Redistricting in America: A State-by-State Analysis

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REDIS RIC ING IN AMERICA A State-by-State Analysis

This Rose Institute report surveys the legislative andcongressional redistricting process in each of the 50 states.It nds that state legislative redistricting systems varywidely, while congressional redistricting has less state-by-state variation. As additional states consider reformingtheir own redistricting systems, it is important to be awareof the variety of redistricting options. With the 2010 censusand 2011 redistricting cycle beginning, observers will havean opportunity to study the success of each model withgreat precision. The majority of states have implementedno redistricting reforms. Others have adopted reformedsystems that allow continued legislative control of the process.The following is a comprehensive state-by-state review of every system used by the 50 states, with a particular focuson the states that have adopted non-legislative redistrictingsystems.

Claremont McKenna College April 21, 2010

Douglas JohnsonIan Johnson

David Meyer

340 E. Ninth Street, Claremont, CA 91711-6420: 909.6218159 | F: 909.607.4288 | E: [email protected]

Member o the Claremont Collegesrosereport.org


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Rose Institute o State and Local Government Redistricting in America: A State-by-State Analysis

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ABLE OF CON EN S

EXECU IVE SUMMARY State Legislative Redistricting..............................................4Congressional Redistricting................................................7

IN RODUC IONAcknowledgments...............................................................9

Redistricting: A Summary..................................................10

LEGISLA IVE REDIS RIC INGIntroduction......................................................................13

LEGISLA IVE CON ROL Te Standard Legislative Process.......................................14

otal Legislative Control...................................................20Legislative System with Back-up.......................................21

NON-LEGISLA IVE POLI ICAL CON ROL Introduction......................................................................28Gubernatorial Control......................................................28Boards o Apportionment..................................................29

COMMISSIONSIntroduction......................................................................30Advisory Commissions......................................................31Legislative-Appointed Commissions.................................34State-Appointed Commissions..........................................38Party-Appointed Commissions..........................................40Independent Commissions................................................42

CONGRESSIONAL REDIS RIC INGState-by-State Analysis.......................................................47

CONCLUSION...........................................................................53

HE UGLIES DIS RIC S IN AMERICA: MAPS...................55


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Redistricting is one o the oldest continuous acts o democratic governance in the UnitedStates. Every ten years, based on new population estimates rom the decennial census,every state must redraw its electoral boundaries. Tese lines have a crucial impact onelectoral outcomes: control o the redistricting process o ten translates into gains onelection day.

Te methods by which states draw these lines are as varied as the states themselves. Inmost states, state legislators are responsible or drawing their own district lines, and they o ten produce plans that avor incumbents partisan or bipartisan sel -interest.

S A E LEGISLA IVE REDIS RIC INGTe many systems or drawing state legislative lines used by the states all into twocategories: those where the legislature retains the ability to implement the redistrictingplan it selects, and those where the legislature does not have ultimate control.

LEGISLA IVE CON ROL 1. Standard Legislative Process: the legislature passes a bill andsends it to the Governor or signature

20 states: Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota,Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, SouthCarolina, ennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming

2. otal Legislative Control: the legislature adopts plans without any gubernatorial involvement

3 states: Florida, Michigan, and North Carolina (though Florida requires state supremecourt approval o plans and the supreme court takes over i the legislature ails to meetconstitutional deadlines)

EXECU IVE SUMMARY


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3. Legislative System with Back-up: the legislature passes a billand sends it to the Governor or signature, but i they do not act by certain dates a back-up system is triggered

10 states: Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Oregon,South Dakota, Texas, and Vermont

4. Non-Legislative Political Control

3 states: Arkansas, Maryland, and Ohio

COMMISSIONS5. Advisory Commission: a Commission draws plan(s) andsubmits them to the legislature or review, amendment andadoption

4 states: Iowa, Maine, New York, and Pennsylvania

6. Legislative-Appointed Commission: legislative leaders appoint a commission with a tiebreaker that then draws and implements a plan

4 states: Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, and Washington

7. State-Appointed Commission: Executive, Legislative and Judicial leaders select a commission that then draws andimplements a plan

2 states: Alaska and Colorado

8. Party-Appointed Commission: state political party leadersappoint a commission with a tiebreaker that then draws and

implements a plan2 states: Missouri and New Jersey

9. Independent Commission: a group o independent individualsdraw and implement a plan

2 states: Arizona and California


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CONGRESSIONAL REDIS RIC INGStates also use a variety o means redrawing congressional boundaries, though thetraditional legislative bill approach is much more common or congressional redistrictingthan or legislative redistricting. Tere are ve broad categories o congressionalredistricting systems:

1. raditional bill: the legislature passes a bill and sends it to theGovernor or signature

a. 42 States

2. Advisory Commission: a Commission draws plan(s) andsubmits them to the legislature or review, amendment andadoption

a. 2 states: Maine, Iowa

3. Legislature-Appointed Commission: legislative leaders appoint a commission with a tiebreaker that then draws and implements a plan

a. 4 states: Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Washington

4. Party-Appointed Commission: state political party leadersappoint a commission with a tiebreaker that then draws andimplements a plan

a. 1 state: New Jersey

5. Independent Commission: a group o independent individualsdraw and implement a plan

a. 1 state: Arizona


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IN RODUC ION

Tis Rose Institute report surveys the redistricting process in each o the 50 states. In2008, Cali ornia became the latest state to re orm its state legislative redistricting process,adding yet another approach to the long list o redistricting systems.

Tis report examines state legislative redistricting systems, which vary widely across theUnited States. Te report then addresses Congressional redistricting, which has less state-by-state variation.

As additional states consider re orming their own redistricting systems, it is importantor re ormers to be aware o the variety o models. With the 2010 census and 2011

redistricting cycle beginning, observers will have an opportunity to study the success o each model with great precision.

e majority of states have implemented no redistricting reforms. Others have adoptedre ormed systems that allow continued legislative control o the process. Te ollowingis a comprehensive state-by-state review o every system used by the 50 states, with aparticular ocus on the states that have adopted non-legislative redistricting systems.

Te Rose Institute exists to provide hands-on policy research experience or the studentsof Claremont McKenna College, and their work is central to everything done at theInstitute. e authors would like to thank Rose Institute Research Assistants DanielShane and Ruth Oliver for their assistance with this report. Institute Student Manager Abhi Nemani provided important assistance which led to the development o theinnovative accompanying online map and website. Finally, we owe a special thanksto Rose Institute Director Dr. Ralph Rossum, Associate Director Dr. Kenneth Miller,and Administrative Assistant Marionette Moore. Teir encouragement, support, and

assistance are crucial to all o the Institutes work, including this report.

Acknowledgments


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REDIS RIC ING: A SUMMARY

e US federal system allows states to function as laboratories of democracy. Policy innovations can be tested, per ected, or rejected at the local level. Redistricting, theprocess o redrawing electoral boundaries, is an old challenge to American democracy.Famously, Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry oversaw the most famous redistrictingin 1812, just 25 years a ter the rati cation o the Constitution. Even earlier, in 1788, adispute between Virginia Governor Patrick Henry and James Madison resulted in thedrawing o a district that unsuccess ully tried to deny Madison a seat in the rst session

of Congress. Partisan plans and uncompetitive districts have been a common occurrencethroughout American history.

In 1962, however, the Supreme Court ruled inBaker v. Carr that the redistricting processis subject to judicial review. Baker challenged state legislative districts in ennessee,

which had not been redrawn in sixty years. Due to population shifts, some districts hadeight times more residents than others. In Baker, the Court rejected the argument thatredistricting is a non-justiciable political question, and ruled that malapportioneddistricts are subject to judicial invalidation under the Fourteenth Amendment. Insubsequent cases, such asWesberry v. Sanders (1964) and Reynolds v. Sims (1965), theCourt established the requirement that legislative districts (including congressional, state,local districts) must be drawn on an equal population basis, and may be redrawn by thecourts to protect the principle o one person, one vote.

In 1965, the Voting Rights Act outlawed racial gerrymandering, the process by whichdistricts are drawn to dilute voting strength o racial minorities, and courts haveoverturned many districts on the grounds that they violate the Voting Rights Act. InShaw v. Reno(1993) and a series of related cases, the Supreme Court held that districtscan be challenged under the federal Equal Protection Clause on the basis that they excessively separate voters into districts based on race. Sometimes it can be di cult tostrike a balance between the requirements of the Voting Rights Act and the restrictions of Shaw v. Reno.

In Davis v. Bandemer (1986), the Supreme Court held that partisan gerrymanders are justiciable, but despite repeated lawsuits, the Court has yet to overturn a plan on thegrounds that it disadvantages members o a political party. State-level re orm e orts havethus been the only check on partisan gerrymandering.


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Tirty-one states have moved away rom using the traditional legislative bill process orredistricting. Fourteen states employ redistricting commissions and seventeen use other

alternative systems. Tis report will describe each approach in detail. As the 2010 censusand concurrent redistricting cycle begin, observers will have an opportunity to study thesuccess o each model with great precision.

Groups of states that share demographic, geographic and cultural backgrounds tendto use similar types o commissions or redistricting. Troughout this study, one may note the apparent similarities o systems in geographic proximity. Tere are our whichclearly stand out. From oldest to newest, they are the Southern, Northeastern, Paci cNorthwestern, and Southwestern models.

Te Southern Modele Southern Model is shared by Texas, Oklahoma,

Mississippi, and Louisiana. ese states all have legislativeredistricting systems with back-up boards o apportionment.Some combination o executive, legislative, and judicial o cialsconstitute these boards, which take total control o the processshould the legislature ail to nish its plan by a given deadline.Back-up boards o apportionment have been used with relativefrequency compared to other state back-up systems. In Texas, forinstance, a back-up board o apportionment has managed threeo the last ve rounds o legislative redistricting.

Te Northeastern Model

In Maine, New York, and Pennsylvania, commissions composedof legislators and citizens are tasked with advising the legislatureon redistricting. Almost identical in structure are the systems o Connecticut and Rhode Island, where the commission ormedis actually a part o the state legislature, despite the presence o unelected o cials. Te commissions vary in strength in eachstate, but the legislature retains control over the process in all

ve states.

States with the Southern Model

States with the Northeastern Model


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Te Pacifc Northwestern Model

Washington, Idaho, and Montana all use similar tiebreakerredistricting systems or legislative redistricting. In the threestates that use this system, an appointed commission o unelected o cialsselected evenly across partisan linesis given the task o drawing district lines. Tere are somevariations in nal approval processes. A ter Washington Statedemonstrated the success o this system in 2002, re ormers inOregon proposed a similar model; the bill failed in the Oregonstate legislature.

Te Southwestern Model

e independent commission system, adopted in Arizonaand California, is the newest of the regional models. Arizonapioneered the independent commission through a ballotinitiative in 2000; the commission rst drew lines in 2001. erevolutionary aspect of Arizonas model was the independentselection of commissioners. Legislators were given a listo names rom which to select, but the list was screenedcompletely independently o the legislature and parties. Teprocess resembled jury selection more than the intentionally partisan selection processes o the Northeast.

Cali ornia took this process one step urther with the passageof Proposition 11 in 2008. Proposition 11 created a commissionselection process even more independent rom the state legislature. Rather than selecting

rom a short prescreened list, legislators in Cali ornia are only allowed to strike a ew names rom the pool o applicants, whose names are then drawn by lottery to start thecommission. Where Arizona established the rst essentially independent commission,Cali ornia created the rst ully independent commission system.

States with the Pacifc Northwestern Mode

States with the Southwestern Model


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LEGISLA IVE REDIS RIC ING

Georgia House o Representatives Districtaround Atlanta

Te most common redistricting systems retain control by the legislature. Most stateshave a permanent committee in each o their two houses that handles redistricting. A redistricting bill passes through the standard legislative process for any bill and requiresthe signature o the governor or a veto override by the legislature.

Te standard legislative control system has slowly grown less common. Tree states givetheir legislatures total control over the process without the governors ability to veto thebill: Florida, Michigan, and North Carolina. Eleven states use hybrid systems involving

back-ups. In these states, the legislature has control over the process initially, but i thelegislature ails to meet certain deadlines the process is handed over to another group:either a commission, the courts, or other elected o cials. While some states have latedeadlines which rarely cause a commission to be invoked, in other states back-up systemshave a major e ect on the drawing o lines.

Te most common hybrid systems involve back-ups. In the eleven back-up systemstates, the legislature has control over the process initially, but i the legislature ailsto meet certain deadlines the process is handed over to anothergroup: either a commission, the courts, or other elected o cials.

While some states have late deadlines which rarely cause acommission to be invoked, in other states back-up systems have amajor e ect on the drawing o lines.

Four states have back-up commission systems: Connecticut,Illinois, Indiana, and Mississippi. In Mississippi, or instance, thecommission is comprised o the chie justice o the MississippiSupreme Court, the attorney general, the secretary o state, andthe legislative majority leaders o each house.

Two states, Texas and Oklahoma, have back-up Boards of Apportionment. In these states, a group o top-ranking stateo cials take over the process i the legislature ails to complete a plan by the end o the

rst session o the state legislature a ter the census. In exas, the lieutenant governor,speaker o the house, attorney general, comptroller, and land commissioner take controlof the process if the state legislature fails to create a plan. In Oklahoma, the boardconsists o the state treasurer, the attorney general and the superintendent o public


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Alabama State Senate

instruction.

Oregon has a unique back-up system. If the legislature fails to nish a plan by thedeadline, the secretary o state becomes responsible or all state legislative districts. Teinitial re orm was proposed to pressure lawmakers into nishing their redistricting planspromptly, to avoid handing control o their ates over to a potentially hostile Secretary o State.

Four states, Florida, Louisiana, South Dakota, and Vermont, specify that a back-up panelof judges draw the lines if legislators fail to make their deadline. Judges, in theory non-partisan, are rarely allowed to take over the process.

LEGISLA IVE CON ROL Te Standard Legislative ProcessIn the following twenty states, redistricting is handled like a standard bill. Lines areusually drawn in committee, passed by each house (or the unicameral legislature of Nebraska), and then submitted to the governor or veto or signature. In these states noback-up system is provided or by state law or state constitution. I the legislature andgovernor deadlock, someone must petition thestate or ederal courts to intervene.

Alabama

Control o the redistricting system in Alabama iscurrently held by the legislature. A redistrictingcommittee o 22 commissioners is ormeda ter each census by the ruling state party, with 11 members drawn rom the House and11 rom the Senate. While the committee isnominally bipartisan (that is, it includes at leastone opposition member), there are no urtherspeci cations as to the composition o thecommittee in the state constitution. Te governorretains veto power over any redistricting bill.


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Proposals to change the redistricting system have been discussed but not introduced.

DelawareFor state legislative districts, each caucus proposes a plan and then the state House andSenate go through the normal legislative process to pass a plan, which then can be vetoedby the governor. Several public hearings on the plan are held; however, public oppositionis rare because the state is relatively small and homogenous.

Georgia

e legislature is responsible for legislative redistricting. Plans produced by the respectivestanding committees or the House and Senate are considered in a special session o theGeneral Assembly. Any plans passed are subject to a gubernatorial veto. ere are noconstitutional requirements regarding when a plan is passed, but the specialsession is traditionally held in thesummer a ter the release o census data.

Kansas

Te legislature is responsible or drawingand passing redistricting plans orlegislative districts. Te plan is subject toa gubernatorial veto. Te attorney generalthen submits the plan to the KansasSupreme Court within teen days o theplan being passed. Te court has thirty days to determine whether the plan isvalid. I the plan is struck down, the legislature has teen days to propose another plan, which is again subject to supreme court oversight. Tis process is repeatable, until anappropriate plan is passed and approved by the supreme court.

Kentucky

Redistricting in Kentucky is done through the legislature. e State and LocalGovernment Committee in the House of Representatives and the State GovernmentCommittee in the Senate propose legislation, which, once adopted, is subject tothe governors veto. is is in accordance with Section 33 of the Kentucky State

Kansas State House o Representatives


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Constitution, which was added in 1891.

Massachusettse General Court of Massachusetts (the

legislature) is responsible or legislativeredistricting. Te process must begin be orethe rst January after Census Day (April 1,2010). Tere is currently no provision or whathappens should the legislature ail to pass aredistricting plan. Te governor has the powero veto over any plan passed by the legislature.

Minnesota

For legislative redistricting, the legislaturesSubcommittee on Redistricting creates a planand submits it to the ull legislature or consideration and revision. Tis subcommittee ispart of the Joint Legislative Coordinating Commission of the House and Senate. Oncethe legislature has approved a plan, it can be vetoed by the governor.

Nebraska

Nebraskas unicameral legislature redistricts itsel through the standard process or a bill.Since there is only one house in the Nebraska state legislature and counties are relatively square, redistricting is relatively uncontroversial.

Nevada

Article IV, Section 5 o the Nevada Constitution gives control o redistricting to thelegislature. e Joint Standing Rules of the Legislature stipulate that the Committee of Government A airs in the Senate and the Committee on Elections, Procedures, andEthics in the House take up redistricting legislation, respectively. Moreover, these rulesdirect the committees to consider compactness and community boundaries, as well ascomply with the Voting Rights Act.

Massachusetts State Senate Districts around Boston


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New Hampshire

Article 9 o the New Hampshire Constitution gives the legislature control o redistricting. Redistricting is introduced as a bill in the House Election Law Committeeand the Senate Executive Departments and Administration Committee. It follows the

standard route or any bill throughthe New Hampshire legislature.

Any redistricting plans passedby the legislature are subject togubernatorial veto. Additionally,the state constitution allowstowns to be divided into multipledistricts only i the plan isapproved through a re erendum.Moreover, i a town is largeenough to receive its own memberof the General Court (lowerhouse), it must have its owndistrict. o accommodate theserequirements, the New Hampshire

legislature has 400 members.New Mexico

e state legislature of New Mexico was given control of redistricting in 1976. Priorto 1976, each county in the state was allocated a set number o seats by state law,and apportionment was carried out only within counties. In 2001, a joint interimredistricting committee dra ted redistricting legislation, which was then considered by both houses. Redistricting legislation is subject to a veto by the governor.

North Dakota

Te legislature has power over the redistricting plans or legislative districts. ypically, abipartisan committee in each house is temporarily ormed to create redistricting plans oreach house. Te governor then has the power to veto proposed plans.

New Hampshire House o Representatives


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Rhode Island

Legislative redistricting is controlled by the legislature and governor, although no speci cpower is enumerated in the constitution. During the last redistricting, the state formedthe Special Commission on Reapportionment comprised o 16 legislators and civilians.

Te speaker o the House andthe Senate majority leader eachselected three legislators and threeprivate citizens, while the Senateand House minority leaderseach selected two legislators.Tis commission advised thelegislature in the creation o abill to redistrict Rhode Islandslegislative seats; part of thisprocess involved reducing thetotal number o House seats

rom 100 to 75 and Senate seatsrom 50 to 38. Te governor has

veto power over the legislativeredistricting plans.

South Carolina

e legislature controls legislative redistricting. e standing Judiciary Committees inboth the House and Senate have traditionally each proposed a plan to redistrict theirrespective houses. Te legislatures plans are subject to gubernatorial veto.

ennessee

Redistricting is controlled by the legislature. ypically, the majority and minority leadersrom both the House and Senate create legislative redistricting plans that are then voted

on by the legislature. Te plans are then presented to the governor or approval or veto.Tere have been several re orm bills proposed, but none have come close to becominglaw.

Rhode Island State Senate


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Virginia House o Delegates

Utah

Te Utah Constitution mandates that redistricting be done by the legislature using astandard committee process. Te governor can veto the legislatures plans. A bill, HB172, would have established an independent, bipartisan redistricting commission. Underthis proposed legislation, districts would have to be drawn to promote competitivenessand partisan airness. However, this bill was introduced February 17, 2009, and de eatedonly three weeks later.

Virginia

Te Virginia legislature is constitutionally

responsible or redistricting the state. Within the legislative houses, the SenateCommittee on Privileges & Electionsand the House Committee on Privileges& Elections have jurisdiction on thematter. From there, legislation goes to thecommittee o the whole in each house.Te governor can veto or approve theplan. Te legislature has until the end o the General Assembly session in 2011 toredistrict. Tough there have been many bills proposed to amend this system, nonehave success ully passed both the Houseand the Senate.

West Virginia

Te legislature controls legislative redistricting. Te Senate Select Committee draws thelegislative reapportionment plan upon which the entire legislature votes. Te governorhas veto power over all plans. A recent re orm bill, HB 2857, sought to lay out speci ccriteria that the State must ollow when proposing new district mappings. Te bill also would have speci cally excluded voter data history rom the mapping process, thereby decreasing the partisan nature o redistricting in West Virginia. However, the bill waskilled in committee.


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Wisconsin

Te legislature controls redistricting using a standard committee selection process.However, the governor has veto power over state legislative district plans. A bill that would re orm the redistricting process by giving power to the non-partisan sta o Wisconsins Legislative Research Bureau (LRB) was tabled and never made it to a vote.If this bill is adopted into law, the LRB will establish new criteria for drawing districtboundaries, including aligning redistricting districts with other political boundaries.Despite constitutional requirements that all districts be contiguous, several legislativedistricts in Wisconsin are not actually contiguous, as they are comprised on non-contiguous city territory.

Wyoming

Te legislature as a whole determines redistricting using a standard committee selectionprocess. Te governor has veto power over the legislatures plans. Tere are no seriousre orm measures under consideration in Wyoming at this time.

otal Legislative ControlOnly three states, Florida, Michigan, and North Carolina,implement legislative redistricting by act o the legislature

alone. Te governor does not have the power to vetoredistricting bills. In Florida the governor cannot veto alegislative redistricting plan, but the state supreme court mustreview and approve legislative plans be ore they become law.

Michigan

Legislative redistricting is handled by the legislature, and aplan must be passed by November 1st, 2010. I a redistrictingact has not been passed by this time then a plea may be made

to the Michigan Supreme Court by the majority or minority leaders of either house, or by a political party, requestingthat the court create a plan. Te supreme court must allow aperiod o thirty days a ter announcing its plan be ore hearingstake place, and the hearing must occur by March 10th, 2012. An o cial plan must be issued by the court be ore April2012.

House o Representatives Districts in Detro


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North Carolina

e Legislature has complete control overcreating redistricting plans or legislative districts.Te governor does not have veto power overeither plan. North Carolinas 1991 redistrictingcycle was tied up in court battles until 2000.Redistricting lawsuits in the 2001 redistrictingcycle lasted into 2008.

Florida

Te legislature in Florida controls the legislativeredistricting process, implementing a new planby joint resolution during the regular legislativesession, as speci ed in Article III, Section16(a) of the state constitution. e governorcannot veto a legislative redistricting bill. I the legislature ails to pass a bill in the regularsession, the governor calls a 30-day specialsession on redistricting. I the special session also

ails to adopt a valid plan, the Florida SupremeCourt will redistrict the state. In a twist unique

to Florida, the supreme court is required toapprove the plans be ore they take e ect. Shouldthe supreme court declare a plan invalid, thelegislature will have two opportunities to createnew plans in extraordinary sessions. I these

North Carolina House o Representatives Districts

Florida State Senate Districts in Miami


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sessions ail to create plans approved by the supreme court, the court will then carry out reapportionment. In the 2010 General Election, Florida voters will decide on

ballot initiatives establishing redistricting criteria o adherence to the Voting Rights Act,compactness and respect or city, county, and geographical boundaries.

Legislative System with Back-upFor the states in this group, the legislature and the governor initially control the process.I they ail to meet certain deadlines, the process is handed over to another group o decision-makers. Back-ups systems usually designate speci c elected o cials or judges to

take over the process a ter the deadline. While some states have relatively late deadlines which rarely cause a back-up structure to be invoked, in other states there is a signi cantchance the back-up will end up drawing the lines.

Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, and Mississippi give the back-up redistricting power toa group o elected o cials and at least one non-partisan state o cial. In Mississippi thecommission is comprised of the o cially non-partisan Chief Justice of the MississippiSupreme Court, the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, and the legislative majority leaders o each house. In Connecticut, the back-up commission is structured similarly tothe legislative reapportionment committee. Te party leaders in both houses select two

members each, or a total o eight members. A tiebreaking ninth member is chosen romthe states electors. Illinoiss party leaders or both houses each designate one legislatorand one member o the public. I this new eight-member commission also ails to createa plan, the supreme court nominates one Republican and one Democratic candidate forchair (and tiebreaking vote) of the commission, and the chair is chosen by selecting oneo those two names rom a hat. Indiana gives back-up control to a commission consistingof the Speaker of the House, President pro tempore o the Senate, the chairs o theredistricting committees o both houses, and a th member o the legislature appointedby the governor.

Texas and Oklahoma call their back-up groups of designated o cials Boards of Apportionment. In each state, the board takes over the process i the legislature ailsto complete a plan by the end o the rst session o the legislature a ter the decennialcensus. exas passed a 1951 law creating a Board o Apportionment comprised o the lieutenant governor, speaker o the house, attorney general, comptroller, and land


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commissioner. In Oklahoma, the Board is comprised of the state attorney general,treasurer, and superintendent of the Department of Education.

Four statesFlorida, Louisiana, South Dakota, and Vermontdesignate a back-uppanel o judges to draw the legislative lines i legislators ail to make their deadline.

Judges, who are supposed to be non-partisan, are rarely allowed to actually take over theprocess. Florida adds an additional twist, as the state supreme court must review andapprove any legislative plan approved through the regular legislative process.

Oregon uses a unique back-up system that combines the designated o cials back-up and judicial back-up options. If the legislature fails to implement a plan by July 1, 2011, theSecretary o State becomes responsible or drawing and implementing state legislativedistricts, which are then subject to review by the Oregon Supreme Court.

All o these systems are designed to ensure that districts are drawn promptly a ter therelease of census data. ey also place pressure on state legislators to redistrict quickly,sometimes resulting in partisan compromise. But the state legislature retains at leastinitial control over the process.

Connecticut

For state legislative redistricting, the Connecticut General Assembly names a committee

to reapportion the state. Te president pro-tempore and minority leader in the stateSenate, as well as the speaker and minority leader o the House, each name twolegislators to a Redistricting Committee. If there exists a third party in the General

Assembly, two members of that party will also be named to the committee. e 8 (10i there exists a third party in the state legislature) members o the committee will makea report of reapportionment recommendations which will be submitted to the General

Assembly. e Assembly then can pass the plan by a two-thirds vote. Should the General Assembly not adopt the plan by September 15th o the year ollowing the decennialcensus, the Governor appoints a back-up commission again designated by those who

selected the Redistricting Committee. Te commission then chooses a state electorto become part o the commission, bringing the number o commissioners to 9. TeCommission has until November 30th to publish and submit a plan to the secretary o state, at which point it gains the orce o law. I a plan is not submitted by that date, thesecretary of state can request that the chief justice of Connecticut Supreme Court eithercompel the commission to come up with a plan or establish its own redistricting plan.


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Illinois

Te state legislature and governor initially control redistricting in Illinois, and a back-upcommission takes over should the legislature ail to meet certain deadlines. According tothe state constitution, the legislature and governor are supposed to pass a redistrictingplan through the normal bill process. However, the legislature has ailed to meet thedeadline every redistricting cycle since the current system was put in place in 1970.Redistricting power in Illinois then reverts to an eight-member commission consistingo one legislator and one member o the public appointed by the majority and minority leaders in each house o the state legislature. Since this commission has consisted o equal membership from each party, it has never been able to reach a compromise on aplan, necessitating the appointment o a tiebreaking chairperson. Under this process, thesupreme court nominates one member rom each party to be the chair, and the secretary of state selects a name from a hat to be the chairperson. Generally, this means that whichever partys nominee is chosen rom the hat will hold redistricting power or thatcycle. A measure that would replace this back-up commission with one appointed by thestate supreme court is pending in the Senate.

Illinois House o Representatives districts in Chicago


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Indiana

Redistricting or legislative districts is handled by the state legislature, and a nal planis approved as a normal bill. Plans passed by the legislature are subject to veto by thegovernor. Should the legislature ail to enact a plan, a Redistricting Commission isformed, consisting of the Speaker of the House, the President pro tempore o the Senate,the chairs o the House and Senate reapportionment committees, and a nal memberappointed by the governor. Tis th member must be a member o the legislature. TeCommission recommends a plan to the legislature, but i that plan ails to secure passage,the governor calls a special session o the legislature to settle to issue.

Louisiana

Louisianas state legislature controls redistricting, according to Article III, Section 6 of the Louisiana Constitution. Redistricting legislation is considered by the Governmental A airs committee in each house o the legislature. Te state constitution designates thestate supreme court as a back-up i the legislature ails to pass a redistricting plan. Shouldthe legislature pass a plan, it is subject to the governors veto.

Mississippi

For state legislative districts, the legislature must approve a plan within sixty days o

the end o its second session ollowing the census. I it ails to pass a plan, the governoris constitutionally bound to call aspecial session or the express purposeo redistricting. I the legislature still

ails to approve a plan, a ve-membercommission will create and enact aplan. Tis commission is chaired by thechie justice o the state supreme court,and includes the attorney general, thesecretary o state, the speaker o theHouse and the president pro tempore o the Senate. Tey must reach a decision within 180 days. While the governormay veto plans passed by the legislature,any plan that the commission approvesautomatically becomes law.

Mississippi House o Representatives


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Oklahoma

Te legislature and governor are initially responsible or redistricting. I the legislatureails to redistrict the state within a certain timeline, then redistricting becomes the

responsibility o an Apportionment Commission. Tis three-member commissionconsists of the state treasurer, the attorney general, and the Superintendent of PublicInstruction.

Oregon

Te legislature is initially responsible orredistricting legislative districts, subject to

gubernatorial veto. I the legislature ails topass its plan or the governor vetoes the plan,the secretary o state takes over the process, anevent that happened in 1971, 1991, and 2001.Oregon Secretary of State Bill Bradbury ranthe redistricting process during the most recentcycle, in 2001. e Oregon Supreme Court islegally mandated to review plans be ore they became law. Any challenges to a redistrictingplan passed by either the legislature or secretary o state are considered by the supreme court.

South Dakota

Redistricting is initially controlled by the legislature, subject to gubernatorial veto. Inthe past, an executive board o the legislative council has ormed a special redistrictingcommittee to handle state legislative district-drawing. However, there is nothing inthe statute that creates this council. I the legislature ails to pass a redistricting planby December of the year that census data is publicly released, then the supreme courttakes over to create a plan within 90 days. HB 1220, introduced February 1, 2010,proposed the creation o a bipartisan, seven-member redistricting commission. However,it was immediately killed in committee, meeting the same ate as similar bills in 2008and 2009. Under the bill, the majority and minority leaders o each house would haveselected one private citizen each; these four citizens would have then selected three morecommissioners or a total o seven commissioners.

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exasTe legislature has primary responsibility

or restricting legislative seats, subject tothe governors veto. I the legislature ails toredistrict House or Senate districts withina set amount of time, then the LegislativeRedistricting Board takes over redistricting.Tis board is composed o the lieutenantgovernor, the speaker o the House, the

attorney general, the comptroller and theland commissioner. Te boards redistrictingduties are also invoked i a House or Senateplan passed by the legislature is vetoed (andnot overridden) or held invalid in court.Re ormers have introduced proposals toamend the constitution to establish theexas Redistricting Commission, which

would have the authority to draw the statescongressional lines. Te bill passed the Senate twice in the last decade but ailed to reacha vote in the House; in 2010 it also failed in the Senate.

Vermont

Redistricting is controlled by the legislature, subject to veto by the governor, and advisedby the Legislative Apportionment Board. e Board is formed of ve private citizens: thegovernor selects one person rom each major party, the leaders o each major party in thestate select one and the chie justice o the Vermont Supreme Court selects one person.

e chief justices representative functions as the chairperson of the LAB. is advisory board provides advice and o ers redistricting plans to the General Assembly, but the

General Assembly does not have to take its advice or use its plans. e supreme courttakes over i the legislature ails to revise the districts within a set amount o time.

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ree states give redistricting control to non-legislative statewide elected o cials. Ohioand Arkansas give control over redistricting to designated boards made up o variouselected o cials. Maryland gives primary control o redistricting to the governor.

Arkansas Board o Apportionment consists o the governor, secretary o state, and theattorney general. During the post-Civil War Reconstruction era, Republican governorElisha Baxter implemented the centralization of the states redistricting system to punishhis political opponents after the Brooks-Baxter War for the Arkansas Governorship in1874.

Ohios Board of Apportionment is also comprised of members of the executives andappointees o the legislature. A redistricting re orm initiative in 2005 was de eated by atwo-to-one margin.

In Maryland the governor orms an advisory committee o state legislators to assist himin the process, but the committee lacks constitutional authority. Te legislature has alimited ability to overturn the governors redistricting plan

GUBERNA ORIAL CON ROL Maryland

Maryland has a rather unique systemo redistricting whereby the o ce o the governor is charged with creatingthe maps or the state legislature. Tegovernor then presents his or her planto the legislature, which treats it asa joint resolution between the two

houses. Te two houses may theneither adopt the governors plan orpropose their own joint resolution.But i the legislature does not approveits own plan within 45 days, the governors plan becomes law. Marylands constitutionstipulates that any plan must adhere to speci c redistricting goals, including contiguity,compactness, and respect or communities o interest.

NON-LEGISLA IVE POLI ICAL CON ROL

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BOARDS OF APPOR IONMEN

Ohio

Te redistricting plansor the state legislative

districts are controlled by anapportionment board. Tis

ve-member board includesthe governor, secretary o state, state auditor, and twolegislators, one appointed by the speaker o the House andthe Senate leader o the sameparty, and the other appointed jointly by the House andSenate leaders o the otherparty.

Arkansas Arkansas legislative redistricting is the responsibility o a Board o Apportionmentconsisting o the governor, secretary o state, and attorney general. Te history o

Arkansas Board of Apportionment is quite colorful. e disputed 1872 gubernatorialelection in Arkansas led to a brie shooting war between the orces o Radical Republicancarpetbagger Joseph Brooks and Republican scalawag (a term for southerners whosupported reconstruction) Elisha Baxter. Baxters eventual victory placed him in aposition to rewrite the Arkansas state constitution, including its clauses on redistricting.He took power over redistricting rom the un riendly state legislature and placed it in

the hands o the governor, secretary o state, and attorney general, e ectively grantinghimsel the power to redistrict. Te law has not been changed since 1874.

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Fourteen states use some type o commission or state legislative redistricting: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington. ere are three major factors in eachmodel: (1) who can serve as a commissioner, (2) who appoints the commissioners, and(3) who approves the commissions plan.

Te kind o people eligible to serve as a commissioner has a signi cant infuence on thecommissions end result. Tere are three basic types o commission composition: somestates allow only elected o cials on the committee, others have a mix o elected o cialsand unelected individuals, and others have commissions made up only o unelectedindividuals.

Te second crucial actor is who appoints the commissioners to each commission. Tose who select the commissioners are o three types: those selected by lottery or independentbureau; those selected by a mix of state o cials; and those selected by party leaders. Also, nal control over the adopted legislative redistricting plan varies widely. Some

commission plans must to be approved by the state legislature and some become law as soon as the commission approves them. Only two states have commissions that canhonestly claim signi cant independence rom legislative and other elected o cials:

Arizona and California. Arizonas Independent Redistricting Commission was created by the passage of Proposition 106 in the 2000 general election. It drew both congressionaland state legislative districts following the 2000 decennial census. Californias CitizensRedistricting Commission is new, created by Proposition 11 in 2008, and it controlsonly state legislative, not congressional, redistricting. Cali ornias commission is slated todraw its rst districts ollowing the 2010 census.

Te third actor, the process or approving plans, varies rom state to state. In ve o theourteen states, legislatures either vote to approve plans or can amend plans produced

by their commissions. In the other nine states, legislatures can infuence the commissionprocess to varying degrees, but possess no legal ability to alter plans created by theirstates commissions.

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Advisory Commissions Among the ourteen states with commission systems, our states - Iowa, Maine, New York, and Pennsylvania- retain signi cant legislative control. In all four, commissions

unction in an advisory role, dra ting plans, providing advice, and communicating withthe public. Maine, New York and Pennsylvania have commissions comprised of bothlegislators and private citizens. Iowa uses a non-partisan government agency, whichsubmits plans to the legislature or approval.

Iowa

Iowa assigns the job o drawing legislative

redistricting plans to its Legislative Services Agency. e Legislative Services Agency is adivision o the Iowa state government charged with providing sta services to the IowaGeneral Assembly such as administrative,technological, dra ting, and research support. As soon as possible a ter the release o censusdata, the LSA drafts a redistricting bill andpresents it to the legislature. Te plan must bepassed within seven days by at least one house,or the LSA must submit a new plan. If thelegislature ails to pass three consecutive plansby the LSA, it is allowed to amend the thirdplan with no restrictions.

Iowas system is notable or the strict guidelines itputs on redistricting plans. It recognizes continuity of cities and counties and bans accessto in ormation on political a liation, election results, and incumbents addresses whenthe LSA draws new maps. However, the legislature can use these data when considering

or amending the LSA plans.

Maine

Maine is one o the last states to conduct redistrictingits deadline is not until the thirdyear a ter the census. Tere ore, it is legally possible that Maines redistricting plan willnot be implemented or the 2012 general election.

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In Maine, redistricting begins in the Advisory Apportionment Commission. Te Advisory

Apportionment Commission is a hybrid model,comprised of both private citizens and publico cials. Te speaker o the House o Representativesand the House minority leader each appoint threemembers o the legislature. Te Senate majority andminority leaders appoint a urther two legislatorseach. Te state chairpersons o each major party ortheir private citizen designates join the commission,bringing its total to 12. Each partys six memberson the commission appoint a private citizen. esetwo private citizens in turn choose a third membero the public, rounding out the commission at 15members.

Te commission submits a plan to the state legislature, which then has thirty days toconsider the plan or enact a plan o its own. Te Apportionment Commission servesan advisory unction, since the legislature is under no legal obligation to implement theCommissions plan. Te nal plan must pass the legislature by a two-thirds majority,and then is still subject to veto by the governor. Tis confuence o actors presents a

challenge to the legislature to pass a plan by the thirty-day deadline. I this deadline isnot met, redistricting authority is passed to the Maine Supreme Court, which is whatoccurred in the 2001-2002 redistricting cycle.

New York

New Yorks legislature appointsa Legislative Task Force onDemographic Research andReapportionment. Te Senate

majority leader and speaker o the House select one legislatorand one private citizen eachto serve on the ask Force.Te minority leaders in eachhouse appoint one legislativemember each. Te ask Forces

Maine State Senate

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responsibility is to analyze the population gures provided by the census for the purpose

of redistricting. It does not actually create a redistricting plan; it serves to advise thelegislature as it develops the plan. e Legislative Task Force holds public hearingsstatewide where citizens can have questions answered and provide input to the Task Force which will then be relayed to the legislature.

e Task Force was established in 1978 through Chapter 45 of the New York State Laws.Redistricting in New York remains under the control of the state legislature, with thegovernor possessing veto power.

Pennsylvania

In Pennsylvania, redistrictingthe state legislature is the duty o a Legislative ReapportionmentCommission. As laid out in ArticleII, Section 17 of the PennsylvaniaConstitution, the LegislativeReapportionment Commissionmust draw up a restricting planfor the General Assembly within

90 days o its ormation. TeLegislative ReapportionmentCommission consists o vemembers. Te our legislativemembers o the commission arethe House and Senate majority and minority leaders or their designates. Tese ourmembers have 45 days to select the fth member (and chairperson) of the commission, who cannot be a legislator. I the our other members cannot select a th member by the established deadline, the state supreme court appoints the th commission member.Once the commission is established, it has 90 days to draw new district lines.

Once the plan is completed, it can be challenged for up to 30 days. If any challenges aresustained by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the commission must edit its maps toincorporate the changes. Once the plan is nalized, it immediately takes the force of law.

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Legislature-Appointed Commissions As noted, advisory commissions have a very limited role in the redistricting process. Inthe other our legislature-appointed commission states- Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, and Washington- commissions have considerably more power over the creation o districtlines, although not ully independent rom state legislatures.

In Hawaii, Idaho and Montana, once state legislative leaders appoint a commission, itfunctions independently. Only in Washington does the legislature retain the power toamend or approve a plan a ter the commission has completed its work, and in thosecases, it can be done only with a supermajority vote. Hawaii, Idaho, and Montana allhave legislature-selected bipartisan commissions which are, once appointed, authorizedto draw and enact plans without requiring legislative approval.

Hawaii

Redistricting or Hawaiis congressional and legislative districts is consolidated under theHawaii Reapportionment Commission. Te commission consists o nine members: themajority and minority leaders o the House and Senate each select two members. Teseeight people in turn select the ninth person (and chair) of the commission. None of themembers o the commission can hold public o ce. Moreover, they are restricted romrunning or public o ce or the next two elections ollowing reapportionment. ArticleIV Section 2 also calls or the creation o an Apportionment Advisory Council appointedby the party leaders in the House and Senate. Each leader appoints one member romeach of the basic island units of Hawaii: the island of Hawaii, the islands of Oahu, Kauaiand Niihau as one unit, and Maui, Lanai, Molokai and Kahoolawe as another unit. e Advisory Council exists or the li etime o the Reapportionment Commission and servesin an advisory capacity to the commission or matters a ecting its island unit.

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A ter its creation, the Reapportionment Commission has 150 days to submit a plan orredistricting of legislative and congressional districts to the Chief Election O cial. e

plan is published and available or public comment and eedbackincluding one publichearing for each island unitafter which it takes legal force. In Hawaii, Democratshave traditionally dominated the state legislature (currently, Republicans hold only eightseats out o 75), and redistricting has been relatively uncontroversial. Hawaiis systemallows the minority party equal say in the process, and, once formed, the commission isindependent rom the legislature.

Idaho

Idahos Commission or Reapportionment controls

legislative and congressional redistricting. As directedin itle 72, Chapter 15 o the Idaho State Code, thesix-member Commission is composed o one designeeeach rom the leaders o both parties o the House o Representatives and the Senate, as well as one designee by the state chairpersons o each party. Te code suggests thatthe appointing authorities attempt to achieve geographicrepresentation, but it is not legally mandated. Like Alaskaand Hawaii, Idaho requires that the members of theCommission or Reapportionment not hold any type o public o ce. Moreover, the members cannot be registeredlobbyists, and must be registered voters.

After the commission is formed, it is required to beginholding meetings throughout the state where any individualcitizen can present a redistricting plan. Within 90 days of itscreation, the commission must submit a nal redistrictingplan to the secretary o state and the plan must be approvedby a two-thirds vote o the commission. Tis plan is not subject to approval by the

legislature or veto by the governor.

Concern has been raised over the act that there is no allback option provided in thestate code should the commission ail to dra t a plan within 90 days. Te only majorchallenge to the legal system in the 2001 cycle was rom the Idaho Hispanic Caucus, which sued or the creation o a Hispanic-majority district. A state court determined thatthere were not enough Hispanics in a speci c area o Idaho to create such a district. TeIdaho system maintains some independence rom incumbent and party leaders, though

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legislative leaders retain control o the nomination process.

Montana Montana employs one commission with responsibility or congressional and legislativeredistricting, but in 1992 Montana dropped rom two congressional districts to one at-large district. e ve-member Districting and Apportionment Commission has nalsay over lines or both types o districts. Four members are selected by the minority and majority leaders in each house. None o these commissioners may be public o ce-holders according to Section 5-1-101 o the Montana State Code. Tese commissionersmust be geographically representative o the state, with two commissioners each coming

rom two predetermined halves o Montana. Te commissioners then have 20 days toselect a th member who acts as the chair. I these our members cannot agree on a th,then the Montana Supreme Court will appoint a chair. Te members o the commissioncannot run or o ce within two years o being on the commission.

e Montana State Code in Section 5-1-108 requires the commission to hold at leastone public hearing on the legislative plan at the state capitol; however, traditionally eightto twelve public hearings have been held. Within 90 days o the census publication,the committee must pass a redistricting plan. Te legislative redistricting plan is sentto the legislature or recommendations at the rst legislative session a ter the censusis published. Within thirty days o being submitted, the plan must be returned to thecommission with the legislatures recommendations. Te commission then has anotherthirty days to nalize its plan, which does not require legislative approval and cannot bevetoed by the governor.

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Washington

Redistricting in Washington is controlled by the Washington State RedistrictingCommission, consisting o ve members with back-up court supervision. Tecommission is named by the Minority and Majority Leaders of the House and Senate,each of whom chooses one private citizen as a member. ese four individuals thenelect a th person to serve as the nonvoting chairperson o the commission. I theoriginal four do not promptly (within 5 days) elect a fth person, then the WashingtonSupreme Court steps in to choose a chair. Tis process is nearly identical to the system inPennsylvania.

e Washington State Constitution requires the commission complete its redistrictingplan by January 1, 2012. e plan must pass with at least three votes of the ve-membercommission. I the commission does not submit a plan by the start o 2012, the supremecourt creates the plan. Te legislature may amend the plan submitted by the commission,but only with at least a two-thirds vote of both houses. Currently, the Democratic Party holds a two-thirds majority in the State Senate and is two votes short o two-thirds in the Assembly. However, three members o the Assembly are independents who caucus withthe Democrats. If Democrats retain their numbers in the 2010 election, they will be ableto signi cantly alter the commissions plan. A vote to amend the commissions plan mustbe taken within 30 days o the original submission o the plan. A ter 30 days, regardless

o amendments passed, the plan becomes state law or both congressional and legislativedistricts. Te governor does not have veto power over the plan.

Te Washington StateRedistricting Commission was established by the Washington StateRedistricting Act,Chapter 44.05 o the Revised Code o

Washington, which waspassed in 1983. All o theCommissions meetingsare public, and it keeps apublic record o its plans.

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State-Appointed Commissionswo states, Alaska and Colorado, employ a commission system in which the redistricting

commission is appointed by members o each o the three branches o the stategovernment. Generally, this means that leaders of each branch appoint several membersto the commission. is system still invests substantial authority in the legislature;however, it attempts to balance legislators inherent sel -interest by allowing the otherbranches infuence over the process.

Te main advantage o this hybrid model o appointment is that it attempts to givesome balance to the commission by removing sole authority rom the legislature. Ideally,the governor and the chie justice will appoint members o the public who genuinely advocate or the public interest instead o simply being a proxy or legislative leaders,since ostensibly both the executive and the judiciary are not infuenced by redistricting.However, the system leads to ailure when the appointments o the governor simply avorthe governors party. Moreover, since many state supreme court justices are elected, thesystem would certainly be weak orm o re orm in a state where one party controlled thelegislature, the executive, and a majority o the justices on the supreme court.

In Colorado, the our legislative leaders and chie justice each appoint one member o the commission, while the governor appoints an additional three. Alaskas commissionconsists o two appointments by the governor, one rom the majority leader o eachhouse, and one by the chie justice. Tis leaves both states vulnerable to partisan bias,since one political party is likely to appoint the majority o appointees.

Alaska

For Alaskas state legislative districts, the Alaska Redistricting Board is thereapportionment authority. Te Board consists o ve members o the public that do nothold public o ce or work or the government. wo are appointed by the governor. Tepresident o the Senate, speaker o the House, and chie justice o the supreme court eachappoint one member. Tere must be at least one member rom each o the our judicialdistricts of AlaskaNorthwest, Central Alaska, Anchorage-area, and Juneau-area.

e Redistricting Board has a relatively strict deadline; it is required to draft a plan forredistricting within 30 days a ter the release o the decennial census, as noted in ArticleVI, Section 10 o the Alaska Constitution. A ter this, the Board will hold a series o public hearings where it presents one or more plans to the Alaskan general public.Ninety days therea ter, the Board adopts into law a nal plan by majority vote.


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e Redistricting Board was established in 1998 by House Joint Resolution 44. Beforethe establishment o the Board, legislative redistricting was under the authority o the

governors o ce. e Democratic governors attempt to employ redistricting to restoreDemocratic power in the statehouse catalyzed this change. While state o cials are notsupposed to actor in party identi cation when choosing the Redistricting Board, clearly the Board is not insulated from political pressure. ere is no requirement for partisanbalance on the Board. All ve appointing o cials could be members o the same party.

Colorado

Te Colorado Reapportionment Commission has drawn legislative districts or thestate legislature since 1974. Te commission is composed o eleven members. Fourare appointed by the chie justice o the Colorado Supreme Court. Te governor o Colorado appoints three members. Te remaining our spots are reserved or the Senatemajority and minority leaders, the speaker o the House, and the House minority leader,or their appointees.

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Te Colorado Constitution spells out the statesredistricting process in Section 48. Part C

speci es that no more than six members o theeleven-member commission may be memberso the same party. No more than our membersreside in the same congressional district. Finally,the constitution requires that each congressionaldistrict have at least one resident on thecommission and, a requirement unique toColorado, one member must reside west o thecontinental divide. e commission is requiredto submit its initial plan to the ColoradoSupreme Court within 130 days o the release o census data, and meetings o the commission areopen to the public.

Colorados commission system inherently has a degreeof political in uence. e state Constitution e ectively requires one party to have amajority in the commission. Te 2010 gubernatorial election is likely to determine whoappoints a majority o members to the commission.

Party-Appointed CommissionsTwo states, Missouri and New Jersey, give the leaders of their two largest political partiesa major role in legislative redistricting. Te major di erence is that in Missouri thegovernor chooses from a list of persons nominated by the parties, while in New Jersey the parties and legislative caucus leaders hold direct appointing power.

Missouri

Missouri employs three systems or redistricting. Te state legislature and governor havesole authority over congressional redistricting. State legislative districts are redrawn by separate House and Senate Reapportionment Commissions.

For the State House, within 60 days o release o the census data, the Republicanand Democratic district committees for each U.S. Congressional district meet andeach nominate two o members o their party who are residents o the district. Te

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Governor then chooses one of the two nominees rom each

party or each district, resultingin an eighteen-member (ninedistricts times two parties)Reapportionment Committee.

is committee is required tosubmit a plan within six monthso its ormation, approved by atleast 13 o its members, or thecommission is dismissed andthe Missouri Supreme Courtappoints a new commissionconsisting o six appellate court judges. Tis judicial commissionmust complete a plan within 90

days. For the Senate, the governororms a Senate Reapportionment Commission by choosing rom lists o ten nominees

submitted by each party. Te governor chooses ve members rom each party to ormthe 10-member committee. Tis committee operates on the same deadlines as the HouseReapportionment Commission, and again power is reverted to a judicial commission

should the Reapportionment Commission fail to create a plan within six months. Onthe whole, the Missouri legislative redistricting process is outside o the direct controlo the legislature, but certainly not isolated rom political infuence. No members o the redistricting commission may hold o ce in the legislature or our years ollowingredistricting.

Since the legislative Reapportionment Commissions have equal numbers of Republicansand Democrats, the plans created are typically incumbent-friendly bipartisangerrymanders. Te lack o a tiebreaking vote can lead to ailure to act, and in the 2001cycle the Senate Reapportionment Commission ailed to meet its deadline, leavingSenate districts to be drawn by a judicial panel. In the November 1982 election,voters a rmed Measure 12, a constitutional amendment re erred to voters by the statelegislature. Measure 12 created the Senate Reapportionment Commission. However,Measure 6, which would have extended a similar commission process to Missouriscongressional redistricting, ailed by a 56 percent to 44 percent margin in the same year.Missouris system is one o the most complex in the United States.

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New Jersey

e New Jersey State Legislature is redistricted by anapportionment commission as laid out in Article IV Section 3 o the state constitution. Tis 10-personcommission consists o ve appointees each by the state Republican and Democratic parties. iscommission creates a redistricting plan or the statelegislatures approval, which is by simple majority vote.Te commission must nish a plan within a month o the governor receiving the o cial census or February 1st o the year a ter the census is taken, whichever islater. If they fail to make this deadline, the New Jersey Supreme Courts chie justice appoints an eleventhtiebreaking commission member. New Jerseys systemencourages incumbent- riendly bipartisan gerrymanders.

Independent Commissionse independent commission is rare. Only Arizona and California can claim

commissions that are largely independent o partisan interests in the selection o itsmembers and the execution o its responsibilities. Cali ornias claim on that descriptionis stronger than Arizonas, but Californias commission has yet to be tested, as it was only approved by the voters in 2008.

Arizona

Arizona was the rst state to achieve a substantial degree of independence from thelegislature in the redistricting process. Its system was adopted through re erendum in the2000 general election and put in place for the 2001 redistricting cycle. Proposition 106

created the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission and charged it with drawingdistrict lines or both congressional districts and the legislature. Te Commission isformed from a list of 25 private citizens determined by the Commission on AppellateCourt Appointments. Te list must contain ten nominees rom each o the two majorpolitical parties as well as ve nonpartisan nominees. Moreover, the nominees cannothave held public o ce or the last three years and must be committed to applyingthe provisions o this section in an honest, independent, and impartial ashion and to

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upholding public con dence in the integrity o the redistricting process. From thescreened pool o 25 nominees, the our legislative caucus leaders choose two Republicansand two Democrats to serve on the commission. ose four then choose a fth,nonpartisan member. Tis selection system, which limits the infuence o members o thelegislature, thus established the nations most independent redistricting commission atthe time.

Arizonas Proposition 106 gives the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission

speci c directions on how to go about drawing districts in a air manner. Tecommission must divide the state into districts in a grid-like manner based on equalpopulation. Te commission must then respect the ollowing laws and principles:the U.S. Constitution and Voting Rights Act of 1965; compactness and contiguity;communities of interest; city, town, and county boundaries; and competitive districts. A ter the commission completes the initial plans, it presents them to the public andlegislature or input and recommendations or a period o 30 days. A ter this review period, the commission draws up nal plans and submits maps to the secretary o state

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or enactment. Te legislature and governor can comment on plans, but they have noauthority over plan development or adoption.

In 2001, the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission produced a plan that hadmuch greater respect or community lines than previous plans and led to a 25 percentincrease in the number of Latinos in the state legislature between 2000 and 2002.

While Arizonas commission process was the most independent in the country whenit was created, it is not entirely free from the state legislature. Arizonas commissionersare uninhibited by the legislature in the drawing of districts, and do not require the

legislatures approval of their nal plans; however, legislative leaders still make the naldecision on who rom the screened pool is selected to be a commissioner.

Cali ornia

Before Proposition 11, the California state legislature and governor controlled allaspects o redistricting. For decades, re ormers had sought to change the redistrictingprocess in the state, but between 1980 and 2005, Cali ornia voters de eated ve separateredistricting reform initiatives. e passage of Proposition 11 in 2008 nally movedcontrol of state legislative districts from the legislature to the Citizen Redistricting

Commission. However, Proposition 11 left congressional redistricting under legislativecontrol. Proposition 11s proponents reasoned that the legislature did not have thesame confict o interest when drawing congressional districts as it did when drawing itsown district lines. Moreover, Proposition 11s proponents wanted to avoid well-fundedopposition by members o the states congressional delegation, an important actor in thede eat o previous re orm proposals.

On November 4, 2008, California voters approved Proposition 11 by a slim 50.9%majority. Te measure, called the Voters FIRS Act, created the commission to draw state Assembly, Senate, and Board of Equalization districts. Under the measure, the

state auditor is in charge o soliciting and reviewing commission applications romprivate citizens across the state. Reformers selected the state auditors o ce to handlethe application process because the auditor is appointed by the legislative leadership butis required under federal law to operate independently of state legislative control. eregulations require that applicants must have voted in two of the last three elections and


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must not have held public o ce or ten years, worked or a political party or candidate,registered as a lobbyist, or donated more than $2000 to a candidate or the legislature

or Board of Equalization. ree members of the state auditors team - one Democrat,one Republican, and one independent - form the Applicant Review Panel. is panelselects 60 nalists with an equal mix of Democrats, Republicans, and others. Each of the

our legislative caucus leaders can strike two people rom each party a liation subpool,leaving the pool with at least 12 people in each o the three party subpools. Te rst

eight commissioners - three Republicans, three Democrats, and two others - are selectedby random drawing rom those 36 candidates. Te rst eight commissioners select theremaining six members based on quali cations and complementary skills, choosing two

rom each subpool o political a liation. Te ull 14-member commission is comprisedof ve Democratic members, ve Republicans, and four others. Unlike Arizona,

where the nal commission is selected by the legislature, Californias system maximizesindependence through random selection.

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compactness. Te Iowa Constitution provides strict ormulas by which compactness is tobe computed. No political data, such as the homes o incumbents or party registrationstatistics, may be used by the LSA in the redistricting process, though the legislature may use such data when reviewing the plans drawn by the LSA.

Te nal plan is submitted to the legislature or approval. I the legislature does not passthe plan, or if the plan is vetoed, the LSA is tasked with creating a new plan. If threeplans drawn by the LSA are rejected by the legislature, the legislature can amend andthen adopt the third LSA plan, subject to thegovernors veto.

ARIZONA

Arizonas independent redistricting commissioncontrols the congressional redistricting process as

well. As discussed above, Arizonas Proposition106 created the rst largely independentredistricting commission in the United States. Tecommissions congressional plan has been in e ectsince 2001.

Te commissioners are selected by caucus leaders

in the state legislature; however, their choices arelimited to a short list o candidates selected by theCommission on Appellate Court Appointments.

e Arizona Constitution lays out thecommissions redistricting priorities. First, itrequires compliance with all federal laws andthe U.S. Constitution. Ten, in descending orderof precedence, it requires districts to have equalpopulation, be contiguous and compact, respect communities o interest, use visiblegeographic eatures and political boundaries, and promote competition where practicableand where there is no signi cant detriment to higher precedence requirements.

While most of Arizonas districts are very compact, the two congressional districts of Northern Arizona have odd shapes. is is a product of centuries old rivalries betweenthe Hopi and Navajo tribes. e Hopi requested not to be in the same congressionaldistrict as the Navajo. e Arizona Redistricting Commission respected this request,

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resulting in two oddly shaped districts.

HAWAII

Article IV o the Hawaii Constitution establishes a commission with responsibility ordrawing congressional as well as state legislative districts. Te commission starts witheight members, as the majority and minority leaders o each house o the state legislatureeach select two members. Tese eight commissioners then select a ninth member toserve as chairman. Te commissions plans are presented to the state legislature or

approval. Te congressional plan is dra ted and submitted as a separate bill.

While Hawaii has detailed rules or representation o each island in the state legislature,these requirements do not apply to congressional districts, in part because the stateonly has two congressional representatives. For the past several cycles, metropolitanHonolulu has elected one representative to Congress, and the rest o the state the otherrepresentative.

IDAHO

In Idaho, as with several other states, the commission created to redraw state legislativedistricts, the Idaho Commission or Reapportionment, also handles congressionalredistricting. Te leaders o the two largest political parties in each house select onemember apiece, as do the chairmen o the states two largest political parties. As noted inthe discussion on state legislative redistricting, the Idaho state law requires considerationo geographic div

Redistricting in America: A State-by-State Analysis

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