GUERRILLAS I \ •[ 111

A Battlefield Guide to Clandestine Warfare

Bob Ncwnian Foreword In Robert K. Brown

Also by Bob Newman:

Maiine Special Wartee and Elite Unh Itetics

Wilderness TOyOndiDg: How to Survive in the Wddenie» « You Travel

-nie Ultimate Outdooraman (video): Critical SkllU (or TVivcling, Snrvivine, and Enjoying Your Time in the Wildemeas

CuerriOas In lAe Mlrr. A SanUfieid Cuide to Clandesnn* nifare by Bob NewrasD

Capytljbl© 1W7 by Bob Newman ISBN 047)64-944-3 PricKd in the United Sutos olAoiecics

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All liglits leserved. Except for oee in a review, no pocdon el tills book may be reproduced in sny fern

This book was writwn tor elite-unit niilinry persotmel aid students mititay history. It was not intended for use by any¬ one who.se lira or wi.sti is to overthrow the United States gov- criunenr or any other government by force or any other means, nor was it intended for use as a demolitions manual. Conspiring, planning, or Mtempting to overthrow the U.S. government by force or ocher violent means, and the illegal use or misuse of explosives or booby traps, are serious crimes with harsh punish¬ ment for those conviacd. The author, publisher, and disrribu tors of this book disclaim any responsiMity for the use or misuse of any information presented herein. This bask is far acaitmic study only.

A.S I write stv'v I am on my way to yet another rebellion against tyranny, this <inc in (ong-siilTering .^bania, once the mow xenophobic of hard-core Communist nations. After completing live .Albania missioti. I will head stiuth to the Dark Conbnent to report on the trouHes in Vaire. Thougho of ftiese, my most recent rebellions, as well as diuens of others I have seen, have caused me to consider die role of the guerrilla in the birth of eounllewnadona—including America- as well as in The liberation of innumerable peofrics lr«n oppressive gcivcDiments, military juntas, and tiii-pol dictators. Still, most guerrilla-led rebellions tail iniserablv. So the questions that aiiyune who has an inieresr in rtbcllioos (or expects ro he involved in one; must ask arc, why do they fail and how can a guerrilla movement succeed?

Tlie answers to these queslioiw are the whole point of this remarkable book, wliich is die fint truly practicai, hard himog manual on how to establish, equip, train, and siiceessliilly employ a guerrilla unit. .Vlake no mistake about it. Guerrillas in tbe -Wirt is dw “bibie” of guerrilla warfare.

I lirsi became associated with Cimncry Sergeant Bob Newman, US-MC' {Rctiiedi, when lie wrote his litst article for SnUierafFartwubaA in 1991, shortly after hb return Iruiii the I’eisian Ckilf War. where he serv'ed with a highly ilecoraied Marine

inl'ancry battalion as a plattx'o sergeant. rHc is now XOFs con- trihiiiing editor for Gulf War Veimns Afiairs.; Ilis ditetse back¬ ground in the Corps, which irreludes tours in rccon I'airhomc- ark] combat-diver qualified), as an instruciof at the notorious Navy SERE School in Maine, Landing Force Training Command (Pacific), and the esteemed Staff Noncommisnoned Officer Academy at tbmp Gd.ger (uhere be was the chief warfighting instructor tor the .\dvanced Course), and in both the Corps’ Marine Amphibious Unit iMAU) and Marine Expeditionary Unit-Special Operations Capable (MEU-.SOC) battle eoiifigura- lions, makes him uniquely qualified to write this bo<*. As you may lie aware, I choose the places where my wnrten wtird* land very cartfully, and this, the latest of the gunny’s bot^ in a long, imptesaive list of ihun. is as secure an LZ as there is.

Read this book Ifoin start to finish, study it, lisren to the gunny’s words of wisdom, and tou will stand a much improved chance of coming away from the fight with the nndl of victors- on ytiut uniform.

—I.i. Col. Robert K. Brown, LTRAR (Ret.) Publisher, iWrfttrref'/itrBiitsinagawiie

As is guerrilla wactarc. wriiing a liook is a joint ctfon. Throiigli their insight, cacdeal c.spcrlise, comprehension of oper adonol art, and esprit de corps, Marines like Colonel Kevin C.onry, Colonel J.L. Clark, I.ieurcnmt Colonel John Bass, lieutenant OiloncI J.W. Muili III, Majnr Keith KclK, Major Pryan .McCoy, 1st Sergcini BraJ Delauier, 1st .Sergeant George Misko. 1m Seigeaiu Rick I’clow. Master Sergeant Ron Wendt. (Vjnncry Scigeini left' Caroihers, CSunncry .Sergeant Joe Gill, and Ciininery Sergeant ’•Lott” Ctegury, « well as professional sailors like Cottimander Koh Fart. Commander Hm Sullivan, and Ma.sicr Chief Petty Oilicer '1‘om Keith, all had a hand in this work. Nor wnuld any of this have been possible without the Kchnical expertise and aiienrion to detail of my eilitor, Karen Prtcheri; publisher, Peder Lund; editorial direetxir, Jeo Ford; ptoofet, Donna l>u\'all; art director, Fran Milner; art designer Barb Beasley: and the people wiiom writers olten fbtgei to rec¬ ognize. without whom not a siii^e book could be sold: the ahip- |sing rrew (‘nm Ibyreodahl, Mike Kerr, Qiris Kuhn, Ray Lyman, Susan Newmaiu Sash, .ind Dan .Stone), sales and niarkeiing directors (Wendy Apps and Tina .Mills, rc^ctjvcly), video pro¬ duction manager (Mike Tanichi, chief financial officer iDana Boeers), and die experts in die front office (Res-erly Bayer,

Wjndd B«nncn, Tom Liidlaw, Cindy Soiling, Manlyn Hanson, and Paula Grano).

Thank* also go to l.icuiciunt CtJoncI Bob Brown for press¬ ing on.

And, as always, my llianks co Susan.

, thiiyf! (Jn’v wtiulii not

—Sting

WIkci dw adcs of I liroiliinu and Naguaiu Nvcnt up in nia$- live of fusion, inanccjoiig and iJially ntdiacing KiinUrcsIs of chousaodt of lafuncsc in liolc more than aj\ inaranr, the world eatped in thock anvl wonder. Military stratcgUis did too, and many heeamc immediace coiwciipts to die belief that warfare as wv knew ii had just come to a Kreecitittg Italt.

They couldn'i li.ive heen nnirc wtoiig A quick look around the world today more than liolfa cen¬

tury later—relk us that, but for teelinology, war has thanaed lit¬ tle since chose hot August days in 1V45, and the guerrilla has somehow manag'd to reniain firmly cnffenched in seemingly euuntleas lunleRclds aroumi the gloi>e. with Australia and Antarcdci being cite only two continents that do not leave guer rilla wars going on. M has been the ease since Che first govern¬ ment was estaWislied thousands of years ago, tyrants and tytan- nkal gfi«.-mnient> are as commonplace as invaduig armies, and ciiirens are stHI growing tired of being spat upon by tliose svho see them as noiiliilg more than cxploitaWe assets who arc pow¬ erless CO do anything about their plight.

I'.nter the guerrilla. A guciiilla war is a war of the people, and. as such, it h one

that can be waged by the proverbial average citizen who has had

enough ilrase and has decided to do something aboiii it from the shadews of the forest and dit^icrapen. Armed with rifles, [»- tols, shotguns, and machine guns—all of which can be garnered by raids on government outposts—and, a cache of o^ilosives, the people come together to form a guerrilla band imcni on treeing themselves of the chains of oppression ur dri¬ ving olT a hoard of murderous mvaders.

In the darkness of night, four men ambush a military vehide by making it appear tliat their car has brr*cn down in the middle of the road and chev need assistance. The truck, diey know, has just left an ainmuiiitioB depot ami is filled with machine gni« and machine gun ammunition, plus several crates ofanritank mines.

A guerrilla war has begun. Tills scene us being played out almost daily somewhere in tlie

world, but only a small, select pcrreniage of guerrilla movements ever attain their goal. The reasons are many, but each ahi-ays come* back to mistakes made and actions not taken by the guer¬ rillas because thev simply didn’t undcBtind the myriad incriea- cict ol' a guerrilla war and hmv to wage one succcsstulty. The Chechens, niimitcmen. A^an muphadeen. Vieteong (VC:), Sandinistas, Red Chinese, and Israelis all understood the tiirrou- la needed for the conduct of a fruitful guerrilla war, but far more groups did not and tell by the wayside with bullets in ihcii head*. That is the reason fin: this book.

tn my many year* of service is a Marine, 1 somciiiDes found myself cither helping to train a Biierrilla force or trying to crush one. Today, I am redeed from the Corps but .still see guerrilla forces around the world lighting for freedom against corrupt governments or invading armies. And in today’s heltcr skelter world society, there is simply no telling svhere the next guerrilla war is gimg to break out. Tonirirrow might see )-Our coumry— tlie country voil love—invaded by a powerful and deadly army; you will have to fi^t them in the streets, fields, forests, and alleys. Or perhaps your rights will be stripped liom you finally by a criminal i>olilician and his henchmen, and ynu will suddenly find vourself m pitched battle.s against hired guns mas«5uerading

M niiliiary men. Whatever the case, you are going to base to know the ins and outs ofa guerrilla war if you expect to be vie- l.srious. This hook will hclp’you.

Here you will leam everything you need to know in a hook that sets down pnnciples based upon thousands ol'years of guer¬ rilla ss-irfare and demonsiraics how those principles are made even more useful by abiding by .Man's lltrce Rules and Eight Remarki for dealing with the civilian populace, which follow;

• All action* arc subjen to ccanmand, • Do not steal from the people. • Re neither selfish nor unjust.

REMARKS

Replace the dtior when you leave the house, (Doors were removes! and used as beds on liut summer nights in China.) Roll up the bedding on wfiich you have slept, lie courteous. Be honest in ytiur tran4.uooiis. Return what you Isorrow. Replace what you break. Do not bathe m the presence of women. Do not without authority search the pockeihonka of those

In the eorninp chajHers j^nu will Icam how to do the following;

use mines and booby traps

develop and use Icadeiship principles use ficldciaft to increase your combat power demonsiiao; sound leadership trait*

3

• utilize thi-pEinciples of <iii« trani • select the best cjtplosivc for the jol' • biiili.1 and use cunriel* and muie^jound bunker syMems • handle and erploh prisnnets • operate at night with great success

Hurrlicr. you will assimilate coiiiti lew nihct skills lo conduct a winning guerrilla war.

You will also learn, through detailed accounts, how guerril¬ las of the past has'c become victorious, a* well as how to avotd the mistakes nwiie by duase who have gtmc before you.

Now Jtni are about to become one of the Guerrilbis in iht Mist.

‘Suuii and ftu tlx bounds afUtll.’’ —Vuiacm I'li* in Midiad lackwn's •'I'htiller’

The suiiiids of rite humid jungle night lilled the little man’s cars and head as lie made his way ailcnriy thruugit rite under, story, his ban: feet feeling their way acims the leaf litter as qui¬ etly as a centipede’s. He knew this jungle well—knew each tree, each shrub, each bird, each hat, each liaaidi the jungle was liis home. With his dark skin and curly black hair, he was able lo blend iiilo Ins surroundings, .md his fluid, easy movements made him seem mote like just another anicnal under the canopy than a man. Hur this animal was more cunning than many of the othetj, and he moved with a sense of purpose and ui genvy, and revenge, a concept none of the other jungle inhabitants knew, .^nd this small, black man had a name given to him by his par¬ ents. Vouza. lacob Vouza.

Stopping beside a wee cloaked in vines irf various widths, Vouza grasped them with gnarled hands and scampered up the tree much like a moukey, quickly rcadiing the lower edge of the canopy and disappearing into the leaiy branches. A moment later, had you been a bird, you could have seen his shining eyes

5

peering from the crtwc. of the tree above the canopy and dwit onto the large stand of palms below, just into tbe liimeiHand ibat lay beyortd the softly rushing surf. cksudi scurrying ovet- licaii parted then to reveal a brilliant full moon hanging in the tropical night sky, bathing the palm grove in lunar light. Vouaj’s eves took in rhe scene, and his quick mind etched the infonna- tion into hii brain forever—the number of men. how tbeii wc.ipons were emplaced, the layout of thor penmeier, svhielc moveitient. cscrything. fhen he slithered back down the tree

The little man scurried quietly back through the lungle ihe general direction from which he had come but avoided trac¬ ing his steps exaetly; he knew that the men he was spying on may have seen him pass the first time, so he avoided the same route More than an hour passed bcibre he reachctl his desrinasion, a uiiv, hidden cave with an opening barely wide enough for a thin man to crawl through, an opening concealed by a dense patch of vegetation. Slipping thtou^i the biu.sh, he iiraselessly entered the c.wc and was met just made the entrance by a set of eyes in the darkness—eyes beluiigjng to anotlier man holding a pLsiol.

•'Martin,’’ Vouaa said softly in broken Knglish tainted with the dialect of the islands, “I find them ’ A slight smile appeared below the second set of eyes.

“You alway.s do, lacob, iny friend. You always do,* Martin Qemens replied as he nodded in the blackness of the damp cave, his aceem thick with down under. “And what have you gol for your old Aussie friend totuydit, mate?”

liie Ciuadalcanal natKe then proceeded ti> describe in detail what he had seen on his mission Clemens recorded the infor- riuition in his heasi for relay to tlie .Allied Forecs headquartered in Pori Moresby. New Guinea, sna the secret radio a commander by the name of Knc Fddt bad given him three years carher in lyasf for juatsuchau occidon. Thccrilical intelligence received hi the .Allies helped tbcm the plans leading to the U.S. Marine invasion of the island ot' Guadalcanal in the Soioinon Islands in August of 1942-

.A week afirr the leathernecks stormed ashore to comincncc one of the bloodiest fights in their lft7-ycar history, Martin Clemens, accompanied by his trusty native scout, repotted to the .Marine commander on the island, .Ma;. Gen, Alexander Vandegrift. Vandegjift cited both men for heroism and learned thai Vkniza had once been captured by the hated Japanese, tor¬ tured, bayoneted, and left fix- dead But the hardy islander was anything but dead, and he soon crawled off into the jungle and evcmually recuperated undo- the care of Clemens. His conrin- ued gueniUa aaiviiies with Clemens wvtc his wav of paying the Japs back far the toiimiess atrocities they had committed upon his people. The -Ataiincs awarded Vouaa the Silver Star, For decavks to come, the Marines continued to pay their respects at every opportunity to.'iei^wnt MijorVouxa, a renred member of the Solomon Islands Constabulary. The Mannes knew one fou^ guerrilla when they saw one. He died peacefully many years laier. the news of his passing causing Marines around the globe to pause, bow their heads, and remember.

THB HATRED SYNDROME

Man is one of the few creatures nn this paroculiir planet that u, knowD to have emonons. with other advanced sin'uans such as chimpanzees and gonllas being the most noted for showing this trait ;»iuch is well documemed thanks to the wurJts of such inthrupok^cal luminaries as Dr. Jane Gondall), amt it b pre¬ cisely diis trait that the guerrilla his relied on far well over the past TWO inillentiia to itific and confound innumerable foes (starting with, insofar as recorded history tells us, Darius's 512 H.C. invasion trf' cummt-day Romania, w-herc then dwelled a iiomadie, savage people know-n as the bcythiins who employed guerrilla tactics R> thwart Dariivs's attempts to subdue them), One of live strongest and most causative of emotions—a deep- 'cated, festering hatred of whomever tJye would be guerrilla sees as an invader or unwtKihy and repugnant political entiry—is often Ihe single most gxjwerfol catalyst to his becoming a guer-

7

rilla ard hi? being whlliDglo cany the as long » il lake? to realize victory over hi» oppres?or '1 his is what Sgt. Maj. Jacob Voiiaa tell in In? heart fot the savage Japanese invadtis who tor¬ tured arui turinenied his normally peacelul people, and his rage allowed him to perform superhuman feats such as surviving what should have been mottai bayonet thrusts to the abdomen. And it is this emotion that soil make? the guerrilla, when led bv com¬ petent and devoted leaders, willing to do almost anything to \vui, poaiiig a serious threat to those be r^>(x>?e?.

ANANCIKNTART

Rut hatteti isn’t the only factor involved in laying the groundwork for a siicce??fol gucrnlla cainpaigii. A practical knowledge of history -not so much the who dad what when, hut more the who did tvhathow and why (the guerrillas' tacti¬ cal or opcratiuna) esiim.tie of the Mtuadonr-'S also demanded of the guerrilla who is hem on tvnnning at all cost. Virtually every successful guerrilla leader of any import in the past two cencucies has been a .student of the history of gucrnlla warfare, with names like Ho CIm .Minh, .Ma?i Zedong, Hninci? Marion, fidel tiastro, Daniel Ortega, i'.h. I jwrenec. and Vo Nguyen Ciap repieseiiung only a tiny handful of i hose who have come to sec victory through ihe eyes of the giicmlia warrior, i Ifon't concern yourself with these examples being enurely Communist but for Marion and Lawrence; the wise guerrilla doesn’t allow the distasteful political tiricntanon of key figures in guerrilla warfare histtity to taini his devotion to his cause.) Given this, it is important that wc ciamine the military art denionsirited hy selected tniimphani guerrillas. Once you know who did what, and why, to win the day, you will be able tn see the battle before it happens. And every battle you light as a guerrilla will have been fouglil Iveforc, albeit in some other place at some other time, but the tactcai situation will be remarkably similar to some earlier contest between iwo swwn

8

•IVTolea, 1809; TVo rnnkeepers, a Priest, aiKl a Peasajit

A sea of coiortui alpine (lower? daiiced in the mouniainside meadenvs. appealing to the eyes of innkeeper I'eier Kemnaier and those of his small guerrilla force that lay hidden in tire dark svoods lining the road south of Innsbruck. The ^icndur of the snouoippcd Alps added lo the magnificence of the panorama, .vui Gen. Karl Kuhpp Von VVrede, leading a corps of Franco- Ravanan troops with the miaion ol destroying the guerrilla force that Isad recently ambusltcd a team of Bavarian engineers, tsaid the pK'iuresqiie selling no mind Hus was a mistake, for had he been mure attentive pj his surroundings he may have detected Ihe small band <if concealed peasants waiting in ilie forest. Alter j Ivrief hui deadly engagement, Von Wrede and his men broke ori the advance, abandoned iheir guns, and rctrcaa'd. This was Kcinnafer's first impuiTaDt victiary.

However. Von Wrede was not one to give up right away, and he saaun led a second force hack into foe mountains along the road nmmng (torn liuisbriick to Hriven. Unformnatcly, Von Wrede considered the first TyToiean victory a lliike, and so lie neglected to examine the tactics and .strategy of iltc guerrillas, thus leailifig him sciaiglu into a hrilliain amhush once again planned and led by Kemnatcr, this tame in a narrow pass that cre¬ ated (be perfect killing field As Von Wrede's army marched ihriHigh the pass. Kcniitater gave ihe signal to attack. Huge boulders, carefully ppcpaivd fi)C unraediwe use long Isel'nre Von Wrede's fi.'tve arrived in lire pass, were rolled down toward the helpless soldjeis. Ill the ensuuig panic, ihe mountaineer marks¬ men opened lire on rise disarrayed enemy tfom their iiiiassailahle ivositioos in die trees and rocks ahm'e and slaughtered them.

A? Kemnatcr was laying waste to Von Wrede, a second innkeeper, who was the (urircf tif the resistante nioveineni, .Andreas Hoict, was busy fighting and dctcating the invaders around I’asscvT Iwith intdligcnce provided by a (jpuchin priest by the name of Joachim Ha-pingerj, while an otherwise unre-

9

markaiilc pr.-djjnr b-,- the lurae of J.iseph Speckbackcr sacked Iimslirack. These three attacks ucre ts-cll-coordiiutcd by the iCiK;rriIlas, such that one of the most astonishing s-Ktories ;froni a pxitcntial combat power statidiwint) ever achieved by a guerrilla force was pulled off. The result was the capture of two geucrab :and their ciirirc stafiisl, more than 6.000 m£inir\-mcn, 1,000 cav¬ alrymen ( along with 801) of their horses), anil several cannoos-

What mistake did Von VVredc make.'Md what guerrilla war- ferc concepts and principles did the ’It-rrrfcarui successfully demonstrate a keen understanding op

First, Von Wreck’s mistakes.

• Von Wreck bad alien viclim to the sante fttc cjf many gen¬ erals of liis time, tliai Iscinga belief in his iversonal superior ity to ruch a degree that it was manifcrtcd as acrr^isncc—Iw confidered himself tix> smart and too educated to be tnily defeated by a rapag band of unruly pcasam.s. This led to his inability to grasp the importance of understanding bow the peasants were thinking tacticallv.

• VoD Wreck believed in the invincilnlity ot'his force from a muncr- ical and technological standpoint- and he failed to af^eciaie the leirain available tor use by the gucrrilla.s {and apporenth bad no umierstanding of how he could also use that terrain).

• He used no cttccnve advanced teconnaissance fijcccs to tell him of the potcndiUv dangerous pass ahead, and he never believed it was possible for him to be ambushed a second time.

• Hb lack of a viable intelligence nenvrxk added to his 5U«- ccplihility to attack and meant he had no way of kneroing that die guerrillas were organised to the degree that they could simultaneously attack three significant targets and do so with great prowess.

Now Kemaater's fortes.

• Kemnaler had an acute understanding of bis enemy, which, historically, i-s an advantage common to all fighters, be they

guerrillas or regular torecs. He dcmonstracal this liy correct¬ ly ptcthcimg Von Wrede would travel the Innsbruck to llntcn road and not avoid ihe where the ambush was SM,

• hacking any formal military training in the tactics of the day as etfxvuscd by most regular European forces—he wasn't bonkned by such static concepts as lliose championed in Humphrey Aland’s I'rcawc kh Military niidplitii— fCcmnatcr operated tacticallv in much the same way be hunt¬ ed die ekver chamois and red stag; that is. he used the nat¬ ural learurc* of the land to dictate his movements Tices, rocks, atul tlte terrain itself all provided him and bis gucrril la< with euxlleni anilHish points.

• Kemnarer, although the Iveneftciary of little formal ediiia- tion. iiiidmtood the imponance ol' gathering and dissemi- naringintdligeitce. and he knew that the enemy was not pre pared for or even expecting simuluncous attacks in diiTereni lucuDons aimed at cridca! objectives.

• Finally, be understood dial all this meant a much smaller force could surprise a larger, hcacr-armcil force and sound ly defear it. He believed.

Arocrka, 1755: The Swixs Solution

When Gen- Kdward Braddock. a classic British iiitaiitrv offi¬ cer with much expcrieuce in the European theater, arrived in the t'olomes in rhe mid 17S0s, he had no way of knowing that his DaJitiunal training and warfighting ideiXogy were to doom him to a -viunning defeat m tlte Manongohela Valley at the hinds tif

combined force of guerrilla (Fcejich) setTJcr.s and Indians, and even cost him his lile, this despite his numerical superioricy, expe¬ rience, and substantial weaponry, Braddock. unable to compre¬ hend the use ol'gtiemila tactics, allowed himself and his forve ol' 1,400 m be pinned against the bonks of the Monongohcla Bivec at its continence with Turtle Creek by a ftirce of 500 fewer men and severely thraslied This momentous engagement caused tlte Britiih hierarchy to rethink in strategy and tactics.

11

hmcr Col. I-lenn Bouquet, i hired pm of Swiss heritage bcuiighi oil by the tJr.Twn to deal with llic iDacjsmgly audacious French and Indians. A saw)' student of nulitary history. Bouquet did not loulie the Fceiicli and Indians and their tacoes, hui admired them inadepce that caiiwd him to atwndon the standard tactics he used witli such cfBcienci' on the manirold batih.'ficliJs of Eiirotie in favor of those used with such implacable elTicacy by his new enemy. Bouquet would himself become a gucmlla. (Il is inter cstiiig to note here that ihe .Swiss have a long histoty of being excellent picrrilla fighters, and tt> this day cs-cry Ssviss arizen nsid- Ing in .Switzerland is requited by law to maintain a weaiwn and be part of a miliria—itnhlce the embarrassingly ill-lnl and trained “raiUtijis'’ that have appeared on the American Kcnc of late- designed to light invaders with guerrilla netks. Switzerland is a country rite with a w-.irren of underpound bunkcis dug into the extreme terrain of the Swiss Alps that will .suppon a guerrilla war no invading annysvixUd want to tangle with. The Swiss eaaly com¬ pare favorably with Hannibal’s foices. the Victminli and Victcong ;VC]. .ind the lews’ Icgun. although the latter did askipl a policy of cerrocism, which b inaiivisable and csxievlh' viewed as motally corrupt by modem Western thouglit.

Bouquet, like successfiil guerrilla leaders bctiaie lum, those he aifiaitly faced, and those he would face in die Ixiture. saw that the following three baste precepts were called lor when fighting n guerrilla wat;

• A eountergiierrilla force Isuckas his lijdtt infantry regiment) must be anned and equipped with weapons and gear that suit rapid mervement in all phases of battle.

• It must always remain rfisperscdin order to avoid mass casualties. • It must be phvrically prepared and mentally willing to pursue

the cnemv constantly and rapidly to ptcvenl them from couiirerattackmg.

These axioms laid the foimdaiion for his sucecssliil operations against the Ftcnch and Indians, so now let us examine where

12

Braddock went wrong and Bouquet succeeded (and why other successful counterguerrilla forces, such as llogcrs's Kangers dur¬ ing this same period, whose guerrilla warfare principles are taught to this day at the United States Army’s Kanger .Schtxil and to Force Reenn Marines, proved eticeriiv). This comparison of lac- txeal standard operating ptextedures iSOPs'i can be likened to a c-omparisou of Iradilional .American infantry tactics against the Vieiccmg and those utilized by .American forces willing and able to conduct business just as the VC did. History tells ii.s that the latter—Special Forces, Rangers, SEALs, and assorted Manne units—were much more effective in dealing with rite enemy than those grunts who didn’t adaix to the tituarion.

Braddoek. probably throng his quiescent tacrical training via the C'xiitcincntal school of thought, was unable to adnpi lo the mcivilcss liit-and-run caedes employed by ihe French and Indians, This made him extremely predictable—his maneuvets eaaly inticipucd and exploited by a entfty enemy wiio knew when lo stand and fight and when to break contact and run. lAlthough cacUei settlers had found ways to downtizc units and lessen individual loads to maximize ease of niovvmcni, Hraddock liiiled to grasp rise tacrical importance of tlus. I

Rraddock's lack of knowledgeable actiuts to warn of French and Indian twvcs in rite vicinity caused liim to either advance tti contact—not often the most sound of ofleosive actions—or be ambushed. He was never able ro gain the u^cr hand with a ilclibcrate attack and simple oiftnsive maneuvers like tingle and double envelopments.

Bouquet, un the other iiand. first and foremost respected his enemy rather than fcisa-ring a belbgerem disdain rbr them and their taetics. Ills first order of business was to study tlieni and learn how the French ansi Indians engaged British torccs, where they chose tndo so. and when. This dispassionate understanding of ilu: enemy led to his second strength; because he knew Ms enemy and how they thought when it came ro the tacrical deei- sxsn-making process, he was able to mirror llsem in mobility, maneuver fttnnations. securitv, rcccinnaisiancc, and task organ!-

/.jlion The end result was Ihe Trench and Indians' reduced abil ity to strike iiuni jn ambush and indict heavy camaltkt, quickly break contact and disperse, and use a keen ccontsmy of manage¬ ment—)ust the rigjit number of troops Ibr the mission—and thereby lessen the nsk of detection. Finally, as the Germans in World War I would do, he adi^d a decentralised philosophy of command as the order of the day. which allowed amah unit lead ers to make immediate tactical decisions on their own ssithont first begging permission from higher-ups, a policy adopted carh' nn bv the Continental Marines, later known as ihc Gniced States Marine Corps, which is still in uk today.

Nevertheless, ftespire Bouquet's clearly superior grasp of the criticality of light infenirv tactics interlaced with guerrilla tncks of the trade, the British army never reaUv caught ■« or accepted dib. On the other band, the cUonists, e-spccialls ihnsc in New lingland, were quick to cake up guerrilla techniques when ihcy broke Ifoni the Ctown in 1776. U'p against the revolurionsiries' emphasis oo marksmanship, small iinit leadership skills, initiative, cunning, and solid intelligence gaihcring, the Briredi were doomed to bilure iTom the start. (On the matters d'lnielligenec and reconnaissance, it should be noted that tlie rehcb, is the British rcrerred it> them, or minutcmcii. a the Amenc.in's referred to them, used human intelligence ro great length, such as when the semoii of the Old North Chtmh in Bouton. Robert Emetson Newman, an ancestor of the author, hung two lanterns ui the steeple to seam iBlvcfstnith Paul Revere of the Bntisli arrKal in Boston harbor. 'Iliis moicaic network would prove to be a maddening thorn in the side of the Crown throughout the war. The rebel Newman was capeuted soon thereafter and Ksetcly thrashed.>

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH \'IETNAM. 1V50-197S: A DARWINIAN DILEMMA

When tile first Amencan Military .Assistance and Advisory Group (NLA.AG) arrived in the Republic td'Vietrum in 19»0 to do what it could tor the ill-fetcd leginie and tounlry, the advisors

14

probably had no inkling of the turmoil and hand wringing to come. The problem would prove to be Darwinian in nature, with die fittest adapting to the changes and the lessfit trying in vain to make the day business as usual and sutTering a fate that befell those wbo went b^re them. Hie American esperience would prove to N: much like that of the Trench in French Indocliina. which ended with the disastrous defeat of their garrison (with mure than 2.000 dead and well over twice that ntunber wounded) at DienBicn Phu by the Vieiminh in the spring of 1954. Tlie Vietininh were bill lianily eominanded by Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, wlio ordered anillery to be teuctly hauled up into die mountains overlooking the plain on which the French garrison was situated, a stroke of tactical genius that allowed him to slidl tlic hapless Trench at will.

fiimiUriy. the Ameriems would by and large fed to adapt to the survival challenges laid liefore tliem in an cnviroiuncm that had bested manvcarlict mvadecs. This fact is what is perhaps most (vcrplaung and troubling; despite Vietnam’s history of warfare, which clearly shows the piifalls army after army has suffered iliere. invaders have continued to march Into is emerald rice paddies, tcreaming iiinj^ea, and xntaeled nvers but never learned.

Gcnerd Giap, his devoted cadres, and the seemingly invisible hoards of clever guerrilla warriors, die Victcong, understood char enemy at all levels and thus were able to engage a virtually gigantic, ludcuusly well-armed and cxpencnced foe with che same tactics used by guccritlas since ficyrbia. .Adding to the com¬ bat power of the insurgent, were the Vietnamese concepts of dme—svhich is quire differeni from Western perceptions—and acceptable loss. The Vietnamese do nor .see a decade as being long at all. and a century trs them isn't much longer than a decade. This oudook illir*s them to undertake negc after siege with no thought toward how long it may or may not take; if it lakes a thousand yean to win, then so be it.

.America lost the war not so much on the battlefields—its sol¬ diers won tar more important cngagonenis than they lost—but in the White House, Ifepartnicnt of Defenre ;Dt)D), and I’cntagon. Consider the tuUowing.

• President? Harry Truntan, Dtriglti histnhower. John F- KenneJt*. Lyndoa Johnson, and Richard Kixtai cacli failed KI graif’ the tcnidry of the enemy. TIk? set the sage for defeat as rat back as Sqrtember of1950 when-American advi¬ sors staned showing up in country to guide a corrupt and often cowardly Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVNi.

• Gen. William Westmoreland failed miserably to have his con vcndonal forces adapt to puenilla warl'are He bdicvixl that Urcpowcr and technology would win the war tor aAmenca. I le was dead wrong.

• Robert .McNarasxa, the scovtary ol'defense during some uf the Vietnam War’s most vicioiu ligbtiiig.lied to the American public by sajnng he truly believed the war was winnaHc. In tealiiy. by his own admiasion, he was convinced it was a lost cause ftom the start but continued to advise the pnrudent to send more itooiss into wliai had bceomc a meat grinder.

• The Amcriean public quicUy grew sick of television scenes that showed Amenean soldiers being slaughtered in distant rice paddies, year after year, with no return on their invest¬ ment. As public suppon waned, so, too, did the soldiers’ chances of rietory.

• Most officer.? on tlic ground did not understand the dangers of guerrilla warfare inso&r sis iw long term leiliality, and wlien they did they were often not allowed to light guernlla .stylc.

• Because orcnnscripdoii lihe draft) and rampant drug ainise in many units, the quality of leadership wa* frequently abysmal. The best units proved to be those with few drug pKiblenu and disciplined noncomnusaoued officers (NCOs) and ofHccrs who saw themselves as professional soldiers and condueted biidness as such.

The North Vietnamese, on the other hand, bad plat’ed their hand masterfully. They luiderstooJ the nature trf the war they were fightiag and prosecuted it well in most instances

• Ho Chi Minh and General Giap correctly antinpalcd that if

16

America’s troops were kept on tlie batilelidd long enough, the American puWic would demand dial they lie hrougin hwne. Giiemlla taaics suited tliis belief perfectly and brought the American psyche into ilie Iwitie.

• The last three wars America had Ibught -Korea, World War 11, and World War Ij were all comenrional wan.. This left the Americans with few leaders who under.siood the nature of guerrilla warlare.

• The Communists, knowing that a curious iVmericaa media would soon dig into the corrupt South Vietnamese govern nient and that the ensuing expose would reduce public sup¬ port for the war even more (which is exacrly what hap¬ pened). managed to amccal their own corruption and bru- lalicy by denying media acceas to thcii much more closed

• In must iiisaanees the North Vietnamese brilliantly exploited prop^eanda opportunities, such u the traitor actress Jane I'onda manning an antiaircraft gun m H.uioi.

The North Vietnamese won this war as much on Main .kireei Ajnerka as they did in the ns'c paddies and jungles of South Vieinain and in the skies over Hanoi and Haiphong. Today, an ■American ambassador once again resides in Hanoi and American companies like Nike pay VTctnamcae ftictury workers 2U cents an hour to nuke SI4fl sneakers.

Now 1st u» esamine wbai is arguably one of the most fasci- ucing examples of a succcsstul guerrilla campaign ever waged and see how you, as a modern-day guerrilla leader, can learn from a cigar champing, bold, lucky, and iinlortunaiely conimu- Qiat revnludonary.

ILsnameisHdel Osim.

Cuba, 1953 and 1956-1959

“Histaiy <piU absolrt nu. “ ridd Cwm alter hot aftault nn the MniieaJi Rarrjeet> Failed. 19R.1,

Ifet'er there a clusic example of a guerrilla war won h\’ the iiiMjrgents despite a staggering nimierleil ai\d technological Advantage held a gtdvcmmcnt and its army, Ctiba i> it.

Fidel Castro, after (ailing in his dnt aticmpt at revxilution lit 1953 (alter witieh he and his Itrother K.'iiil were imprisoned for two years by Batbta and treed under a general amniscv in 1955), stepped back up ^ hat in 1956 and very ncariy struck out a sec¬ ond lime, liit liny guerrilla band never numbering more than i.OUO.and chat at the end of the war. (A year or su earlier Castixi could muster only a few hundred.) Casern’s guerrillas were purtr- ly armed and equipped, to say the least. Oo the other liand, dic¬ tator Fuigcncio Babsta’s army eventually numbered 30,000 and was supported by the United States. This put the fbree-nn-fbrce ratio ai 15:1 in ftvor ol'B.-itista. But. to lire guerrilla, nmubers often mean iHithing.

The son of a peasanr, Kidd was horn in Cuba's Orience rrovince, where poverty was the norm as a resiili of ihe failed social psJidcs of Batista, with much support and encouragement

21

tium .^trit.in mining, ftmt, and ^ugar iiiiercsts. lie was raiud a Cdliiolic, receiving his early ciIucjikmi itnni Jesuit presB, and later attcndcil ihe Univerwt}' ol 1 lavana. Castro showed ngns early on of his proclivity tosv’ard panicipatmg and having a hand 111 leading eiicriUla wariatc movcmcnis. Hisfiisi attempt at such an intuircciinn came in Cxjlombia in IW when he was onh- 20 years old, and it fiiUcd miserably, 'fhe seed of the guenilla had neverlhcle.ss gcrniiiiated and began to grow rapidly an the fcrtile soil of Batista's brutal ditiaiorsbp.

After rounding up men and to^lical supison in Mericti. Castro set sail for Cuba aboard a leaky setw called tltc Gramna with 82 would-lse guerrillas. Disaster struck immcdaitk as the rusDng launch approachcil Cuban sliorcs with Cuban soldier* waiting. Landing in a .swamp and losing most of their supplies, the group was ambushed in a cane field ai>d escaped into the .Sierra Macstra—tiie rugged mountains ftirnung Cuba’s spine— wirli aboiii a doacn survivors, including, remarkably, Fidel, his broilier Raul, ansi revolutionary guerrilla Ernesto “Che" Guevara Wth 70 or no of his men dead or captured, things did¬ n’t look good for Castro, and rhe Batista gjovcnmciu kept the pressure on. However, the struggling guernlla leader found wel¬ come fricnits in the most desperate t>f Cuba’s poor—the pte- eai isuu—who tiavl no land to legjilly e.ill their own He esiab lislied a seeutiiy and iiiielligcnce network among them that pro¬ vided the gucctillas with a more secure base from wluch the* could mount minor attacks, and Cnstro's guemlb war look oft in earnest.

By 1958 Castro’s forces had grown to about 300 mostly unarmed—and those who were armed were, at best, poorly out- littcvl—pcivant guerrillas. Not wanting to bile off more than be could chew—he rcmenihcrcJ his almost faral scrape in 1953 and his 1948 involvement in the Bogota riots, which also nearly cost him tus life—Castro managed .some small victories against gov enimcnt outposts and, in doing so, gained moral support from more and more of the inipoverisiicd populace of Oriente Province. Soon he found himself controlling 2.000 square miles

22

which was the last straw as far as Barista was concerned. The result was a massive assault on Castro's stronghnld that invoKcd virtually every major asset of the Cuban armed forces, including close air-supixift, massed artillery fires, armor, naval gunfire, and nearly 5,000 troops. It appeared tiiat Fidel Castro was about to

In idxmt two weeks’ rime, Barista's 13 mam-uvering units bad lightened the noose around Castro’s position to an area of about lour square miles Castro now-displayed a slirewd under¬ standing of guerrilla tactics by slowly &alling back and Lvicaking coiiiacr with the army each time it advanced, while using scouts Co keep an eve on the soldiers and reporr on their strength, di.s- posiaon. and compotitiua. He chereLty learned the army wa: crowing connnuoasly w-caker because of the extremely demand¬ ing nature nfcnunrergucrrilla warrarc fiiughc in rugged moun¬ tains with dmusi constant rains and ever-increasing disease among the irusaps. Finally, when Castiu decided chat the army w-a.s at its most vulnerable from its clearly ticticallv and logLsci- caily uvcicxccoded lines, he and brother Kaul simtilianemisly attacked two key positions. Castro went after one of the must exposed and insecure units and wiped ii our, killing m<irc than 6U0 soldiers and capturing a huge stasli of weapons and equip¬ ment; the surrivors broke and ran. Kaul assauia-d guvemment pnsitioiu in the north, which yielded dnxens of prisoners—all American and Canadian—in the turm of avilian employees, sailors, and Marines Bur rather than kill chum, Raul cftbeccd a brilliant propaganda coup by treating them well and releasing them completely unharmed, an act Chat placated any wuuld-be American enemies.

Once Batista's army was on the run, Castro again demon¬ strated a sound understanding of offensive fuiuiamentals by sus¬ taining momentum and maintaining contact with the badly

>pvilar support from th^ pcopk. Ratisca fell in TaDuary l^?9. \Vhy did Batisia fail-

Hitiira’s first and probably most liHitift error—although rt could be arguL-d ihjx hi. tirsi true mistake u-as releasing C'istro and his brother fttan imprisonment on the Isk ot Pines_ss-as his failure lo potsiic wth shgof and determination Castro's surnving fortes after their ill-latnl landing in 1956. Ransta laclccd both initianve andresoht and failed loesiimarc accuraicly CastroV willingness to li*e like an animal undCT unhetievabis- harsh tondincos of deptavarion and misery in the Sierra ^UcSIra. Had Barista mounted a campaign like that of Operation Summer—his final but doomed attack on Castro's position in May and lurK of 1958 -while Castro’s forces numbered less than 20. he probably would have woo. The diciarsir ditl not understand how poUiKally damaging his brutal handling of strikes and protests by peasants would bcctimc CO him .fimerican supixirt began to wane and quick¬ ly cvaporictd with the number of newspaper repots filed by American and oilier Western reporters that spoke favorably of Castro’s appitcolly democratic intentions and chanstnaiic leadership style.

' t.a.stlv, the dc-caying tuiderpinnings of Balcsta’s corrupt regime lent ihcmsclyessvcll to popular support of the guer¬ rillas—who promised “land hir the landless'—by the pcas- .intrv. This w-a.H played upon heavily and eftictiveh-by Castro.

And how did Castro manage to eed alter such disasti

Castro’s mist posrerfal asset was his devotion m his cause lly being rerilient—and lucky—he was able to keep lUvc his at first ludicrously inept attempts at guerrilla warfare. Like many guerrillas before him, Castro believed he would even rually succeed, and he did.

such as keepmg an eye on the enemy to dclcrmine bis strength, composition, and dispositiuD and then .struck dcasivc blows when du-y were at their weakest. He prossed the attack from iliere and won.

Iviy reiiuuns in clear |inwer and apparendy gtxid health, tuoning a

dents, all of whom liavc made i clear that they wanted liini gore.

But he is still there.

L

-It is she fsAivn shoe iuys lo mah «'«(•. pn'sumiilily it vill !iat a white Kt.'

—Pruiu’s Frertcnck chc Se^uLil 'H-tunkk ihcCTreunflileticrmVnlulFC. 1742

When <inc cxaminct the history of giierrilb warfare tiiicc its i’iee(<iir>n about five centuries bef()rc a woman named Mary> the nili- ut'a pour cicpenier, gave birrii to a son in Gaiike. one £nds chat of all ibe intncaiics involved in a successful guerrilla war, leadership is key. ‘the l>csi amsed, best trained, and inunt right¬ eous guerrilla arniy is of little consecjuencc to the govemmeat furcct It is fighting unless that guemlla army is led by lotelligenc. well-trained, daring, eiever, and earing leaders who know bow to get the very best perfonnatice out of die men. History tells us that a guerrilla force with leaders who demonstrate tltese trails and qualities tan defeat even seemingly invincible foes. For instance, when die marauding and undefeated soldiers of the niighty Kublai Khan invaded present-dav Vietnam in the I3ih ccniiiry, the Mimgols came up against a people with a well-doc- luiiciitcd history <if resisting invaders. In fact, the very first mili¬ tary academy tn be (bunded in Asia was opened in I lanoi earlier

27

in that centiiiv. and from ii came a ladies bouk lhat allowed ibe Vietnamese to tecel the savages who bad proven m be, up io_ lhat pailii- unassailable. Leadership was the key to the sactess of that academy and ofthc many victories that foUowed.

GLTiRRILLA LEADERSHIP STRATEGY

Bctcire we toniinuE, let me say that I am no fin of any form of itTanny, and I Icwllie what tyrannical giwcmmeius—espctwlly diose baitd on Corrununi-sm—stand ihr and what they are willing to .kj to their own people in order to achieve dieir ends. Howetxr. as both a scudent and insttnetor i>f military hinory, tactics, and sirucgy, I have tisund that beuig able to put a»dc one's pcisunal tvcliiigs about this <it that form of |.-tvxmmcm in order to esam- iiie and etploit the portions thereof that arc worth the dme and effort makes one a more effective leader. (Wasn’t Gen, George Patton keen enoindi to study Eield Marshall Erwin Rommel’s iiiagh'tial treatise Infnntfrie (rmft An I Infantry .Attacks) to the degree that he was able to defeat Rommel in the North Affican desert bctsiiiw he had read his thnughu on lactics? •

And as an otiheat esamplc oi' how some ideas and principles that originate in the enemy camp can prove to have merit, we have America's Social Security progrant, Enacted in 1935, il makes everyone pay for the wclhtre of everyone else when they become senior eiti^eivs. In other words- the government is forc¬ ing indi«diials to assist in the welfare of the whole, legardlcss of whether the donaton. intend to ever use the system dicmsehcs. 'I'his, of course, is a clearly soeialist principle, and socialism torms the underpinnings of Manism. Nevertheless lalihoui^i the sys¬ tem is going to have a serious rash flow problem in five years). there are tens of niillions of -American senior cilivens who Jevvend on their Stcial Security check every month to survive

Ollier groups who have employed the ideas, principles. ai\d/ot tactics of the enemy In ftirther their own objectives include the L'ommunisl People’s Army of Vietnam iPAVNi ansi the infamoua terrorist group known as the Irish Republican

Army (IRAj, as well as the Haganah, whicii w-as a guerrilla/tcr- ronst group of Jews in Palesiiiie during the 1940s wlicn rhey were fighting for them freedom ffom the British ot,.upational Ireee m Palestine anil fur the futmadon of the state of Israel in its place. (The Haganah supported their riva] gnsup's bombing of the King David Hotel in fcru-salcm ui 194ft, winch killed 91 and wounded 45, until live .siippori of the Irgim Isecame a polit¬ ical liability and they withdrew it. It ia interesting to note that the ligun was led by a master a-rrorisc who would later lead the ennre Jewish nation His name was Meiiachcm Begin. 1 While it is true that Vladimir Ilyich l-enm also championed the principles oi'what we arc about to iliscuss, it will Ise shewi that the system vvorits wdi w-ben cmpUccd, employed, and supervised eurrcctly.

Dau Tranh

I will be aving VietnamcM; terminology to set the stage fur this section Iseeause ihe Vietnamese have sueii a remarkable his¬ tory ul being very successful guerrillas -nid war lighters in gen¬ eral. For 2,000 yeans the V'icmamcse have euntmuslly been -ivaded and occupied by- aggressors from Asia, Europe, and Norlh America, and each -ind every iinie ihey locked inio rierec sirugifle wiifi their lue with the absolute belief that they would eventually win Results^ Yes. dicy did in l^i win every time. They're literally batting a thovisand. Any penjsle who can do this ')vi-r two millennia have my respect and attention, even if their curreni gov^rnmeni stinks.

Pan trtiHh is the VVlBamese concept of struggle, and ii is a siruj^lc based not on Marxist or even Leninist philusophy. but rather a xcuapliubic outlook linked to rite philosoplucs of both Taoism (w-hich is based primarily on mysiiasnij and (kin- fucianism, as well as Viemam's prominent religion. Buddhism, laoisi philoMjphy stresses the imysoriance of vinipliciry of action and .inasscrrivcccss in attaining goals [it focuses on ystilience and caution being used tn get whai you want rather than yotm attack¬ ing the problem wiilioul due thought to your options) and was

conceived of tiv i I'.hmcse philosopher named I ao-tzu in ihe sklh exiiiury B.C. ('onfutianism dwlis on die importance of lcnov.mp oneself and seckinj; w’isdom thrmieh inner reflection jnd the earefiii assessTnent iri the opposition lit also cainc into being in China about the same lime Taoism did:. Buddhists believe that in all livT-es there is nidering, but that this suffering can be lessened and cs'cntually almost eliminated ihniiigh ihe practitioner's honest and never-endmg anempis to become morally and mentally pure. By combining xcnt^hobia Ithcir belief in people orhet than themselves- all fureigners—as being culturally, spirituality and morallv inferiorl isiih ihc Taoist, (.lorfacianist, and Buddhist niind sets, you pn a people who truly believe they cannot be conquered and who will do whatev¬ er it takes for a» long as it takes to cjeci the ins-ader. These peo pie arc tlie Viemamese.

Hut rf/iM tranh is much more ilian a simple struggle. Ii mt-am a willingncM to fight forever against ihe savage invaders in a glo rinus and righteous contest in wdiich every person must panici- paic. In Islamic tenns it might be compared to a )ihad or “holy war.” briim tliit concept comes the foundaooii of the succeMlul guerrilla war; the maintaining of an armed tbree of gucrnllas corsistmg of those who arc Kghting for their freedom and rights, led lr>- like ituiividuals who arc honored to be and arc capable of leading the gucrrllas to victory- a ibrce that believes in lire sancricy of ils goals.

Boriunatcly—or perhaps not so—you don’t haw to be a Huddhist, Taoist, w Confuoanist in order lo urilize ihe concept of na»h or its clcinemt, which we will discuss in a moment. Dar* troHh can tie put to good use by any guerrilla force ihat believes it is right in doing what it us dUng and is led by high- qualiiy Icaders-

Tbe Key Elements oflMu Tranb /Jan manl; consists of two kev dements, both ofwhich must be

btousdii into play il'a gucmlla fbree utpecis to be succectiiL The fint. rfaw trusl.'is the cumhai clcmeni of alo* and

It means “amied struggle.” It Ls ahvays a part of the guerrilla war, rcgaislless of who die aggressor is and how- that aggressor is con- djeringhiscam[iai^.TI»esecemd, rfaasranhchinh tr}.iiibc poht- ical end of the concept, but it is a pohtitai oul diat is armed. It is divided into the friUowing three enddes coliccdvciy known as sa»:

• Dan pan refers to die civil and administrative aedvities i1k guerrillas condua in areas they have seized and now control. It means ■‘action among the people."

• Binh van means "acnon among the military" and refers to nonmilitary actions taken against the invading army.

• Ihe/f van is propaganda. In Vietnamese ii iranslatcs into “aerion among the enemy.” It is umlertakcn on both guer¬ rilla turf controlled by the invader and the invader's home¬ land, if possible.

Ac this point you probably realize that svhat wc arc talking almui is total warnirc. a concept that, although dcmoixstratcd by 1 regular anny, to some degree was practiced Ivy none other than William Tecaimseh Shennan during tbe American Civil War. Because he understood the effects of bis waging total war on tlic populace of the Soudi and its army, and because he exploited those effects to great feagcli, Sherman was able to nut only lay waste to the land, but break ihcipint of the civilian populace and severely degrade that of the Confederate Army. Of course, rfiere is no iiulkackifi m Sherman’s writings that be was trying to apply ifau nan/r to the American scene in the ISbOs. but his acdons wetc eleariy along those lines. His grasp orieadersliip led him to vunney just as surely as Grant's grasp of innuvadvc taedes and undcntandingofmancuvvrwarrarc principles—such as his rcKisai to lall hack across the R.-ippahanntiek w-lien lee twice attacked liim—led to Lee's surrender at the courdousc at .^poraartox.

In contrast, ssie can look at guerrilla organizations that had the potential, at least in terms of manpower and weapons, to wai their icipectivc wars but evsaitualiy failed bctausc uf a flaw- in fhc foundation of their leader's leadership abilities. Such an

sample is the Semfero Liiiiiinoso or "Wiining Pslh’’ njn.-oter- rorist puup of Peru.

I'Ke Shining Path first appeared on the scone in 19X0 as the •iinied brinoh of the Commvinisl part)’ of Peru In May or that year, Alsimael Gurman Reynoso, t former successful philosi^hy^ protessesr and personnel director at the N'anotial L'luvctsity of San Cnstobal dc lUaminga (and onc-limc director ol the uni- versiry’s tocher training ptogram). Jeelared a -people’s war" against the govemmcnl. with him a* the leader ta the Shining Path. Me liked to he c,tiled the “Kourih Sword ofMatsism." with iM name added to ilie other ihrec. those bang Mao Zedong i Uii7man operated «alh a decidedly Maoist slartt), Karl Mary Iwho cnauthored the Commumsi Maiui'esio with Friedneli Hngclsi, andAladimir Uyich Iwnin llhe lirst leader of ihc Union of Soviet Sodalisl Republita; heenjpncered the over- throw and murder of the Romaiiofft).

Ill May of IVSn. the Shining Path boasted no nvav than 200 gtiertillas. But the sociopotilical and cceintatiic wiiiaikinj within Peru ia murderously corrupt president and 7,600 percent intLi- non. coupled with a dtnvntfodden peasantry dependent on the coca le.if tor survival) were pcn'cct fi.w the gueTrillas to cspbil, and by I'WO the giiernllas (now turned iiarcoterrurisi.s) had killed more than JO-llOO peottle. Ailding to die Sliining Path’s ahiliiv to wreak havxic was the corrupiabitity of ihe gswerument tinves sent lo hunt them and the ma&sive ate of Peru, which Icfl ihem iniiii- merahlc places in which to hide and operate. Imrthetroorc. the leaders of the fill tire Shining Path were all trained in Maow ide¬ ology in the late IVODs and e.irfy to mid-lVTOs m tlie I’cople’s Republic of China. If ever there was a pcrtcct oiiportiuucy for a guerrilla group to succeed, this appeared to K- it.

Three lactots, however, brought aboul Ihc downfall of the Shining Path, hirst was Cliiaman himself A temarkablv arrogant egomauije who genuinely perceived liimscit as being on the same revulurionaiy plane as Mao. Marx, and Lenin, tiuaman considered liiiiisclf to be ihe uMmaie .Maoist guerrilla leader He was not. .Second, Guzman directed the Shining Path to dcyiarr

32

standard

both the psasants he tetrorizcsl in the countrysiile and the Peruvian miihlii- <da5s uui intell^cotsia.

ihnally, the election of Alberto hujimon to the Peruvian presidency in 1990 and his reconsolidaiioii of power (ruie liy decree'i in 1992 bmupln the economy under control. Ttiis allowed him to devote mute money to building and deploying a better oounreriniurgcncy prt^srani. In 1992 Guzman was cap mred in a raid along with some top Shining I’atit officials in Luiia, a raid that also produced an asionisjiing intelligence eniip in the Ibrni of ihe group's computer files, deiailiiig ail their planned aciioos and who was who withui ilic urg.truzariun, This allowed the govxrnment t<i lip the guts out of the .Shining Path. Since 1990. deaths artriboied to the Sliinmg I’aili have fiilleii by SS perient. Guzman remains imprisoned wuli no a)itvarcnt hope of ever svcuig the li(dic of ilay ag^. and Peru's forttines ace iiii|>roving accordingly.

The Shilling Path sufl'ered from a loial absence of hIum iranb.

The prudent guerrilla leader will avail himself of proven lead ership traits. To do ocherwisi: will cciTainly result in failure. .Although 1 am a retired Marine with 2U years of woiidwide ser¬ vice in the grunts, rccimnaissance, and special operations, .uid dicrefivre speak with a degree of bias when it comes to whose .caderdiip abilides arc best, history cells us that the U.S. Murine I'orps’ concept of combat leadenlup is on die nitring edge. This concept is built aremnd selecl&l leadership traits and characteris¬ tics that serve the guerrilla leader extremely well. However, witli- oiit a decentralized philosophy of command—one in which the siwcrmojt commander on the scene is fully authorized and encoiitogcd to make ilecisiuns then and there without seeking perimssion from higher authority, regardless of his rank—these

33

traiQ, which follow, will be ol'little u-se. The guerrilla force oper- iring without a decentralized philosophy of conunand is akin to purling a governor on the throttle ofa Dodge Viper.

This trait is devclt^d in the guerrilla through a combina¬ tion of thorough, very demanding training, and the plaang <d‘ the would-be leader in progresBvdy more challcngmg positions of absolute authonty, including actual combat itussitms. fake away the ehaUengiug positions or the outstanding traitiing, and the guerrilla will fiiii.

A complete iindctnanding of tatties is absolutely estcntial for ilie guerrilla to become decisive Otherwise, his tactical shortcomings will manifest themseb’es in defeats on the battle¬ field, resulting in his men^ dimmiahed trust and confidence in him as a leuler. To become lacticallv competent the giierrilli must not only study military history, but the complete histwy of the people he is lighting, including tlwir culture. Tlie Americans tailed in Vietnam, despite a glaring superiority in firepower and technology, largely because the generals tunning the war lacked a practical understanding of the enemy’s eoneept of tranh. as well as their concept of time

Moving the guerrilla ptoyessivciy up the Icadendup lad¬ der-starting with comparatively easy missions where success u liXely_will build his confidence in hinudf and his abilities, and his men will develop a like confidence. Bauc guerrilla tactics, such as avoiding enemy units with serious combat power and striking those with reduced strength that are vulnerable m ht^- folly more than one way. arc often the best because they are so simple and effeelivc On the other hand, fiiiled missions must be cmiiiued thoroughly so that the mi.stakcs made in the battle wall be avoided m the fiitute. i.A “zero defects’' mentality will destroy a guerrilla force Ivefbre it gets started. Oftentimes, mistakes arc excellent learning tools. The guerrilla must, from dme to time, be allowed to foil, provided that failure is not catasiro|diic. The

rnandanr in the early and mid- 1980s, began suffering from this ptoliiem; it is still one they arc wmstling with, but it would appear there inighl lie some light al the end of that long tunnel.)

Dependability

I low much you can de|Kitd on a guerrilla or a guerrilla unit cepends largely on the mdivulual's or unit's character, makeup, Icadeiriiip. and tiainiDg, By knowing his men, cite guerrilla leader can make an inliirmcd decision as to what unit to send on

Take government armed Ibices as an example llatsjxm- sibUidca arc delegated baxd on who is dependable for what type of mission. Vm- instance, underwater demolition work h best conducted by the Navy -•sKAIa. but they wouldn’t he the right unit for csublishiog a gucmlfa training base deeys In enemy rer- niory: rhis would fiill to (be .Army Special Focecs, And whereas a large-scale aiiivonte assault would best be conducted by the ■Army’s 82nd .forborne Division, the parachute insertion of a .enall team of men to surrepritioiisly collect inliarmation on enemy strength, eoniposition, and disposition would best be li.mvlkd by Force Recoti Marines.

All rhu can be dirccfiy applied to the guerrilla force as well. Ky training each guerrilla vigorously and fiircing him to max liircsclf out il'that's what it takes to accomplish the mission, i guerrilla force gready increases its combat power. Weakness on me y>art of one guerrilla can and often docs end in dtsiuter. If he can't cut the mustard, lose him,

Ixiyalty

.Aliliougit tile individual guemlla’s loyalty to the leader is important from the viewpoint of respect, it is more important for ibe gucrnlb to feel loyalty to his unit and for tbe leader lo feel loyaltv-toward his troops. This way, riic unit believes that its exis-

tenet depends on every man's life and veell-bcing, and the troop feels that it has the req’ect of its leader. In turn, the troop respects the leader.

The leader must cscidse extreme caution to not demand the loyaltv of his gueniDas. Loyalty is earned throngh biavery and a genmne ctmectr iot the weltarc of every man. Deeds speak much louder than svords wdicn it comes to camittg kiyahy. Once the leader demonstrates to a guerrilla that he is less than inter csted in that troop’s wcliare. the guernlla svill never trust or respect the leader again.

Courage

Terltaps the most pnsottal of leadership oaiis, courage Climes &om many points. Training in and ot itself can't gencraTC courage, nor can taetieal supcrioniy. sclf-eonfidcnee.oratechni cal edge. Courage is quite imangihle. but is often born of tear, angert hatred, and the love of one's brothers.

fhe leader must prove himself courageous ate«ry turn. He must take everv risk his men take and often take it Itrst. Once a leader makes hi* men suspect or believe that he lacks courage, the guerrilla unit t* done for.

Hut courage must be tempered tsiili common sense and knov-ledgc. Unnecessary fc«very often gets guerrillas killed, and few guerrilla units can afford to lose men needlessly. The guer¬ rilla must demonstrate a sense of battlefield intelligence and know-hoiv at all times. Rushing an enemy position with a ki^ ill your teeth is foolish when you could take out the position wiiii a grenade or sniper.

Integrity

This trait is the backbone of the guerrilla leader. Few guernlli leaders who lacked inlegrit)' have cxer been ulti- matelv successful.

Integrity is demonstrated when the guerrilla leader does the

36

right thing despite personal cost. In other words, integrity is shown when the leader stands his ground even if he knows he may pay a heavy cost at a later dale. It is truthfulness in thought and deed, audit can be shown by guerrilla leaders of any poUti cal persuasion. Ono: his ina-pity is lost, the leader will never be able to fully recover ic tor it is human nature to remenilier the shorteumings and mistakes of a man longer than his acltieve- mcius and viaoncs.

Knowledge

TOi is knowledge not only of tactics and wvapoiuy, but on a broader scale as well, It includes a deep understanding of the enemy's tactics and weaponry, ws, but also encompasses know! ci^ of the enemy’s society, history, culture, govemmeni, legal system, and current events.

It IS not cnou^ liar the guerrilla leader rn merely have tbia knowledge. He must share ic at every opportunity wirli his men and allow ilieni to lorni their own opinions and ideas as to wliai hai>pcncd and why. Cluses on every aqicn of the enemy must be laughr along with classes on the basics of being a guerrilb - tactics, weaponry, and ficidcraft.

jud^ent

The guerrilla leader demonstrates judgment in aeuoti ailsf everywhere else, "niii applies to everything from disciplinary laeasures tAeti against his own men to the day-to-day liaitdling of pcTStmncl mitnirs to decisions made on the battlefield when a niisiake in judgment could result in the loss of an entire unit.

Jut^cmcdt comes front the guerrilla leader's level of nifltuii- cy. innate leadership ability, experience, commtm sense, knowl¬ edge. peisoiialiryrypc, and other less tangible thing.s. Ic is crucial tltac the guerrilla leader demonstrate good judgment at all limes in all .situations, regardless of the stresses applied to him at any given moment. It .should also be noted that young KCOs and

officers may sometimes ikmcinsiraic a lack, of good jiu^mcnt. liul they may eventually betiame hettcr leaders with eicellent judgment, provided their seniors apply the principles of solid

Tact has been described as one’s abilitj- to tell another to go lo hell in .suchauayihat the man being cold begins toaniicipaic the trip. I his is a feixly good definition.

Tm is often the s^ of a profcwonal, alihougli there are sinia- tions the gucrrilLi will encouiiiCT wisen fact isn't needed or might even Ire dccrimcnul inti, tact shews that the leader need not humil¬ iate a sulrordinstu in ftoni of his preisjusi to make a point. In most cases, rcpcimaiirls should be issi)^ in privac. nnereas praise should lie public The giierrilb troop who feels hts dignity has been snipped ufliim in such a way diat liis peers no longer respect him ot ace him as a man ot'et|iial wiirth is a danger m the unit.

Bearing

How the guerrilla leasicc deports himself la important because he must always appear to be die leadcnn the cicaofihe men, He must lose his bearing only rarely, and ihert with a plan in mind, which is often to giaphically demonstrate the impor¬ tance of a ceitain misiake made by the unit. Cannon must be taken to ensure that this tactic isn't used too often, which will result in reduced eifeettveness.

Screaming, ranting, and “carryingon” as standard operating pmccdiue is the sign of a weak leader who lacks genuine, tangi¬ ble le.idcrship abilities

'1 his trait is somebmes the nKistdiftkuh to master because it is so fluid. How the guerrilla leader handles problems that

38

aiisolutely cnidal oj the continued Ciistence of the unit. Tliere should be two levels ofjust'ice in every guerrilla unit—

one nnnjudicial, the otlser judicial. NonjudiciaJ punishment Is for minor offenses dial did not put another it risk or that did not demonstrate that the oftending guenilla dix's not care about his lellow guccrillas Isuch as stealing faim another gucmlla). Justice in niiiMir eases should be commensurate with the crime, meaning that you don't execine a guenilla for some litrle thing he know¬ ingly did wTong. On the other hand, acts of negligence that put another at risk or ciiar sliow a serious character flaw tiiar will have some major adverse effect on rise unit must be dealt with severely.

In any case, justice must he swift, just, and final.

Tbc ultimate guerrilla it an independent thinker operating among mdependent thinkers. Therefore, every guernlla leader must strive tu take the initiative so that his unit grows lo become the must iHtificieat of such unili.

No giietrilla should have to lie told to do ihiiigs he already knows he inuR do. .Anyone Ibiind to be recalairant along rbese lines needs to be watclied carefully and rauglu ro rake rhe iniria- live. If be never comes around, rhe appropriate steps musr he taken to hasre him leave the unit, Oilierwhse, you will have a wieak link that may soon become a fatally weak link.

P.nthusiasm

In a guerrilla war, enihusuvti can mmetimes wane, particularly if tile war isa long one.'ITie key to eiithusia.vni is good kadership.

livery guerrilla musi be reminded constantly of whar lie is figliting for. and he must be rewarded from rime to time for his service. The greatest rewards, of course, are personal survK'al and the moveiuem’s viaory. niLs is best accomplislied by demand¬ ing training that leads to winning small hinles, which lead.s to great battle* iron with minimal loss.

39

L

duraiwc u 1 »tnjag person:)] iloubcis like a any piece ot r and CTcniually desmn' dit A guerrilla's endurance i

aiij^cs. and ct » die leader’s responability to make sure those angles are rediKcd to a bare minimum. Hverythmg from the guerrilla's family's welfare to bis own physiol and spiritual health must he accounted for. To develop and maintain this trait takes great personal leadership .skills, aitti the leader must show a genuine conecro for each and every one of his men and their families if lie is to eipcet his guerrillas to endure the rigors of u-arfaiu in a guerrilla unit during a pronaeted conflict.

UnselRshness

Never must a guerrilla leader be scifiih. 'I he insidious char¬ acter dcfidcncy of sclfidiness can be one ol die most derisive in a guerrilla unit because it tells every guerrilla that j-ou arc not in it for them or tor the cause but for pcnonal gain and glory. No guerrilla unit has ever been successful that had a selfish leader.

Share everything with your men, including re^msibility when iippropriitc, but never blame them for what is ultimately your failure. You. as their leader, are responsible.

hhac tsm wavcngiiig Kuwaiti ftghm kuuw the importauice of ahacing.

‘ /uri as one man orn btat tn, so a humiretl men coh boat a thots- iitn4. and a ihonsand tan btat ten thons'ini."

-kliyimuio Miiijili, /i 1643

I'he modern guerrilla, wheiher prosceuting a campaign in the concreie jun^e of Chicago wilh ibrmer memhen of the Latin Kings of beneallt ihe triple canopy of the Ama/on with Jivaro trilicsmen. must have liiorough training in the iiae of every weapon that may bcctimc available to hint, ritis includes nut onlv firearms, sucli as nfles. shotguns, atul handguits, and knives, bur cspkiavcs of all kinds as well Oucrrillas have used csplosves lor eeniurits, and with good reason—they work. But lIuTc arc some intniisie problems related to their use lltat must be discussed hclbtc wx- kim how to .select and cmpliiy assortcsl crjvloavc* ill guerrilla warfatc.

WHAT WAS THAT BIG BOOM?

The sound of exploding ordnance tends to really gel people's atenrioo. and this is the guemlia’s first problem: bccuiity in train¬ ing- Hailurv to aciavuni Ibr and cake cl&ctive steps to prevent

poMrujI enemies ttoiti leiming ol'your guerrilla rorct’s aedvitfc* »ith etploHvcs is one of ibc most exammon nimakes guerrillas make, aiiri it is one thvU frequcnity ends with ilie defeat of ibc force before il ever gets off rise grrsunA Alrhough iwo are appar

derer and the wtst rerronst in Aniencao history, Ted Kae/.ynski ( the alleged ■‘Unabonilier’ who svas captured by FBI agents m the spring of l^^b; and Timothy MeVeij^ and his partner Terry Nkhols. were careless while storing and uaining with explosK-cs. Kacts'ttaki allcgcdlv kept borob-nukrng materials ui his cabin—a major error- and the Oklahoma City bombers practiced wth unprosTSed erplodvcs right on the Nkhols family fitrm—a retnarkablj stupid itlea. Although Kaezsnski. MeVeigh, and Nichols arc not guerrillas btu apparent murderers lin MtVeigli’s case a crsnvktcd murderer), the prioeipks here are the urae.

Ejiplosives training must he conducted under the strictest security measures. I’otcnoil gaps in the guerrillas* seetinty api»- raiiis run the gamut Irom being caught in a sling operaouo while buying explosKus, dctouaiors, fuses, and caps to being seen or licard detonating the devices at what they thought was a site remote enough to escape detection.

Avoiding the first f’roblem might require the use of impro¬ vised explosives by u-sing materials nor normally assoeiaieri with titiitgs that go boom in the night. Right item-1 can spend 30 sec¬ onds under your kitchen sink or in your garage or lonishcd and come up with all rbe scutiT need to blow your house flatter than a 3-day-old caslavct’s b'KCi. And if son live on a (arm, wx-U. you already know tsiiat certain fitniiiaer and foci oil mixtures can do. Improvisadoa is an excellent way of eluding suspicion. Another nieaits of acquiring explosives other than through legal channels is theft; hosvever, explosive materials arc always kept in secure locations and are often guarded. The giiernlla's best bet migin be to ambush vc-hides carrying explonves rather than hitting a sutic storage site. Bewaie. hosvever, of cxploaves that may have raggants or tags inside them. These tags ate tiny ctided markers tliat are placed inside the explosKx mats-nal and can be idendlied

through forensics, giving the other side ibe ability in tell where the explosive came from and therefore identify a chain of custody that could somehow lead in you.

THE RIGHT EXPLOSIVE FOR THE JOB

TIte guerrilla seldom has all the evjslosives he would like available for hU use. I'he truth of the mailer Is ihat ilie guerrilla must often use what is at hand—what he can obtain by hook uc ;>y errxi Still, it is important co try to luc the right explosives fur each jifo. Tltis economy of force helps to avoid ■wisting a large explosive charge on a small job lhai could base Iteen com- pleKd with half the charge.

Cyclonite (ROX)

Most bequendy usesl in conapositc explosives like all the "comps’* (Comp A3, Comp R, Comp H4, and Comp C4;. IIDX U an excelleni exjsiosive for the guerrilla because of us gre.-ti power, versatility, and water resistance. The drawbacks are its sensiovity- it is very sensinsc and thereftirc can detonate acei dentally svith Imle proswearion under die right circumstances— and its ifoisoiious fomes.

R£}X CoiHpasita .43 is ittoaly iiuiJe of RDX with n bmder/deseiLsiuaet made

of wax. It is a very good explosive raa-d below the effeedveness of pure RDX. Ii is quire water-resistant hui, like RDX, gives ol'f

Comp B, another guixl explosive for guerrilla ops, is riO per¬ cent RDX, 3V percent TNf (trinitrotoluene), and 1 [wrcenl Wax. It is highly water-tcsistant and ui'ters outstanding power, but It naturally has those dangerous fumes from the RDX.

<.'omp B4 is very similar in composition to Comp B; howev er. it contaius itu wax but rather calcium silicate. It is Ilk; an up^vKfed Comp B and has about the same pitis and tons.

Comp C4 is a well known explosive consisting ot'91 petcent

44

p!astici7cr. It is isfren used in iindcnvater work, is quite motd- ahle, and is very brisant (has great shattering posser).

PETN (Pentacrythrite Tetranitrate)

The gucrriUi who gets his mitts cm this sniff has done good. Extremely powetfiil like RIIX, it is very watcr-rcsb-tanl and the fumes it produces are not nearh- as dangerous as those of RDX. It’s great for underwater bridge and hull work.

Amatol

Wltcrt voo cunibtne equal amounts tifTWl and ammonium nitrate yoii get Amatol Not a Ixid explosive, but you have to keep it airtight because erf its baWt of absorbing moisture like a iponge. Beware of the lumcs-

Ammonium Nitrate (AN)

Best used for creating holes in the ground because of its vciy slow rate of detonation IH.WO fcet/second as compared to BOX’S 27,400 fect/sccond), this stufi'must also be kq't airtight. It is nut for use In breaching or aiituig

Military Dynamite

This is often one of the most available explosives the guerril¬ la can come across. Though not as brisant as RIW, military dynamite is still good for craiering. It is not diat useful in wet sit¬ uations. and the fumes it produces are dangerous.

Commercial Dynamite

Unlike miliiary dynamite, the commercial or standard variety doe.s contain iiirrojrfyctain. its relative etTecrivcncss depends on its exact makeup andean vury widely ftom manufacturer to man-

Hi

Straight Dynamit

Gelatin

Dissofoed nitroglycerin and niirncotton form the base of this )rfaiiicized dynamite.

Ammoroa gcladn is simply gelatin dynamite with ammonium

Ammonia Dynamite

AmmoDia dynamite it nimiglyccrin and ammonium n

TNT

TNT and military dynamite are not one and the same, as some tend lo think. TN T has hener brisance and is good around The lumes arc ju.-it as bad as military dynamite, hoivcver. TNT '‘baK" ciplusivc; that it. the c.iplosive aU oiliers are compared

10 wlien determining their rdarive effbcrivei'iess! Kb. factor).

Penrolire

When yxiu have a SO/30 mix of PETN and TNT in a single explosive, you have PentoUte. This is another very good ex)tlo- uvB, but. as expected, the fumes are bad.

Tetrytol

A combination of 75 percent tetryl and 25 perceoi TNT

47

Block Dcmolhiua Cliai^cs cjeares Tcnitol. The advantages of this csplosivc an: increased brisance and Ibrcc along with reduced scnsinvitit I he fiimcs an: still dangetous.

Nltrogtycerin

The oifenicly sciuilive lutiitc of niirogh-ccimis nor a mxth. Although it is one of the most powcrfiil erplosivcs, its uses are Uiniied in its pure form because ol this sensntsity.

DEMO GUIDELIKES

'ITie gucrtillj. when sctccmif the tight etploshv for a partic¬ ular job, must consider the ibUowing guidelines if he doesinftet have a choice ofctplosives.

• suflkicnt power and brisance to accomplish the missiwi • resistance to temperature extremes and vahous storage con¬

ditions • stability in handling -not prone to detonation froro jarring

and friction • usefulness in vret elimaie* or underwater » ease ofhanvihng with tegard to siic, pacbiging. wviglu. and

so on—not cumbersome • ability to be hiniiled safely iwith certain precauuons) by

guerrillas (t'uine avoidance) • dependability insofar as detonation goes when the initiator

fires • ability to be detonated mth a variety of initiators

TATES OF CHARGES

The charge you select must be the very best available for die job, and the guerrilla leader must strive to attain as wide a vari¬ ety of exy’losives as possible so that he has what he needs avail¬ able when the time comes. Oftentimes, ihrongh flicft. raids, and .imhushcs, block demolition charges can be acquired.

These charges are the guerrilla’s mainstay for breaching, cra- lenng, and culling jcA* They come in csiiiidncal (roll) and tec- langular packages. All are made of either Comp C, TN I', amnin- iiiuin nitrate, ot Tetrytol.

KoU DenioUtion Charge: Mlftb

Used when you need to wrap a charge around objects wirit diamtuerj in excess of one toot, tiic M186 comes m a 50-fooi roU and is in fact a rolled sheet explosive. You get half'a pound of cither RDX or I’F. I'N in a font of the explosive. A complea' joekiqtc cuiuains 15 blasting cap holders (MS). It conies in a satchel. ThU clurgc is good ftat cutting pilous aiu1 large trees, but tlie surlace must lie free of rust, moisture, kc. and dirt if the adhesive cape on the chaige is to hold.

Ammonium Nitrate RoU

The 40-pouQd ammonium nitrate roll l.fO pounds of .AN and in pound.! of TNT as a boustetl is an e.vcellem cratering charge and can be used caiuly in situations that tequite the vliargc to be lowered on a card or rope because of its attached liiivcring ring. {A'ou can lowet it in from of a tunnel cmraiice/exii Irons alvive. Into a well, into a storage area tfom a linib the security forces failed locut, or wliat have you.)

TNT Block

Versatile and conimonplacc, TNT blocks come in 1/4- pinind. l/2-p<.iund, and I -pound packages. Dtin't think il^t i mere quarter pound of TNT is of little use; if you use yourimag- inadnn and employ such a charge agamst the dglit target. It can rcajly unpteas the enemy. For instance, the guerrillas might stop an enemy food delivery truck cn route to an enemy base in order

ID -collect 1 toll.’' While the dris’er and any passoiitcra an: being questioned and shaken down, an unseen gucirilb enters the tRick and places a charge inside a large tan of coffee or some other easik accessed coDKiiner. sets ihc dmer. packs some nails around it. then tcdlls the container «nih whatc«r he took out. The dnvur ancl passengers ate then sent on their way. Set to det¬ onate during hreaklast when the cooks will be rctilhng the cot- fee urns frequently, the device stands a chance of detonating near rite enemy as they eat.

eng subsurface bridge plings.

Shaped Charge.s

TIterc arc tour primary shaped dtarges in the U-S. inventory, and mch is cstindrieal with a finmekd rursc oxse on otk civ.i. Tliis cone liioiscs the dtarge on a small area. These charges arc good tor crcatii^ holes in thirq^s siicli as roads, lamtaos. bridges, eratcretc, and sis nn.

Black Demolition Charge-. M112

This I 1 /4-pound bnck of CA is vemalile and therefore of interest to the guerrilla. It has an adhesive backing that allow* the charge to be anached to many espes of surliccs. it >* pack¬ aged in an olive drab wTspper and has excellent bruante. plus it is very good for using on object* vritb irregular shapes, such as guners. This citatgc is most often used tor cutting aiid breach¬ ing operations.

Since ii is made of CA. it is casUy molded for use in spMial situations, t lowcvcr, this charge will have to be taped to surbees that either have snmc sort of rendue on them or arc frozen or wet. Also, conindcr the weight of the charge—it ian’t a nice, even number. Nice, even numbers make it easy to cak-ulatc the requited charge sirs: needed to do tJxe job cleanly Your math is going to have to be up to speed with tills charge.

Block Demolition Charge: M118

The name is misleading I'his charge isn't a block so much as it is a package of lour thin sheets of uther PETN or RDX, each sheet weighing half a pound and mcasurii^ 1/4 x 3‘ x 12' This packaging design is tor venatiiity of nsc, and each sheet can lie easily cut to the shape needed and used on curved or other irregular surfeces, liiMi fairty large targets to small carge-ts. Adding to the charge’s versatility is the adhesve backing and the

MZSeria The M2.4.3 and M2.A4 shaped charges arc both 15-poiind

charges, hut the A3 is made of Comp B with a 50/50 Penttiitc booster Of all Pcntolicc, whereas the A4 is Comp B with a Comp .A3 Ivoosier. 'i he big ditfercnce between the cun charges is that the M2.A4 is sulssiantially less sensitive to tilings blow¬ ing up or tiring around it.

M.1 Seruj Tlic run charges in the

M3 Series are Afl-pnund charges. They ate used |ust like tlieir smaller sister

The M3 itself is made ofCornp B wirii a .50/50 Femolite booster. The .M3AI is also composed of Comp B, but it ha.* a Comp A3 Ixiosterwiih it,

Again, (he Comp A3 makes (he charge less siisccptiWc to gun¬ fire anil nearby explosions. .

These arc the demolition basics I’ll cover in this book- I Vr-on’t go into anv more detail here because I would end up turn¬ ing this book into a demolitions book, and I don c «-ant ti> (to chat. Hossxver, I htghle recommend sou consult the Paladin Press catalog for books on demolitioas and eiptoave*. incduding improvised e-xplosivcs.

arfare

Strategy, Operational Art.

and Battlefield Tactics

'Siraiitiy, wbrn /nvwrirrrf Ik Iniiatu, ii tutUi machtry." —An uiunymu-n V !> CaviJey uilker, c ISOs

merybtdy'tgnevin' haby. ‘ —'Ilie B-f3.

“Love Shack’

How is it rhac (xrcain guerrilla force.s are ultimately .success- (ill in the face ot' grim odtls tat least in a atiinencal and (echito- ogicaJ sense) and others niiscrablyl In the end, we sec that no single lactor detennines witn » the winner and who is the loser, but rather who knew tlieir enemy best and who used that kiiuu-lc(4sc to his greatest advant^. These truths arc ^plicable lo (orery miliiary or paramilitary action, regirdless of the nature ufiltc combatants.

Of primary importance to the guerrilla is a complete and Ifuthtul understanding of how the enemy thinks in three realms: itational strategy, opciatiuoal art. and batticliidd tactics.

53

NATIONAL STRATEOY

Nearly aU Wciteni armies first lay out llreir naDonal antegy ' ti^., their girik or pohe-y ol^caK’cs; and then exaniine hw ilrcy ttill achieve those goals through their national pou'cr. Naikiiial power comisrs ot'actions Iwkcn down into the foDoaing fist areas;

• diplomatic

• tcchoolo^dcal • psychological • military

The successful guerrilla lorcc must firn recognue each of these action, and then tike the nccesairy and appropriate step* to counter each one as best it can, All w' the most masterfial guerrilla forces have understood lix impomncc of engaging the enemy at some level along these tisx Ironis, ineludmg American guerrillas during the RevolutioDary War. Mao s guer¬ rillas during World Wat II. and llic Vieiminh and Vieicong du^ ing the French lnslnchma and Vietnam Wans. r«n’««i«ly " Is interesnng to note here that despite President Kcniiedy'i directed reftKttising of American military might on anti- and couiiicrguernlli vrarfarc in the spring of 1961 and thousands of vean of guerrilla warfare history, only a tiny handful of American officers understixjd the guerrilla. ’Ihis remarkable lack of cimprehension allowed Ho and Giap to defeat not ordy thc Freiieh but the Americans as well, even though hindsight tells us tbu we could have, and should have, anlicipited North Vietnam’s strategy, De^te ihc assertions of some authors that the strategy- of the North Vietnamese was something entirely nesv, we now know that the concept of dau tranh was « alive when Kublai Khan invaded what was to become known as Indochina, as it was when France and Amcnca followed in his footsteps. In addition. Douglas Pike, J noted authority on V'ictnatticsc wartare. stated that the North Vietnamese guernlla

ihc war no matter what the cost, and the North Vietnamese anew this (a fiiet that was centra] to their national straa-gy). It crsuld have done so with a single liydrogeii bomb, but the North Vietnamese correctly antidpated thai it was infeasible for the Americans to use such a weapon against so apparently back¬ ward a foe; ir.tcrnarional outrage over the use of such a v.eapoii at such a time against such an enemy would effectively prevent its UK. The CoiMunisis had precmpied fiiur of America's

have been levied against Amcrica.i, psychological i'America knew ii had the ultiniiic weapon hut was prevented Irom using it by economics and world perception and opinion), teclinological (the world’s most advanced nation couldn't play its iniiup card), and military (.America was prev-ented from using all of its combat pawxti. "This situation can be likened to a vicious fist light lietwxcn a smaller man and a bigger nun wiio ha.t a gun, u herein tite presence of too manv witnesses prevents tlie biggsr man Irotn usiag hu gun.

let’s examine the drier points of w-hai a national strategy

Diploinaric

The guerrillas must liave a clevxr dipiomitic strategy, one that gives the appearance of smeerity but that, In reality, it meant only to frusiniie and weaken the enemy over an extended period of dme Look bow long .Anienca tjsent ncgotiaring with die North Vietnamese government in Paris bellire a deal was finally struck—a deal tlial the (^immunise., of course, had nomtenlicm ot honoring, even though die Chritnnas bomWng of 1972 had Uccrally laid watte to North Vietnam. It was pan of their nation¬ al strategy to wear ns down at the peace table and finally slnke a bargain that would vjuiddy remove all American combat forces

from South Vieinam and the bonil'ing of North Victnain- Just over two vears iftct the treaty was signed. North Vietnamese tanks rolkd into the Amcncan emhasst' compoutul ill Saigon, virtually iiii0(>i>05cd.

Diplomarie strategy works especially wvU when the guerrillas are ably assisted by ignorant, easily duped, compliani, and cicirciocly nave “joumiUsts" »uth as 'Ihe Wadniigtoti Pojreolum- nist Richard Cohen f A bettrr piaadrni lorsvriters ofihisilk doe» not and enuid not csist.i Clohcn's astounding comnienu on dac deaths oflhe Tupac Amaru lerrorisn at the hands of coiiragcou* Perusian eommaiidos tell the tale of a man who continue* to piay ditcedy into the hands of iciioriiis worldwide. Fim- instance, in a column Cohen authored shortly alter ihe seige ended, he pointedly refused to refer to the lemwisls as such, calling tliem '•guetriUas' insiead. Oucrtillas, of course, engage only miliiary rargets; they ilo not attack residences filled with several hundred innocent civilians and they are rccogniacd by the CJeneva Conventions. (Vihcn willingly lend* the terrorists a sense of Icginmacy by calling them guernllas.

(Ahcn claims that some of the ‘guerrillas" ‘may hasr been summarily etccutcd,’ but again fails to mention—and even plays dtiwn—the Tupac Amaru's loi^ and very gruesome history of luimhings. arson, kidna(>i'iing.s. murders, and torture. He goes on to say, through his own special brand of reviaunisi hutory and eonveiuent omission of the bets, that the killing of die tcr- wrist.s may have been “an abuse ofhuman ngtils... more trim blii^ than anything the Tupac Amaru has done." Further, Cohen states that the Tupac .Amaru ate ‘hardly a bloodthirsty group." The Tupac Amaru gain much when alleged lournalisi.s like Cohen ‘forget" that some of the poup’s lavoritc targets are KFC restaurants tilled with childicn.

Cohen even went so far as to complain chat Nestor Cerpa, the merciless and maniacal Tupae Amaru leader who command¬ ed the slaughter of lliousands of civilian men, women, and clul- dren dunng hi* murderous reign, had been shot in the forehead during the npcrition. Nowhere in the criiimn docs Cohen ever

56

mention or grieve lor ihe pile* of bodies testih’ing in ihe heinous wrath of the Tupac .Amaru.

1 wotuler what Oihen's lake is on the 1976 bnieli raid at Kiitcbbe?

It is people like Cohim who sec Charles Manson as being a inisundciHood humanise, Mu’ammar Qaddaii and .Saddam Il'.issein as being unfairly maligned peace anivisis, and Abimael yiuzman as Isemg a persecuted dreamer.

If a guerrilla group tan get someone like Cohen—or better yet, Ctihcn himself—on its side, it is fiortunatc indeed.

hconnmic

Bringing cctmomic hardship on an enemy can be ciimpara titely easy. *1 he key is protraction; that is, keeping the enemy iliaes involved in llw war for a lengthy period of time until it wears on their couoTty's economy to a debilitating degree. The d-awback to this is the requirement for tlic guerrilla leaders t<i have complete conlidence in the guerrillar’ tenacity, wlilcli inusi be sulliuent to outlast the enemy.

The gtivemment of the Pvtiplc's Democratic Republic of A'ietnam understood that rlie American people would never stand 'or a drawn-out war dial cost them tens of thousands of their sons' lives over a period of several years. They knew that foe .Anverican [leoplc were very tired at die end of World War II. wliicb hail Lasted only four yean ibr Ainenca, and were biiier about the result of the Korean War, which ended after a mete force years. In facr.ihey knew that rite longest war die Americans had ever fought tnol uicluding llie Indian Wars: was ilieir War of I 'idcpcndcncc, and that was ecntuiies earlier. History told them that lime was indeed on their side, and foe naive—.some would say ijmorant, even stupid—politician* and generals running the «ar onh served to bolsicr the Communists' resolve.

Tcchnologieal

Seldom will the giietfillas Itave technology more avlv-aiieed

57

than lor ewn equal tcij that of the government tuives tlwy are figluing. To efftetiveh- deal with this problem, the giimillas must have a two-pronged approieh. Krsi, they muse use decep¬ tion to make the enemy believe that their suiverior technology is causing tremendous damage to the hapless and frustrated guer¬ rillas and thus continue to devote time, cne^. and money to that end, even though in reality It is having Me, if any, effect. And second, the guerrillas must seek, find, and cjploit gaps in the enemy's technology.

Mobility i* often key to the laiier, F(»^ instance, if a guerrilla forte were to purchase or ochcnvisc acquire mobile missile sys¬ tems such as the SCUD-B and SCUD-C, it could conceivably use the same tactics Saddam's troops used during the GulfWar. Here, permanent SCUD launch sites were left largely undefended and were in fact sacritiaal lambs meant to be destroyed by Coahiion I forces. However, the mobile launchers (on tnicksl tverc madden- ' ingly difficult for the Coalitioo to locate and destroy because of htw easy they were to hide, move, fire, and ihen hide again, hven daring U.S. Army Spcaal Korees tCtccn Bereis.i driving armed dune buggies {Chenouith Fast Attack Vehicles, or V.AVsl in the de.serrs of Iraq had difficulty finding mobile .SCUD launchers.

Psycholt^teal

Psychological operations conducted by guerrillas arc often¬ times amixig tlie most effective weapons they can bring to bear on iheir loc, cspcaalty when linked to a protracted eonllicl.

The doomed Soviet invasion rvf Algjianistan is a classic exam¬ ple of this. As tile war dragged on and more and more Kussian boys were .sent home in body b^ to Mother Russia and ilietr Russian mothers, morale im tive front lines (which were estreme- ty vague) and back home in Leningrad, Vladivostok, and Moscow plummeted. The eitrcme tercain and haish weather of Alghamstan, the apparent invincibility of the mujiliadeen. and the wanit^; support of the Russian populace, who never saw the owning of Af^anistait as being in the Baissian national mterest, all came together in one psyop.

58

And the Russiiiii have yet to leant their lesson. Cliechen guerrillas, in their struggle for iDdepeudcnce, coniinoalK' demol¬ ished Russian regulars, despite what one would think would be overwhelming technological firepower and logisrical ability.

Military

Finally, the guerrillas must be tactically aikpt and adaptable to the laclics used by the enemy. Also, guerrillas must quickly learn tactics to exploit hartlelield eondiiinas such as weather and ttirain features. Gap's forces at Khe Sanh during rbe Tet Offensive of 1968 laid siege to the Marine fire base and were relying upon the monsoons to deny the leathernecks resupply jnd t^ ability to mount an effective counterattack. Rut when the monsoonii lifed early, Giap’s forces were left very vulnerable a> the massive counterattack conducted by the Marines tluoiigli the use of combined arms concepts (assorted weapons systems being brought w bear on the enemy in such a way that he is put ill a dilemma 1. Clap’s bad luck and lack of a pbn R resulted in a massive defeat at the hands of some very angry Marines, and as many armies and thugs an attest, angry Marines arc bad for

OrERATIONAL ART

For the guerrilla, operatinnaJ art dictates general guidelines lor when he is supposed to fight and wlicn he i.s not. The most rudimentary rule of gucrrilU warfare is fight w1ien you have the best chance of winning an important victory and avoid or break contact when you don't. Guerrilla masters have rntiaincd true to this atiom for as long as dicre have been guerrillas.

Amencan mmutemen would not initiate an ambush on the British redcoats unless they were quite certain of victory, hipjnese soldiers in the Philippines, who remained behind after ■he war was over (and who were separated from their umts), only eng^cd the enemy when they thought it most to their advan-

59

cigc. The Vielcong aimust ahvsys lay low imdl the taelicaJ sinia- tion lavoreii them. The teirorists [whom many of the Amencan

rampant over nrach of Lebanon in the 19S0S always chose to engage the American anj Krench ■‘peace-Leeping' fortes in ambushes that took advantage of lethal mistakes made by the Marines and the polititiina who tontroUcU them from the safe¬ ty of their plush Waihmgton offices.

hot the enemy commander, octtalional art is that which links the tactics he employees on the Ivittlencld to hi& guvem- ineiil's lUilional strategy by giving meaning to his opcrarioiw. Yon can hit that the guvernroent trying to put an end to a guer¬ rilla insurgency is going to do evcrythiivg in ns |xswer to avoid situations where the guerrillas are likely to coms: out on top and thus move closer to the reatuaiion of ihctr goals. Therefore, guerrilla warHirc at the irrational an level is a game ofoiiissii- riiig rhe eneiiiy army and etprising decisive, etplottahlc gaps ivithin the framework ol their maneuvers, leadership, csMnmuni-

In order to predict how the enemy's operaiicms will take shape, the giiernlla must Ltuth grasp the enemy's nadunal slraa- gy and iinsierstand his bacitcKeld tactics. The former is done thrnuglt the souitd collection and iiiierpreiatiou of the enemy's claims rele.ised through the media ami through various propa gtmda agcocks and mechanisms. The latter is accomplished hy clrtscly srudyiitg the enemy’s military ItUlory and dogma, gath¬ ering tactical aiui operational incelligcncc. and accurately micr- pteting that intelligence. Once this is accomfdished. the guerril¬ la can fnrnuibie his own sir.ilegs’ for eiigagiog ami defoatmg the

RATTLEFIELD TACTICS

This is tile mrtv-gritty of guerrilla warfare—how the gucml- ia loeate.s, closes with, and destroys the enemy in a place of the k || guerrilla's choosing and at a time he considers to he mosi advan- | U

60 61

npniviutlMi.

Ugcoiis, Man iindcisinod this as the fouadation of gucmila straaip' and stressed the ahwtlute vnticality of pionillas being highk mobile and alert and always at the ready to attack.

Guerrillas ccindtitl combat opctanoiu along two (srimary patits: 1) ambushing ciicniy missions and convoy's and 2', ton- ducung surpnae attacks on outposts with the liiUowmg chaiac

< i hey are Jiflieult lot the enemy to protect tvith lire support Imoriars, artillery, naval gunfire, and close air; or reinldrcc with additional manpower.

• They arc difficult to support logisiically, i.c., resupply is errremefy dangerous if not impossible.

Gviccrilli inftntry tactics must be built around the masiin that a small force can handily defeat a much larger one if the nffentree pnnciplw iS exploiting weaknesses, neutralizing the enemy’s ability to react eftcctively. concentrating combat poustr, unhang surprise, and exhibiting Mdness arc Hilly developed and employed.

Two examples of how smaller forces defeated much larger and moa' p(iux;rhil American forces arc the bombing of the Marine Amphibious L'nii's >M<\U; Banaliisn landing'learn bar¬ racks in Beirut ui October 198.^ rresiihing in the loss of 241 men) and the ambush of a Ll.S. Army Ranger hclibome insertion in Mogadishu about 11) years later flfi killed i.

In tlie first example, one man iihe vehicle’s driver) and hLs support team were able to defeat a huge fiircc in a latally unde¬ fended position by correctly isci-rtaiiiing ihai ihe Amencan gov eminent tiad 1) not learned its lesson in VKtnam regarding oser- lestrictivc rules of engagement iROE) ithc Mannes in Remit were ordered by the IVhitc Hinisc to not load their weapons and prevent/tetum fire unless specifically authorized by a commis¬ sioned officer—a 22-year-old second licutenani ss-iih 30 days’ experience in the Fleet Marine Force could issue otdcis to return lire, but a .sergeant raajnr with 30 ye-ats’ experience and three

64

wars under his bcltcoulJ not—a policy recommended by Robert McFarland and supptirtcd by the Corps’ Commandant, Ccneral PX. Kelley 1 and 2; had not taken the necessary steps to peevent a repeat ofihe sehicle-bomb tactics successfiiUy used against the .\merican embassy in ilui city six months earlier. (.And it is inter esiing to note chat dozens of Americans ha'-e been killed and hundreds wounded by vctuclc bombs detonated at static D.S. armed ibrees fiicilincs in Saudi Arabia in recent months; will •American l• •^ees and the politicians coiitroUing them ever learn?)

The second example lells of a unit That fiuled to adapt to the .•■luliticxofw-hattt considered to be no more than an unruly baiid o: hooligans led by an aging warlord ithc laa- Mohammed Karali Aitlidl and used fatally land unnecessarilyi brash tactics by aitempdng a helicopter raid in Isroad daylighr

ITiis was grcicesqucly added to by the late and theii-Sccretary ot Defense lis Aspin and twxi of his pninary advisors, Gen. loseph Hoar icommander in chief of the U.S. Central ( nmmarnl; aitd rise ehainnan of the ]Oini chiefs of staff Gen. CTilin I’owcii iwho has publicly blamed his subordinates rather than accept any of the rcs|sonfibilicy hiiruelfi. In this last exam¬ ple, .Maj. Gen. Tom Momgumery, who at the time was in charge of the Somalia operation, had reciuested tanks from Hoar and Powel] ID case their iniiniidaling firepower svcrc needed by the army after die Marines deymried. Hnwever, itu-r Hoar and I’.iuell failed to sufficiently back .Montgomery's request, wliich resulted lit the tanks' being denied by .Aspin 'who resigned soon alter the death of the soldiei^ ul question I. Montgomery decid¬ ed to go ahead with che pCHstly planned and uiepily led opera¬ tion tvithout the tanks, a icrnblL- dccuion compounded by the head Kangcr, Gen. William Garrison, who began ordering by radio: lie wasn't actually at the scene of the battle—the nivsccne commander <Lt. Col. Daniel McKnightl to do this and that and go here and there in a skaous tight the general wasn't anywhere I'.ear. AiJid's guernllas mangier! the Americans with miirclercius machine pun fire and repeated voUccx of rockct-propdled grenade cRPGl fire aimed at the tinvermgand cxtrcmclv vulncr-

6S

able beltcoptem belonging tu the 160lh Sfvedal t')peraiions Aeiarioii Reginieni. Making matrcis. worse was llie outrageous lack ot'eoiuirgercy- planning bj- the Ranger* and IVlia Horce commandus, wtin had to wait fiw hours for relief to Come to their aid. And tJiac wa.s provided bv Malaysian and Pakistani ll.N. rbrees.

Guerrilla forces that know the enemy commanders won’t be held atcoiiiualile tot dicir feilurcs are made all the more bold by their opponent’s deadly displat’s of cockiness.

Offensisx Maneuvers

The gucrnlla unit niu-st be able to conduct a variety of often- sive maneuvers if it Is to be Hesible enmigh to citry tm and win a war against a numerically and tccbnologicjllr superior fbc. Fortunately, it has been proven rime and agaitt that cuDsxmion- al forces, when pitted agtinst a well-led, disciplined, dedicated, and trained guerrilla force, stand a much-reduced chance of ever realizing vlctiiry. What hctitr cxamplci of this axiom than the disasffoiis French and American forays into Indochina and the iioviel Union's htal invasion of Al'ghanisianf

Bui 10 Lie victorious, the gucirillas must select and employ the correct tactia for the situation. When considering this, tbc gucr- rilln leader must contemplate seven faeiors alTecring his decision. They can he remembered is the acronym METT-TS-L.

« Missioi'i, fhis is the commander's intent, i.e., what he want* tu achieve. It should Ive simple and clear to csxry guerrilla, right down tv the lowest man in the food chain. .Make the uhjeeiive clear, and then make clear the rcassm why that objeenve has been chosen. The guerrilla who understands why he is doing something is mure dangerous to live enemy than the guerrilla who just piw.* thriHigh the motions with¬ out really understanding the pur^xise behind the attack.

• F.ncmy. Here you must inform your guerrilla* of cvxrythii^ that is known, likely, or suspected about enemy strength.

compo^on, and dispositiun. This includes but is not limit¬ ed tu his weapons, taeces, morale, leadership, lugisties, and supporting cquipmeiu; his organiaaiion and whal types of troops Ive is made up of (infantry, armor, engineen. motor transpori.communicaticios, ac.); and what he i*up to ai the moment riigluh’ dug in, deeply dug in. on the move along a trail or road, awaiting resupply in a pa-siuru, cn:.). Terrain, 'lo the guerrilla, terrain means everything. It includes not only the lay of the land but the vegccatiun, aU Isodie* of vj-atcr, man made fcalurcs, and more. The acronym KfXIO-A can be used to help remember and plan for the efftenve use of terrain;

K • Key Terrain Features O • Oteticlcs C ■ Cover and Concealment O - ObscrvatKin Points and Fields of Fite A - Avenues of ,\pproieh

Troops and Fire Support .Available. The leader must select ■he guerrilla* Ihr the nvusion and assign them their casks. Fire support, *iich as morcar team* and andacnuir assaiili teams, must be identified and planned fiir. Signals Kir ordeiing tire suppciri ate also brought our. Time. Time constraints arc ImpotTuvt because guerrilla oper adons arc abnusi always brief and very violent. Ensure that all tbc guerrillas understand this. Kpicc. This is where the leavler covers boundaries ('cnivrml OKasurcs l designed to iiimt advance* and lliiik*. He must per- ftvrm a careful map study to determine vviiai terrain leaiiirss act as narural bountlanes that can botli Lem in tlie enemy and serve to lei the gucnilb know that he is near a boundary. Id^siks. Kaciv gucrnlla must have a solid understanding of every logiwical concern. Ammunition, medical supplies and ticilities, food and water, extraction, and ocher ftects of logistics have lo be well thought out and communicated to

67

One uf the most omunon guerrilla actirais in the realm ot' rifTensii.\; niMieu«r is the raid. In keeping »ith guerrilla etrategy and racrical theory, f.iids are jiidden. iinexpcetcd, violcm. desirue nvc. and always have a planned withdrwal that tmtiKdiaieh' fol¬ lows the end of the mission (whether it was succeMfid or not).

There are ary number of reasons why a guerrilla unit ton- duas araul.Tlie garnering of weaiions, araraiinittiMi.eomnuini- cations pear, fwisonel^, and supplies are just a tew. ;ln manv cues, raids arc the guerrillas’ primary means of tcsuinvly.) Meticulous planning, audacitv, cunning, and very grvid intelli¬ gence arc demanded of the raiding patty. Supporting elements imisi he at the ready lo help withdraw ihc raiders regardless of the situation .Should a guerrilla be separated front his unit, he must possess the skills and vvill to avoid taptiirc and regain his unit on his own,

Trohably the most important part of the raid tv intelligence. Guerrillas must never conduct a raid on hopes and washes, but rather venfied intelligence reports that tell of much to be gained by risking a raid. A detailed rceonnaisaance plan is rcv|uired, fwe that ptoduces solid inlbniiaiion on the louies of march, assent- hh- areas, line ofdepartiuc. automatic weapons posnions. nunc fields, mortar positions, obstacles, individual readiness, reserve forces, command posts, and mynad other ^lors that will have an effect on tlie outcome uf the mission.

Iitcelicnt contingency plans must also tse made in case all does not go as planned, and rehearsals conducted with stria adherence to standard operaconal procedures, unda the super¬ vision of sejKincd NCOs, must he part ol' the process

frontal Attacks

If reconnaissance patrols report that, wathoui a doubt, the enemy could be caaly overrun along a broad front by a sudden, unc-apccied charge, a frontal attack might b« called for. But

68

FRONTAL ATTACX

iuch iccLcks arc alwxy* considered a Iasi resort because ol'llie oiTrcnie danger tnvoK-cd; it'rccou reporis were wrong and the guerrillas tun into a trap, the chances ol'tbcm being tnasuered are outstanding.

Speed and surprise arc die keys to a successliil fmntal attack. If the gticrtilla euiuinaitder sacpccts that the caeisy has been ti^'^>ed off, the attack must be canceled and new plans laid. There is very little room for error in a IrontaJ attack, bven the lapancsc. »iio were mten willisg tocmpkiv their chilling banzai charges al Marine positions during the War in the Pacific, seldom achieved victory because die Marine* stood their ground and used inter¬ locking fields of tire with support 6xjm indirect fire ivcapons to mow down the attackers.

Point Penetrations

T his was a favorite of the Wiminh during the French- Indochiiu War and the Victcong during the Vietnam War. It

mvc^cs a sudden penetiatioQ of the enemy's detenscs at a single viint, which is quickly followed by the gap being rapidly widened to allow fbUow'.on foeccs to rush through It in the con¬ tusion m strike a decisive blow within the enemy’s compound. It is very risky but, as such, often offers great reward when done

How the rupture of the defenses will be accomplislied is sit- uoiiunal and will be deKrinincd by the leader alter a careftd rcconnai-vancc and evaluation ofthosc defenses to select the best possiMe point. The trick is to pick die right place for the nipmrc (whicli must laix place quickly), insiamly widen that gap so that ■he assault force can enter the eumpound without being cut down by fields of intcrlocldiig automatic weapons tire, and then get to the main target in a lurry and destroy it. Olsviously, unle.ss (he plan is for the guerrillas to actually gain total coiurol of tlie olijcciivc, they must also have a plan for withdrawal that gets them our of there hefore fire support and the counterattack tiirce can be deployed.

g -s

The sinjtlc cnvclopnjcm is one of the most useful forms of ^euvc^ tor a jtucrriEa force. Here, a aipponing attack by a ilcr group of guerrillas engages the enemy at a Jocatkm along enemy’s defensive perimeter that makes the enemy believe a

major attack is under way there. In rcaHey, a larger or more heav¬ ily armed force has t|uictly srtuaked inno another position along a rulneeabk flank that ssiU ghe them access to a deciave objective inside the enemy's perimeter. When the enemy commio his force* to the supporting attack, tlic envefoping force strikes quickly and savagely, destroying the objeextsv selected for its criticality.

The foUowing arc the key* to a successful empkiyincm of a single envelopment:

■ a suppcircing attack chat convinces the enemy it is the main

« an enveloping force chat has asxulcd dcKcbim until it s too bte

• the scjcctioo of an objccasT that is Imiy decisive and vuincrablc • an enveloping force that has sufficient combat power to seise

or dsOToy the objeaive before the enemy’s reserve force has the oppartunicy to counterattack

Should the enveloping force be discaveted trying to get inlu position, the attack must be canceled and the supporting and enveit^ing forces withdrawn immediatciy au that the enemy is unable to conduct pursuit or erploitation operations againsr the guerrillas.

Ooulsle Envdopments

Identical to the lunglc envelopment in concqsi, the execu¬ tion of a double envelopment simply add* a second envelri)sing ibnee to the sccnariu, with tite second force attacking another vulnerable and decisive objective within the enemy’s perimeter.

Tlie obvious drawbacks to the double cnvclopnienl are that the guctriUaA must covertly position a scetmd main effort body without detection along the perimeter and that die likelihood of Iriendty lire increases because of Che counterpositioning of the enveloping force*. Also, sliould one of the enveloping forces get into trouble within the objective, they arc going to have to be extracted by either the supporting twee or llie other enveloping tivcc. Either way is grim. And ti> leave the foae is trouble liiere without extract would crush the unit’s morale by telling each and every guerrilla that he is very expendable and may not be abk to depend on lielp from hi* fellow- guerrillas.

Turning Movements

The insidious turning movenient is a maneuver of great value tt> the etafty guerrilb leader. In tliis maneuver, an objective imporrant to the enemy that can be made to appear vulnerable and desiralvk to the enemy is selected for the supporting attack, but that objective is not really the objective at all. This raise

73

ubiecdvc is always withio uncriccns-'y (kfcnMS’c suppcsri range of the enemy force occupying the guerrillas’ true olsjective, and it is as dee;s as pnuihle in the enemy's rear ana, or »least well into his iiiain IriRlc area.

The idea »to cause the enemy nccu)sying the guemllas' true ohjective to abandon that objcecivc in tmler to save the laisc ubieedve horn what appears us them cn be a main attack to their rear, or, sitouJd the eisenty refuse to completely abandtso it, at least send enough turecs to the felsc ubjccdvc to weaken the true ubjeenve enough to be taken.

’['hese are the basics of tactics, but to liilly understand hsnv a guerrilla turcc must engage the enemy wc must learn about minus and booby trips a.s well as ainbu^es. ail of which will be covered in Cha[>ters 8 and 9. But right now. ler's take a look at the master guerrilla himself, a pca.sant's son from a far away.

ii .

75

The Son

“Mnfiads luinUt u lytuUir varfure tannnt be uppliti vith sac- cat It the special sitwiiiens tiat emJnmi/iurrrUlat.'’

-Mio Zscluni! ■^n Cuerrlils Wanurc'

If ever there iva* » country ripe for giierrilli u'arfare, it viiis tcudal China in the 1920i anU 30».

Feudal China? In the 20ih century? Indeed, feudal China. Centutka beliind much of the Western world when ii came to vnlighKned social diuundii (in both theory and practice), China 11 this lime was populated wcdi half a billion pcasaitis eking out 1 brutal caisicace, made such by rimpigiitg hoards of priv-ate armict commanded by sayage watlurcls in cahoots with the land¬ owning gentry. There was no local government and. therefore, no social services such as lliose we enjoy todic'—no police force, no medical services, no running water or sewage systems, no eleciiiaty. no schooling escept for those who could pay. no nothing. If the marauding mercenaries, mcrdlcss winter, or bru¬ tal summer didn'r kill you, then disease, pestilence, or the cul- mmaoon of a tii^iintarisb, horrible lile did. (It Is ironic—and ■iiczplkablc to some—that President Clinton continues to e.ttend China “most lavored nation tradii^ status,’ this despite

79

thdr long and wcll-doourncntcd hiirn>ry—and current polic>—ot* horrific human rights abuses, but he denies ibc same to Cuba. Clinton clearly understands the axiom “busness is business.”)

In IK93, in a larger-than-most lirmhouse in Hunan IVonnce, a son veas bom to an enterprising and brslghled larmer (who had managed to secure mure land tiuui most the other peasants, and who in turn was able to atJbrd hi» progeny an educaricMi ai a prryrince school that would have been denied lesser pca-sanis) aixi crafty niother. Historians tell u-s that this child’s interests were diverse, but that his true loves were pobiics and history.

At the age uf20, bis tUmal studies complete, he was i^ereil an assistant's job in the litxarv' of Beijing CnivnsiQ'. a position that aFTorded him more than ample rime and resources with whicli to study his beluved puUties and history. Uivtaa the {riight of the Chinese peasantry and his own upbrinjpng, the young man began searching for a meant by which he could change China forever. He believed he luund the answer in tiK wniingsof Marx, Hnge!s.and Lenin, the latter of whom was sdii aiivv and in the ptociss of oana- forming whar w-js recently crarin Russia into the Union rtf Soviet Socialist Republics. In 1921, he jouied the Chinese Coinmiinm Patty. Hve years later, he cctutncd to Hunan l^aocc to lay tbc early groundwork for the revohmon locomeihtough hbs insistence on sweeping land rtfonns and tlie total eliminalion of the land¬ owning genuy, whom he saw as being die driving fbicc behtml tbc wTctchcd .squalor forced upon the peasants

Mao x^doiighasl begun his Ule's work, an ensleavue that would chai^ce not only the riux- of China, but that of die entire svorld.

MAO’S GUERRILLA PHILOSOPHY

Mao Zedong, in his essay “On Guerrilla Warlare,” comes clean light away by staring, “Guerrilla c^ratioas . . arc the inevitable result of the clash between oppressor and oppressed svhen the latter reach the limits of their endurance.” From this beUef, Mao pointed out that a sucecafdl gucrrilb army must take seven “liindamcntai steps” in order to achieve hs goals. These are as follows:

• arousing and organiAug the people • achieving Internal unllieaiion polilkaliy • establishing ba.ves • equipping forces • recovering national strength ■ dcstroving the enemy's nationai strength • regaining lost lenitorics

Arousing and Organising die People

“If yah are plarminji ta bnnt a tiger arfining re the wan, tajrr sruHT retaartt. “

—Chinese proverb

Mao dill nut fashion these seven steps helter-skelter. He gave considerable thought to what ordci they tnust be taken in—and m doing so diowed as astute understanding of the foundatiun tlut muse be laid for a guerrilla force to at least have a chance of success. Mis analogy that ihe people are tlie sea in which guer¬ rillas swim is Isased upon his assertion that the masses must be moiivaied and oiganired before tliey can bo)ve lo fashion and employ an efleciive guerrilla force. Once a Isurgeoning guerrilla force has the backing of the people it is trying to free From oppression, the oppressiv's joh becomes many rimes more diffi¬ cult. One of the reasons rive .Shining Path failed in Peru was because ihe guerrilla-ierroruers began a policy of outright terror ;hnked to the coca irade) directed against not just rive elite and the government but the peasants tivcmscivcs; they alienated ihemsefoes among ilieir own pet^k. who in rum began to see tive Shining Path—rather than the government they claimed to be fi^lidg against—as the enemy.

Oigaiiizifig the peop'® most challenging aspects ol'guerrilla warfare, for tivere are innumerable secunty concerns

peopk to became an informant wiiliin ihe guerrilla force, and an informam in live guerrilla fbr«. if he lor she | takes the appropri¬ ate security iiveasures. can be the group’s Achilles’ heel. For

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iivmaJKC, not only Wr*as it an infomunc thitlcd the Pcnivian p<^*c to Guzman's hkJeool, but it was aninfotinant whohd(>cd Israeli counterterrorist forces to the tcrtoriit known as “'[lie Kngineer’' on the West Hank, and h was an inlbrmaiti wht> spilled the beans on an Irish Republican Atiity lerroast who was gunned down on Gibraltar by the British Speoat Air Service (SiAS).

Ba-cTuiting must be careftilly done as well. Recruits must be aroused into signing on with the guerrillas, and this can be accomplished by exploiting crimes and mistakes made by the enemy and the govcminent they arc supporting, as well as by hiking the initiative to care ibc and protect the locals from harm. Recruits must never be "dtafted" ot pressed into service with the guerrilla unit, for this will alienate not only the recruii but the enbre village trom which he came. Besides, recruits forced to join will ever prove to be highly efreciivc in combat hccutselbcir hearts probably aren’t in the fight.

Vllligcs and towns on the ude of the guerrillas must be orga¬ nized when it comes (u aetn-eand passive defense against the gov¬ ernment. Active dciense is risky, t-es. because once the viUagc dghts against the government forces the might of that guvem- ment will likely come to bear against them, and this can cause cbe village to l>e wiped out nr, worse, blame the guerrillas for their pain and suffering. Passive defense is much wiser is most cases because it doesn't inforiate the gnvcmmcni if carried otf cucreet- ly. The idea is to make the government chink chat the village iiin want) Co be left alone but that it will cuopcraie if it can. In iniih. the village docs very little to really help the guvcmmcDt.

Achieving tiieenial Unifkation Politically

“irr vHTubjecc bi ourtetintry, mr trbalt cimnrry, and natinng

—Daniel Webster June 17. 1825

Politivar are to guerrilla warfare is taxes arc to the IRS—one cannot c.VBt witliout the other, let's face tc the reason you arc in

by and for the people, or became your country has been mvaded by a foreign army and vnu are bent on destroying them at all costs.

Tlie guerrilla army must lie united poliiicallv and have a sin¬ gle, clear, amainablc goal m niind sviicn it initiates hostilities. Guerrillas and potential guerrillas who arc waffling or wiin ate unclear as to why a certain political goal is needed miur he eon- vinecd through educaaon and sound leadership chat the political goal of the gucmlUs is one of noble purpose, that evetyiine is going ■<> benelii from the actions taken by the guetriUas, and ihai ii is (heir duly to work toward chat end

hdiication Is key. The eiicinv will have a piupaganda machine up and running full nil, a machine desigiiai to lace a few truths with misinformaiton. lulf inilhs, and ouiright Iks meaiu to con¬ fuse, scare, and otherwise weaken the resoKe of ihe iiKlividiial giiemlla and the civilian ivojvulaee who are or might lie le.iniiig iiiwanl assisdng the guerrillas. Mgliiing tills propaganda will he a major concern of the guerrillas for as long a.s the war goes on. Fducaiion of the masses and of the indiv-idtui gucrnlla must hc- undertaken from the very heginning and carried out until victo¬ ry is achieved, and it niusr be given on all levels, fl-oni onc--oii- onc disetusions between a leader and hts charge to village and town cbsscs and informarion disveminarion. Caution must be used. however, when dealing with large nunilicrs of people and through mass media. \ radio broadcast can casih- be traced to the source and artaeked with artillery, mortars, aircraft, and a hasty insertion of ground troops into the area, and leaflets writ¬ ten by the guerrillas being ftmnd in the hands of civilians will likely tjuickly result in retaliation by govemmem forces. The pro¬ tection of the pr^ulace is paramount.

The guerrillas must constantly vletnonslrate to the populace the evil ways of the enemy, and then the civilians must be shown h.iw- the guerrillas are capable and wottliy of protecting and serving them. To do this, the gttenillas must estalilisli Imses ihal facilitate the conduct of offonsive operations.

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EsUhlishing BatiCS

ilsrabhshing basis for a gucnilla army can be a daunling task when pitrcci against an ageressnt and dc-itrinined counlcrgocr- rilla force backed by a grtvemment. But it tan and must be itone. Security and resouredutnen are criocal.

Uucrtilla basts arc covert by nanire, never out in the r^n for the enemy to see wdi hit remotely' piloted vehicles, manned aircratt and satellites, In fan. the best guerrilla base is the one that discs not even aptiear to exist, uith no yshyskal evidence whatsoever being available to the scmdnv and pimishmcm of the encmv, •lliia.i* ihc g-.ierrilla base ol'tlie .■kmencan Rcvolutioii.

As you will recall ftoni your -American hirtory classes, wtoh recounted liow many of the Colonists fought the BKtish with a guerrilla atmv of tninutemen who supportitd the Concinentil Army, Nmy. and Marines (the latter svere primarily used as ship's security, boarding parties, and snipers in the nggingi, Amctx'a was born of a guemlla war.'l hese lairncts. itierchanis, crai^Kii, clergymen, irattfseni, and other everyday Idk wore no unitbrms and appeared to be simple civilians going about their lives in the towns and eountrvside, hut wiien tlie call tame they svould sneak asvay to clandcsbnc musters and move to engage the British with hit-iind run tactics that served them e.tiremelv well. Wlicn a fight was over they would teturn to iheit families and jobs and hide their uvapons lod gear from British search parties. The Vietcong used this sime technique nearly 200 yeats lamr.

Security is everyone's concern insoiar as establishing and niiiintaining a guerrilla base is concerned- Children arc especial- Iv vulnerable to being tricked or scared into telling who is a giutr- rilli and where the weapons caches arc. and every precaution must be taken to prevent this. Ignorance is best here--if the chil¬ dren don't fcmiw who is a guemlia and where the goods are.

then they can’t spill the beans. The guerrillas anti guemlla sup- porters must strive to operate late at night (when the kids arc asleep) as much as possible and use hiding platxs that aren't eas ily discovered by children accidenuUy. It might seem igood idea 10 forWd the cliildren access to a certain place nr area where guerrilla supplies and weapons are hidden, bui this can hackfiic when the enemy comts to town and asks the children where they arc forbidden from playing.

Bases csablisited rhai arc more corporeal in naurc must still remain concealed or secrci, away from the prying eyes of those who would do you harm. They must always he underground or ludden away in what the enemy cunaidccs to be some impene¬ trable region. Itee Chapter 12 for guidance.

Equipping Forces

*'/« make M-ar Kiib iJtiui who mrde mirh us is liie serrin^ a MU^ upon a customer at tbs shop ioor. ’

—Tliomai raine

I low to initially equip and then logisricaJly maincain a guer- .riUa force is often oae of the must cli.illeiiging aspects of being a guerrilla leader. IS'cverthclcss. history tells us chat with persever¬ ance and Ingenuity tlie guerrilla leader can come up uitlt the arms, ammunituin, explosives, cuiiuiiumcalious geiir, food and wafer, and support equipment necessary to succcsshdly prose¬ cute—at least iogisticaily—a guerrilla anipaign.

If America were ever invaded again by a foreign toe—the lapanese were the last to accomplish this with their ill fined foray into the Aleutians, which were, at rlic rime, a pos.iession of the United .States and not yet part of what was to become the state of Alaska—or sltould guerrilla warfare be taken up against an American govctiuncnt cumed tyrannical, sve wouldn't have much of an initial cqui^^ing problem for guerrillas, miiess our wej|ions, amniunlllon. etplnsives, and communications equip¬ ment were hist confiscated by ihe enemy. H-ur the Second

85

AnieiKlnient is still pirrinlK’ inner despite mir socialLsi pnliii- swis' repeated amcks oa it through such measiim as the ao- eallcd ''assault ss'capons" ban (even chough 'asaulc weapons* are used In less than 1 percent of ail crimes committed sviclt tdicarms) and ciirnuoac ilarah hrad>’'s isersonal vendetta against law-abiding handgun owners, The prublem would be mainiam iiig those weapons ihrougliour a protracted svar and coining up with the spare parts to iix tlieni and aiiimuniiion resupply, food and water would be equally important and might be hard to get livni cicne to time due to enemy efTons at destroying the sourcea of both—firms and food caches could be put co the torch and water supplies coniamin.sred. the latter of which is a very-.simple thing to du. Good cummunications gear (gear capable of oper¬ ating with a reduced risk of jamming, monilonng. and dirccrion- tiuding) would probably prove to be troublesome to find and mainuin with case, and suj^ort equipment—everything IrtMn packs and ni.igizine pouclws m mess kits and canteens—will soon wear out and need repairs and reyilaceineot.

The guerrilla unit must have the means to repair bn>ken or damaged items and replace those in need of rcplacemeni a.s sveil as eflcctively provide the men with all the ammunition tbev

need. Covert supply lines must be established aiui protected, and this ss-iil take great effort (and the North Vietnamese use of the Ilo <ihi Minh Trail is a good caamplc of dnding a wav, no mat¬ ter what the dangers), fiscal repair Ihcilhics must be maintained, too. and these must Ive underground.

It is likely that raids on vulnerable enemy supply depots will have to be conducted on a regular basis in order to acquire tJic necessary iccms. but the guerrillas must be constantly wary of luses set up by tlve enemy that arc meant to lure the guerrilla into a trap. This is often done by making a supj'ly depot appear ripe tor the plucking when in lactit is heavily defended. And die guerrillas must always be suifiiciuus of “ta^ts of opportunity’' tliat appear as manna from Heaven, those being much needed supplies that arc left bchiiul or otherwise nude readily available Ivy dtc enemy. Such diings arc often ambushes in disguise.

Recovering National Strength

‘hitTtinl pout laia Mutil tin Kc.er tear ’ —RjLssim proverb

litis step involves gening bock up to speed after repealed huftftilattaika by tlie enemy Hie guerrilla movement that is able to recover continually ftum eiidlev» brutal battles waged over years is likely to be victoiious uoc day. The naosT powerliil weapon the guenilias have in this realm cs a belief that they are nght and live enemy is wrong, and tliai when the sun ftnally .sets, they will be left standing on the battiefteld looking over the bro-

But U would tie unrealistic to think thai the belief in your cause is enough to win the svar. It’s not. Winning the war vsiJl also take shrewd cconimiKs, Imlliani tactits, die very best lead¬ ership. an uncanny alvillty to exploit mistakes made by die enemy, and much more. And it will take as lew mistakes as pos¬ sible made hy the guerrillas. Inielligert decisions and the gift nf concct anticipaiion are requLutc at all levels.

87

One of rhc wisest rhin^ a guerrilla movement can do is make friends with those who might see them as being in the right, and who might lie willing to assist them in their struggle. Thc North Vietnamese Amy ;N\'A) and their giierrilla eoiimer- pira in the south would never has-c been able to eonrinuc what the West Itnows as the Vietnam Wat wiihoxn the logistkal and philosophienl stippimt of the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China. Virtiialiy every weapon system operated Iry the NV.A and VC—except lor those firearm* taplurcd on the battlclickl— WPS from either the Soviet Union or China. Consvncly. the New I'ci^lc's -Army in the Phili^iincs wax never very successful, par- tidily because iliev received almost no loreign suispori, even though they were Conunuiiists.

T-riendships with henciactors must be enilnvatcd carefully and erpertly in order to ensure continual support, and great caution must be exenased in protecRng secret allianeca. When Admiral li>hn Poindexter and Lt. Col. Oliver North were caught selling weapons to the terrorist stare of Iran and using the money to fund the Contra* in C'emrai America, they ibund out how important security is in such opetacons—the bard way.

Destroying the Knony's National Strength

‘‘Whalrbelullu/|oir^/|m' !thimgla trereen mnuinfiibis^aT.’ —Waher Cronkitc

An inadvertent broadeasi remark during the I'ei Oflensive, February ISIdS

This is best described as taking the battle to the enemy's backyard and Itopel'ully riglti into his family's aud iieijtlibsir*' hv- ing rooms. This isn't dune by invading his town but rather his family’s, mends’, and neighbors’ psvehe If the guernllis can do this, tile Wit is half won.

Up until ^ winter of 1968 and the infamous Tct Oflensive

home hdd tlic belief that Amenca was winning the war in

88

Vietnam, 'fhc wealth of lies and dis-tfirnmaiioii splailered upon ihe American people by Ifresidents Johnson and Nixon, Defense Secreiary McNamara, Cfeneral VVesimoretand, the joint ciiidsand the service sevretancs, and many of their minion, all came opah- iug down upon Joe American and hi* family when General Gi.tp launched this massive and cosdy suiprisc attack on hundreds of taigcts throughout South Vietnam, from the Mekong Delta up ihmugh the Central Highlands to I Corps, line City, and the OMZ (Dcmilitarmal Zonci. Although it is absolutely true that, despite heavy lositcs by the Americans, the KVA and Vietixmg lost this daring gambit on the hattlcfidd, the Communists won it in America by slap)sing the American public inlo the realiiy of i he atuation. Suddenly everyone rcalurcd that this war wc were sup¬ posedly winning wasn't even close t<i bong won, and that despite horrendous punishment being meted nut by masshe Anierieaii lifepower. the Comnuinisu still appeared to be lu strong ,t* ever and in no way- about to throw in the towel. Ettcctivcly, America lost the war in 1968 Sadly, it ttxik the government anotltcr five yean lv> Cut its losses and run. i'seo ye.-irs .ifter that, die Cotnmunbla mlkd into Saigon as they always knew they would,

On riic battlefield. dic best w-ay to destroy the enemy’s iiaiiisnal strength is i<i send as many of their snn.s home in body bags u possible, and to do so on a regular and graphic basis, flirough perspieunus hut cfrecrive tacbes and solid leadership, the guerrillas can rack up a 1iuge Isody count that will demoral¬ ize not only- the enemy soldiers but tlie enemy naitnn as well.

I^alning Lost Territories

*Wr iidAi has land miil hare srar.‘ —Italian proverb

It may be important to the guerrilla movement to recapture land lost to the enemy a* a mailer of honor, snategy, national¬ ism, and closure M'hen it is determined that certain territory must be taken back, you must consider that once you take it back

89

•Snldlcn Ifkr the«c hIII often do whatever thc>' tJdnk it will cake Co pre*

ynu ire gnirt(t rn have ro hnIJ onto ic. Somciimcs il is wiser cu just deny it ur its use (o Che eneniy ctithnut accusity occupying ii with cnxjps. This can be dune by making it luu risky ur by mak¬ ing it less valuable to the enemy.

T<j make the land tuo lisky the guerrillas must mine, booby trap, and cover the land with indirect tires to such a degree that the enemy makes the decision lo simply leas-e the area alone lo make it less valuable the guerrillas may be able to aher the land in scinie way chat lessens its value, such as when the dcfisliant .‘kgent Orange was applied cu the Souili Vietnamese )uii^e so that -at least in theory—the Victcong and NVA cuuldn't hide there as easily Or the gtienillas may he able to draw ihe enemy away in sumcching like a turning movement because they believe stnncthirg more important is being threatened bv the guerrillas.

In any case, the decisiun to regain Ins: territories must be made wisely and abiewdly.

One can leam much from a peasant's son.

'Si’iyr it tbi imcU sfa icud entmy." —Aliu Vltelbes

atiiu Rsnie nHcdimum, .^.1). OV

Kielderaft includes all those skills the guernlla uses to make his existence in the tinrsc, jungle, or what have you more efri- cient, safe, and comfortable. I'hls migin include creating a cuuk- ing vessel from a Kccion of mature bambuu; nnding, reading, and inteiprenng sign Icit by the enemy: purifying nr filtering water taken from a mud hole^ finding a place to sleep dial the enemy will nut discover; rigging an impeuvised antenna: build¬ ing a booby trap; and much mure. The guerrilla leader must go lo ^al lengilii to ensure that all Ills guerrillas have developed ebeir ticldsmilt prosvess lu the highest degree; he can never aesume that they are proficient at fieldcraft because they are indigenous Cu the regiun in which they arc upetacing. Just because a guerrilla w-as bom and raised in a rural environment doesn't neeessarify mean be wsll denvonsiraie tlie wixids savvy bis tcUow guerrillas do.

91

FOOD ACQUISITION', COOKING, AND EATING

Acquiring is ixinslanth- in Ihe mind of ihc gucrnlU Icakc. There arc lour priinary means of food aaiuisition. and the ii« of each «.ill depeiul on the particular utuaiion of the guerrilla unit in qnestion-

Higher Unit Kesupph-

It tlic guerrilla war is being w.’aftd on a national level, lower guerrilla units wiil be able to-ai least aoniclimcs -dqwnd on resupply Itom higher units. If this is the case. the\- must caercisc extreme caution at all time* wlien iccciving those supplies. At no nine should the suppKnng unit and the unit licing supplied ever come ficc-tu-facc; to do so puts both units in jeopardy rather than only one. Unit-to-unii resupply should be done by cache. T'liis is when the sufiplying unit sta^s and ludes supplies for iinnrhcr unit and then notifies that unit in some way that it* sup¬ plies are ready to be picKed up

Whatever communieation system is used u> tcU the recoving unit that riieir food is smiting for them at such and such a loca¬ tion. it must be a .secure one. This might consist of simple yet secure raditi trimsmt-ssions, or it might invoh-c some signal on tite ground tliiu rhe receiving unit will Ire sure to sec, such as a com¬ mon soda can hing in a certain position neat a certain rock, or pethay* a discarded vehicle tire being tnewed sbghtly lo the right nfwhcrc it usually is. This is someitmes called a dead drop signal.

Voluntary Civilian Resupply

Civilians sympathetic to the gueniUas will souieiimcs be will¬ ing to supply them with food. Gieat care must be taken to pro¬ tect these dviliant from suspichin or, should they be fotuid out. reprisals by the enemy.

The guerrillas and their cirilian confederate* must work out a dandestiiie .system between them so that both partscs. remain

as sate and detached from each other as possible. The village or town hdpii^ the guerrillas must never obviously store excess amounts of food in the town cihe same goes for a family lielping the guerrillas—they must never be caught with saqvicinusly large amounts of food;. To avoid di.scovery, indhidiials must transport tbe food insmall amounts to a cache site. When the time is rigbr a dgo.sl IS given and the guerrillas will collect the tciod.

All foods prwided by civilians must be paid for, or the civil¬ ian* have lo lie compeiusated in some otlier way for ilie risks they are taking. Such miitiiaUy agreeable details must be worked out at the local level.

Should the enemy catch a ctviliin helping the guerrillas and kill rhat civilian, ihe guerrillas miisr pay serious cnmpersailnn lo that person's liunily for their loss. They mutt communicate sin¬ cere cimdolcnccs as well, and diey must enact improved security nwasures in order to prevent additional security breaches. Tlie gucriillas should not take obssous. immediate revenge on the enemy unit that killed the ovUiani this will only bring mure ancniion upon that ramily and village. Nevcrthcle.s5, by waiting i few sveeks and then striking the offendirig unit while it is well away from the village, the guerrillas can, if they feel it imgiit be uatlii], report to the lamily and village that the enemy unit chat killed the civiiian in question has Iveen severely punished. Reassure them chat die enemy has no idea they suflered an attack because of who they lolled in that village.

Involuntary Civilian Resupply

When tbe guerrillas are operating in areas they liave nor yet pacified, it may be necessary to acquire food by uivoluncary resupply. Ihere are two mcan.s of doing this. The first Is with compensation, an excuse, and an apology, otherwise known as forc^ requidtion. Here the gucirillu take food from a village's coniinunai stash (never from a single family unless it is very obvi ousdut family has plenty), apolc^tre for the inconvenience, pay fair maikct value for what they take lor a little more than fair

market value, a& a shon ut' ^ood will), and then otfcr au csvu»c that places l he bbme mr their having ti) do this on the enemy. This techmqiie must be used as inlrequenily as possible.

The second ss-ay of acquiring food by involuntary resupply is uiih a ruse attached. This is v.bcn the guerrillas steal Ibod from an unenoperanve village and do so in such a way that the vil¬ lagers Ivelieve the enemy stole the ftwxi.AcIcvcrmeansirfpulIuqs this oil' 18 to first nieei with the village headman or town mayor to Seam" him that you have received reports of enemy troops stealing food from gardens and cunununal stashes. Advise him to contact you for “asNstance" if fixtd starts coming up mvaing.

A few days or a tveeic later, have your men steal some food and leave tracks like those that wouhl be left by the enemy (have your guerrillas wear bools taken Iront enemy dead). When the heatlman cepotts to you that the enemy has been stealing food, reassure him that you arc doing everything you can to prevent additional thefts, but that your unit is small and has a lot of ground to cover and villages to protect. Ifynu e^mre an enemy soldier, three him to admit to the bcaitman that he seas the one who stole the thod. Then cake him away and promise tbc head¬ man tint iIk soldier wilt be punished severely. Hiis uehniqiic keeps the enemy in disuvor uach the ovilians and may very well bring you and your guerrillas into their &vur, which issxiur goal.

EATING

Food pceparatiun and consuit^oa are always a concern to guerrillas, and ao importani one ai that. Any dme a guerrilla ot guerrilla tinit eats, security is automatically lewned Ivecause less arrenrion is being paid to security. There arc sune steps tlic guerrilla can take, however, that reduce the chances ofasccuri ty breach when tixid is being cooked or ealeii.

On the Move

suming a little ar a time from a pocket filled witli something high in complex carbohydrates, simple sugars, and protein. This is cspecijlly useful during midday when a laigc “sit-down" meal should be avoided: such meals in tlic aAcenoon can rendet the guerrilla lethargic, thus reducing his anenrion to detail and level of alertness, (Tlie sleepy guerrilla wto just consumed a big lunch IS sometimes said to liave fiiUcn into a toed coma.)

As IS the case with every meal, ihe meal-on-the-movc must be eaten in such a way that no trace of the tood is Ictt for the enemy to find; such sign can tcU a tracker a great deal. Apple erwes and fruit rinds, celinphanc wrappers, bones, and all other evidence ituisi be kept with the guerrilla while on the move and di^HKcd of safely and tactically when the situation permits.

At no rinie .should a guerrilla be cadng anything while on the move that hampers his ability to employ his weapon, maneuver, or hide. And he should not have to look down at the fixid he is earing in order tt> get a hold of it; he should be able to amply feel Ibr It and bnng il to his mouth without taking his eye off rhe aunc oc away from the direction he is supposed to be watching.

At Brief Halts

VVhik on patrol or iithcrwisc on the move, the guerrilla unit is going 10 have to stop from rime to rime, for whatever reason. Scops like these demand dut no food be prepared or eaten—the guerrillas are now a stadonary orget and all eyes and thoughts must be tightly focused on security all the wdiilc.

In a Harbor Site

A harbor site is a clandestine hidmg spot that a small guerril¬ la luiit (squad-sized or smaller) uses to rest, and only rest There is no caring or food prepaiadou. Since rhe harbor site will ahvayv be In a spot dirliculc to reach oc detect by the enemy, security can go down to 2S percent if the siruanon permits. The harbor site demands as little movement within the site as possible.

la a Patrol Base

l‘nod may be prepared and eaten in a patrol baw, however, seairitv is always a serious concern. 'I his means that, liepending on the sitiiaiion, up to 50 percent of the nnic may be preparing and eating food; lire other 50 pereent should be lending to secu¬ rity. Cold tboilt no fires) is safer because ol'ihe lack of flames and smoke to alert the enemy r>f your presence. There are some sit¬ uations where the guctnlla can get away with tiny fires, but they must be masked from possible detection at all times by being below ground with the smoke being diffused hy vegetation above the tire site, I>ry hardwood m pieves no thicker riian a pencil IS called for so that smoke is reduced. The Dakota hole lire lay is 1 good guerrilla fire lay because the llamcs arc kept below groundat all times. C oals from the Dakota hole can lie saved and used in .m underground Dutch oven or suuilai fire lay so rhat fooil laii be cooking while the guerrillis arc out and about.

Avoid allowing individual guctrillas to each havx a lire. The more fires built, the greaier the risk of compromise. Vjuad lire* are Isesi, and the guerrilla sciiiad leader must be made te^wnsi- ble for the proper use of those lirta.

In a Seiniperinanent Base Camp

The same rules semipcrnuncDt base camp ino guerrillas evxr operate out of a permanent base camp: the risk of mainiainmg siicii a sranc site are loo greal) lltst apply in a patrol base. Two of the greatest dangers guerrillas ftee insofar as detec¬ tion is concerned when operating oul of a semipermanent base camp involve the disposing of food svaste/coniainers and the denuding of the surrounding area by guerrillas foragmg for foci for tlicir fires.

Food waste disposal is made less of a concern by efficient preparation and consumpooii, i.e., cook tmly what you uilend to eat ami cal everything you cook that is edible. Bones and other inedible waste must be disposed of surreplii lously. well away

irom the camp. Large dump sites are out of the question. This leaves disposal in ales such as deep rivets Ifbr waste that will sink; and one-man dumps. A one man dump is a tiny hole dug by each guerrilla in leliich he places his fiicid waste. These dumps are always well away froiii ihe camp, and the guerrilla takes care to cover the site in older to nuke ii appear llial iioiliinghas hap- (vened dicrc. Such holes should displace no more dirt and detri¬ tus than necessary.

Booby traps can do some good when placed near a dump ate. Some eounterguemlla units will use dogs to sniff r>ut dump Mtes. The more dt^ and enemy forces injured r>r killed hy boohy traps at dump sites, the bettet. The menial stress c*t>cri- cnced by the dr^ handler when searching tor a dump site is bad for tbeic morale.

The gathering of foe) for evasion fires was one of ilie prob¬ lems see always counseled <iur students on ar the Navy SBBJi (Survival-Evasion-Kesisiance-Kscapci School in Maine, fust a Iw men could quickly make t very noiiceable iinpacr on the fiora In a small area when gaibctiiig Kiel Irinder. kindliiig, and the irsore bulky foci) for a lire. Wc tauglit them to ncvvi gather the nutenal they need anywhere near wlwre they intended to Ivulld their evasion theliet. and tliai when thee did colleci rwigs, Ivark, and unall brancites that there must be no evidence of cliav foci having been removed from wiserc it was. Thuve same prin cipics ntusi be applied by guerrillas.

Ill some utuaTions the guerrilla may be able to lutate iuid procure alternate heat sources for warming or cooking his fixid. ir.li all possible, the gucrnlla sbuiild have in his kii a small sin¬ gle-burner aiove tliii is enable of using a variety of hiels, slicIi as whin: gas, Colcmau foci, and gasoline. .Stoves that can use only one type of foci arc to be avoided il' possible because of rlie obvious It^stiCll restraints they fiircc on the guerrilla. One problem caused by these swwes is mainienancc. I’rcvx-nrivc main lenance is crucial in oidcT to avoid unnecessary glitches. The stove must be cleaned regularly and thoroughly, and sp-are pans must be kept on hand.

96

another alternative, that old standby, Sierno, is sdll a viable and ottco advisable means of hcaBng Itxxl. A angle can, if used right, can last quite a while and beat many meals.

lluring the Gulf War, my Manne inlantry unit was intro¬ duced to a new type ufhjod warmer Called an MRE IMeal, Ready to Eat; beater, it consisa of a thin plastk sleeve a little svider and lon^t than an MRE package with a soft, flcaiblc wafer of some material in it that, when soaked with a little water that is [loured into the sleeve, <|uicldy reacts with impresMve heat. Hydrogen gas is produced as a result of this chemical tcac- dem, so laution must be oterdsed not to have any open flame* mar the heater when it is in use.

There arc still various forms of “heat tabs” ai'ailalrie that burn when a lit match is applied to them. A major advantaim of having chemical heating mechanisms such as these available is the Set that they can be carried right along with the guerrilla, thus elinilnaring the need for building a fire.

If logistics permit, each guerrilla should have his own cord¬ ing vessels and utensils in hi* kit; however, this isn’t always the case. In many situadoos, the guerrilla is going to have to fiuhion and use items provided by nature.

If the gucnilla is fortunate enough to be upeiaiing in areas with stands of mature bamboo, the world’s thickest and often

I COOKER

sd for su-aming or bailing food. By cutting a rectangular lid in ihc center of one scctiun, he can stuff food iiuo ihe caviiy and add a little water. He then tephccs die lid and sets the bamboo over a Rre As an alternative, he can take a large setnon of bam¬ boo and cut il offin two places—below die upper joint so the top is open and below tbe lower joint so the bottnin is solid. I hen he can set it up on one end between iwn burning logs nr some rocks to cook the ftxid he has placed inndc.

green leaves like tiiat of taro can be wrapped around KxkI itcins, which are then cooked over coals. The guerrilla places coals in a shallow hs^, piaco rucks over the coals, sels rlie Icaf- wrapfied food on the rocks, and then covets the whole deal whli diit. This is Ihe guerrilla’s Ihirch nven, a system that allows him

to ovok food with no fur¬ ther effort while he tends to either things. ;\]su, those same Icavxs (or green leaves similar to them I can he wrapped around food and shoved dircedy into the coals of a burning fire.

-A medium-sized steel, heavy aluminum, or tin can is easily fashioned inm what is called a hobo stove. Such a device can last ftir many meals if made correctly and

SLEEPING

Where, when, and how a guerrilla unit sleeps is of critical tactical importance.

On the Ground

Most of the time, guerrillas ■niil be sleeping on the ground ivith one excepDon being in net areas like swamps, pocosins, marshes, and sn on, whieb require either ihc construcuon of platforms or the use of hammocks suung lietween trees.

A guerrilla shoukl never has'e to sleep with nothing between him and the ground except the clothing he has on. A ground mat, poncho, tarp, or similar item stioiild lie Issued -•*> that a bul'ter separates the guerrilla from the tlamp and/or cold ground, lleniemhcr that the gueirilla must be able to get some sleep; the guerrilla leader must use whatever plausible mcaas lie can come up with to make his fighters more comfortable.

Ill anything except subtropical or tropical cliiues. a sleeiwng bag of some kind is going to be required. In warmer, temperate rones, a sleeping hag can be consinictcsl out ofa poncho and a linec, but m areas with snowfall and colder temperatures, a gen¬ uine sleeping bag will be needed. As is the cate with most gear guerrillas acquire, sleeping bags, carps, ponchos, liners, and other tilings will be stolen or captured Itom the enemy. In friendly areas where the itidigenuus people favor the gucrriUaa, cottage industries can be set up to manufatturc these iienvs.

A tceluiologically advanced enemy may have ihcrmal imag¬ ing systems moiiiued in aircraft. In this case, guerrillas must sleep ill the fetal position at mght in small groups; this can make them appear lo be a small hcnl of mammals .such as deer. Tlie vast majority of mammal.s sleep curled up this way to facilitate Ixxlv lieal retenrion. The guerrillas on guard duty will ensure chat no sleeping guerrillas stretch out m the linear

100

Above the Ground

When the giierrilbis erquired to sicqi up offi he ground, he may liave up to tluce choices, not including sleeping in a vehi¬ cle, wliicli is inadvisable from a faaica! view-poini,

First, he can string, a liamnioek between two trees. Most ham¬ mocks arc rkhnet style, which makes them lifdit and compaciible, He can stnng a poncho above the hammock for rain protection isonie ovmincrcially available ■‘jungle" hammocks have poncho roofi as part trf the system A dis-advantage of the Jishnci-sryle haimmock is that gear tends to get c-aught in it Phe guerrilla using this kind of liammotk should be taught to hang his combat gear on the tree at his head tor case of retrieval slioukl he need it suddenly. Another disadvantage ol' the h.tmiTiock, comes witli cold-wvalher use |uM as ilic surface of i bridge freezes liefore ilie mad surt'ace does because of the cold air passing beneath die bridge, the hamtmsck will have cold air passing underneath it, causing the guerrilla to liecoine eoWer fasrer.

T he guerrilla can also construct sleeping plartbrms if time, equq’ment, and nature permit jenough .satisfaciory vegetation i. Although most types of wood can be used to build a sleeping plartorm, the easiest to use is bamboo because it is hollow (eas¬ ily chopped dow-ni yet strong. IVainmg in lashing is rcvpiited.

The final chtiicc might he sleeping m a tree. There arc obvi¬ ous dangers here, such as falling out of the tree and iioi being able a> escape easily should yxiu Ive discovered, btill, some trees oftcr (air protection as sleeping locations, .\iwiys use a satety rope to tie the guerrillas uitu the tree with a quick-release knot. Make sure no sign has been left around ihe base of the trees being used or in (he general vicinity.

WATER FILTRATION AND PURIFICATION

The accosmts are many of both picrnlla and convenuonal tbrccs that (ell prey to impure w-aier and lost their struggle bccau.se ofil. Guerrillas must exerdse strict adherence to water

101

midc contaminants are found in water sources. Clarity b ncs’cr to be conadcred a reliable indicator of purity: many contami nuns arc invisible to the naked eye. Nor Is the remoteness of the water source to be coosidcicii a tcliabic indicator, even llte most

and clouds formed by water vapor originalinj' cuvr containinal- cd water or euntainin); airlwrne coniaminanrs (acid rain and other pollutantsi can be danjsetotis.

nitration invidvcs the removal or substantial teduciioii t>f suspended pariiculaie matter, such as sUi and demms, bom water. Filtration alone, altboiigh good for improving the appear ance and perhaps the taste of the water, is nut enough, it does not remove toxins.

Primitive tiltration can be aecomplbhed by ruspending a trouser leg triim a tree branch with the hem down and a knot tied just aisove the hcin. Fill three quarters of tbc leg with alter¬ nating layers of rock, sand, and grass ;nvo layers of each). Pour the water t<i be filtered into the top of the leg .to tkii it drains down tluoiigh the lavers and drips into a euniainer placed on tlie ground below the knot ui the leg.

Two shirts stretched horizontally right, one above the oiber, can have water poured ilimugh chem. Place a eoniainet Jircedy beneath them to catch the water as it cotnes ihroiigli.

You may be able to simply allow standiog water to settle In' nshttlc a» an hour or so in order for the suspended matter trsset-

Purification

Purification is the removal or destruction of harmnil pathogens and other mitenals in the water. Some modern fiiters available at camping stores and trom outdoor equipment suppli¬

ers do in fact purifr water by removing nearly all known natural and man-made contaminants, including viruses, bacteria, dinoflagellale* siicb as plistcria, and other debilitating toxins like

and Cmriia lambliB, as well as heavy met¬ als from industrial waste and fireal colifonn bacteria, winch is common in the water and sediment layers of rivers and stream!, meandering through agricultural areas.

Boiiing water at a tuUing boil for a few minutes kilk all nat¬ ural contaminants but mav leave rynibcTic toxins. Still, boiling is better than aoebing.

Water can also lie purified by chemical means such as bleach or iodine and chlorine tablets. Many conventional armies use iliese tablets fiir combat units operating along the fiTward edge of the baidc area Guerrillas should caretiilly search bodies and prisoners fot these lablets. which they can take and use. Warning: I once operated in a counccrgucrrilla unit that kept higtily to.dc tablets chat looked put like iodine lablets in a genuine iodine but dc in their unilbrm pockets in case of capture or death. -Make sure you give a prisoner from whom you have just taken wliat appears to be kidiiK or other purificanon tableis a canteen of water cun- laining one of these tablets first, Let him see you place the cabin in his water. If he balks, you know the tablets arc bogus.

Water Colloction Sites

Water must be collected covertly, hntire guerrilla units must ntii shosv up at a single water source to collect water, .^fcw guer¬ rillas should cake canteens from the whole unit and fill iKeni horn a position ofsaliry. This way. if they are compromised, only a few guernUas are in double rathet chan cveryme.

Tbc guettiilas must be careful nor to u-se the same e.xact col¬ lection point more than once. An enemy unit watching the river tor other source I might easily spot some ^crrilias getting water .somewhere and allow them to leave w-ithoul being attacked. Then they can set up an olwervanon post to sec if the guerrillas return to iluil collection point. If so, again the enemy allow-them

102 103

tu leave and laicr mine or Ixjoliy trap ihe siie. Or the enemy miisht let them leave and then send in a sniper team m tract the pucirilias on their wav bade to their tinii. Tlie rest you can imag¬ ine. Another option Ihe enemy has in tins instance is to do a tltorough map study ot' the surrounding area in order to deduce where the gia'rrilla patrol base nughi be. then send in a rccon team, conduct aerial reconnaissance Inianned or unmanned), or drop some listening devices in the area. Some counierguerrilla ftircia might even coniaminatc the water if thev think it might harm the guerrillas.

Hou- the guerrilla intends to use the water he is taking will determine where he will take it troin For iiuiaivce, dnnking wiwr comes from the point farthust upstream. Puvvnitream rnini there it the point tor eookiiig water, followed by utensil and cooking vessel wishing, clothes washing, and, if necessary, vi-hiele washing u rare event lor guerrillas). Soaps must never Ive used unless they arc the biuslegradahle kind diat environmental¬ ly aware backpackers use -such sosfis leave no biibhles or other sigiis of pollution.

NAVIGATION AND MOVHMKNT

Gucrnlla torres ate usmIK' indigenous to the region in which they are figliting Nevertheless, the guernll.s leader must make every efiort to ensure that each guerrilla is nut only very ramiliar with the lay of the limi hul also knows how to move across chat land withniir being detected. The gticinlla must also he adept at using technical (map and compass) navigation ccchmsfues as wvl| as primitive means cu get from place to place; the time may come when lie ituisi move nut of his home aiva into a rcgio)i iinlamil- iar to him. be it as a seniipermarent relcxabon or to link up with another guerrilla three in order to condiici a (oini operation.

Tills book does not contain a detailed cipJanation on lech- mcal and pnmitive land navigation, .since this would teejuire a section the size of a hook itself. All the land navigation (and sur¬ vival) technivyiies the guerrilla needs arc found iu Wtliitmiss

104

in a video. The Ultimate OHtdmrsmaK Critical SitsK' far rrareliti^. .SirrFt'vis^. and Ettiimnf Tour Timt in the Wrldemi-ss. Both arc available trom I’aladin Press.

Isluave iivovTcmeiu techniques, Isowei-er. shall be covered licre.

Movemenr

Mao /.cjisng, when writing about yu chi chan Iguernlla war- arc;, said that guerrilla siraiegy must he based primarily on alcrmcis, mobility, and attack. The lirsi iwo are crucial to achiev¬ ing the third.

Anyrsiie. regardless of his background, can learn to move imdctcacd. Whereas it »true iliai many giiernllis are bom out in the countryadc and have learned to move quietly through ihe wnosls while hunting, a new guerrilla bom and raised in aiity can also be laiiglii to slink through the tbresr without a sound. And country buys can be caindu w improve iheir movement skills. (I am a perfect ciiatnple of this. .Mihuiigh 1 was raised in the woixis of Maine and in the Isackcountry of old south Florida and the Evcigladts when this region siill liad liuge triers of uninhabited uilbcrncss and was quin; prutinciit at tneakiiig about by the rime I was 13 years old. I '.camed more as a tecontiajssanec Marine by paying atceiiooii to people like Sian Iramk. my point man. vvho was raised in fric Palau junyde in rite western I’aciDc; I’si Mailing, a strapping country Isoy from the sugar beet lidsls of nocilieni Minn»ota who knew how to run a patrol better than mtut men; and I'ndd Ohman, my rceon team machine gunner.)

The guerrilla must always he watching, listening, and learn¬ ing. The day the guerrilla ^It he has noihiiig more to learn Is ihe day ilie guerrilla war is lust.

The Trail Fallacy

I ixcall being laiighi in the Marines that you must never use Jails because of the inctesised likelihood of being ambushed.

103

Although it is io that the more often one u<es a trail to get ftom one point to another the greater his chances arc of being ambushed, the truth is that all guerrilla iurccs and all toasvn- tional forces u-se trails etnensively. The icason for this is czpcdi- enc>'. It is often neccssarv to move quickly from f>nc place to the nuet, and bails afford you that ability. The key is to use trails as inlfequendy as possible arxl, when using them, to reduce the amotint of sign nr impact left on that trail.

lb reduce sign ; whether on a trail or offi, the guerrillas should trasel in small groups with the li^mst possible loads, and pteler- ably travel during rimes of darkness arsd rain, 'nie iewer feet on a bail die fewer tbnrpnnis left hehiiid. Tlie lighter dw indivkhul load, tite less lltc impact of the tout on the ground. Rain helps wash away sign, and darkness allows a certain degree of visual safety.

Sntall trails are preferred to larger ones because they arc more diftleuli ibr the enemy to detect. Guerrillas can use game trails extensively in many cases, provided they adhere to the ahjrcmcnticmcd rules. It is wise to have a large guerrilla force break up into sittaller grou('s and move independently via small trails ami then loim up at a predetermined, secure location for the attack when cIok to the objective. It is wortbwlulc to tram dogs to run point and detect boolty traps and enemy ambu.shes with their sensitive nosea.

The diiitaace between one g;ucrrilla and the guernllas to his unmediatefront andrear is called interval. Interval isdctermiocd by the tactical sinianon: you want enough distance to prevent or lessen the chances of two or more men being wounded or killed by a single booby bap nr ambicsh, but you also want to be close enough so that eye contact can be mainiaiived and mutual sup¬ port is available in ease of trouble. I'errain. weather, vvgetarion, weapons capabilities, and the level of tactical prufieicney the imir has all play a role. In any case, the interval should not be so great that one guerrilla eannot effccovclv communicate with the guer¬ rilla in front of or behind him with hand signals.

Hand Signals

Hand signals .sitauld be simple and easily uitdersinod. For

then pointing in a direction means you sec something in that •lircction. Next, flashing numbers with your fingers means that something is so many yards away in tliat diicvtion. This signal might be tblluwed by another numerical signal indicat¬ ing how many of those things you see, which is followed hy a signal Ibr wliai those things are The latter might he forming a iiandgiin with your Itand, which would mean enemy croups. In les.s than three seconds one gueniUa can “teU" another guerrilla that he secs fivv enemy soldiers 200 yards to the cast .Hid never have to open hU mouth or risk dctccuon by mov¬ ing hack CO rhe other guerrilla.

Time Together

Guerrilla leaders must do everything in ilieir power to keep small units together as much as possible, 'live mnre rime a small unit spends living and operating logeilier, the more cfftcicnt they will bcetimc as a team. .Mler several months of combat together, a small team of guerrillas can seem to read each other's thoughts based on how they are iiinvvng. i.e., their Ixidy lin guage 1 have- operated in units with this abiiiiy and can assure you that they arc hiydily eftective.

Minimise pcrsotmcl turnover, l-.veryihing should he done as a team—sleeping, caong, training, reltearsing. and tiglviing. If a personaliiy da^ cannot be worked out wiihm the team, move one of the guerrillas involved ti' another team.

Simple Rules of Movement

The foHowing arc some simple rules to make movement

• A guerrilla must nevee use vegeiaiion to pull himself up a

107

slope: pulling on vegetation leaves addiiional sign of tiic guerrilla's passmu,

• Stealthy stuiiti must be used ic adsance of the main body, and a reliable eummunicatiuns syMcm must link them.

• Refore moving out, the guciiilla must silence all gear »irfi camouflaged idark green, brown, ot blacki maiking ape.

• Trails I'King avoided by villagers and [0110)1011: are being avoided for a reaion—they are iiiisafe llir some reason, i.e., they are mined or booby trapped.

• Night movement must be practiced more than day imrvc- mciiti nigln movement is more dtlllculi and the majinty of guerrilla operanons mil be conducted at night.

• Wlicn using a trail system, u.k nhertiaie routes to avoid pat- ccming,

Alteriute Movement Teehniquca

Besides moving over land on foot, the guerrillas should aca'mpt to take advantage of rivers and other bsadics vf u'aa'r. Watercraft can be an eicelleni nteihod of moimg supplies and InHItracing troops.

Higli Speed Cast

While operating m the Philappines, one of my reconnais¬ sance unit’s favorite insertion methods was by bonka boat— diigoiil canoes with outriggers and outboard moinr.s operated by indigenous people like the Negritos and the l-llipinos iheni- sclves. The boats arc extremely common and ihercfore seldom attract attention. By having the boat operator run the boar at high speed (which is just about the only speed they tun at) along a shoreline, a team ofmen can “iiigli speed east” into die water ivithotu the boat’s having to slow down. They can then

I1ic guerrillas hang

KUNO AND SNOKKSL SYSTEM

Hang Glider

ktliders were tirsi used by commandrw in World War II. ivith the Bridsh, Amcricaiu, and Germans all getting into r1ie act. Today, liaiig gliders are more likely to be used because thev arc •smaller, easily hidden, simple to operate, and oficn unexpected. You need an elevated launching point.

Hang gliders must only be used by guerrillas at night, and the operator must he an expert at aerial navigation via terr.iin .issoci- atian or, if available, Gkibai Pueinoning System (GPS). He must stay clear ofihe moon and stay sulTicienily high inuil time la land so that be is not heard; yes. all hang glldcts make some ntilsc as tbc wind pushes against the fabric and frame of the glidet.

109

Bicj-cle

Ciuerrillas used bicycle? cxtcnsistly during Worid War II, and the Vkteong also iiac<l them to move supplies and weapoas not only along the Hn Chiltlinli 'I'nil but oS it as ucll.

Some conventional fortes are currently cipcdmcnting stith mountain bikes as a means for messengers and otn reconnais¬ sance units to get aboiil, and the giictiillas can do the same. These nigged bikes can also move supplies.

Horses and other animals can he UKd, too. A neat irick I once used to move some sheet c.splosives into an area waa to sew the Bvplosivcs right into the saddle blanket of ihe liorse. No one suspected a thing.

Now let's look booby traps.

CHAPTER 8

‘Tie mine issues au afficiai communique.' -AdnenU Wiltani PnUL l'a42

Mines and booby traps are to tlie guerrilla as Ito and half tnults arc to politicians and many juumaHsai dicv go hand in hand and |ilay' a enrieal role in conducting day-to day hiuvinnsii. The gucnilla force that does not use mines and booby traps as a combat muldplicrscandt a subnandally reduced chance of victory,

Mutes and booby traps first came into dteir own on a gxand scale in World War 11 when antitank and anti^iersaniiel mines svere used heavily by both the Aais and .Mlied powers: booby traps were used but to a much lesser degree. But it tt-a.sii't until the Vietnam War that we really began to see )usl how dei'asiai- ing an elTect these guileful weapon.? could have on an army. Their surrepntious nature and tendency to brutally maim rather than kill outright makes them partiailaily elective in lowering the enemy's morale and shattering not only their will to tight, but that of their country, too. Also, they are readily available in the world arms maiket and can be very alhxdable, uiili some antipersotinel mines cosring as hde as S2 each. When you add this to the fact that booby traps are just i-s easy to manufiicturc

ami rig as antipersomiel mines are cn purchase, you begin to see why they are so imporlanl ro the guerrilla.

Every mim.- at booby trap set where a guerrilla might acci¬ dentally dctotiace it because he didn’t kniw it was there man be marked ro prevent this. A system of apparently meaningless iiiaiks (meaningless to the enemy, and perhaps even imnodcedl must be developed that warn any guerrillas passing by that a mine or booby trap lies ahead. Iltese marks might he something u innocent looking as a machete idaah agaiiisl a tree.

•Vlines are divided into three categories: antitank or anrivchi- de, antiship, andaniiitersnnnel. 'I'hcpidicioususcofcach can sub icmdally turn the ride in a guerrilb war. and if the guerrillas have a reliable source of rc.supply.thdr combat power is aU the greater.

DETONATION SYSTEMS

Mines and hoohy craps can be detonated by a number of means, inelinling the foltnwing:

• pressure • pressiite-telease

• on-command • magnetism

• antidisturbaticc • air pressure diaiige • air ccnipcrature change

\Miith detonation nieclianism ihe guerrilla selects ssnil depend on the circumstances.

Press uic

Pressure-deionaled mines are among the most common types ttiutid in guerrilla wars. They work on the simple principle

112

aRsiying pressure to ihe top of

instandv in most cases. They are commonly placed on trails, palhs, and roads, (laurion

is placed at a depth that la jiisl ri^c for dctoiurion,

.Some types of mortar rounds can be rigged as mines by placing lliem nose up in the ground wnli titc Ivire riding saft^ pin rerauved aiul setting the (use assemhiy on impact. Failure to remove the Isorc rid¬ ing .saKty pin will result in the round's falling to go olf.

MORTA* ROUND MINE Pressure-Release

■fhe (wesaure release mine is esacily the opposite of the pres¬ sure nunc. This mine require* that the pressure keei'ing the mine Inim de-conacing be released or reduced in order tbi- the mine trs detonate. .Such mines ofteo rely upon some ruse perpetrated upon a careless or unsiispccong enemy soldier where the soldier picks up or moves an object silting on the mine's pressure plate ■X sw-itcb, .A classic example of rius is w1ieii a guerrilla three leaves something that dae enemy would find of interest ori top of the unseen mine—a weapon, map case, radio, stack of papei-s. ui what have you. When the enemy soldier removes it—whump. kven more insidioiis is placing a soda or beer can upnglil along a resad or jsath. underneath which is a pressure-release mine. Many suldiets just can't resist kicking at cans, so .. .

Pressure-release mines can also be placed uiuler die dead bodies of guerrillas and enemy Sisldiers.

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Tension-release detonacors are normally associated with booby traps. These arc the dassic “trip wire" devices that cost so many American GIs body pans and their lives in Vietnam.

When setrinp these booby traps it is important and very wise to have nvo sources of tension on the wire. Ihis adds an evtra dimension ofsafety to the operation.

The Viirc can be run aenns trails at vanuus hcifdits. and I recommend using the 5-to 1 rule. This rule says that after every five trip wires set at ankle height, the next one should he set at head or shoulder height. You do this because if the enemy point man fiiuls five wires at ankle height be may assume chat they arc all set at ankle height. KopcftiHy. he will he proven ftially wrong.

On-Comiruind

I1ie on-cnmniand loommand-deionniedk mine is most often a dayiiiore, a cuntaiucr uf pellets backed with an csplosisv ebatge that hurls the hundreds of pellets toward die enemy. It is a devas¬ tating weapon chat can cnyiple nr kill niiineroiis enemy in a single wcU-dicected blase. An electrical charge detonates the mine.

Magnetism

Magnetic mines arc usually reserved fiv antishipping pur¬ poses. ’Ihey can be set on the bottom cd* a harbor, and when a ship passes iivec them the magnetic pull lifts them off the bortnm and pulls them against the ship's hull for immediate delonatioa.

Mines of many styles can be ngged with tirncni in the fiicto- ry !«■ by the guerrilla in the field. limpct-stjie mines are com¬ monly used by special operations forces such as Force Rccon Mamies, Navy SEALs, and the Bniish S|iccial Boat Squadron in

sink enemy sliijvs. Ifa guerrilla tbrcc can come by such mines and use them against enemy sluivping, they have done good and added a new dimension to I he war.

AnticiistujbaDcc

Both mines and Ixiolvy traps can lie rigged with antidistur- baiu'e systems desigoed to detonate the mine when somenne tampers with it. Asimplc mercury switch is all tliai is really need¬ ed, and these can be fashioned with the insides uf i stamiard household chernuvsiai ennraininga vial ofmemary, which allows an electrical circuit to be complied.

Air FeeKsure Change

A more sophistivated deionaiion device u-ses a barometer to explode the mine or booby nap when the air pressure ri.ces or fells to a vxriain level. This is a good system to use wlicn your intelligence says an enemy unit will be moving into a certain area ahead of nr behind a storm from.

Air Temperature Cliangv

Tlic same principle as the air pressure change detonator can be used to fig a dcvace to go off when rhe air temperature readi¬ es a certain level. A digital dierniomeier is required.

Mines and booby traps are one nf Hie guerrilla's best tfieiiJs. Use ilieni wisely and watch the mwtile of the enemy plummet.

115

*H4r havt the ptneer ui Imack any laeicly out of the 20lh century:’ — Ikitiue Sci^ury Rnbcrr McNamiro. 1464

Jluc hcarin{i the Kwd ‘‘smbubh" can make a guerrilla fight¬ er's jaw tigliten and eyes squint, fi>r it'there is uoc ballinarkut'a guccrilli war, it is the ambush. 'I'he amlsush is probably the old¬ est Tocric in guerrilla's warfightiiig manual, and the reason it IS still there is simple: It works, and it wuri.s retnarluibly well when platmcd aikl executed correcciv.

'I'he list of guerrilla forats whu used ambushes is long and impressive and iDCliides doseivs of .American Indian tribes, the Huns, the Munguls, the Swiss, the Afghans, the French, Americans in neariyevery warihcy have iMuglu, the Russians and the Soviets, the lapanese. tlte Chinese, the Vietnamese, the lamils, and thousands mure.

'The guerrilla force must be cipvrt at setting and exeemiiig ambushes in a variety of situations. Once the guerrilla attains the ability to ambush enemy forces with bloody results, Itis combat power u> greatly multiplied.

119

W'HY AN AMBUSH?

Besides the obviuus overall goal of weakening the cnenw pliysically, lacticallv, ipirittidUy. and logcgically, ihe amhush is meani to either destriiy a ccctam cncm> loive (and reap the

tain i'utee in otilcr to wear it down and reduce its combat powxr. When an enemy tbrcc is dcsttoexd. tneaning it can no longer

tiglac as a unit, the giu-tiillas lan benctit by capturing the following:

• weapons • equipment • intelligence iiiformaiion

’nieywill also bencHt Irom the hallowing:

» a rise in their morale • increased ambush expenenee • Increased general combat leadership cxpeiieaiee

The guerrillas bendit in the following ways when ihe>- tuc- cessfully harass an enemy fiiree:

• by forcing the enemy ts> abandon or alter their plans • by keeping the enemy on the defcmave • by lowering the enemy's morale and will to tight • by demnnscrating to the cisilian populace that the enemy is

powerless agiliiiSI the guerrillas

And regardless of the type of ambush—slestnicoon or harassment—the enemy will beemne less aggressive and mtifc uneasy and distressed when uperadng in giicrnlla country. Hiis will result in the enemy’s sahsheuting caution for Ma^resaon, which orients thent more to the defense than the offense, and

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AMBUSH CLASSinCATIONS

Htc tvpc of ambush ’ tactical siruatkm at the rr cs: deliberate and hasty.

iduct will depend entirely on the . Ihere are two types of ambush-

I'he deliberate ambusii is an ambush planned .igainst a pre¬ selected umt at a predetermined time and place. Solid mtclh- gence and detaikd planning arc the tuxi elements that make a deliberate ambu.\h possible and worthsiiiilc.

Deliberate ambushes require information on the foilnwing:

the dze of the enemy unit (squad, placuuD, company, etc.) the composinon of rhe enemy unit {infuury. mechanized infiiniry, motor transport, headquarters, supply, etc.; ebe di^mdon of the enemy unit {casual, somewhat alert and defensive, very alert and dcfensivvl the strength of the enemy unit {sveapons, leadership, .support equipment. cK.i rise mute of march of the enemy unit and estimated dmc of

ihc appiuxjmaie strengdi iif'thc

of mirth tht eHiinated

rlie kill 7onc

•h Is conducted quickly on tii^ccs ut'uppcx'- urk the guciriUis must think and act quick¬ 's that make ebera react correctly when the

require the following mliffiDacon;

Tliiv is thrqucntly uxkt ui* dsc nu)st dflSculi and cinse-coQ- suming &aors ti> maMcr. CommunicaiitMi and anenlion to detail are tbe keys to solid fire coordination, viaihuiil uhidi the ainhuah is doomed lo I'ailure. Kvery man must hnoss- predseig wliat to da and when to do it if the kill zone is lo be filled «irh the bodies of the enemy. A imstake in fire coordination means a loss of concentrated mass fins in the kill zone.

Ctmiinand and Control

The andsosh is the most intense fiirm cd combat and. as such, tequires the eery best in command attd control. Leaden ail up and dowTi the chain of command must have a tight grasp of the procedures that eontrtd the ambuah, Irom the insertioa to the setting up to the execution to the cinraction. SOPs, thorough planning and rehearsals, and supervision ace what it takes to command and control an ambush effitctively.

CaMHWiitd ani Cttaml (Avsb The gucnillas muse use command and control measutex to

lio the foUosving;

• dca'ct the enemy's approach and intunn the ambush team • allow the eiKinytolully enter the kill ronelvelhre initiating fire • utilite immediate action if the ambush is discovered prior to

• ucilUe direCT and indirect fires svlien needed • utilize search and sweep techniques immediately after the

ambush • safcly and tactically withdraw once the anihusli is finished

AMBUSH FORMATIONS

The type of ambush ibrmation you select will depend upon the following

• the size and lurmatiuii of the unit being attacked, as well as its compusiooii and disposition

• tlie weaponry Iscing carried by the unit belies attacked • the terrain • the vegetation • the size, composition, and di^xisition erf the ambush fijrce • tlie weaponry available to the ambush firrcc

Once the guetriHa leader has determined these ftctocs he can better select the best ambush fiirmation to use.

127

linear {liocj Amhitsh Box (Rectangle) Ambt

Tlie linear ambaxh situates the ambush ftitcc parallel to the enemy tbrcc. .\fter pinning the enemy in position by scaling off both ends of the long axis mines or other weapons, the ambush force attacks the cDcmy with large voluines of fire along the enemy's flank that is ei^xtscil to the ambush fiircc.

llie guerrillas must nsc caution to ensure that the majority of enemy troops and weapons is within the kill zone; an enemy unit that is strung out on its long axis is unlikeK to be darned seriously by a linear ambush.

llie boxantbsish is especially effeciivc against a tbrcc that has little or no experience with ambushes. It rdici upon four ambush teams (orming tl*e lour cornets ot'a box with the enemy made the box. One corner engages the enemy at a tiinc. W’hen the enemy turn lo flghi in ilvjt darcctaon, the initialing team ceases fire and ai'ipears to be withdrawins. At that dme the team diagonal to the firsi leani <^ns fire and forces the enemy to shift riseir fiscus of attention. As they do to, a thud team engages the enemy as the second team ceases lire ami appears to withdraw. When llie enemy go alter the third team, the third team also ceases dre and appears to withdraw. Now the tburth team opens liic to finish off what's iclt of the enemy futee.

Pyramid (Triangle) Ambush

There are two tvTws of pyramid arahuslics; tiglit configura¬ tion and loose configuration.

The tight I'tyramid or irlan^e Is used vciih inrerlodting Helds of fire from automatic weapons set at the points of die coiifigii' raiioii when the direction Irom wiuclt the eiieiny will he appnsaching is uoknuwn. This canftgiiradoii u &irly secure but requires at least 20 or so men due to the tisk uf the enemy asuulting chrtiugh.

.‘similar in concept to the box, the liiou: triangle has the aum- inatic weapons engaging the enemy's lead firet until the enemy tries to assiiiill through llsem. When they do so. one of the flank¬ ing automatic weapons opens fire to draw the eiKmy off, When the enemy mes to attack that team, the other fianking team engages than.

.An oflishoot of this is to hate assault reams standing by to cloac with and destroy the enemy as soon as they are it) disarray and being worn down by the autumade weapons fire.

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Sl’ECIAL AMBUSHES

Spcrial ambushes arc limired only by tbc siruacon and the audadry and Imaginarion uf the gucnillas

Helicopter Ambush

By disabling an enemy hclicopcer in a Wll zone but leaving some oK the enemy alive inside or just outside the chopper, the guerrillas can lute in another helicopter or helicopters In an attempt to extract the downed bird's crew and/or troops. To do ■ his tile guerrillas simply cease Sre and remain hidden until the rescue choppers arrive.

In many eases tbc rescue force will Kni Hy a couple of gun- ships along the iseriiiictcr of the laiuiiiiB rone to ehctk for and dear guerrilla Ibrccs. 'Hsis makes camouflage and discipline ciit- ical: no guerrilla must be seen or open lire until the rescue birds are on rhe grosmd. I'hen they open with .1 large vnluine ol' eon- eentrated tiic to cripple or sksiruy the other hclos. Withdrawal inusi lie immediate if the enemy has ilie resotitves to engage ilic guerrillas ftum chcairsvithgunshipsor with supporting arms like artillery and inortats.

Demolition Ambush

Adcmiilidisn ambu.sh is initiated by flnt attacking somerlting important to the enemy with explosives. Harassing lire Is then delhered to the target as ilie enemy reacts to the explosion. It may behoove die guerrillas to hold their fire liir a while before upemng up with tiicir automatic weapons hum a distanect the enemy will likely Ise expecting some imniediaie harassing fue and by delaying flsr a .short while the guerrillas may Knd That the enemy, uocc it appears to them diat nu harassing tire is immi¬ nent. relaxes llieir guard somewhat.

Claymore-Sniper Ambtisb

If the enemy is moving across fairiv caieii ground with little

cowt, a claymore mine can be defonaied to stop his lurwaid progress. Several snipers are positioned around the kill eonc and withhold fire tmtil the enemy thinks that the ipicinllas have fled. Once the enemy comes out iittu the open again the guerrilla snipers pick ufl'as many enemy as possible and then withdraw.

Ambushes arc one of rhe guerrillas’ best ways to even the sides.

138

and Indoctrination

‘Dcaii is Iffiburdian afcaihtr. duty hasry as a msuncain.’ —bmperur Meiji, IB8.>

Kor a tew years I was an instructor at the U.S. Navy S£R£ SduKil in Maine. One of my jobs at this most demanding and challenging school was widtin the itesisranee IVaining laboratory (ivn.) training and testing students on their ability to survive a simuUtcd prisuner ufwarlPOlVi experience honorably. Also dur¬ ing rhis rime. 1 served as an .tdvaneed .SKRli inainiciar leneliiiig graduates uf tiK basic S£R£ course dungs dtey needed tu knuw prior lu making a dcploynscni overseas in the near fumre. In Isotb job* I worked for former prisoners of war who hatl been shut down over North Vietnam and captured m 1968. Their experi¬ ences helped n»e—and the rest of the instniciar stafl^—better ■indersiand die myriad lactors governing the interrogadun, indoctrinadon, and exploitation of'prisonen. of war.

Immediately after finishing my tour at the school I was sent tu Saudi Arabia and then Kuwaitwidi a Marine rifle company for the Gulf War, trom the buildup to the final withdriv^ from Kuwait in May of 1991 of the last Marine combat unit, which liappcncd to be my unit t2nd Battalion. 4th Marines: chen-

139

Licutcnimt Colonel A. Conry, commanding). I found thai, just ds I expected, it is often easy [o make prisoners useful in some way. sometimes cxircracly useful.

CAPTURE AND HANDLING

Let roe make thft pei*cily clear—4 prisoner of «-ar b a valuable commodits’ that yexi, the guerrilla, must learn to expitnt. A very vdlualilc eonunodirv. As such, you must go to the greaiesc lengths to make extremely sure w\ir men do not -inads-enemly or other- svije—injure, maim, harm. (X othcrwwe damage the prisoner.

Combat b an increiibly cmotionjl experience. All at once it can lie tcrrilj'ing, thnlling. shocking, horrilymg. disgusting, repuJsve, maddening, siekeiiiiig, humorous, confusing, and mind numbing, and ei’cry guerrilla is going to be, to some degree, affcacd by these emotions. This undeniable fact iswliat yuu, as the guerrilla comroaiider, are going to bai'e to deal iviih on probably a regular basis »hcn it comes to prisoners of «•« and how they are handled during and immediaiety after ilicir capture and, if you arc rcumred lo hang on to the pnsonets fot an extended period, perhaps for monthis on end after their eap- uire. Kmotions—those of the guerrillas—arc the greatest threat to the viUie of the prisoner of war. and you mun do everything in voar power to prei'ent emotional lespoiiset from degrading the value of your prixe.

Prisoners of war arc afforded certain rights under die Geoeva Conventions Relevant lo the Treatment of Ihiioners of War, which wassigiicd in August of 1S14H by many sgnitories and has .since been signed by many more. Abiding ^ these conventions actually increases the combat pmver of the guerrillas in many (most ! drcumsiances, so it behooves the guerrillas to abide by them. Brutality tor brutality’s sake is oi'almost no value to the guerriliiis and only serves to gain immediate phy^cal compliance. Although there s somertting to be said tor physical compliance, there arc other, mote valuable means for gaming such compli-

142

Ibc American military uses the 5 Ss—search, sileiicc, segre¬ gate, speed, safeguard—to lay out how prisoners of w'ar should be handled initiafty on the bankdcld and all the way to their per manent detention ftaiity By sriclong to this formula, i he guer¬ rillas will reduce the number of problems they have between the rime they actually capture the prisoner and the croc they mm him over to higher command.

The search is the first thing the gvicrnlla docs upon captur¬ ing on enemy soldier. After taking die prisoner's obvious weaivins away, the guerrilla ciHiduec on immediau' search of the enemy soldier's person, including his unifonn. He thoroughly searches pockee,, pack, and other web gear, as well as briois, hat, gloves, and esery odicr uniform item fix weapons or anything that might be used as a weapon (i comb, pencil or pen, keys, watch, compass, belt, bool laces, identification tags and their chain, and so onj. Once the Bcoe.'il situation perniils, the guer¬ rilla perfurnis a strip search, and this includes body earitics anil depreasionB. The anus, ear canals, moutli, bottoms of fiict. armpits, groin area, small of the back, hair, nostrils, navel, pas- icnur knee, palms of the hands, and other potential hiding spun are checked and cleared.

All searches are done with one roan doing tlic search and one roan covering tlie prisoner wilii i rifle. Tlic searcher must never step between the prisoner and die roan with the rillc, for obvi¬ ous reasons. If the guerrillas have file funds (and tills ikiesii't require: much), Home electrome dog collars should be boi^t and placed on the prisoner duiing the deiaileii search. Should the row deaife to get fttLsty. a guerrilla just pushes a button and

gun is another worthy investment. The guerrillas must translate immediately all duciimcnu and

process them fur their imelligence v.ilue and tlicir cxpltxtariiHi

143

Every POW miisr be slenced from die tnocncnr of cipnirc iiinil he u well iway from the bittle anw and in a controlled sit¬ uation. Masking tape is cxctUctw tbi this iyta.it hurts when you take it off but it does not harm the phsoncri. Make sure be caa breathe thtuutdt ha nostrils when you put the tape over hi* mouth. A friend of mine one* lost a prisoner (read: the prisoner sutTocaied) after raping his mouth shut. The gu> had a cold and bis congcsrcil nose didn'i aHnw enoueh air into his lunp, so. ■.

depending on the tactiiai aluaiioo, you may have to Nnd the prisisner’s legs and arms js uvU n> keep him frum thrashing amind.

It is permissihlc to segregate prisonen by tankupion their cap¬ ture so as to prevent immediate neape aticnipu> and escape attempts are mure likely to succeed when they ate undertaken soon after capeure. buftite the ptisooers are deposited in a more pciiiianeiit detention Facility. In the Krsi 24 hours ui su alter eap- mre, the new prisuncr itsiiallv Iws the lollotving points in his &vi)r:

• He u close to Ins unit or frientUie*. • He is often in cxedknt physical cundiiion. » He is m situarioiv: such as trasviing in vchklet that iindx

escape easicc- • He is in situations that snberwiw make escape easier because

of the fog of war.

Hy segiegating prisoners by rank liuniur culisleds, NCUs, . and officers), In many cases the guerrillas can undcmiinc the iirginiration eft covert escape committees, and committees that

144

Later, when the prisoners arc in more permanent facUirics. it may behoove the gjierrillas to segregate prisoners by race, reli- gioii, gender, and even age. Such segregation can make etplona- tion easier and more pfoduclne.

Speed Kenmving the prisoner from die halile area as quickly as pos¬

sible is crucial to his future exploiiahtm. Ity getting him away rtiiin the Dgliting and speedup him to a safe area, the guerrillas are mun- likely to prevent htc .successful escape or addition.il injury.

But with igwcd comes rise danger of trveriooking a security concern. Every precaution must Ive lakcn lo deny the prisoner the opportunity to slip away unseen or make a Isold dasii for freedom in the conftasion of the ftght. Plans and SOPs must be ouvhilly laid 10 increase the chances of a successful uxtrachixi of the prisoner.

Safeguard Every prisoner iniut be aftiirded nifBcicnt prutcctiuii from

enemy lire and friendly retaliation, 'i'hc more damage you do or allow done to a prisoner, tlie more likely he is to lie of little asc. Remember that the prisoner of war is a most valuable conimod- iiy that Is to Ise 7ealously saicguardvd regardless of the tactical situadoD. If this means thai he must he allowed to keep his per- .vonal proevetbe gear like aheimet. gas mask, and Ihik jiickei,

The guctnllas must move the prisoners frequently ro help prevent rescue attempts by their comrades, They must conduct searches conumially so that they can detect and deal with secret stashes and covert orguiiaauoiis within live ranks of the prison¬ ers. If facilities permit, ptisonen should be kept m solitary con- Giicinetit and secured with redundant security systems.

InterrogatioD and Exploitation

Piuuncr intenogatioa is an art unio itself and is covured in its entirety in die Paiadin Press book Mate 'Em Tali: fVintipfc.'

145

■ Rci.) aihl (yr Tim Siillivan USN iRtc.i, and nuw-retired Xiiiy SKM. Master Chief Turn Keith, the lancr ot wliuni ^.•llI^dueted numcroas field inicrro^oons in the Mekung Oeha.

Tornirc gams cdmpUancc, phvMtal >'omi>tiaiice, hiu it doesn't often elicit usctiil informanon that is reliable, and it doesn't serve any purpose in the piaeiieal cvploiianon of the prisoner, for insonec, during an cxploiiaiinn session in Hanoi >v|ierc several American POWs were bmiighr Iwftirc a Kleet gn-nip of media (selected by tlie Communist regime, that is), one prisoner ofu.’ar ssas toned CO walk on stage in ftont of the eanieras and was then told CO buss. Ihe prisoner intentionally walked not and acted like a'rumble, iben Ivwvod stiftly to the assembly first to the li'ont. and then at 90-degree angles to “box tlie compass.'' Tills made him appear like an auinnucon who had loH liis mind, and it was made even worse for rhe man's captors wlien a guard ordea-d him to bow again. 'Ihis gave the ete'cr pnaoner anorlicr chance to box the compass with bows, three of uhieli went inward the sitics and

During another exploicatioti session in Hanoi, a group c.if Ametican Communist media was allowed to question tcver.il POWs. A bowl of fruit had been placed on the table to #ve the idea that the prisoner, were bring fed well, which was far from the truth, of course, but one prisoner saw an opportunity to turn the tables on the rumcoaC. by snatching a large handfrd of tlie fruit and feeding ravenously as they quesnoned him, sliowiiig that he was underfed.

The wy best way to exnaei useful iiifiirmatiun is to use poven approaches {outlined ui detail in Mabe ‘Em Talkt th.il do not call tor genuine physaeal abuse or tnrtua-. It is almost alwa^-s easier to get asefid and aeeutatt informaiion by using trickery.

Profasionab Only The intcrcoyiarion ot prisoncre by guerrillas other than those

traiiicri in interrogation tcehm^ues must be avtsded ITiere is raiieh too much to be Ion at die hands of an irate, untrained interrogator in the field. Duieipline and extraction SOft will help get the prisoner away I'mm the baulefield and into the hands of someone who knows exactly what be is diring «-bcn it eumes to

iHformaibtn Stom^cand MxplnilaiuiH SyrUms Information gleaned from prisoners must be kcp« in a safe

place and in a system that is caaly and accurately accessed In' the gueniUas' intelligence network. Systems with holts iliac allow good information to he lost or not fully cxploia'd must

The djsseminacicm of intelligence from the inierrogation center down to the troops must be smooth and eflicicot at all levels. Otherwise, the guerrilla movement is simply spinning its wheels in this area.

ItuioftriruitiaH It may or may not he worth rite time and efibn <if the gucr-

rllas to run an indoannation program, it all depends on their resotirees. abilities along these lines, and the ediicadnn level and resistance tcclmii|ucs of the prisoners. If the guerrillas have the linancial and iugisDcal resources, as svcil as indocrniiators who are experts at their craft, and if the prisoners’ educational level is fairly low and they have little or no training in resistance tech- nmues. it is advisable fbi the guerrillas to indoctrinate the pris¬ oners into their way of thinking. This not only makes them more compliant, it also makes them exeelleiu propaganda sources, aiui lhai propaganda an be directed at both the local populace and the smemy's homeland.

But as the previous two examples of crplonatioii attempts demonstrate, evploiiatiim and indoeirinaiion are not without risk, especially when the prisoners ace educated ami have been trained to nsiist enemy inducennadon attempts. Interrogators should abeavs cry to learn the pHsoncr'a educational level.

To indocirinaie prisoners—make i hem ihink like you ihinknnd sec things as you see diem—the guemlla must use a smattering of irudis mixed with haif-cnidis, lies, disinftirmaiion, and v-agary to sway them. Pir^vaganda used against Htem must lie of the highest equality; anything less will be seen ftir what it is: a tnck. Persistence and die ability m use Kxmtingly msignitieant data as tools in the indoeirinaiion syuem are two ofthe guerrillas' most valuable assets.

On the Other Hand

Lastly in this chapter, a wued on guerrillas who ace captured, Kvery effort mu.tt lie made to rescue guerrillas who arc taken pnsonct, and every giiertilb musi be taught escape pnxediires and how to resist enemy interrogatian, exploitation, and indoc¬ trination techniques .Strict acenunrability must be maintained so that gucmllas taken pnsoner arc not willingly left behind in the name of political expediency, such as when Amcnca left nearly 1,000 American POVVs in North Korea and China after the

149

Korean VVai during Hairy Tnunan’s prcadcncy, and when, as Kline allege, hundreds more American POWs wcic. knoH-ingly left behind in North Vietnam after the truce was signed in 1973 during the Nixon presidenev-

'l iic leadership trail oftoyait> mutt be demorwtrated at aU levris.

Out^m^aig the Couirfcef^i e rrilla

Force ‘Brfrtrrtrfif thi>n lx a emrarti."

—CtiiiUu lajinii

Ciuerrilla tearfare it a war of laclict, strategy, nperalinnal art, and ftrepuwer, but it is alto a war of wills aitd iitinds. The guec- rilla army that understands the cotantcrguerrilla a'chitisjues the enemy uses aitd ittnves lo thwart rhnse Techniques at every rant will be the tictor, Eten Antciica—a country with extensive expe¬ rience fighting goerhllas. ranging Irom the Barbary pirates in the early 19th eeniury to Mohammad harali Aidid’t guerrilla thugs in Mstgadishu —txindnuos to be stymied by third world btruli- gaiis, this despite the tvorid's ntnst pciwerlul nation having been bloodied in giicrtiila wars itt Central and bouth America, Airica, Ada, North America, and Europe. Major powers will always, it seeina, l*e vulnerable to the guerrilla because of the modern tubun's arrogance, pour leadership {in the capital and on the Isaitlefield), and ntmarhabic ignorance when it comes to how a guerrilla army can and should be engaged and defeated.

151

THE ADiDSSION

The number one problem com’cnriona] jrmie* make wher going tu war against a guerrilla force is tcfiiing to admit that their ally—the nation with the insurgency/guenilla problem—is suffering from political, social, atui ccoiioinic problems that have given birth to the very insurgenq' ir is now faced with. Who u to blame for these problems is less relevant than finding and implementing solutions to them or, if that tails, aeecpiing the loss cark im so that one can get out.

America lost the Vieinam War because iiimiiored, contemp¬ tuous ptiliticians believed they could defeat the VTeicong and North Vittnaniese Army with sheer firepower and advanceil lech- nology. and these same tvilmciant made the fatal mistake of rely¬ ing upon military oftieets who. in most cases, never understood the nature of tlieir opponent and whal lengths be was willing to go to in order to win. President lohnson. already one of the most cgotisueal. crass polideiaiis ever io sit in the Oval Office, accept ed Che rceoininenditions of generals whr> told him whai iltey believed he wanted to heat—chat maaave bombing in the north was Ibe answer. History tdh us that although the bombing of Hanoi tertified the civilian populace, the people were never in a presition to dcinaiiii chat their govcmmenl stop the war in the south, and chose people did ctiily see the Amcneaiis as Ivartvanani committing war crimes against an innocent society. When Nixon entered office he began secret bomtung missions m laios and Cambodia lU an attempt to strike NV'A and VC bases there, but the peilicv Med iiiijetably on the natioual level, even though B- 52 strikes were greatly feared by the enemy. Instead of merely increasing tlie level of violence and letting it go at that, America should have set out to either remove the impetus of the struggle or, if chat proved impossible land sometimes it will prove impos- sibic), cut its losses and fled Vietnam m 1968 Instead, the war didn’t end until 1973. a fact that cost tens of thousands more .Ametkan Ikes, and all for naught.

A review of tile tactics used by the most successful counier-

guemlla Ibrvcs in Vietnam shows that small units of disciplined, aiffircssive, ciatty soldiers who were willing and allowed to tight the VC on thor own terms, were the most succtj-shil. When Special Forces ourfic sfarfed training and arming people like the Montagnards and I Imoiig to defend thcmscK-es usmg guerrilla tactics and .Marine units began their strategic hamlet program along with useful cordon and searcli techiiiipics. the VC sulfetcd serious setbacks. .Add -Navy SKAl.s to the Mekong Delta hunting VC svith guerrilla tactics and you start to win. But even these successes would never have b«n cntiugh to wui the Vietnam War because the Communists had an almost inexhaustible sup¬ ply of young men and rc-solve, and they knew that America was unwilling to fight for decades and see more and more body begs coming home. TTic truth of the matter h, some guerrilla wars arc unwinnable because of the nature of the insurgency itself, lapan learned It in China. America learned ii in Vietnam, and the Soviet t'nion learned it in .Afghanistan.

Once a nadun providing fiireign internal defense i.lTD.i to a iHcnd admits diaries friend has social and pnlitical problems ihal led to ihe msiirgeney and moves to correct these pcublems, it can get oo with the war. The guerrillas must be ready Inr this and ready for the strategy and tacncs used by both the nation pro¬ viding the HID and the host nation itself.

COUNTERING T HE FIVE .ST’El’S IN COUNTERGUERRITJJA WARFARE:

THE MALATAN INSURGENCY

Many tnodem naciuns use the suceessful Britub coiuiterin surgenq- operaoon in Malaya ;i948-19S9), wlierc the Briri.sli luughi and defeated a guerrilla army belonging to the .Malayan Communist Party, whom rile Britisb referred to as CTs for Communist Terrorists'land they were just rliar), as a good eTam- (fleof how a nation can conduct .i prudent cuunterguerrilla war. One of the most insiglilful wnujigs on this topic is Lt. Col. Roland -S.N. Mans’ essay, -Viewty in Malaya.” Mans served in

Malaya linm 1953-1956. iivd he both dUeJ cfMnbit billcii on the iiom lines as a rifle eotiH'ony commander wiih ihc FiiM Battalion of ihe Queen’s Royal Regiment and sersed as a staff officer on the headquarters s^'of the 7ih Gurkha Division, one of the iiuin dangerous and efliictivv toiiiiiei^ucrrilla tbrccs ever ai be itiuMercd,

liciiteiianr Colonel Mans cites five ftscoxs that are critical to a successtiil eounterpucnilla tampaigi). 'I'hc guerrilla leader who is familiar with these stands a much better chance ol preventing them from ever takrag Isold.

A Coordinated Intelligence Neeworit

Without an accurate and active intclligcnte network that can Ik used by all in need of chat uuetligence. the countergucrnlla force is going nowhere Mans ased an outstanding poliev fotoe of sorts to establish and tun this network, and it was highly cffcc- livc, The British knew a great deal about the CTs’ plans, tactics, .iiid strategy ami were able to thwart many of the CTs' minarivea because of this.

The gucrnjl.li mast sinvc to prevent a police Ibree (or any other enemy unit) Ironi esrahlishing an inielligence network of any kind, '1 he guerrillas can accomplish this by sniping indbid- ual niKlIigenee operanves. ambushing the enemy police patrol before they ever reach tlieir objcctrec. and using propaganda to sway the populace to their side. A One way to accomplish the lat¬ ter is to invite the local chieftain totagalotag lor an amhush of a police patrol coming toward hts village. One guerrilla will have on his person a set of bogas orders that direct the police to uiier- rogale and then slaughter all llw men in the village after they arc forced to watch their women and children bemg gang raped, linniediatcly alter the ambush, while the guerrillas arc searching the hoslies. the guerrilla with the orders tucks them into the coat pocket of the senior police irilicer without being seen by tile cliieft.iin, who is being distracted. The guemlla calls out to the leader tlut he lias found some important looking papers, and the

154

leader aild the chieftain apprroch to see the guerrilla removing those papers from the officer’* pocket. He hands them to the leadet, svho immediately caaraines them.

N'o» a little acting. Feigning rage and disgust upon reading them, he thrusts them intr> the chieftain’s hand, who then reads them and secs that the police were coming to slaughter his men and defile their svomcn and children.

This ploy can be rcinibivcd by hating a “refugee” from a dis- lant tillage enter the chieftain’s village and tell of how be barely escaped with his life alter the police came to his tilli^ and massa¬ cred everyone therein, women and children included. He also tells of how the guerrillas fought t-aliantly to dcfcnd the village bm were also killed, and how he Iwcd only because three bodies fell on top otTiim during the massacre, shielding him from the bulkisaiKl bayonets, lie then moves on, Of course, he is no refugee, but jc^ally a gueniUa, and there never was any missaav.

Another pkiy, which Is ongoing, is feeding disinfiirmatiun and inaccurate infbrmaoon into the enemy’s intelligence net work- This should be done Ifotn many .sources anti on all level* so [hat tlie enemy use up a* much tinic, energy, and manpower as pusMbte backtracking the bogu.s mlitrmaDon.

If you liave a civilbn intbnmng on you, he must be killed. However, it must be ttiade to appear as ^ugh :hc psiUcc ihon- sclves killed him, perhaps because they sui^ctted he was a double agent. His diath must show ptausiUe evidence chat it was rite police (or other intelligence cipeiatites;i who murdered him. The word will spread quickly that the police cannot be misted. .And the boily or head ci'a police officer should he sltown ui the tillage from W-hich ilie informant came siith the c.spUnation that he was the officer who murdered the inlutniant and that the guernlla* took revenge upon the evil enemy tor hs crime against the people.

Winning Hearts and Minds

The cmemy will try tigorously tn “win the hearts jikI minds” oftlicpci^lc. They’ll try to do so by caring (hr the people with

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capen medical and dental case, food and water, and much more, and they will try to educate the people to sliow how the gov- cnimcnt is right and the guerrillas arc wrong, hiill, unless the government is mending its ways and has muted to give land trv the landless and money lo die ptxar. while holding the wedkhy criminal elite accountable tor their crimes, ilte gucrnllas can always ask simple questions such as, “lias ihc governmenr given you the land you were promised? Land that is rightltilly yours?" When the answer to pointed questions like these is "no,” then you have arguing ptnver.

All eecellent way the enemy convince some people to see it their way is by providing the people with food. T'n counter this move the guerrilla has dtoices, including ambushing the lv>od convoy before itctxr gets to the tillage it i-t destined lor and lac¬ ing (he fixid with a strrmg but nonl'aial poison that makes the I>enplcuck.Tbis is done liyan agent insiiJe ihe enemy orgonua- lion who has access rei the food hefi^ it goo on live trucks. A week or so after the pestle eat ihe food and have recovered from ihcir iUncss, the guerrillas spread rite word that all villagers should U.SC cjitrcme caiilion when aecepong food from the gov- enunan Isecausc a plot was une.tnhcd that called for ihe poi¬ soning of certain villages by the governmenr

Integrarcd Command

The military is going to lie required to interface on many levels witli civilian offals, and this includes any foreign milinry asiisiing the govcninieni. The military will try to appease llie bure-aucmis and officials as often a.* passible, hut will endeavor to alwan make clear to them that the military is in chitrge at all tunes, even if it is trying tn make nkc.

The guerrillas can do a lot of damage here by finding which officials had a well knostn run in witJi ihe military diat wsis wit¬ nessed by several people. Soon thereafter the ollicial is ftiund dcati with asii^le hullet hole to the back of the head, gagged, and with his hands bound—an obvious coccuiion Word is spread that the

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1

poverimiciit d^»5in;ir«d him bccitiic he wuuldn’t coopenu fully M-'itb thcin. This merthoil cau quickly* dcscrcn' already chakv

Patience and Tenacity

A wise cDuntrrgucmlli tcecc will be both parieni and lena- ciuus, accepting chat the war may take decades to win and accepting char they are Indeed in it for the Juratiua. Hac guer¬ rilla can best counter thia by applying Mao’s principle of dtstroy- iiig the enemy’s natioDal strength.

When the enemy arc never allowed to rest and recuperatt, arc constantly Lseing harassed and niaimcd and killed, and when iheir own pct^le back home arc being cominced that the war is tar ttio costly and prohahh- unwinnable, ihey will lose panenee and their teniciry will wane.

Training and Aggressitxncss

This is the most difiicult taemr for the guerrilbt lo counter. The training and aggressive nature of the enemy will Ukdy be instilled in them well heibce they come alter the guerrilla, and once they have that training and aggressh'c spirii it is trouble¬ some to take it from them

Nevenlicless, tJte enemy’s ^^ressivenc.ss can be depleted somewhat through the sagacious use of mines, booby traps, and, m a .slightly lesser degree, anibiisbes. {Ambushes ate more easily countered in must eases than mines and hnrvlsy' traps.) hveryooe fears being maimed more than anything, and the mure graphic maimings the enemy stiftb, the more cautious they are likeh* to become. Caurion is like a cancer when smeared on aggtesavencss.

MANS’ PRINCIPLES

laetitenant Colonel Mans sec down four principles that lie believed—and with good reason—were the rra-son the British

Some limpU tnining will hive gunrillai polauning the enemy's water supply wMi lusie wiue.

were sucecssKiL tn Malaya. The guerrillas themselves can api'ly these same principles in their quest for victory.

Initiative and Aggressioo

'Ihe success of the guerrillas in individual operations will often depend on the initiative and aggresave action taken hy NCOs and how well they arc able lo lead iheir men in like acrioo. Uvesc small unit leulers must do whatever it takes to gel iheir men to be the mosi physically resilient, hard-charging dogs of war they can poMbly be. The guerriUas mii.st all be almost immune to the most cMreme liardships over an extended period of time—usually yean and somcrimes decades. Tliey must live and operate for one thing and one thing only, that being the complete destruction of the enemy no matter where tliey go and whar the eonditioiis there arc.

159

Firearms »nd Flxplosiva Bxperdse

Mans stressed the criticality of being an erpert marksman at short ranges, hiil the guctriila must go bewtid that lo being highly protiaent with all weapons at short ami medium ranges, and he at least prufidcnl at ranges up to about SOO yards. lie most also !u\'C a thorough uiuiersianding of er|MnMvcs and be able to kill silenth’ with a knife.

But Mans also realized that it is imposablc lot the giiernlla leader to train a luiit in which every man has the same marks¬ manship skills, and he tctomnieniied keeping your best shots “upfront" wliere rheycando the most good. Bui everyone must be able to shoot quickly and shoot accurately. Piactiee is the key tn aehiestng this: there is no ollwr way.

Navigation

'IVaining in land rurigabon—to include not only traditional map and compass work hui more primitive means as well, such at ecletdal naviganun. contouring, and terrain association—is paramount to the .success of a guccrilln unit operating in a rural enviiutinient, regardless of whether that enviioument is an alpine Kirest, a iiuigle, a desen, or the taiga (the wet, coniietuiis forest Ivelow rhe rundra), Every single man must be able to go it alone anywhere, with or tvirhoui map and compass, 'lliis is important Kir the comiuci irf patrols, wilderness survival, and cseape and evasinii. ’I'hc guerrilla wiiu lacks such skills is a threat to the success of the unit.

hiddcraft

Mans called this “junglecraft’’ because that's wiiere lie was ftghting the CTs, but since you may find yourself in places oilier than a jungle, we'U call it tickicraft.

Lieiiteiiani Cnlonel Mans quoted Field Marshal .\.P. WavclI's femed perception of the skills a grunt must have: “lie

must be a conihinaiion of car burglar, gunman, and poacher." Thisis a very accurate desenprioo nf a guenilla as well and works well here. (Field Marshal Hrwin Rommel said ofWavoll in Vhe Rammct P»perj. “The only one who showed a touch of brilliaiKe was Wavcll-’';WTth regard to V%vc-il’sdtaciipcion, Mans went on to say that “Certainly the good jungle warriiirs in Malaya need¬ ed all diese aniisooal eharacterisiics and a surprisntgly large number acquired them."

•See Chapter 7 tor addintHial guidance on frelderait.

Now thal we know how lo ourtliink the enemy, uv can go undcrgcuund.

Guerrilla Tunnel Systems

‘Waritaritifi^rnTt. lassuKym that 2 have fonffhi taty tiaules, and I tiamd nathi^fl iur vhat 2 kiuv tricti 2foufAi the fine ime."

N^kiIccni Ai*iiifijnc in CupirdCrui^oid. 181S

Wicbuul <4iics6on, ihe niasicn or' fiiicrnlla tunnel warferc wen: the V^cccong Entire books have been written .iboiir the reniarkable ahitiries of these S3w\' (tuerrillas when it canie to buildmg and utilizing secret tiinneU and bunkers, and ut; can learn a great deal Irom them. One American general’s d^hng wish, as he lay irtorially wounded at the height of the Vlctnain War after a sweep of a tunnd-iofesied area, was to inecr tlte man who built iliose tunnels. lust meet him. It is this level ol'respeci chat shows us just bow shrewd the V'ictcnng were.

nie runnel rat was born in Viettiani. A tunnel nr was i Marine or soldier, u.sually of slight statuiv, who would ciitet a tunnel with a pistol and a fiashllght to try to flush out the VieK'mg hiding therein. It was eatiemely dangerous work, and soon it became clear that the secret tunnels and associated sub¬ terranean bunkers were marvels of clever engineering and audac¬ ity. One sergeant major ndaicd to me an inddenr he witnes.sed

163

hi«xi[ul in the Central Highlintls where a Soeiet-bailtT SS Cdiik lielonginj; to tbe SVA was sem lomiiig a trail. It turned right and entered the jungle.

And ditippeareJ. Within niiimces Marines were swamiing in the jiu^jlc where

the tank hail just lieen seen, but the liuge metallic beast was gone; it had dis.appcf'^'J underground. Despite hours of frantic acarcliini- the tank svas never seen again. Aireraft were called in to bomb tlie area with the hope of the bombs collapsing the con¬ cealed bunker the rank had pulled into, but to no avail.

Hut tunnels are nor without dangers to ihe guerrillas. A very uschil lactic that Marines and selected .Army units used in South Vtcmara in .areas where tunnels were a problem was to leave a rwD-man sniper team lathiml to watch llie area after the main iKKiy departed. .Vcordiiigio la Marine DisiMon records, in one dght-rouiitli period .Marine siuiMrs chalked tip nearly 500 con¬ firmed kills using this reehniqne. which etploirs the fan that the guerrillas must come tnii of their runnels ami biiitkers sometime. And poor cnnsiruetion techniques and mistakes made by the guerrillas while they arc in the tuanel/bitnker complex can lead to the system’s discovery by ctnintcigucrnlla forces as ssxll. For instance, tunnels dug without siiiTicieni nitns and sumps to pre¬ vent smoke from filrering through the entire system will be vul¬ nerable to being duoded with smoke as a metliusl of determin ing where the other entrances to the tunnel ant. Tunnels that weren't built so that one entrance can be covered by lire hxun aiicilher entrance are also vulnerable, as are tunnels that contain no booby ir.ips. false walls, trapdoors, and hiiiden exir.s/entrances. i'he point here is that if you are going to build 1 tunnel/l’urker complex, build it right or not at all.

TUNNKL PROS

The advantages of tunnel and subterranean bunker usage arc many. ’I'licy can be used as I'nilosvs:

» for evasion when being pursued • for stt^tir.g food, weapems, ammutiition. and equipment well

forward in enemv areas • as hospitals, rest and tecrearion htciJilirs. observation posts,

sniper positions, and inriltratKiii routes • for aaaJueling briefings and training • as repam faiahtk-> for vi capons and equipment • as command and control facilities • as morale builders for harned gueirillas

TUNNEl-CONS

.Aueniiv* counieigiunTilUtiirccsareaileptat&jdiugtiiii desirov- ing ninm-k ami uikleigroiind iMinkcrs 11'.ey kKik hir the fblluwuig:

• ihingsoiii ofplacc. such as small food plots hidden ui under gruwili away from hahiration

• wisps of smoke wiiii no appatenr source lli imt cooking fires underground; the otiut of liw.! conking is anorlicr giveaway if il'.at sme.l uui'r near a house or liut l

• the tidor of diesel fumes firtim an umlergrouiid pener.norl • small pilB><if dirt or spoil spread out on the grtiur.d with no

Ollier explanatKin for its being there • guernlUs ail beading in one direction after Ix'iiig deiecied

wiilt no apparent avenue oi’escape • eoimnii.'il sniper flic or harassing lire I'roin one area titar has

been swept by eonveiiiional troops but with negative resuli.v • vemilarion shaAs (usually hidden in clumps of brush or

luider logs or mcksc • false canopies (estm briisli and branches placed in living veg-

elalion above a cuiiael; • entranee • the smell or sight of human feces that appears out cij place • a laiiii irail leading into a thiekei and ihcn disappearing • a ehister of Ss'iilT marks, lisotprims, and ttaiid-bolds on near

hv trees or bushes with no obvious eipian.'tdon

• an individiul thai appears Co be b>' himself and has no obvi¬ ous rcascai lor being where he is

('ounicrguciTilla tbnxs uperaling against guerrilla uniB known to use runnel fistcms arc trained lo kmk for enrancee in tertain areas. I'liey (ocu-s nn buildings—where tunnel entrance* can be hiddai under seaions of false fioonng and under cook¬ ing pots hanging over fires on the ground insualh- in a corner), aitd even lienciih food stock piles—-and anywhere chat would allow the guerrilla better observation ot the surrounding area: just otf trails m a thicket, beside streams, and in hedgerows. The guerrillas must be sure to avoid patterning themselves in this manner. Invagination and ingenuity are the liallmarks of i good runnd system. Someiimc* the most obsaous place is a good loca¬ tion tor an cmrarKC, and soiiieumes a good place is ingenious. .\i> obvious place could be a secret cniranec l^iilc halfway down the town well (nuke sure the acrud entrance looks )usc like the will of the well) or in the base of a Ivimb crater If there are burned our vehicles lying around that arc being taken tor grant¬ ed by the soldiers as iiisi pan of the scetKry nf war, a tunnel entrance could be run into the underside or" a vehicle uith part cof the wreckage .serving as dtc dturt cover,

To further avoid detection, fill in the initial excavation abaft (liar Is dug to get to the level on wtuch die main tunnel complex will be located Iselmv. flsis way, should stHnetme who liciped dig rlic excavation shaft be captured and imernvgjied. he won't be able to tell the enemy where the old tntiaiicc b because it will no longer be there. It is .ilso wise to keep the system’s where- jlviuts 1 secret from civilians so that, if questioned, they won’t be able to divulge wiiere it is either.

COUNTERING THE TUNNEL SWEEP-AND DESTROY OPERATION

Modern counterguerrilla forces conduct tunnel sweeps with i force whcoc sire is determined by the sine of the area they are

166

to search. Seldom b thig ibrcc smaller than a platoon fanywhere between 25 and 4(1 troops), and it is usually no larger than a com|)any (100 ro about 160 troc^l. If the discovery of a major system b the goal, occasionally the enemy will bring in a battal¬ ion, but tlus isn’t often the case. In any case, the unir is broken down into squads, which arc given sectors to search.

Unit Task Oiganization

The enemy will divitk into three primary groups—die search unit, security unit, and re.serve unit.

Settrd Vmt These arc the troops char will be doing the actual looking

around lor a hole leading to die runnel/bunker syxrem. 'I1iey will cry U) get into every imaginable place to find a hole and will be looking hard ftir anything that might indicate a possible entrance. 'Ihls team might also have its own security derail to supplement the peciineter security unit. Search teams that are cflucdvi; arc tncthudical and padenr. and they don't care what lengths dtey have ro go to in order to find a runnel.

Stettri^ Unit becunng the penmelcr of the search area will be rite security

unit. Its job b to prevent attacks Iroin outside the area and be watchful fitr gucmilas trying tu sneak out. The sceuiity unit can employ observation posts, automatic weaitons positions with cleared fields ofintcrlockong fire, and sniper teams. The most mod- eni counteiguerrilb units may also attpioy rcinotcly piloted vchi eUs to wabdi the ana from above with a real-time video camera.

Rttent Unit These arc the troops who back up the seciiniy team and

assist in keeping the area cordoned oft to unaudoonzed foot and vchick tralBc. The reserve unit also contains the headquarters element. (The headquarters clement comaiiis the company or

platoon ca;nmjtider. but it is unlikely ihat he will stay rishl with 1

grade ofUters will go titun siibordinaic unit to sahordinau | unit—a company eoniniandcrwUlgo feom platoon loplatmin, a platoon comraandcc tiom squad to squad—to pcisonally moni¬ tor their progress. A sniper should traich for this man and hii ever-present radio operator. It is easy to ideniiiy ihLs pair moving j from unit to unit, with one of them always handing the radio handset to the other. If the tactical siruarion peimils, ihe guer¬ rilla sniiser should kill this officer, l

Tunnel Infilmtioti and Destruction Techniques

The Ibllowing will dictate tiie infilirarion and desauenon tcchniqutai employed hy the enemy;

• the level ofmaining they have received • their fiscal resources iwhat they can alTord; • Icadenthjp ability ;including that of any torcign iidviaors they

may have with them, who may consist of expeneneed sol¬ diers—officer and cnlined—or more clandestine types front the military branch of the supptirluig nadoii's imelligcncc

fly knowing his enemy, the guerrilla ean often predici wHiai teehiiiques and equipment they will iise; rhercrorc, the guarilla can work to millify both.

Demelitiem, (jTtnaits^ and Bvmbs and ArtilUry The use of demolitions iusually satchel chaigesi and

grenades is commonplace when destroying tunnels. Given tliis, the guerrilla can construct tunnel entrances that thwart their use.

The illustration at riglu shows a typical tunnel enttance with a gas sump and a demolition sump. Wiien intending Co collapse the tunnel with demolitions without first sending in iiuincl rats, a soldier will usually clear the entrance with cither a burst of

168

automatic weapons fire or a grenade and theu ciuer ihe tunnel with a salcliel charge. He will prolubly syispect a gas sump near the entrance and will by it to try to find tlw main vertical shaft. Lhilesslic isvery brave, he will likely drop the charge down the main vertical sliaft and retreat, then detonate the charge once he is clear of die entrance. Adeaiosump at the liascofthc vcrtkal shall will catch the cliargc and allow ic to cxploile harm- lcs.sly. Above the gas sump on the second horiaontal stretch, the guerrilla can place a hidden charge that he will detonate ifatr the cnetny's charge has gone off in the sump. This small diarge is just strong cnougfl to collajsse ihis section of the tumid so that,

169

should the enemy reenter the tunnel to sec if theif charge worked, they will find the timjicl collapsed just inside and hope¬ fully think it did. When the enemy dqun, the giKrnlias dig a

will remember where it was and check it from time to lime. Bombs and artillery with delay fitses might be used to tol-

lapse tunnels, .fircillcry is much less efteciive than powerful fuse- delay bombs. When the enemy has hcas-y air power, tunnel tys- tems must be very deep and heavily rcinicffecd. Entrances dug bcncacli thick canopy arc somewhat protected as they help to detonate the bomtis and artillery shells before they strike the ground and have a chance to buttow underground.

Gosani Sntiike Smoke, tear gas, and white ix red phosphorous from

grenades, and, in some cases, special generators that force smoke into a tunnel can be used. These methods can be very cHcctivc prmided the guerrillas dt> not have gas masks. Cherefore, every guerrilla should have a gas mask.

Besides being used as a flushing tool designed ui force the guerrilla to Ilee the tunnel systcin, smoke can be used to locate ventilation shafts—llte smoke finds to way into the abaft, drifts upward, imd is then seen by watchfol soldiers. When the enemy can sec smoke rising from several venclanon shafts, they get a rough idea as to the layout of the system below thcii feet— knowledge ihey can easily use to help destroy the tunnel.

The enemy may elect to roll fiagmeniaDon grenades down these ventilation shafts. Tliis means that the guerrilla must buikl a grenade sump into the shaft so that no rolling grenade makes it to the main tunnel Or bunker Most fragmenuDun grenades have a 3- to S-second fuse, so the sump should be no more than a meter nr su from the .surface. A sump so (riaced will catch the grenade Iseforc it has a chance to roll very far down the shaft, but far cnoughso that the sotiiier who rolled it thinks it did rhe trkL

VennlacioD holes that arc more narrow than a standard grenade may not be useful because of their reduced ability to

170

move air. and when dealing with advanced intelligence agency advisors the guerrillas may find that those advisors carry grenades that arc half the size of a standard grenade.

.Vine Dtttcter Mines made of metal should out be used near tunnel com¬

plexes because of the else with which they can be detected by a mine detcetor; howec'cr. plastic mines [wliich are commonplace today) migjit be used. Becret than mines arc booby trajts, which can be rigged above ground in many ways.

171

I

Any type ot‘mct:il (tTitne) Jctcctor can IcKalc metal below iCroimd, mduding ammunition, weapons, eomm gear, and so on j stored III [lie compler. But tic metal detector is only as good as the soldier opcralme it, and being himuii, dial toldier is often I easily led astray, Hc^e-thuw.

As the runnel cornplca is being biiili, a leam of guerrillas should be euUtoing as inanv shell fragments from enemy arrillcry and mortars as possible. 'I hey place these in the gniund ar taritius depths between die iiiiinel and the surface.

When the detector indicates meial below, the enemy t^iera- tor steps hack jml alkiu-s .moiher soldier to earcliiUy dig for the '‘inine." but lie only finds metal I'ragmcno. from what he will assume must base been a previous any or mortar sniki; on the area, ^^'hen the guerrillas h.tve placed several fragments at each ' spot above iitorage areas holding metal, olicntiinct, the enemy soldien will get tired of deiecring metal and isnly finding frag¬ ments. and they will start in become lackadaiKcal in their dudes, believing that every Rme ihe detector goes off it it jun another shell fraffnent and not worth ilieir rime and elTbrt.

Amither trick, a little mote in.sidiou.s. is to ng mines with andtampccing devices such as a mercury switch. When a soldier tciuches the mine, theitiereury In the vial rolls and complncsthc connection, thus detonating the mine. 'I his is usually only good for one event, however, because every lime after that ihesoldien will just blow the mine in place rather titan trying to remove ir.

I he use of dogs is quite rare when clearing a nmnd, hill il may Ik coitinion in some units for locaiing tunnels. Dogs with good noses like labradors, golden retiievcrs. German shep¬ herds, and beagles can be trained to detect a great many things, tunnel entrances among them, but most dogs don't like going into narrow, dark tunnels and they aren't that eficetbe when down there because of booby traps and difficuli passages, sneh as vertical shafts.

172

unit than shoodng the handler Humans often foctn tlw strongest of emotional bonds lo dogs, and they get highly upset when a dog U shot. Iliis could easily result in a substantially grcanir level of dciermiii.ilion and revenge being Ucmonsiraied by the soldiers. Also, dog handlers receive just as niiieli iraining as the dog, and the two arc a Ivonded team. It might take longer lo replace the liandler than tlic dog.

Sijibt Visim Cii/iglei and Flaibligbti Digguig iiiniiels seith frequent turns can lessen the ctfcetivc-

ness of devices sucli as these; even the best night vision goggles ;NVGsi can't see around cornen.

If cketrcicyis available within the tunnel system and the rat is wearing older model N\'Gs that don’t have the ability to counter sudden briglir lights quickly, rig up a lighlbulb right in the mklille of the runnel. Keep it ofl'until the guernlla is right in Iront of il and then mm it on. 'Hie sudden bright light will “white out” 111* goggles and temporarily blind him. Tlien do

funnel rats carry pistols. Lite NV’Us .iiid flashlights, bullets don't go around comers 1 at Icastnottlic lines I am familiar with, although some aeqiiainianccs of mine—don't even ask; diey even scare me in a certain government agency say their organi- Mtion IS working on ici. frequent turns help reduce the effec¬ tiveness of pismLs.

Flame weapons come in four types; those that lire an incen¬ diary pfojeciiie (such as the old M202 Multi-shot Incendiary foveket Launcher, w-hitc of red phivsphcirous shellb, or l ucl Air Explosive bomlis IFAEjl, those that fire open llanies {the cb.ssit flamethrower;, those that bum after being detonated icertain

173

mines and hnohy traps 1. anti those that burn after being poured (gasoline). Only poured flammable liiiuids are efteoive in tun ncis in most situaiitins, and even then modern counierinicnilla forcia seldom use them because they arc so easih- ToileJ through the use of sumps,

Some Evil Tricks

liesictes .ivtiidiiig deteetion ui the fiist place, one of the guer¬ rilla's goals in tunnel warfare is to discourage the enemy from entering the tuitnel. This is done by making tunnels extremely dangerous to enter and clear. All tunnel tricks mum be siibriy marked on both sides leoming from both direction}.) in such a way that every guemtia will knot* not only that there i* a tr>ck there but what kind of trick it is and therefisre not Isdl prey to it. l.'se whatever system weicks beat fur you, but make sure every guerrill.i knows that scsietn by hcan. Ensure that the ourkwon’i ire readily noticed by a tunnel rat and identified as a warning Simple mnrb like » angle bullet Jett bang in the tunnel might make a rat iluok that a gucnilla juit dropped it there unknow- iiigty, bill It is really there to icU the gucrnlla.s that a ceri.iin inck

Minn’s Kisbtmart Mure than anyihing, a miner fears a care-iii. All tunnel rats

tear cave-ins just as much as the miner does. Walls and ceilings of tunnels can be weakened and tigged tn

c-otlapsc through the ii» of reiiiuldy detonated dcmnlicinns carefully placed behind opposing walls and in the ceiling above those walls. 'I1ie charges can be detonated by command Or bv the rat irippiug them uith a hidden pressure switch in the door. A mCKlificutionijfthis is tohasv the prcs.stire switch eight or nine feet past the charge. This is giHxl to terrorize the rat by irappiim liiin insicie the tunnel, or tor when two rats are in the lunnd, one right beliind the other. The .second rat is buried alis-c by the

aciinnsorthc fiiM rat, who sipped ihe device, and who then has to either try to dighispactncroiiior find another exit. If the Krst man lives to tell the calc, be now has to continue tighdng knosv- ing tlut he caused his pal's dcalli. Tunnel warfare is always a game of psycholr^cal wardire.

At a minimum, a tunnel collapse wiiii a soldier inside simvs the search down as would-be search teams come to help try to excavate the trapped soldier. If a less than aggressive comniandcr is in charge be may even call off the search and svitlidraw,

f'alst Flwr Puiy? Pit laking yet another cue from the Victrong. dig a pungy pit

in the tunnel floor and cover it with a false floor so that tlie lun- nel rat’s hand gcKs through the false floor as he crawls forward. Rare is the tunnel rat who will coiitimie the search once his hand has been perftsrated by several sharpened stakes.

COBNSR SHXU

Tatt a Sbavt SiDgle-c^1g«<j ii7at hlodcA cw be plaecii in ilie l1o(?r in

buDclict about ill incit apart and barely covered wiiit dirr The ral |Hace» his hand on them and is cut to shreds, As you can do Mich ptiiigy stakes, apply (cccs i<i the blades to ittcre.tse the chance of infeclion. 11'you arc opcracinp in areas with certain species of wildlife iImI are Itighly toxic, such .u tlic poison arrow Ihijt of the Soutli American rainforest la colorful little frog titnt it anbclicvibly toxic just lo the much, livaru Indians use leas'e.t to pick the Ijidc bug)prrs up, lest they he poisoned themselves, and then iw; the poison tlie frog’s skin releases on their hunting artvmx and hUm-gun darts), even more evil can be done.

A modificar.on of this is to plate .1 very aggresshe. highly venomous snake in the pit along with tlie pungy siakes. Now tite rat ha.s holes in his hand Ifuro siakes and a nasty snakebite; he mil depart the nmncl imnicdiaicly to seek ireatnieni, and the Ollier rars won’t be especially keen on going into rise tunnel ( drporal Dcadguy just came scrcatrang out of.

CorJirr Shelf About head ticight tor a crawling man and immediately

around a 9U-d^ree comer in the tunnel, dig a shelf into the wall, Place a deadly snake on it and tic its tail to a stake with a strong piece of string (li.yve another man hold the snake behind the head to prevent your being bitten as vtni do this). .As the guerrilla turns the comer, the idea Is for the snake m srrike. A head wound intlktcd by a snake like a buslimasier. western or ea.stcm diainondback lattlesnakc, ktail, fer-de-laiice. puff adder, or otiicr equally dangerous reptile is more likely to kill the sol¬ dier than a wound elsewhere on the both'.

Dump Site Although Dot fall!, a pile ut'humaa feces placed in a shallow

hole in the Hoot and then hardy cxrvcred with dirt will prove highlv annoying and disgusting to the tunnel rat.

Pfier At chest height tor a craseling man. a hole ls drilled through

the tnnncl seall into another chamber the nr doesn't know is there. In that chamtacr is a t^ncrrilla with a spear. The liar's tip and the hole the spear is in are concealed trom the crawling sol* diet by a small piece of false wall that is thin enough for the spear txi pierce caaly. From another secret hole tmseeii by the rat, the gucnilU watches, When the rat gets in front of the false section of wall, the guerrilla cams the spear forward and skewers the liin- nd tat. i,A Grcarm can be uscsl in piare d' the sisear.t

Ben A'nsniiiH Riin a meial bar about a frxit out from the tunnel wall so tliai

it appears to be just a piece of rebar remfrirdng, or run it out of a w-all tunning a vertical shaft to appear as ining tor climbing in the shafr. Now atiach a live wire with a few amps running throusdi it to the other end r^ the bar. When the tunnel tat grabs

ilont turret to nuke the experience a icrrii>ing one. MIml panics are terrible for the tunne) rar. 'I n' ihit one place a $mU can riitht in the middle of the runnel wiib j noie allacbed that reads. ‘‘N'ti, this Lsn't a hooln' irap, bin ihere lire joine ahead. Have a nice day. Ii ttill lie ysmr Ust with eseniiht.’* Or, 'Poisonous snake .nheari." Remember Madonna'i line in her song "V'ogiie": “All you need is yoiirwnimagsnaoon, soasc it, that's what it''s roc.”

TUNNEL CLEARANCE AND DESTRUCTION SOPS

descroviiig ninncls and make plana to sxjunrer those teehniqvtes, Moslem eounceigucrtiUa fotsss orien use a fotir-step procedure.

Burst of Fire

To kill any enemy nght neat the entrance or turce them to move dcs.-pcr into the tunnel, a stddier will fire a long burst of aurrMTiaiic weapons fire dircedy into ihc rannci opening straight through the hole’s dosv. (If ihe dnsir is thin w-ood or made of thatched grass or braoelies, a ilair.eilirnwer—a weapon that the Marines used very cffcetively during World War II to flush laps firsm tunnels and ’'spider" hiilcs -can be used Ibi this as well,)

'llie guernila can reduce rhe cffccnvcncss of this first step by building two turns iiiio the tunnel iinntediaicly alter the cntrancx bole.

Door Dutmctioa

IKtIic door is snll inset, .t demo diai($e or grenade is pieced on it to clear it and also dctoneic mines and boobv traps that may be associated with the duor.

i'ltere isn't a lor the guerrilla can do about this.

Drop Charges and Grenades

The third step is to drop a demo charge or fragmentation grenade down the tunnel iuclf.

As already discussed, sumps and turns help reduce the cfli-c- tivctiess of this step. The enemy may choose to use gas or smoke grenades at this point, too. and the eountenneasurcs lur these have already been discussed as sstII.

Kars

The final srep comes with the inciodiiction of tunnel tars into the system to clear any remaining gnccrillas and gather doc¬ uments, weapons, equipment, and so on, and then destroy the

All the possible methods fat countering the rats were listed

TUNNEL DESTRUCTION

In most cases, the enemy will chixisc to ilestroy the runnel complex with explosives. Therefore, ir is wise to construct tun¬ nels with false w jls and trapdoors hiding reinforeed bunkm and connecting tunnels. The enemy, when using explosives, might use one or more techniques.

Bangalore Torpedoes

•Mott otten used to breach perimeter dctetiaes, a secies of bangalore torpedoes placed ihruiiglioui the complex and deto¬ nated simiilwneously can bring down the entire cninpln. Kcinlorcing walla and ceilings may have little elifea. It might lie feasible for a sniper to target the bangalores if the enemy is tbol- ish enough to stack them all in one place in prepanition for use.

Cratering Charges

‘lliese can be vsmy cftective against subterranean bunkets, The deepet die bunker and heavier the temRircenieni, the bet¬ ter for the guerrillas.

Block Charges

The primary benefit »rf a block charge is chat it can be tamped right against the tunnel ceiling and, when detonated,

could have a rippk cticct that \;ollav*se* the tvhole sunrteL However, this uMiaDy taltcs a charge uf at IcaM 10 pounds.

Satchel Chaises

These can be placed or loesetl into shallow ranneU ajid bunkers and can be cflcctivc in collapsing them, bin the destruc¬ tion does not often go fir beyond the room or tunnel section in which (he charge exploded.

Shaped Charges

Shaped charges can be set deep within a nnicm and deto¬ nated either upward or downward lo achieve a lot of destruc¬ tion. Rcinfiarcing walls duon’t often do much good against such

TUNNEL AND BUNKER COMPLEX CONSTRUCTION

Tunnel and hiuikcr systems run froni the s-ery simple to llse v-cryion’lcatc.^VhaI gees built where depends encreh on the lac- lical situation and available manposver and logistics.

Simple Holes and Hides

These are the easiest to construct and take muiimal man¬ power, i hev' can be built in enensy areas as infiltration sop putters and tor wlien the guertilias must break contact and hide quickly. Normally they arc only large cnou)^ for a maai- mum of three guertilias. and that is often pushing ii. with one- and two-man holes being more common. They can be placed below huts or under clumps of vegetation, and they can even have underwater eturaitces that are accessed from drainage ditches and sticains. Two air holes arc the norm, but in some

184

. HOlJr/HlllR

VNK)RTlFrEO UNDRRGROUNDBASt; CAMR

Unforcified Base Campii

Since they tire iiiitortificd, thrae base camp> are maintained in regions controlled by the gucrrillaa and are used for logistical and ctimmand and control aiies. Because they are in gucrtilla- eoiitrolled areas they are often very tompitn and deep. A varicqr i of rooms and room siees can be used. Trenches and supporting lighting positiorvs are not used.

sorrintit) ondemrovnd Run cami>

Fortified Base Camps

The mosieomplcx of systems, the fortified base earapis cen¬ tered around a command bunJier that often protrudes up ro iwc> feet abwe tlie sur&ce with tiring and otMervaiion ports. These camps arc in enemy areas. Radiating out lur long distances (often hundreds ofyardsi ftum the cummand bunker are runnels linn lead to outlying bunkers of similar design to the command bunker, and these ouriynng bunkers all have mutually supporting fields fire.

In between die tminck are trenches leaiiing to iiuiividual fighting posirions at various distances liom die command bunker. These, too, ofier mutual supporu

L

DONXHR U1TH TVNNHU TO COMBINATION RNTRANCK/HGrTTINO rOSITIONS

Bunkers

Runknv tan he made of awonni maieriali ranaing. from brido, cll^dcr blixks, and contreie lo lop and ehcci mewl and any conibiiiaiion ot these. Some have firing pons, others don't, bill all are protected from overhead fire and haw tunnels lead inp to and from them.

Guccrtlbs must be erpcm in designing, buikling, inaintaio- ing. ind operiuing from bunkers. They are an cxcclicni combat multiplier frir a forte that i> inumsically weaker than its coemy- 'I'hc giiecrilla force that uses them well stands an improved diancc of victory.

‘My soiMian lo ibt problem vouU be ft fell Ithe Viiteiiv/ij rtry’vr goftoirato in fiirirAur>i.'*i«(< jrsji cheir aggnaitm or i»i’regiii>{ii It btmb rbem back info the Stone

-Cell Cirtj h. Le.Vlts IV6.i

Guerrilla movciiieins are more and more likely w be at least (urrly involved In built up areas such as the inner city, iiidusTiiaJ areas, and llie suburbs. I'his is true because our wurid pupiila- dons cononue to prow sod there apjvcars to be no chance of llveir siahlliring, much less dropping.

In the neat past, guerrilla wars have been fought in cides like l.ondan, Derry, and Belfast <;although tlve IK.'i has made the ter rible and unforgivahlc mistake of turning to lerrori.sm rather chan aUding by an honorable and genuine guerrilla war), Kabul, Madrid (where the Ba»<iuc sqaaialisis. known as hTA, also made the miujke of going the terrorist rouw), Colombo, Cimrny, Saipin. and Lima (again, the laiier suftfcring terrorism at the hands of the Shining Path and Tup.ie .\inaru; cn name a ll-w. Future gtierrilla wars will increase in the dries and their sur¬ rounding cLunmunlties.

189

ibrcci. Instcjd, individuali and small cells of picrrilias will I of'eming in such ii way that only one member of each cell w

• arahushing vehicular and foot palroU • bombing enemy suiipty points and other logisbeal or com¬

mand and control fecililies • satxJtaging public services such as mass transii. coiitmunKa-

tions, sewer systenvs, garbage collection systems, medical ser¬ vices, power plants, port facilities, and security service*

• attaciing itvdustrial targets ibai directly support the govern-

• sniping enemy patrols roadblocks, check points, and leaders « coudiictinghomb wrockel attacks on government building* • prtivoXing the enemy force* in Mich a way that they lose con¬

trol and injure or kill Chilians

The gucnillas mtwt make all trfthese aeiions appear to be the lank of the govanineiii. They must make a great efPnrt to pre¬ vent unnecessary civilian injuries and deaths that will be seen as Iveing the fault ol'the guerrillas. Whetuheperqvle believe that the guerrillas arc on their side and rhe giwcmmem ts unable or unwilling to fight them, the battle u nearly won.

Modern guerrilla armic* must plan for and conduct opera¬ tions in the following types of built-up areas

• urban houring areas, including teitemcnis and apartments • suburbs, including free-standing houses, condorainium*,

townhouses, and apartments • industrial areas • clusters of various buildings in a variety of settings (associat¬

ed with rnads/hi^ways, railroads, etc.)

The wise guctrilla leader will never assume that he will he operabng only in one type of area, for as the tactical and strate¬ gic dtuadons change, the more likely it is tliai the guerrillas will hud therasclvcs haring to change aiot^ with them. This means you may have to conduct 3 demnlition raid on a major port oil storage fimtlity in a city of more than half a miUion inhabitants one nigiti and stage a convoy ambush along a suburban side street the next.

TACTICAL FACTORS

Both tlie guerrilla aivd the enemy must take into account sev era] lacturs involving their rc^vecrivc operations in built-ujs areas. Kach factor can ciiha be a hindrance or an asset to the panic*, depending on how they arc used. In ilie built-i^ anna, innovation plays a special and often incisive rule in determining the outcome nf i bitde.

The Surrounding Xeiraln

Conventional armies fighting in a guerrilla war tend to think statically and ace therefore largely predictable; ilieir field manu¬ als and instiuiional teaming dogma make this so. Better yet, if the enemy do not enjoy a decentralized philosophy of command and (he guerrillas do, they expose themselves to a much higher risk of destruction on the built-up area bacdcficld. There are five key terrain ficiors rive guerrilla must consider wlicn fighting in a built-up area.

Key Terrain

The enemy will be fcicusing on key terrain features within the built-up area. These include building* that are capable of with¬ standing a lot of punishmenl and ovcritxvk likely avenuej; of approach, sew^r and subway systems, bridges, railheads, port lacilitics. tclcvisioo and radio stations, tall buildings that could

191

suppon plunging tire, jndsoon. By booby-trapping tbcsc place* and registering indirect fire on them before the enemy gets there so that vour fires will be immediately accurate, you increase your eonilvit power.

Ob-servarion/Fields of fire

Observadun and fields of fire tend to be resificied in bulk up areas liecausc of the buildings, smoke, dust, and nibble. ITtc enemy will therefore seek vantage poinre that arc above the fra¬ cas in orticr to direct their tires. The giierrilla-s should use smoke, du.sr, and dcl^ to conceal their movemems and at die same tune direct fire on enemy observation points, which should also be booby-irapised.

Oh.s cades

These ate limited only by the guerrilla's imaginadoQ. Creative rthscadcs slow the enemy's progress and expose them to fire, and once expiscd their actions become all the more pre-

192

dicrabic. Olutaclcs should dtanne] lire enemy into minefields and areas diat are heavily booby-trapped, as well as areas where the guerrillas have open I'ldds of fire to the enemy with auto¬ matic weapons and mortars. An cxedlent way trs slow and chan¬ nel ilic enemy’s approach with no fire whatsoever is to make some tcalisdt XATO chemical niarkers and place them along the cncmv’saiisofadvanceso that tliey have only one logieal way to go. That way should be inmed and covered by automatic weapons fire and mottars—hold your fire until the main body is in the kill zone, dicn lay waste to them

Cover and C'uancealment

Cover provides proKcOon from fire; concealment pnisides pro- teebun lioiQ detection. Fix' die guerrilla, cover and/nr conceal¬ ment can, depending on the situation, take the following lorms;

• buildings • dumpsters

• signs • Jiiyihing else thai prevents the enemy from detetung or fir¬

ing oil you

Avenues of Approach

Avenues of approach include the following:

• highways/mmpikes

• w-aterw-ay^ (ou matter how' stualli • roads and streets • alleys • sewer systems • jt^^ging/bicyde trails

193

unusable. Kven the narrowest, most unlikely access route, such IS a jo^ng trail through a park’s woodlands or an old sewer sys¬ tem filled with rats, lend water, and fixes, tan be used by a shrewd ccnintcrguerrilla commander to infiltrate the guemllas’ area of operations and catch them unaware at the worst possible moment. So intent are the U.S. Marines on effectively dealing with urban guerrillas that they have huih elaborate MOXTT (Military Operations on Urban Terrain) fecilincs that are realis¬ tic to the point of liaving sewer systems lhai Marines and aggres¬ sor units use to simulate urban guerrilla warfare; the miniature cities even have gas nations, stores, apartment buildings, streets, sidewalks, and partes.

The People

1 lotv the popuhux leels about the guerrillas will play a role— often a critical one—in the outcome of the guerrilla war. If the people ilo not feel that their lives are Iveing made untenable by the government and the national or fbtei^ forces supporting the government, the guerrilla movement will never succeed. The people must be shown that the government and is henchmen are the true enemy, The guerrillas must he adept at the fuUovving:

• .stirring the people into action, such as strikes and ancigov- eniment demonstrations

• arrangiiig for the govetiuneni to appear responsible for social woes sudi as racial tension and prohlcm-s between var¬ ious other gremps

Reniembcr that tlie people are the guertilKs’ greatest asset if handled correCTly.

The Enemy

the level of their leadership, and how committed they’ arc to destroying the guerrillas ail play a role in ihe outcome of the waj*. This is where the guerrillas’ knowledge ofdu eocniy comes into play, tor wldtoul a clear and accurate understanding and assess- menc of the enemy, the gucrrilias stand no chance ofviaory.

The Guerrillas

M wiih the enemy, the guerrillas must be commitred, and they must have superior leadership, excellent training, ami a reli¬ able means oflogisiica! supivon to be victorious. Nowhere in die realm of guerrilla warfare are recurity and small unit leadcrsliip more important than when fighting in built-up areas; it will usu¬ ally be the NCOs who lead and conduct most urban guerrilla operations because of the smaller si« of the individual guerrilla forces (cells). Here the dcccntraiiaed philosophy of comiitaiid shines its brightest.

Now for some night ops.

How well the enemy arc trained in countcrguerrilla warfare,

195 194

Un^^^^ver of

The Nocturnal Solution

*/am mart a/raiil eftvr mtiialw! ilutH onr enimiis'iisijiHS.“ —P;m'lr< t<j the Ailicri.tis, 4.U H C.

Guerrilla wjrlare is s game of ourtliinking the orlier twy It is a (Simc of sirikin); at him in a lauld. jggresriee. and iiiiex|'ect- ed manner in a place and at a dmc that yxiu believe give you an advantage tKiiii wlueti you can win a decisive viemry. To win at this game, the guernlla mutt learn the eiicmy'ii iseiics and in sluing so Icjrii how to prevent the enemy thtm uamg the tactics andweaptms they hehesv will allow them to gain rlie upper hand and win. Ihcrcthre. gucrrilb vvaitare is a game of preempiion and ciniing, anticipation and guile, cssurage and knowledge.

The jcucrrilli ftsttx- must tiiiii to coiidiici at least 70 percent of its opemtlons under cover of darknew; the guerrillas must tm-n the n4?ht to sucli a degree that the enemy gready tear hav¬ ing to go after them aider the sun sets, ill is interesting to note that one of the world's mast respected countetguetrilla forces, the U.S. Marines, sdll conduct* less than lialf of its trailing at night, this despite Marine doctrine indicaiing that at least 70 percent of Marine training should be nuaunial.) If tlie enerny

197

soldier, when told he is to go on j nighi patrol to hunt a guer¬ rilla unit, gets an ininiediatc burning sensarion in his guts and breaks out in a cold svs-eai upon learning of his neat misrion, then the guerrillas in that area arc doing their job.

Darkness gives the iollowing nvo important taciidal advan- lages tr> die guerrilla force;

• It conceals the forte so that it can remain undeiecied after setting in tor an ambush.

• It allows the force to withdraw quiekly ortcc the ambush has been triggered and completed.

It can also allow the gucrnllas to do the hallowing:

• nuke lip ftir what in the dattime would he a lardcal diaad- vaiuage due to reduced eonibai power

• maintain conhKt with the enemy Dom a pminon ot'ieUdsc safeiy • tbtlow up on daytime reiecesscs

TACTICAL CONTROL MKASURES

The caemy are likely to use certain tacdcai eonirol mcasiirea iia they prepare for iheir night operations. 'I he guerrilla force's job is 10 determine what and where those control measures are and strike a decisfte gap in those measures bclbre the enemy iiitack acMally tomiiieiices. By deceiving the enemy into think¬ ing they have found a good target m such and such a locatiixi (which in reality is a ploy tin the pan of the guerrillais to get the enemy to come to a ceriain place), the gueirilias can often deduce much about how the enemy wnll get front their ba.se camp to that target.

Assembly Area

Night attacks often call tot an isscmbly area that is closer to the line of departure than one that would he used for a dayli^t

attack. This means that the enemy arc going to have to move out of ihcir dcfcnsK'c poCTrai at night to get to that assembly area, and they will usually move in columns as they do so. But before they send out the first column they will deploy reconnaissance teams .and scouts to reconnoirer the area ciu:y will be traveling thiough and the route thq' intend id use. The guerrilla-s musr ensure riiat they remain andeiecied by these rccon pairols and aenuts. observing their movements and actions all the while. Also, iIk enemy may use renal recimnaissaiue—manned or unmanned (remoticly piloted drones)—o> gather tactical infor¬ mation about the asKmbly area and the route planned to get there. Guerrillas must be exiremely wary oi aircraft and drones. Any reconnaissance measutca used by the eiremy can be helpftil in determining the enemy’s route of march.

Once the enemy rccon and scoui unils have completed their niLssion, ihey can either return to tlie haw tamp and report their tuxlinip, or they may stay hidden near the aasembly area and send their repmr back to the rear via radio. If they stay near ihc assembly area, the guerrillas inust selea an ambush site some¬ where between the enemy's camp and the asrembiy area. This site must be fire enough away fttmt the reconnaissance teams and scTHiis to prevent their counterattacking the guerrillas, and it likewise imisi be situated fire enough away from the enemy's main body's rewrve ftircc, which could also he deployed as a counieraliack force, hor additional Insurance along these lines, the guerrillas may be able to ret up a blocking or delaying force lienveen rhese pntenrial cnunrcrattack forces and the ambush site. Remember that a blocking forte seeks to deny the eneitty access to a certain area sre avenue of approach, and a delaying force seeks to trade space (terrain) for time, with the idea of buy¬ ing just enough time for the ambush force to wltlidraw.

Release points arc poa-nrial gaps because they arc points where a higher commander relinquishes control of subordinate

199

at an easily rctogniited rerratn icimre and the {^cnillas antid- paic this, cunhision can result in the enemy fisrcc when the ambush is sprung beiaiise iif possible mi<ujtdersiandin}pi in command and control at that point. Unless the commander on the scene takes immediate and bold action to cotinier the ambush, the ijiierrillas stand a good chance of getting a decent body count. (But don’t be (btsled into thinking that btidy counts win wars; during the Vietnam War. Anterica learned thal this isn't always the case.;

Attack ptisnions arc used only occanonally ditrii^ night up», andnotitialiy they arc only ixcupied for brief periods of time due to rheir propensity for suficriitg spoiling attacks. However, the enemy force may need to pick up some special ctiuip'mcni or ueipons along the Vray or receive additional insmteboas from higlter command that require a quick stop for disaeniinarion to the smjll unit leaders, and the attack position may be that place. Puteiiliiil attack positions should be mined rather than ambuiihcd, and cIk mines should be placed ihroiigltoiii the |VMition.

Ifthe enemy is lacking in reconnaissance incaMuxs, routes ot' march can be suiiie of the easiest and most effetrrive control inca sure.s along which to lay ambushes. These routes are usually cho¬ sen by terrain and their proximity to and attitude tosvard the enemy’s objective. Ofteiitmies. guides are forward-deployed by the enemy mancuvenng force to asrist the smaller umts in dnd- ing their lines of deployment. Ciucrtillis must be cautious to remain hidden ftom these guides.

If manpower permits, guerrilla scouts must be placed along ail potential avenues of apiimach to watch liir .signs of enemy niovctnctit. Be aware of ruses; the enemy may send in recoo and

200

Kadir

The enemy will no doubt have radio.s from the squad level on iqi Gueiiilb .sharpshgorets should make priority targets those noopswiih radios on their hacks ami anyone who is called to speak into the luindsec by ihe radio operator—this is almosi always a leader.

Markings

Sometimes the unit leader will mark his tmifijiro in some way so tliai hia men can easily tell wlicre tie is at all timts. sueli as luminous tape .'“cat eyes" I in a pariiciilar pattern on the leader’s helmet or hat Again, sharpshooters should inake anyone who looks dilTeient a prionty largct.

THE PLAN OK ATTACK

The cnemv’s plan <M’ attack will consul of a scheme of maneuver and a fire support plan (indirect fire weajsoiis that will support the enemy attack, »ueh as mortars and urtiUery). How rise guerrillas inticipaie and deal with Ivnh of these elemenis will have a direct impact on die outcome of the inibush.

Scheme of Maneuver

.A scheme of mancirver is a plan ftirmulated that details the employmenr of all enemy units other than lire support. The scheme of inaiieui'cr includes all subordinate, alrached. and sup- |x>rling units i the latter of which aren't lire siippon but rather lulils used to siippon the main ctlbri by acting as decow).

Prior observed nngaprnients ami the enemy’s own tactical and operational d<^ia can be invaluable in detennining his

201

$chenie of maneuver. This is»her« the iuitle ofmis bcraicn the giierrilLi leader and the enemy leader begins. Ii's aimost .Abboii- Costelloian in concept, i.c., you are formulaliiig vewr ambush plan on hnwyou expect the enemy to maneuver—you kiKW Ivow he thinks. Bill the enemy knoses you know how be thinks, so be mij^t change his plan to counter that. Then again, yam know that he knrmx you know how he thinks, so you go to Plan B in order Id Tool him. But he knows that you know that he kniws rlui you know how lie thinks, so . .. well, you kc the problem.

The trick is to do something he doesn’t expect and do so in such a way that it hiitis him badh' in a very shon period of lime—a matter of seconds—and then melt into ihe shadows so that he can't counterattack or pursue your utthdiawiag furcea. This is the essence of an ambush.

I recall laying an ambush once wttli mv six-man recon team. We had an M-hO machine gun ak>ng, and I laid id the ambush the way I thought would produce the best results. My machine gunner, Todd Ohman, said that my plan was eday but that he had a better one and that T should use his plan, I w-anied lo do it my way and didn’t listen to'I odd—when I should have—and the ambush produced only marginal rcsiilis. lodd had ani>cipar- ed .a prolilem rhai did in fact present isdf, but because I was in charge and still learning the trade at that point, 1 didn’t listen In fact. Ukcr the ambush was sprung, my team was very nearly ambushed by a counterambush team Todd's pian would have

Hie next time, I listened to Todd.

Fire Support Flan

The enemy’s fire support plan must be considered and planned against rrcim the start. By utilising rcai-binc radio com- muaicacioiis. where the ambush team has direct comm with tbc countcrlirc support team, the ambush commander can inibrm the counterfire support team that hb ambu^ is in progress and that he should now prevent the enemy fire support unit from

doing ns )ob. So we see that this learn is In fiici the ambush team’s fire support unit.

'I he enemy fire support unit’s poation must be rcconnoi- lered taicfiilly if it is to be engaged effectively; never assume thal yon can lake it out easily with a single means. For instance, if you expect the enemy cornyvany commander to use his oiganic mor- tan. a* his pnmary means of fire support -because that's wliat be has done in the past and ihal’s svhai his mamiab say to do—and ynsi intend to take diose mortars oui witli sharpsliootcrs, you would be disnuyed to find that he has dug in his mortars and they are now- wry difficult or impossible t<i engage with direct- fire weapons like rifles.

If you firsi reton the mortar posiuon you can beiier select a means of engagemeni Use the combined arms concept r<i pin the firesuppon unit in a dilemma, and have plan B ready iti go, iCanyou now sec why it is so imporrani to always he keeping an c-ycon the enemy! Gaining and mainiaining visual contact is cru¬ cial!! Consider ihii you may he able to simply reduce his tire siippon unit’s ability to deliver ctRsetive lire; if he is using mcir eats, try to knock down liis aiming stakes with grenades and ynur tisvn iiivUreit tires. Once those stakes art down his Arcs become less aexurace, and il a mortar cresvman anempto rt> replant tlicm. your sni|'«r can ong him. But the mortars may be following in trace of the maiieiiwr elements rather than being iefr in the hnse earap. If this is the case, ilie ambu.sh might be plannevl so diat it purs (he mortats in a poor firing position Ibcneaih tbek canopy so that their rounds can’tbc fired, or in a muddy field that mtikcs scaring ihe base plate s-ery diltic-ult;.

sSiill, a smart company commander will have a fire support plan that intends oi arilire mote than just his oiyanic mortars; he might luce larger, nonorjtanie mortars, artillerv, or even close air suppsxt on call. The picrnllas' ambush, li'sprung cnrrealv itliat Ls, ettreracly list and fatal). will not be vnlncrable to these weapons systcitis. Nev-ertheiess, the giiernlla three must be pre¬ pared rei receive pumiing fires from these weapons as it with¬ draws, making maamium riispcision very important.

Reserve Consideritions

The cneniy, u-licn operaant? at streiigihs bekw haitjlion kwl Icompmy, pUloon, and squad), arc somewhat unlikely lo have a reserve eoinponeiic at night because of coimnaiuJ ami h eoinrnl problems inherent in night operations. Therefore, since H few if any of your guerrilla operations will l>« conducted against H units larger than a compuiv, and given that most of your opera- | dons will be eoiidiicted at night, \vm will not oltcn be fortcti to consider the enemy’s reserve force. However, ij' the situation puts the enemy in a very narrow oroilietwtse restneted zone of action that does not lend itselfWell to using their eiuite force as maneuver clciueiits, nr ii" the eominandcr's sehenic of maneuver necessitates the exposing of oiie of his rlanks or rear, the enemy may choose to keep a platoon in reserve lift he iinu is a compa ny). By carefully watching the placement trfthat reserve eienieni and is sccurrty measures, ihe guerrllas can determine whcihcv the reserve element itselfia vuluerablc to aiiacli.

In this situation, where the reserve element is used Ity the enemy eommtindcr to provide security along his Hank or restr. the guerrillas are looking for a gap. litis might he the reserve not retnaiiiing siifllcienth’ close to the main body vluring llteir maneu¬ ver, thus leaving it exposed, or it miglti become exposed when Icii at the line of departiuv to await the commaitd to come forward.

Training in night operations is always near the front of the guerrilla leader's eoiieecns. No guerrilla unit can ever spend too much time training m everything trum individual nigiti move¬ ment to uitheate night amhushes.

Hob Newman retired from the U.S Marine* after more than 20 years of serviec m assorted rectainaissance. infantry, sfweial ofcracititu. and instructor billets. He served with Fox Compiiny, 2itd Harialion, 4th Marines, during dte Gulf IVar as an infantry umt leader, ami spent three years as a .ShllK instnictor at the tabled Navy SERE School m h-lame He has v'oittpleied tlie Army Airborne Courae, N’avy SCUBA Course, N'avy Submarine Escape Trunk CH>emiar’* Course. Marine Amphihious Rceonnatssance Course, U.S, Aar Force Special Operaiions School’s Revnliinniury Warfare and Dynamics of Intem.arional Terroriara Courses. Navy SliRl' and SKIIF Instructor Courses, and many other fisrmal military courses of iiutnictioii. His tioni tour was as a warllghring insrructor u the Marine Corps StaH NCO Atademy’s Advanceil Course almard Camp tieiger.

'Ihe award-winning authtir of numerous books and thoii- santls ol'magazine and new-spaper articles and columns chat have appeared in dozen* ot' publications, lie wrote a eortroversial weekly column for die Marine Coipn edition of tlic iVary '/fwru as '"Dan MetsTew" and still wTitts opinion piece* on leadership for that publication. He founded I .I.. Bean’s Outdoor

204 205

Disojverv' I’rt^ram's VVilderntss Sllrv^■al ^Wjrkshop while livinj? in Maine. He airrcniiy llws in the Rockies where be i» an editor at a pnblinhing house, the director of die Wilderness Emergency •Skills Course, and is Soldier of Partunc'i conihbutmg editor for GiiirvVar Veterans

160rh Speoal Operaiioiis Asiuioii Regiment. 66 In Matine Divuian, 164 RSs,143 S-m-l rak. 114 92nd Aiiharoe Divimm. 35

Academy. Suil' Noneomniissioncd Ollccr. siii Afghanistan, 59, 66,153 Afghana, IIV Africa, ISl aggressivcncw. 156 Aldid, Mdummed Famh. 65.151 •Alaska. 95 .Alhanij, vii Akutiaru. 85 amatol. 46 ambiidu2-3,9. U. 14,44, 59, 64, 166.119-122,124-137. 154,

191,198-203 Amendment, Second, 85. 86

207

America’North. 29,151 America, South. 151 Americam. 15. 17. 54, 54-55, 57, AS, R*-R9,109.119,152, anmuls, 110 AppimiauCLC, 31 arcai.inaustrial, 189 190 Army, Cunfcracrju:,31 .Srmy, New I'eopk's, 69, 88,122 arl,oy'crjUDnal, V, t\, .55, 59-60,151 ARVN, 16 Asis,27,20, 151 .4lpui. Lo. 65 om!i.k, I tomal, 65,70 arrack. num,72,74 aicaclc, ttippiirriniiu 72-75

base, parnil. 96,104 baacs. csi.iblirhintt, 81, S4 Rmlsiu, Tulguicio, 21 -24

boacmg, 38 Rc)pii, Mciiacbun. 29, 112 Bcijimi Universiiy, 80 Beirut, 64 heltasT. 189 bicyde. 1 in. 193 hiHbrvH.Sl Kland, Humphrey, II Bogota, 22 Ixiohc :ra|u,v.w.3. 74. 97,106,110-117.1S8,164, 171-172,174,

Bojton Harbiir. 14 RiiuqueL Henri, Col.. 12 Hraddix-k, Kclward. General. 11,13 Btacfy. Sarah. S6

Clemens, Miron, 6 7 ox:a..32.81 Cohen, Richard, 56-57, 60 Caiombo, 189 ciimmand, JcLcncraJiacd philoaophy ol', 14, 33-34,191, 195 command, intet^red, 157 Comp A3.45, 51 52 Crimp R. 45, 51 Comp B4, 45 Comp C4.45

209

Cranma, The. 22 Ciranr, L. ^i.,al grcnarfci, 25. 168.17U 171,182,203 Grozuy. 189

Guevara, hme^rd "Clhc", 22-2.3 Guaman, iVhiraad RcyiKKo, 32 33, 57,82

llaysvnah, 29 Haiphong, 17 H.'uling, Fji, 5<rgcaiiv, 105 halo., OR Haniijhal, 12 Hand, 17, 27,147,152 I laspiiiger, loochira. 0 Havana, ciry of. 25 Havana, L'nivcrucy of. 22 Highljiivia, Ceniial. 80,164 TTird"hitn.a, I Hmong, 153 HoOliMiiih,®. 16, 87.110 Koar, joweph, Ucncral, 65 Hotb’, Anvitcas, 9 Hoe City, 89 Hunan I’rovirK-c, 8U Hum, 119 Ilusacin. Saiklarn, .57

IiiJianv, 11-14,53. 177 inilcictrinaTion, v, 139,141,143.145.147.149 infjnlrv, viii, 11-14,28, 64,67, 08,121,205 iiiiJjOvc, 14,24,39, 82, 159

I^j-Tzu, 30

leadership, T. 3, 14. 16, 24,27-29.31,33-39.41-42,60,67.83,87, 89, 120 121. ISO ISl, 168. 195,205

Lebmiou. 60 Lex, Rtibcrt E., General, 31 I.cnin. Vladimir Iljnch, 29, .32. SO larnmgrad, Sg Lima, 33,116,189 layalls 33-36,150

Madrid, 189 Maine, vhi, 97. lOR, 139,2(13-206 Malsya, 153 134.159. 161 managemem, ecoiinmy ol. U maneuver, sehemc .if, 201-202. 204 Manifaro, tlaTimun;.t, 32 Mans, llaland$.A., Liruunanc ColoneJ, 153-134.158. 160-161 Maiiann, Cliarln, 37 maneuver, 13,31.68, 72-73,76,93. 130, 132,201 204 Mao, 3, 8. 32. 34. 64. 79-Sl. 86,105.158 Manne AmphihiiiLLv Unit |M.\U1, vhi, 64 Marine Kapedirionary t'nic LMblL'l Special Uperaoems Capable

(SOC;. viii M-arinea, Force Reersn, 13, .15, 114 Marine*. L’ S., 35,194.197 Marion. Francis. 8 Marx, Kari, 32, RO McKailand, tlDbcn, 65 McKiilghl, DanicL Lirutcnanc Colonel. 6.3 McNamara, Robert, 16, 89.119 McVeigh. Timothy, 44 measures, tactical control, 198 media, 17,60,83. 147 memiliry, “zero delects’’, 34

MBIT TS-L, 66 mincs.v. 2-3.74,110 115. I 17, 128. 131 1.36, 158, 171 172. 174,

182. 200 Miuaesoci, 105 miinircmcti,2.14, 59.84 Misko. Geisr;^ Cannery Sergeant Ichen), ix, 147 mobiliiy. 13. 58.105 Mogadishu. 64, 151 .Vlongpls, 27, 119 Miinuii^hcla Valley. 11 monsoons. 39 Mimognaius, 133 MoQ^omcry. Tom. Major General, 65

MOLT (mitiurv opetacions on urban terrain}. 194 mosxiaacni, xii, 6,9, m3, 25, 39.73, 75, 87-90,95. 1D4-10S.

107-108,126.133-134.148.194, 200. 204 movcaoent. simple rules o(, 107 rmtcx-mcni, rummjj, 7.3, 7S, 9(1 MRE (meal, ready to eai|, 98 mujihadecn, 2, $8, 77

Nagasaki, I KATO, 193 navigatkHi. 104. 109,160 NCXls, 16. 37.68.144. 139, 19a Negriins, 108 NcwBagland, 14 Ketv Guinea, 6 Newman, Robert Emerson, 14 NTchob, Terry. 44 night. 2.4-6.44.85,100. 108 109.173,191.195.197-200, 2U4 nitrale, ammonium, 46 47. 49 niirogtyccnn. 46-48 Kivm, Richard AL. rrcstdcoi. 16, 89,150.152 North. Oliver. I acutenant ColimcL 88 N\'A, 88-90,152,164

Ohmjn. U»U, Corxiral [then!. i05, 202 OkJjhoma Qfy, 44 Old Norrh Church., 14 OFcnriiin Summer, 24 ucgunuoliQD, mV, 1C7 Orknrcrrovincc.II 22 Ortega, liauicl. X

I’acihc, Wjr in the. 711

Pjlcstinc, 29 Pjsscvt, 9 pjliciicc. 29, 458 I’jnon. George, General, 28 PAVK ll’cnplc'a Army of Viernam], 2S peneiration, prnrt, 71 reiiugciii, Uie, 15 pemoiicc. 47, 51 Peril, 32-33, 81 PK'I'N Ipcnrjeryrhritc rerranirrare), 46*47,49*,40 Philippines, Rrjiuhlic cif the, 59, 88, 108 PiVe, Di:ugljs. 54 Pines, Isle ol', 24 picatos. Barbuy, 151 plan, lire support. 201 203 Poindexter, John, .Aiimiral, 88 Port iVUircibv, 6 Poitell, rolin, Oeneral, 65 power, national, 54-55 precatisijs, 22 Pdudpies, Mans’, 158-161 propaganda, 17,23,31, 60, 83, 14V, 154

Qaddafi. Mu’ammar, 57 Queens Roeal Beguiiciit, Pirst Baiialion ed*, 154

raids, 2,43,68,87 Ranger School, 13 Raj^rahauiiock, 31 RDX. 45-46.49-50 Rh lacmr, 47 reconraissincc. 10. 1.1-14, .3.3,68.71. 104-105, 108, 110, U6, 199-

200. 205 recovenng naiuanal strea^th, 81.67 repining loM icrriiories, 81.89 rcaerYC. 68, 73, 167, 199, 204 Resistance I'raining Inhnraniry {KH.i, 13V resupply, l^hcr unit, 92 resupply, insoluikUrs civilian, 93 resupply, voluntary civilian. 92 Revere. Paul, 14 revoluunii.21.80.84 Roger's Rangers. 13 Bomaiua, 7 Ruiuiicl, Erwui. Field Marshall, 23. 161 Rules of F.ngagenieiu iROE!. 64 rung and snorkel, 109 Russia, S8. 80

Saigon, 56,89,139 ■San Cristobal dc Huanianga. GnK^Tsiry of, 32 Sandinunu., 2 Saudi Arabia, 65. 139 .Schttnxer RG-8.A. 116 SCL11 8. 53 SCCD-G, 58 Scythia. 15 Scythians. 7

217

Open this l)0<>k nnd iravel to Switzerland. Sai^nn, Cuba's Siena Macslra. and posl-Wirld War [I China, where wri will becume the consiimmah; student of clandestine warfare as practiced by victnrious guerrillas for thousands of ycais.

-•\iilhot Bob Xewmaii spent lime both Uaining guerrilla forces, and trying hi crush tliein in his 20 sears of service as a U.S. Marine, and here lie pulls no punches. Newtnan leads novice and evpericiwed com- bnl trnoiier alike iiiln the grim, violent worirl of guer¬ rilla warlare. Drawing examples Emm ih rich liistury and a|>plying ptoien etjneepts. techniques, and prinoi- jiles of leadership, tactics, and opc.'atKiii.il art plus his own global experience honed by vears on rite forward edge of tlic Iwtfle area. New-man leaches exactly what you imu't know to win on the Ijatrleficld as a guerrilla leader; basic ficldctafl; mines aii<l booby traps; amhiLslies; tunnel constTUrtioii and strategy; urban and nocturnal tactics: interrogation, iiuloctrinalioii. and exploitation: psynps; and iniicli mure, Wliether you are going into battle or insi wont to learn how guerrillas tliink. fight, and siiivivc. tliis Ixiok has it all, Por acade¬ mic tluth onh.

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