Relevance of Traditional African Leadership

8/14/2019 Relevance of Traditional African Leadership

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Economic Commission

for Africa

African Traditional

Institutions of

Governance

Relevance of

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Economic Commission

or Arica

African TraditionalInstitutions of

Governance

Relevance of

2007


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Economic Commission or Arica, 2007

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Edited, designed and printed by the ECA Publications and Conerence Management Section (PCMS).

Cover photograph: USAID


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iii

Table of Contents

Preface vIntroduction 1

1. DiversityandransormationoAricanraditionalInstitutions 3 1.1 owardsanewtypologyoAricantraditionalinstitutions 5 1.2 ransormationoAricantraditionalinstitutions 6 1.3 raditionalinstitutionsinthepost-colonialera 8 1.4 Genderrelationsintraditionalinstitutions 8

2. TeDebateovertheRelevanceoAricanraditionalInstitutions 10

2.1 Reasonsorthedivergenceoviews 11

3. TeoreticalFramework 15 3.1 raditionalauthorities 15 3.2 ConvergenceotraditionalAricanpoliticalvalueswith moderndemocraticgovernance 18

4. AreasoPotentialContributionoraditionalInstitutions 20 4.1 State-building 20 4.2 Statereconstructionandaccountabilityoleadership 21

4.3 Expansionopublicservice 22 4.4 Managementoresource-basedconicts 22

5. IntegratingraditionalAuthoritiesintotheGovernanceStructure 23

6. FutureDirectionoResearchandAimsotheProject 24 6.1 Newtypologyotraditionalinstitutions 24 6.2 Resilienceotraditionalinstitutions 25 6.3 Genderrelationsintraditionalinstitutions 25 6.4 Changesinlandtenureandtraditionalinstitutions 25 6.5 Mechanismsointegratingtraditionalauthority 26

Annexes AnnexI 27 AnnexII 30 AnnexIII 41

Bibliography 48


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Preface

Anumberostudies havearmedthe resiliency, legitimacy and relevance oAricantraditional institutions in the socio-cultural, economic and political lives oAricans,particularlyintheruralareas.JuxtaposedwiththisisthesometimesparallelmodernState, vested with enormous authority in rule making, application, adjudication andenorcement.AsAricaseekstobuildandstrengthencapableStates,thereistheneedtorecognizeandaddressthisdualityully.TisisprincipallyborneoutbyagrowingrecognitionthatcapabledemocraticStatesmustbegroundedonindigenoussocialvaluesandcontexts,whileadaptingtochangingrealities.Tiswillrequireamongotheractions,aligningandharmonizingtraditionalgovernanceinstitutionswiththemodernState.

Te roles that traditional authorities canplay in the process o good governance canbroadly beseparated into threecategories: rst, theiradvisory role togovernment, aswellastheirparticipatoryroleintheadministrationoregionsanddistricts;second,theirdevelopmentalrole,complementinggovernmentsefortsinmobilizingthepopulationortheimplementationodevelopmentprojects,sensitizingthemonhealthissuessuchasHIV/AIDS,promotingeducation,encouragingeconomicenterprises,inspiringrespectorthelawandurgingparticipationintheelectoralprocess;andthird,theirroleinconictresolution, an area where traditional leaders acrossAricahave already demonstratedsuccess.

Tequestionthereoreisnotwhetherthetraditionalandmodernsystemsogovernance

arecompetingagainsteachotherbuthowtointegratethetwosystemsmoreefectivelyinordertobetterservecitizensintermsorepresentationandparticipation,servicedelivery,socialandhealthstandardsandaccesstojustice.

ItisagainstthisbackgroundthatinOctober2004,theEconomicCommissionorArica(ECA)organizedtheourthAricanDevelopmentForum(ADF-IV),whichocusedonthetheme,GovernanceoraProgressingArica.IntheADF-IVagendaoraction,ECAwasrequestedtodevelopaprojecttomapouttraditionalsystemsogovernance,includingtheirconsensualdecision-makingmodels,aspartoabroadereforttobetterdeneand advocate their role inachievinggoodgovernance inArica. Tis concept

paper addressesthese issuesand outlines the theoretical ramework or the dynamicsthatenabletraditionalgovernanceinstitutionstoplayamoredevelopmentalistroleinmoderngovernancesystems.


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TepaperwasalsodiscussedinanexpertsworkshopthattookplaceinAddisAbabainJune2006.Teexpertsendorsedtheconceptpaperandmadeconcreterecommendationsonhowtoefectandimplementtheissuesaddressed.

AstafteamromtheDevelopmentPolicyandManagementDivision(DPMD)preparedthestudyundertheoverallsupervisionotheDirector,Mr.OkeyOnyejekwe.TeteamwasledbyMr.KojoBusiaandcomprisedMr.StephaneOertelandMs.HasnaMengesha.TetechnicalsupportoMr.KidaneMengisteabwasinstrumentalintheproductionotheconceptpaperandthesuccessotheworkshop.


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Introduction

Arican countries are characterized by ragmentation o various aspects o theirpolitical economy, including their institutionso governance. Large segments o therural populations, the overwhelming majority in most Arican countries, continuetoadhereprincipallytotraditionalinstitutions.Tepost-colonialState,ontheotherhand,essentiallyemulateswesterninstitutionsogovernance,whichareotenatoddswithtraditionalAricanculturalvaluesandtheregionscontemporarysocio-economicrealities. Fragmentation o the institutions o governance, alongwith economic andsocialragmentation,hascontributedtoAricascrisisostate-building,governance,andeconomicdevelopment.

Despitemodestprogressinsomecountries,thepost-colonialStatehasbeenunableto

establishrights-basedpoliticalandeconomicsystemsogovernancethatwouldacilitateconsolidationostate-buildingandpromoteeconomicdevelopment.oalargeextent,thishasbeenduetoitsdetachmentromtheinstitutionalandculturalvaluesoitsconstituency.Teprevailingstateopovertyonthecontinent,thepersistenceowidespreadethnicandcivilconicts,andrequentelectoralandpost-electoralstriearesomemaniestationsotheailureotheState.Tepersistenceotraditionalinstitutionsasaparallelsystemogovernance,whichprovidessomeleveloreugeortheruralpopulation,otenalienatedbytheState,isalsoanotherindicationotheailureothepost-colonialState.

Ontheotherhand,AricantraditionalinstitutionsarealsonotequippedtocompensateadequatelyorsuchailureotheState.Inadditiontotheirlocalorientation,manyotheseinstitutionsacevariouslimitations,especiallyintheareasoaccountabilityandgenderequality.Manyarealsohamperedbytheirinabilitytodeneandsecurepropertyrights,therebyraisingthetransactioncostsoresourceallocationtotheirconstituencies.Moreover,thegrowingeconomicdiversityandcomplexdivisionolabour,whichmarkthepresenteraoglobalization,arelargelybeyondthescopeotraditionalinstitutions.Teseinstitutionsare,thereore,unlikelytobeabletocopewithpovertyalleviationamongtheirconstituencieswithoutthestewardshipotheState.Aricasdeepeningcrisis, is thus, unlikely tobereversedunderthe existingduality oinstitutions.TeormalinstitutionsotheState,i.e.,rulesregulatingthestructureo

polity,propertyrights,andcontracting,cannotbeefectiveitheydisregardorcontradictthecustomaryrulesothetraditionalinstitutions,whichgovernthelivesandlivelihoodolargesegmentsothepopulation.Forinstance,theStateisunlikelytosucceedinstate-buildingand inmobilizing the cooperation o largesegmentso itscitizens orsocio-economicdevelopmentwithoutconnectingitseltoandharmonizingitspoliticalapparatuswith the institutions, cultural values and interests o all its constituencies,includingruralpopulations.


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Te task o reversing Aricas general crisis and realizing the New Partnership orAricasDevelopments(NEPAD)conceptoAricansolutionstoAricanproblemsarelikelytorequireintegrationotheparallelinstitutionsogovernancesothattheycancomplementeachother.Harmonizingthetwosetsoinstitutions,inturn,requires

reormobothinwaysthatwouldmakethemdemocraticandamenabletointegrationintoacoherentandefectivesystemogovernance.TisvisionprovidestheimperativeortheproposedECAproject,whoseoverarchingobjectiveistoexplorewaystoreormandintegratethetwoparallelinstitutionsinamannerthatpromotesdemocraticgovernance.Tisobjectivecanbeattainedonlythroughcareulanalysesothecharacteristicsanddynamicsotraditionalinstitutionsinordertogaininsightintotheiractualandpotentialcontributionstodemocraticgovernanceandeconomictransormation.Tisexercisewillbeparticularlyuseulastraditionalinstitutionsonthecontinentarelargelyunderstudiedandmisunderstood.Asarststeptowardsthebroadobjectiveoutlinedabove,thisconceptpaperaimsto

undertaketheollowing:

Describebrieythecomplexdiversityotraditionalinstitutions,including,theirmechanismsoaccountability,thetransormationtheyhaveundergoneovertime,andthegenderrelationstheyoster;

Outlinethenatureothedebateovertherelevanceotraditionalinstitutions;

Sketch a theoretical ramework to explain how traditional institutions cancontributetoAricassocio-economictransormation;

Identiy specic areas in which the application o traditional institutions ogovernancewouldhavesignicanttransormativeimpact;

ExamineinadequaciesinmodelsthathavebeenusedbysomeAricangovernmentstoincorporatetraditionalauthoritiesintomoderngovernancestructures;

Suggestsomecriticalareasopolicy-relevantresearchwhichwouldserveastherststeptowardsllinggapsinourunderstandingotraditionalinstitutions;thiswouldserveasthebasisoanewmodelorintegratingtraditionalinstitutionsintothemoderngovernancestructuresinamannerthatwouldpromoteAricas

socio-economictransormation;and

Construct abrie schematic roadmap or conducting a pilot study to test theresearchpropositionsoutlinedinsectionsix.


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1. Diversity and transformation of African traditional

institutions

Aricantraditionalinstitutionsogovernancearediverse.Teyhaveevolvedsignicantly

romtheirpre-colonialormsintandemwithtransormationothecontinentspoliticalsystems,duringthecolonialandpost-colonialeras.Despitetheircomplexdiversity,muchothepost-independenceliteratureclassiesAricantraditionalinstitutionsogovernanceintotwotypes,basedontheirpre-colonialorms:(a)theconsensus-basedsystemsothedecentralizedpre-colonialpoliticalsystems;and(b)chietaincyothecentralizedpoliticalsystems.

Decentralizedsystems

In largeparts oArica, pre-colonial politicalsystemswerehighlydecentralizedwith

law-making,socialcontrol,andallocationoresourcescarriedoutbylocalentities,suchaslineagegroupings,villagecommunities,andage-sets.Tesesystemswerelargelybasedon consensual decision-making arrangements that varied rom one place to another.AsLegesse(2000; 1973)notes, the undamentalprinciples thatguidethe consensus-based(decentralizedauthority)systemsincludecurbingtheconcentrationopowerinaninstitutionorapersonandavertingtheemergenceoarigidhierarchy.Tesettlementoconictsanddisputesinsuchconsensualsystems involvesnarrowing odiferencesthroughnegotiationsratherthanthroughadversarialproceduresthatproducewinnersandlosers.

Decentralized authority systems are basedon respect or the rights and viewso the

individual,asindividualscanvetotheopinionsothemajority.However,individualsarealsoexpectedtorespectthewishesandinterestsothecommunitybyacceptingcompromises,astheycanacevariousormsocommunitycensure,includingsocialisolation,itheyailtodoso.Teextenttowhichminorityviewsareaccommodatedenablesthesesystemstopreventconictsbetweenminorityandmajoritysegmentsoacommunity.Anotherimportantaspectothesystemisthatitavoidstheexistenceopoliticalandsocialgapsbetweenthegovernedandthosewhogovern,asalleligiblemembersothecommunityparticipate inboththecreationandenorcementorules. When the appointmentoindividualsorspecictasksisnecessary,thedurationotheappointmentisrathershort,otennotexceedingayear.Inmanyothercases,taskassignmentsarebasedonage-cohorts.

Onedrawbackothedecentralizedauthoritysystemsisthatdecision-makingisgenerallyslow,sinceconsensus-buildingisatime-consumingprocess.TeIbovillageassemblyineasternNigeria,theEritreanvillagebaito(assembly),thegada(age-set)systemotheOromoinEthiopiaandKenya,aswellasthecounciloelders(kiama)otheKikuyuin


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Kenyaareamongwell-knownexampleswheredecisionsarelargelymadeinaconsensualmanneroonekindoranother.TeesoandLangooUganda,theongaoZambia,andtheNueroSouthernSudanareotherexamples.Telocalsel-governancesystemovariousBerberethnicandclangroupsalsoallswithinthedecentralizedconsensual

systems(Montagne,1931;Aplort,1954;Alport,1964).DespitesomevariationsbetweenBerbergroups,alladultmalesareeligibletoparticipateinanassembly(jmaa)althoughdecisionsaremadeinaconsensualmannerbyacouncilonotables(inasoraitarbain).

AmongsomegroupsintheHighAtlasregion,thecouncilelectsinrotationandinacomplementarymanner,aleader(moqaddem)whopresidesovertheexecutionothecouncilsdecisionsoraxedtermooneyear.Insomecases,however,themoqaddemhasstayedinpowerlongerandhasevenestablisheddynasties.Othergroups,suchasthoseintheSussandtheAnti-Atlasareas,donotappointmoqaddem.Instead,allmaleadults assembleand assist the council inadjudicatingdisputesand passing sentencesuponcriminals.

Centralizedsystems

Other parts oArica established centralized systems o governance with kings andmonarchs.Televelocentralizationandconcentrationopowerinthehandsotheleadersvariedromplacetoplace.Insomecases,suchasAbyssinia(Ethiopia)andRwanda,therulersenjoyedabsolutepower.Inmostothercases,thepowerotherulerswasrestrainedbyvariousarrangements,includingtheinstitutionocouncils(Beattie,1967;Osaghae, 1989). Te level o development o the mechanisms o checks andbalances,however,diferedwidelyromplacetoplace.

Insomecases,suchastheBugandaoUgandaandtheNupeinNigeria,theormalinstitutionsochecksandbalancesandaccountabilityoleaderstothepopulationwereratherweak(Beattie,1967).Inothercases,suchastheAshantioGhana,Lesotho,theswanaoBotswana,andtheBusogaoUganda,thesystemsochecksandbalanceswererelativelybetterdenedwithconstitutionalprovisionsandcustomarylawsauthorizingacounciloelders,religiousleaders,andadministrativestafothechiestocheckthepowerotheleadersandkeepthemaccountable(Busia,1968;Jones,1983;Coplan,1997).

Viewedromthe perspectiveocontemporary democracy, the ormalmechanisms oaccountabilityinthecentralizedAricantraditionalinstitutionswereratherweak,since

chiesotencombinedbothexecutiveandjudicialpowersandthecouncils,whentheyexisted,wereotencomposedlargelyomembersothenobilityorcloserelativesothechies.Terewere,however,variousinormalmechanismsthatalsoosteredaccountability.Teabilityocommonpeopletoshittheirallegianceawayromadespoticchietootherchieswas, orinstance, animportantmechanismthatmitigated the autocratictendenciesochies.


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Despitecentralizationatthetop,centralizedsystemsarecharacterizedbyagreatdealoautonomyatthebottom.Atthegrassrootslevel,chiesotenactprimarilyasacilitators,whopresideoveraconsensualdecision-makingprocessbythemembersoreldersotheircommunities.Atthegrassrootslevel,thechietaincysystem,thereore,overlapsinmany

respectswiththedecentralizedconsensus-basedsystems.TeadministrativestructureotheAshantioGhana,orexample,allowseachlineage,villageorsubdivisiontomanageitsownafairs,includingsettlingdisputesthrougharbitrationbyelders(Busia,1968).InBotswanaalso,thepowerothechiesisregulatedbytheconsensualdecision-makingprocessinthekgotla.

1.1. TowardsanewtypologyoAricantraditionalinstitutions

Te old classication o traditional institutions into centralized and decentralizedsystems,whileuseulasananalyticalentrypoint,isaninadequateconceptualrameworkorunderstanding traditional institutions. Itmasks signicant diferences amongthe

characteristicsoeach typetogetherwith similaritiesbetweentypes, because it lumpsvariouschietaincysystemstogetherwithdiferinglevelsoaccountability.Italsoconatesconsensualsystemsthatoperateonthebasisoage-segmentationlumplineageorvillage-basedsystems(seetable1).Moreover,theoldtypologymakesitdiculttodistinguishsuccinctlybetweentherelevantandtheobsoleteaspectsotraditionalinstitutions.

Futureresearchmustunpacktheexistingtypologytomakeitpossibleorustolearnmoreabouttheintricatecharacteristicsthatarelostinitsgeneralizations.Suchinsightenablesustoidentiytheattributesothevarioustypesotraditionalinstitutionsthatcanbeusedtopromotedevelopmentanddemocraticgovernanceandthoseaspectsthat

areincompatiblewithdemocraticgovernanceandneedtobechanged.Withoutaullerunderstandingothecharacteristicsanddynamicsotraditionalinstitutions,itisdiculttounderstandwhytheyhaveremainedresilientandtodeterminethepotentialcontributionstheycanmaketothebuildingodemocraticinstitutionsthatarecompatiblewithAricanrealitiesandvaluesystems.


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Figure1.entativeypologyoraditionalInstitutionsontheBasisoAccountability*

*Systemswithinthedottedboxaresimilarintheirstructure.

Table1.Examplesotheentativeypology

Centralized Systems with Absolute Power Abyssinia (Ethiopia), Rwanda, Swazi

Centralized Systems with Limited Checks

and Balances

Nupe, Buganda, Zulu, Hausa, Yoruba,

Igala

Centralized Systems with relatively Well

Defned Systems o Checks and Balances

Ashanti, Busoga o Uganda, Lesotho,

Tswana o Botswana

Decentralized Age-Set Systems Oromo, Kikuyu, Masai

Decentralized Village/Kinship Systems Ibo village assembly, Eritrean Baito, Tiv o

Nigeria, Owan society o Nigeria, and the

council system o the Berbers

Tetentativetypologyoutlinedintable1incorporatestheexistingbroadclassicationbutitalsoattemptstoclassiythechietaincysystemsintoatleastthreecategoriesbasedontherobustnessotheirmechanismsoaccountability.Italsobreaksdownthedecentralizedsystems,intoage-setsystemsandvillageandkinshipsystemswhileshowingthesimilarities

betweenthesesystemswiththechietaincysystemsatthegrassrootslevel.

1.2. TransormationoAricantraditionalinstitutionsundercolonialism

AricaninstitutionsogovernancewerealteredradicallywithcolonialoccupationandtheensuingundamentalrestructuringoAricanpoliticalentitiesandsocioeconomicsystems.TecolonialStatebroughtthediferentAricanpoliticalsystemsundercentralizedStates.Abriedescriptionothechangesinthetwotraditionalsystemsollows.

CONSENSUALSYSTEMS

TRADITIONALINSTITUTIONS

CHIEFTAINCYSYSTEMS

Chiefs: StrongChecks &Balances

Chiefs: LimitedChecks &Balances

AbsoluteSystems

Age SetSystems

Village/KinshipSystems

GrassrootsChiefs

GrassrootsChiefs


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Impactondecentralizedsystems

Inthe ormerlydecentralized traditionalsystems, such asthoseo the IbooEasternNigeria, theonga inZambia, and theMasai inKenya, the colonial State invented

chietainciesandimposedhierarchicalruleonitssubjects.Insomecases,theinventedchiesusedtheirpowertoenrichthemselvesandupondiferentiatingthemselvesromtheircommunities,theysubvertedtraditionalpoliticalvalues(osh,1973).Inmanyothercases,however,theinventedchietaincieswereunsuccessulindisplacingtheconsensus-basedgovernancestructures(Gartrell,1983).TewarrantchiesappointedbytheBritishcolonialStatewere,orexample,unabletoreplacethetraditionalsystemovillagecouncilamong the Ibo o Nigeria (Uwazie, 1994). Te Eritrean village baito also survivedcolonialismlargelyintact.TedistrictadministratorsappointedbythecolonialStateactedprimarilyas taxcollectorsandthevillageheadsappointedbysuchadministratorslargelypresidedovervillageassembliesandpronouncedtheconsensusthatemergedromanassemblysdeliberationsratherthanassumetheroleodecision-makers.

ImpactoncentralizedsystemsTeimpactocolonialismuponthecentralizedauthoritysystemswasmuchgreater,asitlargelytransormedtheormandcontentochietaincyand,thus,therelationsbetweenchiesandtheircommunities,asCoplanandQuintan(1997)indicateinthecaseoLesotho.TecolonialStateeitherdemotedoreliminatedAricanleaderswhoresistedcolonizationorrebelledatercolonization(Busia,1968).Leaderswhosubmittedtocolonialruleweremostlyincorporatedintothecolonialgovernancestructureoindirectrule,whichwasdesignedtoprovidethecolonialStatewithaviablelow-costadministrativestructureto

maintainorder,mobilizelabour,enorceproductionocashcrops,andcollecttaxes.

Incorporation severely weakened both the ormal and inormal mechanisms oaccountabilityotraditionalleaderstothepopulationbychangingthepowerrelationsbetweenchiesandtheircommunities.Undercolonialism,chiescouldberemovedrompoweronlybythecolonialadministration.Chieswerealsogivencontrololand,therebycurtailingtheabilityoordinarypeopletoshittheirallegiancetootherchies.

Itisotenarguedinthepost-independenceliteraturethatcolonialismtransormedchiesintomerecivilservantsothecolonialState.Itislikely,however,thatthisviewisotenexaggerated.TerolesoHausachiesinNigeriaandNiger,orexample,wereafected

diferentlybycolonialism,withthepowerothoseinNigerreducedmoreseverely(Miles,1987).AsintermediariesbetweenthecolonialStateandlocalpeoples,chieswereexpectedtomaintainpeaceandorderwithintheircommunities.obeefectiveadministrators,chieshadtomaintaintheirlegitimacywiththeircommunities.

Tisrequiredthattheyattempttoeasetheburdenocolonialismbyintercedingwithcolonial authoritiesonbehal o theirpeople and byprotecting the interestso their


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communitiesasmuchaspossible.AsamemberotheNigerianLegislativeCouncilortheIboDivision,acertainchie,I.O.Mba,orexample,issaidtohaveargued...Imustsayonethinginregardtothepolltax,thatwhenItalkedtopeopleaboutittherewasnotonesoulwhowasorit;notoneChieeitherwhowasorit...(Okaor,1972:128).

Insomecaseschiesalsorebelledagainstcolonialismwhenunabletopersuadecolonialadministratorstomodiysomeotheirpolicies.

1.3. Traditionalinstitutionsinthepost-colonialeraDecolonizationrepresentedanotherlandmarkinthetransormationoAricantraditionalinstitutionsogovernance,especiallytheinstitutionochietaincy.Teabolishmentothecolonialsystemoindirectruleletinuxtheroleotheupperechelonsochiesand their relations with the newArican State. Many o Aricas nationalist, rst-generation leaders, such as Houphouet-Boigny, Sekououre, Leopold Senghor, andKwameNkrumah,sawchiesasunctionariesothecolonialStateandchietaincyas

ananachronisticvestigeotheoldAricathathadnoplaceinthepost-colonialpoliticallandscape.Aricannationalistleaders,thereore,otenpursuedpoliciestoAricanizethebureaucracywithoutindigenizingtheinstitutionsogovernance.Tenewelite,whichincreasinglygrew sel-serving and autocratic, also couldnot tolerate the existence ocontendingpointsopower.Astheybannedoppositionparties,theyalsodispossessedchieso the bureaucraticpositions they heldwithin the indirect rule systemo thecolonialState.BurkinaFaso,Guinea,anzania,Uganda,ZambiaandZimbabwe,amongothers,attemptedunsuccessullytostripchiesomostotheirauthorityorevenabolishchietaincyaltogether.Inmanyothercases,inefortstoenhanceitsownlegitimacy,thenewelite,especiallyamongthesecondgenerationoAricanleaders,attempted,with

varyingdegreesosuccess,toco-opttraditionalleaders.

Despitetheseambiguouseforts,chietaincyhascontinuedtooperatewithlargenumbersoadherents,especiallyinruralareas.AsanECAstudy(2005a)notes,chiesotenoperateascustodians o customary law and communalassets, especially land. Teydispensejustice,resolveconictsandenorcecontracts.Teyalsoserveasguardiansandsymbolso cultural values and practices. Unortunately, chiesoperate largely inan inormalsettingwithoutcleardenitionsotheirauthority.Somecountriesthathaverealizedtheresilienceotheinstitution,suchasSouthAricaandUganda,arestillgrapplingwithhowtoincorporatechietaincyandmonarchyintotheirmoderngovernancestructure.

1.4 Genderrelationsintraditionalinstitutions

Gender relationsinArica ingeneral, andwomens participation indecision-makinginparticular,varyromonecommunitytoanotheranditisnotclearhowmuchothevariationisassociatedwithdiferencesinthetraditionalpoliticalsystemsthatprevailonthecontinent.Partothevariationseemstoberelatedtowhetherornotwomenareengagedintheproductionovaluedgoodsthatwouldempowerthemeconomicallyandwhetherthecommunityhasamatrilinealorpatrilinealsocialorganization.Ingeneral,womenwhocontrolwealthorwhoareengagedintheproductionohigh-valueproducts


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havegreateraccesstodecision-makingpowerrelativetowomenwhodonothaveeconomicindependence.Inmostcases,thepositionowomeninmatrilinealsocietiesalsoseemstobebetterthanthoseinpatrilinealsocieties,althoughinsomematrilinealsocieties,suchastheBerbers,uareg,andtheShahooEritrea,womenneitherparticipateindecision-

makingnorhaveinheritancerights.

Genderinconsensualsystems

Asnoted,theconsensualsystemsarelargelydemocraticintheirdispensation.However,thedecision-makingprocessisrarelyinclusiveoallmembersothecommunity.Womenandyoungadults,orexample,thoughnotormallyprohibitedbyrule,areotenpresumedtoberepresentedbytheirhusbandsandathers,respectively,andarecustomarilyexcludedromparticipationinthedecision-makingassemblies.Although,insomecases,womenplayedvariouskeysocietalroles,thepatrilinealsystemsareparticularlyweakinprotectinggenderequalityindecision-makingonissuesoapublicnature.AmongtheIbo,orexample,

disputesthatamilyheadsailtoresolvearereerredtotheumuada(marrieddaughters)(Uwazie,1994).Likewise,intheEritreanvillagebaitosystem,landisallocatedtothehouseholdwhichisormedbymarriage.Incasesodivorce,thehouseholdsallotment,alongwith otherproperty, are split equally between the ormer spouses (Mengisteab,2003).

Bycontrast,wealsondcases,suchasamongtheSonjoinanzania,theGussioKenyaandUganda,andtheivoNigeria,wherewomenseemtohaveewrightsastheyaresubordinatedtotheirhusbandswhopaysignicantamountsinbride-wealthtomarrythem(Gray,1960).AsKritzandGurak(1989)note,acceptanceobride-wealthseems

totranserreproductiverightstothehusbandandhislineage.Idivorceorseparationoccurs,thewieisotenobligedtoreturnthebride-wealthpaymentorleaveherchildrenwiththeirather.

Genderinchieftaincysystems

Similarly,opportunitiesorwomentoparticipateindecision-makinginthechietaincysystemsarelimited,althoughthereareconsiderablediferencesbetweencommunities.Women in the Nupe and Yoruba societies are generally considered to maintain anautonomouseconomicroleasmarkettradersorganizingtradeguilds,whichprotecttheirinterestsand allow them toplay important roles inpolitical activities (Lebeu, 1963;

Levine,1970).WomeninsomeMendecommunitiesoSierraLeone,wheretheSandesecretsocietiesoperate,arealsosaidtobepoliticallyequaltomen.InthesecommunitieswomensSandesocietiesandmensPoroassociationsaresaidtoalternatepoliticalritualcontrolwithwomenrisingtobecomechies(Day,1988).KoyarwomenintheJosplateauoNigeriaarealsosaidtoexerciseindependenteconomicandsocialdecisionswithlittlesubordinationtomenwhiletheymaybeexcludedrommostlysymbolicperormancesorituals(Netting,1969).


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Despite such pockets o active womens participation in political decision-making,however,womengenerallyaresubordinatedtomeninmuchoArica,andespeciallyinthepatrilinealsystems.Asisthecaseinmanydecentralizedpoliticalsystems,bride-wealthissaidtosubordinatewomeninmanycentralizedsystems,suchastheBaganda

oUganda(Gray,1960).

Changesingenderrights

While their impact on the patrilineal and matrilineal social organizations is unclear,educationandurbanization,alongwithactivestateinvolvementinsupplantingtraditionalmarriageswithlegalmarriages,haveledtosomeimprovementsinwomensconditions.Cameroon, orinstance, has registeredanotabledecline inbride-wealthpaymentsandwidow-inheritance. It has alsomade progress in improving the inheritance rights ochildrenandinraisingtheageomarriagebypromotingmasseducation.However,lessthan50percentotheAricanpopulationlivesinurbanareasandonlyroughlythesame

ratioisliterate.Tus,manyothemechanismsthatsubjectwomentooppression,includingabduction,arrangedmarriageswithouttheconsentothebride,andmarriageatanearlyage,arestillwidelypracticed.A2003reportbyEhiopiasNationalCommitteeonraditionalPractices,orexample,indicatesthatmarriagesbyabductionintheSouthernNationsandOromiaregionsoEthiopiaaccountorabout92percentand80percentoallmarriages,respectively(BBC,May15,2006).

2. The debate over the relevance of traditional institutions

Te relevance o traditional institutions, especially chietaincy, to the transormation

oAricaneconomies andgovernancesystems ishighlydisputedin thepost-colonialliterature. At the risk o over-generalization, three strandscanbe identied in thisdiscourse. One highly skeptical strand contends that chietaincy is anachronistic, ahindrance to the development and transormation o the continent, undemocratic,divisive,andcostly.Amongtheargumentsadvancedbythisviewarethat:

ChietaincyhasbeencorruptedbythecolonialStateandbytheclientelismothedespoticpost-colonialStateandis,thus,nolongersubjecttoaccountabilitytothepopulace(Zack-Williams,2002;Kilson,1966);

Populationsundertraditionalauthorities,asinSouthArica,liveassubjectsrather

thanascitizensotheState,anddemocraticgovernancewouldnotbeachievedwhilesuchsystemscontinuetoexist(Mamdani,1996;Ntsebeza,2005);

Chietaincyheightensprimordialloyaltiesaschiesconstitutetheocioethnicidentities(Simwinga,quotedinvanBinsberger,1987:156);

ChietaincyimpedesthepaceodevelopmentasitreducestherelevanceotheState inthe area o social services (omMboya, inOsaghae, 1987;Law andDevelopment,1974);and


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Te hereditary nature o chietaincy renders it incompatible with democraticgovernance, which requires competitive elections as one o its cornerstones(Ntsebeza,2005).

A polar view asserts that traditional institutions are indispensable or politicaltransormationinArica,astheyrepresentamajorpartothecontinent shistory,culture,andpoliticalandgovernancesystems.TisviewattributestheinefectivenessotheAricanState inbringingaboutsustained socio-economicdevelopment toitsneglectotraditionalinstitutionsanditsailuretorestoreAricasownhistory(BasilDavidson,1992).AsDore(n.d.)notes,whenpolicyneglectshistory,culture,andsocialcontext,huge amountso efort and resources canbewastedonpoorly conceived initiatives.However,theindigenousnessoinstitutions,byitsel,isnotasucientconditiontoenabletraditionalinstitutionstoacilitatethetransormationosocialsystems.Historyteaches us that, depending on their nature, traditional institutions may hinder oracilitatedevelopmentanddemocratictransormationandthattheseinstitutionsarenot

static,astheyundergoconstantchange.Itislikely,however,thatpoliticalandeconomicdevelopmentwouldbemoresuccessulwhenrooteduponwidelysharedinstitutionsandculturalvalues(Fallers,1955).

Athirdandmorebalancedviewacknowledgesthelimitationsotraditionalinstitutions,thatthecolonialStatelargelytransormedchietaincyintoitsintermediateadministrativeinstitution, and that the post-colonial State oten co-opted chies to acilitate theextensionodespoticcontroloveritscitizens.Tisviewnonethelessrecognizestheactthattraditionalinstitutionsconstitutecrucialresourcesthathavethepotentialtopromotedemocraticgovernanceandtoacilitateaccessoruralcommunitiestopublicservices.Amongtheargumentsadvancedbythisviewarethat:

Chietaincycanprovidethebedrockuponwhichtoconstructnewmixedgovernancestructuressincechiesserveascustodiansoandadvocatesortheinterestsolocalcommunitieswithinthebroaderpoliticalstructure(Sklar,1994;Skalnik,2004);

Teconceptionotraditionalinstitutionsthatthesourceandraisondetreopoweristhecollectivegoodoallmembersosociety,providesastrongphilosophicalbasisorestablishingaccountablegovernance,(Osaghae,1987);and

Giventhatover-centralizationopower inthehandso predatoryStatesoten

obuscatescommunity-basedinitiativesanddemocraticpracticesatthegrassroots,good governance canmaterialize only through the articulation o indigenouspoliticalvaluesandpracticesandtheirharmonizationwithmoderndemocraticpractices(AJID,1996,vol.2,no.1;Ayittey,1992;Ake,1987).

2.1.Reasonsorthedivergenceoviewsontraditionalinstitutions

Anumberoactorshelptoexplainthesharpdivergenceoviewsintheliteratureandtheskepticismsurroundingtherelevanceotraditionalinstitutions.Oneactoristhe


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ailureoscholarstodiferentiatebetweentheroleandbehaviouroactorswhoexerciseauthorityandtheaspectsotraditionalinstitutionsthatreertocustomarylaws,politicalvalues,andrulesthatgovernsocio-economicinteraction.Asskepticsandproponentsotraditionalinstitutionsnote,theroleandbehaviourochieswaslargelytransormedby

boththecolonialandpost-colonialStates.

However,therehasbeenlittleevidenceorresearchtoshowthattheessenceocustomarylawsorhaspoliticalvaluesoAricansocieties(includingthemechanismsorconictresolution)havebeenundamentallyalteredbythecolonialandpost-colonialexperiences.Televeloloyaltyenjoyedbytheseinstitutions,especiallyromruralpopulations,supportsthisperspective.Tedisputeintheliteratureis,thus,largelyaboutthechangingrolesochies,whichotenwereimposedbythechangingpoliticalsystems,andnotabouttherelevanceothepoliticalvaluesotraditionalsystems,althoughthelatterdeserveatleastasmuchattention.

Asecondactoristheailureoscholarstodiferentiatebetweenthevariousormsochietaincyandgovernancepracticesatdiferentlevelswithinthehierarchyochietaincy.Asnotedinsectiononeothispaper,thenatureochietaincyinAricawithregardtoaccountabilityoleaderstothepopulationvariesgreatlyacrossbothgeographicalandhistorical space. Insomecases, chietaincy isaccompaniedbymechanismso checksandbalances,whileinothercasesthearrangementsorregulatingthepoweroleadersandensuringaccountabilityarenotrobust.Chietaincyvariesintermsohierarchy,evenwithin the same geographicalandhistorical context. Atthe lowerlevels, chiesandheadmengenerallyexerciselittlepowerbeyondpresidingovercommunitymeetings,wheredecisionsarelargelymadeinaconsensualmanner.

Atthegrassrootslevel,chietaincysystems,orthemostpart,overlapwiththeconsensualsystems. Chiesat thegrassrootslevel are accountableto thehigher-level chiesandrarelyhavethepowertosubvertthecommunitysinterests.Despitethesevariations,theliteratureportrayschietaincyasahomogenoussystemandtheskepticsposit,withlittle acknowledgement o the democratic practices--especially at grassroots levels--thatchietaincycannotbereconciledwithmoderndemocraticinstitutions.Botswanasexperience seems to suggest that chietaincy can indeed co-exist with democraticgovernance.

Anotheractorthatshedssomelightonthedivergenceoviewsintheliteratureisthe

ethnographicnatureothestudyotraditionalinstitutions.Sincethenatureochietaincyvariessignicantlyacrossgeographicareas,thendingsoethnographicstudiesontheroleandbehaviourochiesalsovarywidely.Careullycratedcomparativeresearchislikelytoexplainthedivergenceoviewsresultingromdiferencesinmethodologicalapproaches.

Analyticalproblemshavealsocontributedtothehighlyskepticalviewconcerningtherelevanceotraditionalinstitutions.MuchotheskepticismemanatesromtheperspectivethatchiesotenavailedtheirservicestoboththecolonialStateandthepost-colonial


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despoticState,therebybetrayingtheirresponsibilityto theircommunities.Tischargeisundeniableinmanycases.Byclaimingtribute,labourandtitheonpeasantsproduce,chiesotenbuiltuptheirownortunesduringthecolonialera.Higher-levelchiesalsobuiltnetworksopatronage,throughinuence, inotcontrol,oappointmentsotheir

subordinates(Gartrell,1983).Somewereevenapatheticinthenationalistmovementorearolosingtheirlucrativepositions,asMiller(1968)notes.Manychies,however,resistedcolonialismandcolonialpoliciesthatsubvertedtheinterestsotheircommunitiesandwerekilled,jailed,ordemotedorit.TeexileotheKabakaoBugandain1953ordeyingaBritishGovernorisagoodexample.EveninthecaseothosewhosubmittedtothecolonialStatetoserveasintermediariesorthosewhowereco-optedbythepost-colonialState,itisnotclearitheircollaborationwiththeStateworsenedoramelioratedtheconditionsotheircommunities.AsKuper(1970)notes,chiesandheadmenotenpresentedtodistrict commissioners the argument that theirpeople wouldnot acceptcertainmeasures, and sincetheirpriority was tomaintainlaw and order, theDistrictCommissionersotensupportedthechies.

TeroleoSouthAricanchiesundertheapartheidsystemcanbeusedtostrengthenthe argument that chies, or themost part, did not worsen the conditions o theircommunities.Manychieswerenotwillingunctionariesotheapartheidregime.Aconsiderablenumberothemwere,orinstance,amongtheoundingmembersotheAricanNationalCongress (ANC), which at the timeo its ormation in 1912wasknownastheSouthAricanNativeNationalCongress(vanKesselandOomen,1999).Somechiesalsoledruralrevoltsinthe1950sand1960sagainstvariouspoliciesotheapartheidregime,includingtheBantuAuthoritysystem(Beinart,1985).AsHolomisa(2004)notes, theSouthAricanruthandReconciliationCommissionalsodoesnothaveanyrecordoordinarytraditionalleadersbeingengagedinoraccusedocommittinggrosshumanrightsviolationswhentheyservedundertheapartheidState.More importantly, i chies betrayed their responsibility to their communities bycollaborating with the State, then the State was at the centre o the problem. Inmostcases,however,theroleochieswasanalysedoutsidethecontextotheState.Teskeptics,orexample,didnotprovideconvincingargumentstoexplainwhythepopulationsunderchietaincychosetocontinuetoadheretotheinstitutionichiesdidnotcommandanyaccountabilityoritheytreatedthepopulationas subjects. Itmayverywellbethatchietaincy,despiteitslimitations,providesthepopulationwithbetterservicesorservicesatalowertransactioncostthandoestheState.Itisalsolikelythat

itprovidesthepopulationwithareugeromtheoppressionotheextrovertedpost-colonialState,whosepoliciesweredrivenbythesel-interestounctionariesandthedemandsodonorsandlendersratherthanbybroadsocialinterests.EmpiricalresearchthatwouldenableustounderstandwhytheAricanmassescontinuetheirallegiancetotraditionalinstitutionsissorelyunavailable.

Teclaimthatchietaincyisdivisiveisalsohighlysuspect,especiallyinviewo theactthatpoliticalleadersothepost-colonialStatehaveotenpoliticizedethnicityinordertoextendtheir tenureinpower throughvariousdivide-and-rulemechanisms anduneven


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distributionoresources.AsMinikin(1973)notesinthecaseoSierraLeone,thepoliticaleliteevenattemptstopoliticizechietaincyinaneforttosecureelectoralsupport.Tereislittledoubtthatchiescanplayadivisiverole,especiallywhenmobilizedbytheStatetoplaysucharole,asisevidentromtheroleosomechiesintheDarurconict.However,

chiesandothertraditionalauthoritiesalsohavethepotentialtomitigateethnicconictsbyapplyingtraditionalconict-resolutionmechanismstonarrowdiferences.

TevariousethnicconictsacrossthecontinentsuggestthatAricantraditionalconict-resolutionmechanisms, which have been reasonably efective in resolving intra-groupconictshavenotbeenefectiveindealingwithinter-ethnicconicts.Teexplanationorthislimitationliesperhapsintheactthattheseinstitutionsdidnotdevelopthenecessarymechanismsoenorcementodecisionstobeabletooperateefectivelybeyondthelocallevel, as their developmentwascurtailed by the colonial disruption andpost-colonialneglect.Tetraditionalconict-resolutionmechanism,however,hasthepotentialtobeefectivebeyondthelocallevel,givenanenablingpoliticalenvironment.Tecoalitions

thatchiesinmanycountrieshavebuiltamongthemselvesinorderto strengthentheirownpositionvis-a-vistheStatemayalsoservetoreduceethnicconicts.

TeconcernoskepticsthatchiesareusedbytheStateattheexpenseotheirresponsibilitiestotheircommunitiesis,thus,otentimesvalid.However,ichiesareadaptiveenoughtobeusedasresourcesbythecolonialStateandarestillusedbythepost-colonialState,thereislittlereasonwhytheywouldnotprovidetheirservicestoademocraticStateandbecomecatalystsordemocratizationanddevelopment,especiallygiventhegenerallackoadministrativecapacityAricancountriesace.Teycanmobilizetheircommunitiesorparticipationinpoliticalactivitiesandeconomicdevelopment,aslongastheycommandtherespectandallegianceothesecommunities.Teskepticalviewdoesnotconsiderthispotential,althoughthereisevidencethatservicedeliveryinruralareashasbeensmootherinareaswheregovernmentstructureshadgoodrelationswithtraditionalleadersthaninareaswhererelationsarenotgood(Miller,1968).Moreover, the skeptics o the chietaincy systemofer little beyond advocacy or theabolishmentotheinstitution.Teeasibilityothisproposalis,however,highlyquestionablesincelargesegmentsoruralAricansdemonstrateallegiancetotheseinstitutionsandtheStatehasencounteredintenseresistancewhenitattemptstoeliminatethem.In addition to the analytical problems discussed above, the literature on traditional

institutionsischaracterizedbyomissionosomeotheircriticalattributes.Tepaltryattentionpaidtothepoliticalvaluesandpracticesothedecentralizedconsensualsystemsisoneglaringomission.Anotheristheneglectothepoliticalvaluesandpracticesomostchietaincysystemsatthegrassrootslevel.Tetreatmentochietaincy,assuggestedintheprevioussection,concentratesmoreontherolesotheupperechelonsoleadersandtheirrelationswiththeStatethanontheunderlyingcustomarylawsandpoliticalvaluesandpracticesincludingtheadministrativestructuresatthegrassrootslevel.


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Omissionsothisnaturehaveobscuredmuchothedemocraticcharacteristicsothevaluesandpracticesotraditionalinstitutionsandtheirconvergencewithmoderndemocraticgovernance. Tis issuewillbedeveloped urther in section 3.2. Wenow attempt toormulateaworkingtheorythatwouldhelpusexplainwhytraditionalinstitutionshave

thepotentialtobecomeinstrumentalinAricassocio-economictransormation.

3. Theoretical frameworkDespitewidespreadskepticismabouttheirrelevance,Aricantraditionalinstitutionshavethepotential to acilitatedemocratic transormationandsocio-economic development.oexplainthispotential,thissectionothepaperexaminesthedynamicsoboththeleadershipandvaluesotraditionalinstitutions.

3.1. TraditionalauthoritiesUnderstanding the dynamics o traditional authorities entails distinguishing betweenthesocialpositionochiesinthecentralizedpoliticalsystemsandthatoeldersinthedecentralizedsystems.Withrespecttochies,theirroleinosteringdemocraticgovernanceandsocio-economicdevelopmentlargelydependsonanumberoactors, includingthenatureothestate;thelevelodemocraticawarenessothepopulation,whichisinuencedby the natureo traditionalpolitical values and leveloeducation; themechanismsoaccountabilityothechietaincysystem;andtheadministrativeefectivenessothesittingchie.Tishypothesismaybeexpressedasollows:

Y = (Sn, Pa, Ca, Ce),

whereYstandsorthepotentialroleotraditionalauthoritiesinpromotingsocio-economicdevelopmentanddemocraticgovernance,Snrepresentsthenatureothestate,Parepresentspoliticalawarenessothepopulation,Carepresentsthemechanismsoaccountabilitytothecommunityothechietaincysystem,andCerepresentstheadministrativeefectivenessothechie.

Itisgenerallyagreedthat,sincethelossoindependencebyAricansocietiesandtheormationothecolonialState,chieshaveessentiallyoperatedbetweentwopoliticalandsocialorces.Ontheonehand,theStateotenattemptseithertoco-optchiesortoabolishtheirauthorityaltogether,especiallyitheyailtocomplywithitsdemandsanddirectives;

ontheotherhand,communitiesexpecttheirchiestobecustodiansotheircollectiveinterests. Chies, likemost otherpolitical leaders, can beexpected tohave conictingtendencies;eithertoadvancesel-interestattheexpenseocommunityinterests,ortocurbtheirsel-interestinordertopromotecommunityinterests.Tepursuitoeithertendencyis,however,constrainedbythedemandsthattheStateandtheircommunitiesplaceuponthem.ChiescannotignorethedemandsotheState,astheyretaintheirpositionattheStatespleasureandotentheydependontheStateorresources.TisdependencecompelsthemtoperormtasksthatlinktheStatewithruralcommunities.


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Atthesametime,chieshavetoprovidesomeprotectionortheinterestsotheircommunitiesinordertomaintainthelegitimacyotheirleadership.TeclaimbyvanNieuwaal(1987)thatachiecommitspoliticalsuicideiheailstoperormwhathis/hercommunityexpectsislargelytruesinceachiecannotstayinpowerorlongwithoutcommandinglegitimacy

withinthecommunity.

Beingunderpressureromthetwosides,themostbasicsel-interestochiesislikelytorevolvearoundthepreservationotheirposition,whichispredicatedlargelyupontheirefectivenessinnegotiatingbetweenthedemandsotheircommunitiesandthoseotheState.Tesetwosetsointerestsmayotenconictwitheachother.Inotherwords,chiesaremotivatedtomaintainlegitimacythroughtheallegianceotheircommunities,whichrequiresrespondingpositivelytocommunitydemands,andbysecuringrecognitionbytheState,whichalsorequiresrespondingpositivelytotheStatesdemands.

Despitethecommunitysheterogeneity,itsdemandsarelikelytorevolveprimarilyaround

issuesodevelopmentanddemocraticgovernance.Televelopoliticalawarenessandleveloeducationothecommunitycanalsobeexpectedtoafecttheabilityothecommunitytoarticulateitsdemandsandexertpressureonchies.TenatureothedemandsotheState,ontheotherhand,varieswiththenatureotheState.

Inademocraticenvironmentwherethe population exercisescontrol over the activitiesotheState,thedemandsthatthelatterplacesuponchiescanbeexpectedtocoincidelargely with those o the communities. A democratic system can also be expected toallowchiesthereedomtochoosepoliticalpositionswithoutreprisalsromtheState.Undertheseconditions,itisunlikelythattheadministrativeroleochieswoulddeviatesignicantlyromtheharmoniousdemandsotheStateandthecommunity.Inthiseraodemocratization,inwhichAricansocietiesareengagedinanintensivestruggleorpopularpoliticalparticipation,chieswholagbehindaprogressivestateinadvancingtheinterestsolocalcommunitiesexposethemselvestoextinction.TepeoplecaneasilyvotewiththeireetbyabandoningchietaincyandembracingtheinstitutionsotheState.TeStatecanalsoeasilybypassordismisschieswholoselegitimacy.

Under such conditions, sel-preservation is likely to orce chies to act as agents orthe advancemento local interest, which in turnwill coincide with the promotion odevelopmentanddemocraticgovernance.Intheprocess,however,thechietaincysystems,andespeciallythosewithweakmechanismsoaccountability,arelikelytobetransormed.

Inotherwords,underademocraticState,chieshavetocontributetotheempowermentotheircommunitiesinordertosustaintheirlegitimacyandthemoreempoweredruralcommunitiesbecome,themorelikelytraditionalauthoritiesarepushedtobecomeagentsodevelopmentanddemocraticgovernance.

AdemocraticStatecanalsobeexpectedtoacilitatereormingandintegratingtraditionalinstitutions into the modern governance structures. In a democratic political system


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thereore,wecanexpecttohaveallthreeentities,namelytheState(S),chies(C),andthepopulation(P)pushingtowardsademocraticsystemogovernanceanddevelopment,asdepictedinthesimpliedmodelbelow.

a. (Despotism)S C

P

(Democ.&Develop)

InasituationwheretheunctionariesotheStatearedespoticandsel-serving,thedemandsotheStateandthoseothepopulationcanbeexpectedtobeinconict,ortomoveinoppositedirectionsasthesecondandthirdmodelsdepict.ReconcilingtheconictingdemandsotheStateandthoseothecommunitybecomesdicultorchieswhentheStateisundemocratic.TeycannotignoretheState,astheyserveatitspleasure.

Otentheyarealsocorruptedbytherewardstheyobtainrompoliticalleadersinreturnortheirsupporttosuchleaders.Still,evencorruptchiescannotcompletelyignorethedemandsotheircommunitieswithoutrunningtheriskocompletelylosingtheirlegitimacy

whichwouldbecostlyorthembecausewithouttheallegianceotheircommunitiesandtheirabilitytomaintainsomelinkbetweentheStateandthecommunity,theirvaluetotheStateisalsolikelytodisappear.Undertheseconditions,chieswouldacetwooptions.OneoptionisorthemtomeetthedemandsotheStateandmanipulateorignorethoseothecommunity,asdepictedinthesecondmodel.However,thisstrategyislikelytobeunsustainable,especiallyincaseswherethemechanismsoaccountabilityandthepoliticalawarenessothecommunityareairlydeveloped.Tepriceorneglectingtheinterestsothecommunityisthatchiesloselegitimacyandeventuallytheirrelevancetothestate.

b. (Despotism) SCP(Democ.&Develop.)

Tesecondandperhapsmorelikelyoptionisorchiestoattempttomeetsomeothedemandsoneachside(depictedbyarrowspointingindiferentdirectionsinmodelCsothattheydonotendangertheirsocialposition.Intheprocessotakingamiddle-o-the-roadposition,chiesprovidesomereugetotheircommunitiesthusmitigatingtheimpactothedespoticState.Sucharole,ocourse,requiresefectivenessonthepartothesittingchie.

c. (Despotism)SCP(Democ.&Develop.)

UnderatyrannicalState,theabilityochiestoprotectthewell-beingotheircommunities

is likelyto belimited, especiallyin themorecentralized chietaincy systemswith lessstringentmechanismsoaccountability.Tebasisorintegratingtraditionalinstitutionswiththemoderngovernancesystemwithaviewtoattainingbettergovernancewouldalsobelargelyabsent.However,itislikelythattheinterestsothecommunitywouldbebetterservedunderchiesthanwithoutthem,underasel-servingdespoticState.Fanthorpes(2006)surveyinSierraLeoneconrmsthisproposition,aspeasantspreerredchiesoverStatebureaucrats,althoughtheywantedreormsothechietaincyaswell.


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Withrespectto leadersinthedecentralizedpoliticalsystems,theabilityoelderstotakemeasuresthatdivergeromtheinterestsothecommunityislimited,sincetheydonotcontroldecision-making.Teactorsinthistraditionalsystemare,thus,thestateandthecommunity.ItheStateisdemocraticandsharescommoninterestswith

thecommunity,theeldersbecomeresourcesoradvancingthesharedinterests.ItheStates interestsdiverge rom thoseo the community, however, the elders serve toarticulatethedemandsothecommunity.

3.2. Convergenceotraditionalpoliticalvalueswithmodern

democraticgovernance

Tenatureo theirunderlyingpoliticalvaluesisanotheractorthatgivestraditionalinstitutionsthepotentialtocontributetoAricasdemocratizationprocess.Itislikelythat the more traditional political values converge with democratic principles intheirdispensation,thegreaterwouldbetheirpotentialtocontributetodemocratictransormationothecontinent.ItisalwaysriskytogeneralizeaboutAricantraditionalinstitutions,giventheirdiversity.Nevertheless,themostcommonpoliticalvaluesandpracticesinthedecentralizedpoliticalsystemsinclude:

Decentralizationopower;

Directparticipationindecision-making;

Resolutionoconictsbynarrowingdiferences;

Respectordissentandprotectionominorityviewsandinterestsbyrequiringconsensusondecisions;

Narrowingthegapbetweentherulersandtheruledthroughdirectparticipationoalladultmalesinmakingandinenorcingrules;

Shorteningthetermoserviceooceholders;and

Equitableaccesstoland.

Tesevaluesclearlycontradictclaimsthatthepoliticalculturetendstobevertically

organizedinruralAricansocieties(Yoder,1998).Suchpracticesarealsonotlimitedtodecentralizedsystems.Mostothesevaluesarewidelyheldatthegrassrootslevelinmostchietaincysystems.Asaresult,theyareAricanpoliticalvaluesratherthanpoliticalvalueslimitedtoaspecictypeoapoliticalsystem.

Undoubtedly, traditional Arican political values have limitations that necessitatereorms,particularlyintheareaogenderrelations,asindicatedintherstsectionothepaper.Tislimitationnotwithstanding,thereislittledoubtthatAricanpolitical


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values,especiallythoseotheconsensualsystems,convergewithmoderndemocraticpoliticalsystems,whicharecratedtoallowthegeneralpopulationtoexercisecontrolover decisionmaking on issues o public concern (Beetham, 1992).Te identiedtraitsosuchpoliticalvaluesandpracticesclearlyenablelocalcommunitiestocontrol

decision-makinginsoarasthisafectstheircollectiveinterests.

However,perhapsbecausetheirdevelopmentwasblockedbythecombinedefectsoAricascolonialexperienceandsubsequentneglectbythepost-colonialState,traditionalAricandemocraticvaluesandtheirconict-resolutionmechanismsremainedlargelyconnedtothelocallevel.Asaresult,theyoperatethebasisodirectparticipationratherthanonarepresentativebasis,anddecisionsaremadeonaconsensualratherthanonamajoritybasis.Bothothesearrangementsreducetheneedorelectoralcontests.Inotherwords,Aricanpoliticalvaluesconvergewiththeessentialcharacteristicsomoderndemocracy.TemechanismbywhichAricandemocraticvaluesareexercised,however, vary signicantly rom those o the modern democratic system o liberal

democracy.SomeothemechanismsbywhichAricantraditionaldemocraticvaluesarepracticedare inapplicable at the state level in their present orm. It would, or instance, beimpracticaltohavedirectparticipationo thepopulationindecision-makingbeyondthe villageorlocal level. Itwould alsobehard toimagineall state-leveldecisionsbeingmadeonaconsensusbasis.Someothemodernmechanismsodemocracyare,thereore,indispensableorcontemporaryArica.However,theimportedmechanismswere largely developed in post-industrial andpost-state-building (nation-building)conditions.

Asa result, some aspects o these importedmechanisms are inconsistent with pre-industrialandpre-state-buildingrealitiesoArica.Temajority-basedelectoralsystems,orexample,areunlikelytoresolveconictresultingromdisagreementsoverthetermso incorporating various ethnic entities into theState.Aricas transition, thereore,requiresthatsomemechanismsotraditionalinstitutionsareappliedtocomplementthemodernmechanismsodemocracyindealingwiththecriticalproblemsthatcannotefectivelybeaddressedthroughthelatteralone.Oncestate-buildingandtransormationothepeasantryareachieved,thetraditionalmechanismsarelikelytoconvergemoreullywiththemechanismsomoderndemocracy.

Inotherwords,themoreadvancedstate-buildingbecomes,andtheurtherAricansocietiesmoveawayromtheirpresentpre-industrialmodeoproduction,themorelikelyitisthattheirtraditionalmechanismsodemocraticvalueswouldalsoevolveclosertothemechanismsomoderndemocracy.raditionalauthorityisalsolikelytobetransormedintandemwiththetransormationothetraditionalmechanisms.WenowexaminesomeareaswheretheapplicationothetraditionalmechanismswouldmakeasignicantcontributiontoAricassocio-economictransormation.


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0

4. Areas of potential contribution of traditional institutionsConict resolution, bynarrowing the diferences betweenprotagonists, is one o thestrengths o Arican traditional institutions o governance. However, the Arican

continentremainsplaguedbymanyinternalconictsthatemanateromproblemsostate-building(nation-building).Teseconictshaveproducedimmensehumanlosses.TeseAricancontinentnowaccountsormorewar-relateddeathsthantherestotheworldcombined(HumanSecurityReport,2005).TeconictshaveledtothecollapseotheStateandgrosshumanrightsviolations,includinggenocideinsomecountries.

Concomitantly,theconictshaveresultedintheowomillionsoreugees,widespreadinternaldisplacement,severeeconomicdislocations,anddisruptionintheprovisionopublicservices.TerearealsogrowingindicationsthattheconictsarecontributingtothespreadotheHIV/AIDSepidemicinvariousways.

4.1. State-building

Aricasprocessostate-buildingisonecriticalareathatcanbenetromtheapplicationo the traditionalmechanismso conict-resolution andconsensualdecision-making.SettlementoborderdisputesamongAricancountriesisanother.

Teactorsthatcausecivilwarsaremanyandvaryromcasetocase.Inmostcases,however,thesewarsaremaniestationsotheabsenceobroadagreementamongthevariousethnicandothersub-stateentitiesonthetermsoincorporationintotheState.Aricancivilwars,thereorearelargelychallengeslevelledagainsttheStatebydisafected

entities.TeAricanStateusuallyattemptstosuppressthesechallengesbyorce,whichrarelyadvancesstate-building.

AsOkaornotes,coerciveapproachestostate-buildingailbecauseinthecontemporaryviewohumanrights,violent,coerciveunicationandrepressivehomogenizationaremorallyandsociallybankrupt(2000:525).Farromleadingtolong-termpeaceandstability,militaryvictory,iattained,leadsonlytoatemporarylullinviolentconicts,accompaniedbyintenseresentmentandresistance,whicharelikelytobeollowedbyanewcycleohostilities.Bycontrast,Aricanconict-resolutionmechanismsaredesignedtoestablishpeaceandharmonyinordertopreventutureeuds.

Electoralmechanismsalonearealsoinefectiveindealingwithconictoverthetermsostate-building,sincepeoplemayvotealongethniclines,thusmarginalizingethnicminorities. Under these conditions, it is imperative that divided Arican countriesexplorealternativedispute-resolutionmechanismsandapplythetraditionalmechanismsoconict-resolutionandconsensus-building,atleastwithregardtothetermsostate-building.Constitutionsandelectorallawscanbecomeefectivemechanismsostate-buildingiestablishedinaconsensualmanner.


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Aspost-electionconictsinmanycountries,suchasBurundi,CtedIvoire,Ethiopia,andogoshow,electionshardlysettlethecontestorpowerwhenthecontestantsdonotevenagreeontheconstitutionalrameworkorstate-building,oreventhelawsgoverningelections.

ManyAricancountriesalsohavetocontendwithborderconicts,whicharelikelytoincreaseandintensiywiththegrowingdemandorresources.Again,traditionalconict-resolutionmechanismscanbeextremelyvaluabletoolsindealingwithsuchconicts,inconjunctionwitharbitrationefortsbyactorssuchastheAricanUnion(AU).

Tetraditionalconictresolutionandconsensualdecision-makingmechanismscan,thus,enhancestate-buildingbycreatingpossibilitiesoraccommodatingtheinterestsodiferentsub-stateentitiesandtheprotectionominorityinterests.Decentralizationodecision-makingandadherencetotermlimitsoleadersareothermechanismswithtraditionalrootsthatcanacilitatestate-building.Incorporationotraditionalvaluesalsomakesit

possibleortheadoptionopower-sharingarrangementsasastrategyostate-building.Tisstrategywasefectiveinthetransitiontopost-apartheidSouthArica.Inaddition,thetraditionalconict-resolutionmechanismscanbeappliedinordertodealwiththegrowingproblemopost-electioninter-partyconicts.TecoerciveapproachAricanStateshaveadoptedtosuppresspoliticalpartiesotenexacerbatethestate-buildingcrisis,aspoliticalpartiesotentendtohaveethnicorregionalaliations.

4.2. Statereconstitutionandaccountabilityoleadership

Anothercriticalaspectothecrisisostate-buildingisthenatureothepost-colonial

State.Manyobserversviewthedespoticandsel-servingnatureotheAricanStatetobeamajorhindrancetoAricaspoliticalandeconomictransormation(Ayoade,1988;Keller,1991;Ayittey,1993;Ake,1996;Samatar,2002).TeAricanState,inmostcases,inheritedtheextractive(rentier)productionrelationsandrepressivesecurityapparatusothecolonialstate(Musah,2002:915;Acemoglu,Johnson,andRobinson,2001).Italsoremainedlargelyoutsidethecontroloitscitizenry,advancingprivateinterestsattheexpenseopublicinterests.

As a result, the general population oten perceives the State to be an apparatus oexploitationandoppression,whiletheliteseeitasasourceopowerorcontrolandsel-enrichment.AStatethatisperceivedinthismannerandlackinginternallegitimacy

cannotprovideaccountableleadershiporbeanagentortheempowermentocitizens.Italsocannotmobilizethegeneralpopulationorsocialdevelopment.ransormingtheAricanStateintoanagentoempowermentocitizensandpoliticalandeconomictransormationentailsre-conceptualizingtheStateanew,inordertoestablishasystemogovernancewithmechanismsthatenablethepopulationtocontroldecision-makingandtherebycoordinatepolicywithbroadsocialinterests.


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TeincorporationoAricantraditionalpoliticalvaluesintothemodernvaluesogovernanceconstitutes a critical step in the reconstitution o the Arican State. Decentralizingdecision-making, resolving conicts bynarrowingdiferences,making keydecisions onconsensualbasis,andestablishingpower-sharingarrangementsogovernance,allcontribute

tobringingtheStateunderbroaderpopularcontrol,groundedonAricanpoliticalandculturalvalues.ReconstitutionotheStateandintegrationotraditionalinstitutionsarethuscomplementaryprocessesthatmustgohandinhand.

4.3. Expansionopublicservices

Public-servicedeliveryinAricaisgenerallypoor.AnECAstudy(2005a),orinstance,revealsthatlessthan31percentothepopulationothecountriesinthesurveysampleexpressedsatisactionwiththeservice-deliveryotheirlocalgovernments.Lackopoliticalwillandcapacityonthepartogovernmentsandlackolocalparticipationinthedesignanddeliveryoserviceareamongthemajoractorscontributingtothepoorstateoservice-

delivery.DemocratizationotheState,alongwithincorporationoAricantraditionalinstitutions,cancontributetotheimprovementoservice-deliveryinvariousways.

raditionalauthoritiescanmobilizelocalcommunitiesorpoliticalparticipation,therebyempoweringthemtoplayapartininuencingpolicyonthedistributionopublicservices.raditional authoritiesalsohavethepotential tosupportthe efortsogovernments inservice-deliverybyparticipatingintheadministrationojusticeandbymobilizinghumanand nancial resources or expanding educational and health services (ECA, 2005a).Aricantraditionalvalues,thus,notonlyconvergewithmoderndemocraticvaluesbutalsohavethepotentialtocomplementthemechanismsomoderndemocracybyllingthegaps

intheapplicabilityomoderndemocraticmechanisms.Teycanalsobringmarginalizedgroupsosociety,includingthepeasantry,intothepoliticalprocessandenhanceaccesstopublicservicesorsuchcommunities.

4.4. Managementoresource-basedconficts

Anotherareaopotentialcontributionotraditionalinstitutions isinthemitigationoresource-basedconicts.TecommunallandtenuresystemthatispervasiveinmuchoAricaisaoundationorthetraditionalpoliticalstructuresanddemocraticvalues.Tecommunaltenuresystemcreatesaccesstolandorallmembersothecommunity.Whileitdoesnotnecessarilyalleviatepovertyorensuresocialequality,itcreatesarelativeequality

o access in the rural areas. Until economic development creates access to alternativeopportunities,thecommunaltenuresystemremainsavitalmechanismorreducingruralunemployment, poverty and inequality. It alsomakes the preservation o traditionaldemocraticvaluesandruralsel-governancepossible.

Notable changes in land tenure systems are presently taking place in many Aricancountries.Insomecases,suchasKenya,thishasbeenefectedthroughregistrationandprivatizationocommunalland.Manygovernments,however,haveissuedlandconcessions


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tocommercialarmersandminingcorporationswithlittleregardorthelandrightsandinterestso localcommunities.Suchconcessions,inconjunctionwithpopulationgrowthandadverseecologicalchanges,haveledtolandshortagesandtheimpoverishmentolocalcommunities,triggeringviolentresource-basedconictsamongcommunitiesandbetween

thestateandcommunitiesinseveralcountries,includingNigeriaandtheSudan.Mitigatingresource-basedconictsislikelytorequirerespectorthetraditionallandrightsolocalcommunitiesandtheirinvolvementindecision-makingaswellasinsharingthebenetsolandandothergeo-resourcesallocation.

5. Integrating traditional authorities into the governance

structure

otheextentthatAricantraditionalpoliticalvaluesandcustomarylawsareessentialtothecontinentstransormation,theroleotheauthoritieswhoareengagedinthepracticeand

maintenanceothosevaluesisindispensable.Chies,especiallythoseatthegrassrootslevel,andeldersinthedecentralizedpoliticalsystems,areleadersinthepracticeothosevaluesandtheyormanintegralalbeitinormalpartothegovernancestructuresoruralArica.Asvonrotha(1996)notes,chiesandvillageheadsundercivilchietaincyconstituteaorumwherelocalinterestsaredebatedandarticulated.Tus,theycanconstituteavaluableresource in inorming the state about the interests o local communities as well as inmobilizingruralpopulationsoractiveengagement,notonlyindevelopmentactivitiesandthedistributionopublicservices,butalsointhenationalpoliticalprocess.

Unlike government-appointed administrators, lower-level chies and village leaders liveinconditionslargelysimilartothoseotheircommunities.Teysharecommoninterests

andthinkliketheirpeople.Asaresult,theyarebetterequippedtorepresenttheinterestsotheircommunitiesthanaregovernment-appointedadministrators,whoareaccountableonlytothepoliticallite.Partnershipindevelopmentbetweenlocaltraditionalleadersandgovernmentadministratorsisalsolikelytopromotecooperativestate-societyrelationsthataresorelyabsentinArica.However,eventhoughincorporatingtheseleadershasnotbeencontroversial,thestatehasinvariablyunderutilizedthetraditionalleadersatthegrassrootslevelandhasdonelittletointegratethemintotheormalgovernancestructures.

Asnoted in the second section o this paper,much o the controversy over traditionalinstitutionsliesinthedebateovertheincorporationotheupperechelonsochiesintothemoderngovernancestructures.Nevertheless,agrowingnumberoAricancountries,includingsomeothosethathadpreviouslyattemptedwithoutsuccesstostripchiesotheir power or to completely abolish traditional institutions, have realized the politicalcurrencythatchiespossess.Teyalsonowconcedetothepoliticalrisksoropportunitycostsinvolvedinabolishingchietaincy.Chieshavebecomevote-brokersinruralareasandexercisesignicantinormalcontrolovertheStatesinterventioninlocalafairs(vonrotha,1996;vanKesselandOomen,1996).Asvote-brokers,theyalignthemselveswiththepowersthatoferthebestchancesorsaeguardingtheirpositionsandadvancingtheirinterests.Asaresult,severalcountries,includingthoseledbyregimesthatarereluctant


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toallowtheestablishmentandreeoperationooppositionparties,suchasUgandaandZimbabwe,havetakenmeasurestoreinstateandtointegratechiesintotheirgovernancestructure.

Temodalitiesointegratingchiesintothemodernsystemogovernancevaryacrosscountriesbutthemostcommonormhasbeenthecreationoanupperhouse(houseochies)inparliamentwithalargelyadvisoryrole.TeCounciloraditionalLeadersinNamibia,orinstance,isanorganthatadvisesthePresident,mostlyonmattersoutilizingcommunalland.GhanasHouseoChiesisalsochargedwithadvisinganyauthorityundertheconstitutiononmattersrelatedtochietaincyandcustomarylaw.ZimbabwereverseditsearlierpolicyodismantlingchietaincyandcreatedaCounciloChiesin1993.TeHouseoChieswasrestoredinZambiain1996.InLesothoandMalawi,chiesconstitutetwo-thirdsand30percentotheSenaterespectively.SouthAricas1996constitutionprovidesorthecreationoprovincialandnationalhousesotraditionalleaders.TeCongressoraditionalLeadersoSouthArica(CONRALESA)has,

however,complainedthattheNationalHouseoraditionalLeadersismerelysymbolicanddoesnotgivetraditionalleadersasubstantiverole(BankandSouthall,1996).

CONRALESAs concerns are however valid, since the existing mechanisms ointegrationlimitchiestoalargelyadvisoryrole.Teextenttowhichpolicymakerstaketheadviceochiesseriouslyisalsounclear.Itispossiblethatthehousesochiesaredesignedlargelytoappeasechiesandtomanipulatethemintosupportingthepoliticalleaders.Inanycase,themechanismsmerelyincorporatetheupperechelonsochieswithoutintegratingthetraditionaldemocraticvaluesortheleadersatthegrassrootslevel.Tisapproachisnotverylikelytoleadtoadynamicharmonizationotheragmentedgovernance structures oArican countries. A new andmore holistic incorporationotraditionalinstitutions,includinglower-levelchiesandheadmenandtherelevantaspectsocustomarylawsandpoliticalvalueswouldbemoreefective.Botswana,whichhasmaintainedanupperhouseochiessince1965,hastakenstepsinthisdirection.It hasmaintained the traditional courts, with chiesperorming judicialduties. Anapproachwhichcombinesadvisory and judiciary roles or traditionalauthoritiesandbuildsondemocratictraditionalpoliticalvaluesandcustomarylawsislikelytobemoresuccessul.

6. Future direction of research and aims of the project

Asstatedattheoutset,Aricantraditionalinstitutionsareunderstudiedandmisunderstood.Tissectionattemptstohighlightsomekeygapsintheexistingliteratureontraditionalinstitutions.

6.1. NewtypologyotraditionalinstitutionsAsalreadynoted,theliteraturecategorizestraditionalinstitutionsintochietaincyunderthecentralizedpoliticalsystemsandtheconsensualsystemsothedecentralizedpoliticalareas.Unortunately,thisbroadclassicationhasmaskedcriticaldiferenceswithineach


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systemaswellassimilaritiesbetweenthetwosystems.Anewtypologythataddressestheseproblemsandhighlightstheattributesanddynamicsoeachtype,perhapsalongthelinessuggestedintherstsectionothepaper,wouldbeinstructive.Suchatypologywouldhelpdeterminewithgreatercertaintytheactualandpotentialrelevanceotheseinstitutionstothe

economicandpoliticaltransormationocontemporaryArica.Acomparativelongitudinaland cross-sectionalstudy o traditional institutions isnecessaryora ullerappraisalotraditionalinstitutionsandwillhelpconstructamoreinormativetypology.

6.2. Resilienceotraditionalinstitutions

Anothermajorgapintheliteratureisthenear-absenceoempiricalstudiesontheresilienceotraditionalinstitutions.AricantraditionalinstitutionscommandtheallegianceolargesegmentsoAricansocieties,butthereislittleempiricalworkeitheronthesizeothissegmentothepopulationorhowadherentsassessthebenetsandcostsotheseinstitutions. Whetheradherentsdrawdistinctionsbetweentheirtraditionalvaluesand

traditionalleadersanditheyarecontentwiththeperormancesotheirtraditionalleadersisalsoanopenquestion.

6.3. Genderrelationsintraditionalinstitutions

Teweaknessotraditionalinstitutionsintheareaogenderrelationswasnotedinsectionone.TeState,insomecases,includingEthiopiaandSouthArica,hasattemptedtoremedythesituationthroughconstitutionalandlegalchanges.Somecountries,includingMozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, South Arica, and Uganda, have also raised therepresentationowomenintheirparliamentsto25percentorhigher(ECA,2005b).

Teimpactosuchmeasuresonthegeneralsituationowomen,however,remainsunclear.Tere is little doubt that there is still room or constitutional and legal changes andrepresentationowomeninpositionsoauthority.However,suchmeasuresareunlikelytobesucientsincetheyarenotwell-linkedeithertothepopulationortothecustomarylawsontheground.Acombinationolegalchangesandrevitalizationocustomarylaws,alongwithtransormationthrougheducationandpovertyalleviation,wouldberequiredorpromotionogenderequity.Futureresearchneedsto identiytheobsoleteculturalvaluesandcustomsthatsubjugatewomen,includingmarriagebyabduction,paymentobride-wealth,earlymarriage,anddenialoinheritancerights.Tereisalsoaneedorresearchthatwillproposewaysinwhichtraditionalauthoritiescanhelperadicategender-relatedoppression.

6.4. Changesinlandtenureandtraditionalinstitutions

TecommunallandtenuresystemsthatprevailinmuchoAricaunderpinAricantraditionalpoliticalstructuresandvalues.However,signicantchangesinlandtenuresystems, including privatization o communal land, which are intended to promoteagriculturalgrowth,areunderwayinmanycountries.Suchchangesarelikelytounderminethetraditionalstructuresosel-governancebyremoving romthevillage,kinship,andchiestheauthorityoverlandallocation.However,therehasnotbeensucientresearch


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toshowhowchangesinlandtenurepatternsimpactontraditionalinstitutions.Furtherresearchisalsorequiredtoilluminatehowtraditionalauthoritiescanbeusedtomitigatesomeotheresource-basedconictsthathaveravagedmanycommunitiesintheaceochangesintenureandland-usesystems.

6.5. Mechanismsointegratingtraditionalauthority

Moreresearchalsoneedstobeundertakenonhowtointegratetraditionalauthorities,customarylaws,andtraditionaldemocraticpoliticalvaluesintothemoderngovernancestructureinadynamicmannerthatenhancesdevelopmentandpromotesdemocratization.Teexistingstrategyo creatinga secondchamberinparliamentdevotedtochies issimplyinadequate.Itisnotevenclearwhatistheimpact,iany,ocreatingsuchchambersincountrieswherenon-chietaincytraditionalsystemsco-existwithchietaincysystems.Unortunately,eventheliteraturethatadvocatestheuseulnessotraditionalinstitutionsinAricastransormationislargelysilentonhowtointegratetheseinstitutionsintothe

moderngovernancestructure.

Giventhediferencesinthecharacteristicsandhistoriesotheseinstitutions,itisnotlikelythatresearchwillproduceasinglestrategyapplicabletoallthecountriesonthecontinent.Itmaybepossible,however,torameabroadparadigmthatcanguidepolicytowardsoptimaluseotraditionalinstitutions.Researchthatwouldleadtochartinganewvisioninthisregardislongoverdue.


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ANNEX I

Relevance of African Traditional Institutions of GovernanceWorkshopAddisAbaba,17-18June2006

Recommendations

I. All participants o the workshop, which was held at UNECA in Addis Ababa17-18 June, agreed on the ollowing substantive issues:

1. Rationale or the project: why harmonization o institutions o governance iscrucial or Aricas socio-economic transormation

Aricasgeneralcrisisisunlikelytobereversedwithoutacoherentandefectivesystemoinstitutions.Teormalinstitutionsothestate,i.e.rulesregulatingthestructureopolity,propertyrights,andcontracting,cannotbeefectiveitheyailtoadvancetheinterestsolargesegmentsothepopulationanddisregardorcontradictthetraditionalinstitutions,whichgovernthelivesandlivelihoodsolargesegmentsothepopulation.

Te task o reversing Aricas general crisis requires integration o theparallelinstitutionsogovernancesothattheycancomplementeachother.

Harmonizingthetwosetsoinstitutions,inturn,requiresreormobothinwaysthatwouldmakethemamenabletointegrationintoacoherentandefectivesystemogovernance.

Reorms that reconcile the two setso institutions also reconcile state-societyrelationsandtherebypromotedemocraticgovernanceonthecontinent.

Tis vision provides the imperative or the proposed ECA project, whoseoverarchingobjectiveistoexplorewaystoreormandintegratethetwoparallelinstitutionsinamannerthatpromotesdemocraticgovernance.

2. Tat the most salient aspects o the study, as identied in the concept paper, areappropriate. Tese salient issues include:

(a) Re-examination o the nature o traditional institutions to develop a newtypology:therearemajorgapsintheexistingstudiesotraditionalinstitutionsastheypaylittleattentiontodiferencesbetweenvarioustypesochietainciesandvarioustypes


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odecentralizedsystems.Tisareaoocusisdesignedtolltheexistinggapsinourunderstandingothenatureandattributesotraditionalinstitutions.Tekeyresearchissuesothisareaoocusinclude:

Anewtypologyothecharacteristicsotraditionalinstitutions;

Mainactorsortheresilienceotraditionalinstitutions;

Genderrelationsintraditionalinstitutions;and

Teimpactsochangesinlandtenuresystemsontraditionalinstitutions.

(b) Identication o specic areas o contribution o traditional institutions: onthe basis o their attributes, including their conict-resolution and decision-makingmechanisms,thesecondareaoocusexaminestherelevanceanddynamicsotraditional

institutionsandthespecicareaswheretheywouldmakeasignicantcontributiontoAricassocio-economicdevelopmentanddemocratictransormation.Amongsuchareasare: Advancingstate-building;

Settlingpost-electionconicts;

Reconstitutionothestateoraccountableleadership;

Coordinationoresourceswithsocialinterestsandexpansionopublic-servicedelivery;

Managementoresource-basedconicts;and

Settlingborderconicts.

(c) ExploringmechanismsoroptimalintegrationoAricantraditionalinstitutions:the thirdareaoocusattemptstocharta newvisiononhowto integrate traditionalauthorities,customarylaws,andtraditionalpoliticalvaluesintothemoderngovernancestructure.Amongtheresearchissuesothisareaoocusare:

Existingmodelsointegrationotraditionalinstitutions;

Decienciesoexistingmodels;and

Characteristicsoaholisticmodel.


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3. Te theoretical ramework, as outlined in the concept paper, is appropriate.Te theory on why traditional institutions can contribute to Aricas socio-economictransormation is based on the ollowing two propositions:

(a) Politicalvaluesandpracticesothedecentralizedpoliticalsystemslargelyconvergewithdemocraticvaluesandarelikelytoenablethesesystemstocontributetodemocratictransormation.Temostcommonpoliticalvaluesothedecentralizedsystemsinclude:

Decentralizationopower;

Directparticipationindecision-making;

Resolutionoconictsbynarrowingdiferences;

Respectordissentandprotectionominorityviewsandinterests by ostering

consensusondecisions;

Narrowingthegapbetweentherulersandtheruledthroughdirectparticipationoalladultmalesinmakingandinenorcingrulesandbyshorteningthetermoserviceooceholders;and

Equitableaccesstoland.

(b) Chietaincysystemshavethepotential to acilitatedemocratictransormationandeconomicdevelopment:chies,beingpartothepoliticallite,canbeexpectedtohavethetendencytoadvancesel-interestattheexpenseocommunityinterests.Chies,however,arenotsovereign.TeyserveundertheStatealthoughtheyobtaintheirpositionromtheircommunitiesandnotromtheState.Undertheseconditions,whetherornotchiespromotecommunityinterestsanddemocraticgovernance(Y)largelydependsonanumberoactors,including:

Tenatureothestate(Sn);

Televelodemocraticawarenessothepopulation,whichisinuencedbythenatureotraditionalpoliticalvaluesandleveloeducation(Pa);

Temechanismsoaccountabilityothechietaincysystem(Ca);and

Teadministrativeefectivenessothesittingchie(Ce).

Tehypothesisonwhatdeterminesthedemocratizingroleochiescanbeexpressedasollows:

Y = (Sn, Pa, Ca, Ce)


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0

ANNEX II

Traditional Systems of Governance and the Modern State

KeynoteAddressPresentedBy

HisRoyalMajestyOtumfuoOseiTutuIi,AsanteheneAttheFourthAfricanDevelopmentForum

AddisAbaba,12October2004

YourMajestyKgosiLeruoMolotlegi,YourExcellency,theVicePresidentotheGambia,YourExcellency,thePresidentoAricasParliamentaryGroup,YourExcellency,theExecutiveSecretaryotheEconomicCommissionorArica,Excellencies,HeadsoDiplomaticMissions,HonourableMinisters,HonourableMembersoParliament,LadiesandGentlemen,

PleaseallowmetoexpressmythanksandthatomydelegationtotheGovernmentandPeopleoEthiopia,orthewarmreceptionandhospitalityextendedtoussinceour

arrivalinthishistoriccityoAddisAbaba.Inthesamevein,mayIexpressmyprooundgratitudetoyouall,especiallytheEconomicCommissionorArica,theAricanUnionandtheAricanDevelopmentBankorthehonourdonemebyinvitingmetodeliverthekeynoteaddressontheimportantthemeoraditionalSystemsoGovernanceandtheModernState.

ItissignicantthattheorganizersothisForumhaveputtraditionalsystemsogovernanceontheAricandevelopmentagenda.

Iwouldwish,evenbeoreIgointoanydetail,torequestthattheAricanUnionconsidersgivingAricantraditionalleadersaseatintheirregularmeetingstodiscussdevelopment

issuesonthecontinent.Reasonsorthisrequestwillbecomemoreapparentinmypresentation.

Iaminormedthatthepurposeothisplenarysessionistoexaminetraditionalmodesogovernanceinordertoevaluatetheaspectsoindigenousleadershipthatareinaccordwiththebasictenetsomoderndemocraticgovernanceorcanbeadaptedtocontemporarypoliticalrealities.Inthisrespect,particularocusistobeplacedonthespecialvalueandmeritsotraditionalmethodsoconictresolution.


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TRADITIONALFORMSOFGOVERNMENTINAFRICA

DearDelegates,

Aricansocieties,throughoutthecenturies,havebeenorganizedonthebasisoasocialcontractwherebypeoplecometogethertoormastateornationbecausetheybelievethat,throughtheircombinedeforts,theywillbemoreabletorealizetheircommonaspirationsorpeaceand security,whichare essentialortheirphysical and spiritualwelareandprogress,bothasindividualsandasacommunity.Itistoachievetheseobjectivesthatthepeopleagreecollectivelytosurrendertoakingorrulerthepowertocontroltheirlivesandtoorganizeandregulateactivitieswithintheirsociety. Intheprocess,theyhavealwayshadclearunderstandingsandagreementsregardingtheideasandprinciplesthatunderlietheirpoliticalsystemsandonthebasisowhichpowerandauthorityaretobeexercisedbythevariouselementsogovernment.

By traditional systems, I reer to genuine traditional institutions, uncontaminated bycolonialorpost-independencemodicationsordistortions.MostobserversotraditionalArican political systems recognize two main orms, namely the non-centralized orragmentedtraditionalStateandthecentralizedState.

Non-centralized traditional states: In these states, there was no sovereign in theAustiniansense.echniquesosocialcontrolrevolvedaroundwhatMeyerFortescalledthedynamicsoclanship.Tenormativeschemeconsistedoelaboratebodiesowell-establishedrulesoconduct,usuallyenorcedbyheadsoragmentedsegments,andinmoreseriousorsubversivecases,byspontaneouscommunityaction.Examplesarethe

allensioNorthernGhana,theSukumaoanzania,theNueroSouthernSudan,theIbosoNigeriaandtheKikuyuoKenya.Forthepurposesoourdiscussion,weshouldnotetwomajoreaturesothissystem:

1. Teexistenceowell-denednormsdespitetheabsenceoahierarchicalsystemheadedbyasovereign;

2. Tedirectandpronouncedparticipationopeoplemembersoclans,segmentsandsoonindecision-makingassuringavisibledemocraticprocess.

Centralized states:TecentralizedstatessuchasAsanteandMoleDabganioGhana,

YorubalandoNigeria,ZulusoSouthArica,BarotseoZambiaandBagandaoUgandahadamorestructuredandsophisticatedpoliticalsystem.Tesestateswereorganizedunderwell-entrenched,highlystructuredandsophisticatedpoliticalauthorities.TeyhadalltheelementsoanAustinianstateapoliticalsovereignbackedbywell-organizedlaw-enorcementagenciesandhabituallyobeyedbythecitizenry.Inractionowell-articulatedlegalnormsattractedswitsanctionsimposedbystateocials.Troughtheking,chieorthepoliticalsovereign,ruleolawwasacardinaleatureotheirsystemogovernance.Tekingwasultimatelyaccountableandliabletodepositionupontheviolationonormsconsideredsubversiveotheentirepoliticalsystemorparticularlyheinous.


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Inmanycases,thepoliticalstructureswerecomplementedbyhierarchyocourtspresidedbytheking,theheadchieorthevillagechie.

Teconceptolawinthesestateswas,insubstance,hardlydistinguishableromthato

amodernstate.

Inmostothesestates,therewasprovisionorparticipationindecision-makingbygroupsothecitizenry,eitherindirectlythroughtheheadsotheirclanslineagesoramilies,ormoredirectlythroughvarioustypesoorganizationsliketheAsaoCompaniesotheFantesinGhana.

EligibilityorinstallationaskingorchiewaslimitedtocertainroyalamiliesbutamongmanystatesoGhana,theinstitutionoking-makerswasnotunliketheElectoralCollegeinsomeothercountries.TeQueenMotherplayedacriticalroleasthecustodianotheroyalregisterandthepersonwhopronouncedontheeligibilityoconditionsorchiey

oce.

MULTIPLICITYOFSYSTEMS

ItisevidentromthethemeothisSessionandmyremarksthattherearevarioussystemsotraditionalgovernanceinArica.Justastherehavebeenandremaindiferentormsandorientationsowesterndemocracy,sotherewerediferentormsandinstitutionsogovernmentamongthevariousethnicgroupsandsocietiesindiferentpartsoArica.But in spiteo the unavoidablevariations, the diferent orms oArican traditionalgovernancehadanumberoimportantcommonelementsandeatures.

Invariably,theyalmostalwaysinvolvethedevolutionopowerbyascription.Apersoninheritsgovernmentalauthorityorpositionmainlybyvirtueomembershipoaparticularamilyorclan.However,inmanycases,thechoiceothepoliticalleaderisbasednotsolelyonthecircumstanceobirth,butinvolvesothercriteria,suchasthecharacterorotherpersonalqualities.Wherethisisthecase,thereusuallyisanelectionbetweenseveraleligiblepersonsromthesameamilyorclan.TepeoplewhoexercisedgovernmentalauthoritywerereerredtobyvariousnamesindiferentpartsoArica,suchaskings,chies,elders,leopard-skinchies,emirsandsoon.Inallcases,theyruledorgovernedtheirsocietieswiththeassistanceolower-rankrulers,aswellasalargenumberandlevelsoadviserswho,orthemostpart,alsooccupiedtheirpositionsbyvirtueotheiramily

orclanoriginsandstatus.

Itisworthemphasizingthatthismechanismensuresthatthekingorchiedoesnotrulearbitrarily.Althoughthekingorchiehasthenalword,heisboundtoconsultvery regularly, and decisions are reached byconsensuswithout ormalvotes. In thisconnection,althoughachieiselectedandinstalledorlie,hiscontinuedstayinoceissubjecttogoodconduct.


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Achiewhobreakshisoathoocetoseekthewelareothepeopleandprogressothenationisremovableaccordingtotherulesandprocedureslaiddownandtransmittedromgenerationtogeneration.

Itisnotmyintentiontogloriyour traditionalsystems. ButIamconcernedtopointoutthatdemocracywasnotalientoalltraditionalAricansystems,andtheruleolaw,whichprovidedchecks andbalancesin thepolitical systemand imposed restraintsonauthoritarianrule,wasaprominenteatureomosttraditionalAricansystems.

However,thispresentationisnotaboutourtraditionalsystemsintheirpristinepuritybeorethecolonialandpost-independenceimpact.ItisverymuchabouttheroleothesesystemsundermodernpoliticalandconstitutionaldispensationsinArica.

THEFUNCTIONSOFTHETRADITIONALRULER

DearBrothersandSisters,

Beoretheadventocolonialrule,thetraditionalleadersroleencompassednumerousunctionswhichrevolvedaroundthecardinalthemeoguiding,protecting,deendingandprovidingortheneedsothesocietyheserved.Hewastheintermediarybetweenthedepartedancestors,thelivingandtheyetunborn.Teseholisticapproachesinvolvedreligious,military,legislative,executive,judicial,socialandculturaleatures.

Leadershipwas,however,predicatedonasetowell-articulatednormsandmechanisms.Te multiarious unctions were exercisedwith specic unctionaries whose role was

hallowedbyancientcustom.Sometimesthesewereeldersorcouncilors,orcommunalgroupsor judicialinstitutionsostateordrummers.Eachentityperormeditsassignedroleinaccordancewithcustomarylaw.

Temilitaryroleothetraditionalleaderwasaccentuatedbytherequentincidenceointer-ethnicwarsorthenormalprocessoacquiringterritoryorstatehood.Butinthisunction,thewelareothepeoplewasparamount.Anychiewhoignoredthisoreitedthetrustohispeopleandwasliabletodeposition.

TRADITIONALAUTHORITYINCOLONIALANDPOST-COLONIAL

ERAS

Tecolonialandpost-independenceerashadaprooundimpactontraditionalinstitutions,inparticularchietaincy.TecolonialsystemostensiblyenhancedchietaincythroughthesystemoindirectruleparticularlyinNigeriaandGhana.Buttheperceptionthatchiesandkingsultimatelyderivedtheirpowerromthecolonialpowereventuallyunderminedtheirpower.InsomeAricancountriesthecolonialauthoritiesappointedchiesdirectlytherebyunderscoringtheuncomortableactthattheywerecolonialcreations,whichwereultimatelyabolishedwiththedemiseocolonialrule.


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Asaraspost-colonialAricanregimeswereconcerned,itishardlycontestablethattheysaw traditionalauthoritiesasadangerousbastionorivalpoliticalpowerand largelysucceededindismantlingorattenuatingtheirauthority.ExamplesexistinLiberiaandotherAricanStates.TerealityisthatinmostAricanStates,ourtraditionalsystems

havebeendivestedo theirormalexecutive, economicand judicialpowers except innarrowlydenedareas.

Evenmorecritical,theyhavebeendeniedtherequisiteresourcesorefectiveunctioning,althoughtheinstitutionochietaincyhasbeenguaranteedinsomeconstitutionssuchasGhanas.

But,inspiteoallthesemoves,itisparadoxicalthatinanumberoAricancountries,chietaincy is attracting academics, civil servants, business leaders and teachers. InNigeria,Ghana,Uganda,Lesotho,andSwazilandandinSouthArica,thetraditionalleadershippositionisbecomingmorecompetitivethanprobablyeverbeore.Itwouldbe

illuminatingtondoutwhythesituationischangingsoast.

TRADITIONALAUTHORITYTODAY

Admittedly, the chieo todaycannot act inthewayhispredecessorsbehaved.Heisneitherthemilitaryleadernorthelegislatorthatheoncewas.Exceptinverylimitedareas,hehasnojudicialunctionsorexecutivepowersoanysignicance.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatthechiehasnomeaningulroleinthemodernera.

Onthecontrary,hehasavitalroletoplaynotjustinhisowndomain,butalsoatthe

nationallevel.Tisactis recognizedinthegovernmentalsystemoGhana,wheretheinstitutionochietaincyisgivenanentrenchedstatusinthe1992Constitution.Amongotherduties,

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