Reform, Reorganization, and the Renaissance of the ...users.clas.ufl.edu/rconley/polp_016.pdf ·...

Politics amp Policy

Volume 34 No 2 (2006) 304-342 Published by Blackwell Publishing Inccopy The Policy Studies Organization All rights reserved

Reform Reorganization and the Renaissance of the Managerial Presidency The Impact of 911 on the

Executive Establishment

Richard S Conley

University of Florida

In the wake of 911 realigning the human and financial resources of theexecutive branch to fight the war on terrorism quickly became thedefining mission of George W Bushrsquos transformed presidency Thisarticle assesses the ways in which 911 impacted on the executive branchof the US government using a framework of ldquopunctuated equilibriumrdquoto posit that the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington addedconsiderable force to trends already in motion September 11 proved acatalyst for significant institutional changes such as the enhanced roleof the vice president in policy making and the reorganization of thefederal government and intelligence apparatus Organizational reformsdriven in a top-down fashion by the White House reflect President Bushrsquosconfidence in the managerial presidency the notion that preventingfuture terror threats is effectively a problem of executive controlbureaucratic coordination and adequate funding

O

n September 11 2001 the extensive death and destructionheretofore perpetrated by terrorists elsewhere finally reached theAmerican homeland On the evening of those atrocities in New Yorkand Washington President George W Bush (2001a) sought to reassurethe public and prepare the way for a war campaign unlike any other inUS history Two days later in a phone call to Mayor Rudolph Giulianiand Governor George Pataki of New York Bush reiterated his ldquosteadyand strongrdquo determination ldquoabout winning this war that has beendeclared on Americardquo ldquoItrsquos a new kind of war And I understand itrsquos anew kind of war And this Government will adjustrdquo (Bush 2001b)Realigning the human and financial resources of the executive branchto fight this war on terror quickly became the defining mission of Bushrsquostransformed presidency

In a time of war the presidency becomes the pivot point in theAmerican constitutional order Not surprisingly the unprecedentedscope of the terror attacks on New York and Washington and US

Blackwell Publishing LtdOxford UK and Malden USAPOLPPolitics amp Policy1555-56232006 by the Policy Studies Organization All rights reservedJune 2006342304342Original Articles

Impact of 911 on the Executive EstablishmentConley

Conley Impact of 911 on the Executive Establishment

305

intelligence sourcesrsquo failure to foresee and prevent the attacksfundamentally redirected Bushrsquos policy focus and decisions Bushrsquoswar on terror reoriented the work of the entire ldquopresidential branchrdquo(Hart 1987) comprising the White House the Executive Office of thePresident (EOP) and cabinet departments and prompted thepresident to take unilateral actions through executive and otherorders The role and policy-making influence of the vice president wassignificantly enhanced Dick Cheney has arguably become the mostprominent vice president in US history whether operating in thepublic spotlight or more frequently behind the scenes Organizationalchanges reverberated through the federal bureaucracy and for myriaddepartments budgetary priorities shifted to counterterrorismactivities The massive reorganization of agencies into the Departmentof Homeland Security (DHS) the internal reforms of the FederalBureau of Investigation (FBI) and the creation of the new post ofDirector of National Intelligence (DNI) were directly aimed atsolidifying and coordinating federal counterterrorism efforts andemergency response management Despite sporadic congressionalresistance or inertia the White House drove these changes and othersin a top-down fashion

Which paradigms offer insights to explain these post-911 dynamicssurrounding the presidency and executive branch This article positsldquopunctuated equilibriumrdquo as a useful theoretical lens through which toview how Americarsquos deadliest confrontation with terrorism impactedupon the executive branch Indeed the terrorist attacks addedconsiderable force to several trends already underway before Bushrsquospresidency While 911 bolstered the vice presidentrsquos influence innational security the policy-making role exercised by Cheneyrsquospredecessors had grown considerably in the last several decades therebyproviding a firm foundation for an even more significant advisoryrelationship and policy-making role in the White House With respectto the massive reorganization of the federal bureaucracy as aconsequence of the creation of the DHS the creation of new entities(eg the DNI) and the renovation of others (eg the FBI) 911stimulated the requisite political will to accomplish many reforms thathad been recommended previously by various commissions and theCongress but which had previously failed to garner consensus in theabsence of crisis

306

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2

Bushrsquos leadership on the resultant functional changes bureaucraticreforms and reorganizations is best understood from the perspectiveof the ldquomanagerial presidencyrdquomdashthe notion that implementation ofthe presidentrsquos policy objectives is essentially a problem of effectivelymanaging the White House and permanent bureaucracy (see Pfiffner1991 1-16) Although rare in recent decades successive post-World WarII presidentsrsquo attempts to restructure the federal government representldquoa changed conception of the role of the presidency in administrationrdquounique to the modern office (Arnold 1998 3) In the post 911 contextfor Bush to signal his resolve as commander-in-chief and to win the waron terrorism required asserting optimal control over agencies withcounterterrorism responsibilities

Previous presidents have tended to approach the comprehensivereorganization of executive functions cautiously Bushrsquos administrativestrategy immediately after 911 was to centralize functions in theWhite House Following the lead of many of his recent predecessorshe bypassed congressional approval and circumvented the careerbureaucracy When Congress threatened to pursue reorganization on itsown Bush quickly preempted the legislature with his own plan thatsought to maximize influence over and impose his own managerialvision on any new structure It is in this way that 911 provided a uniquewindow of opportunity for the largest reorganization of federalresponsibilities since the end of World War II

This article unfolds in several stages The first section sketches thenotion of ldquopunctuated equilibriumrdquo as it relates to Bushrsquos managerialpresidency Subsequent sections synthesize Bushrsquos unilateral executiveactions the development of a stronger policy role for the vice presidentreorganization and reforms of the federal bureaucracy and intelligencecommunity and the impact of post-911 budgetary decisions Theconcluding section examines the prospects for success in the war onterrorism following the implementation of these far-reaching changesAlthough no major terrorist attack on the United States has taken placein over four years serious questions remain concerning federalemergency management coordination and preparation in the event of amajor act of domestic terrorism particularly in light of the federalgovernmentrsquos inability to respond adequately to hurricanes Katrina andRita in 2005


307

Punctuated Equilibria and the Managerial Presidency

Scholars have utilized various theories to explain stability andchange in policy outcomes and institutional structures Lindblomrsquosmodel of incrementalism sought to elucidate the relative durability oforganizations and continuity in decision making In an atmosphere ofuncertainty bureaucracies often ldquomuddle throughrdquo with incrementalapproaches to problem solving to reduce risks (Lindblom 1959) Theldquogarbage can modelrdquo is a variation on the same theme where choicesare unclear and participation in organizations is fluid outcomes aredependent on those resources and solutions available at a given timeand place (Cohen March and Olsen 1972) Neither of theseperspectives however effectively account for occasionally dramaticnonincremental shifts in organizational structures processes and policyoutcomes Contrastingly Baumgartner and Jonesrsquo (1993) notion ofpunctuated equilibrium seeks to explain significant changes in thepolicy process Periods of relative systemic stabilitymdasheven gridlockmdashare periodically interrupted by considerable transformations in policiesand organizational structures Moreover ldquo[c]omplex interactivepolitical systemsrdquo Jones Baumgartner and True (1998) contend ldquodonot react slowly and automatically to changing perceptions orconditions rather it takes increasing pressure and sometimes a crisisatmosphere to dislodge established ways of thinking about policiesrdquo (2)Government-wide changes in structure and policy output are mostlikely to occur when a

fundamental reinterpretation of the role ofgovernment

takes placeWhen lacking such a reinterpretation of governmentrsquos place in

society recent presidents have nevertheless tended to eschewcomprehensive reorganization plansmdashand for good reason As Pfiffner(1996 91) notes

the problems associated with large-scale reorganization exact ahigh cost in terms of presidential energy political capital and goodwill They take up valuable time and must be traded off againstother policy priorities Turf battles must be fought with Congressthe bureaucracy and interest groups who are all jealous ofwhatever power they have and will not give it up without a fight

308

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2

Although some writers lament contemporary presidentsrsquo shunningof comprehensive reorganization planning in favor of centralizingfunctions in the White House (Moe 1990 129) presidents cannot befaulted for shirking such efforts given their predecessorsrsquo recordsPresident Johnson failed in his attempt to create a Department ofEconomic Affairs President Carter could not muster support for aDepartment of Natural Resources Furthermore in a stinging defeatRichard Nixonrsquos proposal for a massive reorganization of domesticfunctions into ldquosuper agenciesrdquo over which he hoped to exertconsiderable control fell on deaf ears in Congress (see Arnold 1998Nathan 1975)

Consistent with the punctuated equilibrium model most successfullarge-scale executive reorganizations creating new departments andenhancing presidential administrative authority have typically been theproducts of crises whether real or perceived Decontrol of the wartimeeconomy following World War II the emerging Cold War and newtechnologies precipitated the passage of the 1947 National Security Actwhich sought to rationalize military and intelligence structures (Hogan1998) Similarly President Carterrsquos successful campaign for theDepartment of Energy was a response to the energy crisis of the 1970s

The establishment of the DHS and the DNI the reform ofintelligence and domestic law enforcement agencies and the enhancedrole played by Vice President Cheney may be explained by thepresidential congressional and public reactions to the 911 crisisDomestic security was thrust to the top of the governmentrsquos agendaEven as attention refocused on other matters such as the economypublic concern regarding terrorism remained high (Kiefer 2001) Thehigh expectations that the federal government should and wouldsafeguard the homeland provided a significant bastion of support forreorganization that had been previously missing Scores of proposalsfor reforming intelligence and domestic security had been floatedforward from President Truman Yet apart from enhancedcongressional oversight few innovations were achieved in the absenceof a major intelligence failure of the magnitude of the 911 attacks (Best2004) The widely held view that the agencies responsible for domesticsecurity had not taken terrorist threats sufficiently seriously before 911clearly motivated presidential and congressional reorganization plans(Robbins 2002)


309

Unilateral Presidential Actions

Scholars have recently begun to refocus attention on the formallegal powers of the president including executive orders and decisionsthat do not require congressional assent (Cooper 2002 Howell 2003Mayer 2001) Indeed many significant actions taken by President Bushin the aftermath of 911 that had broad implications for homelandsecurity were initiated

directly

by the White House Figure 1 tracesexecutive orders National Security Presidential Directives (NSPDs)and Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs) from 2001-05The data presented are issues relating solely to domestic security orcounterterrorism with the Afghanistan and Iraq military operationsexcluded

The data underscore just one of the ways that 911 transformedBushrsquos policy focus and activities Domestic security matters constitutedno less than a tenth of all executive orders from late 2001 until late 2005

Figure 1 Unilateral Executive Actions on Domestic Security 2001-05

Note

Data for 2005 are through October Executive orders National SecurityPresidential Directives and Homeland Security Presidential Directives are those

pertaining to homeland security those concerning Iraq were excluded

2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Executive Orders National SecurityPresidential Directives

Homeland SecurityPresidential Directives

Num

ber

310

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2

Early orders included blocking property and transactions of individualssupporting terrorism protecting critical infrastructure establishing theOffice of Homeland Security (OHS) in the EOP and transitioningthe office to a new cabinet-level department in 2003 discussed belowOthers comprised the establishment of a National Counter TerrorismCenter and an order that targeted the financial resources of proliferatorsof weapons of mass destruction (Linzer 2005 Pincus 2005a) NSPDsand HSPDs promulgate presidential decisions on national security andhomeland security respectively

1

Bush implemented national securitydecisions ranging from cyber warfare to biodefense and nuclearweapons detection Most of the HSPDs were issued undercongressional statute once the DHS had been established in early 2003The focus of the directives linked terror prevention to immigrationemergency management preparedness and food and biological defensepolicies

Dick Cheney Vice President or Viceroy

For most of the history of the American republic the vicepresidency has scarcely been regarded as a locus of policy-makinginfluence or of much importance in mediating policy outcomes betweenthe executive and legislature Franklin Rooseveltrsquos first vice presidentldquoCactus Jackrdquo John Nance Garner once referred to the office as nothingmore than ldquo[a] warm bucket of spitrdquomdashwith the last word replacing anexpletive Nelson Rockefeller called the office ldquostandby equipmentrdquo andtold Richard Nixon that he had ldquonever wanted to be vice president ofanythingrdquo However when the man a heartbeat away from the OvalOffice has had to succeed to the presidency his lack of involvement inpolicy making can prove a serious liability as the case of Harry Trumanillustrates (Natoli 1985)

An excellent case may be made that much has changed for the vicepresidential office in the post-World War II eramdashand that the office hasreached the apex of influence under Dick Cheney Presidents have bysome fits and starts increasingly used their vice presidents in policy-making and influential advisory roles both in domestic and foreignaffairs Gerald Ford tapped Nelson Rockefeller to head up the newlyformed Domestic Council The experience was less than successful


311

because the councilrsquos proposals often ran counter to Fordrsquos toughbudget stances Internal White House rivalries further complicatedmatters (see Turner 1982) Rockefellerrsquos bid to manage the Senatesimilarly floundered (Hatfield 1997 505-12) For Felzenberg (2001 22)however it was Walter Mondale who ldquowas the first vice president tocommand major influence within and without the administration inwhich he servedrdquo He was the first to occupy an office in the West Wingand to hire a significant staff Carter gave him access to intelligencebriefings and meetings as well as the opportunity to intervene indomestic and foreign policies that interested him Mondale (2002 A25)contends that ldquo[u]nder Carter for the first time the one other electednational figure in the American government became an engagedparticipant in all the important issues confronting the presidentrdquo Thegradual strengthening of the vice presidency continued under PresidentsReagan (Kengor 2000a Reston 1985) George H W Bush (Duffy 1996Kengor 1994) and Bill Clinton In particular the partnership forged byClinton and Al Gore laid the groundwork for extensive policyentrepreneurship by the vice president (Conley 2002 Kengor 1997)

Vice President Dick Cheney stood poised to follow in hispredecessorsrsquo footsteps build upon the foundation they had laid andmold a vibrant vice presidential office George W Bush chose Cheneyfor his political acumen gained through over 30 years of nationalpolitical experience Cheney has extensive roots in the Republicanestablishment and unimpeachable credentials in conservative circlesmdashat least among economic conservatives He worked for Presidents Nixonand Ford before successfully running for Congress six times AsSecretary of Defense under President George H W Bush from1989-92 he was instrumental in directing ldquoOperation Just Causerdquo inPanama which ousted dictator Manuel Noriega and managingldquoOperation Desert Stormrdquomdashthe Persian Gulf Warmdashwhich drove Iraqidictator Saddam Husseinrsquos troops out of Kuwait Cheney had preciselythe

savoir-faire

in congressional relations White House operations andforeign policy that could significantly enhance his advisory influence

Even before 911 Cheney took on the management of the 2000presidential transitionmdasha task without precedent for a vice presidentHe recruited and vetted cabinet secretaries including his mentorDonald Rumsfeld whom he convinced to join the administration He

312

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2

also prepared the presidentrsquos first budget pushed for tax cuts andchaired the (controversial) task force on energy policy ThroughoutBushrsquos first term he performed crucial liaisons with Republicanmembers of Congressmdashand not just in his capacity as president of theSenate or to cast tiebreak votes in the upper chamber He intervened inboth chambers to convince skeptical conservative Republicans to cedeground for tactical reasons and support the presidentrsquos agenda Hisefforts were particularly effective on tax cuts and prescription drugs forthe elderly (Chaddock 2004 Cochran 2003 Hernandez 2004 Seckora2003) If Cheneyrsquos early imprint on the vice presidency was notimpressive the events of 911 provided him with opportunities towield greater policy-making influence than his predecessors As thepresidentrsquos best-positioned loyal lieutenant who had no designs on thetop job himself because of health complications he enjoyed Bushrsquosconfidence in his counsel (Bumiller and Schmitt 2003) As Brinkley hasobserved Cheney emerged as

the

principal advisor to Bush on theemergent war on terror ldquoHe is the vortex in the White House onforeign policy making Everything comes through himrdquo (Slavin andPage 2002)

Cheneyrsquos supposed command of national security and foreignpolicy in the Bush White House has had a number of ramifications Partof this perception stems from the vice presidentrsquos public explanation ofhis role during and his subsequent ldquodisappearancerdquo after the 911attacks Apparently it was he who made key national security decisionsafter the first aircraft hit the World Trade Center (Cheney 2001) It wasalso Cheney who phoned Bush in Florida told him to remain awayfrom Washington and ordered the evacuation of Capitol Hill andcabinet members (Schmitt 2001) Cheneyrsquos subsequent move to aldquosecure locationrdquo out of public view caused one veteran observer toponder ldquo[s]ince when does the vice president need more protection thanthe president It creates a lot of speculation about whether hersquos ill oron a secret mission or if theyrsquore afraid he will overshadow the presidentrdquo(Crummy 2001) Others pointed to Cheneyrsquos ability to direct policyfrom anywhere utilizing an extensive personal network assembled over30 years of public service Spanning the Pentagon and major cabinetdepartments to key House and Senate leaders this network generatedvital informationmdashldquothe coin of the realm in Washingtonrdquo (Powell2001)


313

Since 911 Cheneyrsquos influence in the White House has scarcelywaned He visited numerous countries in the Middle East to rallysupport for the war to oust Saddam Hussein and for the war onterrorism (Orin 2002) He typically flies Air Force 2 which is more thanjust a symbolic representation of the authority with which he speaks forthe administration and when he makes public statementsmdashon topicsranging from the legal status of al Qaeda and Taliban fighters detainedat Guantaacutenamo Bay to dire predictions that more terror attacks arelikely on United States soilmdashit is clear that Cheney has the solid backingof the President (Johnson 2002 Price 2002) ldquoI cannot think of anyother vice president who has been permitted to speak out on such adelicate war-or-peace subjectrdquo as regime change in Iraq wrote onelongtime Washington observer ldquoCheneyrsquos voice carries the power of avice president who is being increasingly perceived by the public as a manwho is President Bushrsquos closest day-to-day adviser particularly on thequestion of how to deal with the terrorists and Iraqrdquo (Sperling 2002 9)

Beyond his apparent decision making and the solid support that thepresident provides Cheney the vice president has to some extent providedthe intellectual context for Bushrsquos foreign policy decisions (Otterman2002) In early 1997 Cheney cofounded the neoconservative think-tankProject for the New American Century (PNAC) alongside otherprominent conservatives including commentator William KristolSeveral PNAC members joined the administration

2

and Cheney actedas a conduit for their perspective on foreign affairs which ultimatelydrove Bushrsquos decision to invade Iraq preemptively in March 2003 ThePNAC (1997) advocates US global leadership favors militaryinterventionism when diplomacy fails and supports a foreign policybased on ldquomoral clarityrdquo Five years before Bushrsquos decision to invadeIraq PNAC leaders had written to then-President Clinton criticizingwhat they regarded as the failure of his containment policy toward Iraqurging him to reassess Saddamrsquos threat to the Persian Gulf region andto begin taking measures to remove him from power (Editorial 1998A21) However perhaps the most pivotal factor in Cheneyrsquos influenceis his ability to manipulate White House policy debates that often havethe effect of sparking dissension among other administration officialsespecially the secretary of state (Kengor 2000b) By most accountsSecretary of State Colin Powell was considered ldquoodd-man-outrdquo in theadministration debate on invading Iraq (Warshaw 2005) which bolstered

314

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2

Cheneyrsquos position In the aftermath of the invasion disagreements overthe course of policy in Iraq continued ldquofortify[ing] Cheney as a centerof gravity for Bush on choices of substancerdquo (Hoagland 2005) Part ofthe reason seems to stem from Cheneyrsquos predilection for offering advicethat advocates resolute action even at the expense of criticism or atemporary loss in public support which appears to chime with Bushrsquosintuitions and instincts (Stevenson and Bumiller 2005)

Clearly any assessment of Cheneyrsquos long-term impact on the vicepresidency is premature To his detractors he is a Machiavellian figurewho has gone out of his way to ldquopunishrdquo critics of the administration

3

To his supporters he is a savvy and indispensable advisor to PresidentBush The question for scholars as well as for future occupants of theOval Office is whether vice presidents should wield as much influenceas Cheney ostensibly has during Bushrsquos two terms The controversy overthe alleged existence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraqunderscores the point Cheney apparently played a pivotal role ininterpreting intelligence reports The claims of WMD were proven falseafter the Iraq invasion (Farrell 2003 A1) The suspicion is that Cheneyrsquosupper hand in the Bush Administration policy debates detrimentallylimited policy options The danger as former Vice President WalterMondale has explained is that ldquowhen others hear him talk like thatthey think the president is behind itrdquo (Barnard 2004) For this reasonmost scholars advocate a presidential advisory system in foreign policydecision making that allows multiple advocacies and does notprematurely cut off presidentsrsquo options (see Hess 2002 Janiz 1972)What is clear is that while it conforms to the notion of punctuatedequilibrium the post-911 vice presidency-centric decision-makingapparatus in the Bush White House represents a singular model in theera of the modern presidency that raises important normative as wellas practical questions Whether this model survives in the post-2008presidency remains to be seen

Reorganization and Reform of the Federal Bureaucracy

George W Bushrsquos immediate predecessors were either uninterestedin expending the political capital necessary to win congressional


315

approval for major reorganizations of the federal bureaucracy or theyfailed when they tried In the last 30 years Jimmy Carter was perhapsthe most successful reformer as he was ultimately able to goad Congressinto creating new departments of Education and Energy However hefailed to win approval for the more ambitious plans outlined in his book

Why Not the Best

(see Moe 1980 Stanfield 1979) President ReaganrsquosGrace Commission was less an instrument for promptingreorganization than it was a denunciation of ldquowaste fraud and abuserdquoand allegedly excessive government spending (Arnold 1998 375-6)Even Vice President Gorersquos National Performance Review was primarilyfocused on reorganizing federal government functions Insteadldquoreinventing governmentrdquo was concerning supplanting traditionalconcerns regarding bureaucratic accountability with efficiency andentrepreneurship across the executive branch (Moe 1994) Indeed thelast

major

reorganization of the federal government dates to PresidentTruman and the 1947 National Security Act which unified the armedforces under a single department (Defense) and created both theNational Security Council (NSC) and Central Intelligence Agency(CIA) (Hiatt 2002) Cold War imperatives demanded governmentaction at that time

A Department of Homeland Security

The 2003 reorganization of 22 federal agencies into a new DHS isone of the most visible aftereffects of 911 Just like the unification ofthe armed services in 1947 the reorganization follows the rationale ofthe punctuated equilibrium framework September 11 gave precisely theldquopushrdquo necessary to prompt lawmakersmdashand ultimately the presidentmdashto take action and streamline organizational structures to wage the waron terror more effectively and fulfill public expectations Final legislativeaction came on the heels of many high-profile studies and reports thathad called attention to the likelihood of domestic terrorism reachingAmerican shores before the attacks on New York and Washington

Protecting the United States from a terrorist incident had been onpresidential and congressional agendas for years before 911 The 1992bombing of the World Trade Center and the 1995 bombing of theMurra Federal Building in Oklahoma City accentuated the countryrsquos

316

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2

vulnerabilities President Clinton signed an executive order and issuedseveral Presidential Decision Directives in 1995 to enhancecounterterrorism efforts (Beresford 2004 3) By 1997 variouscommissions were emphasizing the centrality of domestic security andhomeland defense in the new millennium The National Defense Panelrsquos(1997) report

Transforming Defense National Security in the 21stCentury

gave particular weight to the need to thwart nuclear threatsand streamline the Department of Defense (DOD) Beginning in 1999and based on five reports that underscored the potential threatsfrom chemical biological radiological and nuclear attack and theimportance of domestic preparedness the Gilmore Advisory Panel toAssess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism involvingWeapons of Mass Destruction initiated a review of federal programsand national standards In 2000 the congressionally mandatedNational Commission on Terrorism chaired by Paul Bremer advocatedtargeting state sponsors of terrorism loosening CIA guidelines onintelligence sources and enhancing the FBIrsquos role in counterterrorismactivities

4

In its last 2003 report the Gilmore Advisory Panel continuedto accentuate the need for information sharing across federal agenciesas well as coordination with state and local governments

5

Finally from1998-2001 the Hart Rudman Commission (2001) on National Securityin the 21st Century identified homeland security as one of five vitalcapabilities that the United States needed to develop or enhance Thereport offered a prophetic and chilling warning

The combination of unconventional weapons proliferation withthe persistence of international terrorism will end the relativeinvulnerability of the US homeland to catastrophic attack Adirect attack against American citizens on American soil is likelyover the next quarter century

6

Among its recommendations the Hart Rudman Report called fora National Homeland Security Agency in which the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency (FEMA) would play a central role

All of these past reviews of domestic terrorism prevention andpreparedness failed to prompt bold governmental action The attackson New York and Washington on September 11 made these concernsmatters of the utmost urgency

7

Through Executive Order 13228 in


317

October 2001 Bush established an OHS which centralized the functionswiftly in the EOP Bushrsquos move was more than window dressingdesigned to show the country that he was ldquodoing somethingrdquo to fightterrorism He appointed a well-respected and capable advisor formerPennsylvania governor Tom Ridge to head the OHS with the tasks ofharmonizing counterterrorism efforts scattered across federal agenciesand acting as ldquohonest brokerrdquo in coordinating cabinet departments andagencies in policy making

Problems with this ldquopresidential advisorrdquo model surfaced quicklyIn particular critical voices in Congress pointed to inherentweaknesses in Ridgersquos post Without any budget authority theyargued the Homeland Security czar lacked sufficient human andfinancial resources had no way to enforce decisions and reliedprimarily on the power of persuasion albeit as a trusted advisor withunfettered access to President Bush (Lindsay and Daalder 2003 70)Matters came to a head in early 2002 when Ridge proposed mergingelements of the Border Patrol Coast Guard and Customs ServiceThe proposal met with enmity from the chairs of relevantcongressional committees determined to protect their turf Othersincluding Democratic senators Joe Lieberman (D-CT) and RobertByrd (D-WV) feared that without statutory authority for his positionRidge was beyond congressional accountabilityndashndasha fear that wasseemingly given weight by Ridgersquos refusal to testify before Congress onhis officersquos activities (Milbank 2002) President Bush had previouslyrejected the need for full-scale government reorganization Howeverby March 2002 congressional calls for a full-scale reorganization ofthe federal bureaucracy became insistent The White House reversedits position when it became apparent that the Congress would legislatewith or without its blessing and in June 2002 introduced a proposalthat sought to maximize presidential influence over the structure ofany new cabinet-level department Bushrsquos plan became the centerpieceof a debate that would not be reconciled until the 2002 midtermelections

A conflict ensued between the White House and Senate Democratswhich was as much concerning Bushrsquos vision of managing the federalbureaucracy as it was concerning the specifics of homeland defenseprograms Bush insisted on flexible personnel rules that far exceeded thelatitude requested by his predecessors In keeping with what Moynihan

318

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2

calls the ldquoNew Public Managementrdquo agenda targeting efficiency(Moynihan 2005) the president demanded unprecedented discretionover hiring firing and transferring employees that ran counter totraditional civil service protections The Republican-controlled Houseof Representatives passed Bushrsquos proposal in late July 2002 but whenSenate Democrats who had a bare majority balked Bush threatened toveto any measure that did not conform to his preferences Ultimatelythe legislation was resolved following the 2002 midterm elections inwhich Bush indefatigably reiterated the need for Republicans to winback control of the Senate and pass his bill The GOP took back themajority and gained six seats in the House (Busch 2005)

8

Realizing theinevitability that the 108th Congress would pass Bushrsquos proposal SenateDemocrats dropped their filibusters and the lame duck 107th Senateagreed to the bill 90-9 in late November

The Homeland Security Act (Public Law 107-296) reorganized ahost of federal responsibilities along functional lines The majoragencies transferred and renamed under various DHS directoratesincluded Immigration and Customs Enforcement Customs and BorderProtection the Coast Guard the Secret Service and the FEMA Otherscomprised the National Cyber Security Division and theTransportation Security Agency which oversees airport security

9

Reorganization of intelligence gathering and management would beaddressed through various reforms at the FBI and CIA and throughthe creation of the DNI or ldquointelligence czarrdquo

Reorganizing government functions into the DHS may well solidifythe federal governmentrsquos capacity for both domestic security andemergency management (Rubin 2004 3) However as Kettl (2004 8)has explained a major dilemma lies at the core of the DHSreorganization The Bush Administration

sought

prevention

to do everything possible to ensure that thosewho might launch such attacks were stopped before they couldtry However they also needed to strengthen

response

to doeverything possible should an attack occur to minimize injuriesthe loss of life and damage to property Administration officialsknew that any attack was unacceptable but that total protectionwas impossible The terrorists had proved that they were cunning


319

strategists who worked hard to identify and exploit points ofvulnerability Officials thus needed to maximize their abilityto respond while doing everything possible to prevent attacks inthe first place [Emphasis in the original]

From the perspective of early 2006 it is clear that the DHScontinues to struggle with these multiple and complex tasks One of thefirst acts of Ridgersquos successor Michael Chertoff was to embark on yetanother extensive reorganization of the departmentrsquos functions toimprove coordination at the top levels and to streamline intelligenceResistance from some units such as FEMA has been palpable(Gorman 2005) With its traditional focus on emergency managementand a continuing difficulty in balancing prevention and preparednessFEMA may struggle to integrate into the broader DHS mission (Sylvesand Cumming 2004) FEMArsquos example suggests that the culture ofcooperation necessary for success may be yearsmdashif not decadesmdashawayand that continual organizational tinkering may only exacerbate DHSangst Furthermore the DHS must face the insufferable possibility thatits greatest successes in thwarting terrorism may never see the light ofday while the public and policy makers will surely assign the agencyblame if its preventive efforts fail

Of course the DHS is only one of many federal entities engagedin the war on terror Key law-enforcement and intelligence functionslie beyond the agencyrsquos reach Yet in some measure the success of thenew department depends on information sharing with other executiveorganizations including the FBI and the broader intelligencecommunity

Reform at the FBI and Department of Justice

The FBI is no stranger to controversy In the 1970s the bureaucame under scrutiny by the Rockefeller Commission and the ChurchCommittee in the Senate for alleged civil liberties violations Incidentsat Ruby Ridge Idaho and at the Branch Davidian compound in WacoTexas placed the bureau under the congressional microscope in theearly 1990s Further blunders including the failure to turn overdocuments to the defense in Oklahoma City bomber TimothyMcVeighrsquos trail and the belated capture of Robert Hanssenmdashan FBI

320

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2

agent who spied for the Russians for a decademdashhighlighted the agencyrsquosmanagerial failures damaged the organizationrsquos reputation andempowered its critics

September 11 raised a very different and more deeply troublingquestion for the FBI Why did the bureau fail to accurately analyzeintelligence information ldquoconnect the dotsrdquo and anticipate thehijacking of commercial jets (Betts 2004 2-3) The FBIrsquos shortcomingson this score drew the indignation of many on Capitol Hill includingsome of its traditional supporters who began ldquochafing at a stream ofstunning revelations that painted a picture in clear 2020 hindsight ofhigh-level bumbling by the bureau in the opening battles with terroristsrdquo(Andersen 2002) Most damning was the FBIrsquos inability to linkinformation from Minneapolis agent Colleen Rowley concerning thealleged ldquotwentieth hijackerrdquo Zacarias Moussaoui and Phoenix agentKenneth Williamsrsquos report that al Qaeda members were attending flightschools in the United States (Editorial 2002a A20)

The short answer to these questions is incompetence in intelligenceanalysis at the top echelons of the organization

10

What followed 911has not simply been reorganization of the FBI to redress thesedeficiencies rather the FBIrsquos primary mission has been fundamentallyredefined from a traditional focus on law enforcement tocounterterrorism The implications of this shift in emphasis areparticularly important in terms of intelligence gathering andinformation sharing

The director of the FBI Robert Mueller had only been in post aweek before the 911 attacks when he was immediately tasked withtrying to remedy the perceived failures of the bureau which includedthe anthrax mail attacks that followed 911 (Johnston 2001) By mid-October 2001 as the Bush White House mulled reorganization plansboth Attorney General John Ashcroft and Director Muelleremphasized the agencyrsquos new mission in public comments (Shenonand Johnston 2001) By early November 2001 Ashcroft ordered amassive ldquowartime reorganizationrdquo of the entire Justice Departmentincluding the FBI Ten percent of the departmentrsquos budget ofapproximately $25 billion and ten percent of its Washington DC staffwould be redirected to antiterrorism as local authorities were givenresponsibilities for traditional law enforcement tasks such as white-collar crimes Revamping the agencyrsquos obsolete computer system for


321

intelligence gathering would be given top priority (Eggen 2001Washington 2001)

The massive shift of personnel to counterterrorism efforts and thecreation of new units within the FBI have been impressive InDecember 2001 Mueller created four new directorships in thebureau to supervise criminal investigations counterterrorism andcounterintelligence law-enforcement services and administration Twoother divisions were created to oversee computer-facilitated crimes andsecurity (Seper 2001) In 2002 the bureau embarked on a campaign tohire 900 new agents with special attention given to recruitingcandidates with foreign language skills and law enforcement experience(Seper 2002a) Mueller also diverted 400 agents who had previouslyworked on drug cases to counterterrorism (Editorial 2002b A14) Alltold approximately 3000 of the FBIrsquos agentsmdashabout a quarter of thework forcemdashhave been transferred to counterterrorism and staff a hostof new units within the reorganized agency Mueller also created asuper-unit of ldquoflying squadsrdquo based at the Washington headquartersto coordinate domestic and international investigations (Seper 2002b)These special units are dispatched around the nation to conductsurveillance of suspected terrorists (Editorial 2002c A1) JointTerrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) were created at all 56 local FBI officesThe JTTFs include agents who are ldquoexperienced in international anddomestic terrorism investigations combined with other federal stateand local law enforcement officers who bring a variety of skills to thetask force environmentrdquo (Casey 2004 2) Most recently in June 2005President Bush ordered the creation of a National Security Service(NSS) in the FBI to link counterintelligence and counterterrorismdivisions (Eggen and Pincus 2005) The director of the NSS reports tothe attorney general and FBI director with the concurrence of theDNI

In January 2003 the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms(ATF) was transferred from the Department of the Treasury to Justicein a move aimed at giving ATF a tighter focus on traditional lawenforcement The move would also have the added benefit ofcompensating for the FBIrsquos changing role and enabling bettercoordination (Eggen 2003) The bureau established a director ofintelligence position and by 2004 had doubled the number ofintelligence analysts (Bowers 2004)

322

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2

Although the transformation of the FBI is ongoing the bureaursquoscritics continue to express objections on several different levels Forsome on Capitol Hill the bureaursquos slow progress on its computeroverhaul and turf battles with other agencies have contributed to aperception of procrastination Director Muellerrsquos leadership has alsocome under attack Indeed Senate Republican Judiciary Committeechair Arlen Specter (R-PA) noted in a press interview that giving theDNI authority over the intelligence components of the FBI was a directreflection of dissatisfaction with the bureaursquos performance (Lichtblau2005) Other critics are decidedly leery of the FBIrsquos role in intelligencegathering and worry that constitutional protections may be violatedparticularly as the bureau works more closely with the CIA and DNI(ldquoIntelligence Open to Abuserdquo 2005) Moreover state and localgovernments are concerned regarding the loss of FBI support (Lyons2002)

Whatever the extent of its transformation the FBIrsquos most dauntingtask may be changing its organizational culture Since its inception in1935 the bureau has been a law enforcement agency with an emphasison criminal prosecution and

post facto

chain of evidence (Editorial2005 A16) ldquoFor this organization to be successful in preventingterrorismrdquo B Guy Peters (2004 236) has argued ldquoit would have hadto become more concerned with prospective detection and then movetoward a more active stance in preventionrdquo A recent internalDepartment of Justice study lends support to this argument Between2000 and 2004 the bureaursquos caseload dropped by 45 percent and farfewer of its 34000 cases involved drugs organized crime civil rightsand fraud as other agencies including the Drug Enforcement Agencyother federal agencies and state and local law enforcement have pickedup the burden (Eggen 2005) However equally important is whether thebureaursquos new substantive focus lines of accountability and intelligence-gathering efforts can avoid a repeat of the lapses that precluded agentsfrom paying close attention to the Phoenix memo Clearly informationsharing with other agencies and removing traditional pressures toldquomake a caserdquo before acting on information are vital (Carr 2002) andin these regards the new DNI may have a particularly important roleto play


323

Reforming the Intelligence Community A Director of NationalIntelligence

As with homeland security reorganization an abundance of reportsdating from the mid-1990s championed reform of the intelligencecommunity to prepare for new threats to national security The Aspin-Brown Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the USIntelligence Community emphasized the challenges of global crimeterrorism international drug trafficking proliferation of WMD andinternational organized crime The commission recommended thecreation of a new committee in the National Security Council for suchmatters highlighted shortcomings in the CIA directorrsquos ability tomanage intelligence and recommended a new layer of deputies in theagency specifically to enhance coordination

President Bush and the Congress conducted other more recentenquiries into intelligence capacity Just months before 911 in May2001 Bush issued NSPD-5 (2001) the objective of which was toldquoensure that US intelligence capabilities are honed to serve us on awide range of critical challenges that face us now and in the futurerdquoIn response CIA director George Tenet appointed two review panelsone comprising government officials and the other nongovernmentexperts The text of these reviews was never made public In 2002however the Joint Inquiry on the Terrorist Attacks of September 112001 conducted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence andthe House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence became thefirst to recommend establishing an intelligence czarmdasha statutoryDNImdashwith the responsibility of coordinating intelligence acrossmultiple agencies and overseeing their budgets The Bush-appointed911 Commission the National Commission on Terrorist AttacksUpon the United States reiterated the call for such a czar and furtherrecommended establishing an NCTC (see Best 2004) In February2004 after failing to find WMD following the invasion of IraqPresident Bush charged the Commission on the IntelligenceCapabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of MassDestruction (2005) with analyzing the basis for intelligenceshortcomings The commissionrsquos March 2005 report cast a deeplytroubling pronouncement on the state of US intelligence before thewar in Iraq

324

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2

The Intelligence Communityrsquos errors were not the result of simplebad luck or a once-in-a-lifetime ldquoperfect stormrdquo as some wouldhave it Rather they were the product of poor intelligencecollection an analytical process that was driven by assumptionsand inferences rather than data inadequate validation and vettingof dubious intelligence sources and numerous other breakdownsin the various processes that Intelligence Communityprofessionals collectively describe as intelligence ldquotradecraftrdquo Inmany ways the Intelligence Community simply did not do the jobthat it exists to do

The 911 attacks together with the embarrassment of intelligencefailures that prompted President Bush to go to war with Iraq providedthe catalysts for intelligence reform

Not surprisingly the creation of an intelligence czar promptedsome resistance from the intelligence community Secretary of DefenseDonald Rumsfeld created an undersecretary of defense for militaryintelligence as a hedge against anticipated changes and was criticizedby some members of Congress for this action Detractors contendedthe move was a direct challenge to the CIA (Pincus 2002) Two yearslater as pressures for a new intelligence coordinator post mountedinterim CIA director John McLaughlin contended that a czar positionldquodoesnrsquot relate particularly to the world I live inrdquo and maintained thatthe CIA director could effectively carry out such a function (Taylor2004)

Presidential intervention set the path to reform in motion By EO13354 in August 2004 President Bush implemented the 911Commissionrsquos call for an NCTC and a cabinet-level DNI (FederalRegister 2004) The centerrsquos tasks are (1) to serve as the primaryorganization for analyzing and integrating intelligence (2) to conductstrategic planning for counterterrorism (3) to assign operationalresponsibilities to lead agencies with counterterrorism activities (4) toact as a repository for data and (4) to ensure that agencies haveappropriate access to intelligence The center would thus assign andoversee the intelligence activities of the FBI CIA and DOD

As the president awaited congressional legislation creating the NDIposition to oversee its operations NCTC operated temporarily underthe CIArsquos tutelage In December 2004 the Congress finally enacted theNational Intelligence Reform Act of 2004mdashthe most significant reform


325

of the intelligence community since 1947 The legislation established thenew DNI who is appointed by the president and confirmed by theSenate with responsibility for coordinating the efforts of 15 agencieswith intelligence responsibilities and overseeing their budgets includingthe NCTC One problem that emerged was a conflict between Bushrsquosexecutive order creating the NCTC and the congressional legislationestablishing the DNI over respective reporting capacities (Pincus2005d) The NCTC director was to report on planning and progress ofcounterterrorism operations but was required to report to the DNI onbudgetary matters The bifurcated reporting structure could raisequestions concerning which director would be the presidentrsquos principaladvisor (Pincus 2005b) The congressional legislation intended the DNIto assume this advisory role Following the confirmation of formerUnited Nations ambassador John Negroponte as DNI Senator PatRoberts (R-KS) chair of the Senate Select Committee noted thatldquocertain ambiguitiesrdquo in the legislation would have to be resolvedRoberts expected that the DNIrsquos position would ldquosupercederdquo even thatof Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld concerning intelligence (Shane2005b)

Indeed the lingering question is whether Negroponte or hissuccessors can wield effective authority and influence to coordinate andoversee the far reaches of the intelligence apparatus An even largerquestion is whether

process

will lead to better decision making andabuse of constitutional liberties The statutory position created by theCongress certainly granted more independence and budgetary authorityto the director than the OHS had for Tom Ridge However as one criticpointed out ldquothe DNI could wind up as powerless as the drug czars ofpast administrations The DNI would have minimal staff and no powerbaserdquo (Magnusson 2004 84) The inevitable challenges of battlingentrenched interests and bureaucratic inertia also raise seriousquestions concerning Negropontersquos potential for success One 911Commission member Tim Roemer suggested that the DNI ldquomust havethe full confidence and authority of the president to negotiate these turfbattles personnel battles and budget battlesrdquo (Priest and Wright 2005)Even before Negropontersquos confirmation by the Senate Rumsfeld madea personnel move that was interpreted by some as a means of censuringinformation reaching the DNI he directed his undersecretary fordefense intelligence to ldquosynchronizerdquo intelligence reform within the

326

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2

department (Pincus 2005c) Negropontersquos deputy General MichaelHayden has also suggested that the ldquomost serious problemrdquo facing theOffice of the DNI was forging a ldquoculture of cooperationrdquo amongintelligence agencies (Shane 2005a) This potential problem is not justa question of an individual agencyrsquos cooperation with the DNI but alsoone of interagency relationships that have often proven rocky The CIArsquosreticent collaboration with the DOD and FBI are prime examples (seeHitz and Weiss 2004 Russell 2002) Integrating these agenciesrsquointelligence-gathering work with the fledgling DHS is an additionalchallenge Moreover while Negroponte has indicated that he wishes toinstitutionalize a ldquodevilrsquos advocacyrdquo structure across agencies examiningintelligence there is no guarantee that ldquogroupthinkrdquo will be avoidedmdashor that the NDI will not influence the presidentrsquos decisions to theexclusion of all the other agencies (Editorial 2004 A30 Priest andPincus 2005)

Negropontersquos initial steps as DNI do show signs of promise As theofficersquos first director he stands poised to leave a significant imprint onits future path He came to the post with approximately 300 staff whichis expected to grow to 1000 He has chosen personnel from diversebackgrounds drawing from the CIA the department of state and themilitary He has displaced the CIA director in the presidentrsquos dailyintelligence briefings and has Bushrsquos confidence (Grier and Bowers2005) He also faced down the Congress in an early and critical turfbattle regarding his authority over personnel decisions RepresentativeDuncan Hunter (R-CA) chair of the House Armed ServicesCommittee ultimately backed off his insistence for a veto power overNegropontersquos decisions (Shane 2005) However Senator SaxbyChambliss (R-GA) a member of the Senate Armed Services andIntelligence committees has promised to reintroduce legislation toconsolidate the Defense Departmentrsquos intelligence agencies under asingle commander to facilitate the DNIrsquos coordination role (Chambliss2005 82) Negroponte also won the authority to share in choosing anew intelligence director at the FBI (Johnston 2005) FinallyNegropontersquos relationship with CIA director Porter Goss appearspositive They jointly announced the creation of a National ClandestineService (NCS) within the CIA in October 2005 with the charge ofimproving human intelligence (HUMINT) capacity across agenciesThe NCS is tasked with designing rules and establishing standards for


327

intelligence gathering to aid the military and such agencies as the FBIand minimize interagency conflicts (Jehl 2005)

Besides these potential coordination problems there are concernsregarding possible civil liberties abuses Paradoxically without propersafeguards an effective DNI stands poised to erode the historical wallbetween domestic intelligence gathering under the purview of the FBIand foreign spying to which the CIA and military are constrainedAccountability for the use of government information concerningAmerican citizens may also be blurred by minimizing the supervisoryrole of the attorney general over the intelligence arm of the FBI and bymaking the DNI answerable directly to the president (Martin 2004) Asconservative columnist William Safire has argued ldquomarrying the lawofficer and the spyrdquo is potentially dangerous and the Privacy and CivilLiberties Oversight Board created by Congress to supervise the Officeof the DNI may be a toothless tiger (Safire 2004) Whether the boardtogether with the Civil Liberties Protection Officer within the DNI caninsure that agencies comply with privacy laws and constitutionalliberties remains to be seen Much may hinge on Congressrsquo oversightrole President Bush later confirmed reports in December 2005 claimingthat he authorized the National Security Agency to eavesdrop onhundreds if not thousands of domestic communications withoutwarrants This underscores the palpable tension between nationalsecurity and civil liberties protections in the post-911 era (Risen andLichtblau 2005)

The Cost of Security Federal Budgeting in an Age of Terror

September 11 has not only affected the structure of the executiveThe ensuing war on terror has had a tremendous fiscal impact on theexecutive branch Between financial years (FYs) 2002 and 2006discretionary spending for the top five agencies with responsibilities forhomeland security increased by a remarkable 38 percent from $236billion to $382 billion The 2006 figure represents about 89 percentof all nondefense discretionary spending in the federal budget

11

Theincreased emphasis on homeland security has substantively affected theprogrammatic orientation of a host of cabinet-level departments Mostobviously the shift in priorities has affected federal agenciesrsquo budget

328

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2

strategies ldquotoward arguing for resources on the basis of security thanfor other reasonsrdquo (Joyce 2005 22)

Figure 2 shows that the new DHS consumes the greatest proportionof resources dedicated to homeland security followed by theDepartments of Health and Human Services (HHS) Justice EnergyState and Agriculture respectively A detailed analysis of how DHSallocates its resources accentuates the departmentrsquos counterterrorismstrategy Figure 3 shows that the Border and Transportationdirectoratersquos budget increased almost threefold between FYs 2002 and2006 and in FY 2006 accounts for 59 percent of the departmentrsquosdiscretionary funds Enhancing border and airport security is aimed atpreventing terrorists from gaining entry to the United States The CoastGuardrsquos budget nearly doubled over the same period The sharp spikein FY 2002 spending for Emergency Preparedness and Response reflectsBushrsquos supplemental appropriations request of $27 billion made

Figure 2 Discretionary Outlays for Homeland Security by Department Fiscal Year 2002-06

Source

Federal Budget FY 2002-06

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

02468

1012141618202224262830

HomelandSecurity

Health and HumanServices

Justice Energ State Agriculture

Bil

lion

s($

)


329

immediately following the 911 attacks which was aimed at shoring upnational security and providing aid to New York City (Editorial 2002aA20)

Paradoxically the only subcomponent of DHS responsibilities tosustain a consecutive drop in funding has been state and localgovernment coordination Between FYs 2004 and 2006 discretionaryspending in these areas decreased by $600 million and contrary toexpectations that fiscal federalism should correct fiscal disparities acrosslocalities (Donahue and Joyce 2001 731) the opposite has occurredWhether funding to ameliorate state and local capacity for emergencymanagement increases in the wake of the abysmal failure of all levelsof government to aid residents of New Orleans following hurricaneKatrina remains to be seen

As Figure 2 shows other departments besides the new DHC havewon increased counterterrorism funding from the Congress HHS leadsthe charge with over $4 billion allocated in FY 2006 for public health

Figure 3 Department of Homeland Security Outlays by Subgroup Fiscal Year 2002-06

Source


2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

200220

03

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005 20

05

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

BorderTransportationSecurity

Coast Guard EmergencyPreparednessResponse

StateLocal GovernmentCoordination

Bil

lion

s($

)

330

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2

the safety of the nationrsquos food supply and bioterrorism prevention Forexample within HHS the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)coordinates with DHS and the Department of Agriculturersquos FoodSafety and Inspection Service to insure the food supply is safe fromterror attacks In FY 2006 these programs accounted for $180 millionin the FDA component of the HHS budget and $146 million of theDepartment of Agriculturersquos budget (States News Service 2005c Pianinand Miller 2002) Much of the Department of Energyrsquos approximately$15 billion FY 2006 budget comprises nuclear weapons and nuclearenergy security The Department of Statersquos $938 million FY 2006 budgetfor security matters focuses on antiterrorism training technologyinfrastructure the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative concerningresponses to terrorism and the ldquoRewards for Justicerdquo program whichoffers rewards for information that prevents or provides information oninternational terror attacks on US interests across the globe (StatesNews Service 2005a)

A closer analysis of outlays by the Department of Justice (DOJ)underscores the dramatically changing mission of the FBI Figure 4shows that overall discretionary spending by DOJ remained fairlystatic between FYs 2001 and 2006 ranging between $212 and $191billion However the FBIrsquos proportion of the overall DOJ budgetsteadily increased over the same period from $34 billion in FY 2001to $57 billion in FY 2006 The second

y

-axis traces the FBIrsquos outlaysas a percentage of total DOJ spending By FY 2006 the FBI took upnearly a third of the entire departmentrsquos budget Part of this increasewas earmarked for hiring thousands of new agents following 911(Morgan 2003) Noting that counterterrorism investigations had morethan tripled from 9340 in 2001 to over 33000 in 2004 AttorneyGeneral Alberto Gonzales justified large funding increases in 2005 forthe FBI on the basis of its increased workload (States News Service2005b)

It is clear then that 911 and the ensuing war on terror havesignificantly changed departmentsrsquo budget profiles insofar as cabinetand agency heads have scrambledmdashwith the presidentrsquos backingmdashtoincrease their share of funds for counterterrorism programs Whilemembers of Congress have sometimes grumbled over the progress ofsuch programsmdashmost particularly the reform of the FBImdashtheconservative Republican majorities in both Houses joined by many


331

Democrats have rarely balked at signing the checks even as the federalbudget has risen This situation may not continue indefinitelyPresident Bush and the Congress have been relatively unconcernedabout the huge federal deficits that have accrued from tax cuts the911 attacks and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq To date domesticspending and entitlement outlays have continued apace alongside theincreases in homeland security spending By late 2005 fissures in theRepublican congressional majorities over the national deficit haveemerged and threaten a potential repeat of the debates at the end ofReaganrsquos second term about ways to trim the federal budget either bydiscretion or by automatic mechanisms (Thomma 2005) Such choicesin future battles over scarce resources could have a profound impact onthe direction of counterterrorism programs spread across the FourthBranch

Figure 4 Discretionary Outlays Total Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation

Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

252422

22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent

Total Outlays FBI Pct FBI

332 Politics amp Policy Vol 34 No 2

Conclusions

One of the key lessons of 911 is that reorganization and reform ofthe executive branch is not necessarily a linear process Punctuatedequilibrium suggests that significant change is the exception not therule and is most likely to occur when there is a fundamental shiftin public expectations of government responsibilities September 11furnished a policy-making environment conducive to reformingcounterterrorism programs along functional lines by creating the DHSand to reforming the intelligence community by restructuring the FBIand establishing a DNI in a coordinating role It also created manyopportunities for strong presidential leadership By preemptingCongress on the need for a new cabinet-level department and chargingthe 911 Commission with recommendations on intelligence reform hepromised to follow President Bush was able to leave an indelible imprinton the shape of counterterrorism programs and their management fromthe top When Bush leaves office in 2008 the war on terrorism will bean entrenched component of the permanent bureaucracy

Dramatic events such as 911 also can have a distinct and profoundimpact on decision-making processes within in the White House DickCheney assumed an unprecedented role for a vice president as Bushrsquoschief advisor who makes operational decisions frames internal WhiteHouse debates and builds a very public case to go to war in Iraq Perhapsinterviews and archival material will cast light on whether Cheneyrsquosinfluence and interpretation of intelligence reports on Iraq undulyswayed Bush to launch a preemptive invasion of Iraq If so scholarswill be able to compare the advisory processes that led to decision failuresin other situations in other administrations such as Kennedy and theBay of Pigs Johnson and Vietnam with a vice-presidency-centric policy-making framework that is truly unique in the modern era

President Bush has staked his presidency and his historical legacyon preventing future terror attacks in the United States With everymonth that passes since 911 Americans breathe one more sigh of reliefbecause the country has been spared such a catastrophe now for overfour years The problem is that no one knows whether it is the blizzardof organizational change at the federal level the disruption of al Qaedacells abroad or simply ldquoluckrdquo that is responsible for the absence ofanother attack Popular expectations of domestic securitymdashwhich Bush

Conley Impact of 911 on the Executive Establishment 333

has exacerbated through his use of the bully pulpitmdashare at variance withthe realities of the access potential terrorists have to targets in theUnited States and the constraints under which government and lawenforcement agencies must operate in a free society

Sadly what is crystal clear are the continuing deficiencies inpreparedness for a major incident Incredibly the issue has not seizedadequate attention in the White House or on Capitol Hill The lessonsof hurricane Katrina underscore the point For 72 hours forecasterstracked the mammoth storm in the Gulf of Mexico They predicted thatthe catastrophic Category 5 system on the Saffir-Simpson scale wouldmake landfall near New Orleans The storm did so on August 29 2005produced massive flooding and claimed over 1300 lives in Louisianaalone Despite the DHSrsquos planning scenarios for such an eventcoordinated federalndashstatendashlocal evacuation and relief efforts failed (seeLight 2005) The obvious point is that terrorist groups such as al Qaedawill not give advanced warning The inability of federal state and localofficials to communicate with one another effectively was at the centerof the problem in Katrinarsquos wake It is not a problem unique to theCrescent City it speaks to nationwide deficits in preparation In its finalreport in December 2005 the 911 Commission (rechristened the 911Discourse Project) continued to give low-to-failing grades to the federalgovernment for emergency preparedness and response programsincluding the establishment of common radio frequencies for firstresponders a unified incident command system assessments of criticalinfrastructure vulnerabilities and private sector preparedness (911Public Discourse Project 2005) These issues were at the heart of thedismal response to Katrina at all levels of government

It may well be that organizational reshuffling per se has reached itslimits in the war on terror President Bush Congress and the executiveestablishment have prioritized prevention of a terrorist attack overpreparation for the aftermath of an incident However exclusivereliance on prevention is not failsafe and optimism is not a panacea forthe challenges that face the United States As Americans and the federalgovernment keep a cautious eye on possible terrorist threats in thefuturemdashas well as increasingly ferocious Atlantic hurricane seasonsmdashthose agencies like the FEMA with responsibility for emergencyresponse must realize as Kettl (2003) argues that ldquocoordinationproblems differ according to the incident homeland security takes


many of the traditional problems of organizational coordinationmultiplies them enormously and vastly raises the stakes for success andfailurerdquo (256) A ldquodirty bombrdquo attack on a populous urban area willrequire different resources and coordination efforts compared to windsand flooding from a major storm Kettl makes the case for a contingentcoordination model that recognizes such differences in emergencyresponse planning A similar approach emphasizes the degree to whichthe cause and effect of emergencies are known or unknown as a guidefor the appropriate preparation for response Cynefin models (from theWelsh word for ldquohabitatrdquo) array emergencies in ldquoknownrdquo ldquoknowablerdquoldquocomplexrdquo and ldquochaoticrdquo spaces This continuum defines howmdashandifmdashwe can analyze situations for decision making terrorist attacks willmost likely fall in a complex space where responses are contingent uponinteracting forces and developing situations in a chaotic space wherethe situation may be temporarily beyond grasp and where cause andeffect are indeterminate (French and Niculae 2005) Thinking aboutemergency response in these ways takes the analyst well beyond theconfines and norms of traditional organizational theory

The challenges of homeland security for presidents and thepermanent bureaucracy go well beyond moving boxes in organizationalcharts Since 911 Bush and the Congress have superimposed astructure that must now mature Whether the executive establishmentcan achieve the security for which Americans yearn within that evolvingand imperfect organizational design is a question as open-ended as thewar on terrorism itself

Notes

1 A list and text of NSPDs and HSPDs are available from the American Federation of Scientists(2005)

2 Other prominent PNAC members include Lewis ldquoScooterrdquo Libby (chief of staff to Cheney)Richard Perle (Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee) Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary ofDefense) and Paul Wolfowitz (Deputy Secretary of Defense)

3 As of December 2005 Cheneyrsquos chief of staff Lawrence ldquoScooterrdquo Libby has been indicted forleaking the name of CIA operative Valerie Plame to a reporter Plame is the spouse of AmbassadorJoe Wilson who publicly disputed the Bush Administrationrsquos claims that Iraq was attempting toprocure material for weapons of mass destruction The degree of Cheneyrsquos involvement in the leakif any is unknown

4 The National Commission on Terrorism (2000) has published the full text of the report


5 See Gilmore Commission (1999-2003) for the full version of reports 1-5

6 See Hart Rudman Commission (2001) for the full text of the report

7 The section that follows draws heavily from Conley (2005)

8 For a detailed analysis see Andrew E Busch (2005)

9 Bush had contemplated placing the FBI in DHS but concluded that its law enforcement focusrequired that the agency remain within the Department of Justice (see Sanger 2002)

10 For a thorough discussion of these issues see Mark Phythianrsquos (2006) article in this special issueof Politics and Policy

11 Figures calculated by author from successive federal budgets and the FY 2006 federal budgetTables S-2 and S-5 (see Budget of the United States Government 2006)

References

911 Public Discourse Project 2005 Final Report on 911 Commission RecommendationsDecember 5 Accessed on February 18 2006 Available online at httpwww9-11pdporgpress2005-12-05_reportpdf

Andersen Martin Edwin 2002 ldquoWhatrsquos at the Heart of FBI Failuresrdquo Insight on the News July1 20

Arnold Peri E 1998 Making the Managerial Presidency Comprehensive Reorganization Planning1905-1996 2d edition Lawrence University of Kansas Press

Barnard Jeff 2004 ldquoWalter Mondale Says Vice President Cheney Changing Role of His OfficerdquoAssociated Press State and Local Wire May 3

Baumgartner Frank R and Bryan D Jones 1993 Agendas and Instability in American PoliticsChicago IL University of Chicago Press

Beresford Annette D 2004 ldquoHomeland Security as an American Ideology Implications for USPolicy and Actionrdquo Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 1 (3) 1-21Available online at httpwwwbepresscomjhsemvol1iss3301

Best Richard A Jr 2004 ldquoProposals for Intelligence Reorganization 1949-2004rdquo CongressionalResearch Service Report to Congress (RL32500) September 24

Betts Richard K 2004 ldquoThe New Politics of Intelligence Will Reforms Work This Timerdquo ForeignAffairs 83 (3) 2-8

Bowers Faye 2004 ldquoHow FBI is Remaking Intelligence Functionsrdquo Christian Science MonitorMay 19 2

Budget of the United States Government 2006 ldquoBrowse Fiscal Year 2006rdquo Executive Office ofthe President of the United States Accessed on February 19 2006 Available online at httpwwwgpoaccessgovusbudgetfy06browsehtml

Bumiller Elisabeth and Eric Schmitt 2003 ldquoCheney Little Seen by Public Plays a Visible Rolefor Bushrdquo New York Times January 31 A1


Busch Andrew E 2005 ldquoNational Security and the Midterm Elections of 2002rdquo In Transformingthe American Polity The Presidency of George W Bush and the War on Terrorism edited byRichard S Conley Real Politics in America Series Upper Saddle River NJ Prentice Hall 40-61

Bush George W 2001a ldquoAddress to the Nation on Terrorist Attacksrdquo September 11 WeeklyCompilation of Presidential Documents Week Ending September 14 1301

____ 2001b ldquoRemarks in a Telephone Conversation with New York City Mayor Rudolph Giulianiand New York Governor George Pataki and an Exchange with Reportersrdquo September 13 WeeklyCompilation of Presidential Documents Week Ending 14 September 1305

Carr Rebecca 2002 ldquoWould the Phoenix Memo Be Noticed Nowrdquo Cox News Service May 21

Casey James 2004 ldquoManaging Joint Terrorism Task Force Resourcesrdquo FBI Law EnforcementBulletin 73 (11) 1-7

Chaddock Gail Russell 2004 ldquoWhy Cheney Despite Controversies is a GOP MainstayrdquoChristian Science Monitor September 1 11

Chambliss Saxby 2005 ldquoRe-Forming Intelligencerdquo The National Interest (Spring) 79-83

Cheney Richard 2001 ldquoInterview with Tim Russertrdquo In Meet the Press September 16 Accessedon February 19 2006 Available online at httpwwwwhitehousegovvicepresidentnews-speechesspeechesvp20010916html

Cochran John 2003 ldquoGOP Turns to Cheney to Get the Job Donerdquo Congressional QuarterlyMay 31 1306-8

Cohen Michael D James G March and Johan P Olsen 1972 ldquoA Garbage Can Model ofOrganizational Choicerdquo Administrative Science Quarterly 17 (1) 1-25

Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of MassDestruction 2005 Accessed on February 15 2006 Available online at httpwwwwmdgovreportreporthtmlchapter1

Conley Richard S 2002 ldquoCongress the Presidency Information Technology and the InternetPolicy Entrepreneurship at Both Ends of Pennsylvania Avenuerdquo In Congress and the Internetedited by James Thurber and Colton Campbell Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall 135-60

____ 2005 ldquoPresidential and Congressional Struggles over the Formation of the Department ofHomeland Securityrdquo In Transforming the American Polity The Presidency of George W Bush andthe War on Terrorism edited by Richard S Conley Upper Saddle River NJ Prentice Hall 135-48

Cooper Philip J 2002 By Order of the President The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct ActionLawrence University Press of Kansas

Crummy Karen E 2001 ldquoSpeculation Rife Over lsquoDisappearancersquo of Cheneyrdquo Boston HeraldOctober 11 2

Donahue Amy K and Philip G Joyce 2001 ldquoA Framework for Analyzing EmergencyManagement with an Application to Federal Budgetingrdquo Public Administration Review 61(NovemberDecember) 728-40

Duffy Robert J 1996 ldquoDivided Government and Institutional Combat The Case of the QuayleCouncil on Competitivenessrdquo Polity 28 (3) 379-99


Editorial 1998 ldquoSpeaking of Iraqrdquo The Washington Times January 27 A21

____ 2002a ldquoA Heroic Whistleblowerrdquo The Washington Times June 6 A20

____ 2002b ldquoBeyond the FBIrdquo The Boston Globe June 1 A14

____ 2002c ldquoFBI Chief 911 Surveillance Taxing Bureaurdquo Washington Post June 6 A1

____ 2004 ldquoReform in Hasterdquo Washington Post December 8 A30

____ 2005 ldquoIntelligence Shufflerdquo Washington Post July 4 A16

Eggen Dan 2001 ldquoAshcroft Plans to Reorganize Justice Curtail Programsrdquo Washington PostNovember 9 A17

____ 2003 ldquoMove to Justice Dept Brings ATF New Focus Under Security ReorganizationAgency Will Stress Firearms Probesrdquo Washington Post January 23 A19

____ 2005 ldquoNew FBI Cases down Since 2001 Drop Reflects Anti-Terrorism Focusrdquo WashingtonPost October 4 A12

Eggen Dan and Walter Pincus 2005 ldquoSpy Chief Gets More Authority over FBI NegroponteWill Control Bureaursquos Intelligence Siderdquo Washington Post June 30 A1

Farrell John Aloysius 2003 ldquoCheneyrsquos Intelligence Role Scrutinizedrdquo Denver Post July 23 A1

Federal Register 2004 ldquoPresidential Documents 69 (169)rdquo September 1 Accessed on February15 2006 Available online at httpwwwarchivesgovfederal-registerexecutive-orders2004html

Federation of American Scientists 2005 ldquoIntelligence Resource Programrdquo Accessed on February19 2006 Available online at httpfasorgirpoffdocsnspd

Felzenberg Alvin S 2001 ldquoThe Vice Presidency Grows Uprdquo Policy Review 105 (February-March)13-25

French Simon and Carmen Niculae 2005 ldquoBelieve in the Model Mishandle the EmergencyrdquoJournal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 2 (1) 1-16

Gilmore Commission 1999-2003 ldquoPanel Reportsrdquo National Security Research Division AccessedFebruary 19 2006 Available online at httpwwwrandorgnsrdterrpanel

Gorman Siobhan 2005 ldquoHomeland Security Dept to Undergo Reorganization ChertoffrsquosPlan Redesigns its Top Leadership Rung Revamps Intelligence Wingrdquo Baltimore Sun July 133A

Grier Peter and Faye Bowers 2005 ldquoTransforming the World of US Spiesrdquo Christian ScienceMonitor June 17 3

Hart John 1987 The Presidential Branch New York Pergamon Press

Hatfield Mark O with the Senate Historical Office 1997 Vice Presidents of the UnitedStates 1789-1993 Washington DC US Government Printing Office Accessed on February 152006 Available online at httpwwwsenategovartandhistoryhistoryresourcespdfnelson_rockefellerpdf

Hernandez Raymond 2004 ldquoCheney From Any Perspective Made His Role Matterrdquo New YorkTimes October 26 G4


Hess Stephen 2002 Organizing the Presidency Washington DC Brookings

Hiatt Fred 2002 ldquoTrumanrsquos Rose-Colored Reformsrdquo Washington Post July 15 A17

Hitz Frederick P and Brian J Weiss 2004 ldquoHelping the CIA and FBI Connect the Dots in theWar on Terrorismrdquo International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17 (1) 1-41

Hoagland Jim 2005 ldquoCheneyrsquos Undimmed Rolerdquo Washington Post February 20 A23

Hogan Michael J 1998 Cross of Iron Harry S Truman and the Origins of the National SecurityState 1945-1954 New York Cambridge University Press

Howell William G 2003 Power without Persuasion The Politics of Direct Presidential ActionPrinceton NJ Princeton University Press

ldquoIntelligence Open to Abuserdquo 2005 Newsday Opinion July 10 A35

Janiz Irving L 1972 Victims of Groupthink A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisionsand Fiascoes Boston MA Houghton Mifflin

Jehl Douglas 2005 ldquoLittle Authority for New Intelligence Postrdquo New York Times October 14A16

Johnson Tim 2002 ldquoNew Attacks lsquoAlmost Certainrsquo rdquo Albany Times-Union May 20 A1

Johnston David 2001 ldquoAshcroft Plan Would Recast Justice Dept In a War Moderdquo New YorkTimes November 9 1

____ 2005 ldquoAntiterror Head Will Help Choose an FBI Officialrdquo New York Times June 12 A1

Jones Bryan D Frank R Baumgartner and James L True 1998 ldquoPolicy Punctuations USBudget Authority 1947-1995rdquo Journal of Politics 60 (1) 1-33

Joyce Philip G 2005 ldquoFederal Budgeting after September 11th A Whole New Ballgame or Is ItDeacutejagrave Vu All over Againrdquo Public Budgeting and Finance 25 (Spring) 15-31

Kengor Paul 1994 ldquoThe Role of the Vice President During the Crisis in the Persian GulfrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly 24 (Fall) 783-808

____ 1997 ldquoThe Foreign Policy Role of Vice President Al Gorerdquo Presidential Studies Quarterly27 (Winter) 14-38

____ 2000a Wreath Layer or Policy Player The Vice Presidentrsquos Role in Foreign Policy LanhamMD Lexington Books

____ 2000b ldquoThe Vice President Secretary of State and Foreign Policyrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly 115 (2) 175-199

Kettl Donald F 2004 System under Stress Homeland Security and American PoliticsWashington DC Congressional Quarterly

____ 2003 ldquoContingent Coordination Practical and Theoretical Puzzles for Homeland SecurityrdquoAmerican Review of Public Administration 33 (3) 253-77

Kiefer Francine 2001 ldquoPost-Terror Americans Moving Onrdquo Christian Science MonitorDecember 11 1


Lichtblau Eric 2005 ldquoComplaints Signal Tension Between FBI and Congressrdquo New YorkTimes August 15 13

Light Paul C 2005 ldquoKatrinarsquos Lesson in Readinessrdquo Washington Post September 1 A29

Lindblom Charles E 1959 ldquoThe Science of Muddling Throughrdquo Public Administration Review14 (Spring) 79-88

Lindsay James and Ivo Daalder 2003 ldquoWhorsquos Job Is It Organizing the Federal Government forHomeland Securityrdquo In American Politics after September 11 edited by James M LindsayCincinnati OH Atomic Dog Publishers

Linzer Dafna 2005 ldquoUS Plans New Tool to Halt Spread of Weapons Measure to Target Assetsof Anyone Tied to Suspect Firmsrdquo Washington Post June 27 A01

Lyons Brendan 2002 ldquoPolice Prepare for FBI Changes Reorganization Could Leave FewerFederal Agents to Help with Local Investigationsrdquo Albany Times-Union May 30 B1

Magnusson Paul 2004 ldquoThe Smart Way to Fix Intelligencerdquo Business Week June 28 81

Martin Kate 2004 ldquoIrresponsible Intelligence Reformrdquo Washington Post September 29 A27

Mayer Kenneth R 2001 With the Stroke of a Pen Executive Orders and Presidential PowerPrinceton NJ Princeton University Press

Milbank Dana 2002 ldquoCongress White House Fight Over Ridge Status Compromise Is Likelyon Constitutional Flaprdquo Washington Post April 18 A19

Moe Ronald C 1980 ldquoThe Carter Reorganization Effortrdquo Congressional Research Service ReportNo 80-172GOV September 16

____ 1990 ldquoTraditional Organizational Principles and the Managerial Presidency From Phoenixto Ashesrdquo Public Administration Review 50 (March-April) 129-40

____ 1994 ldquoThe lsquoReinventing Governmentrsquo Exercise Misinterpreting the Problem Misjudgingthe Consequencesrdquo Public Administration Review 54 (2) 111-22

Mondale Walter 2002 ldquoCarter Was First to Give Veeps a Voicerdquo Raleigh News and ObserverSeptember 15 A25

Morgan Dan 2003 ldquoCongress Hopes to Raise FBI Funding to $43 Billion Compromise Comesafter Senate Call for Bureau Cutsrdquo Washington Post February 10 A2

Moynihan Donald P 2005 ldquoHomeland Security and the US Public Management PolicyAgendardquo Governance 18 (2) 171-96

NSPD-5 2001 ldquoReview of US Intelligencerdquo National Security Presidential Directives May 9Accessed on February 19 2006 Available online at httpwwwfasorgirpoffdocsnspdnspd-5htm

Nathan Richard P 1975 The Plot that Failed Nixon and the Administrative Presidency New YorkWiley

National Commission on Terrorism 2000 Countering the Changing Threat of InternationalTerrorism National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (Bremer Report)Accessed on February 19 2006 Available online at httpwwwmiptorgbremerreportasp


National Defense Panel 1997 Transforming Defense National Security in the 21st Century ReportDecember 9 Accessed on February 19 2006 Available online at httpwwwfasorgmandocsndpexechtm

Natoli Marie D 1985 American Prince American Pauper The Contemporary Vice Presidency inPerspective Westport CT Greenwood Press

Orin Deborah 2002 ldquoVeep Kicks off Anti-Terror Tourrdquo New York Post March 11 2

Otterman Sharon 2002 ldquoOn Sept 11 Dick Cheney Was the Right Man in the Right Place atthe Right Timerdquo United Press International September 7 From Capitol Hill Blue Accessed onDecember 4 2005 Available online at httpwwwcapitolhillbluecomcgi-binartmanexecviewcgiarchive=9ampnum=390

Peters B Guy 2004 ldquoAre We Safer Today Organizational Responses to Terrorismrdquo In ThePolitics the US Response to 911 edited by William Crotty Boston MA NortheasternUniversity Press

Pfiffner James P 1991 ldquoCan the President Manage the Government Should Herdquo In TheManagerial Presidency edited by James P Pfiffner Pacific Grove CA BrooksCole

____ 1996 The Strategic Presidency Hitting the Ground Running Revised 2d edition LawrenceUniversity of Kansas Press

Phythian Mark 2006 ldquoThe Perfect Intelligence Failure US Pre-War Intelligence on IraqiWeapons of Mass Destructionrdquo Politics and Policy 34 (2) 400-424

Pianin Eric and Bill Miller 2002 ldquoSecurity Permeates Budget Many Agencies Would Share $377Billion in New Fundsrdquo Washington Post February 5 A7

Pincus Walter 2002 ldquoRumsfeld Move in Pentagon Criticized Aide Defends New Post onIntelligencerdquo Washington Post December 11 A16

____ 2005a ldquoCounterterrorism Center Awaits Presidential Actionrdquo Washington Post June 3A21

____ 2005b ldquoCounterterrorism Center Awaits Presidential Action Director and Chain ofCommand Are Needed by June 17rdquo Washington Post June 3 A21

____ 2005c ldquoRumsfeld Memo on Intelligence Criticizedrdquo Washington Post April 8 A4

____ 2005d ldquoCounterterrorism Policies in Conflict Report Saysrdquo Washington Post March 28A7

Powell Stewart M 2001 ldquoCheney Isnrsquot Seen but Is Still Connectedrdquo Pittsburgh Post-GazetteDecember 2 A20

Price Joyce Howard 2002 ldquoCheney Says Powell Agrees That Terrorist Detainees Are Not PowsWhite House Seeks to Explain a Memordquo Washington Times January 28 A1

Priest Dana and Robin Wright 2005 ldquoRelationship with Bush Will Be Key Negroponte NeedsPresidentrsquos Support as He Negotiates Agenciesrsquo Bureaucraciesrdquo Washington Post February 18A8

Priest Dana and Walter Pincus 2005 ldquoNegroponte Stresses lsquoMandatersquo For Changerdquo WashingtonPost April 13 A4


Project for the New American Century (PNAC) 1997 ldquoStatement of Principlesrdquo June 3 Accessedon February 19 2006 Available online at httpwwwnewamericancenturyorgstatementofprincipleshtm

Reston James 1985 ldquoEditorialrdquo New York Times June 12 A27

Risen James and Eric Lichtblau 2005 ldquoBush Lets US Spy on Callers Without Courtsrdquo NewYork Times December 16 A1

Robbins James S 2002 ldquoDefending Homerdquo National Review June 7 Accessed on February 192006 Available online at httpwwwnationalreviewcomrobbinsrobbins060702asp

Rubin Claire 2004 ldquoMajor Terrorist Events in the US and Their Outcomes Initial Analysis andObservationsrdquo Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 1 (1) 1-11 Availableonline at httpwwwbepresscomlphsclufledujhsemvol1iss12

Rudman Commission Hart 2001 ldquoExecutive Summary of the US Commission on NationalSecurity in the 21st Centuryrdquo Milnet Brief January 31 Accessed on February 19 2006 Availableonline at httpmilnetcomhart-rudman

Russell Richard L 2002 ldquoTug of War The CIArsquos Uneasy Relationship With the Militaryrdquo SAISReview 22 (Summer-Fall) 1-18

Safire William 2004 ldquoTomorrowrsquos lsquoRogue Elephantrsquo rdquo New York Times September 8 A23

Sanger David E 2002 ldquoIn Big Shuffle Bush Considered Putting FBI in His New DepartmentrdquoNew York Times June 9 35

Schmitt Eric 2001 ldquoCheney Describes His Nerve-Center Role in the First Hours of Crisisrdquo NewYork Times September 17 A2

Seckora Melissa 2003 ldquoCheney Plays Strategic Roll on Hill Votesrdquo The Hill May 21 1

Seper Jerry 2001 ldquoMuellerrsquos Plan for FBI Draws Praise Lawmakers Applaud Directorrsquos Intentto Overhaul Agencyrdquo Washington Times December 5 A4

____ 2002a ldquoFBI Sets lsquoAggressive Hiringrsquo Goal At 900 Languages Cyber-Skills Are PrioritiesrdquoWashington Times January 30 A4

____ 2002b ldquoFBI to Assume New Powers to Counter Terror Attack Prevention Will Be PriorityrdquoWashington TimesMay 30 A1

Shane Scott 2005 ldquoIntelligence Chief to Retain Personnel Powersrdquo New York Times June 10A18

____ 2005a ldquoOn First Day on the Job Intelligence Director Sizes up His Challengesrdquo New YorkTimes April 23 A10

____ 2005b ldquoNegroponte Confirmed as Director of National Intelligencerdquo New York TimesApril 22 A19

Shenon Philip and David Johnston 2001 ldquoFocus of FBI Is Seen Shifting to Terrorismrdquo NewYork Times October 21 1

Slavin Barbara and Susan Page 2002 ldquoCheney Is Power Hitter in White House Lineuprdquo USAToday July 28 1


Sperling Godfrey 2002 ldquoDick Cheneyrsquos Powerful Veep Voicerdquo Christian Science Monitor August20 9

Stanfield Rochelle 1979 ldquoThe Best Laid Reorganization Plans Sometimes Go Astrayrdquo NationalJournal January 20 84-91

States News Service 2005a ldquoState Department Remarks on Presidentrsquos Budget Request for FY2005rdquo April 12

____ 2005b ldquoAnti-Terror Efforts Play Big Role in Justice Dept Budget Requestrdquo March 1

____ 2005c ldquoFDA Proposes $19 Billion Budget to Expand Food Defense Effortrdquo February 7missing page number(s)

Stevenson Richard W and Elisabeth Bumiller 2005 ldquoCheney Exercising Muscle on DomesticPoliciesrdquo New York Times January 18 1

Sylves Richard and William R Cumming 2004 ldquoFEMArsquos Path to Homeland Security1979-2003rdquo Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 1 (2) 1-21 Availableonline at httpwwwbepresscomlphsclufledujhsemvol1iss211

Taylor Guy 2004 ldquoIntelligence lsquoCzarrsquo Not Needed CIA Chief Saysrdquo Washington Times July 19A1

Thomma Steven 2005 ldquoFederal Spending Splits GOPrdquo Charleston Gazette (West Virginia)October 30 6A

Turner Michael 1982 The Vice President As Policy Maker Rockefeller in the Ford White HouseWestport CT Greenwood Press

Warshaw Shirley Anne 2005 ldquoIdeological Conflict in the Presidentrsquos Cabinetrdquo In Transformingthe American Polity The Presidency of George W Bush and the War on Terrorism edited byRichard S Conley Upper Saddle River NJ Prentice Hall 62-83

Washington Wayne 2001 ldquoAshcroft Orders Reorganization of Justice Departmentrdquo The BostonGlobe November 9 A13


305

intelligence sourcesrsquo failure to foresee and prevent the attacksfundamentally redirected Bushrsquos policy focus and decisions Bushrsquoswar on terror reoriented the work of the entire ldquopresidential branchrdquo(Hart 1987) comprising the White House the Executive Office of thePresident (EOP) and cabinet departments and prompted thepresident to take unilateral actions through executive and otherorders The role and policy-making influence of the vice president wassignificantly enhanced Dick Cheney has arguably become the mostprominent vice president in US history whether operating in thepublic spotlight or more frequently behind the scenes Organizationalchanges reverberated through the federal bureaucracy and for myriaddepartments budgetary priorities shifted to counterterrorismactivities The massive reorganization of agencies into the Departmentof Homeland Security (DHS) the internal reforms of the FederalBureau of Investigation (FBI) and the creation of the new post ofDirector of National Intelligence (DNI) were directly aimed atsolidifying and coordinating federal counterterrorism efforts andemergency response management Despite sporadic congressionalresistance or inertia the White House drove these changes and othersin a top-down fashion

Which paradigms offer insights to explain these post-911 dynamicssurrounding the presidency and executive branch This article positsldquopunctuated equilibriumrdquo as a useful theoretical lens through which toview how Americarsquos deadliest confrontation with terrorism impactedupon the executive branch Indeed the terrorist attacks addedconsiderable force to several trends already underway before Bushrsquospresidency While 911 bolstered the vice presidentrsquos influence innational security the policy-making role exercised by Cheneyrsquospredecessors had grown considerably in the last several decades therebyproviding a firm foundation for an even more significant advisoryrelationship and policy-making role in the White House With respectto the massive reorganization of the federal bureaucracy as aconsequence of the creation of the DHS the creation of new entities(eg the DNI) and the renovation of others (eg the FBI) 911stimulated the requisite political will to accomplish many reforms thathad been recommended previously by various commissions and theCongress but which had previously failed to garner consensus in theabsence of crisis

306

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2





307







308

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2





309



directly




Note



2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7



Num

ber

310

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


1






311



savoir-faire



312

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


the

principal advisor to Bush on theemergent war on terror ldquoHe is the vortex in the White House onforeign policy making Everything comes through himrdquo (Slavin and002)



313



2


314

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



3





315


Why Not the Best


major





316

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




4


5



6



7



317




318

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


8



9



sought

prevention


response



319






320

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




10




321




322

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



post facto



323




324

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2







325



process


326

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




327





11


328

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




Source


2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

02468

1012141618202224262830

HomelandSecurity



Bil

lion

s($

)


329





Source


2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

200220

03

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005 20

05

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18




Bil

lion

s($

)

330

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



y




331



Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

252422

22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References


















































































































































306

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2





307







308

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2





309



directly




Note



2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7



Num

ber

310

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


1






311



savoir-faire



312

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


the




313



2


314

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



3





315


Why Not the Best


major





316

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




4


5



6



7



317




318

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


8



9



sought

prevention


response



319






320

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




10




321




322

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



post facto



323




324

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2







325



process


326

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




327





11


328

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




Source


2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

02468

1012141618202224262830

HomelandSecurity



Bil

lion

s($

)


329





Source


2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

200220

03

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005 20

05

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18




Bil

lion

s($

)

330

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



y




331



Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

252422

22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References



















































































































































307







308

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2





309



directly




Note



2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7



Num

ber

310

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


1






311



savoir-faire



312

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


the




313



2


314

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



3





315


Why Not the Best


major





316

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




4


5



6



7



317




318

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


8



9



sought

prevention


response



319






320

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




10




321




322

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



post facto



323




324

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2







325



process


326

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




327





11


328

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




Source


2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

02468

1012141618202224262830

HomelandSecurity



Bil

lion

s($

)


329





Source


2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

200220

03

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005 20

05

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18




Bil

lion

s($

)

330

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



y




331



Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

252422

22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References


















































































































































308

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2





309



directly




Note



2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7



Num

ber

310

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


1






311



savoir-faire



312

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


the




313



2


314

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



3





315


Why Not the Best


major





316

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




4


5



6



7



317




318

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


8



9



sought

prevention


response



319






320

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




10




321




322

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



post facto



323




324

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2







325



process


326

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




327





11


328

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




Source


2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

02468

1012141618202224262830

HomelandSecurity



Bil

lion

s($

)


329





Source


2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

200220

03

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005 20

05

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18




Bil

lion

s($

)

330

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



y




331



Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

252422

22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References



















































































































































309



directly




Note



2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7



Num

ber

310

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


1






311



savoir-faire



312

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


the




313



2


314

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



3





315


Why Not the Best


major





316

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




4


5



6



7



317




318

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


8



9



sought

prevention


response



319






320

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




10




321




322

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



post facto



323




324

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2







325



process


326

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




327





11


328

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




Source


2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

02468

1012141618202224262830

HomelandSecurity



Bil

lion

s($

)


329





Source


2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

200220

03

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005 20

05

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18




Bil

lion

s($

)

330

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



y




331



Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

252422

22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References


















































































































































310

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


1






311



savoir-faire



312

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


the




313



2


314

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



3





315


Why Not the Best


major





316

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




4


5



6



7



317




318

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


8



9



sought

prevention


response



319






320

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




10




321




322

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



post facto



323




324

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2







325



process


326

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




327





11


328

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




Source


2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

02468

1012141618202224262830

HomelandSecurity



Bil

lion

s($

)


329





Source


2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

200220

03

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005 20

05

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

0

2

4

6

8

10

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14

16

18




Bil

lion

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Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



y




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Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

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0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

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5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References



















































































































































311



savoir-faire



312

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


the




313



2


314

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



3





315


Why Not the Best


major





316

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




4


5



6



7



317




318

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


8



9



sought

prevention


response



319






320

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




10




321




322

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



post facto



323




324

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2







325



process


326

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




327





11


328

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




Source


2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

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HomelandSecurity



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Source


2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

200220

03

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005 20

05

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

0

2

4

6

8

10

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16

18




Bil

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Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



y




331



Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

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22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References


















































































































































312

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


the




313



2


314

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



3





315


Why Not the Best


major





316

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




4


5



6



7



317




318

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


8



9



sought

prevention


response



319






320

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




10




321




322

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



post facto



323




324

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2







325



process


326

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




327





11


328

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




Source


2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

02468

1012141618202224262830

HomelandSecurity



Bil

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s($

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Source


2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

200220

03

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005 20

05

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

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16

18




Bil

lion

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Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



y




331



Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

252422

22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

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0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References



















































































































































313



2


314

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



3





315


Why Not the Best


major





316

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




4


5



6



7



317




318

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


8



9



sought

prevention


response



319






320

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




10




321




322

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



post facto



323




324

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2







325



process


326

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




327





11


328

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




Source


2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

02468

1012141618202224262830

HomelandSecurity



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329





Source


2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

200220

03

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005 20

05

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18




Bil

lion

s($

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Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



y




331



Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

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22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References


















































































































































314

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



3





315


Why Not the Best


major





316

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




4


5



6



7



317




318

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


8



9



sought

prevention


response



319






320

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




10




321




322

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



post facto



323




324

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2







325



process


326

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




327





11


328

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




Source


2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

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02468

1012141618202224262830

HomelandSecurity



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Source


2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

200220

03

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005 20

05

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18




Bil

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Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



y




331



Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

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22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References



















































































































































315


Why Not the Best


major





316

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




4


5



6



7



317




318

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


8



9



sought

prevention


response



319






320

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




10




321




322

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



post facto



323




324

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2







325



process


326

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




327





11


328

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




Source


2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

02468

1012141618202224262830

HomelandSecurity



Bil

lion

s($

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329





Source


2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

200220

03

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005 20

05

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18




Bil

lion

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Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



y




331



Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

252422

22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References


















































































































































316

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




4


5



6



7



317




318

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


8



9



sought

prevention


response



319






320

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




10




321




322

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



post facto



323




324

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2







325



process


326

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




327





11


328

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




Source


2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

02468

1012141618202224262830

HomelandSecurity



Bil

lion

s($

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329





Source


2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

200220

03

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005 20

05

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18




Bil

lion

s($

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330

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



y




331



Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

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22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References



















































































































































317




318

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


8



9



sought

prevention


response



319






320

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




10




321




322

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



post facto



323




324

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2







325



process


326

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




327





11


328

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




Source


2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

02468

1012141618202224262830

HomelandSecurity



Bil

lion

s($

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329





Source


2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

200220

03

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005 20

05

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18




Bil

lion

s($

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330

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



y




331



Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

252422

22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References


















































































































































318

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2


8



9



sought

prevention


response



319






320

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




10




321




322

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



post facto



323




324

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2







325



process


326

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




327





11


328

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




Source


2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

02468

1012141618202224262830

HomelandSecurity



Bil

lion

s($

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329





Source


2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

200220

03

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005 20

05

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18




Bil

lion

s($

)

330

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



y




331



Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

252422

22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References



















































































































































319






320

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




10




321




322

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



post facto



323




324

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2







325



process


326

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




327





11


328

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




Source


2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

02468

1012141618202224262830

HomelandSecurity



Bil

lion

s($

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329





Source


2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

200220

03

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005 20

05

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18




Bil

lion

s($

)

330

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



y




331



Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

252422

22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References


















































































































































320

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




10




321




322

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



post facto



323




324

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2







325



process


326

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




327





11


328

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




Source


2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

02468

1012141618202224262830

HomelandSecurity



Bil

lion

s($

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329





Source


2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

200220

03

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005 20

05

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18




Bil

lion

s($

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330

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



y




331



Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

252422

22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References



















































































































































321




322

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



post facto



323




324

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2







325



process


326

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




327





11


328

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




Source


2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

02468

1012141618202224262830

HomelandSecurity



Bil

lion

s($

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329





Source


2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

200220

03

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005 20

05

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18




Bil

lion

s($

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330

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



y




331



Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

252422

22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References


















































































































































322

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



post facto



323




324

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2







325



process


326

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




327





11


328

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




Source


2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

02468

1012141618202224262830

HomelandSecurity



Bil

lion

s($

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329





Source


2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

200220

03

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005 20

05

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18




Bil

lion

s($

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330

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



y




331



Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

252422

22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References



















































































































































323




324

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2







325



process


326

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




327





11


328

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




Source


2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

02468

1012141618202224262830

HomelandSecurity



Bil

lion

s($

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329





Source


2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

200220

03

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005 20

05

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18




Bil

lion

s($

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330

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



y




331



Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

252422

22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References




































































































































Slavin Barbara and Susan 02 ldquoCheney Is Power Hitter in White House Lineuprdquo USAToday July 28 1














324

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2







325



process


326

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




327





11


328

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




Source


2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

02468

1012141618202224262830

HomelandSecurity



Bil

lion

s($

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329





Source


2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

200220

03

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005 20

05

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18




Bil

lion

s($

)

330

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



y




331



Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

252422

22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References



















































































































































325



process


326

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




327





11


328

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




Source


2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

02468

1012141618202224262830

HomelandSecurity



Bil

lion

s($

)


329





Source


2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

200220

03

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005 20

05

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18




Bil

lion

s($

)

330

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



y




331



Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

252422

22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References


















































































































































326

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




327





11


328

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




Source


2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

02468

1012141618202224262830

HomelandSecurity



Bil

lion

s($

)


329





Source


2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

200220

03

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005 20

05

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18




Bil

lion

s($

)

330

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



y




331



Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

252422

22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References



















































































































































327





11


328

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




Source


2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

02468

1012141618202224262830

HomelandSecurity



Bil

lion

s($

)


329





Source


2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

200220

03

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005 20

05

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18




Bil

lion

s($

)

330

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



y




331



Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

252422

22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References


















































































































































328

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2




Source


2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

02468

1012141618202224262830

HomelandSecurity



Bil

lion

s($

)


329





Source


2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

200220

03

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005 20

05

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18




Bil

lion

s($

)

330

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



y




331



Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

252422

22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References



















































































































































329





Source


2001

2001

2001

2002

2002

200220

03

2003

2003

2004

2004

2004

2004

2005

2005

2005 20

05

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

2006

est

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18




Bil

lion

s($

)

330

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



y




331



Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

252422

22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References


















































































































































330

Politics amp Policy

Vol 34 No 2



y




331



Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

252422

22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References



















































































































































331



Source


212

197193 195 202

3442 46 51 57

191

43

16

30

252422

22

0

5

10

15

20

25

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 est

Bil

lion

s($

)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Per

cent



Conclusions











Notes













References



















































































































































Conclusions











Notes













References

























































































































































Notes













References


























































































































































References


















































































































































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