Relational Ontology of Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach

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The Relational Ontology of Amartya

Sen’s Capability Approach:Incorporating Social and Individual

CausesMatthew Longshore Smith

a & Carolina Seward

b

a International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Ottawa,

Canadab Canadian Department of Health, Ottawa, Canada

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Journal of Human Development and Capabilities Vol. 10, No. 2, July 2009

ISSN 1945-2829 print/ISSN 1945-2837 online/09/020213-23 © 2009 United Nations Development Programme

DOI: 10.1080/19452820902940927

The Relational Ontology of Amartya Sen’sCapability Approach: Incorporating Social

and Individual Causes

MATTHEW LONGSHORE SMITH and CAROLINA SEWARD

Matthew Longshore Smith is a Program Officer at the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Ottawa, Canada, and Carolina Sewardis a Policy Analyst in the International Affairs Directorate at the Canadian

Department of Health, Ottawa, CanadaTaylorandFrancisLtd CJHD_A_394264.sgm10.1080/19452820902940927JournalofHumanDevelopmentandCapabilities1945-2829 (print)/1945-2837 (online)Original Article2009United NationsDev elopmentProgramme102000000July2009MatthewLongs [email protected]

Abstract While Sen has written extensively on the social factors of capabilities, the exact nature of these social factors and how they interact toform and influence capabilities is contested and unclear. Consequently, how to coherently integrate social components into capability research remains aconcern for those attempting to put the capability approach to practical use.This paper proposes one approach to understanding and integrating thesocial nature of capabilities. Building upon two recent contributions by

Martins, we argue that underpinning Sen’s notion of capabilities is anontological conception of a relational society. In this perspective, anindividual’s capabilities emerge from the combination and interaction of individual-level capacities and the individual’s relative position vis-à-vis socialstructures that provide reasons and resources for particular behaviors.Crucially, this conception of society is predicated upon a contextual notionof causality that is flexible enough to incorporate both individual and socialcauses into social analysis.

Key words: Capability approach, Causality, Ontology, Relational society,

Social theory

Introduction

Amartya Sen’s capability approach (CA) has inspired much theorizing andresearch that seeks to better understand and evaluate the status and processof human development. However, the relatively abstract definition of capa-bilities leaves open a lot of space for both critique and misinterpretation. Onesuch critique is that the “multidimensional-context-dependent-counterfactual-normative nature of this approach might prevent it from having practical and

operational significance” (Comim, 2001). However, can we imagine a theory of human development and well-being that is not multidimensional, context



M. L. Smith and C. Seward

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dependent, or normative? Indeed, this critique applies equally to any attemptto analytically capture the social complexities of development. The relevantquestion is whether or not Sen’s approach provides an analytical structure thatcaptures social complexities sufficiently while maintaining enough simplicity

to ensure ‘operational significance’.Central to the successful application of the CA in a way that respectssocial complexities is the manner in which it incorporates social factors.Incorporating social factors in research is a philosophical and methodologicalissue that engenders debate in the social sciences, and the capability approach is no different. Recently an issue of the Journal of Human Devel- opment was dedicated to exploring the “quintessentially social nature of indi-

vidual freedom and agency” inherent in the capability approach (Herdt andDeneulin, 2007, p. 179). If we agree that the CA includes social factors, then

which social factors are relevant and how exactly should they to be incorpo-rated into a CA-inspired analysis? This question is extremely important for conceptualizing and applying the CA. Are elements of the context to betreated as external variables that somehow enhance capabilities? Or are they actually a constitutive part of capabilities themselves? How do we understandthe interaction between the individual and the social spheres that shape anddetermine capabilities? If we can answer these questions, then we have moreinsight into how to approach incorporating social factors into a CA analysis— as well as answering the questions of what aspects of the social world weincorporate, in what circumstances, and for what capabilities.

This paper will provide one approach to answering these questions. Inthis way, the paper is similar to Ibrahim’s recent contribution that suggests

that to better understand the social nature of capabilities “the CA needs to becomplemented with the literatures on collective action, institutions andsocial capital” (Ibrahim, 2006, p. 405). Our article adds to this conversationthrough a complimentary, but more philosophical, tack. Rather than attempt-ing to establish or identify which specific social factors influence capabilities,

we lay out a framework that provides the structure upon which to advancethe social theory components of the capability approach.

The argument made here builds on two recent contributions by Martins(2006, 2007) regarding the ontological status of capabilities. Martins’ work provides a conceptual framework of the meta-theoretical assumptions that

underpin capabilities. Extending his work, we argue that conceptualizing andincorporating the social aspects of capabilities requires a basic understandingof how societies and individuals together constitute capabilities. We arguethat this understanding is, in part, already deeply embedded in Sen’s concep-tualization of the CA approach. What this article provides is a set of ontolog-ical assumptions that flesh out these insights.

More specifically, we argue that Sen’s notion of capabilities and freedomsimplies an ontology of a relational society. Within a relational conception of society, a particular capability is the outcome of the interaction of an individ-ual’s capacities and the individual’s position relative to others in society. This

position contrasts with several of the standard conceptualizations of society.



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Furthermore, it entails several other important assumptions that have impor-tant implications for conceptualizing and applying capabilities. Most criti-cally, to understand the nature of a relational society — and the agent-socialstructure interaction that forms capabilities — it is necessary to grasp the

nature of this interaction. At a meta-theoretical level, this requires confrontingthe notion of causality.To develop this approach, this article begins with Martins’ argument that

capabilities are best understood as the specification of ontological social cate-gories that lay the groundwork for more substantive theorizing of specificcapabilities. Martins fleshes out this argument through a more specificconsideration of the underlying causal assumptions behind Sen’s notion of capabilities and functionings. We build upon this argument in two ways.First, we extend Martins’ notion of causality to show how it is inherently contextual. This allows us to argue for the relational notion of society as acoherent approach to integrate individual and social causal mechanisms inthe constitution of capabilities and their functionings. Second, we groundthis philosophical discussion with implications for the conceptualization andapplication of the capability approach.

Capabilities as causal realist ontology

The underlying argument of the CA is that capabilities should be used as thespace for evaluating human development (Sen, 1999). Capabilities as definedby Sen are a “person’s or group’s freedom to promote or achieve valuable

functionings” (Alkire, 2002b, p. 6). These capabilities are what allow peopleto perform certain functionings to “lead the kind of lives they value — andhave reason to value” (Sen, 1999, p. 18).

In two articles on the philosophical basis of the CA, Martins (2006,2007) attempts to clarify the ontological nature of capabilities. Here wefollow Martins’ definition of ontological claims as “claims about things (aboutbeing, or about what there is)” (2007, p. 45). In other words, Martins is inter-ested in what capabilities are. Martins’ argument is based on the assumptionthat explicit recognition of this ontological dimension is crucial for thefurther development of the CA. The hope is that improved specification of

the ontology of capabilities will improve consequent theorizing of capabili-ties. This section does the following: outlines Martins’ arguments concerningthe CA, and extends these arguments to include a discussion on the natureof contextual causality.

Capabilities as causal powers

Martins argues that it is possible to clarify the ontological nature of capabili-ties and functionings. Martins argument is inspired by the critical realist(Bhaskar, 1978, 1998b) philosophy of social science and its social ontology.

He argues that the particular set of ontological assumptions made by critical




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realism is both compatible and appropriate as a meta-theory to the CA. Inparticular, Martins concludes that capabilities can be understood as causalpowers with particular properties.

Martins argument begins with the distinction between two levels of

ontology: philosophic and scientific (Bhaskar, 1978). Scientific ontology involves those things or entities that are studied by science — that is, the“entities that are posited or presupposed in scientific or other theories”(Lawson, 2004, p. 2). The philosophic ontology is more abstract than thescientific ontology. It is concerned with the commonalities of what exists;that is, “what all the things that are have in common” (Lawson, 2004, p. 1).

This distinction allows for the potential integration of assumptions that work at different levels of abstraction, and thus need not conflict. Martinsargues that Sen’s definition of capabilities is operating at the scientific ontol-ogy level, whereas critical realism works in the philosophical ontology level:

Sen has been preoccupied with clarifying social categories at a lessabstract level (categories such as ‘well-being’ and ‘advantage’), atthe level of scientific ontology, while critical realism has addressedmore general properties of the social realm such as structure, open-ness/closure … at the level of philosophical ontology. So both approaches are complementary and mutually enriching. (Martins,2006, p. 12)

A central insight of Martins is that the social category of capabilities falls within the critical realist philosophic category of causal powers. Thus, at a

more general level, capabilities are causal powers (a ‘ power to’) that providethe potential to realize particular functionings. Thus, “freedom (or capability or power) is not only an ethical goal, but also an ontological constituent of reality” (Martins, 2007, p. 52). Goertz (2006), reflecting on Nussbaum’snotion of capabilities, makes a similar argument — noting that embedded inthe idea of capabilities are causal theories about how humans operate insocial, biological, and psychological terms. Sen uses the words ‘cause’ and‘powers’ when describing capabilities. It is also implied in his descriptions of the five sources of variation (see Table 1). However, Martins’ argumentmoves beyond simply noting that capabilities themselves are a type of causal

powers.To understand what Martins means when he describes capabilities ascausal powers, it is helpful to know the other key components of the criticalrealist ontology. There are two fundamental components in this ontology:structures and mechanisms:

Structures are the underlying conditions of possibility that enableor facilitate the occurrence of a given phenomenon. Structurescomprise powers that may or may not be exercised and, when exer-cised, may or may not be actualised in actual events and states of

affairs. Mechanisms refer to the mode of operation of structures




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and exist as the power that a structure possesses of acting in a given way. (Martins, 2006, p. 6)

This ontology is predicated on the concept of emergence where structuredobjects in the world are more than the aggregate sum of their constituentparts. That is, the whole has qualitative properties that are different fromproperties of the constituent parts (Sawyer, 2004). These properties emergefrom the internal relations of the object that form its structure. In this way,the causal properties (generative mechanisms) of these objects are a functionof this internal structure.

A quick note of clarification is necessary here. We use the term ‘struc-

ture’ to refer to all objects, both natural and social, that have causal mecha-nisms emerging from the internal relations of these objects. This is anontological position that is found in critical realism and other ontologies

where complex objects are understood to be held together by bonds of somekind: logical in a conceptual system, and material in a concrete system (for example, Bunge, 2004a, 2004b). As we will see, there can be both naturaland social structures.

It is crucial to understand that causal mechanisms do not act determin-istically (Sayer, 2000, p. 95). They are better understood as tendencies(Bhaskar, 1998a, p. 34) of a structure to behave in a particular way by

virtue of what it is. For example, Alexis de Tocqueville argued that theintrinsic structural features of democracy have the logic of increasing inclu-sion. In critical realist terms, we would say that democracy tends towardsfull inclusion. This is decidedly not a deterministic statement as any real-lifemanifestation of democracy is neither ideal nor free from interaction with influential contextual mechanisms. In reality the world is highly complexand always determined by a multitude of factors. The notion of tendenciesimplies that causes are always a partial explanation of an outcome; that is,mechanisms are always acting and interacting in a context of other causesthat generates the observed outcome (Dupre and Cartwright, 1988;

Kincaid, 1996, p. 65).

Table 1. Sen’s five sources of variation between real incomes and their translation into advantages, focuses

on the causal relation between these factors and the ability to achieve the particular outcomes

Sources of variation Causal descriptions

Personal heterogeneities “Physical characteristics that make needs diverse …”

Environmental diversities “Environmental conditions that influence what a person gets outof a given level of income …”

Variations in social climate “Conversion of income is also influenced by social conditions …”

Differences in relational perspective “For example, being relatively poor in a rich community can

prevent a person from achieving some elementary ‘functionings’

…”

Distributions within the family “Distributional rules followed within the family can make a

major difference to the attainments and predicaments”

All quotes from Sen (1999).




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Thinking of capabilities as a bundle of structures with associated causalmechanisms begins to clarify the nature of the relationship between capabil-ities and functionings, which has not always been clear (Gasper, 2002,p. 448). Capabilities are structures with particular internal relations from

which their causal powers (mechanisms, i.e. the potential to perform a func-tioning) emerge. Functionings are the realization (outcomes) of the activa-tions of these causal mechanisms. Thus, the structures are what constitute acapability and the mechanism provides the instrumental link between thiscapability and the associated functioning.

Contextual causality

If we accept Martins’ argument regarding capabilities as causal mechanismsof the sort described above, then several interesting implications follow. Thisnotion of causality stands in contrast to other perceptions of causality in thesocial sciences (Bhaskar, 1978; George and Bennett, 2005; Hedström andSwedberg, 1998) and consequently requires a slight shift in thinking. Crucialto this shift is the contextual nature of causal mechanisms. As we will see,this contextual nature is integral to the approach taken for incorporating rela-tional factors into the CA.

How causal mechanisms are contextual can most easily be seen whencontrasted with the Humean notion of causality, whereby causality is theconjunction of events: if a, then b. Note that this is a notion abstracted fromcontext and thus, not surprisingly, is also generally associated with a search for universal laws (Hempel, 1966). In contrast, a causal mechanism account

states that the conjunction of events (if a, then b ) is only the result of acause if there is some mechanism c that, when stimulated by a, generates b.Thus, the causal mechanism notion contains three components and can beformalized as follows: “ x causes y (in circumstances c )” (Cartwright, 2003).This notion includes the three components: the generative mechanism(structure of x ), the outcome that these mechanisms tend to produce ( y ),and finally the elements of context that trigger or inhibit the firing of thesegenerative mechanisms ( c ). Consequently, any explanation must include allthree of these elements.

The notion of causality that x generates y (in the context of c ) can be

applied to understanding capabilities at two points. First, a capability is thecombination of an individual’s capacity to do something combined with thecontext of particular enabling (or disabling) mechanisms. Second, the realiza-tion of a capability (i.e. the functioning) will be modulated by the particular configuration of contextual mechanisms that shapes the capability.

In the literature, the idea of contextual mechanisms is equivalent to thenotion of conversion factors. A central argument by Sen for the importanceof capabilities over commodities as an evaluation space is the fact that peoplehave different conversion functions for the same commodities. This notion of causality is compatible with and reinforces his argument. Commodities will

only be converted to a particular outcome under the relevant contextual




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factors. For example, to realize benefits from the Internet is both a matter of the geographical, social, and economic factors that mediate access, but alsodependent upon the individual’s ability to put the technology to good use(DiMaggio and Hargittai, 2001).

We can also consider what this implies for specific interventions. Anintervention will only generate a particular outcome (such as increased capa-bilities) where the relevant contextual mechanisms exist. In this sense,outcomes associated with the intervention are always a result of influencefrom contextual conversion factors. As will be briefly discussed later, thisapproach has implications for the type of knowledge (read: theory) we needif we are interested in understanding how to increase specific capabilities. Inparticular, it suggests an analytical approach to explaining the interaction of context and capabilities to understand how, for whom, and in what circum-stances capabilities exist and are converted into functionings. It alsoprovides the framework for incorporating social factors into the theorizationof capabilities, to which we now turn.

Relational capabilities

In Agarwal and Panda’s (2007) study of domestic violence in Kerala, animportant finding was that a determining factor of a woman’s susceptibility to acts of domestic violence was her economic standing relative to her husband (Qizilbash, 2007). Interestingly, in this case, a woman’s capability isnot determined by an absolute level of economic status, but also by her

relative positioning. A woman’s freedom in Kerala (in this case, the freedomfrom violence) is a function of the nature of this social relationship and the

woman’s role therein. This empirical example illustrates nicely how somecapabilities can have a social and relational component.

It is certainly nothing new to state that capabilities have a social compo-nent. While the CA undoubtedly has an individualistic orientation, it is widely acknowledged that a complete account must include both individual capac-ity and social factors (Alsop and Heinsohn, 2005; Corbridge, 2001; Gasper,2002; Robeyns, 2005; Sen, 1999; Stewart and Deneulin, 2002; Uyan–Semerci,2007). However, the individualistic nature of the CA has been an important

topic of debate (Gasper, 2002). There are a variety of critiques. Gore (1997)is concerned that the CA does not allow for an adequate social framework toassess social well-being and development. Stewart (2005) asserts that the CA cannot accommodate the influence of collectivities on capabilities. Ibrahim(2006) recently argued that the CA is limited in its ability to capture the inter-relationship between individuals and social structures. In rebuttal to some of these assertions, Robeyns (2000, 2005) argues that those who view the CA asoverly individualistic are conflating ethical and ontological individualism. Sheargues that the CA is ethically individualistic but not ontologically individual-istic. In other words, while the ethical focus is on the individual, there is noproblem incorporating social ontology into the framework as a factor that




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determines capabilities. The argument in this paper is in agreement with Robeyns that incorporating social ontology is not problematic, and, in fact,the way to do so is for the most part implicit in what Sen has already written.

Consider Sen’s (1993) notion of ‘positional objectivity’. For Sen, one’s

position provides a unique perspective and rationality for holding beliefs.The argument here is that one’s position vis-à-vis others does not just resultin a unique perspective and reasons, but also provides objective resourcesthat enable and constrain particular activities, regardless of the beliefs of theindividual. This implies, among other things, that any one development inter-

vention will have differential impacts on different individuals dependingupon the individuals’ physical and mental makeup as well as their relativeposition in society.

In another work on social exclusion, Sen explicitly considers the‘Relational Features of Capability Deprivation’:

… being excluded from social relations can lead to other depriva-tions as well, thereby further limiting our living opportunities. For example, being excluded from the opportunity to be employed or to receive credit may lead to economic impoverishment that may,in turn, lead to other deprivations (such as undernourishment or homelessness). Social exclusion can, thus, be constitutively a partof capability deprivation as well as instrumentally a cause of diversecapability failures. (Sen, 2000, p. 5)

In the same paper, Sen directly addresses the concern that the CA is overly

individualistic and thus might somehow not be able to take into accountsocial causes. In doing so he specifically refers to the notion of relationalconnections as central to capabilities. It is worth quoting at length:

… in what sense is the capability perspective bound to miss theserelational connections and doomed to be excessively individualistand insufficiently social? While the individual is seen as the personto whom relational deprivation occurs (as it is in the literature onsocial exclusion), the focus of capability analysis — right from thetime of its Smithian formulations — has been very sensitive to the

social causes of individual deprivation. For example, both concern with the capability to take part in the life of the community (or themore specific capability to appear in public without shame) and thecausal factors that are seen as influencing such capabilities cannotbut be inescapably ‘social,’ and have been seen as such. What canmore legitimately be seen as a point of departure is not theacknowledgement of the idea of relational connections, but thefocusing on it. (Sen, 2000, p. 8)

For Sen, social relations take on both a constitutive and instrumental

importance. Constitutive importance implies that particular configurations of




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social relations (such as those that result in social exclusion) can in and of themselves be a capability deprivation — they are elements that constitute acapability (or lack thereof). Social relations also take instrumental importancebecause they can be casually significant. For example, “[social relations] may

not be impoverishing in themselves, but they can lead to impoverishment of human life through their causal consequences (such as the denial of socialand economic opportunities that would be helpful for the persons involved)”(Sen, 2000, p. 13).

The ontology of a social realist relational society

Crucial to the argument of this paper is that Sen is attributing causal efficacy to social structures as well as individuals. Accepting these aspects as part of the social ontology of the CA raises an important question that this articleseeks to address: is there a coherent way to incorporate the social into theCA? In particular, the question arises as to how we should think about socialcauses. How do these social causes work? For example, how can we incor-porate the importance of both one’s financial status relative to a spouse, andalso the fact that many of an individual’s freedoms are only secured whensocial obligations are fulfilled, such as through institutional rules and enforce-ment (Richardson, 2007)? We argue that a more detailed understanding of the underlying ontological nature of the social component of capabilities willhelp to answer these questions. Even more specifically, we argue that the CA implies a relational notion of society.

To better understand the nature of a relational notion of society, it is

helpful to contrast it with other visions of society. A central debate in sociol-ogy is the relationship between social structure and individual agency: the(social) structure–agency debate. Fundamentally, this debate is betweendiffering ontological positions regarding the existence of social objects andforces, and if and how they causally influence individual behavior. Two clas-sic conceptions of society take dichotomous positions (Hollis, 1994; Porpora,1998). On the one hand, you have the notion of an individualistic sociology that essentially denies (or discounts) the existence of social entities or forces,and explains society through an examination of individuals and their actions.In contrast, holistic accounts propose that individuals have little or no agency

and that individual behavior is ultimately the product of social forces.In contemporary sociology, two perspectives have emerged with uniqueontological positions that move beyond this dichotomy: structurational andrelational theories (Porpora, 1998). Structuration theory takes a middle way between individualism and holism (Jones et al., 2004) by focusing on the‘duality’ of agency and social structure that are “dependent upon each other and recursively related”, ultimately reducing both agency and social structureto social practices (Rose, 1998). In contrast, in the relational conception of society, which and can be traced back to Marx (Porpora, 1998), both individ-uals and social structures are causally efficacious, and interact through time

(Archer, 1995). In the following section we will briefly discuss the nature of




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the two causal components of society (the individual and social structures),and then elaborate on how they interact.

The individual as causal agent

Individuals have particular capacities by their very nature, and can act onthese capacities. This idea mirrors Nussbaum’s (2000) notion of basic andinternal capabilities. Basic capabilities can be seen as the inherent capacitiesof individuals to function as human beings, such as the capacity for speech,love, practical reason, and work. Internal capabilities are inherent to beinghuman, but are also fostered through an individual’s interaction with theexternal environment. It is at this level that we can discern the fundamentalcapacities of individuals that are the causal powers that interact with and areshaped by social structures.

Generally, understanding individual capacities and predilections is therealm of disciplines such as psychology and social psychology. ‘Interpretivist’approaches to research that are concerned with ‘understanding’ arguably focus on these types of individual causal mechanisms. Without getting intotoo much detail, it is possible to identify a whole range of causal mechanismsthat emerge from the inherent structure of an individual, such as reasons,beliefs (Bhaskar, 1998b; Sayer, 2000, p. 27), emotionality, memory (continuity of self), desires, reflexivity, sense of self, and personal and social identity (Archer, 2002). These inherent capacities of humans are developed andaltered through the individuals’ unique history allowing people to engage inreflexive intentional behavior and realize their potential as a human being and

social creature. A good example of an individualistic causal mechanism is self-identity.

People have a multiplicity of personal and social identities (Archer, 2000;Sen, 2006). However, as Sen (2006) shows, appeal to one particular identity such as membership in a particular religion, or group can be a powerful moti-

vator for action. Appeals, through identity politics (a social mechanism), for example, trigger the prioritization of one particular identity, overwhelmingthe efficacy of other simultaneously held identities (e.g. that of being human,a wife, a teacher, etc.) — sometimes to disastrous consequences. Indeed, asingular identity can be so powerful that it can overwhelm an individual’s

“freedom to think” (Sen, 2006).

Social structure and social causality

Martins argues that a key ontological category implied in Sen’s writings aresocial structure and interconnectedness (2007, pp. 48–49). Such a positionholds that social structures, such as gangs, churches, and governments, havean ontological existence that is both autonomous and independent fromindividuals. Like natural entities, social structures emerge from relations: therelations between humans, and between these human relations and nature

(Bhaskar, 1998b). The emergent properties imply that these social structures




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are neither reducible to individuals, contra sociological individualism, nor reducible solely to the activities of individuals, contra the structuralistperspective (Archer, 1995; Bhaskar, 1998b, p. 27).

These emergent social structures are reproduced and transformed

through a dialectical process: people experience social structures as anobjective reality and, through human activities, transform or reproduce thesesocial structures that form the people’s new social environment (Bhaskar,1998b, p. 34). However, social entities can also exist prior to any one individ-ual human activity that reproduces those social structures, logically implyingthat they are at least partially independent from those activities (Bhaskar,1998b, p. 25). Crucially, these relations are both necessary and relatively enduring, implying that they can be studied (Archer, 1995, p. 166).

Democratic institutions, for instance, uphold citizens’ rights and resolvecommon challenges through a discursive decision-making process (Dahl,2000; Warren, 2004). Democratic institutions are causally influential oncitizens’ lives. It is individual citizens, however, who — through their daily practices — undertake the responsibility (or not) to uphold and enforcedemocratic rights and participate in influencing the decision-making process.Citizens can maintain, strengthen or weaken a democracy through their prac-tices, influencing the nature of democratic institutions for generations tocome. Of course, certain citizens have a more central role, due to their socialposition, than others in the daily reproduction of democratic rights, such asthose in the media.

The point of contact between the social structure and individuals — thelink between social structure and agency — is to be found in positioned prac-

tices; that is, “ positions (places, functions, rules, tasks, duties, rights, etc.)occupied (filled, assumed, enacted, etc.) by individuals, and of the practices(activities, etc.) in which, in virtue of their occupancy of these positions (and

vice versa), they engage” (Bhaskar, 1998b, p. 41). Occupying a particular role, relative to others, is what determines what a person can or cannot do(Sayer, 2000, p. 13). In this way, a person’s relative position in society subjects them to the causal mechanisms that constrain and enable behavior.In apartheid South Africa, for instance, rights were denied based on race,constraining black South Africans’ political participation and opportunities.

It is important to realize that this notion of causality differs from the

apparently direct causality that seems to occur in the natural sciences.Humans do not appear to respond deterministically in the same way billiardballs deflect off of each other; they are self-determining creatures (Taylor,1994). Arguably, we are dealing with the phenomena of non-determinatehuman behavior (Fay, 1994). Unlike the direct push or pull of physical causal-ity, a more apt metaphor for this type of causality is the rules of grammar —they “impose limits on the speech acts we can perform, but they do notdetermine our performances” (Bhaskar, 1998b, p. 36).

More specifically, social entities have causal influence through how they shape the circumstances of the agency of individuals, shaping their choices

and capacities (Bhaskar, 1998b, p. 36; Little, 1998, p. 202; Pawson and Tilley,




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1997, p. 66). The web of relations condition and influence an individuals’reasoning and action through the provision of material resources and norma-tive ideas (recall Sen’s notion of positional objectivity) (Archer, 1995, p. 212).Of course, individuals who occupy particular positions can still act with free-

will. People ‘respond’ rather than ‘react’ (Moren and Blom, 2003). However,their possibilities for action are still objectively constrained and enabled. A classic example is that an individual is always free to act on false beliefs.However, this is risky behavior that will have objective consequences despitethe actor’s belief system (Archer, 2002; Elster, 1989, p. 20).

Social structures and their mechanisms emerge from relations betweenpeople and relations between people and nature. Included in this set of relations is culture, which can be considered the existing set of ideas that canbe understood or known by someone (Archer, 1995,, 1996). These mecha-nisms act causally by providing reasons and resources for action like vestedinterests, opportunity costs, strategic guidance, and social norms.

Crucial to the causal influence of these mechanisms is an individuals’position within these social structures. Archer identifies two types of posi-tions that an individual can occupy vis-à-vis society: as members of collectiv-ities, and a role incumbent. Collectivities are groups that share “the same lifechances” (Archer, 1995, p. 257). One’s position determines differentialaccess to resources and social roles. This provides individuals with objectivereasons, resources, and liabilities for different courses of action. These mightinclude groups of people in a particular socio-economic category that sharea sub-set of socio-economic-related capabilities. One example of a socialstructural mechanism that impacts on agents is the demographic shift in

many countries. For example, the retiring of the baby-boomers places a hugeconstraint on the financial flexibility of governments as well as potentially altering the central issues in democratic politics. Conversely, in many coun-tries, the demographic bulge in the 15–24 age group means that employmentopportunities are reduced, acting as a causal mechanism inhibiting theeconomic capabilities of this collectivity.

Role incumbents are the individuals who choose to occupy particular roles within society. This implies a differentiation between the role and theperson who chooses to fill the role. The role comes with its set of ‘powers’and ‘liabilities’, and is characterized by a set of corresponding social

practices. For example, a teacher’s behavior is structured by her relation with her students and the correlated practices associated with that position. Of course, how the teacher personifies that position is a question of her personal capacities including her cares and concerns with respects to therole.

Society—individual interaction through time

While analytically it is straightforward to state that social entities and individuals are separate, the distinction is not quite so clear. Social structure

and individual agency may be autonomous to some degree, but they are also




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mutually constitutive. As discussed, the social mechanisms that emergefrom social relations shape an individual’s situation, and individuals asconstituent parts of society reproduce and sometimes transform society through engaging in socialized or unique social practices (Archer, 1995;

Bhaskar, 1998b). This interrelatedness means that while performing analy-sis, the dividing line is not so clear. For example, Herdt and Deneulin writeof the “blurring of the … dual model that so nicely separates public respon-sibilities and private choices has profound policy implications: the privateand the public, the personal and the political, risk becoming intimately connected” (2007, p. 182).

The approach taken here encourages the analysis of social changethrough time by tracing the interaction of social structure and agency (Archer, 1995, 1996). Indeed, such an analysis is invaluable if we are tounderstand how social policy, development interventions, or other socialchanges provide new resources to individuals to change their behavior, thuspotentially altering the social structures that are also constitutive of their capability set.

Research implications

So far, this paper has remained abstract. We have not attempted to suggestparticular social theories or social structures that should or should not beincluded in the CA. Rather, we have made explicit an approach to conceptu-alizing the ontology underlying these social theories. At its most simple, theargument of this paper provides a philosophical basis for the social nature of capabilities predicated upon a very specific notion of contextual causality.This ontological underpinning asserts that the external environment consistsof social structures with differential causal impacts on individuals’ internalcapabilities depending upon their relative position within that social struc-ture. In this section we will now move to more pragmatic implications of

ways that these philosophic ideas translate into the process of theorizing anddoing research.

Conceptualizing capabilities

To conceptualize a capability in its totality, one must identify the essential struc-tures that compose it and illustrate how these structures causally generate theassociated functioning. This consists of three main inter-related components:

1. A conceptualization of the necessary individual capacities.2. A conceptualization of the necessary social structures that enable this

capability. This is a description of how particular social structures providethe reasons and resources for the realization of the particular capability.Identification of the causal powers of the social structures comes through an understanding of the individual’s position in a role or collectivity, and

how that position shapes their life chances, powers, and liabilities.




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3. A theory of how these powers enable the generation of the associatedfunctioning(s).

An important caveat to keep in mind is that the existence of a capability is

not an either–or binary proposition but is better understood as a scalar func-tion. The extent of the capability then determines the qualitative nature of the related functioning. This can stem from two sources.

First, there is the intensity of the capability, which is the strength of thecausal power to generate a particular outcome. This will be dependent uponthe qualitative properties of the component parts (individual and socialcausal mechanisms) of the capability.

Second, contextual causal mechanisms offer reasons, resources, oppor-tunities and/or constraints to individuals or groups that may modulate thecausal processes connecting capability and functioning. This implies thattheorization and research should attempt to understand how other contex-tual social structures alter/modulate the realization of the capability (fromcapability to functioning). Thus, theories of how capabilities ( x ) result infunctioning ( y ) have to be tried and tested with an understanding of circum-stances ( c ) in which capabilities fail or succeed to generate the associatedfunctioning. For example, media biases influence the realization of the capa-bility of democratic citizenship, modulating the actual functionings (politicalparticipation) — it may even provide reasons to not actualize a capability (among politically under-represented groups, for instance). The questionthen becomes how, and in what circumstances, do the media have thesedifferential effects.

By way of example, we will expand briefly on the concept of demo-cratic citizenship, a quintessentially social capability. When conceptualizingthis capability, the starting question is ontological: What mechanisms (individual and structural) are necessary for the realization of the capabilityof citizenship? Considering the ideal of democratic citizenship, one canunderstand citizenship as a social position of political equality within ademocratic structure with an associated set of citizenship practices. Citizen-ship, conceived as such, is an ideal that reflects the rights and responsibili-ties that an individual undertakes on behalf of the common good within ademocratic structure. Democratic institutions (as part of the democratic

structure) causally provide the resources to realize the valued functioning of political participation (citizenship practices). The role of the citizen will beadopted differentially, with both passive and active political participationreflecting the actualization of individual-level mechanisms such as the hold-ing of democratic values and estimations of one’s political efficacy in thecontext of the enabling and constraining democratic institutions. Table 2provides an example of one conceptualization of the necessary individualcapacities and necessary social structure for the capability of democraticcitizenship.

Citizenship can thus be understood as a social relationship between

the citizen and the political community of which the citizen is a part. This




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relationship is characterized by the citizen’s capacity, by a common iden-tity, by certain rights and responsibilities, by resources provided by demo-cratic institutions, by a culture of democratic values and an ideal of thecommon good, and by democratic trust. These are the necessary structuresand mechanisms for the capability of citizenship. An important outstandingquestion is the extent to which each of these mechanisms, and their inter-actions, contributes to the capability of democratic citizenship. For exam-ple, if trust in democratic institutions is weakened, then so would themotivations for individual citizens to participate. The question is, how much, for whom, and in what circumstances?

Of course, as discussed, other circumstances or contextual mechanismsmay alter an individual’s capability to achieve valued functionings. For instance, although citizens are theoretically political equals under the law, their political influence will vary given socio-economic status, education, and soforth. These circumstances (contextual mechanisms) alter how the capability of citizenship is actualized.

A form of methodological individualism

The conceptualization of capabilities given above implies that a variant of

methodological individualism might be particularly useful to understand

Table 2. A conceptualization of the capability of democratic citizenship illustrating the necessary

individual and structural mechanisms

Mechanism Abstract description Necessary mechanisms for the capability of

citizenship

Individualmechanisms

The inherent capacities of humans.These capacities include the capacity

for intentional reflexive behavior

A citizen requires the physical and cognitivecapacity to engage in the political process,

including the knowledge and skills necessary for

participation, as well as the belief that their

participation has influence or is politically

efficacious. The individual identifies with the

identity of the “citizen”

Structural

mechanisms

The material and normative reasons

and resources that motivate and

provide incentives for (constrain/

enable) choices and actions. These

emerge from the position of the

individual/collective in the relevant setof social relations between people and

the relations between people and

nature for the capability

Citizenship involves membership in a political

community, and therefore a common identity is

necessary for the capability of citizenship. This

shared identity (most commonly a national

identity) provides reasons to uphold the rights

and responsibilities inherent to citizenship.These rights and responsibilities are aimed toward

achieving some common good. Democratic

institutions provide the resources for citizens to

engage in citizen practices. Citizens must also

have trust in democratic institutions in order to

fully participate in the democratic process and

believe that their participation is influential.

Democratic values in society provide individuals

with normative reasons for participation




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capabilities. This form of methodological individualism does not reduce soci-ety to individuals, but rather places the individual in relation to the socialstructures in which he is embedded. What makes it individualistic is thebelief that an explanation of a social outcome requires at some point that the

cause works its way through the heads of individuals (Coleman, 1994; Little,1998). To fully understand a person’s capabilities, one must understand how their position in the social structure shapes their incentives and opportuni-ties, as well as how these opportunities and incentives are interpreted.

This perspective then implies that we are especially interested in under-standing what combinations of individual capacities and social context resultin particular capabilities, and how and in what circumstances this combina-tion will result in the associated functionings. This idea is reflected in Stewartand Deneulin’s discussion of the role of social structures:

insofar as some structures are instrumental to individual capabilities,some are enabling and others constraining, one needs an evaluationspace that would distinguish valuable from non-valuable structuresof living together, i.e., that would distinguish the instrumental struc-tures that lead to an expansion or a reduction in individual capabil-ities. (2002, p. 66)

As Stewart and Deneulin imply, this approach suggests a direct engagement with developing measures to ascertain the existence, or not, of the (causally)relevant social structures. Crucially, this analysis must focus on the relativepositioning of the individuals within the social structure to understand for

whom different structures are differentially causal. The point here is that thismoves the discussion from noting that capabilities are social to asking thequestion — for a particular capability — what components are social, how,in what contexts, and for whom?

Capability as a multi-level concept

Goertz (2006), in a recent book on social science concepts, suggests athree-level approach to constructing social science concepts: basic,secondary, and indicator/data level. The basic level is the concept as used

in theoretical propositions. The secondary level is the constitutive dimen-sion of the basic-level concept. It is here that the multi-dimensional natureof concepts appears, and it is here where the ontological analysis ismostly focused. Finally, the indicator/data level is where the concept ismade specific enough for data to be gathered. This formalization is helpfulfor understanding how the different ontological levels and componentscan be integrated when attempting to conceptualize and apply particular capabilities.

To capture all the levels of the concept of capabilities, it is helpful to addone more level, the abstract level. It is at this level where Sen’s formulation

of a capability as the freedom to achieve functionings would reside. As




229

discussed, this notion of capabilities is a highly abstract notion that embodiesthe commonalities across all different types of capabilities.

The next, more concrete, level — the basic level — requires a set of capa-bility dimensions that cover the range of capabilities to achieve well-being.

This list of capability dimensions is the bridge between more concrete,specific instances of capabilities and the abstract notion of capabilities them-selves. A good example of capability dimensions are those elaborated by Nussbaum (2000) or Alkire (2002a, 2002b, 2007). For example, Alkire drawsfrom Finnis and lists the following seven categories: life, knowledge, mean-ingful work and play, friendship, self-integration, authentic self-direction, andtranscendence. While these dimensions draw from empirical and ethicalconsiderations of what constitutes a human’s well-being, they must necessar-ily remain underspecified and abstract categories; they are useful as a “mentalchecklist of the categories considered to be central to well-being in many cultures” (Alkire, 2007, p. 11).

To assess capabilities, however, these abstract dimensions of capabilitiesare not yet concrete enough. These dimensions provide a framework for theidentification of “locally-valued-and-relevant-capability-sets” (Alkire, 2002a,pp. 184–185) within each category that are more concrete in nature. For example, citizenship can be understood as a more concrete, specific capabil-ity that falls within the capability dimension of authentic self-determination.Once the specific capability is identified (at the secondary level), we canbegin to think analytically about the necessary social and individual mecha-nisms of that capability. It is for this reason that the secondary level gets tothe heart of where most research and learning about capabilities resides. Also

central to theorizing at the secondary level is contextualizing the capability;this requires an analysis of the contextual mechanisms that will work tomodulate the actualization of these capabilities.

The final level of conceptualization allows for the development of empir-ical indicators. This level requires situating the abstract understanding of capabilities through instantiating them in a specific empirical context. Thesocial structure of democracy, for example, may have many different instan-tiations that provide the opportunity for participation and influence. We alsoknow that they will work differently depending upon specific characteristicsof people, their positions, and other contextual mechanisms that may

impede or enhance the democratic structures. Thus, we need contingent theories of how, for whom, and in what circumstances these particular instances of structures and mechanisms work.

It is at this level that there may be a wide variety of capabilities, and there-fore also a diversity of empirical manifestations of these capabilities. Impor-tantly, however, the tight connection in theory allows there to still be someexternal validity (generalization) from the empirical work, even potentially from singular case studies. The central concern for researchers, as we see it,is to use appropriate methods that provide good evidence of the existence(or not) of a capability and a causal link to, say, a particular development inter-

vention. Generalization, then, takes the form of theory refinement through




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the theoretical abstraction of the empirical evidence, up to the secondary level and beyond, if possible. These different levels are represented in Table 3.

Critical social science

A logical conclusion of conceptualizing capabilities as a product, in part, of social relations is that it necessitates a research approach that focuses onissues of power and political economy. This critical element should not be asurprise considering the relational notion of society has roots in Marxian

social theory. Stewart and Deneulin criticized the CA for inadequately dealing with the realities of political economy, and they argue that “[Sen’s] discus-sions of choice, democracy, and politics are at an abstract idealistic (andsometimes unrealistic) level” (2002, p. 70). However, if individual capabilitiesare causally formed by the individual’s positions in a set of social relations,then, in order to explain these capabilities, one must understand the network of social relations. As Sen (2000, p. 8) stated in the quote above, the CA doesnot just depart from the notion of relational connections, but implies a focuson them. In this way, one’s position vis-à-vis relations of unequal power andoppression are constituent components of one’s capability set. One cannot

entertain a notion of enhancing capabilities without addressing the social

Table 3. The multiple levels of the capability concept, from abstract through to the indicator/data level

Level of ontology Concept level Concepts

Philosophic Structures (with internal relations ) and their emergent causal

mechanisms

Scientific Abstract Capabilities, functionings, well -being , agency. Abstract notionsof human well-being that includes the commonalities across all

capability types

Basic Capability dimensions. General categories of capabilities that

cover every aspect of human well-being. For example, the

categories of life, knowledge, meaningful work and play,

friendship, self-integration, authentic self-determination, and

transcendence

Secondary Specific capabilities and their associated functionings.

Specification includes identifying the necessary individual and

structural causal mechanisms and how they generate the

functioning. These necessary mechanisms are common across all

instances of the capability Contextualizing capabilities: theorization of the circumstances

that may enable/constrain/disable/modulate the actualization

of the capability. These mechanisms are context specific. For

instance, what other social structures interact with the necessary

mechanisms of the capability?

Indicator/data Contextualized capabilities. A case-specific level of theorization

that allows for the identification of indicators. Ideally, at this level,

the set of capabilities are determined by the relevant subjects/

target population. Note that the same capability may exist in

different structures




231

structures that constrain (oppress) and enable the realization of a flourishinghuman life (Houston, 2001).

Second-best capabilities

The relational nature of capabilities also suggests that we should be wary of best practices. Best practices are set methods that are theoretically the ‘best’

way to bring about a particular outcome. However, if the context modulatesthe outcomes of particular practices, then it is hard to imagine that one setof practices will work in all contexts. Furthermore, we can imagine that thereare many ways to achieve the same ends. This is well illustrated by DaniRodrik (2008) in his recent discussion paper entitled ‘Second-Best Institu-tions’. Rodrik shows how the advice to implement ‘best-practice’ institutionsdoes not sufficiently take into account the institutional and social contextthat exists. Rather, he argues for ‘second-best’ institutions that, through contextually sensitive institutional arrangements, can bring about the desiredoutcome. Likewise, any particular capability can potentially be formedthrough various different combinations of social structures and individualcapacities. Consequently, when assessing capabilities across differingcontexts, it is important to be sensitive to the different causal configurationsthat might exist.

Conclusion

This paper provides a complementary addition to the ongoing discussion of the role of social relations in constituting capabilities. We have purposefully not waded into the specific social and psychological theories that help to illu-minate particular capabilities; rather, the discussion has remained at a high level of abstraction. Where many authors have pointed theoretically and empir-ically to the social aspects of capabilities, we have presented a philosophicontology that provides a coherent approach to integrate these social factors.If this argument is persuasive, then it provides a license and a framework for incorporating particular social theories, such as attempted by Ibrahim (2006).

This particular framework places causal mechanisms at the center of

explanation and consequently theorization. Consequently, in this paper wespent a good deal of effort attempting to elucidate the nature of these causalmechanisms and how they interact with the context, as well as providing atypology of the basic types of causal mechanisms: individual and structural(including cultural). We have further argued that one way to understand theinteraction of these components is through the conception of a relationalsociety that provides the analytical possibility of tracking the interaction of the component parts through time.

The centrality of causal mechanisms brings the secondary benefit of providing the key common denominator that allows for the coherent inte-gration of different social theory across disciplines and even philosophical




232

paradigms (George and Bennett, 2005). This integration requires the(re)interpretation (Pratschke, 2003; Ron, 2002; Smith, 2008) of the theory interms of structures and causal mechanisms, and how those mechanismsinteract with individual capacities. If we follow Ibrahim’s (2006) advice to

integrate concepts of collective action, institutions, and social capital, therelevant question becomes: How, to what extent, and for whom (and inwhat position) does (collective action, institutions, social capital) intro- duce reasons and resources that constitute or modify capability X?

To conclude we offer two final points to illustrate how this paper fitsinto other arguments regarding the CA. First, the argument here, with itsgrounding in ontological realism, provides support for Nussbaum’s essential-ist approach. There is no tension in theorizing a highly specific and relativecapability at the concrete level and a universal capability at an abstract levelthat draws on commonalities across all people and societies. Second, theunderstanding of society as relational social structures gives space for theinclusion of the causal efficacy of groups or collectivities. The key is to recog-nize that particular social structures (sets of social relationships) by their very nature have causal mechanisms that also — in particular circumstances — arecausally efficacious. This corresponds to the notion of collective capabilities(Evans, 2002; Ibrahim, 2006) where collective action is enabled through participation in a group.

Acknowledgements

We would like to recognize the following people for the time and energy they put into improving this work, which has evolved over some time:Marshall Smith, Shirin Madon, and Aaron Martin. We would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their insights and recommendations. We aregrateful for all your contributions.

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Relational Ontology of Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach

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