Relative Performance Evaluation in Management Control · Nyenrode Business University Centre for...
Transcript of Relative Performance Evaluation in Management Control · Nyenrode Business University Centre for...
NRG POSITIONING PAPER SERIES
RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION INMANAGEMENT CONTROL
Hilco J. van EltenMay 2007 no.07-01Nyenrode Research Group
NRG POSITIONING PAPER SERIES
Relative Performance Evaluation in
Management Control
Hilco J. van Elten
May 2007 NRG POSITIONING PAPER NO. 07-01
NRG
The Nyenrode Research Group (NRG) is a research institute consisting of researchers from Nyenrode Business Universiteit and Hogeschool INHOLLAND, within the domain of Management and Business Administration.
Straatweg 25, 3621 BG Breukelen P.O. Box 130, 3620 AC Breukelen The Netherlands Tel: +31 (0) 346 - 291 696 Fax: +31 (0) 346 - 291 250 E-mail: [email protected] This is a positioning paper and meant to stimulate discussion on the author’s behalf. NRG positioning papers can be downloaded at http://www.nyenrode.nl/research/publications
Abstract Economic theory predicts that performance evaluation gains meaning and accuracy if the performance is compared to peers, as described by Relative Performance Evaluation theory (or: RPE). RPE can be deployed as a means for standard-setting based on peer group performance, by incorporating the performance of a reference group of agents in the compensation plan. Nonetheless, research on RPE suggests that peer comparison is not often a part of the performance evaluation, at least at the CEO level. This research proposal argues that RPE needs also to be studied at lower echelons. Amongst business unit-managers, we believe, RPE can make a significant contribution to opportunism-mitigation. By externally determining the performance standards, targets are less easily influenced by the managers whose compensation depends on them. This extends the interpretation of RPE, a phenomenon that has been analysed primarily from the perspective of efficient risk sharing and informativeness. Building on the literature on RPE, the objective of this research proposal is to study the incidence and form of relative performance evaluation at the business unit level, and to explore contingencies that are associated with empirical (non)-existence of RPE. Extant RPE models do not consider the influence of contingency factors on RPE’s applicability or desirability. This proposal presents a preliminary contingency model which aims to further our understanding of RPE. An additional contribution of this study derives from its direct, survey based approach, as opposed to the mostly indirect, public data based prior research. This allows for a deeper examination of RPE in practice, yielding stronger tests. Keywords Relative Performance Evaluation; Management Control; Business units; Contingency approach; Survey Research; Research Proposal Address for correspondence Drs. Hilco J. van Elten Nyenrode Business University Centre for Accounting, Auditing and Control Straatweg 25 3621 BG Breukelen The Netherlands Tel +31 346 291311 Fax +31 346 291250 Email [email protected] Web www.nyenrode.nl
NRG 07-01 Relative Performance Evaluation in Management Control – Hilco van Elten - 3 of 24
1. Introduction
One traditional tenet of agency theory is that it makes good economic sense to tie
managerial compensation to performance. Such a compensation scheme would help to
align the goals of managers with those of their principals, and would help to induce the
level of managerial effort the principal seeks. Prior research in incentives has focused on
the choice of performance measures and pay-performance sensitivities, but has largely
ignored standard setting as such, i.e. how firms decide on the level of performance
required to attain one’s bonus (Ittner and Larcker, 2001; Merchant et al., 2003, Anderson
et al, 2006). This is unfortunate, because the performance standard choice is an important
and consequential dimension of the incentive structure (Murphy, 2001).
There are two main ways in which standards can be set (Murphy, 2001): (1) they can be
determined in some internal, administrative process; or (2) they can be externally
determined. The difference between these alternatives lies in the extent to which agents
can influence the standard-setting process. Internally determined standards include
standards based on prior-year performance and standards derived from company plans
or budgets. Such standards are affected by managers’ actions, and can have dysfunctional
effects. For example, when standards are based on prior-year performance, managers
have incentives to avoid unusually positive outcomes, because good performance in the
current period is penalized through an increased standard in the next period. In a similar
vein, budget-based standards provide incentives to negotiate easy standards and
disincentives to beat the budget, especially in a regime of incremental budgeting. In
contrast, externally determined standards are less affected by managers’ actions. For
instance, managers can hardly influence the performance of an industry peer group, and
therefore standards based on such external benchmarks leave less room for managerial
opportunism.
These considerations suggest that the choice of the performance standard matters. More
particularly, they indicate that contractual efficiency can be improved by incorporating
the performance of a reference group of agents in the compensation plan. This extends
the interpretation of relative performance evaluation (RPE), a phenomenon that has
been analysed primarily from the perspective of efficient risk sharing and informativeness
(Holmström, 1982). Extant RPE models argue that as measured performance is almost
NRG 07-01 Relative Performance Evaluation in Management Control – Hilco van Elten - 4 of 24
always affected by random factors beyond the agent’s control, contracts based solely on
observed individual outcomes expose the agent to substantial risk. However, to the
extent that these factors are common to all firms in an industry or market, RPE allows
the associated uncertainty to be filtered out. RPE, then, provides managers with an
incentive to perform well, while insulating their compensation from the effect of
environmental conditions that also affect the performance of other managers in the same
industry or market. To this reasoning, the current discussion adds considerations of an
opportunism-mitigating kind. This extended version of RPE seems to provide a
compelling theoretical framework for understanding managerial compensation.
This study builds on and extends the literature on RPE –both theoretically and
empirically. Its theoretical contribution lies in the previously introduced opportunism-
mitigation perspective. Furthermore, the research proposal takes an contingency
approach to understand the use of RPE. The empirical contribution relates to this
research’s use of new data sources, namely detailed data on RPE at the business unit-
level. This new data is due to this study’s survey approach; where prior studies mainly
analyzed data from publicly available databases, this study can take a more in-depth look
at RPE-incidence and the variety of forms.
The remainder of this research proposal is organised in four sections. Section 2 reviews
prior research on relative performance evaluation and describes a number of research
opportunities. The research question is presented in section 3. The fourth section of this
research proposal provides the theoretical background of RPE, the preliminary model
and the development of the hypotheses. This proposal concludes with a presentation of a
summary research plan.
2. Research opportunities Despite its promising theoretical basis, the empirical evidence for RPE is at best
inconclusive. Both Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) find
that RPE is not a prominent feature of executive compensation contracts. Antle and
Smith (1986) find some weak support for RPE, but they also present results that are
inconsistent with RPE’s implications. Janakiraman et al.’s results (1992) are generally
negative. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) report strong support, but the interpretation of
their results has been criticized quite severely by Janakiram et al. (1992). Overall, the lack
NRG 07-01 Relative Performance Evaluation in Management Control – Hilco van Elten - 5 of 24
of strong empirical evidence suggests that RPE models have limited descriptive validity.
However, for a number of reasons, I believe that studying RPE can be a fruitful
endeavour for understanding performance evaluation practices. There are opportunities
of a theoretical and a methodological nature. The remainder of this paragraph describes
these opportunities.
2.1 Studying RPE at the business unit-level
Prior research almost exclusively studies RPE at the executive level. But, for a number of
reasons, RPE might not find its ultimate application amongst CEOs. The first reason is
of an opportunism-mitigating kind: RPE at the business-unit level can aid the standard
setting process, by comparing the actual performance to peer-output. Because the target
levels are externally determined, managers cannot easily influence the height of the
performance-standard and negotiate easy target levels for the next period. This leaves less
room for managerial opportunism. Furthermore, RPE-based standard setting helps to set
the target at a realistic level, dealing with unforeseen and unanalyzable circumstances.
With RPE, the principal ex-ante tells the agent what his relative goal will be (e.g.: ‘be the
best’, or ‘perform above average’), but what this means in absolute numbers is
determined ‘after the fact’ (via ex-post comparison with peers), This guarantees a certain
‘realism’ of the target, because it is determined by similar firms or divisions who realize
their targets under the same circumstances. This helps to set challenging but attainable
targets, which enables the organization to motivate its managers with targets.
At the CEO level, standard setting seems to be less of an issue. Here, incentives can be
directly coupled to the interests of the principal (or: shareholders), without the use of
performance standards. This can be accomplished by tying evaluation and compensation
directly to firm value, for example through stock returns. This would provide –potentially
strong– incentives for the CEO to act in the principal’s best interest; to pursue increases
in firm market value. Furthermore, these incentives would be undistorted because they
can hardly yield too much of ‘a good thing’ (namely: increases in firm value). This is
different at the business unit-level, where standards often also function as instrument to
coordinate activities (Leone and Rock, 2002). For example, in case of intra-firm
NRG 07-01 Relative Performance Evaluation in Management Control – Hilco van Elten - 6 of 24
interdependencies, where rewarding its manager based on some proxy for business unit-
market value could lead to suboptimalization.1
The existence of other means than standard-setting to provide strong incentives does not
disqualify RPE as such for executive compensation. But it can lower RPE’s incidence at
the executive level whilst RPE might still be present at lower echelons.
The second reason relates to the extant efficient risk-sharing perspective on RPE. As
argued in the introduction paragraph, RPE can remove common (e.g. market-specific)
risk from the agent’s compensation. But, it is entirely possible that (relatively wealthy)
executives can undo this undesired market exposure from their incentive contracts
themselves, by hedging this common risk with their own investment portfolios. If so, the
need for a, potentially costly, RPE-contract decreases. Therefore, the possibility of
managerial hedging may limit the reliance on RPE. In support of this argument, Garvey
and Milbourn (2003) found that although RPE is not an important feature in the
compensation contract of the average manager, it is in fact present for younger and less
wealthy executives, i.e. those managers for which personal hedging is likely to be
prohibitively costly. If RPE is part of evaluation practices of executives, who are less able
to hedge their market-exposure, this strengthens the idea that RPE might very well be
part of –on average less wealthy– business unit-managers as well.
Indeed, not much support for RPE has been found at the executive level. Considering
both reasons described in this paragraph, I argue that the inconclusive findings for RPE
at the CEO level need not discourage us, if studying RPE at the business unit level.
2.2 Contingency approach
A second research opportunity lies in another extension of RPE theory, towards a
contingency approach. The extant RPE models that most prior research builds on, do
not consider the influence of contextual factors on the applicability or desirability of
relative performance evaluation. This suggests that RPE is always a good idea, regardless
of the circumstances. However, a still growing body of literature argues that
1 An example of ‘too much of a good thing’ is the case of an overzealous production department, causing congestion in the pipe-line, resulting in high stocking-costs and an overburdened distribution department.
NRG 07-01 Relative Performance Evaluation in Management Control – Hilco van Elten - 7 of 24
circumstances do influence the choice of methods to assess performance, and –more
broadly– management control systems (Luft and Shields, 2003; Ittner and Larker, 2001).
‘Contingency theories’ contend that there is no universally applicable system of
management accounting and control, and that the choice of appropriate accounting and
control techniques depends upon the circumstances surrounding an organization (Ittner
and Larcker, 2001).
In support of the argument that circumstances matter, the influence of such
contingencies provides an explanation for empirical findings concerning limited RPE use
(e.g.: Bannister and Newman, 2003). A number of contingency factors are described in
the preliminary theoretical model of this proposal, and aim to add to our understanding
of RPE.
2.3 Direct testing vs. indirect testing
The third research opportunity is based on a methodological issue. Most prior studies do
not test RPE-use directly, but rely on indirect testing methods instead2. Typically, indirect
studies attempt to find support for the RPE-hypothesis by employing regression analyses
on publicly available data. Indirect studies do not study the actual contract or the
processes from which this data results. Although indirect testing has a number of
important advantages, such as the ability to gather larger samples, it also has two
drawbacks. The first downside of the indirect approach is the reduced test power. Given
the sample size, indirect tests are inevitably weaker statistically than direct tests, since the
researcher can only speculate about the details of the contract he or she studies. Then,
results’ reliability is threatened by, for example, misspecified peer groups, performance
measures, compensation metrics, etcetera (Bannister and Newman, 2003; Albuquerque,
2005).
The second disadvantage is that indirect testing is not suited to pick up detailed
information on RPE-manifestations. For example, indirect tests can not differentiate
between various forms of RPE, such as formalized, explicit or non-formalized, implicit
RPE. Furthermore, it is entirely possible that RPE mainly exists in subtler ways or by
different means than previously suggested by the literature. For example, it may be that
2 Examples of ‘indirect studies’ include: Gibbons and Murphy (1990), Janakiraman et al. (1992), Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), and Garvey and Milbourn (2003).
NRG 07-01 Relative Performance Evaluation in Management Control – Hilco van Elten - 8 of 24
the budget itself or the assumptions and estimates underlying the budgeting process are
regularly being ‘marked to market’. If this is the case, it could be that the budget is
reasonably well protected against both managerial manipulation and common
uncertainty. Another possibility is a situation where, instead of peer-comparison using
objective performance measures, subjectivity underlies the performance evaluation. Then, a
manager’s performance evaluation is based on his superior’s ‘feel’ for market conditions,
and thus, the performance evaluation is subjectively linked to market situations.
Considering the potential real life variety of RPE, not only the incidence but also RPE’s
specific manifestations need studying.
Concluding on this research opportunity, exploring the RPE hypothesis with a direct
approach seems desirable, especially given the current state of our knowledge of RPE. By
employing a questionnaire, interviews or reviewing compensation contracts, direct testing
can enable more sophisticated testing of the RPE hypothesis, and go more in-depth.
2.4 Conclusion
Overall, there is currently not much empirical support for the RPE hypothesis. But, a
number of promising opportunities for further research exist. In this paragraph,
opportunities of both theoretical and methodological backgrounds have been discussed.
This study aims to build from these opportunities, seeking further support through
theory development and previously unapplied methods to the topic.
3. Research question
This research proposal aims at theoretically and empirically examining the use of relative
performance evaluation at the business unit-manager level, and associating the use of
RPE with contingency factors. This goal is made explicit in the following research
question:
Can we explain RPE-incidence at the business unit-manager level by associating
incidence with contingency factors?
The proposal contains preliminary theory on when and why RPE is used, associated with
the organizational context (uncertainty, information asymmetry, asset specificity and
NRG 07-01 Relative Performance Evaluation in Management Control – Hilco van Elten - 9 of 24
managerial power). Besides the theory-driven research question, this study is also partially
exploratory in nature. Besides understanding RPE-incidence, the study wants to explain
the variety of forms of RPE in practise. Concerning this part of the study no preliminary
theory is presented. Currently, the literature does not provide a sufficiently reliable
foundation to build such a theory. Instead, the aim is here to map the forms of RPE, and
gain insights to provide us with building blocks for future research.
4. Theory 4.1 From an insurance perspective to opportunism-mitigation
Performance evaluation is considered to gain meaning and accuracy if the agent’s
performance is compared to the performance of a reference group, in case the agents’
performances are affected by common factors (for example, see: Holmström, 1982;
Janakiraman et al., 1992). This phenomenon has been termed in literature relative
performance evaluation or RPE. This research proposal views RPE as a means for
determining the performance standard and opportunism-mitigation. This approach is
new to the RPE literature. To the best of my knowledge, prior studies exclusively
approached the RPE phenomenon from an informativeness and efficient risk sharing
perspective (see: Holmström, 1982).
Extant RPE models argue that –because measured performance is almost always affected
by factors beyond the agent’s control– contracts based solely on observed individual
outcomes expose the agent to substantial risk. However, when these risk-inducing factors
are partially typical to a reference group, RPE-based contracts would filter out these
uncertainties. This is how the performance of peers is informative about the agent’s
actions; by filtering out common external –often uncontrollable– factors, relative
performance evaluation provides the principal with better insights in the agent’s true
effort (Janakiraman et al., 1992). The principal and the agent now can write a more
efficient contract, with both parties being less exposed to risk.
However, the preliminary theory presented here views RPE from a different angle, that
of opportunism-mitigation and target-setting, where RPE contributes to the
determination of performance-standards. This approach comes into play at lower
hierarchical levels, especially at the business unit level. At the business unit-level,
NRG 07-01 Relative Performance Evaluation in Management Control – Hilco van Elten - 10 of 24
performance standards (in the form of budgets and targets3) play an important role in
management control. Despite their central place in management accounting and control
practise, budgets and targets are widely known to potentially cause severe damage to
organizations (Onsi, 1973; Hansen et al., 2003; Jensen, 2003). Budgets’ and targets’
negative effects on control have often been traced back to dysfunctional performance
measures and non-linearities in the pay-performance relation. Less studied, but also a
cause of these effects, is the performance standard, and how it is determined. Literature
claims that there is a limited number of ways to determine performance standards (see,
for example: Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Murphy, 2001). Murphy (2001) distinguishes
two main approaches. He argues that targets can either be 1) internally determined
(amongst others, standards based on budgets, prior-years performance, or board
discretion) or 2) externally determined, for example where standards are compared to a
benchmark.
The main difference between internally and externally determined standards lies in the
extent to which managers can influence their performance standard. Internally
determined standards lie in the sphere of influence of the manager. This can lead to
severe dysfunctional behaviour. For example, when performance standards are budget-
based, this generally provides incentives to negotiate easy standards for next year by
gaming the system, instead of beating the budget, especially in case of incremental
budgeting and ratchet effects.
In contrast to internally determined standards, externally determined standards are not
(as easily) affected by managerial actions. Consider the case of an RPE-based contract,
where contemporaneous performance is compared to peer-performance: the
performance standard is externally defined ex-post by ‘the market’. This market consists
of a reference group with agents whose performances are affected by the same
uncertainties, and thus, who are exposed to the same risk (preferably both in nature and
level). Since peer performance is relatively hard to influence for the manager, the
manager cannot influence the performance standard to which he is evaluated. This
3 When, in this research proposal, the term budget is used, it refers to budgets deployed as targets. Other reasons-to-budget are, for example, for operational planning, communication of goals, and strategy formulation (Hansen and Van der Stede, 2004)
NRG 07-01 Relative Performance Evaluation in Management Control – Hilco van Elten - 11 of 24
complicates engaging in dysfunctional behaviour, and mitigates (from the principal’s
perspective) undesired managerial opportunism.
4.2 Provision of powerful incentives and an exploration of a coordination role.
This paper views RPE as a means to induce motivation of organizational members (in
this study specifically: business-unit managers)4. This research proposal claims that RPE
can be helpful to motivate managers, because it can aid the calibration of the incentive-
zone in performance-contracts, where the managers performance will lead to a bonus.
The motivating character of targets in compensation schemes has been studied
extensively. When targets are used to motivate managers, typical dysfunctionalities arise.
These dysfunctionalities are mostly related to the calibration of the incentive-zone.
Performance evaluation (and subsequent rewarding) motivates to provide high effort, as
long as the manager believes his effort has an effect on his rewards. Such compensation
systems only have strong motivational properties when the actual performance lies in the
incentive zone, because only then, the manager will receive a variable bonus, dependent
on his performance. Consider the compensation scheme in figure 1 (conform: Murphy,
2001; Jensen, 2003) The incentive-zone refers to the part of the reported performance,
for which the manager receives a bonus. In figure 1, this zone is marked as I. In this area,
the system is motivating the manager to provide high effort, without increased risk of
managerial opportunism.
Around the edges of the incentive-zone (indicated as zones II.1 and II.2), the threat of
opportunistic behaviour increases. The system strongly induces gaming. In zone II.1,
reporting a higher then actual performance is stimulated by the system, in order to just
reach the hurdle bonus. In zone II.2, it serves the manager’s interests better to not report
4 Management control instruments in general, and targets specifically, can also be deployed as means for coordination of organisational activities. Concerning this other role of management control instruments, RPE’s fitness for coordinating activities is assumed to be low. Since RPE abandons preset absolute performance goals –which enable forecasting required capacities– the planning and allocation of resources becomes more difficult. Especially for organisations with much or complex interdependencies (reflected in high asset specificity), this is likely to lower reliance on relative performance evaluation. The link between interdependencies and asset specificity will be discussed in the operationalization of the model (not included in this research proposal).
NRG 07-01 Relative Performance Evaluation in Management Control – Hilco van Elten - 12 of 24
performance that exceeds the target with more then –in the example– 20 percent. Again,
fraudulent reporting is induced. The zones marked III.1 and III.2 do not have
motivational properties, since the compensation is not dependent on (small) changes in
effort. In this case, dysfunctional behaviour will not take form as fraudulent reporting,
but agents are likely to shirk.
Figure 1: typical compensation scheme
If an organization chooses to use performance evaluation for the provision of incentives,
it is critical to calibrate the performance standard, so that realized performances lies
within the boundaries of the incentive zone. However, it is difficult to ex-ante define the
appropriate height of the performance standard, especially in case of external
shocks/uncertainties.
Relative performance evaluation aids the calibration of the incentive zone by an ex-post
determining the target, comparing with what was attainable for the reference-group. This
solves the main part of the problem: the attainable performance lies within the
boundaries of the incentive zone, hence the manager receives incentives to maximize his
effort. Nonetheless, the performance that is feasible for the reference-group, is not
necessarily feasible for the evaluated manager. In case of highly idiosyncratic risk, RPE-
NRG 07-01 Relative Performance Evaluation in Management Control – Hilco van Elten - 13 of 24
based contracts may still be too noisy. Then, actual performance can still lie within
‘danger-zones’ II.1 or II.2, or even in III, since RPE can only correct the performance
standard for shared uncertainties, and not for firm-specific risk. Nonetheless, in many
cases, RPE can make a contribution to opportunism-mitigation, depending on the
circumstances. The circumstances which are considered to be critical to RPE-use are
discussed in the next paragraph.
4.3 Contingency approach
This study introduces a preliminary framework of contingency factors that furthers our
understanding of RPE at the business unit-manager level. Contingency theories contend
that there is no universally applicable system of management accounting and control, and
that the choice of appropriate accounting and control instruments or techniques depends
upon the circumstances surrounding an organization (Ittner and Larcker, 2001).
Prior RPE literature generally did not take on the position that circumstances matter, but
rather builds on the assumption that performance evaluation always benefits from peer-
comparison, regardless of the organizational context. In contrast to prior studies, this
research proposal presents preliminary theory to argue that certain contextual factors
influence whether or not organizations deploy RPE. Although the literature associates
numerous contingency factors with management control choices5, the theory presented
here deliberately describes only a small number of factors, which are fundamental to
RPE-use. Why I believe that specifically these factors describe the core of the problem,
will be argued in the next sub-paragraphs.
Figure 2 illustrates the associations between the RPE-incidence and the contingency
variables. The remains of this paragraph describes the individual contingency factors.
First, the independent variables which primarily relate to firms’ need for RPE will be
discussed (the desirability variables). Subsequently, two ability-decreasing factors will be
presented. The latter set of variables are modelled as moderators, as shown in the figure
below.
5 See Chenhall (2003) for an overview of the usual suspects in contingency research.
NRG 07-01 Relative Performance Evaluation in Management Control – Hilco van Elten - 14 of 24
Environmentaluncertainty
Informationasymmetry
RPE-use
Positive (H1)
Positive (H2)
Assetspecificity
Managerialpower
Negative (H3b)
Negative (H4a)
Negative (H4b)
Desirability
Ability
Negative (H3a)
Figure 2: theoretical model concerning RPE-incidence and contingency variables
The desirability variables
Target setting and motivating managers would be significantly easier in a world of perfect
information and certainty, where future events would not surprise us, and where the
principal would have unlimited access to the specific knowledge of the agent.
Unfortunately, most organizations do not operate in a hyperrational Nirwana, and
therefore need instruments to face the challenges of unforeseen externalities and
incomplete, costly information. Both desirability variables (environmental uncertainty
and information asymmetry) can cause a shortage of information: the principal will have
insufficient information to determine an attainable performance standard. This
potentially leaves room for managerial opportunism. Because RPE can provide
informative performance standards, it makes a contribution to solving this information
gap. Already in the earliest RPE papers, RPE set out to address these two factors,
described in terms of informativeness and (common) uncertainty (Holmström, 1982).
More specifically, Holmström describes how peer-comparison can be informative –and
hence, reduce the information insufficiencies concerning the attainability of performance
standards– by filtering out common uncertainty. Environmental uncertainty and
information asymmetry form the basis of the desirability of relative performance
evaluation. (conform: Holmström, 1982; Murphy, 2001).
NRG 07-01 Relative Performance Evaluation in Management Control – Hilco van Elten - 15 of 24
Environmental uncertainty
Uncertainty can have many origins, of which the external environment is amongst the
most widely researched aspects. Uncertainty is present in situations in which probabilities
cannot be attached to future events, or when even the future events themselves may not
be predictable (Chenhall, 2003). Uncertainty is found to make up front programming
difficult, and high levels of uncertainty require maintaining flexibility to allow adaptation
to events as they unfold and to information as it accrues becomes imperative (Speklé,
2001; 2004).
Uncertainty is often due to the external environment. So called environmental
uncertainty is a powerful contextual variable that is at the foundation of contingency-
based research (Chenhall, 2003). It is this specific form of uncertainty which’s
consequences are addressed by relative performance evaluation. RPE is only suited to
filter out common risk. This common nature of the uncertainties is essential for RPE for
informativeness-reasons (Holmström, 1982); because also the performance of peers is
influenced by these common shocks, common risk can inform the principal the
circumstances under which the agent had to perform. Only external circumstances are
shared by peers, and affect the performance of all reference-group members.
Indeed; also other shades and colours of uncertainty can ‘cause problems’ by
complicating forecasting, hinder target setting, and affect performance, but only
environmental uncertainties are common, and can be reduced by RPE.
In a highly uncertain environment, RPE not only gains desirability, but non-RPE types of
performance evaluation also lose theirs. This is because performance evaluation based on
traditional, ex-ante determined targets requires forecasting, and forecasting becomes
more difficult with increasing levels of uncertainty, since it involves highly uncertain
future circumstances. This seriously reduces the applicability of non-RPE types of
performance evaluation. But, RPE does not require forecasting, since it relies on ex-post
target setting. As opposed to traditional, absolute performance evaluation, RPE is better
able to deal with an unpredictable, uncertain environment. Therefore, with high
environmental uncertainty, more use of RPE is expected. Hence, the first hypothesis is
the following:
NRG 07-01 Relative Performance Evaluation in Management Control – Hilco van Elten - 16 of 24
H1: High levels of environmental uncertainty positively influence the use of relative performance
evaluation.
Information asymmetry
Information asymmetry, relating to the information gap between principal and agent, is
often described (both theoretically and empirically) to be the core of agency problems: it
is the combination of information asymmetry and the agent’s aversion both to work and
risk that steer him away from cooperative behaviour (Holmström, 1982; Kunz and Pfaff,
2002). This sub-paragraph argues that RPE can make a substantial contribution to
solving the target-setting problems caused by information asymmetries.
Setting an appropriate and reliable target can be problematic when a subordinate has
better information than a superior about factors that influence performance, especially
when the agents pay depends on his performance vis-à-vis the target (conform: Chow et
al., 1988). These information asymmetries occur when lower-level managers have specific
knowledge about the functioning of the division that is either unavailable to corporate
management, or is too costly for the principal to obtain (Abernethy et al., 2004; Christie et
al., 2003; Dunk, 1993).
In contrast to situations of high uncertainty –where both the principal and the agent
cannot judge the attainability of a performance target up front–, high levels of
information asymmetry hinder only the principal6. The agent –who is considered to have
superior insights about the mechanisms that drive performance– might rely on self-
interest seeking behaviour with guile, which can result in misrepresentation towards the
principal and building budgetary slack (Dunk, 1993; Chow et al., 1988, Fisher et al., 2002).
Through relative performance evaluation, the principal can let the peer-group ‘decide’ the
height of the performance standard, without the need to understand the ins and outs of
the business unit and the factors that drive its performance. This way, the principal works
6 Information asymmetry can go both ways: it is also possible that the principal has information about the business unit, which the agent has not. However, this study specifically looks into information asymmetries where the agent has superior information (conform: Abernethy et al., 2004)
NRG 07-01 Relative Performance Evaluation in Management Control – Hilco van Elten - 17 of 24
around the business unit to assess its manager’s effort, instead of obtaining the –costly or
just unavailable– information required to in-depth evaluate the business unit.
The prediction this study makes is that RPE will be used especially amongst
organizations facing high information asymmetry. Therefore, the effect of information
asymmetry is explicated as:
H2: Information asymmetry positively influences the use of relative performance evaluation.
The ability variables
Whereas the previous section described ‘desirability-enhancing’ factors for organizational
reliance on RPE, this section discusses some important necessary conditions for RPE-
incidence. These factors, both from economical and behavioural backgrounds, are
expected to disable the use of RPE for target setting and motivational purposes, and are
modelled as moderating variables.
Both factors are, similar to the desirability variables, argued to be at the core of RPE. Asset
specificity relates to the level of comparability amongst agents. Without comparability (or
here: with high levels of asset specificity), no meaningful, informative comparison
amongst agents can be made. The managerial power variable has a broader background;
this factor does not solely stem from agency theory or contingency literature, but is also
supported by behavioural literature and wide recognition by practitioners. Especially the
latter argue the urgency of the inclusion of managerial power when explaining
performance evaluation and compensation.
Asset specificity
Asset specificity concerns the (opportunity costs of the) investments made to support the
products, activities, or processes of a business unit (conform: Speklé, 2004). Based on
Transaction Cost Economics reasoning, Speklé (2001; 2004) argues that the
informativeness of externally determined performance standards depends on asset
specificity; the lower the degree of asset specificity, the better these standards represent
efficient performance. If a division produces highly specific products or services, or relies
heavily on specific processes, the division’s uniqueness reduces the comparability of
performance with other firms or business units. This is problematic for the appliance of
RPE, since comparability is at the very heart of RPE. A sufficient number of reasonably
NRG 07-01 Relative Performance Evaluation in Management Control – Hilco van Elten - 18 of 24
comparable peers is needed to build an objective point of reference to form the target
level to which the agent’s performance is measured.
In other words, only a large enough reference-group can substitute the market including
its external shocks, which RPE aims to eliminate from the agent’s performance.
Although the principal might want to tie the targets to the market, high levels of asset
specificity can frustrate the much needed comparability. As a result, internally determined
target setting might be the only feasible option.
But, asset specificity does not drive RPE-incidence in a direct manner. The sheer ability to
compare with peers (i.e.: low asset specificity) does not cause peer-comparison, it just
makes it possible. Therefore, no main effect between asset specificity and RPE-use is
hypothesized. Instead, this study predicts moderating effects of asset specificity on the
two main relations hypothesized in H1 and H2. High values of asset specificity will
weaken the relation between environmental uncertainty and RPE-use, and between
information asymmetry and RPE-use.
Therefore, the claim is that asset specificity negatively influences reliance on RPE, not
directly but only via environmental uncertainty and information asymmetry, formalized
as:
H3a: Asset specificity negatively influences the positive relation between environmental uncertainty and the
use of relative performance evaluation.
H3b: Asset specificity negatively influences the positive relation between information asymmetry and the
use of relative performance evaluation.
Managerial power
Managerial power is defined here as the ability of managers to influence or exert their will
or desires to others, for example on the remuneration decisions made by the board of
directors, or by the compensation committee of the board. This definition is in line with
Finkelstein (1992), Lambert et al. (1993), and Grinstein et al. (2004), who generally find
significant and positive effects of managerial power on CEO compensation. These
empirical findings are theory-consistent: under the managerial power approach, there
NRG 07-01 Relative Performance Evaluation in Management Control – Hilco van Elten - 19 of 24
should be a positive correlation between the level of compensation and the level of
managerial power in the firm; managerial skill and performance should play a secondary
role in explaining the variability in compensation (Grinstein et al., 2004).
However, two main differences exist between the application of the managerial power
approach sketched above, and the view which this proposal adopts. Firstly, the
managerial power approach has been exclusively studied at the top-management level,
whereas this research proposal has a different level of analysis. This study applies
managerial power at the business-unit level, where nonetheless, I assume, similar forces
are at work. Nonetheless, it is likely that lower in the hierarchy managerial power levels
are significantly lower.
Secondly, prior studies deploy managerial power to explain the height of compensation,
not the structure of the compensation contract behind it. Explaining the height of
compensation seems evident, given the unwritten assumption that everyone –including
CEOs and business unit-managers– prefers more compensation over less. However, this
study is concerned with explaining RPE-use, instead of the height of compensation. It
poses a different assumption.
This research proposal argues that managers generally prefer a non-RPE based contract
over an RPE-based contract. RPE is not necessarily a manager’s first best solution,
because of the risk it exposes the manager to (who is generally considered to be risk-
averse). Although RPE is can shield the manager from risk, compared to a ‘regular’
performance-based compensation contract (as discussed in paragraph 4.1 from an insurance
perspective to opportunism-mitigation), it is not as secure as a fixed-pay contract. This lowers
the attractiveness of RPE from a managerial point of view. Also, managerial preference
for non-RPE based contracts receives support from the behavioural literature.
Fershtman et al. (2003) also claim that managers prefer non-RPE contracts, whereby the
authors rely on the human tendency to derive utility from earning more than others. The
general idea is that managers care not only about their own wage, but also prefer their
compensation to be positively related to the wages of other managers (Fershtman et al.,
2003). This suggests that –for as far as it lies within their power– managers will negotiate
a contract that yields more compensation than their peers, regardless the circumstances.
NRG 07-01 Relative Performance Evaluation in Management Control – Hilco van Elten - 20 of 24
Casual conversation with managers and compensation consultants7 provides support for
these ideas. Interviewees argue that at top and middle-manager levels, managerial power
negatively influences the use of RPE.
The applicability of relative performance evaluation –as a means for standard setting and
remuneration– is seriously weakened when managers ultimately influence their own pay
via managerial power instead of effort. Managerial power would allow them to negotiate
a contract which makes this possible. Therefore, RPE will lose it motivating properties
when managerial power is high, despite it still provides an objective performance target.
Similar to the discussion about asset specificity, managerial power does not cause RPE-
incidence directly. Again, this study predicts no main effect between this managerial
power and RPE-use. Instead, this study hypothesizes moderating effects of managerial
power on the two main relations hypothesized in H1 and H2. High values of managerial
power will weaken the relation between environmental uncertainty and RPE-use, and
between information asymmetry and RPE-use.
Consequently, the following hypotheses are formulated:
H4a: Managerial power negatively influences the positive relation between environmental uncertainty and
the use of relative performance evaluation.
H4b: Managerial power negatively influences the positive relation between information asymmetry and the
use of relative performance evaluation.
5. Research plan The aim of this research proposal is to highlight the relevance of studying RPE at lower
hierarchical levels, and to build theory that helps us to explain the (non-)use of RPE at
the business unit-managers. Such a preliminary theory is presented in paragraph 4.
Furthermore, as brought forward in the research question, this study sets out to explain
the variety of forms of RPE in practise. This part of the research question will be studied
inductively, since no solid theoretical expectations can be build from prior literature.
7 These conversations include discussions with the CEO of a major Dutch housing association and an executive compensation specialist from Towers Perrin.
NRG 07-01 Relative Performance Evaluation in Management Control – Hilco van Elten - 21 of 24
To answer the research question, this project involves a quantitative, large sample
empirical study. Given the paucity of prior research in this area, it is unlikely that I can
rely fully on existing datasets. To ensure a substantial and high-quality response, I plan to
administer a survey through the NIVRA-Nyenrode network of professional controllers
(current students of the MSc in Controlling programme). Recent experience shows that
this is in fact a feasible solution to mitigate response problems.
NRG 07-01 Relative Performance Evaluation in Management Control – Hilco van Elten - 22 of 24
References Abernethy, M.A., Bouwens, J., and Van Lent, L. 2004. Determinants of control system
design in divisionalized firms. The Accounting Review, 79: 545-570. Aggarwal, R.K. and Samwick, A.A. 1999. Executive compensation, strategic competition,
and relative performance evaluation: Theory and evidence. Journal of Finance, LIV: 1999-2043.
Anderson, S.W., Dekker, H.C., and Sedatole, K.L. 2006. The impact of pay-for-performance and negotiated goal setting on performance-to-goal, goals and performance. Working paper.
Albuquerque, A. 2005. Who are your peers? A study of Relative Performance Evaluation. Working paper.
Antle, R. and Demski, J.S. 1988. The controllability principle in responsibility accounting. The Accounting Review, LXIII: 700-718.
Antle, R. and Smith, A. 1986. An empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation of corporate executives. Journal of Accounting Research, 24: 1-39.
Bannister, J.W. and Newman, H.A. 2003. Analysis of corporate disclosures on Relative Performance Evaluation. Accounting Horizons, 17: 235.246.
Chenhall, R.H. 2003. Management control systems design within its organizational context: findings from contingency-based research and directions for the future. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 28: 127–168.
Chow, C.W., Cooper, J.C., and Waller, W.S. 1988. Participative budgeting: effects of a truth-inducing pay scheme and information asymmetry on slack and performance. The Accounting Review, 63: 111-122.
Dunk, A.S. 1993. The effect of budget emphasis and information asymmetry on the relation between budgetary participation and slack. The Accounting Review, 68:400-410.
Fershtman, C., Hvide, H.K., and Weiss, Y. 2003. A behavioural explanation of the relative performance evaluation puzzle. Annales d'économie et de statistique, 71-72: 349-361.
Finkelstein, S. 1992. Power in top management teams: dimensions, measurement, and validation. Academy of Management Journal, 35: 505-538.
Fisher J.G., Maines L.A., Peffer S.A., and Sprinkle G.B. 2002. Using Budgets for Performance Evaluation: Effects of Resource Allocation and Horizontal Information Asymmetry on Budget Proposals, Budget Slack, and Performance. The Accounting Review, 77: 847-865.
Garvey, G. and Milbourn, T. 2003. Incentive compensation when executives can hedge the market: Evidence of relative performance evaluation in the cross section. Journal of Finance, LVIII: 1557-1581.
NRG 07-01 Relative Performance Evaluation in Management Control – Hilco van Elten - 23 of 24
Gibbons, R. and Murphy, K.J. 1990. Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43: 30S-51S.
Grinstein, Y., and Hribar, P. 2004. CEO compensation and incentives: evidence from M&A bonuses. Journal of Financial Economics, 73: 119–143.
Hansen, S.C., Otley, D.T., and Van der Stede, W.A. 2003. Practice developments in budgeting: an overview and research perspective. Journal of Management Accounting Resrach, 15: 95-116
Hansen, S.C., and Van der Stede, W.A. 2004. Multiple facets of budgeting: an exploratory analysis. Management Accounting Research, 15: 415-439.
Holmström, B. 1982. Moral hazard in teams. Bell Journal of Economics, 13: 324-340. Horngren, C. T., G. Foster, and S. M. Datar. 2000. Cost Accounting: A Managerial
Emphasis. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Ittner, C.D. and Larcker, D.F. 2001. Assessing empirical research in managerial
accounting: a value-based management perspective. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 32: 349-410.
Janakiraman, S.N., Lambert, R.A., and Larcker, D.F. 1992. An empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation hypothesis. Journal of Accounting Research, 30: 53-69.
Jensen, M.C. and Murphy, K.J. 1990. Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of Political Economy, 98: 225-264.
Jensen, M.C. 2003. Paying people to lie: the truth about the budgeting process. European Financial Management, 9: 379-406.
Kunz, A.H. and Pfaff, D. Agency theory, performance evaluation, and the hypothetical construct of intrinsic motivation. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 27: 275-295.
Lambert, R.A., Larcker, D.F., and Weigelt, K., The structure of organizational incentives. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38: 438-461.
Leone, A.J. and Rock, S. 2002, Empirical tests of budget ratcheting and its effect on managers’ discretionary accrual choices, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33: 43-68.
Luft, J. and Shields, M.D. 2003. Mapping management accounting: graphics and guidelines for theory-consistent empirical research. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 28: 169-249.
Merchant, K.A., Van der Stede, W.A., and Zheng, L. 2003. Disciplinary constraints on the advancement of knowledge: the case of organizational incentive systems. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 28: 251-286.
Moers, F. 2006. Performance Measure Properties and Delegation. The Accounting Review, 81: 897–924.
Milgrom, P., and Roberts, J. 1992. Economics, Organization & Management. Prentice Hall, New Jersey.
NRG 07-01 Relative Performance Evaluation in Management Control – Hilco van Elten - 24 of 24
Murphy, K.J. 2001. Performance standards in incentive contracts. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 30: 245-278.
Onsi, M. 1973. Factor analysis of behavioural variables affecting budgetary slack. The Accounting Review, 48: 535-548.
Speklé, R.F. 2001. Explaining management control structure variety: A transaction cost economics perspective. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 26: 419-441.
Speklé, R.F. 2004. Configurations of control: A transaction cost approach. Working paper.
Nyenrode Research Group
Nyenrode Business UniversiteitNyenrode Research Group
Straatweg 25Postbus 130, 3620 AC BREUKELEN
T +31 346 291 696F +31 346 291 250E [email protected]
www.nyenrode.nl/nrg