Regulatory Approach on Human Factors Engineering of Main Control Room Modernization:

A Case of Kori-1 Nuclear Power Plant in Korea

Dhong Hoon Lee, Dai Il Kim, Choong Huei Chung Dept. Instrumentation & Control Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety.

Daejeon, Korea {dhlee,k144kdi,k148jch}@kins.re.kr

AbstractThe objective of this paper is to present the regula-tory activities and issues on reviewing the control room mod-ernization process, Kori 1 nuclear power plant of Korea. The staff of Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety will review the safety analysis report for attaining plant modification permit in the perspectives on Human Factors Engineering of Kori-1 NPP, based on current regulatory requirements and guidelines. The HFE review will be focused if the modification of the main control room affects the roles and tasks of operators and is potentially significant to plants overall safety. The focus of review activities and issues are presented in this paper. And, the implications of the overall results are discussed.

I. INTRODUCTION Several nuclear power plants (NPPs) are starting instru-

mentation and control (I&C) modernization programs to address obsolescence issues and the need to improve plant performance while maintaining high level safety. As inte-gral part of I&C modernization program, the control room (e.g. main control room (MCR), remote shutdown room, etc) and other human-system interfaces (HSIs) are also being modernized [2]. Also, US Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) states that there are many reasons for the moderniza-tion activities, including; (1) to address obsolescence and lack of spare parts, (2) to meet the need for equipment re-placement due to high maintenance cost or lack of vendor support, (3) to improve plant performance, HSIs functional-

ity, and reliability, and (4) to enhance operator performance and reliability [1].

In the case of Korea nuclear power industry, several NPPs have plan for plant modernization. Among these, Kori 1 NPP was designed and built by thirty years ago and prob-lems were foreseen with difficulty of abstaining spare parts, increased maintenance cost, and lack of competence related the operation with the old HSIs. Furthermore, operational experiences had identified strong needs for improvement and modification of the control room. According to these backgrounds, Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Company (KHNP) is designing the new control room of Kori-1, in-cluding remote shutdown room and safety parameter display system (SPDS). Figure 1 shows overall scene of MCR of Kori-1 NPP at present.

For this plant modification, Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) is responsible for reviewing the safety of control room and other-related activities. Therefore, KINS will review the safety analysis report (SAR) in the perspec-tives on Human Factors Engineering (HFE) of Kori-1 NPP submitted for attaining plant modification permit.

In this regard, the objective of this paper is to present the regulatory approch on reviewing the control room moderni-zation process, Kori-1 NPP of Korea. The review activities and HFE issues based on KINS Safety Regulatory Guide (SRG) and NUREG-0711 are presented in this paper.

Figure 1. Figure 1. MCR of Kori-1 nuclear power plant

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II. DESIGN ACTIVITIES OF THE NEW CONTROL ROOM

Compared with the old main control room, one of the main differences of the new control room is the computer-based workstations reflecting the modern computer technol-ogy. In the new control room, operators will work with a combination of analog and digital displays for monitoring plant variables, including workstations of Plant Monitoring System (PMS), Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), and advanced alarm system. Main control boards of new control room consist of three sections: engineering safety feature control board, reactor control board, and turbine con-trol board. Among these, the reactor control board includes two visual display units (VDUs) such as one for SPDS, and another for advanced alarm display. And, the turbine con-trol includes a total of ten VDUs, which consist of one op-erator support display, three system displays, and three in-formation (for displaying the trend and various plant pa-rameter data) display, and so on. Operator consoles consist of three workstations such as workstation of reactor operator, turbine operator, and electric operator. Figure 2 illustrates concept design of the new MCR.

The design process of the new control room is specified according to standards and guidelines (e.g. KINS Safety Regulatory Guidelines (SRG), NUREG-0711 etc). The util-ity, KHNP, developed a detailed plan for design and devel-opment of the new control room. According to the plan, the

design team is performing various HFE activities to decrease the potential negative effects due to the introduction of the new control room such as decreasing of human performance, increasing the human error, etc. The HFE-related activities and plans include the following, based on KINS SRGs and NUREG-0711:

HFE program management plan Operating experience review plan Functional requirement analysis and allocation plan Task analysis plan Staffing plan Human reliability analysis plan Human-system interface design plan HFE standards, guidelines, and bases Human-system interface design guidelines Procedure development plan Training program plan HFE verification and validation plan

III. REGULATORY ASPECTS FOR THE CONTROL ROOM MODERNIZATION

KINS establishes a regulatory policy for enhancing hu-man performance, and provides strategic support to encour-age excellent manpower to engage in nuclear power fields. In additions, KINS also devises institutional measures to incorporate HFE into the design of nuclear installations.

Figure 2. Figure 2. Concept design of the new MCR

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The details of HFE shall be described in the Preliminary and Final Safety Analysis Report (PSAR & FSAR), which is to be filed to obtain Construction Permit (CP) and Operating License (OL), in accordance with the Atomic Energy Laws. The principles for HFE are also consistently applied to any design modification of nuclear installations. KINS conducts a safety review for the SAR submitted by KHNP, an appli-cant for CP and OL, and field inspections to verify whether HFE is properly reflected in the design.

The details of HFE activities for the control room modification in Kori-1 design will be primarily described in Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and in several related topical reports published by the applicant. The HFE criteria used to review the acceptance of new control room of Kori-1 NPP is primarily base on the review requirement and guidelines of KINS. The applicable review requirements and guidelines can be classified as high-level and specific requirements.

A. High-level requirements The following high-level safety requirements and criteria

will be applied in the review of the new control room in Kori-1 NPP: KINS Safety Principle 3, Consideration of Human

Factors: KINS General Safety Criteria II-9.2, Human Factors: KINS General Safety Criteria II-30.2 Control Room Especially, KINS General Safety Criteria II-9.2 declares

the the application of HFE in the construction phase as fol-lows:

Human Factors associated with the plant workers and human-machine interface shall be taken into account sys-tematically in the design of nuclear facilities.

B. Specific requirements and guidance The following regulatory requirements and guidance will

be applied in the review of the new control room in Kori-1 NPP [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]: KINS SRG 9.10: Bypassed and Inoperable Status In-

dication of Protection System and Safety Related I&C System

KINS SRG 9.13: Instrumentation for Post Accident Monitoring

KINS SRG 9.15: Reliability of Control Room An-nunciator Systems

KINS SRG 11.4: Habitability of a Control Room KINS SRG 15.1: HFE program Plan KINS SRG 15.2: HFE Analysis KINS SRG 15.3: HFE Design KINS SRG 15.4: HFE Verification and Validation The one weakness of KINS SRGs is that the current

guidelines has focused on HFE activities of the new con-struction of NPPs; that is, the KINS SRG has not some spe-cific points relating to the modification of NPPs. Therefore, in this regard, the staff will use guidance from the U.S. Nu-clear Regulatory Commission (NRC) NUREG-0711 to re-

view more comprehensively in the perspectives on the con-trol room modifications [8].

IV. REGULATORY POSITION TO REVIEW THE NEW CONTROL ROOM IN KORI-1

NUREG-0800 Section B states the regulatory positions review of the HFE aspects for the control room modification as follows [9];

Review of the HFE aspects of HSI Modifications Li-cense amendments involving major changes to the HSIs, such as control room modernization, should be reviewed using the guidance contained in Section II.A of this chapter (review of HFE aspects of a new plant). However, since the extent of such modifications can vary, the staff's review should be tailored using the additional guidance presented in this section.

According to this guideline, the regulatory position about plant modification provides under assumption that corre-sponding plant applied the HFE program during the con-struction phase. Therefore, we should consider following question;

Does Kori-1 NPP apply the systematic HFE program at that time of construction?

As an answer, Kori-1 has not chapter 18 Human Factors in their FSAR. That is, Kori-1 didnt apply the HFE pro-gram during the construction phase. The plant only had performed the safety review of a DCRDR(Detailed-Control Room Design Review) and SPDS as a post-TMI actions in 1990. Therefore, KINS should conduct the safety review of the new control room in Kori-1 as the same level of CP and OL licensing process for new design of NPP .

Especially, for, KINS staff would focus the following points and issues in the perspectives on HFE for the submit-ted applicants SAR:

1) Scope of HFE program management As described above, to review the HFE aspects of the con-

trol room modifications, KINS should conduct the safety review as the same level of CP and OL licensing process. According to KINS SRG, therefore, the area of HFE review should include the following all areas of HFE program ele-ments; (1) HFE program management, (2) operating experi-ence review (OER), (3) functional requirements analysis & function allocation, (4) task analysis, (5) staffing, (6) human reliability analysis (HRA), (7) procedure development, (8) training program, (9) HSI Design, (10) HFE verification & validation (V&V), (11) design implementation, & (12) hu-man performance monitoring.

To review the specific HFE aspects of the control room modification, according to NUREG-0711, the effects of modifications on human performance should be considered in HFE program management including (1) the plan of the installation to minimize disruptions to work and (2) the co-ordination plan of training and procedure modifications with the control room modification.

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B. Scope of OER According to KINS SRG and NUREG-0711, the scope of

OER should include the predecessor plant and systems, rec-ognized industry HFE issues, related HSI technology, and operator interviews. To perform the more comprehensively for the control room modification, OER should focus to at-tain information relevant to HSIs, procedures, or training that is being modified.

C. Scope of task analysis As described above, Kori-1 didnt apply the HFE program

during the construction and operation phase. Therefore, the applicant should conduct task analysis for selected represen-tative and important tasks from all areas of operations, main-tenance, test, inspection, and surveillance. Especially, the identification of the difference of the design characteristics should be considered between the existing and the modified HSIs.

D. Scope of HRA The most important review point in HRA, according to

NUREG-0711, is that when modifying the HSIs, procedures, and training by the design of the new control room, the scope of HRA should consider personnel actions resulting from the modifications. Therefore, the applicant should confirm the following aspects of HRA; (1) the original HRA assumptions are valid even if the design modification be conducted, (2) the human error types and mechanism in the existing HRA are still valid, (3) the human error probabili-ties by operators and maintenance personnel are considered in terms of the modified human actions resulting from the modifications.

E. Scope of HFE V&V As described earlier, Kori-1 didnt apply the HFE pro-

gram during the construction phase; that is, the applicant has not an experience relating to HFE V&V activities for the existing HSIs. The applicant only performed DCRDR as a post TMI action. Therefore, the applicant should conduct HFE V&V with respect to the general criteria of KINS SRG and NUREG-0711 including following activities; opera-tional condition sampling, design verification, integrated system validation, and human engineering discrepancy reso-lution. Among these, the KINS staff would focus on the review of integrated system validation because this activity is the process guarantying the safe operation of the plant. In

this regard, the applicant should confirm the criteria satisfac-tion of integrated system validation in the implementation plan such as; validation test beds, validation team, scenario definition and development, performance measurement characteristics, selection, and criteria, test design, data analysis and interpretation, etc.

V. CONCLUSIONS Kori-1 has not chapter 18 Human Factors in their FSAR

and didnt apply the systematic HFE program during the construction and operation phase. Therefore, KINS should conduct the safety review of the new control room in Kori-1 as the same level of CP and OL licensing process. In the review, the acceptance decisions for HFE activities are de-termined by the criteria of KINS SRGs, however, the current SRGs has not some specific points relating to the modifica-tion of NPPs. Therefore, the staff will use guidance from the U.S. NRC NUREG-0711 Rev. 02 to review more com-prehensively.

In this paper, we provide some important regulatory posi-tions for the representative HFE programs, that is, review scope of HFE program management, operating experiences, task analysis, human reliability analysis, and HFE verifica-tion and validation. The applicant should consider these positions as the basis of the modification process of the con-trol room. Furthermore, the HFE programs for the submit-ted SAR will be acceptable and satisfied when the applicant successfully addresses the HFE activity issues.

REFERENCES [1] Electric Power Research Institute, Human Factors Guidance for

Control room and Digital Human-System Interface Design and Modification, TR-1008122, (2004).

[2] Joseph Naser, Control Room and HIS Modernization Guidance, Nuclear Plant Journal, May-June, pp31.-35, (2005).

[3] Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS), Safety Regulatory Guide (SRG) 9.13: Instrumentation for Post Accident Monitoring, (1996).

[4] KINS, SRG 15.1: Human Factors Engineering Program Plan, (1996).

[5] KINS, SRG 15.2: Human Factors Engineering Analysis, (1996). [6] KINS, SRG 15.3: Human Factors Engineering Design, (1996). [7] KINS, SRG 15.4: Human Factors Engineering Verification and

Validation, (1996). [8] Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Human Factors

Engineering Program Review Model, NUREG-0711, 1994. [9] NRC, Standard Review Plan Chapter 18. Human Factors

engineering, NUREG-0800, (2004).

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