Regional peacekeeping in the post‐cold war era

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Regional peacekeeping inthe post‐cold war eraJustin Morris a & Hilaire McCoubrey ba Lecturer in International Politics , Universityof Hullb Professor of Law , University of HullPublished online: 08 Nov 2007.

To cite this article: Justin Morris & Hilaire McCoubrey (1999) Regionalpeacekeeping in the post‐cold war era, International Peacekeeping, 6:2,129-151, DOI: 10.1080/13533319908413775

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THE REGIONAL IMPETUS

Regional Peacekeeping in thePost-Cold War Era

JUSTIN MORRIS and HILAIRE McCOUBREY

The end of the Cold War has brought about a major change in the paradigm of UNpeace support action. The organization has found itself unable successfully to sustainthe increasing demands placed upon it and has sought other mechanisms throughwhich peace support might be achieved. Prominent among these has been explorationof the extent to which regional organizations and defensive alliances might assume thisrole as, in some sense, 'delegates' of the UN. The great diversity in both the nature andcapacities of such organizations suggests, however, that this cannot be a simple orsingular solution to the problem of peace support into the next century. Rather than asingle unitary new paradigm, the pattern which is suggested is both more complex andmore diverse, with a combination of regional organizations and 'coalitions of thewilling' having to function in a system which yet combines the essential imperativesof ultimate UN oversight and practical efficacy.

Collective security concepts and mechanisms have undergone a series oftransformations during the United Nations era, from that originallydeveloped in 1945 through the exigencies of the Cold War to, by no meansleast in significance, a possible new post-Cold War paradigm. The forceswhich have generated these changes are in themselves obvious enough, butare, nonetheless, by no means always accorded full recognition. Thecircumstances in which the UN was called upon to operate during the ColdWar differed very markedly from those which were apparently anticipatedby those who drafted the Charter. As a result, the provisions of the Charterpertaining to the maintenance of international peace and security werenecessarily interpreted and applied in ways which cannot originally havebeen anticipated.1 The point is one which could usefully be considered byinternational lawyers of a 'black letter' tradition and others who

Justin Morris, Lecturer in International Politics, University of Hull; and Hilaire McCoubrey,Professor of Law, University of Hull.

International Peacekeeping, Vol.6, No.2, Summer 1999, pp.129-151PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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130 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

dangerously misrepresent the UN Charter as a fixed and inflexible text. It isnot the equivalent of a municipal statute2 but a living and flexible instrumentto be applied in structures of international relations which are subject tounpredictable and radical change. The succession of arguable peace supportparadigms since 1945, including that which is possibly being generated bythe end of the Cold War, clearly affirm this proposition. The present phaseof UN development represents a venture into uncharted waters, the outcomeof which will determine the future shape and efficacy of the UN well intothe next millennium.

This process began with the end of the Cold War ideological blockagesin the UN Security Council which led initially to expectations of increasedUN activism in peace support operations. However, the experiences, interalia, of former-Yugoslavia and Somalia demonstrated that the increaseddemands placed upon the UN seriously over-stretched its capacities. In thelight of these experiences, especially under the Boutros Boutros-GhaliSecretary-Generalship, the option of delegation of peace support operationsto regional organizations and defensive alliances was thought to offer apotential solution.3 However, the diversity, and in some cases the absence,of such organizations together with serious problems of mandating andcommand and control have demonstrated that this is not a simple or unitarysolution.4 As a result, under Kofi Annan, there has been a realization that amore pragmatic and ad hoc approach to each problem of regional peacesupport will necessarily have to be adopted. The purpose of this article is toanalyse both the present and potential roles of the UN and regionalorganizations in peace support with a view to assessing the shape which anydeveloping post-Cold War paradigm might take.

The Evolving Concept of Collective Security

Collective security is essentially a concept of the twentieth century,although it has much older roots.5 The concept is one which seeks to securethe prevailing status quo through the prohibition of acts of aggression and,at least in theory, is general in the sense that it is directed against any andevery state which chooses to commit such an act. In this sense collectivesecurity can be distinguished from collective defence which is specificallydirected against an identified potential adversary.6 The process ofdevelopment from which the concept of collective security emerged may bepresented as the operation of a form of 'catastrophe theory'. It also to someextent emerged as an aspirational alternative to collective defencearrangements which came to be seen, in the aftermath of the First WorldWar, as part of the problem of international conflict rather than a solutionthereto. In the face of new war crises - from the Thirty Years War to the

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REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 131

Second World War - successive modes of averting or constraining armedconflict threatening ultimate destabilization of the international or regionalcommunity failed and so new regimes emerged, supposedly bettercalculated to this end. The present phase of development following the endof the Cold War is admittedly different in degree, no threatening globalcrisis has yet emerged and the basic international institutions remain stable.Nonetheless major changes in the defence and security fields have beencalled forth by a radically new situation and, in these terms, at least a minor'catastrophe' of change may be argued to have occurred.7 In this sense achange of paradigms is arguably in progress which requires analysis interms of the future patterns and forms of collective security and defence.The UN has had to adapt its approach to peace support action in light ofchanges in the nature of conflict and in so doing raise serious questionsabout its future pattern and conduct. As Boutros Boutros-Ghali remarks:

It is indisputable that since the end of the Cold War there has been adramatic increase in the United Nations activities related to themaintenance of peace and security... [Furthermore] there have beenqualitative changes even more significant than the quantitative ones.One is the fact that so many of today's conflicts are within Statesrather than between States...there has been a rash of wars... often of areligious or ethnic character and often involving unusual violence andcruelty.8

It is invariably to the UN that governments and the public turn in theirsearch for a response to such conflicts. In assessing the future role of the UNhowever, one must not lose sight of the fact that the present and the futureare rooted in the past and a historical overview is thus a prerequisite for thepresent discussion.

No concept of either collective security or collective defence strictosensu existed in the medieval world, subject to whatever interpretationmight be put upon the doctrine of the two swords affirmed by PopeGelasius I,9 or during the early modern era, dated to the 1648 Peace ofWestphalia. The Grotian concepts upon which this era of internationalrelations and law was founded, reflected a prevailing seventeenth century'social contractarian' ideology in which war was treated essentially as aself-help remedy of last resort for cases of gross legal wrongs.10 It was notuntil the breakdown of the 'Grotian' system in the face of the FrenchRevolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and the crisis of 1914^5 thatrecognizable concepts of collective security emerged in Europeaninternational relations.

The Concert of Europe which followed the post-Napoleonic Congress ofVienna, can be argued to have represented in its early consultative

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arrangements at least the basic elements of collective security. Sadly, theConcert of Europe did not develop far along this route because, under theinfluence of Metternich, it became to a large degree an instrument ofpolitical reaction. British and French opposition to this redefinition of theConcert's role, and in particular British threats at the 1822 Congress ofVerona to use naval force against other Concert members, signalled adegeneration of the Concert system to little more than a balance of powermechanism. The increasing emphasis of the Concert upon the maintenanceof a political principle of 'legitimist' autocracy involved what might, withan imposition of modern terminology, be termed a broadening of its conceptof security, moving from inter-state to intra-state concerns. Modernattempts to expand the notion of security may be suggested to parallel thesedevelopments, albeit in an opposite ideological direction, and within thisprocess there may lie similar dangers. The broadening of security concernswithin the UN into areas of human rights and political rights, of whichpointed examples may be seen in Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti may raiseparticularly pointed questions in this regard.

The modern concept of collective security was embodied more clearlyin the League of Nations Covenant. The League resulted from anintellectual and political rejection of balance of power politics and was anattempt to mitigate the conditions and consequences of internationalanarchy, viewed as the fundamental cause of World War I, through theworkings of a more highly institutionalized international framework. Theoutbreak of global conflict in 1939, perceived to be the ultimate failure ofthe League, is commonly represented as indicative of inherent failings in theLeague system and more fundamentally as demonstrating the bankruptcy ofcollective security itself. In fact the structures set out in Articles 10-16 ofthe League Covenant were by no means necessarily ineffective. The onesignificant peace support operation undertaken by the League, the policingof the Saarland Plebiscite of January 1935, was entirely successful. Theproblem seems rather to have been a failure on the part of the League'smembers to accept the responsibilities and burdens which the Covenantplaced upon them and a lack of will on the part of the leading democraticpowers in the face of totalitarian aggression in the 1930s. The resultantcritique of both the League of Nations and the concept of collective securityled to the generation of a now dominant discourse in international relationstheory in which the former is viewed as evidence of the fact that the latteris ex hypothesi a 'weak' strategic concept upon which reliance, in a UN orany other context, may be dangerous.

However one interprets the history of the League, the concept ofcollective security, of which it was the first overt manifestation, lives on inthe form of the United Nations. Yet despite common theoretical

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foundations, the founding fathers of the United Nations endowed theorganization with far more robust enforcement provision than those of itspredecessor. The ability to decide upon the imposition of binding economicand military sanctions, in conjunction with a clear demarcation of powersvesting 'primary responsibility' for international peace and security in thehands of a 15 (originally 11) member Security Council, provided the UNwith the genuine potential to mount coercive operations against a memberstate which challenged the prevailing status quo which the organization wascreated to protect.

The debates on security structures at the time of the creation of the UNsystem turned to some degree upon rival concepts of globalism andregionalism. Many of the state actors favoured a regionalist approach inwhich local great powers would assume responsibility for the maintenanceof peace and security in their respective areas. This view was closelyassociated with Winston Churchill, who remarked that: 'There should beseveral regional councils, august but subordinate, [and] that these shouldform the massive pillars upon which the world organization would befounded in majesty and calm."1 While this argument may have owed moreto Churchill's desire to perpetuate the British imperium in another guise,smaller states were concerned also about preserving regional identities. Thislatter aspect played a significant role in the concerns expressed by the SouthAmerican states at San Francisco which led to the reservation of an inherentright of individual and collective self-defence under Article 51 of the UNCharter. However, there were also real fears that the regionalization ofcollective security imported a danger of regional hegemonism, a fear whichhas contemporary salience. Ultimately a compromise was reached at SanFrancisco in which the structure adopted was fundamentally globalist,whilst making some concessions to regionalism, not least in Article 51 itselfand in the provision of Chapter VIII of the Charter.

Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement under the UN Charter

The UN security apparatus centres around the Security Council, conceivedas a body small enough to be capable of a rapid and effective response incrisis situations and, through its permanent members, guaranteeing thebacking of the great powers. Having delegated responsibility in the field ofpeace and security to the Security Council, the UN membership agree,under Article 25, to abide by its decisions. The principal provision for themaintenance of peace and security is set out in Chapter VII of the Charter,specifically in Articles 3 9 ^ 2 . Having determined under Article 39 that athreat to peace and security exists, the Security Council may, under Article40, impose 'provisional measures' for the containment of a threatening

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situation, before, if necessary, proceeding to the imposition of sanctions.Article 41 makes provision for measures not involving armed force, inpractice primarily economic sanctions, while measures involving force maybe authorized under Article 42 in cases where the Security Councildetermines that Article 41 measures 'would be inadequate or have provedto be inadequate'.

In practice this system, with the possible exception of the intervention inKorea, has never worked as intended. The Cold War ideological blockagesin the Security Council made use of Article 42 so sensitive that it has veryrarely been directly referred to, the normal practice being to refer to'measures under Chapter VIF while carefully avoiding reference to specificarticles. Beyond such legalistic niceties the provision under Article 43 forthe maintenance of forces on stand-by for UN service has, for much thesame reasons of political suspicion, remained largely inoperative, leavingthe UN military Staff Committee set up under Article 47 in the unfortunatesituation of a general staff without an army to command.

Thus the impact of the Cold War involved a basic change of peacesupport paradigm from that apparently intended in 1945. This had importantpractical consequences, among which was the much enhanced emphasisplaced upon Article 51, preserving the 'inherent' right of individual andcollective self defence in the event of an armed attack. Originally intendedas a short term emergency response to invasion, the article became in factthe principal mechanism in preparation for and in reaction to breaches of thepeace and as such it functioned as the basic underpinning for the missionconcept of organizations such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Sadly, Article51 was inadequately conceived and drafted for this expanded, albeitunanticipated, role.12

Regional organizations were conceded a role in the maintenance ofpeace and security in the UN system from the outset, both in terms of thecollective security and collective defence. In preserving the legitimacy ofcollective defence, Article 51 admitted the role of defensive alliances,although, affirming the fundamentally globalist approach of the intendedUN system, their role was to be subordinate to that of the UN SecurityCouncil and their right to take action ceased once the Council had takensteps to restore international peace and security. This hierarchicalrelationship is also clearly evident in the collective security provisions ofthe Charter; Article 53(1) gives clear authority to the Security Council todelegate enforcement action to regional organizations, but no enforcementaction may be taken by regional organizations in the absence of the priorauthorization of the Security Council. In reality, however, this model wasnever realized, the Cold War inducing veto paralysis in the Security Counciland to some degree a reversion to balance of power politics. Within this

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balancing mechanism regional organizations, such as NATO and theWarsaw Pact, represented the competing ideological blocs and used the self-defence provision of the UN system to legitimate their self-defined agendas.

Forced to operate in an adversarial environment not anticipated by itsfounders and unable to perform the collective security role for which it hadbeen established, the UN was obliged to modify the operation of its peacesupport function. With the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII inpractice unavailable, the UN developed a concept of peacekeeping notspecifically provided for in the Charter. Based upon the principles ofconsent, non-coercion and minimal use of force to be exercised only in self-defence, this concept was significantly more limited than the intended scopeof the Chapter VII provision.13 Moreover, while it was originally intendedthat peace enforcement actions would be undertaken with the full supportand participation of the five permanent members, peacekeeping did not, asa rule, involve direct military contributions by these states. Within thiscontext those regional organizations identified as representatives of theopposing ideological blocs were effectively precluded from participating inUN peacekeeping operations. However, those regional organizations lessclosely identified with the Cold War dynamic still played a limited role. TheOrganization of American States (OAS) conducted a small number ofpeacekeeping operations, though the organization operated under theshadow of the United States and all OAS operations in the Cold War era andeven beyond must be viewed accordingly. Institutions such as theOrganization of African Unity (OAU) were to a large degree paralysed byproblems of infrastructure, coordination and the inherent political natureand tensions of the member states - themselves often a consequence of theCold War manipulation, whilst in South East Asia the Association of SouthEast Asian Nations (ASEAN) followed a different path of developmentfrom any of these organizations.

The United Nations Between Paradigms

The end of the Cold War can be argued to have represented a change in thestructure of twentieth century international relations at least as significant asthose which took place as a consequence of the First World War and thepost-1945 Cold War. In the immediate context of peace support action theassumptions and experiences which underlay the first half century of theUN era were to a very large degree undermined and overthrown. This hasmeant that the UN organization and many, if not all, of the regionalorganizations and defensive alliances have been forced radically to rethinktheir positions and in some cases effectively to reinvent themselves. Thisprocess has, by its nature, demanded significant changes both in the

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concepts of peace support action and in the means by which such action isto be undertaken. For the UN these changes have necessitated a majorreview of peacekeeping practice. The efficacy of traditional criteria ofconsent and minimal use of force has been called into question by thechanging patterns of conflict alluded to by Boutros-Ghali in Supplement toAgenda for Peace. The experience of the 1990s has demonstrated a need formore robust and less consensual approaches in many volatile situations. Ata lower level of force, operations mandated under Chapter VII but affordedinappropriate or inadequate rules of engagement and resources demonstratethe Security Council's difficulties in adapting to the exigencies of the newglobal and regional situation. Boutros-Ghali remarks pertinently that:

Nothing is more dangerous for a peacekeeping operation than to askit to use force when its existing composition [and militaryresources]...deny it the capacity to do so. The logic of peacekeepingflows from political and military premises that are quite distinct fromthose of enforcement....To blur the distinction between the two canundermine the viability of the peacekeeping operation and endangerits personnel....Peacekeeping and the use of force... should be seen asalternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum,permitting easy transition from one to another.14

The present era is thus one of experimentation as a new and more complexparadigm progressively emerges.

At the beginning of this period of transition there were optimisticanticipations of the peace support capacity of the UN itself, but these provedrapidly to have been grossly unrealistic. The early success of action by theUN sanctioned coalition in the 1990-91 Gulf conflict raised what proved tobe exaggerated expectations, but later and more problematic actions,including those of UNPROFOR in former-Yugoslavia and UNOSOM inSomalia, led to a perception of UN 'failure', although this may be seen as aconsequence of original undue expectations both within and beyond theUN. The search for alternative and effective modes of operation forms alarge part of post-Cold War reorientation of peace support policy andpractice.

Among the possible approaches a much increased reliance upon regionalorganizations and defensive alliances has been emphasized in thecontinuing debate.15 There has, however, been found an inevitable problemin the vast diversity of structure and capacity among such organizations. Tothis extent the experience of the transition from UNPROFOR to the NATO-led IFOR/SFOR forces in former-Yugoslavia may be considered to havebeen unfortunate. While the NATO-led forces had considerable success -even if it may be questioned whether they were put in at the right time in

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the conflict - in terms of its operational experience, infrastructure andcommand and control practice, NATO is in many ways atypical of regionalorganizations (indeed strictly speaking it does not consider itself to be aregional organization but rather a defence alliance). Moreover NATO isunique in that the great preponderance of its present member states arestable, representative democracies with clear subordination of military tocivilian direction.16 In this regard not all organizations, or their leadingmember states, are politically or strategically acceptable to other states,even in their defined area of operation - again raising questions of regionalhegemonism which were debated at the outset of the UN era. Any attemptto extrapolate lessons from the case of former-Yugoslavia, or to apply theexperiences there to other situations involving other regional actors, musttherefore take account of so many variable factors that the value of theexample as a general model must be extremely doubtful.

The impact of the end of the Cold War has, naturally, had its most directimpact in terms of regional organizations and alliances in the European andAtlantic sectors, but it has also forced major reorientations in a much widerspectrum. This is, for example, true in sub-Saharan Africa where the futurerole of the OAU and the developing potential of the South AfricanDevelopment Community (SADC) are major current issues. This is also thecase for the OAS, not least as the waning of the perceived communist threathas engendered highly significant debate upon a broadening of the conceptof security to include, inter alia, the protection of democratic regimes fromviolent displacement. Elsewhere other factors are forcing a redefinition ofregional security concepts and practice. In South East Asia ASEAN hasdeveloped a security agenda which embraces much broader regionaleconomic and political issues. The 'ASEAN way' is emphasized in thesecurity field by the institution of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) andthe associated endeavours to deal with the sensitive issues of the futureregional roles of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Japan. In someareas, including that of the tense confrontation between India and Pakistan,and in the Middle East,17 there are no regional organizations capable of apeace support role. These many variable factors preclude any simple orsingular solution to the dilemma of the UN in post-Cold War peace supportaction. It is therefore necessary that any assessment deals with the regionsand their potential in terms of the local conditions and institutionalinfrastructures prevailing in each instance.

Regional Perspectives and Capacities

Regional security organization in the Western European and Atlantic sectorhas, as indicated above, developed in many ways atypically, but is still taken

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to some degree as a paradigmatic example of the forms of regional security.Devised as a collective defence organization and intended primarily to faceup to the perceived threat posed by the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies,NATO military action is fundamentally predicated upon Article 5 of theNorth Atlantic Treaty. Resting upon the inherent right of self-defencepreserved in the UN Charter, this provides for collective defence among themember states if an attack occurs upon any of them within the geographiclimits of Europe or North America as defined in Article 6 of the treaty.

Whilst the threat which the organization was originally created tocounter has largely disappeared, the Article 5 commitment remains its basicraison d'etre, though the geographic parameters imposed by Article 6 inrelation to the collective defence commitment, while remaining in force, arelikely to be liberally interpreted. Nonetheless, Article 6 does serve tocomplicate NATO endeavours to redefine its role through the potentialaddition of non-Article 5 operations. Since 1990 NATO has been engagedin a major review of its role and future, expected to culminate in the 1999Washington Conference. Out-of-area peace support operations notinvolving a direct attack upon NATO territory are seen as part of theorganization's future role, deriving at least in part from the experience ofIFOR and SFOR in former-Yugoslavia. This case demonstrates NATO'swillingness to expand its operational remit beyond that laid out in the treaty,action being undertaken even though the threat to the areas of definedNATO concern must be considered somewhat remote. The North AtlanticTreaty is, to a degree, like the UN Charter, a living document requiringsome flexibility of interpretation if it is to remain functional in radicallychanging circumstances.

Among the concerns arising from the Yugoslav experience is animperative need for clear directional mandates, including effective exitstrategies, and an avoidance of the type of UN micro-regulation which wasa major weakness of the former UNPROFOR force. A dual key system ofcommand and control would be considered militarily unacceptable,although if this was demanded by the political leadership it would have tobe tolerated. It is also argued that minimization of 'mission creep' whichmight embroil NATO forces in activities for which they are ill-suited andlittle trained will be a vital continuing policy concern. Experience alsosuggests that mandating is likely to prove a contentious issue. NATO, incommon with any other organization contemplating such action, technicallyrequires a UN, or possibly an OSCE, mandate if it wishes to undertake non-consensual, non-Article 5 operations.18 In practice however, there seems tobe some divergence of views within NATO as to whether action without amandate could ever be taken. Some member states, notably the UnitedStates, are of the view that given sufficiently compelling strategic and

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political imperatives, action in the absence of such a mandate would beacceptable.19 This position is at variance with that of France, while theUnited Kingdom leans toward the American view, though with somereservations. It is not possible, given these divergent positions among theleading member states, to develop an overarching framework within whichto assess the likelihood of future NATO peace support operations in theabsence of a UN mandate. Similarly the issue of consent may have to bedealt with on a case-by-case basis, depending upon political and strategicdynamics and the nature and military power of the de jure government andof the other actors in the crisis.

In parallel with the rethinking of the role of NATO, the WesternEuropean Union (WEU) has not so much been involved in a process ofreinvention as in one of reincarnation. The winding down of the Cold Warand an increasing sense in US domestic politics that Europe should to agreater degree shoulder its own defence, coupled with an increasingcorporate consciousness within the EU, led to a revival of the WEU in the1980s, notably at the 1984 Rome Conference. The broad intention was setout in a 1987 policy document, Platform on European Security, which isviewed by the UK as offering 'a means of strengthening the European pillarof the [NATO] Alliance and of giving concrete form to Europe's securityand defence'.20 Others have perceived a role for the WEU which is at onceboth more ambitious and more amorphous, including a potential, in effect,to be the security arm of the EU. It is clear that the WEU would prefer tomaintain an existence separate from the EU, but in any event the keyquestion for its future is that of capability.

The potential remit of the organization is, rather ambitiously, set out bythe 1992 Petersburg Declaration. This excludes self-defence, which is seenas NATO's core remit, but includes peacekeeping, humanitarian and rescuemissions and crisis management. NATO for its part does not seehumanitarian and rescue missions as forming part of its tasks but might bewilling to share assets and infrastructure if the WEU became involved insuch an operation. The WEU Council has designated Southeast Europe, theMediterranean basin and Africa as areas of special interest. The ratherstartling inclusion of the latter apparently arose in response to concerns overFrancophone Africa and specifically the Great Lakes crisis. Even assumingthe availability of suitable military assets, however, it must seriously bedoubted whether European forces could have a large role in sub-Saharanpeace support, granted the historical 'baggage' of colonialism and themodern emphasis upon Africanization of such operations. In this respect theexperience of the Great Lakes is far from encouraging. The ultimate role ofthe WEU remains to be seen, but its potential as a major peace support actoris considered with marked scepticism outside of the organization. It is

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difficult to avoid the thought that much of the impetus for revived interestin the WEU derives from French anti-Atlanticist policy in Europeandefence, but the WEU may ultimately find a role between NATO and EU inpeace support, although hardly upon the scale suggested by the Petersbergprinciples.

During the years of the Cold War the Soviet Union played a very limitedrole in peacekeeping operations.21 The demise of the USSR brought with it,at least temporarily, a major change in attitude toward peacekeeping on thepart of is 'successor' state, the Russian Federation. In an initial burst ofenthusiasm for UN peacekeeping, part of a radical reorientation of foreignpolicy based on more liberal-internationalist ideals and geared in no smallpart toward attracting foreign investment, Moscow undertook eight newpeacekeeping missions between 1992 and 1997. As part of its newapproach, Russia, for the first time, dispatched troops to participate inpeacekeeping operations in Croatia and Angola. Throughout 1996 and forthe majority of 1997 Russia ranked as the third largest contributor to UNpeacekeeping operations and in addition is a principal participant in the UN-mandated IFOR/SFOR mission in Bosnia. However, Russia has notmaintained this level of participation and since the Spring of 1998 hasdramatically reduced its peacekeeping forces by 80 percent. Russia nowranks a relatively lowly sixteenth among contributors to UN peacekeepingoperations and, with the exception of its continued participation in SFOR,shows signs of reverting to a Soviet-style, limited participation, observeronly, UN peacekeeping stance.

However, participation in UN or UN sanctioned operations representsonly one aspect of Russia's peacekeeping efforts. Moscow has also beenactive in unilateral and multilateral actions, often under the ostensible guiseof the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In fact, for everyRussian soldier deployed on UN or UN sanctioned peacekeeping missionsoutside of the CIS, between three and five have been deployed within theregion. Problematically, while Russian activities in UN or UN sanctionedoperations have met with a generally positive response, those undertakenoutside of these parameters, often with the absence of effective internationalscrutiny and control, may present cause for greater concern. Thedeployment of troops prior to the establishment of ceasefires, the partialmanner in which they have often been seen to act and their willingness toresort to force in excess of that usually deemed appropriate forpeacekeeping purposes has led many to conclude that Russia is far from theideal candidate as a regional peacekeeper. Indeed it often appears thatMoscow is far from disinclined to destabilize neighbouring states in orderto create a pretext for further military involvement. Fellow CIS memberstates are incapable of facing up to such policies and the OSCE and the UN

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may find the task little easier. If the UN chooses to engage more closelywith Russian peacekeeping initiatives, it runs the risk of appearing tolegitimize Moscow's regional ambitions, much as it was seen to do inAbkhazia. Yet if the UN adopts a more distant stance, this may similarly beperceived by Moscow as amounting to a green light to intervene.22

Fears of regional hegemonism have also predominated in the OAS.During the period of the Cold War US fears of communist encroachmentinto the western hemisphere led to a distortion of OAS security conceptsand in many cases the installation or support of highly repressive non-democratic regimes. The hemisphere's highly institutionalized collectivesecurity apparatus came to serve as a means of legimitizing Washington'sregional foreign policy objectives to the exclusion of other concerns.However, the end of the Cold War has led to a major revision of theperceptions and objectives of the OAS, coinciding with, and indeedstrengthening, the democratization of Southern and later Central America.No longer preoccupied with the perceived communist threat, theorganization has turned to a broadened concept of security. This does notexclude traditional inter-state security concerns, at least in part because, asmilitaries cease looking inward, they might potentially begin to look acrossfrontiers. However, issues such as human rights, democratization andeconomic and social development are now high on the OAS agenda. Inparticular the maintenance of norms of democratic governance has come tobe seen as part of the security agenda, as has a realization that democracy isreliant upon a socio-economic base across the region in which all sectors ofsociety can see real benefit.23

Despite the dramatic changes which the western hemisphere haswitnessed in the last decade, national and institutional historical experiencecontinues to colour the manner in which the OAS and its member statesview their future role. Thus, as regards peace support action, the OAS seesitself as having a persuasive rather than an enforcing or coercive role. Theexperience of action in Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and morerecently in Grenada, Panama and Haiti has tended to dissuade theorganization from involvement in military intervention. Despite this, theorganization has developed a mechanism designed to further developdemocratic ideals and to deal with threats to democracy should they arise.The basis of this mechanism is laid down in OAS General AssemblyResolution 1080 and the OAS membership most recently reiterated itscommitment to this cause at the Second Summit of the Americas held inSantiago in April 1998. However an extreme reluctance to resort to the useof force is likely to prevail, though in the most extreme circumstances theOAS might be willing to refer the violent overthrow of a democraticgovernment to the UN Security Council. Perhaps inevitably given the

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regional historical context, the organization emphasizes peacebuildingrather than peace enforcement and effective military/civilian liaison inconfidence building measures. It has developed some considerableexperience in this area, most notably during the seven year support andverification mission in Nicaragua which ended in June 1997. The future ofpeace support in the region would seem therefore to involve a central rolein peace and confidence building by the OAS but in the end a reliance uponthe UN for more robust action. Recent OAS thinking also recognizes thatthe capacities of both the UN and the OAS itself are limited and that anenhanced role for sub-regional organizations may also become necessary inhemispheric peace support.24 It must however be said that here, more thananywhere else, any action, by the UN or the OAS, would still rest upon atleast the acquiescence of the United States as the inevitably dominanthemispheric power.

Peace support operations in Africa have been fraught with difficulty, inpart because of the colonial legacy and the varieties of historical 'baggage'which this imports, but also because of external Cold War-relatedmanipulation which contributed markedly to political instability in theregion. This unhappy background has engendered a general consensuswithin and outwith Africa that the best way forward may be an Africansolution to African problems in which a combination of action by regionalorganizations and coalitions of willing African states may be mostefficacious. Establishing how and by whom such 'African' solutions are tobe implemented is, however, highly problematic. A starting point must befound in the OAU, the Charter of which includes among the organization'spurposes by Article 2(1 )(c) the defence of sovereignty, territorial integrityand independence and to these ends requires by Article 2(2)(f) that memberstates engage in cooperation for defence and security.25 In 1993 the OAUestablished a 'Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management andResolution' intended to provide the organization with the capacity to act toprevent and manage conflicts of both an inter- and an intra-state nature. TheOAU expressed further willingness to undertake peace support operations atthe 1997 Chiefs of Staff meeting in Harare, whilst confirming that any suchoperations would have to be in accordance with the UN Charter. Non-consensual operations would require a UN mandate and for this purposemechanisms for consultation have been established between the OAU andthe UN Security Council.

The operational capacity of the OAU is, however, open to some debate,past OAU peace support operations sending out rather mixed messages. TheInter-African Force (IAF) sent into Chad at the end of 1981 suffered from afailure by many states to supply promised contingents, defective missiondefinition and exit strategy and problems of command and control. The

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force was withdrawn after only six months and must be considered to havebeen a failure, though valuable lessons may have been learnt.26 The OAUundoubtedly has operationally capable forces at its disposal and theorganization is exploring cooperation with external actors such as NATOand the WEU in training and infrastructural development. Such support isrendered the more necessary by the large financial deficit carried by theorganization, but requires politically sensitive handling. There are lessons tobe learnt from the US sponsored concept of an African Crisis ManagementForce which has become effectively moribund largely through failure toconsult within Africa. The more recent African Security Studies Instituteinitiative, also supported by the United States, is thought to have a betterchance of success because African powers have been involved from theoutset.

Sub-regional organizations are also of great importance in sub-SaharanAfrica, albeit, again, of variable potential and impact. The ECOWASceasefire monitoring group ECOMOG, sent into Liberia in 1990, provedproblematic from the outset.27 There were again problems of missiondefinition and of command and control and also serious problems arisingfrom the conduct of elements of the forces on the ground, especially thelarge Nigerian contingent, which rapidly gained an unenviable reputation intheir areas of operation. This again raises the problem of the dangers ofregional hegemonism. In any regional or sub-regional approach it has to beborne in mind that major regional actors may in some cases not be thesolution to the problem but may themselves be a large part of the problem!Other sub-regional actors of potential significance include SADC, agrouping of southern African states of which South Africa itself is thelargest and most militarily capable, but which also includes such significantactors as Zimbabwe and Ghana. The organization evidently has genuinemilitary capability, but much will turn upon the attitude adopted by SouthAfrica.28 The massive tasks of post-apartheid reconstruction, including thesensitive task of restructuring the defence forces, seems likely to disinclinethe country from engagement in external crisis management for some timeto come. When and if SADC does move into a regional peace support role,however, it may be an actor of very considerable potential, with thebeneficial effect also of balancing the military strength of Nigeria in Africansecurity calculations.

It is improbable that there is any single African solution to Africa'ssecurity problems. It does seem probable, however, that the OAU will beactive at least in peace and confidence building measures and possibly inmore forceful action, although here in particular it seems likely that UN andother external support will continue to be called for. The great questionmark for sub-Saharan African and the continent more generally concerns

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the role of SADC and this, as so much else, turns essentially upon theultimate development of South Africa. At the time of writing thisnecessarily remains uncertain, although the experience of the intervention inLesotho in 1998 counsels some degree of caution in the expectations whichmay be entertained.

The consideration of collective security and regional peace supportcapacities in South East Asia has been to some degree distorted by westernpresumptions about collective security and international relations which arealien to the political and cultural traditions of the region. The dangers ofsuch a 'parachuting' of concepts into a South East Asian context areoutlined by Nicola Baker and Leonard C. Sebastian in their comment that,

We...run the risk of proposing or creating security structures,agreements and processes which are irrelevant to the concerns ofstates in the Asia/pacific region or, worse still, threaten to underminetheir security.29

In post-colonial South East Asia ideas of security are at least as much boundup with questions of internal stabilization and economic development as withfears of external threat. This stems in significant degree from the troubled pastof the region which itself derives in part from the imposition of a 'European'concept of statehood with significant resulting political distortions and socialtensions. Defensive alliances tend to be perceived as exclusive andthreatening rather than inclusive and protective and also as contrary to theurge towards consensualism which is a significant imperative of regionalrelations. This is not, however, to say that there is a lack of collective securityconsciousness and relevant regional organizations or that the dynamics of theCold War and its ending left the region untouched.30

The principal regional organization is ASEAN, established in 1967,though it is not strictly a regional security organization, still less a militaryalliance. ASEAN has been concerned to promote confidence and intra-mural amity between its members, notwithstanding the many tensionswhich exist between them, and to minimize intervention in their internalaffairs. J.N. Mak remarks that:

ASEAN should be seen as an attempt at managing inter-state tensionsso that each member could concentrate on domestic consolidation andeconomic development The 'ASEAN way' of conflictmanagement and security is unstructured, informal and based onconsensus.31

Despite the continuing commitment to 'preventive diplomacy' as anintegral part of the 'ASEAN way' the 1990s have brought about a shift inregional security thinking.

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As Hugo Dobson argues, in the following article of this issue, theestablishment, in July 1993, of the ARF was a major indicator of thischange. The ARF involves the overwhelming majority of the regionalpowers, apart from North Korea and Taiwan, as well as India and theEuropean Union. The central element of the ARF is constituted by theASEAN Powers but its credibility as an actor in the region is underpinnedby its acceptance by both the PRC and the United States, neither of whichwould have been happy to see a South East Asian security forum dominatedby the other. The ARF may play a highly significant role in regionalconfidence building and conflict avoidance, if, however the region were toface a major military crisis it may be questioned whether it could in theshort or even medium term function as an effective mechanism of regionalcollective security.32 At present the practical mechanism of regional peacesupport action would almost certainly be a coalition of the willing on a case-by-case basis.

The Middle East and Islamic North Africa possess, at both the regionaland the UN level, particularly acute problems in terms of peacekeeping.33

Among more radically Islamic regimes such as those in Iran and Sudan, thequestion of Western dominance of the UN dictates a cautious approachtoward the organization's activities. Similar fears also have a part to play inthe policies of those more pro-Western states facing radical Islamicdomestic opposition. UN detractors advocating such a stance base theircriticisms upon issues of Western bias and domination rather than uponmore fundamental opposition to the UN itself. Thus more traditional UNpeacekeeping based upon the consent of the parties to the conflict remainsa feasible option in situations where conflict arises. However, more robustforms of peace support operation, especially where connotations ofenforcement action exist, are likely to remain taboo. The UN's response tothe Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is instructive in so far as the tensions createdwithin the Arab world were in large part a response to what was perceivedas a Western led military intervention in a situation which would have beenbetter handled within a regional forum.

Whatever the wisdom of such a regionalist approach, it is clear thatorganizations such as the Arab League and the Organization of the IslamicConference are particularly ill suited to dealing with the most protractedproblem in modern day Middle Eastern affairs, namely the relationshipbetween the Arab states and Israel. While regional organizations are oftenseen as appropriate fora for conflict resolution because of the motivation toact demonstrated by the membership, in the case of the Middle East thisclearly does not represent a viable option.

Sub-continental South Asia poses different, but no less acute problemsin terms of regional and UN peacekeeping. Traditionally staunch supporters

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of UN peacekeeping operations, India, and to a lesser extent Pakistan, haverecently seen their relationship with the UN and crucial members thereindeteriorate. In the case of India in particular this can for the most part beexplained by a reassessment of foreign policy belying a more nationalisticand assertive view of the world. As Alan Bullion explains, the 'altruistic andsolidaristic objectives have been superseded by India's wider globalambition for recognition and influence on the world stage'.34 This hasinevitably exacerbated existing tensions between India and Pakistan, thedecision by both to test their nuclear weapons capabilities serving to furtheraccentuate the situation and introduce a potentially even more dangerouselement into sub-continental relations. Given the refusal of both states tosubmit to the will of the international community, or the terms of theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty, it is unlikely, at least in the immediateterm, that the UN will entrust either with a principal role in a peacekeepingmandate, particularly so given the state of relations between New Delhi andWashington. The absence of a regional institutional framework throughwhich peacekeeping operations could be undertaken exacerbates thisalready difficult situation.35 The only recent example of a 'regional'operation was that of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force which operated in SriLanka between 1987 and 1990 and which met with ignominious failure.36

Single state forces of this type are unusual and in most cases highlyundesirable.37 In any event, the Indian action in Sri Lanka cannot be seen asa useful precedent; the operation failed not only in its basic objectives, butalso in the extent to which it accorded with established norms ofpeacekeeping. Overall, within the context of the South Asian sub-continent,it must be said that in present circumstances the development of a capableregional organization seems exceedingly unlikely.

Towards a New Paradigm of Peace Support?

As the above analysis suggests, the international security environment ismuch changed since the end of the Cold War and internationalorganizations, both global and regional, have been forced to adapt in orderto address the new challenges which they must now face. Although thechanges have been less overtly dramatic than those which occurred in 1918and 1945, they are arguably no less significant in their actual and potentialimpact. Indeed the changes which are now occurring in global and regionalsecurity concepts and architecture can fairly be considered to represent aprocess of change of paradigm. Like any such period of transition, thepresent situation is ex hypothesi both uncertain and unstable and developingapproaches to the maintenance of international peace and security involvesa significant element of experimentation and ad hoc expediency which will

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not only continue into the next century but, subject to certain clearstabilizing norms, may well become a fundamental part of a new and moreflexible paradigm of peace support. The way forward may involve the moreextensive use of suitable regional and sub-regional organizations and,possibly, suitable NGOs with delegation of larger-scale enforcementmeasures where and if a suitable organization is available. The UN may wellremain directly involved in smaller-scale enforcement measures but it isprobable that a key role will be played by 'coalitions of the willing' asgrouping of regionally interested powers. The extent and form of thesechanges in practice will no doubt vary significantly, not only from region toregion, but from situation to situation within regions. The terminology offlexibility of response is, indeed, becoming commonplace in the discourse ofboth the UN itself and many of the regional organizations and alliances.Within this rapidly evolving context a variety of political and legal concernsarise which will require urgent and continuing address. These include theneed to maintain impartiality whilst securing efficacy and to retain ultimateUN oversight whilst affording clear mandates for action and efficientmechanisms of command and control. Fundamental imperatives, emphasizedby the experiences of former-Yugoslavia and Somalia, include the absolutenecessity for clear mission planning and objectives, especially exit strategiesfounded upon defined end states rather than end dates, and awareness of boththe positive and negative potential of so-called 'mission creep'.38

As remarked at the outset, the initial adoption of a more activist stanceon the part of the UN at the end of the Cold War had initial success in the1990-91 Gulf Conflict but was followed by disappointments of expectationin former-Yugoslavia and Somalia. These experiences are likely to shapeUN perceptions of the role the organization is capable of playing and henceit is likely to look toward regional organizations as primary actors in peacesupport. However, as the analysis set out above indicates, there is so great adegree of diversity in both the structure and capabilities of theseorganizations and in the nature of the states of which they are comprisedthat no simple or singular global pattern for future development canreasonably be proposed. This diversity of capability calls for an expansionof inter-organizational support and facilitation as well as experience-sharing. The latter is beginning to develop, for example, between NATO,the WEU and the OAU. The OAS is also beginning to consider such anagenda, for example between itself, the OSCE and OAU. A commitment bythe major powers is also essential if regional organizations which arecurrently incapable of carrying out major UN mandated peace supportoperations are to develop capacity to do so.

However, the utilization of more highly developed regional peacesupport capabilities must take place within the constitutional parameters

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laid down by the UN Charter with Chapters VII and VIII serving as thefoundations of peace support and inter-organizational cooperation. Thebroader membership of the United Nations must be secure in the confidencethat actions carried out on their behalf are not the result of regional power-plays in which the UN serves to do no more than legitimize regionalhegemonic ambitions. Similarly, the security agenda which the UN and theregional organizations with which it collaborates pursues, while beingsufficiently broad to account for the changing prerogatives of the post ColdWar world, must be based upon the politics of consensus rather thandictation.39 The lessons of the Concert of Europe should not go unheeded,for that, arguably the first attempt to replace a simple balance of powermechanism with one founded on the principles of collective security,foundered upon a commitment of some of the member states to the politicalprinciple of autocracy which could in modern terms be considered a'broadening of the concept of security'. Quite apart from the possiblydivisive effect of such broadening of agendas, the question of capacityarises. Regional organizations are not necessarily well resourced and theircapacity to take on ever expanding remits must be doubted. Suggestions ofsome form of international peace support contingency fund are not withouta prima facie attraction but in practice they simply restate the problem. Thesource of such funding is uncertain and there is no reason to imagine that itwould be any more forthcoming than that currently available to theorganizations. It may also be pointed out that the political suspicions whichundermined the concept of stand-by forces held in readiness for UN usemight well also be an obstacle to the setting up of any such contingencyfund.

Despite these caveats, a concept of security suited to the complexities ofthe twenty-first century necessitates an approach to peace support whichemphasizes the inter-related nature of military, economic and socialconcerns. Within this context organizations should look to be pro-activerather than reactive, but where a military solution is required, states andorganizations need to realize the continuing nature of peace supportcommitment. It is preferable to remain engaged for a prolonged period thanto be forced to return to resurgent and possibly exacerbated troubles in aformer area of operations. In short, effective peace and confidence buildingmeasures must be seen as part of a seamless spectrum of peace supportaction with any necessary military action seen as the last and least desirableresort. It is necessary not merely to terminate hostilities but also to attemptto resolve the causes of conflict.

It would be satisfying from an academic and possibly also a practicalpoint of view to advance some single theory to underpin peace supportaction in the post-Cold War era. Such an endeavour must, however, be

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suggested to be fundamentally misconceived. The diversity of the situationsand organizations which are likely to be involved is such that a much moreflexible approach involving a multiplicity of conceptual formulations willcertainly be necessary in any global, or even regional, appreciation of futurepatterns of peace support action and developing ideas of security. A holisticconcept of security in a new and more complex international relationsenvironment in fact precludes any simple or singular formula for futuredevelopment in this area. The flexible responses which have been, and willbe, demanded of regional organizations and defensive alliances in volatileand rapidly evolving situations mean that patterns of response into the nextcentury will, by their nature, develop pragmatically on a case-by-case basis.This does not, however, mean that patterns of future response and actionwill be devoid of a principled base and theoretical underpinning. Theessential imperatives which have here been suggested may at least beargued to define the limits within which the necessary flexibility of responsein the evolving global and regional security agenda must be framed. Out ofthis process of development, it may be suggested, there is likely to emergenot a single new unitary paradigm for the maintenance of internationalpeace and security but rather a paradigm involving a wide variety of modes,better suited to a diverse and volatile international relations context.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to thank the many officials and members of staff of the UK, US andCanadian governments, the International Peace Academy (New York), NATO, the Organizationof American States, the UN and the WEU who generously gave of their time in backgrounddiscussions. The authors confirm that the opinions expressed are in no way represented asauthorized statements and are presented here upon their sole responsibility.

NOTES

1. For a general discussion see S.R. Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping, New York: St. Martin'sPress, 1996, pp.1-81; R.C. Johansen, 'Enhancing United Nations Peace-Keeping', in C.F.Alger (ed.), The Future of the United Nations System: Potential for the Twenty-first Century,New York: United Nations University, 1998, pp.89-126; J. Chopra (ed.), The Politics ofPeace-Maintenance, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998; and J. Roper et al., Keeping the Peacein the Post-Cold War Era: Strengthening Multilateral Peacekeeping, New York: TheTrilateral Commission, 1993.

2. It may, however, be noted that even these may be subject to radical judicial reinterpretation!3. For an overview of Boutros-Ghali's views on the subject of peace support operations see An

Agenda for Peace, New York: United Nations, 1992 and Supplement to Agenda for Peace,New York: United Nations, 1995. See also D. Cox, 'Exploring An Agenda for Peace: IssuesArising from the Report of the Secretary-General', Aurora Papers, No.20, Canadian Centrefor Global Security.

4. For discussion of mandating and command and control see Boutros Boutros-Ghali,Supplement to Agenda for Peace, New York: United Nations, 1995, paras 38-42; also R.

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Connaughton, Military Intervention in the 1990s: A New Logic of War, London: Routledge,1993, pp.127-38.

5. See discussion in I. Clark, The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in theInternational Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp.93-208.

6. For discussion see A. Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics,Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962, pp.181-204; also I.L. Claude, Swords intoPlowshares, New York: McGraw Hill, 1984, pp.245-85; also C.A. Kupchan, 'Concerts,Collective Security and the Future of Europe', International Security, Vol.16, No.1, 1991.

7. This is not, of course, to suggest that the end of the Cold War is an unwelcome or regrettableoccurrence, but rather that it constitutes a 'catastrophe' in the sense that it constitutes a causeof discontinuous change.

8. Boutros Boutros-Ghali (see n.4 above), paras 8-10.9. See discussion in S.S. Ali, J. Bussutil, H. McCoubrey and S. Subedi, The Idea of Just War in

World Faiths, Hull: University of Hull Press, forthcoming, 1999.10. For discussion see H. Bull, D. Kingsbury and A. Roberts, Hugo Grotius and International

Relations, Oxford: OUP, 1990.11. W. Churchill, cited in I.L. Claude, Swords into Plowshares, New York: McGraw Hill, 4th

edition, 1984, p.113.12. See D.W. Greig, 'Self-Defence and the Security Council: What Does Article 51 Require?',

International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol.40, 1990, pp.370-72.13. For discussion see N.D. White, Keeping the Peace, Manchester: Manchester University

Press, 1997, pp.207-40. For an overview of Cold War peacekeeping operations see The BlueHelmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping, New York: United Nations, 1990.

14. Boutro-Ghali (n.4 above), paras 35-6.15. This has been referred to as 'burden-sharing'. See Eric Berman, 'The Security Council's

Increasing Reliance on Burden-Sharing: Collaboration or Abrogation?', InternationalPeacekeeping, Vol.5, No.l, spring 1998, pp.1-20.

16. The Western European Union can also make this claim, but in any event the membership ofthe two organizations largely overlap.

17. The Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Arab League by definition exclude Israeland are largely disabled in the primary source of regional conflict.

18. It should be noted, however, that the potential of the OSCE now appears very limited, itsmembership is too numerous, its procedures too cumbersome and its bureaucracy tooineffective for it to be able to play such a role.

19. See C.A. Stevenson, 'The Evolving Clinton Doctrine on the Use of Force', Armed Forcesand Society, Vol.22, No.4, 1996, pp.511-35. On US attitudes to peacekeeping see I.H.Daalder, 'Knowing When to Say No: The Development of US Policy for Peacekeeping', inW.J. Durch (ed.), UN Peacekeeping, American Politics and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s,Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997, pp.35-68.

20. Britain, NATO and European Security, London: HMSO, 1994, p.33.21. N.A. Kellett, Russian Peacekeeping Part III: Peacekeeping Operations Since 1991 (Revised

Version), Ottawa: Canadian Department of National Defence, 1998.22. T. McNeill, 'Humanitarian Intervention and Peacekeeping in the Former Soviet Union and

Eastern Europe', International Political Science Review, Vol.18, No.1, 1997, p.98.23. See J.I. Donfnguez, International Security and Democracy: Latin America and the

Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998; A.Hurrell, 'Latin America's New Security Agenda', International Affairs, Vol.74, No.3, 1998,pp.529-46.

24. Some of these ideas were considered at the OAS Unit for the Promotion of DemocracyConference on 'OAS Peace Building Experiences: Progress Achieved, Lessons Learned andFuture Possibilities' in Washington DC on 20 October 1998.

25. For an excellent analysis of the potential role of the OAU see Report of the Joint OAU/IPATask Force on Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in Africa, New York: IPA, 1998. For apersonal view see Mwalima Julius K. Nyerere, Africa Today and Tomorrow, London: Centrefor the Study of Global Governance, 1997.

26. See R. May and S. Massey, 'The OAU Interventions in Chad: Mission Impossible or Mission

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Evaded?', International Peacekeeping, Vol.5, No.1, 1997, pp.46-65.27. See F. Olonisakin, 'UN Co-operation with Regional Organizations in Peacekeeping: The

Experience of ECOMOG and UNOMIL in Liberia', International Peacekeeping, Vol.3,No.3, 1996, pp.33-51.

28. See P. Vale and S. Maseko, 'South Africa and the African Renaissance', InternationalAffairs, Vol.74, No.2, 1998, pp.271-88; K.A. O'Brien, 'Regional Security in SouthernAfrica: South Africa's National Perspective', International Peacekeeping, Vol.3, No.3, 1996,pp.52-76.

29. N. Baker and L.C. Sebastian, 'The Problem with Parachuting: Strategic Studies and Securityin the Asia/Pacific Region', in D. Ball (ed.), The Transformation of Security in theAsia/Pacific Region, London and Portland OR: Frank Cass, 1996, p.29.

30. See C. Mackerras, 'From Imperialism to the End of the Cold War', in A. McGrew and C.Brook, Asia-Pacific in the New World Order, London: Routledge, 1998, pp.44-5.

31. J.N. Mak, 'The Asia-Pacific Security Order', in A. McGrew and C. Brook, Asia-Pacific inthe New World Order, London: Routledge, 1998, p.88 at pp.113-4; D.K. Emmerson,'Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore: A Regional Security Core?', in R.J. Ellings and S.W.Simon (eds), South East Asian Security in the New Millennium, New York: M.E. Sharpe,1996, p.35 at p.75.

32. See Robyn Lim, 'The ASEAN Regional Forum: Building on Sand', Contemporary SoutheastAsia, Vol.20, No.2, 1998, pp.115-36.

33. See B. Lia, 'Islamic Perceptions of the United Nations and Its Peacekeeping Missions: SomePreliminary Findings', International Peacekeeping, Vol.5, No.2, 1998, pp.38-64.

34. Alan Bullion, 'India and UN Peacekeeping Operations', International Peacekeeping, Vol.4,No.l, 1997, p.99.

35. See A.N. Reed, 'Regionalization in South Asia: Theory and Praxis', Pacific Affairs, Vol.70,No.2, 1997, pp.235-51.

36. For a discussion of this case see A. Bullion, 'The Indian Peacekeeping Force in Sri Lanka',International Peacekeeping, Vol.1, No.2, 1994, pp.148-59.

37. Other 'single state' operations have included the UN mandate for UK action in relation to theUDI regime in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), but this was an all but unique case ofan imperial power being required to take measures for the termination of an illegitimatelyinterrupted process of decolonization which was seen as a threat to peace and security. SeeUN SC Resolution 217 of 20 November 1965, referring specifically to the Rhodesiansituation as a threat to international peace and security. For discussion of the Rhodesian casesee J. Morris, 'The United Nations: Collective Security and Individual Rights', in M. JaneDavis (ed.) Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996,pp.116-20.

38. See M. Pugh, From Mission Cringe to Mission Creep? Implications of New Peace SupportOperations Doctrine, Oslo: Institutt for Forsvarsstudier, 1997.

39. For an interesting discussion of this in the context of the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict see A.F.Cooper, R.A. Higgott and K.R. Nossal, 'Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership inthe Gulf Conflict', Political Science Quarterly, Vol.106, 1991-92, pp.391-410.

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Regional peacekeeping in the post‐cold war era

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Transcript of Regional peacekeeping in the post‐cold war era