofreligion.Thispartofmyargumentisofcourserelevantif(andonlyif)theauthorsdonotwanttoarguethatwhenitcomestoreligiontheseunconsciousmechanisms(theirsetupandspecialmixture)constrainusmorestronglyormoreeffectivelythaninanyothercontext.7Inotherwords,theirargumentwouldhavetobepointedatall sciences or at science in general for it to be sound. If thatwere so,Iwouldrestmycase,asIseenootherflawinit.Butitisnotpointedatscience ingeneral,as theyclearlystate:“[O]nscientificgrounds”(p.9)thusassumingsciencepossible.8Insummary,thereisnospecialreasonwhyscientists-religiousscholars

shouldtendtodobadsciencemorethananyotherscientists,andiftheydo,theyhaveonlythemselvestoblame.Yes,scienceisunnatural,itishardtocultivate,9andit takeshighlytrainedmindsnottomakeanymethod-ologicaloversteps.Butasmathematicianscannotletothermathematicianstogetawaywithmistakesinsophisticatedformulas,sowecannotletourfellowscholarsofreligiontogetawaywithappreciation(p.12)ordepre-ciationof religionwhile anunbiasedexplanation of thephenomenon isneeded. For the very same reason, the authors themselves should haveavoidedusingevaluatingtermslike“otherwiseveryintelligentpeople”(p.16),whentalkingaboutfellowscientistswhoexpresstheirreligiosity,or“rather naïve” (p. 16), when addressing any religious belief, and theyshouldhavestucktopointingoutmethodologicalmistakesscientistsmightbe making when they let their metaphysical stances meddle with theirscientificwork.From within a broader perspective, I would suggest not to turn our

lensesonourlensesyet.Therewillalwaysbetimetoreflectuponourre-flection with our reflection after conversion to postmodern tactics andgoals.Let’sstillworkonthecognitivescienceofreligionbeforeturningtothecognitivescienceofcognitivescienceofreligion,whichwouldonceagainstirusintoaninfiniteregressheadingnowhere.

7 WhichisnotaninherentpartofMartinandWiebe’sargument,andmyassumptionisthatitisnotevensomethingtheywouldwanttohold(giventheimplicationsofganz andereorsui generisofreligion,thatwouldsecretlycrawlitswaybackintothescien-tificstudyofreligionjustunderdifferentguise).

8 Theirownscientificgroundswouldhavetobeaffectedbythesamedoubtsofnofullemancipationfromunconsciousmechanisms(generalizationfromunconsciousmecha-nismsconstraining/shaping“religiousconcerns”).

9 RobertMcCauley,“TheNaturalnessofReligionandtheUnnaturalnessofScience”,in:FrankC.Keil–RobertA.Wilson(eds.),Explanation and Cognition,Cambridge,MA:TheMITPress2000,61-85.


42

SUMMARY


InmyresponsetoMartinandWiebe’sacademic“confession”,Itrytoshowthatthereisamajorinconsistencyintheirargument.Thisinconsistencyresideswithintheirpartialandthereforebiasedapplicationofuniversalunconsciousmechanismsthatconstrainthehumanmind,wheretheapplicationshouldhavebeencomplete.Theirargumentshouldhavebeendirectedatallsciencesoratscienceingeneralinorderforittobesound,andnotparticu-larlyatReligiousStudies.Thiswouldresultintheargumentthatanyscientificdisciplineisadelusion,whichisanoutcomeMartinandWiebedonothold,astheymakescienceasine qua nonfortheirownargument.

Keywords:ReligiousStudies;CognitiveScienceofReligion;PhilosophyofScience.

LaboratoryforExperimentalResearch raDek kunDtofReligion(LEVYNA)DepartmentfortheStudyofReligions [email protected]áka160200BrnoCzechRepublic

Radek Kundt

X X / 2 0 1 2 / 1 / T é m a

Rethinking the Relationship between the Study of Religions, Theology and Religious Concerns: A Response to Some Aspects of Wiebe’s and Martin’s Paper

toMáš bubík*

Recently, asEuropean scholars living in a liberal society andmostlyteachingatstateuniversities,wearenotunderpoliticalorculturalpressuretoacceptadominantworldview,evenascientificone,asexclusive,andtodenyothers.Thereforeourmotivationsfordoingthehumanitiesmaybevery diverse, private and as such also hidden. However, it is true thatsimply relyingonanappropriate scientificmethodmightnotbealwayssufficient for preventing us from cultural presuppositions, personalmo-tivations and expectations. I consider addressing these limits and “de-terminations”inourownscholarlyendeavorsasoneofthemostimportantobligationsofascholar.Speakingabout“religious”agendasbehindourknowledgesystemsas

in Luther Martin and Donald Wiebe’s paper, “Religious Studies asaScientificDiscipline:ThePersistenceofaDelusion”1requiresespeciallyrethinkingtherelationshipbetweenthestudyofreligionsandtheologyinparticular,whichis,supposedly,averyspecificone.Inthehistoryofthefield,debatesaboutthedifferencesbetweentheologyandthestudyofre-ligionswereinadequatelyfrequentcomparedtothediscussionsabouttherelationshipsamongthestudyofreligionsandotherdisciplines.However,atpresentmostEuropeanscholarsconsider thedistinctionsbetween thestudyofreligionsandtheologyasclear,withallmisunderstandingssolved.Hencesomecolleaguesofmineunambiguouslyrejectopeningsuchnewdiscussions,butafterallI,asahistorianofthestudyofreligions,mustdothatfromtimetotime.Mycolleaguessaythatnow,morethenonehundredyearsaftertheestablishingofthefield,thetopicisasidestep,wastingpre-cioustime;besides,therelationshipisusuallydiscussedbythosescholars

* Thetextisoneoftheoutcomesoftheinternationalgrantproject“DevelopmentoftheStudy of Religions in Central and Eastern Europe in the 20th Century” (GACRP401/10/0311)financedbytheCzechScienceFoundation.


44

whodonotunderstandclearly thedistinctions, thepossibilitiesandbor-derlinesofbothdisciplines.2 The issueaddressedbyWiebeandMartin in theirpaper is,however,

most likely deeper than we are willing to admit. Furthermore, as theyclaim,itisalsochronic.Andiftheconcernswiththe“lossoftrust”inthestudyofreligionsasadisciplinecanbeheardsoloudlyfromtheinside,moreovervoicedbysuchrenownscholars,theymustnotbetakenlightly.Thus, I am grateful for the opportunity to respond to their provocativepaper,whichIunderstandtobealsoapersonalconfession.DespitethefactthatIunequivocallydefendtheconceptofthestudyof

religionsasa“value-indifferentscience”,Ihavetoadmitthatitisasci-encespecificallyinclinedtoideologization.Itisobviousfromthehistoryofmoderndisciplines,particularlyofthehumanities,thatespeciallyphi-losophy,history, ethnology,oriental studies andothershad struggled, attimes,with similardifficulties.These stemmainly fromeffortsof someinterest groups or even individuals to mis/use scientific knowledge forpurposesconsideredbyscholarsasextrascientific,suchaspolitical, ra-cial,national,economicorreligiousagendas.Inourcase, itneednotbeonly religious promotion. For example,many scholars from the formerSovietblockhadnumerousexperienceswithwhatcanbecalled“anti-re-ligiouspropaganda”.DuringtheCommunistera,religionwasseenastheenemy of the state, of politics, of the “only right worldview”, and ofcourse, of science.All science was influenced by the Marxist-Leninistphilosophy;thestudyofreligionswasconsideredabourgeoispseudosci-enceandthus,withthesoleexceptionofPoland,3scientificatheismwastheofficialtheoreticalinstrumentforthecritiqueofandstudyingofreli-gion.Eventhepresenttendencytomis/usescientificknowledgeforthepro-

motionofnationalobjectivesbysomeUkrainianscholarscanbenamedasanexampleoftheextra-scientificagendainthehumanities,andbyimpli-

2 See the discussion inReligio: Revue pro religionistiku: Jiří Gabriel, “Mezi teologiíareligionistikou”,Religio: Revue pro religionistiku1/1,1993,91-96;IvanŠtampach,“Můžebýtteologreligionistou?”,Religio: Revue pro religionistiku 1/2,1993,180-182;JanHeller, “Ještě jednou teologiea religionistika”,Religio: Revue pro religionistiku 1/2,1993,190191;OtakarFunda, “Rozdílmezi teologema religionistou”,Religio: Revue pro religionistiku1/2,1993,177-179;BřetislavHoryna,“Religionistikaateolo-gie”,Religio: Revue pro religionistiku 1/2,1993,183-189;IvanaDolejšová,“‘Nezávisláreligionistika’aotázkypomezímezifilozofiíateologií”, Religio: Revue pro religionistiku2/2,1994,155-158.

3 SeeHenrykHoffmann–HalinaGrzymała-Moszczyńska,“TheScienceofReligioninPoland:PastandPresent”,Method and Theory in the Study of Religion10,1998,352-372;HenrykHoffmann,Dzieje polskich badań religioznawczych 1873-1939,Kraków:WydawnictwoUniwersytetuJagiellońskiego2004.

Tomáš Bubík

45

cationinthestudyofreligions.Thereareseveralorthodoxchurchesoper-atinginUkraine,andthelargestone,theUkrainianOrthodoxChurch,isunder the ecclesiastic jurisdiction of theMoscowPatriarchate.With re-gardstothestrongpatrioticeffortsoftheUkrainiansociety(strugglingforindependencefromtheinfluenceoftheformercolonizer)theotherortho-doxchurchesareseenasthoselegitimizingUkrainianstatehoodwhiletheUkrainianOrthodoxChurchoftheMoscowPatriarchateisconsideredtobetheinstrumentofpoliticalinterestsofRussia.ThenChurches’activitiesare seenbysomescholars through the lensof thenationalandpatrioticinterests.I claim therefore that the ideologization of science can have various

formsandcanchangeinaccordancewithsocialdevelopmentanddomi-nant interests.Extra-scientificobjectivesof– inourcase– thestudyofreligionscannotbereducedtoonlyreligiousonesinthewaysuggestedbyWiebeandMartin.Letme further illustrate thatnotonly religion influ-encessciencebutthatsciencecaninfluencereligion,i.e.thatresearchandknowledgeinthestudyofreligionscanquestionone’spersonalreligiousexperienceandsimilarlytheroleoftheologyinthelifeofachurch.IwillshowinaccordancewithWiebeandMartinthatseekingapracticaluseofthestudyofreligions,beitforreligiousorhumanistreasons,isawaytoitsideologization.Briefly,ononehandIgenerallyagreewiththeirappre-hension and critique of “extra-scientific and non-epistemic agendas“(p.12),whichis,accordingtothem,constantlypresentinthefield,butontheotherhandIamperhapsmoreoptimistic,ornaïve,aboutitsfutureanddonotfeeldeludedyet.InthefollowingIattempttoanalyzepotentialinfluencesofextrascien-

tificagendas,especiallyreligiousones,onthestudyofreligionstoprovewhetherMartinandWiebe’sdelusion is equally justified inCentral andEasternEurope.Inthepastyears,IhavefocusedintenselyonthereflectionoftheCzech

academicstudyonreligions4andImustconfessmysurpriseattheamountandtheformsofextra-scientificagendas,notonlyintheologicalorphilo-sophicalworkshops.On theotherhand,high-qualityandwell-respectedworksweredonealsobytheologians,CatholicandmoreoftenProtestantones, a fact that may seem paradoxical in the context of Wiebe andMartin’sargumentation.Aneventfromthefirstnationalcongressof thePolishSocietyfortheStudyofReligionsinTyczynin2003canserveas

4 TomášBubík, “Outsider and InsiderPerspectives in theCzechStudyofReligions”,Temenos: Nordic Journal of Comparative Religion45/2,2009,235-254;id.,“Osobistedoświadczeniaanaukowezałożeniawstosunkudoreligii”,Przegląd Religioznawczy 235/1,2010,73-82;id.,České bádání o náboženství ve 20. století,ČervenýKostelec:NakladatelstvíPavelMervart2010.

Rethinking the Relationship between the Study of Religions…

46

agoodexampleofthisparadox.Itwasalsothefirsttimewhentherepre-sentativesoftheformerMarxistwingofthePolishstudyofreligionsmetwiththerepresentativesoftheCatholic-orientedstudyofreligions(called“religiology”).Oneofthekeynotespeakerswasaphilosopher,aspecialistonthemethodologyofscienceandalsoaCatholicpriest,AndrzejBronk,member of the SocietasVerbiDivini.At the opening of his speech, hepointedoutthatanytimehislistenerswouldfeelhespokelikeapriesttheyshouldalerthimto thefact.Therewasnotasingle reason todosoandafterwardshis lecturewasconsideredas thecongress’bestcontribution.HisworkPodstawy nauk o religii(“ElementsoftheStudyofReligions”,2009)5 is seen by secular Polish scholars as one of themost importantbooksonthemethodologyofthestudyofreligions.Similarly,intheCzechstudyofreligionstheexcellentbookJak srovnávat nesrovnatelné?(“Howtocomparetheincomparable”,2005)6waswrittenbyareligiousstudiesscholaroriginallywithatheologicaleducation,DaliborAntalík,whoevencurrentlyservesasaprotestantpastor.Itisquiteinterestingtonoteinthiscontextthatinthestudyofreligions

wecanhardlyfindcasesofscholarswhobecametheologiansorwantedtosucceed in theology. However, a contrary movement, i.e. a theologianbecomingareligiousstudiesscholar,isquitefrequent.Ithappened,moreor less successfully, rather often in the post-communist countries.Nevertheless,itisnotonlyregionalspecific,aswecanfindsimilarexam-plesintheinternationalstudyofreligionsaswell.Itseemsthatspeakingaboutreligiousissuesinasecularand,atthesametime,scientificwayismoreattractivethendoingsoinecclesiasticalterms.Basedontheabove,wecanargue,inthecontextofWiebeandMartin’s

text,thatareverseinfluenceoccurs,namelythatscienceinfluencestheol-ogyandreligiousagendas.Weknowthatthestudyofreligionsasadisci-plineispartofvariousstudyprogramsatuniversities,includingtheology.Even some contemporary, respected religious studies scholars such asIlkkaPyysiäinen,JeppeS.JensenorArminW.Geertz(coordinatoroftheresearchunitReligion,Cognition andCulture atAarhusUniversity) areaffiliated to faculties of theology. For example, in the Czech Republicthere are six departments for the study of religions, three ofwhich arebased at faculties of theology.Without doubt, theologians influence thestudyofreligionsbutalsothestudyofreligionsinfluencestheology.Mycrucial question then is: What motivations can a theologian have forstudyingotherreligionsandwhatrolecanthestudyofreligionsatfacul-

5 AndrzejBronk,Podstawy nauk o religii,Lublin:TowarzystwonaukoweKUL2009. 6 DaliborAntalík,Jak srovnávat nesrovnatelné,Praha:Oikúmené2005.

Tomáš Bubík

47

tiesoftheologyfulfill? Andcansuchauseofthefindingsofthestudyofreligionsbeconsideredasservingreligion?Ithinkitcannot.Sincethebeginningoftheestablishmentofthestudyofreligionsmany

theologiansrefusedthestudyofreligionsonprinciple,whileothersculti-vated it.Anumberof theologiansused theapproachesofhistoryandofcomparativereligiontoprogressfromstudyingprehistoricformsofreli-giontowhattheyperceivedasthetruthfulone,to„thetruereligion“,toChristianity–wecouldevensaytheytriedtogetthroughsciencetoreli-gion!Accordingtoothers,thestudyofreligionscannotbeusedforcritiqueor apology of religion, but instead it can lead to personal decisions inchoosingthebestamongtheplentitudeofreligioustraditions.Suchmotivationscanbedocumentedeveninsourcesfromthetimesof

theestablishingofthediscipline.7Generallytodeepenone’spersonalfaithcanbeseenasanimportantmotivationfortheacceptanceofthefindingsofthestudyofreligions,aswecanseeinmanyworksoftheologiansinEuro-American cultural background. Nevertheless, studying other reli-gionscanalsohaveotherreasonsthanpurelypersonalones;itcanbecol-lectivelymotivatedasforexampleinthecaseofmissionaries.I seeanothersignificanceof thestudyof religions for theology in its

stressonaccommodating“religiousotherness”,its“positiveacceptanceofreligious plurality”, and thus the ability to deal with plurality withinEuropeansecularsociety.Still, theemphasisonmulti-disciplinarycoop-erationintheology(inourcasewiththestudyofreligions)issometimescriticallyseenespeciallybychurchauthoritiesandbyconservativechurchmembers.Why?Namely, a studyof religionsapproachapplied in theo-logical studies makes Christian faith relative, just one among many.ThereforetheacceptanceoftheprincipleofpluralitybytheologymakesChristianitydeeplyambiguous.Also, theproclaimedindifferentpositionofthestudyofreligionstostudyingreligionsand,atthesametime,poten-tial applicationofmethodological agnosticismgo against the traditionalmodelofChristianityand theology,andsimultaneouslyagainst thecon-ceptof“onetruth”andapromotionofanexclusiveformofreligion.The study of religions makes theology relative, it secularizes it and

liberalizesitandatthesametimeitmotivatesittowardsgreateropennessandtowardsobjectificationofitsassumptions.Suchinfluencesarevisiblewherever the study of religions becomes an integral part of theologicaleducation, usually at university levels, asmentioned earlier.Apart fromthis,thefactthatfacultiesoftheologyinCentralandEasternEuropeare

7 David J. Burrell, Religions of the World, Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board ofPublication andSabbath-SchoolWork [1888], 305-332;AlfredS.Geden,Studies in Comparative Religion, London: C. H. Kelly 1898, 25-26; Alban G. Widgery,Comparative Study of Religions,London:Williams&Norgate1923,29.


48

part of state universities plays a specific role in secular academia.Compared to private institutions, state universities in this region haveamuchhigherlevelofqualitybothinteachingandinresearch.Thestressonthescientificrelevanceoftheologyandamoderatechurchdiscourseintheologycanbeappliedmoreeffectivelybecausethetheologicalfacultiesarenotisolatedfromtherestoftheacademia.Inthisrespect,thesituationsandtherolesofthestudyofreligionsandoftheologyareverydifferentfromthoseinNorthAmerica.Inpredominantlyprivateeducation,variouscorporationscanexercisetheirinfluenceandcontrolmoreeasilythaninmostlystateandpubliceducationinEurope.Here,theologyisusuallypartofasecularuniversitysystemandassuchitisstronglymotivatedtostandinresearchcompetitionwithotherhumanities;itismoreoftenconfrontedwithrequirementsofmodernscientificdiscourseandmust,inmanycases,followthem.Such“scientific”theologycaninmanyrespectsbeveryclosetothestudyofreligionsandlay,non-professionalsociety(sometimesevenprofessionals,academics)mightnotperceiveanyfundamentaldifferencebetween the two.Nevertheless, this “non-religious” (meaningscientific)agendaandthemoreorlesssecularobjectivescancastabadlightonthe-ologywithinitsownchurches,particularlyforitstendencytowardssecu-larmodernity.Letmenowturntothereverseinfluence,i.e.tothatoftheologyupon

thestudyofreligions,religiousstudiesscholarsandtheirprofessionalac-tivities.A tendency in contemporary Russian study of religions as de-scribedbyAlexanderKrasnikovcanserveasagoodexample.KrasnikovclaimsthatthemaininclinationinthecurrentRussianstudyofreligionscanbelabeledasthe“orthodoxstudyofreligions”,whichmeansthatinmanyregionsofRussia thestudyof religionsdevelops inclose relationwiththeOrthodoxChurchorevenunderitsdirectcontrol.8Thus,thepre-viousMarxistdiscourse inRussiawas replacedbya theologicalone, inotherwords,itscontemporaryreligiousstudies’paradigmisamixtureofboth,thoughtheMarxistoneisratherhidden.However,itdoesnotmeanthat in addition there is no secular study of religions.Alongwith that,Russian scholars are disconcerted by the fact that the SupervisoryCommittee of Sciences of the Russian Federation granted the status ofscientificdiscipline toorthodox theology.Althoughmanyacademics re-fusedit,thecommittee’sdecisionremainedunchanged.9 Anotheraspectofthemutualrelationshipbetweenreligiousstudiesand

theologyisthequestionofmotivationsreligiousstudiesscholarsmayhave

8 Aleksander Krasnikov, Metodologiceskie probljemy religiovedenja, Moskva:Akademiceskijprojekt2007,3-8.

9 EkaterinaElbakian,Did the Soviet Religious Studies Exist Indeed?,unpublishedma-nuscript.

Tomáš Bubík

49

forapplyingcertaintheological(orhumanistic)issuesintotheirownre-search.Andalsowhatrolecanatheologicalenterprisefulfillatasecularuniversity?It isgenerallyexpectedthatscientificfindingsshouldbeso-ciallyusefulandapplicable.Ifthepracticalapplicationofknowledgeanditsfindingsisaveryimportantcriterionformeasuringthesuccessandtheresultsinnaturalsciences,thaninthehumanitiesthepublic(orthestate)canrequirethesame.Thisclaimcanbeaconsequenceoftheeconomiza-tion of science.Hence the humanitiesmust latelymore andmore oftendefendtheirownweakstatuswithinscienceingeneralandinthesocialstructureaswell.The“production”ofonlyintellectualgoodsbythehu-manitiesissomethingverydifficulttomeasureineconomicterms.Fromthatperspectivethestudyofreligionsasadisciplinecanbeconsideredtooweak,unpractical,anduseless,justwastingthestatebudget.Whencomparingtheologyandthestudyofreligionsfromthepointof

viewoftheirpracticalroleinsociety,theapplicableaspectoftheologyis,tome,moreevident.InEuropeansocietyitisgenerallyunderstoodwhattheologyisandwhatitsgoalsare.Itsknowledgeisappliedinchurchlife.Churches use theological opinions formore effective economization ofChristianity, particularly for better organization of churches, for deeperreflection of faith, and at the same time for more effective missionarywork,or,generallysaid,foritsactivityinsideandoutside.ManyEuropeansunderstandthesenseandpracticalroleofchurchesandtheologyinsocialandideologicalcontexts,eveniftheydonotappreciateitordisagreewiththeseactivitiescompletely.Buthowaboutapracticalroleofthestudyofreligions?Doweasschol-

arsof the fieldhave any special public space for the applicationofourfindings and knowledge?How canwe be useful for society and on theotherhandwhatisanacceptablewayforjustificationofthestudyofreli-gions in social andeconomic system?Oneoption, even if generally re-fusedbythereligiousstudiesscholars,isthefollowing:Modernconceptofsciencesandhumanitiesgotridofthequestionaboutthemeaningoflifeandofwhatcontemporaryscholarsshouldbelieve.However itdoesnotmeanthatweallasscholarsandashumanbeingsdonolongerasksuchquestionsandthatinourdisciplineswehaveno“seekers”ofanswerstothesequestionsanymore.Myexperienceisthatthestudyofreligionsisaveryattractivedisciplineformanyseekers.Itisnotunusualforthestu-dentsofthestudyofreligionstoseethemselvesaspeoplewhocameintothefieldtostudyvarioustraditionsinordertoselecttheonemostsuitableforthemselvesortocombineelementsofdiversetraditionsastheyseefit.Becauseuniversitiesfullyrespectstudents’rightsforprivacy,theydonotaskfortheirmotivationtostudyanddonotknowthattheyhavecomefor


50

someakindofspiritualsupermarket.10Thereforethestudyofreligionsinparticularcanbeperceivedasaspacefordoubtsgivingrisetosuspicionsthattheacademyisnotonlythespaceforintellectualandscientificinter-ests,butalsoforpersonalquestsofreligiousfaithorofsomebody’sworldview.11However,itcannotbeprevented.Unfortunately, inmanyEasternEuropean countries the study of reli-

gionsasasubjectisnotincludedyetintheeducationalcurriculaofele-mentary and secondary schools; however, teaching “about” religions isa part of other subjects, such as Civic Education or Ethics. If it is, bychance,thecoursesareonlyoptional.IntheCzechRepublicmanyschoolmanagementsconsideranyparticularreligion,andlikewiseanyscientificeducation “about” religions, as having no place at public schools. Theparadoxthenisthateachyearmanyreligiousstudiesspecialistsgraduatefrom secular universities (in the Czech Republic between 50 and 100graduatesannually)buttheycannotfindappropriatejobsintheirfieldofstudy.InPoland,12wheretheCatholicChurchholdsadominantpositionamongallchurches,priestsandcatechistsarepreferredtoteachreligiouseducation(teachingofreligion)atelementaryandsecondaryschools.InSlovakiathesituationisgenerallysimilar.13Simply,teaching“about”re-ligionsfromastudyofreligionspointofviewhasverylittlepracticaluseinareligiouslyhomogeneoussocietysuchasPolandorSlovakia.IntheCzechRepublic, any significant inclusion of the study of religions intoelementary and secondary schools curricula is prevented by the generalindifference(evenhostility)towardsreligionassuch,whichisparalleledbyaverylowlevelofknowledgeaboutreligiousissues;atbestonecanexpect some scarce and disparate awareness about Christianity. Peoplepersonallyrefusereligion/sandthusdonotwanttoknowanythingaboutit/them.If thepublic is informedatall, it isusuallyviaunqualifiedper-sons,“specialists”withoutqualification.Iamafraidthatalong-lastingeconomicdepressionandthecuttingof

statebudgetsinmanyEuropeancountrieswillundoubtedlygeneratesimi-larsortsofpoliticalquestions:Forwhatreasonsshouldweaspoliticiansfinanciallysupportthehumanities?Whatwouldbeapoliticallyadequatecriterion for measuring their social usefulness and their results? What

10 SeeMiroslavVrzal,“Studiumreligionistikyjakoduchovníhledání”,Sacra7/2,2009,72-81.

11 ThomasA. Idinopulos, “Must Profesors of Religion be Religious”, in: ThomasA.Idinopulos–EdwardA.Yonan(eds.),Religion and Reductionism,Leiden:E.J.Brill1994,65-81.

12 HenrykHoffmann–AniaKsiążek,“Religioznawstwowszkole–polskiedoświadcze-nia”,Pantheon: Journal for the Study of Religions6,2010,33-49.

13 RomanKečka,“ReligionistickétémyvovyučovanínazákladnýchastrednýchškoláchnaSlovensku”,Pantheon: Journal for the Study of Religions6,2010,51-70:54.

Tomáš Bubík

51

wouldhelpustoreducetheirincreasingnumber?14Willthestudyofreli-gions,asamarginaldisciplineofhumanities,beabletodefendnotonlyitsownpositionwithinhumanitiesbutevenitspureexistence?Letusagainreturntothequestionofwhatmotivationsreligiousstudies

scholarscanhaveforapplyingcertaintheological(orhumanistic)issuesinto their own research. Reflecting the situation in Central and EasternEurope,Ihavenoticedoneparticulartrendintheactivitiesofsomeschol-ars.Theconsciousabsenceofaspecialsocialfunctionofthestudyofre-ligionscanleadtoaspirationsatusingitsfindingsinactiveinter-religiousdialogue.Religious studies scholarsveryoftenparticipate inpanels anddiscussionswithrepresentativesofvariousreligionsandcontributeintheirsolutionseekingprocesses.Whatmotivatestheirefforts?Canthefeltab-senceofaspecificroleofthedisciplineorhumanist’seffortsbesufficientasanargument?PersonallyIdisapproveofsuchinvolvement.Asmuchaspeaceamongreligionsisneededanddesired,afterallwehavetoaskthequestionwhetherscholarsofthestudyofreligionsarereallythoseabletoreconciledisunited sides inanappropriateway.Asneededas thepeaceamongreligions is,westillhave toask thecardinalquestionwhether itshould trulybe religiousstudies scholarsplayinganactive roleat someroundtableofreligions.Oneofthereasonswhytheycouldbeisthefactthatthestudyofreli-

gions attempts to approach all religions indiscriminately and neutrally.Thatcertainlyisagoodprerequisite.Itwouldalsoallowthescholars tojustifythediscipline’spracticalusefulnessforsociety.Aquestionremainswhether religions, especially those which are not originally part of theEuropeancultureandwhichrefuseascientificstudyofreligions,wouldwelcomesuchanactivityofsecularscience.Ontheotherhand,letussup-posethatindividualreligioustraditionsstrivingforinter-religiousdialoguewould invite religiousstudiesscholars toparticipate in it–what shouldthenbetheirspecifictask?Ifscholarsaretofulfilltheroleofmediatorsamongreligionsinconflict,whoshouldinitiatesuchadialogue?Shouldtheinitiatorbesomeacademicorreligiousinstitution?However,todele-gatescholarsasjudgesorrefereesmightbeperceivedasyetanotherar-rogantambitionofsciencetomakedecisionsaboutreligiousissues.Ihopethatthetaskofthestudyofreligionsasanacademicdiscipline

isneithertocreateconditionsforaninter-religiousdialoguenortoinitiateone.Inter-religiousdialogueis,aboveall,areligiousinitiative,religious

14 SuchquestionsarecurrentlyveryfrequentamongpoliticiansintheCzechRepublic.IntheCzechacademia,significantapprehensionaboutthefuturedevelopmentcanbefelt,including concerns about the sole existence of study programs and departments.Because the study of religions in theCzech academy is amarginal discipline, suchworriesare,unfortunately,grounded.


52

activity that the study of religions as a science should certainly closelyobserve,criticallystudyandanalyzebutshouldnottakeactivepartin.Ourroleasscholarsistobeintouchwithreligionsbutnottobeinvolvedinreligiousendeavors.Activeeffortatinter-religiousdialoguecanbeaspe-cificexample.Afterall,atruedialoguedoesnotallowforkeepingadis-tance.Andscholarsactivelyengaginginsuchadialogue,whichisareli-gious activity, can undoubtedly easily lose their scientifically detached,bird’seyeview.ThusIconsidersuchendeavormisleadingbecauseitin-conspicuouslybringsideologyinsidethediscipline.15

Judging from the situation of the study of religions in Central andEasternEuropefrombothhistoricalandcontemporaryperspectives,Ican-notsaythatitisinthrallofsome“universalcognitiveproclivity”toreli-gion. Iwouldclaim instead thathumancognition ingeneral isprone touniversalism,i.e.tophilosophicaladdressingofproblems.Butifscienceis tostayscientific, itcannotbecomea“project”tosolvetheexistentialquestionsofascholaroroftheacademiccommunity.Ifthestudyofreli-gionsistoprotectitselfeffectivelyfromsuchafallacy,itmustbewaryoftheologyaswellasofanyattemptstochangesintoaphilosophy(ofreli-gion);andthesewerenumerousthroughoutthediscipline’shistory.Iper-sonallyunderstandthestudyofreligionsasa“modestcognitiveproject”,as an empirical and descriptive field to which historical-philologicalmethodiscentral.Asaphilosopherwithinterestsinthehistoryofthefield,Iwoulddaretosaythatitmustalsobestronglyanti-philosophicalanditmustnotbringbackmeta-narrativetheoriesandthespiritofthe19thcen-tury,Imeananyattempttocreategenerallyacceptedtheory.Attheveryend,allowmeapersonalnote.IaskedDonaldWiebeduring

hisandLutherMartin’svisitinPardubiceinFebruary2012whathesawasthegreatestproblemofthefield,heansweredwithasmile:“Money!”Ifhemeantitseriouslythentheproblemofideologicalagendaspresentinthe studyof religions is not the first, but second, and that soundsmorehopefulthantheverybeginningofourpurelyacademicdiscussion.

15 T.Bubík,České bádání o náboženství ve 20. století…,221-222.

Tomáš Bubík

53

SUMMARY

Rethinking the Relationship between the Study of Religions, Theology and Religious Concerns: A Response to Some Aspects of Wiebe and Martin’s Paper

This response deals with some aspects of Luther Martin and DonaldWiebe’s paper“ReligiousStudiesasaScientificDiscipline:ThePersistenceofaDelusion”.Theauthorsthinkthatthehumanmindingeneralconstantlytendstowardsreligiousnessandthuscom-prehensive scientific inquiry into religion is actually impossible. They argue that “suchstudyisnoteverlikelytooccurinthatoranyothersetting”(p.9).Theyalsostressthattheyweredeludedinthepastandarguethatespecially(oronly)thecognitiveapproachcanhelpus toelucidate theproclivity towardsreligiousness. Ipartlyagreewith them,particularlythatthepromotionof“extra-scientific”agendasinAcademiaisquestionable,butIdonotseeitassuchaseriousproblem.Thereductionofthebiasestoonly“religious”agendasismistaken.Thehistoryof thefield isahistoryofdiverse“extra-scientific”agendaswhichchangeinaccordancewithsocialdevelopmentandprevailingpolitical interests.IpresentthesituationfromacentralandeasternEuropeanpointofview.Atthesametime,Iarguethatmanyscientificfieldsdealwiththesameissue,evenifnottosuchanextent.Thisisbecausereligiousstudies,morethanotherdisciplines,attractsscholarswithaspecialincli-nation toward religion. I also argue that scholarly results aremuchmore important than“personal” agendas.Also, the aspiration of religious studies as presented byMartin andWiebeseemstometooidealistic,perhapsutopistandthusunrealizable.

Keywords:StudyofReligions;theology;religiousconcerns;CentralandEasternEurope;ideologyofhumanities;politicsofeducation;inter-religiousdialogue.

Katedrareligionistiky toMáš bubíkFakultafilozofickáUniverzitaPardubice [email protected]á9753210PardubiceCzechRepublic


Vědecký čtvrtletník Nový Orient je časopis Orientálního ústavu Akademie věd

České republiky

Cílem časopisu je odbornou a seriózní formou seznamovat českou veřejnost s realitou zemí Asie a Afriky,

podporovat věcnou informovanost o nich a pomáhat vyvracet romantické nebo xenofobní mýty, jimiž jsou orientální země opředeny. Časopis Nový Orient nabízí

svým čtenářům korektní vhled do problematiky dějin, náboženství, materiální kultury, současné politiky

i jazyků a literatur asijských a afrických zemí.

Bližší informace o časopisu i předplatném:www.orient.cas.cz

Redakce Nového OrientuOrientální ústav AV ČRPod vodárenskou věží 4182 08 Praha 8 – Libeň

Telefon: 266 053 523e-mail: [email protected]

ww

w.o

rien

t.ca

s.cz

tel

efo

n 2

66 0

53 5

23

X X / 2 0 1 2 / 1 / T é m a

Straw Men and Scientific Nostalgia: A Response to Luther H. Martin and Donald Wiebe

kocku von stuckraD

LutherH.Martin andDonaldWiebe have considerably enriched thetheoreticaldiscussionabout religionduring thepastdecades.When twodistinguishedscholarsofreligionproclaiminfatalisticwordsthatevolu-tion results in an inevitable contamination of the study of religionwithreligiousbeliefs,wemayexpecttolearnsomeimportantlessonfromsucha provocative thesis. And when their article on “Religious Studies asaScientificDiscipline:ThePersistenceofaDelusion”1comesinthefor-mat of a classical philosophical argumentation, with ‘conclusions’ thatfollow logically from ‘assumptions’ that are claimed “to have an initialplausibility” (p. 9), the readermay expect an important contribution toarigorousscientificdebateaboutreligion.Unfortunately,theirarticledoesnotfulfillsuchexpectations,andmuchofthescientificrhetoricthatsteersMartinandWiebe’splotturnsouttobeproblematic.Letmebeginwithanobservation.OftenwhenIreadarticlesorlisten

topresentationsbyscholarswhoadvocatethecognitivestudyofreligion(proudlycalledthe‘cognitivescienceofreligion’)Iamstruckbythereli-giousconnotationsthatregularlyunderliethesenarratives.Inmanycases,scholarswhoweretrainedintheologydecadesago,presenttheir‘turn’tocognitive study of religion in words that resemble conversion stories,markingacompletelynew(scholarly) identity. In their roleasadeptsofanewculttheyhavethetendencytopreachthegospelandtodistinguishclearlybetweenin-groupandout-group.ThesameconnotationisapparentinMartinandWiebe’stext.Whatismore,toframetheirbiographicalnar-rativeinagenreof“confession”(p.9)isindicativeofthemixtureofreli-giousandacademiclanguagethat, interestinglyenough,oftencharacter-izesprogrammaticpublicationsinthefieldofcognitivestudyofreligion.Thismaybeaccountedforbyacertainnostalgiawhenitcomestothe

topic of science (and now I turn frommere observation to arguments).Throughout theirarticle,MartinandWiebe refer toascientificstudyof


56

religionassomethingthatwouldusetheempiricalmethodsofthenaturalsciences.That iswhytheycanpresent thesimpleclaim:“Thehistoricalrecord, we maintain, shows that no undergraduate departments ofReligious Studies have fully implemented a scientific programof studyandresearchsincesuchanapproachwasfirstadvocatedinthelatenine-teenthcentury”(p.9, italicsoriginal).Thisclaimissurprisinggiven thefact that in Europe already at the beginning of the twentieth centuryReligionswissenschaftwasestablishedasanacademicdisciplineinphilo-sophical–andnottheological–faculties,andpracticedasanon-confes-sional studyof religion.The studyprograms typicallydistinguishedbe-tweenahistoricalandasystematic(comparative)approachtothestudyofreligion.MartinandWiebebrieflyrefertoMüllerandTieleastheinitialconceiversofthisacademicpropositionbutdonotdescribethehistoricaldevelopmentofthedisciplinethathascharacterizedReligionswissenschaft asanindependentacademicfield.Itistoosimpletostatethatbythemid-dle of the twentieth century this ‘scientific’ initiative had been com-promisedbya“crypto-religioustrend”andsabotagedbytheologicalinter-ests (p. 12-13). Their strawman is ‘religious studies’, which indeed isa problematic concept; but that the more accurate translation ofReligionswissenschaft is ‘academic study of religion’, thus referring toastudythatisnotitself‘religious’,doesnotseemtofittheauthors’overallpolemicalinterest.Fromthebeginning,theacademicstudyofreligionhashadtofacethe

same challenges as other disciplineswithin the humanities, particularlyhistoriography,anthropology,psychology,and(lateron)culturalstudies.Themostimportantchallengeofthesedisciplinesisnottomeettheem-pirical standardsof thenatural sciences, but tomake scholarly researchacademicallyaccountable,basedonhistoricalandlogicalargumentation.This isexactlywhatcritical scholarshiphasbeendoingevenbefore thecognitive ‘science’ of religion entered the scene. Today, the academicstudyofreligionismainlydefinedthroughitsobjectofstudy,i.e.anhis-toricallyidentifiable–andIwouldarguediscursivelyconstructed2–ob-jectcalled‘religion’,anditappliesmethodsandtheoriesthatarewelles-tablishedinneighboringdisciplines(thisbecomesclearwhenwelookatthe collection of research methods in Engler and Stausberg).3 There isnothingintrinsically‘religious’inthestudyofreligion,eventhoughtherearemanydepartments of religion inEurope andparticularly theUnitedStates where religious interests intersect with academic research – the

2 Kocku von Stuckrad, “Discursive Study of Religion: Approaches, Definitions,Implications”,Method and Theory in the Study of Religion25/1,forthcoming2013.

3 Steven Engler – Michael Stausberg (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in the Study of Religion,London:Routledge2011.

Kocku von Stuckrad

57

reasonfor this,however, isnotevolutionorbrainfunctionsbutpolitics,power,anddiscourse.Hence,MartinandWiebeunderestimate(thepotentialof)theacademic

rigorofacriticalstudyofreligion.Theirfirstassumptionthattheprimaryobjectiveof“themodernwesternresearchuniversity”is“scientific, thatis,togainpublic(intersubjectivelyavailable)knowledgeofpublic(inter-subjectively available) facts” (p. 9) perfectly fits the understanding ofscholarswhoworkinthecontextofculturalstudies,historiography,andself-reflective critical humanities.Claiming that this scholarly endeavorhasfailed(andisevolutionarilydoomedtofail!)isagrosssimplification.InMartinandWiebe’stext,thisunderestimationofthestudyofreligion

goesalongwithanoverestimationofthescholarlyrigorofthenaturalsci-ences.Tobesure,itisarecurringproblemintheacademicstudyofreli-gionthatwehavetodealwith“theactualrealityofcontinuinginfiltrationsof extra-scientific agendas into the field” (p. 13). However, with thisproblemweareingoodcompany!Otherdisciplineswithinthehumanitieshavetoconfrontthischallenge,aswell;butmoreimportantly,thenaturalsciencesthemselveshavebeenredefinedandcriticizedinthewakeofthephilosophical,cultural,anddiscursiveturnsofthetwentiethcentury.Thehistoricityofknowledgeinthenaturalscienceswasalreadyfamouslydis-cussedbyLudwikFleck.4EdmundHusserl,GastonBachelard,GeorgesCanguilhem,andothershavecontributedtothisdebateandhelpedustounderstandthatitisnot‘nature’thatformulatesnaturallawsbutthat‘facts’areproducedincommunicativeandsocialprocesses.5MartinandWiebedonotseemtotakenoticeofthiscriticalscholarshipandsticktoanaïveimageofthenaturalsciencesthatmosthistoriansofsciencewoulddecon-structtoday.TheyrunintothetrapthatRussellT.McCutcheonaptlysum-marizedrecentlyasfollows:

Sincewecantrace thehistoryof“religion”and“religiousexperience”as itemsofdiscourse–andbythisImeanagenealogicalstudyoftheinventionofreligiousex-perienceasanagreeduponsubsetofthebroaderrangeofinteriordispositionsknownasexperiences–itisindeedoddtofindnaturalisticscholarssoconfidentthattheywillfindwherethisdiscursiveconstructresidesinthebrainofallhumanbeings.6

4 Ludwik Fleck, Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache: Einführung in die Lehre vom Denkstil und Denkkollektiv,Basel:BennoSchwabe1935.

5 Overview in Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, An Epistemology of the Concrete: Twentieth-Century Histories of Life, Durham: Duke University Press 2010. See also BrunoLatour,On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods,Durham–London:DukeUniversityPress2010.

6 RussellT.McCutcheon,“WillYourCognitiveAnchorHoldintheStormsofCulture?”,Journal of the American Academy of Religion78/4,2010,1182-1193:1188.

Straw Men and Scientific Nostalgia…

58

Giventheirunreflectivebeliefinscience,itisnotsurprisingthatMartinandWiebeconstructanotherstrawman,thistime‘postmodernism’:“Our fourth assumptionisthatthecurrentanti-theoreticalandanti-sciencepos-turingsofpostmodernismhavenotunderminedthecredibilityofmodernscienceasapeculiarlysuccessfulinstrumentofinquiryintothecharacteroftheworld,eithernaturalorsocial”(p.10).Unfortunately,theauthorsdonot explainwhat theymeanby ‘postmodernism’, and there isno singlereferencetoauthorswhowouldfitthetaxonomyof“anti-theoreticalandanti-scienceposturings”.Asamatteroffact,criticalresponsestorealisminthetheoryandphilosophyofsciencearenotatalldirectedagainstthe-oryorscience,quitethecontrary:contributionsfromthefieldofsociologyofknowledgeanddiscursiveapproachestothestudyofsciencearehighlytheorizedreflectionsontheconditionsofknowledgeandtheattributionofmeaningtotheworld–includingwhatisregardedasscientificobjectandfact.Against the authors’ prejudices it seems necessary to point out once

morethatdiscursiveapproaches–andrelatedtheoriesdeemed‘postmod-ern’byMartin andWiebe– argue thatourknowledge isnot about ‘theworldoutthere’(eveniftheexistenceof‘aworldoutthere’isnotdenied)andthatweshouldadoptarelativist,ratherthanarealistpositioninthephilosophicaldebatethatislinkedtotheseepistemologicalandontologicalissues.Therelativistpositionhasledtomany,oftenhighlypolemicalob-jections.DerekEdwards,MalcolmAshmore,andJonathanPottercallthemostprominentrejectionthe“DeathandFurniture”response:

‘Death’and‘Furniture’areemblemsfortwoverycommon(predictable,even)objec-tionstorelativism.Whenrelativiststalkaboutthesocialconstructionofreality,truth,cognition,scientificknowledge,technicalcapacity,socialstructureandsoon,theirrealistopponentssooneror laterstarthitting thefurniture, invokingtheHolocaust,talking about rocks, guns, killings, humanmisery, tables and chairs.The force oftheseobjectionsistointroduceabottomline,abedrockofrealitythatplaceslimitsonwhatmaybetreatedasepistemologicallyconstructedordeconstructible.Therearetwo relatedkinds ofmoves:Furniture (tables, rocks, stones, etc. – the reality thatcannot be denied) andDeath (misery, genocide, poverty, power – the reality thatshould notbedenied).7

Martin andWiebe contribute to this anti-relativist polemic.But theirargumentisitselfunder-theorized,whichturnstheircritiqueof‘postmod-

7 Derek Edwards –MalcolmAshmore – Jonathan Potter, “Death and Furniture: TheRhetoric, Politics and Theology of Bottom Line Arguments against Relativism”,History of the Human Sciences 8, 1995, 25-49: 26 (italics original); see also PirjoNikander,“ConstructionismandDiscourseAnalysis”,in:JamesA.Holstein–JaberF.Gubrium(eds.),Handbook of Constructionist Research,NewYork:TheGuilfordPress2008,413-428:413.

Kocku von Stuckrad

59

ernism’againstthemselves.Forinstance,whentheirfifthassumptionre-ferstothepossibilityof“scientificresearchonreligiousthoughtandbe-havior”(p.10),acriticaldiscursiveresponsewouldpointoutthatbeforewecanhaveascientific(rigorousandempirical)studyofreligionwewillhavetodefinewhatthis“religiousthoughtandbehavior”actuallyis.8Andthisactisnotatallempirical,buthermeneutical.Thescholarlyattributionofmeaningtocertainhumanthoughtandbehaviorisbasedonsocialcom-municationanddecisionsthatscholarshavetomaketoenterintoamean-ingfulconversationwiththeircolleagues.ThatiswhyMartinandWiebehavetointroducewhatactuallyboilsdowntoadefinitionofreligion,intheircase“abeliefinagentsthatarebeyondidentificationbywayofthesensesorscientificmetric”(theirsecondassumption,p.9-10).Thereasonsfor thisassumptionarebeyondscientificargumentation,andMartinandWiebedonotexplainwhythisdefinitionof‘religion’makesmoresensethanothers.Don’tgetmewrong:Iamnotarguingagainsttheuseofdefi-nitions anddemarcations in scholarly argumentation.But all definitionsandassumptionshaveadiscursive historythatcriticalscholarshipshouldreflectandanalyze(thisisespeciallytrueforthehighlyproblematiccon-ceptof‘belief’indefinitionsofreligion,butthatisanotherstory);whatIargue is thatgenericdefinitionsof religion,suchasappliedbyMartinandWiebe,shouldbeabandoned9andweasscholarsshouldbecarefulnottogeneralizeandreifyfindingsthatarebasedondiscursivelyconstructedknowledge.Otherwisewewouldshun“questionsconcernedwiththeap-parenteaseofmovingfromparttowhole,fromcontingenttonecessary,from history to ahistory, from local to universal, and from culture tonature”.10As a final point of criticism it is important to note thatMartin and

Wiebe’sargumentationappearstobeself-contradictory.Whentheauthorsclaimthat“[o]urspecies’anti-scienceproclivityisastrueofprofessionalscholarsofreligionasofotherintellectuals,perhapsespeciallyso,giventheirsubjectofstudy”(p.16),onewonderswhytheauthorsassumethatscholarswhoengageincognitiveresearchareanexceptiontothatrule,astheyapparentlyresisttheanti-scienceproclivity.Thisislinkedtoanotherinconsistency:Whentheauthorsclaimthat“religiousnesswillcontinueto

8 SeealsoHubertSeiwert,“TheStudyofReligionasaScientificDiscipline:ACommentonLutherMartinandDonaldWiebe’sPaper”, Religio: Revue pro religionistiku20/1,2012,27-38:32,33.

9 SeeKockuvonStuckrad,“DiscursiveStudyofReligion:FromStatesoftheMindtoCommunicationandAction”,Method and Theory in the Study of Religion15,2003,255-271;id.,“DiscursiveStudyofReligion:Approaches…”.

10 R.T.McCutcheon,“WillYourCognitiveAnchorHoldintheStormsofCulture?…”,1185.


60

constraintheacademicstudyofreligionevenasitwillcontinuetodomi-natetheconcernsofHomo sapiensgenerally”(p.14),onewonderswhy‘science’ –which the authors,withMcCauley, regard as ‘unnatural’ (p.14-15)–becamepossibleinthefirstplace.Icannotescapetheimpressionthatifwereallywouldacceptthepremisesofthisarticle,thepropositionsconcludedfromthemwouldbemeaninglessandlogicallyflawed.Thenar-rativewouldsimplybeanotherexampleoftheprolongationofthedelu-sionthattheauthorslament.ReadingMartinandWiebe’smeditationsaboutthe“persistenceofade-

lusion”issomewhatdisappointing.Manyoftheassumptionsareunwar-ranted,andtheargumentationthatisbuiltontheseassumptionsisprob-lematic, as it mainly reflects an uncritical belief in the success ofscientificmethods,aswellaspolemicalmisrepresentationsofscholarshipthattheauthorsdeem‘postmodern’.

Kocku von Stuckrad

61

SUMMARY

Straw Men and Scientific Nostalgia: A Response to Luther H. Martin and Donald Wiebe

Thisarticleargues thatLutherH.MartinandDonaldWiebepresentaposition that isbasedonmanyunwarrantedandromanticassumptions.Tobeginwith,theauthorsunderes-timate(thepotentialof)theacademicrigorofacriticalstudyofreligion.Thisunderestima-tionofthestudyofreligiongoesalongwithanoverestimationofthescholarlyrigorofthenaturalsciences.MartinandWiebedonotseemtotakenoticeofcriticalscholarshipinthehistoriographyandepistemologyofscienceandsticktoanaïveimageof thenaturalsci-ences thatmost historians of sciencewould deconstruct today.The authors havewrittenapolemicagainstrelativistpositionsinthehumanities,buttheirargumentisitselfunder-theorized,which turns their critiqueof ‘postmodernism’against themselves.Finally, it isnotedthatMartinandWiebe’sargumentationappearstobeself-contradictory.Forinstance,whentheauthorsclaimthatthehumanspecies’anti-scienceproclivityisastrueofprofes-sionalscholarsofreligionasofotherintellectuals,onewonderswhytheauthorsassumethatscholarswhoengageincognitiveresearchareanexceptiontothatrule,astheyapparentlyresisttheanti-scienceproclivity.

Keywords:LutherH.Martin;DonaldWiebe;methodandtheoryinthestudyofreligion;definitionsofreligion;cognitivestudyofreligion;discursivestudyofreligion;naturalsci-ences;relativism.

DepartmentofComparative kocku von stuckraDandHistoricalStudyofReligionFacultyofTheologyandReligiousStudies c.k.m.von.stuckrad@rug.nlUniversityofGroningenOudeBoteringestraat389712GKGroningenTheNetherlands


Laboratory for Experimental Research of Religion October 25th - 27th, 2012

We invite interested scholars and students to submit proposals for papers (lasting no more than 20 minutes) and/or posters for pos-sible inclusion in the program of its upcoming conference taking place between October 25th - 27th, 2012, at Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic. All proposals must be related to the theme of the conference. We recognize that the experimental study of religion encompasses a wide array of disci-plines and methods, including, among others, laboratory and fi eld based experimental

and quasi-experimental paradigms and survey techniques from the social sciences. Primarily, we welcome experimental data and analysis; however, presentations advanc-ing theoretical insights designed to advance new experimental approaches to the scientifi c study of religion (and by extension culture) are welcome. We also welcome submissions from advanced undergraduate and postgradu-ate students. The conference will consist of at least four panels grouped together by thematic and/or methodological criteria.

The language of the conference will be English only. All prospective participants (those who wish to present a paper/poster as well as those who do not) are kindly asked to register at http://www.phil.muni.cz/relig/levyna2012/ and submit their paper/poster proposals via this registration platform. The deadline for submission is August 31st, 2012. All enquires concerning the onference program or organizational matters should be addressed to the conference email: [email protected]

Dr. William W. McCorkle Jr., Director (LEVYNA)Dr. Dimitris Xygalatas, Director (LEVYNA)Dr. Aleš Chalupa, Chair (Department for the Study of Religions)

Call for Proposals for Papers for the 2012 conference presented byThe Laboratory for Experimental Research of Religion (LEVYNA), The Czech Association for the Study of Religions, and the Department for the Study of Religions, Masaryk University

HOMO EXPERIMENTALIS EXPERIMENTAL APPROACHES IN THE STUDY OF RELIGION

Plenary and Invited Speakers Include Professor Andreas Roepstorff (Aarhus University)Dr. Pierre Liénard (UNLV), Dr. Jesper Sørensen (Aarhus University)Dr. Emma Cohen (Max Planck Institute and University of Oxford)

Flyer A5_fall conference_Religio1 1 5.7.2012 19:27:18

X X / 2 0 1 2 / 1 / T é m a

Why the Possible is Not Impossible but is Unlikely: A Response to Our Colleagues

luther h. Martin – DonalD Wiebe

Wewish to thank the editors ofReligio: Revue pro religionistiku fortheirinvitationtopublishourreflectionsonthestudyofreligionaswefinditinmost,ifnotall,modernresearchuniversities.1And,wearegratefultoourcolleaguesinEuropefortakingthetimetocriticallyreviewourworkinthissameissueofthejournal.Despiteour“confessed”frustrationwithour attempts to further a scientific study of religion, we appreciate thecriticalresponseswehavereceivedwithrespecttoourposition.Wehopethat this conversation might make some contribution to “breaking thespell”of religion, theology,andothernormativeagendasand ideologiesthat constitutemajorconstraintsonour fieldof study. Ifwemaybeal-lowed to speakwith a bit of irony, only the gods really knowwhetherconversationslikethismightmakeitslightlymorelikelythat thescien-tific approach to understanding and explaining religion might come todominate our “religious studies” (and so-called religionswissenschaftliche)departments.Our ironic commentmay come as somewhat of a surprise toHubert

Seiwert, Kocku von Stuckrad, and RadekKundt, all of whom seem tothinkthatwehavearguedthatascientificstudyofreligioniscompletelyandwhollyimpossible.Althoughwemadeitveryclear,bothinthe“as-sumptional” framework forour arguments and in thebodyof thepaperitself, that a scientific study of religion is indeed possible, itmaywellbenefitourconversationifweonceagainrestatethecoreofourconcern.RadekKundtclaimsthatweoffera“pithy,provocativestatement”of

theessenceofourargument,2whenweclaimthatit isdelusorytothinkthat“ReligiousStudies”haseverachievedorcanachieveafullemancipa-tion from religious concerns. Note, however, that while we consideredsuchanemancipationtobehighlyunlikely,wespecificallyacknowledgedthelogical possibility forsuchastudy,preciselybecauseofthereflective

1 LutherH.Martin–DonaldWiebe,“ReligiousStudiesasaScientificDiscipline:ThePersistence of a Delusion”,Religio: Revue pro religionistiku 20/1, 2012, 9-18.Allreferencesinthetext,unlessotherwisenoted,aretothisarticle.

2 RadekKundt,“AScientificDiscipline:ThePersistenceofaDelusion”, Religio: Revue pro religionistiku20/1,2012,39-42:39.

64

aswellasreflexivecapacitiesofhumanbrainsemphasizedbyKundtbutwhichhe seems to thinkweneglect.3We also emphasized the fact thattherearemanyindividualscholarsinthefieldwhostudyreligioninsucha scientific fashion aswell some research centerswhich do so (p. 13).Thus,toreiterate,theprimaryobjectofourcriticismwas,andstillis,thedisciplinary units within the curricula of our modern western researchuniversitiesthatarededicatedtothestudyofreligion(theso-calledReli-giousStudiesdepartmentsintheU.K.,NorthAmerica,andelsewhereintheworld,aswellasthosethatexistasdepartmentsofReligionswissen-schaftinEurope).Asweputitinourpaper,thehistoricalrecord“[s]howsthatnoundergraduatedepartmentsofReligiousStudieshavefullyimple-mentedascientificprogramofstudyandresearchsincesuchanapproachwas first advocated in the latenineteenthcentury–much lesshas therebeenanybroadestablishmentofsuchadisciplinaryfieldofstudy”(p.9).Wenotedinourpaperthatourargumentrestsonseveralassumptions,

whichweconsideredtohaveatleastsomeinitialplausibilityandwhich,consequently,wewouldnotspecifyfurther.Nevertheless,weappreciateHansGeraldHödl’sconcernthat,despitethat“initialplausibility”, theremaybesome“relevanttopicsthatcouldbetakenintoconsideration…tofurtherdevelop”ourargument.4WealsoappreciateHödl’srecognition–andthatbyHubertSeiwertandKockuvonStuckrad–thatourpaperdoesnotattempttoprovideacomprehensiveargumentinsupportofourposi-tionandthat,consequently,thereadershouldnotexpecttofindeveryas-pectoftheproblemwetackledtobefullyelaborated.Thisdisclaimerap-plies,ofcourse,tothisresponseaswell.Likeus,Hödlacceptsthatscientificinquiryinitselfis,atleastideally,

“anunbiasedundertaking”.5Nevertheless,his concernwithour first as-sumption concerning the purpose-designed character of the modern re-searchuniversityisthatwefailtoacknowledgethatsciencecanitselfbeinvokedtosupportvariousideologies.6Weare,ofcourse,quiteawareofthis,7butthisisnottheissueaboutsciencethatisgermanetoourargumentandsoweleaveitwithoutfurthercommenthere.Hödl’s concernwith assumptions twoand three regardingour claims

thatthestudyofreligionconcernsa“kind”ofhumanbehaviour,individual

3 Ibid,40-41. 4 HansGeraldHödl,“IsanUnbiasedScienceofReligionImpossible?”,Religio: Revue

pro religionistiku20/1,2012,19-26:19. 5 Ibid.,21. 6 Ibid.; cf.KockuvonStuckrad,“StrawMenandScientificNostalgia:AResponse to

LutherH.Martin andDonaldWiebe”,Religio: Revue pro religionistiku 20/1, 2012,55-61:57.

7 E.g.,LutherH.Martin,“TheUses(andAbuse)oftheCognitiveSciencesfortheStudyofReligion”,CSSR Bulletin37,2008,95-98.

Luther H. Martin – Donald Wiebe

65

andcollective,ratherthansome“reality”calledreligionthatliesbeyondtheboundariesofempiricalandtheoreticalstudy,amountstoasimplisticdefinition of religion in terms of supernatural agency only. So, for ex-ample,Hödl correctlynotes that “‘ritual’ is akindofumbrella term forvariouskindsofactivity,whichcan,butdoesnothaveto,referto‘super-humanbeings’”.8But,heasks,“[w]hatexactlyisitthatmakesritualactiv-ity,narrativesabouttheoriginoftheworld,doctrines,ethicalsystemsandsoonreligious ones?”.9Precisely,wemaintain,a legitimatingappeal totheauthorityofsuperhumanagency.10Hisalternativeappealtotheuseofmetaphorsandmetonyms in theconstructionof religiousworldshas,ofcourse,alsobeenexploredbycognitivists.11However,Hödl’sespousalofMelfordSpiro’s“definition”ofreligion,similartoours,whichhangsonto“culturally postulated super-humanbeings”,12 should neverthelessmakehimrelativelyhappywiththecleardelineationweprovideaboutthefieldofinterestforstudentsofreligion.Hödl’s criticismofour fourthassumption,which rejectspostmodern-

ism’sunderstandingof scienceas simplyanotherhistorical formofdis-course rather than as a superior epistemic route to knowledge, as beingamererhetoricalwayofavoidingcriticism13issimplywrong.Toprovideargumentforthisassumptionwouldhavetakenfarmoretimeandspacethanwas available.Moreover,we have dealt with thismatter at lengthelsewhere,14andwedeferfurthercommentonituntilwerespondtovonStuckrad’ssimilarcriticism.

8 H.G.Hödl,“IsanUnbiasedScience…”,22.Cf.PascalBoyer–PierreLiénhard,“WhyRitualized Behavior? Precaution Systems and Action Parsing in Developmental,PathologicalandCulturalRituals”,Behavioral and Brain Sciences29,2006,595-650.

9 H.G.Hödl,“IsanUnbiasedScience…”,22. 10 Theinsertionofaroleforsuperhumanagentsintootherwiseordinaryhumanpractices

is, of course, the governing thesis of E. Thomas Lawson – Robert N. McCauley, Rethinking Religion: Connecting Cognition and Culture,Cambridge:CambridgeUni-versityPress1990.Thevolumeisgenerallyconsideredtohaveinauguratedthefieldofthecognitivescienceofreligion.

11 E.g.,GerogeLakoff–MarkJohnson,Metaphors We Live By,Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress1980.

12 H.G.Hödl,“IsanUnbiasedScience…”,23. 13 Ibid.,20. 14 E.g.,DonaldWiebe, “DissolvingRationality:TheAnti-SciencePhenomenonand its

ImplicationsfortheStudyofReligion”,in:JeppeS.Jensen–LutherH.Martin(eds.),Rationality and the Study of Religion,London:Routledge22003,167-183;id.,“Appro-priatingReligion:UnderstandingReligionasanObjectofScience”,in:TorAhlbäck(ed.),Approaching Religion, Åbo – Stockholm:Almquist andWiksell International1999,253-272;id.,“ModernWesternScienceandtheStudyofReligion:AResponseto Richard King’sOrientalism and Religion”,Method and Theory in the Study of Religions14,2002,265-278.

Why the Possible is Not Impossible but is Unlikely: A Response…

66

In largepartHubertSeiwert is inagreementwithourhistoricalargu-mentaboutthenatureofthestudyofreligion.Heagreesthatascientificstudyofreligiondidemergelateinthenineteenth-centuryandthatitsub-sequentlybecamedominatedbyideologicalconcerns.However,Seiwertgoes on to claim that the ideological character of the fieldwas, and is,largelyaNorthAmericanphenomenon.Hefindsevidenceforthisinthefactthatothersocialsciencesintheuniversitycontexthavenowpickeduponthestudyofreligionasofconsiderableinterestandimportance–butnot,wewouldargue,becauseofanyresearchfindingsproducedbyschol-ars of religion who are rarely cited by such social scientists, if at all.Further,hepointstotheimportancethattheInternationalAssociationfortheHistoryofReligions(IAHR)hasplayedinEuropetoprovideacontextexclusivelygivenovertothescientificstudyofreligion(acontextwhichhenowseesas“underthreat”bytherecentadmissiontoitsmembershipofAmericanAcademyofReligion).15Thus,heconcludesthatourhistori-calargumentdoesnotshow“thattheStudyofReligioncannotdevelopasascientificdiscipline”,16orthatitisimpossibleforittodoso17–aclaim,aswenotedabove,thatwedonotmakeinourpaper.Toclaimthattheideologicalelementinthestudyofreligionisprimar-

ily a characteristic ofNorthAmerican institutions ignores the evidence.The studies commissioned byGregoryAlles for a volumeonReligious Studies: A Global View,18forexample,providesufficientevidencetoun-dermineSeiwert’sclaimsinthisregardaswellasthecontributiontothatvolumeon“religiousstudies”inWesternEuropebyMichaelStausberg.19 Furthermore,tocitetheIAHRasanexampleoftheinstitutionalizationofreligiousstudies in theuniversity ismisdirectedsince it isnotaffiliatedwithanyuniversityanditshouldbenotedthattheIAHRhasitselfbeencontinuallyforcedtocountertheinfluenceofreligionandtheologyinitsendeavours.20

15 Hubert Seiwert, “The Study of Religion as a Scientific Discipline:A Comment onLutherMartinandDonaldWiebe”, Religio: Revue pro religionistiku20/1,2012,27-38:29-30.

16 Ibid.,30(emphasisadded). 17 Ibid.,31(emphasisadded). 18 GregoryAlles,Religious Studies: A Global View,London:Routledge2008. 19 MichaelStausberg,“WesternEurope”,in:GregoryAlles,Religious Studies: A Global

View,London:Routledge2008,14-49.ForfurtheranalysisofStausberg’sargument,see DonaldWiebe, “Religious Studies: Toward Reestablishing the Field”,Religion 39/4,2009,372-375.

20 See thepoliticaland/or religiousorientationsof theIAHRprograminRosalindI.J.Hackett–MichaelPye(eds.),IAHR World Congress Proceedings, Durban 2000: The History of Religions: Origins and Visions,Cambridge:RootsandBranches2009;alsoBrianBocking (ed.), IAHR World Congress Proceedings, Tokyo 2005: Religion and Society: An Agenda for the 21st Century,Cambridge:RootsandBranches2010;esp.


67

Asforourscientificargument,Seiwertiswhollyunconvincedbecause,according to him, (1) it is ideological in that it assumes an ontologicalnaturalism that has not the slightest plausibility; (2) it is incoherent be-causeitignoresthecontributionsofthesocialsciencesandhumanitiesandutterlyfailstorecognize,asdothesedisciplines,theimportanceofherme-neutics for any explanatory project; (3) it assumes religion to be a sui generisphenomenon;(4)itlacksamotivationforthestudyofreligion;(5)itisinternallyincoherent;and(6)itisbasedonfaultyassumptions.21Seiwert’slistoffaultsinourargumentsislongandprecludesdetailed

analysis and response here but they are, for themost part, based uponmisunderstandingsofourargument.Itshouldfirstbenoted,withrespecttoSeiwert’sconcernsaboutourcommitmenttoscienceingeneralandthecognitivescienceofreligioninparticular,thatweneverevensuggest,letaloneclaim, that “sciencecanproduceunquestionableknowledgeabouttheworld”,22 or that it“canbetakenasagaugetomeasure the truthofreligiousbeliefs”.23Wedonot concernourselveswith“religious truth”.Ourfocusisreligiousbeliefasitexpressesitself inobservablereligiousbehaviours, trying to find out what motivates them and seeking bothaproximate(historical,social,economic,political)aswellas“ultimate”(cognitive/biological) explanation for those behaviours.We do not seekeitherto“appreciate”or“depreciate”religion,butrathertounderstandit(in anon-gnosticway,24 that is, todescribe it properly according to theavailable“empirical”evidence)andthentoexplainit.PerhapsthemostseriousargumentSeiwertraisesagainstusisthatwe

arenaïveanduncriticalinourassessmentofthecharacterofscienceandthatweare,therefore,at“riskoftransformingscienceintoametaphysicalideology that is unaware of its own epistemological limitations”.25 Seiwert’sjustificationforthisclaimisthatweare,sotospeak,inthralltoan“ontologicalnaturalism”.ItisdifficultforustorespondtothisclaimbecauseSeiwertprovidesnoclearindicationofwhathemeansbythisal-lusion.Indeed,heusesaproliferationoflocutionswithrespecttotheno-tionofnaturalismwithoutany indicationofwhat thediversityofadjec-tives mean; the terms include “naïve naturalism”, “methodological andontologicalnaturalism”,a“fundamentalistversionofnaturalism”and,by

625-626; and DonaldWiebe (ed.),Proceedings of the XXth World Congress of the Internatonal Association for the History of Religions: Religion: A Human Phenomenon,Toronto:AnIASRPublication2011,esp.75,90,105-107.

21 H.Seiwert,“TheStudyofReligionasaScientificDiscipline:AComment…”,30-33. 22 Ibid.,35. 23 Ibid. 24 DonaldWiebe, “‘Understanding’ in Religious Studies:A GnosticAberration in the

ModernStudyofReligion”,Fu-Jen Religious Studies6,2002,15-56. 25 H.Seiwert,“TheStudyofReligionasaScientificDiscipline:AComment…”,34.


68

implication, ametaphysical naturalism.26However, the assumptionswemakeinthisessayclearlycommitsusonlytoamethodologicalnaturalism.Thiscommitmentsimplyamountstotheacceptanceofthevalueofknowl-edgeforthesakeofknowledgealone–avaluethatpossesseswhatErnestGellner has called a diplomatic immunity from other cultural values,27 and,asMaxWeberputit,arefusaltoinvokemysteriousandincalculableforces inourexplanations.28And thisdoesnotpreclude invoking inten-tionallanguageatthedescriptivelevelofourenterprise.Aproperdescrip-tionofourobjectofexplanation–namely,humanbehaviour–willclearlyrequiretheuseofintentionallanguagebutthisdoesnotprecludeanexpla-nationof intentionalityat adifferent levelof reality.Whatexistsatonescaleofreality,inotherwords,isbuiltfrommaterialatalowerscaleofreality.Consequently,Seiwert’sclaimthatwereject“hermeneutics”andthereforeignoreandexcludethedescriptiveworkdonebyourcolleaguesin thesocialandhumanisticsciences issimplymisdirected.29Simply tojumpintohermeneuticalexerciseswithoutanyintersubjectiveexplanationofwhatistobeinterpretedis,forus,afutileexerciseinsubjectivefantasy.A final comment onSeiwert’s critiquemust suffice.Seiwert believes

thatourcommitmenttothecognitivescienceofreligionsomehowimpliesouradoptionofasui generisnotionofreligion.30Wefailtoseehowthisclaimfollowsfromourespousalofacognitivescienceapproachtoreli-gion, particularly since he acknowledges that our approach can explainwhy“mostpeoplearemoreinclinedtounderstandtheworldreligiouslyinsteadofscientifically”.31Itappearstousthatour“confession”hascreatedmoreheatthanlight

inKockuvonStuckrad’scritiqueofourarguments.VonStuckradreadsouressay as a conversion story, a religious narrative by former theologianswhohavegivenupthefaithforthenewcultofthecognitivescienceofreligion. He claims that the framing of our “biographical narrative inagenreof‘confession’”isindicativeofa“mixtureofreligiousandaca-

26 Ibid.,31,34. 27 ErnstGellner,“TheSavageandtheModernMind”,in:RobinHorton–RuthFinnegan

(eds.),Modes of Thought: Essays on Thinking in Western and Non-Western Societies,London:Faber1973,179-181.

28 MaxWeber,“ScienceasaVocation”,in:HansH.Gerth–C.WrightMills(eds.),From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress1981,139.

29 See, for example, the first chapter of E. T. Lawson – R. N.McCauley, Rethinking Religion…,12-31, inwhich the foundersof thecognitivescienceof religionclearlyemphasizeanecessaryrelationshipbetweeninterpretationandexplanation.

30 H.Seiwert,“TheStudyofReligionasaScientificDiscipline:AComment…”,30,31,32.

31 Ibid.,31.


69

demiclanguage”.32ThisrathercuriousclaimwouldseemtoindicatevonStuckrad’sown“discursive entanglements”more thanours.TheOxford English Dictionary, for example, lists numerous meanings of “confes-sion”, from its initial entries on general uses to its juridical ones.Specifically religious uses of the word are relegated to its penultimateentry(entry8and9of10).Von Stuckrad rejects our historical argument but, unlike Seiwert, he

doessobymakingthehistoricallyinaccurateclaimthatReligionswissen-schaft at the beginning of the twentieth century “was established as anacademicdisciplineinphilosophical–andnottheological–faculties”.33 Further,hemaintainsthatifwewereabletorecognizethedistinctionbe-tweenReligious StudiesandReligionswissenschaftwewouldseethatourempirical claim regarding undergraduate departments is simply wrong.However,vonStuckradhasnottakenthehistoricalevidenceaboutthesematterstoheartandhefailstoseethatthedifferenceinterminologydoesnotsomehowtransformintocounter-evidencetheevidencedocumentedinAlles’“globalview”of theacademicstudyofreligion inEurope,NorthAmerica,andaroundtheworld.ContrarytovonStuckrad’sclaim,there-fore, it is not we whomisrepresent scholarship in the field.What vonStuckradfailstoseeisthatthe“historyofreligions”engagedbyhistoriansandphilologistsintheearlydevelopmentofthefieldofreligiousstudiesisnotthe“HistoryofReligions”oftheirsuccessors.Theahistorical,faith-imbued scholarship of phenomenologists likeGerardus van der Leeuw,RudolphOtto,orNinianSmartorofHistoriansofReligion likeMirceaEliadedoesnotamounttoascientificstudyofreligion.VonStuckrad’scom-plaintsaboutnottakingseriouslytheimportanceofhermeneuticsforourfieldandnottakingseriouslytheworkofscholarsinthehumanitiesalsofailtohittheirtargetforthesamereasonsweindicatedinourresponsetoSeiwert’scritique.Again, like Seiwert, von Stuckrad insists that we overestimate the

achievementsofscience(naturalism)justasweunderestimatetheachieve-mentsofthehumanitiesandthatwesimplyexhibitan“unreflectivebeliefinscience”.34AccordingtovonStuckrad,“criticalscholarship”(postmod-ern scholarship) has revealed the historicity of scientific knowledge, bywhich,we take it that hemeans that science is simply another formofdiscourse rather thanadifferent, andepistemically superior,method forunderstandingandexplainingtheworld.Andwehave,asaconsequence,undertheorizedrelativismwhichisresponsibleforouroverestimationof

32 K.vonStuckrad,“StrawMen…”,55. 33 Ibid.,56. 34 Ibid.,57-58.



theepistemicvalueofscience.Tomountafully-fledgedargumentagainsttheclaimthatscienceisbutanotherdiscourseamongmanyisnotsome-thingwecouldundertakeinouroriginalarticlenorisitpossibletodosohere.ButthisisnogreaterfaultthanisthefailureonthepartofbothvonStuckradandSeiwerttomountafully-fledgedargumentinsupportoftheircriticalstancewithrespecttoscience.Furthermore,wethinkthatouras-sumptionherehasagreaterdegreeofinitialplausibilitythandoestheirs.Consequently,wethinkitreasonable–notsurprising–toseekforanac-count(explanation)ofreligiousbeliefsandbehavioursthatformspartofacausallyintegratedmodelofexplanationthat takesseriouslyallof thesciences,includingthenaturalsciences.35TomášBubíkfocusesonthecontinuingproblemoftherelationshipof

religion and theology to the study of religion specifically in Europe –Central and Eastern, as well asWestern. Like Hödl, Seiwert, and vonStuckrad,heinsiststhatEuropeanscholarsclearlyunderstandthediffer-encesbetweenandamongthesedisciplines.Andlikethem,heiscommit-ted to undertakingReligionswissenschaft as a scientific enterprise.Alsolikethem,herecognizesthatReligionswissenschaftissusceptibletoide-ologization.However,unlike them,he(andKundt) recognizes thatsuchideologizationofthestudyofreligion,includingapervasivereligiousness,characterizesEurope asmuch as it doesNorthAmerica. Ironically, thisjudgementisbytwoscholarsfromacountrythatisconsideredtobeoneofthemostsecularinEurope.Theyarewellpositionedtorecognizehowthestudyofreligionhasbeen,andcontinuestobe,usedideologically–todefendreligionorscientificatheism,forexample,ortodefendexistential/religiousquestionsandquestsformeaning.Despitehisgeneralagreementwithourargument,Bubíkislesspessi-

misticthanweareaboutfutureprospectsforscientificstudyinthecontextofreligiousstudies/religionswissenschaftliche departments.Itappearsthathe thinks that only ifwe can generatemore practical (social) value forscientificallycredibleknowledge,whichsuchastudymightproduce,wewillhaveimprovedthechancesofensuringthatthescientificapproachtoreligiousstudieswillformthedominantframeworkinourundergraduatedepartmentsforthestudyofreligion.Perhaps,butweremainskeptical.Surprisingly,allofour respondents seem tohave takenourhistorical

and our scientific arguments as two distinct claims thatmight be sepa-ratelyacceptedorquestioned.Ourintent,however,wasthatourscientific(i.e.,cognitive)argumentwasofferedinsupportof,andprovidedanex-

35 JohnTooby–LedaCosmides,“ThePsychologicalFoundationsofCulture”,in:JeromeH.Barkow–LedaCosmides–JohnTooby(eds.),The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress1992,19-136.

71 Why the Possible is Not Impossible but is Unlikely: A Response…

planationfor,ourobservationsaboutthehistoricalfailureofanyscientificparadigmbecomingas“athome”inthestudyofreligionashashistoricaldescription,phenomenologicaltypologization,and/orthedefenceofcul-turalrelativism–whatwecharacterizedastheaspectsof“religionappre-ciationcourses”.Consequently,wearepleasedthatRadekKundtnotonlyagreeswithourbasicassumptions,withourhistoricalargumentaboutthestudyofreligionaswellaswiththeimportanceofacognitivescienceofreligion.However,Kundtdisagreesradicallywithwhatheunderstandstobe an “extension” of our scientific argument, whichwe take to be ourprognostications about the future for a scientific study of religion. Heclaimsthat,ineffect,weneglectthehumanability“toconsciouslyprocessknowledge about how unconscious levels operate, trace those mecha-nisms,makethem(ortheirresults)explicit”.36Otherwise,heconcludes,we“wouldhavenowayofknowingthatopticalillusionsareillusions”.37 WhileKundtisabsolutelycorrectaboutthecapabilitiesofhumanbrains,thereare,ofcourse,innumerableinstanceswherepeopledonotrecognizeopticalillusionsasillusionsandtherearenumerousopticalillusionsthatthevisualsystemcannotrecognizeasillusoryeventhoughweknowcon-sciously,evenscientifically,thattheyareillusions.Weagree,consequent-ly,withKundt’sobservationthat“thereisnospecialreasonwhyscientists-religious scholars should tend to do bad science more than any otherscientists”38–excepthistorically,theyhave,and,weargue,theycontinueto do so.With apologies for the libertieswe takewith the title of vonStuckrad’sresponsetoourpaper,wehavesoughttooffersomescientificexplanation for the enduringweight of this historical reality rather thanretaininganynostalgiaforwhatwedescribeastheacademicchaffofpre-viousscholarshipinthestudyofreligion.

36 R.Kundt,“AScientificDiscipline…”,40. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid.,41.


SUMMARY

Why the Possible is Not Impossible but is Unlikely: A Response to Our Colleagues

Thispaperisaresponsetotheresponsestoourpaper“ReligiousStudiesasaScientificDiscipline:ThePersistenceofaDelusion”byHansGeraldHödl,HubertSeiwert,RadekKundt,TomášBubík, andKocku vonStuckrad, published in this same issue ofReligio: Revue pro religionistiku.Someoftherespondentsactuallyoverstateourposition.Wehaveclaimed,andstillnowclaim,thatafullyscientificprogramof“ReligiousStudies”,evenifpossible,ishighlyunlikelytoeverbeachieved.

Keywords:religiousstudies;religiousconcerns;historyofthestudyofreligion;cognitivescienceofreligion.

DepartmentofReligion luther h. MartinUniversityofVermont481MainStreet [email protected],Vermont05405USA

TrinityCollege DonalD WiebeFacultyofDivinityUniversityofToronto [email protected],OntarioCanadaM5S1H8

Religio Unbiased Discussion

Documents

Transcript of Religio Unbiased Discussion