Redistricting 2001

RedistrictingILLINOIS

2001

Institute of Government and Public AffairsUniversity of Illinois

Chicago • Springfield • Urbana-Champaign

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Chicago • Springfield • Urbana-Champaign1007 West Nevada • Urbana, Illinois 61801 • 217/333-3340

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RedistrictingILLINOIS, 2001

�� Origins, Mechanics, and Politics

by Samuel K. Gove

� On Partisan Fairnessby Brian Gaines

� Race and Representationby Cedric Herring

� Parties, Leaders, and the Prospects forCompromiseby Jim Edgar

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�HE 2000 CENSUS CONFIRMED WHAT MANY KNEW INTUITIVELY – ILLINOIS HAS CHANGED

dramatically in the last 10 years. The state’s population has grown, even though it has notkept pace with more rapidly growing states like California. Chicago’s collar counties haveseen tremendous population growth, while the rural areas of downstate Illinois arecontinuing to lose population. Demographically, Illinois is more diverse than ever, withgrowing black, Hispanic, and Asian/Pacific Islander populations.

Before long the changes in population will lead to further, potentially major changes inpolitics through the decennial drama of redistricting. From the Capitol in Washington,D.C., to the Johnson County Courthouse in Vienna, Illinois, elected officials, party leaders,and interest groups are working on re-drawing the landscape of Illinois’ politics. Afterwhat is likely to be a tortuous, conflicted process, the resulting remap will affect thefortunes of politicians and the political parties, the representation of political groups, andultimately the direction of government for the coming decade.

In this report, Redistricting Illinois, 2001, a distinguished group of political experts look atthe complex problem of redistricting from several angles. Sam Gove, an observer ofIllinois politics for half a century, offers a historical review, “Origins, Mechanics, andPolitics.” Political scientist Brian Gaines, a specialist in electoral institutions, discusses thedifficult issue of defining and pursuing fairness in redistricting in “On Partisan Fairness.”Race is a central part of the changing Illinois demographics and politics. Here, sociologistCedric Herring offers a discussion of “Race and Representation.” Finally, former GovernorJim Edgar brings to bear an elected politician’s perspective and his direct experience withthree previous redistricting processes in his essay on “Parties, Leaders, and the Prospectsfor Compromise.”

I believe this report offers excellent insights into what is often, as Sam Gove says, “therawest of political exercises” and yet has major implications for the quality of representa-tion, political competition, and democracy in Illinois government. The faculty of theInstitute of Government and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois and I hope that youfind it both useful and interesting.

Jack KnottDirector, Institute of Government and Public Affairs

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�VERY TEN YEARS, AFTER THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RELEASES THE RESULTS OF THE CENSUS, EACH

state must re-draw its congressional and state-legislative electoral districts. The mainpurpose, mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court, is to ensure that all districts have essen-tially equal populations and thus satisfy the principle of “one person, one vote.” Butother objectives – from promoting electoral competition, to enhancing representation ofracial minorities, to favoring one or the other political party or merely protecting particu-lar office-holders, among others – play large roles, and make the process thoroughlycontentious.

The redistricting process hasn’t been pretty in Illinois. Politicians and the two majorparties look out primarily for their own electoral interests. Deals are made within eachparty. A decision is then reached through a process that is likely to feature party-linevotes, obstruction and deadlock, a high-stakes tie-breaking lottery, and often in the end, apartisan ruling by a state or federal court. Few participants worry about broad statewideconcerns such as fairness, competition, or orderly process.

Arguing that there must be a better way, many observers of the Illinois redistrictingprocess have advocated reforms, usually intended to take redistricting out of partisanpolitics. Other observers, however, have disagreed – suggesting that the existing processworks fairly well; and in any case, that no fundamentally different process would work inthe partisan setting of Illinois politics.

The essays in this publication address the central issues about redistricting in Illinois, for2001 and beyond. How did the state develop its peculiar practices for redistricting? Howdoes the use of computers affect the process? Why do the two parties often let so muchride on a pure-chance tie-breaking procedure instead of reaching a compromise? Arethere grounds for expecting a different result in 2001? The essays also consider long-termissues about improving the process. How can we think about, and perhaps measure,partisan fairness? What are the best ways to promote the interests of racial and ethnicminorities? And is significant reform a meaningful possibility?

The reader who seeks a clear road map to a better system of redistricting for Illinois willbe disappointed. One of the themes of these essays – a point of agreement among all of theauthors – is that easy solutions do not exist. The reader who seeks an informed basis forevaluating the current Illinois system and thinking constructively about possible improve-ments will find these essays amply rewarding.

Paul J. QuirkCoordinator of Publications, Institute of Government and Public Affairs

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�HE ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAS A VERY

difficult task to perform. It must redraw thestate legislative and congressional districts tobring them in line with the results of the 2000census and U.S. Supreme Court decisionsrequiring equal population. To the averagecitizen this chore sounds simple. To the statelegislator, however, redrawing district lines isextremely difficult because the decisions havepolitical, geographical, racial and personalovertones.

The drawing of district boundaries is not simpleand may be the rawest of political exercises.Legislators empowered to make the decisionsare intent upon producing districts that will, inthis order, make it easiest for: 1) them to bereelected, 2) their party to gain the maximumadvantage, and 3) incumbents in both parties toremain in office. Redistricting is a collectivedemonstration of unvarnished self-interest inaction.

At the outset a couple of terms need to bedefined. Redistricting is the process by whichstate legislative and congressional boundariesare drawn. Reapportionment refers to the redis-tribution of the number of congressional seatsamong the states following every decennialcensus. In common terms, redistricting andreapportionment are used interchangeably, butthere are technical differences.

Another common term used in this exercise isgerrymandering. It refers to the practice ofdrawing strangely-shaped districts for politicaladvantage. The term originated in 1812 whenGovernor Eldridge Gerry of Massachusettspersuaded the legislature to carve a dragon-shaped district out of Essex County. Thepainter, Gilbert Stuart, thought it looked like asalamander. “Better say, Gerrymander,”quipped editor Benjamin Russell. The namestuck.

The Redistricting ProcessThe ground rules for legislative redistricting arespelled out in the 1970 state constitution. Thedistricts “shall be compact, contiguous andsubstantially equal in population.” The courts,

primarily federal, have expanded on thoseprovisions, generally agreeing with the one-man, one-vote or now one-person, one-vote

principle. The courts have allowed somedeviations.

The decisions by the legislatures and the courtsare based on the accuracy of the count by theCensus Bureau. The census count is challengedfrom time to time, especially in inner cities. The“floating” population, illegal aliens and othergroups make a precise count difficult. Courtshave ruled that regardless of their legal status,all aliens who reside within the U.S. are to beincluded. Only visiting foreigners and thoseattached to foreign consulates are excludedfrom the census count.

In the 2000 Census an important issue waswhether the unadjusted count or one wherestatistical sampling of the population was to beused for reapportionment and redistricting. TheU.S. Supreme Court ruled that for reapportion-ment, the unadjusted count was to be used. Forredistricting, the Census Bureau studied using astatistically adjusted count, but decided againstit. Census officials said they could not prove,before the April 1 deadline for release of thedata, that statistically adjusted data was moreaccurate than that which was not adjusted.Supporters of the sampling method felt itwould raise the count in predominantly minor-ity, urban areas.

The census count is challengedfrom time to time, especially ininner cities. The “floating”population, illegal aliens andother groups make a precisecount difficult.

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In Illinois, both parties have used computers todraw their maps. Data can be entered at theprecinct level. Thus the voting record, racialcomposition, social data and other populationcharacteristics can be shown for each proposeddistrict. With more sophisticated redistrictingsoftware being developed all the time, thepossibilities for drawing alternative districts aregreat.

Some have argued that there should be a“neutral” process for redistricting. They say, ineffect, that a neutral computer should be giventhe assignment. There is no neutral computer.The decision has partisan consequenceswhether legislators, courts or even computersdraw the district lines. The person who hascontrol of the computer analysis is making apolitical decision whether he is aware of it ornot.

Legislators remain uncertain of just how muchthey can gerrymander districts without beingrebuffed by the courts. They must consider a1986 U.S. Supreme Court decision (Davis v.Bandemer) which held that partisan gerryman-dering was unconstitutional when it was sosevere as to “consistently degrade” a politicalgroup’s influence. The case involved a lawsuit

by Indiana Democrats who argued a redistrict-ing plan engineered by state Republicans wasunfair. Interestingly, California Republicansjoined the Indiana Democrats in support oftheir position. The court declared for the firsttime that claims of gerrymandering solely forpolitical reasons could be reviewed by federalcourts. Additionally, a 1993 case in NorthCarolina (Shaw v. Reno) found a congressionaldistrict to be “racially gerrymandered.” Themajority of the court found the district so“irrational on its face that it can be understoodas only an effort to segregate voters into sepa-rate voting districts because of their race.” TheSupreme Court has not expanded on thedefinition of gerrymandering. Future cases will

undoubtedly be filed based on the precedent setforth in Bandemer and Shaw. It will then be up tothe courts to evaluate the evidence of thesesubsequent cases to set net standards to evalu-ate gerrymandering.

Redistricting in Illinois: AHistoryIn Illinois, politics is played hardball and thereare few instances when it is played harder thanduring the redistricting process. The history ofredistricting in Illinois is filled with partisanbattles where each side has worked to outma-neuver the other but where, often, the finalshape of the new districts have depended onthe luck of the draw. In a broad sense, however,the process has worked.

From 1901 to 1954 the legislature refused toredraw the state legislative district lines,shortchanging Cook County and particularly itssuburbs of representation on a population basis.In 1954 an amendment to the state constitutionwas proposed and adopted that representationin one house, the Senate, would be based ongeographic districts, fixed in size regardless ofchanges in population. Representation in theother house, the House of Representatives,would be based on population. This representa-tion basis lasted until the landmark U.S. Su-preme Court decisions of Baker v. Carr (1962)and Reynolds v. Sims (1964), which requiredrepresentation in both houses to be on the one-person, one-vote basis. Chief Justice EarlWarren summed up the intent of this decisionwith his now famous phrase, “Legislatorsrepresent people not trees or acres; citizens, nothistory or economic interest, cast votes.”

After the 1960 census the legislature, actingunder the 1954 constitutional amendment, triedto redistrict the House. The Legislature and thegovernor could not agree on a proposed redis-tricting map. As provided in the constitution,the governor appointed a 50-member redistrict-ing commission. The commission also wasunable to get the redistricting job done.

The commission’s failure to agree on newdistrict boundaries meant that, by law, IllinoisHouse members would be selected in an at-large election. The events surrounding the 1964at-large election were unique and complicated.As provided by law, the Republican andDemocratic parties held conventions andnominated 118 candidates each for the 177house seats. Thus, 236 names on the at-largeorange “bedsheet” ballot caused the conscientious

In Illinois, politics is playedhardball and there are fewinstances when it is played harderthan during the redistrictingprocess.

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The 1971 remap effort was aspartisan and controversial as theearlier efforts.

voters many problems. 1964 was a strongDemocratic year nationally and the Democratselected all 118 of their candidates, with theRepublicans electing only 59. Name recognitionwas a factor with Adlai E. Stevenson III receiv-ing the most votes on the Democratic line andEarl Eisenhower, the brother of the president,outpolling other Republican candidates.

The U.S. Supreme Court decisions mentionedhad an impact in Illinois after the 1964 at-largeelection. The legislature, once again faced withthe dilemma of redrawing district lines for boththe Senate and the House, was unable to agreebecause of sharp political divisions. This timethe Illinois Supreme Court was ordered tohandle the Senate redistricting, while thegovernor again appointed a legislative redis-tricting commission to develop House districtboundaries. The Supreme Court and the com-mission redistricted both houses. Downstateareas (those outside of Chicago and its suburbs)were big losers in the final remap. As a result,downstate politicians could only hope to play abalance of power role in Illinois legislativepolitics.

Politics continued to dominate the legislativeredistricting game in the 1970s. A new stateconstitution, adopted by the voters in 1970,contains provisions on legislative redistricting(Article IV, section 3). It provides that “legisla-tive districts shall be compact, contiguous andsubstantially equal in population.” It alsoprovides that the General Assembly shallredistrict after every federal decennial censusand it includes a provision for a new legislativeredistricting commission. The new constitutionadded one Senate district making the GeneralAssembly a 59-member Senate and a 177-member House body. The House memberswere to continue to be elected from three-member districts under the unique cumulativevoting system that had been adopted in the1870 constitution. Each district was to elect onesenator and three House members.

The 1971 remap effort was as partisan andcontroversial as the earlier efforts. The GeneralAssembly failed to draw new district lines. Oneof the controversies was whether districts couldinclude both Chicago and suburban CookCounty areas.

As provided in the new constitution, a redis-tricting commission was created, this timeappointed by legislative leaders rather than thegovernor. The commission struggled with thesame issues as in the past, primarily those of

party and geography. But, with bipartisancooperation, managed to draw new districtsthat favored Chicago Democrats and non-CookCounty Republicans..

The next remap “war” came in 1981 after the1980 census. It was political as before, but

Chicago Mayor and Democratic leader RichardJ. Daley had died and the Chicago Democraticorganization was not as cohesive as in the past.Moreover, in the 1981 fight, racial consider-ations were the most important factors in thedecision-making.

Complicating the problem for the legislatorswas the adoption of the 1980 “cutback” amend-ment. This was the first constitutional initiativeunder the 1970 constitution to be placed on theballot. It was approved by 69 percent of thosevoting on the proposition. The amendmenteliminated the cumulative voting method ofselecting House members and reduced the sizeof the House of Representatives from 177 to 118members. As a result, many incumbents wouldbe pitted against each other in the newly drawndistricts.

The 1981 General Assembly was divided on apartisan basis with the Democrats controllingthe Senate and the Republicans controlling theHouse. The 1981 struggle was as politicallydifficult as those in the 1960s and 1970s. In fact,the battle was so contentious that a physicalfight broke out on the Senate floor. Not unex-pectedly, the General Assembly was unable toredistrict.

Again, the constitutional provision for a legisla-tive redistricting commission was used, and thelegislative leaders appointed an eight-membercommission. However, after the 30 days it hadunder the constitution, the commission was atan impasse.

For the first time, the “tie breaker” provision ofthe 1970 constitution’s redistricting section wasinvoked. It provides that “if the commissionfails to file an approved redistricting plan, theSupreme Court shall submit the names of two

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. . . the 1991 experienceemphasizes the partisan nature ofthe redistricting process in allthree branches of the Illinois stategovernment.

persons, not of the same political party, to theSecretary of State....” The secretary “publiclyshall draw by random selection the name of oneof the two persons to serve as the ninth memberof the Commission.” In 1981 the SupremeCourt submitted the names of former governorsRichard B. Ogilvie, a Republican, and SamuelShapiro, a Democrat. Secretary of State JimEdgar drew Governor Shapiro’s name out of ahat once worn by Abraham Lincoln. Thus theDemocrats had the majority on the commission.

Not surprisingly, the Democrats drew mapsvery favorable to themselves. The commissionmap was challenged in federal and state courts.The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the mapwith only one modification. Blacks, Hispanicsand Republicans separately challenged thecommission map in federal court. Some changeswere made in minority districts. The Republi-

cans did not get any help from the courts,giving Democrats a significant victory. The 1981experience again emphasizes the politicalnature of the redistricting process. There arewinners and losers. The Democrats, because ofthe draw for the tiebreaker, were the winners in1981, and subsequently were the majority partyin both houses of the General Assembly in thedecade after the 1981 redistricting map tookeffect.

The 1991 scenario was somewhat similar to the1981 experience. The Democratically-controlledGeneral Assembly passed a redistricting mapthat was vetoed by Republican Governor, JimEdgar, a deadlocked redistricting commission,and a tiebreaker drawn out of a hat by Secretaryof State George Ryan. This time the name was aRepublican, Al Jourdan, the chairman of theRepublican State Central Committee.

The Republican map was challenged in theIllinois Supreme Court. In a 4-3 party line vote,the court issued an order that invalidated themap and remanded it to the Redistricting

Commission. The commission made some slightchanges in its map. This time one of the judgesswitched sides and voted with the minority touphold the map. The partisan nature of theswitch was spelled out in the dissent when thefinal map was appealed. With this partisanaction of the court, the 1991 redistricting wasconcluded.

With the Republican tiebreaker, the Republi-cans controlled the Senate for the decade. TheHouse Republicans were not as successful andonly controlled the House in the 1994-95session.

As before, the 1991 experience emphasizes thepartisan nature of the redistricting process in allthree branches of the Illinois state government.

After his tie breaking experience in 1991,Secretary of State George Ryan said, “Thepeople of Illinois deserve better, and theydeserve representation that is not a lottery. Thelegislature cannot just flip a coin or draw aname every time they are forced to make atough decision.”

In March 1992, Ryan appointed a 29-memberbipartisan Redistricting Process Review Com-mission to consider reforms in Illinois proce-dures for re-mapping legislative districts every10 years. The commission met intermittentlythrough the 1990s. A report was submitted tothe secretary of state in January 1999 thatrecommended a constitutional amendment torepeal the tiebreaker.

It provided each legislative chamber be allowedto redistrict itself by a resolution adopted by athree-fifths vote. Should one or both chambersfail, then the responsibility for redistrictingwould be transferred to the bi-partisan stateBoard of Elections. That board was to selectspecifications for a computer program thatwould redistrict the state’s population toprescribed criteria. The General Assembly byresolution of three-fifths of its members couldreplace those computer specifications with itsown. Otherwise, the specifications of the Boardof Elections would be applied to a computerprogram, which would draw separate redis-tricting plans for each house, to be certified bythe board.

A constitutional amendment implementingthese recommendations was introduced in theSenate in the 1999 session. No action was takenand the ground rules set out in the 1970constitution continue for the 2001 legislativeredistricting.

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Battle for Control in 2001Now that the 2000 census data is available, theIllinois General Assembly must get down to itsredistricting tasks – legislative and congres-sional. The parties – Republican and Demo-cratic – will fight, once again, for partisancontrol of the map-making process. Incumbentlegislators and congressmen will struggle tokeep their seats in safe districts. Blacks andother minorities will fight to get the maximumnumber of seats. Both parties will utilizesophisticated computers. The congressionaldistricting will be very difficult because of theloss of one seat. An incumbent congressmancould lose his/her seat. This very partisanactivity will have an impact on legislativedecisions in other areas.

Will the legislative and congressional districtingbe completed? Probably yes. But who willaccomplish the task is unclear. One veryimportant factor will be the 1998 election when

a Republican, George Ryan, won the office ofgovernor. In the 2000 election, the Republicansmaintained control of the Senate and theDemocrats control of the House of Representa-tives and the Illinois Supreme Court.

Whatever the outcome, James Nowlan’sthoughtful observations in 1991 remain perti-nent: “Redistricting has become another ritualstruggle in the game of politics. It is played byinsiders for insiders, and most participants arecompelled by the machinations that will affecttheir political futures... But it is a game, andrules have been developed that make redistrict-ing a basically good conditioning exercise forthose on the playing field of democracy.”

Samuel K. Gove is Director Emeritus of theUniversity of Illinois Institute of Governmentand Public Affairs.

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�OST AMERICAN STATES REDRAW THEIR U.S.House and state legislative districts during theone- to two-year window between the release ofdecennial census data and the next elections. Sowidespread is the belief that these districts aretypically drawn in an unfair way that manypeople use the pejorative “gerrymandering” asa synonym for “redistricting.” But this skepti-cism raises the question: What is fairness in thiscontext? Fairness to whom? Is it the process, theoutcome, or both that should be held to somestandards? What features of process or out-come reflect fairness?

A catalogue of the kinds of groups to whom theredistricting process is said to be fair or notwould include: the major (and occasionallyminor) political parties; incumbent legislators ortheir challengers; voters who support thesesame parties or candidates; racial and ethnicgroups; citizens in urban, suburban, and ruralareas; and, generally, any population group that

is clustered geographically (e.g. minorities interms of language, occupation, sexual prefer-ence, etc.).

Historically, urban-rural schisms loomedlargest in American battles over district lines,mainly because many states allowed very largepopulation discrepancies across districts(usually in a way that diluted representation ofurban residents). Since the 1960s, courts haveenforced quite strict equal-population stan-dards within states, and such conflicts havebecome muted. Instead, the main disputes have

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concerned efforts to incorporate voters’ racialcharacteristics into districting procedures. Justas city-country conflict often had partisanovertones, racial issues in redistricting are notdivorced from partisan considerations. Forinstance, drawing majority-minority districts(districts where the majority of the citizens areof a minority race) in the U.S. seems to haveincreased not only the number (and safety) ofminority-race (typically Democratic) legislators,but also to have decreased the Democratic votein surrounding districts. Hence, majority-minority districts are associated with morepolarized legislatures, because they increasenumbers of liberal (minority) Democrats andconservative (white) Republicans, and, con-comitantly, decrease numbers of moderate(white) Democrats. For simplicity, this reportwill hereafter concentrate only on partisanfairness. The focus will be how to assesswhether electoral maps are biased with respectto representation of the major political parties.The next section reviews issues concerning theprocess of electoral map-making, and the thirdsection discusses outcome-oriented criteria forredistricting fairness. I conclude with a shortmenu of possible reform options for the Illinoisredistricting process.

Fairness of ProcessIf the main concern about redistricting is thatthe process be fair to major parties, two broadapproaches recommend themselves: ensure thatno major party is excluded from the process; orelse guarantee that all political parties areexcluded. The source of much citizen suspicionof redistricting, after all, is undoubtedly thesimple fact that the authority to draw electoralmaps ultimately lies in the hands of plainlyinterested actors, the partisan members of thestate legislature. A typical assumption, then, isthat anytime a single party holds majorities inboth legislative chambers and also holds thegovernorship, this unified government will takeadvantage of power today to ensure powertomorrow, by drawing maps that accentuate theparty’s electoral prospects and harm those of itsopponent.

Historically, urban-rural schismsloomed largest in Americanbattles over district lines, mainlybecause many states allowed verylarge population discrepanciesacross districts . . . .

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In general, the simplest way to load the diceagainst a party is to unite its historically stron-gest areas in common districts, thereby burden-ing it with a relatively small number of verysafe districts, wherein substantial numbers ofvotes are “wasted” on needlessly inflatedmargins of victory. The favored party, bycontrast, enjoys small margins in more districts,and thus efficiently translates its votes intoseats.

As long as voting habits are predictable, redis-tricting done by exactly one party will almostsurely be regarded by citizens and by the otherparty as manipulative. Hence, probably thesimplest notion of fair redistricting is biparti-sanship, involvement and approval of bothmajor parties. There is substantial variation inthe exact rules governing redistricting acrossthe 50 U.S. states. Generally, gubernatorialvetoes and supermajority requirements increasethe likelihood that new plans cannot passwithout approval of members of both majorparties, especially in states where both partiesare generally competitive. By this reasoning,then, fair redistricting is never guaranteed, butit emerges as a byproduct of (a) institutions thatincrease the number of actors with vetoes overplans and (b) the existence of roughly evenparty competition. The disinterested observermight, accordingly, infer from the roll calls bywhich a plan was passed whether or not it wasfair. If a mostly unified majority party out-votesa mostly unified minority party in passage of aredistricting plan, a natural conclusion is thatthe new map represents a partisan gerryman-der.

Some states, in lieu of bipartisanship, embraceputative non-partisanship, especially for thedrawing of state legislative districts. Outside ofthe United States, purportedly nonpartisancommissions (whether permanent or ad hoc)are by far the most common method of creatingelectoral boundaries. And, with some excep-tions, in most of these nations, there is relativelylittle political controversy surrounding theredistricting process. This is true even in thecase of countries that use precisely the samesingle-member-district, first-past-the-postelectoral rule as the U.S., such as the UnitedKingdom, or Canada and its provinces.

In the United States, however, although therehas been a slight increase over time in thenumber of states that formally assign redistrict-ing authority out of the legislature to some kindof appointed commission, a general suspicion

remains that such mechanisms are no guaranteeof nonpartisan intentions. Whoever is chargedwith appointing the map makers—whether thelegislature as a whole, the legislature with thegovernor, a committee of one chamber of thelegislature, etc.—is nearly always a partisanindividual or body. Hence, one view of nonpar-tisan processes is that the appointment stage is

either partisan or bipartisan, and beyond thiscrucial distinction, any differences betweenlegislators directly discharging redistrictingduties, or picking “experts” to do it for them isunimportant.

Whether that conclusion is needlessly cynical ormerely realistic, given the individualistic natureof American politics, is probably best resolvedby careful case studies of different state histo-ries. A highly abbreviated summary of recentexperience with nonpartisan districting in Iowaprovides some arguments for both views.Iowa’s congressional districts of the 1970s weredrawn by the state Supreme Court, following asuccessful challenge of a plan devised by thestate legislature. The court overturned theoriginal plan not on grounds relating to parti-san fairness, but because it found excessivevariation in population across districts. In 1981,the legislature (both chambers of which hadRepublican majorities) and the Republicangovernor passed a law delegating authority toredistrict to the nonpartisan Legislative ServicesBureau. In further pursuit of de jure partisanneutrality, the bureau was forbidden fromconsulting data on partisan registration ortaking into account where incumbents lived,and outside consultation was restricted. In theIowa process the bureau submits a plan to thelegislature, which cannot make amendments,but can reject the map outright, in which case,the process starts anew. Up to three suchiterations can occur: if three LSB maps arerejected, the legislature reassumes responsibilityfor drawing the district lines. In its first imple-mentation, this process nearly did fail at itsnonpartisan stage. The legislature rejected the

. . .the simplest way to load thedice against a party is to uniteits historically strongest areas incommon districts. . .

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first two plans drafted by the LSB, ostensiblybecause of excessive variance in district popula-tions, but much more plausibly because twoincumbent Republican U.S. Representativesraised trouble when they found their districtsmerged.

This is not the place for a lengthy discussion ofthe many ways that American politics aredifferent from parliamentary politics, but itdoes seem that some of the difficulty in creatinggenuinely non-partisan political institutions is,paradoxically, related to the weakness ofAmerican parties relative to individual repre-sentatives. Iowa’s redistricting procedure,whatever its merits, is at odds with powerfulincumbents, and to some extent non-partisan

expertise gave way to legislators’ power in thefirst implementation.

Some expectation of this intermingling ofputatively neutral expertise and nakedlypolitical self-interest seems implicit in severalstates’ hybrid schemes. States, for instance,often make use of two kinds of provisions: theycreate commissions to which the legislaturedelegates map-making power; and, theyintroduce tie-breaking procedures that implythat commissions are expected to consist offaithful party agents. The complicated, multi-stage Illinois procedure, described in LegislativeRedistricting in Illinois by Professor Sam Goveoffers a fine example. For all its complexity, thecurrent Illinois process can be succinctlydescribed as a 50-50 lottery over rival partisangerrymanders, held whenever bipartisancompromise fails and neither party is in aposition to pass its plan unilaterally. GovernorEdgar’s section, The Politics of Redistricting,reminds us that the process does not stop there.Judicial review further complicates the proce-dure, and so willingness to gamble may alsorepresent beliefs about likely behaviour by the(partisan) state Supreme Court down the line.In two implementations thus far (1981 and1991), the parties chose to gamble, not compro-mise, and a very rough fairness resulted, as they

each had one chance to impose their preferredmap on their opponents and the people of thestate. An optimistic reading of this history isthat the parties seem not to be greatly fearful ofwhat their rivals can achieve with districtingpower, so the gerrymanders must not be toosevere. A pessimistic interpretation is thatrelations between the parties are so poisonedthat only artificial devices can break gridlock,and even sensible bipartisan compromise isexceptionally difficult to achieve.

Fairness of OutcomesIn one sense, to focus on procedure whenevaluating fairness is shortsighted. Ultimately,it is the outcome—the new electoral mapitself—that is truly the concern. However,assessing the fairness of a particular set ofdistrict lines by analysis of election results hasproved to be a difficult task, and there is nogeneral consensus on any one best method fordoing so. Outcome-based assessments of thefairness of electoral maps usually focus on theparties’ shares of the legislative seats, and howthese relate to their vote shares. If an electoralmap is crafted to create an advantage for oneparty over another, that party ought to winmore seats for any given level of vote sharethan its disadvantaged rival. One complicationis that efficient gerrymandering might actuallydepress the disadvantaged party’s vote shares,leading to an underestimate of the bias. Theparty’s supporters may stay away from thepolls both in districts where they expect theparty to lose predictably and in those wherethey expect it to win by lopsided margins or therace is uncontested. A related complication isthat large numbers of uncontested races canbadly distort aggregate party vote shares. Butprobably the chief difficulty in measuringwhether a map is biased is that each electioncreates only one data point of seat shares andvote shares for each party. Given decennialcensus reports, modern electoral maps tend tolast about five elections, so there is fairly littledata at the aggregate level with which to assesspossible bias in a map. Accordingly, academicshave developed a wide variety of statisticalmodels of how votes turn into seats.

A simple method is to explore hypothetical seatshares generated by “uniform swings.” Had allDemocratic candidates won an additional1percent of the vote (and all Republicans1percent less), what would the parties’ seatshares have been? What if this imaginaryswing had been 2 percent, 3 percent, and so on?

For all its complexity, the currentIllinois process can be succinctlydescribed as a 50-50 lottery overrival partisan gerrymanders,. . .

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In this manner, one can simulate the full rangeof plausible vote and seat shares for bothparties, to determine if either party seems to besystematically awarded more seats per votethan the other. More sophisticated modelsallow for non-uniform swings, taking intoaccount incumbency status of seats, historicaland geographical patterns of vote share, andother such factors. Even with only a handful ofelections, then, analysts have been able todevelop measures of bias, the tendency for oneparty to do better than the other in seats forgiven vote levels, and responsiveness, the rateat which improvements in a party’s voteperformance get translated into additionalseats.

Figure 1 illustrates this kind of analysis usingIllinois’ U.S. House election results from 1992 to2000. In the middle of the plot are the actualdata points, Democratic seats and vote sharesfor these five elections (hollow dots), plus adecade average based only on the contestedraces (solid dot). The parties split the 20 seats 10to 10 in each election except 1992, when theDemocrats won 12 seats. The vote sharesspanned a small range, with the Democratshaving won between 48.1 and 56.2 percent ofthe statewide vote, and having averaged 53.5percent. To judge the partisan effect of the 1990sdistricting plan, we would like to know what

would have happened to the Demo-cratic seat share if the Democrats hadwon more or fewer votes. Althoughgeneralizing from a mere five pointsto a seats-votes curve is tricky, thecurved line labeled “model” indi-cates the most probable seat sharesfor given vote shares under the 1990smap using the actual results in eachrace and a fairly standard math-ematical model. There is evidence ofa very slight Republican advantage.The curve passes just to the right ofthe (50 percent, 50 percent) point:that is, Democrats had to win a littlemore than 50 percent of the vote towin 50 percent of the U.S. Houseseats.

This redistricting plan was proposedby U.S. Representative DennisHastert and other Republicanmembers of the Illinois Congres-sional delegation and adopted by thefederal district court. Is the aboveresult confirmation of gerrymander-ing? That conclusion is premature.

Generally, disproportionality in vote and seatshares follows from inefficient concentrations ofvotes in safe districts. To expect perfect propor-tionality, however, overlooks not only the

complexities of each election but also thenuances of geography that reflect accidents ofhistory more than constructions of crafty mapdrawers. If, for instance, particular ethnicgroups with distinct partisan preferenceshappen to have settled in geographic clusters,then some bias and variation in responsivenessis almost inevitable, rather than being theproduct of manipulation.

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If,. . . particular ethnic groupswith distinct partisanpreferences happen to havesettled in geographic clusters,then some bias and variation inresponsiveness is almostinevitable.

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Thus, along with seat-vote performance, peopleoften judge maps according to essentiallygeographic criteria. Do boundaries respect pre-existing administrative or historical divisions?Do they follow natural geographic divides suchas rivers and mountains, or nonpolitical man-made breaks such as major highways? Are

districts smooth and sensibly shaped—are theyrelatively “compact” as opposed to beingsuspiciously irregular? Surprisingly, compact-ness turns out to be exceptionally hard to definein a useful manner. Thus, even though manystates have some variety of legislative orconstitutional language demanding that

districts be compact, itis a criterion invokedwith decreasingregularity and insis-tence.

Figure 2 provides ahighly stylizedexample of redistrict-ing, and illustratesboth why pluralityelections are notautomatically propor-tional, and whycompactness and“naturalness” stan-dards can be difficult,or even perverse, toimplement. In thishypothetical state,there are 64 precincts,each having one voter,and these must bearranged into eightdistricts each havingexactly eight voters.Republicans andDemocrats are equallynumerous in the state,but are somewhatclustered, the Republi-cans in the northeastand the Democrats inthe south central

region. In six of the seven electoral mapsdrawn, one party enjoys an advantage inexpected seat shares: the two maximum gerry-manders, maps D and G, inflate 50 percent voteshares into 75 percent seat shares. Map A, bycontrast, is proportional in expectation: eachparty has one very safe seat, but the remainingsix seats each contain four Republicans and fourDemocrats. Yet, clearly, the districts in A aremore awkward and contrived than are those inthe “accidental,” slightly partisan gerrymandersof maps B, C, E, and F. Given systematicgeographic patterns in partisan support,emphasizing the standard of partisan fairnesscan require de-emphasizing any (or all) geo-graphic criteria.

Finally, another potential criterion is stability,or precedent. If altering district boundarieshampers citizens’ efforts to establish connec-tions amongst themselves or with representa-tives, there are clear reasons to favor minimaldisruption when creeping population variance

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necessitates redistricting. Of course, from afairness standpoint, stability’s appeal rests onprior maps having been fairly drawn. Whateverthe value of minimizing disruption, it is un-likely to override fairness to parties.

Computers have greatly simplified redistricting,but does technological efficiency enhance ordiminish bias? A typical assumption has beenthat technology makes gerrymandering easier,so that, all else equal, procedures open topartisan abuse are more dangerous than ever inthe age of microprocessors. Computer technol-ogy undoubtedly does make it easier to exploremultiple means of packing an opponent’ssupporters into relatively few very safe districts.But a counterpoint is that computers can beinstructed to create random maps, which areuseful for establishing a baseline that is notgeographically unrealistic, against which tocompare maps created by interested parties. Allthe same, although computation-intensiveredistricting by computer is almost 30 years old,the holy grail of redistricting analysis remainselusive. The ideal tool for assessing bias andfairness of a given map would be a character-ization of all possible maps, given 1) the num-ber of districts being drawn, 2) data describingtraits of the basic, unbreakable units (e.g. censustracts) out of which districts are formed, 3)information about which units adjoin whichothers, and 4) all inviolable constraints, such asnear equality of populations. Unfortunately, themathematical scope of this problem exceeds thepower of even the fastest computers. Indeed,for any large area—say, a state having thou-sands of census tracts—the problem can beshown to be NP-complete, which is to say,roughly, “too hard to be solved by brute force,no matter how fast the computer.”

In short, judging the fairness of maps by theelection outcomes they produce, though clearlydesirable, is, for the time being, as much an artas a science. It is surprisingly difficult to estab-lish objective criteria for fairness, and uncertain-ties are compounded when one is makingfuture projections about votes rather thanretrospective evaluations of past elections.

Some Ideas About Redistrictingin Illinois, 2001 and BeyondAcademicians making backward-lookingassessments of partisan bias in electoral bound-aries continue to quarrel over how best toconstruct models of the kind shown in Figure 1.Given the same election returns for Illinois’ past

20 years, different political scientists mightreach discrepant conclusions over whether themap of the 1980s (drawn by Democrats) and themap of the 1990s (drawn by Republicans) weresuccessfully “unfair” gerrymanders. A forward-looking citizen, inclined neither to wait a

decade nor to plunge into statistical and data-analytic debates, is more likely to focus onprocess.

That the current Illinois redistricting processhinges on a random draw ensures one varietyof fairness: if the process reaches that stage, thetwo major parties are equally likely to bepermitted to gerrymander. Members of thepublic who are not died-in-the-wool partisansmight, however, prefer a process designed tofoster bipartisan compromise. Ignoring thepractical matter of whether any of these ideas isin any sense likely to win the endorsement ofthose in position to implement them, I concludewith three process-oriented options for achiev-ing fairness more reliably in each decennialredistricting, plus a fourth option that involvesboth process and outcome assessments.

Three Process-oriented Optionsfor Achieving Fairness1. A nonpolitical body. The “commonwealth”option is to follow the example of the UnitedKingdom, Australia, Canada, India, and NewZealand by establishing a boundaries commis-sion. A host of devices can be used in anattempt to separate appointments to thiscommission from political conflict: terms can bestaggered; appointments can be made in odd-numbered years; as in Iowa, the commissioncan be forbidden from explicitly making use ofpolitical data, and commission plans can begiven closed-bill status so that amendments arenot possible. Ultimately, though, this optionrests on the possibility of widespread belief in apublic body being able to stand apart from the

. . .judging the fairness of mapsby the election outcomes theyproduce, though clearlydesirable, is, for the time being,as much an art as a science.

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political parties, display neutral competence,and resist interference.

2. Compelling bipartisan cooperation. For thosewho regard nonpartisanship as incompatiblewith American politics, bipartisanship is thegoal. If the current lottery mechanism wasmeant to represent an outcome so drastic thatno one would ever want to risk not compromis-ing at the first stage, it has failed. Parties haveshown a preference for risk. A simple reformwould be to remove this “tie-breaking” provi-

sion and instruct the eight-member commission(or even the original legislature) to producesome plan by a fixed date. But if gridlock stillensued, what penalties would apply? Handingredistricting over to a randomly chosen judge,having the commission produce multiple maps,one of which would be chosen by lot, or anysuch lottery scheme, would essentially mimicthe existing provisions. The ultimate “timebomb” that might force an evenly constitutedcommission or legislature to compromise wouldbe the true default: an election without dis-tricts. This situation did occur in Illinois in 1964and a statewide election for state representa-tives and senators was held, although subse-quent judicial rulings have probably renderedthis option illegal. Other devices to forcecompromise can be imagined. There could belarge fines accompanying the lottery, or, morefancifully, a requirement that maps drawn aftera given date place some number of incumbentsfrom each party into the same district. What-ever outcome is intended to loom over theparties, it ought to be plainly disadvantageousto both of them.

3. Open bidding. Most mechanisms that wouldbe feared equally by both parties, and so wouldlet option 2 work, are probably highly unusualand impractical. A much less predictableoutcome that might stimulate party leaders to

cooperate at prior stages would be an openbidding process. For instance, the eight-membercommission could be forced, if it failed toapprove a plan by a fixed date, to acceptproposals from any interested citizen, and tochoose one such plan by another fixed date.Objections galore would arise: the state could bebombarded with crazy redistricting schemes;interest groups would take over the process;and so on. Of course, the point of the provisionwould be to make it sufficiently undesirablethat its possible arrival would lubricate legisla-tive gridlock. But another view of such aprovision is that competition breeds efficiency,and opening up a partisan process to interestedobservers might actually be the best way toensure that multiple standards of fairness arepublicly aired and considered in the redistrict-ing process.

4. Independent review. Finally, to say that thereis not full consensus on how to evaluate fairnessof maps according to actual election outcomes,or even projections about new maps based onpast outcomes is not to say that there is noconsensus at all. Decades of academic work onmaps, seats, and votes have produced manyuseful techniques. The spirit of option 3 is thatopenness and publicity are useful means forexposing unfairness. Similarly, there could be arequirement for some kind of independentassessment of the partisan implications of plansbefore they could be passed into law. Merelyrequiring a report on the partisan implicationsof a plan will not ensure that it be fair, but themain idea here is that, from a public interestpoint of view, the more light that can shined onmap makers’ intentions, the better.

I will not eagerly await adoption of any of theseproposals in the near future. On the other hand,spurts of enthusiasm for institutional reformare, themselves, hard to foresee, so broachingpotential reforms is never completely pointless.

Brian J. Gaines is an associate professor in theDepartment of Political Science at the Univer-sity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. His areasof specialization are elections, political behav-ior, and political institutions.

The ultimate “time bomb” thatmight force an evenly constitutedcommission or legislature tocompromise would be the truedefault: an election withoutdistricts.

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�EDISTRICTING IS ALWAYS POLITICAL, INCREASINGLY

controversial, and often ugly. Politicians, withtheir political careers at stake, have alwaysfought tooth-and-nail over district lines. Untilrecently, however, most voters probablythought of the courts as being apolitical andfairly neutral. But with the recent presidentialelection and the necessary intervention of thecourts, it has become clear to most observersthat the courts, too, have entered the politicalthicket by becoming the final arbiters in manyelectoral decisions that have long-lastingconsequences for representation.

The reality is that the role of the courts ininfluencing election outcomes is not all thatnew. Indeed, at least since the Supreme Court’s1962 decision in Baker v. Carr, the courts haveruled that elections are within the purview ofthe judicial system. In Wesberry v. Sanders in1964, the courts redefined representation withinthe U.S. by establishing the “one man, onevote” doctrine. According to that ruling,electoral districts were to be as equal in popula-tion as practical so that one person’s vote wouldbe worth as much as another’s.

But what is the purpose of redistricting? Whatdifference does it make to representation,especially with respect to race? How do weknow when we have gotten it right? And does“good” redistricting lead to better representa-tion? This essay addresses these issues byexamining the fundamentals of race, redistrict-ing and representation in Illinois.

What Is Reapportionment andWhy Do We Redistrict?The fundamental reason for enumerating theU.S. population every 10 years is to determinethe number of members of the U.S. House ofRepresentatives each state is entitled to elect – aprocess known as reapportionment. Redistrict-ing is the legislation that alters district shapesand sizes in order to create districts that are“very nearly equal” in population and, forcongressional districts, to account for anychange in number. Each member of the U.S.House will represent approximately 650,000

people. In Illinois, the official population onenumeration day, April 1, 2000, stood at12,419,293. This represents an 8.6 percentincrease over the 1990 enumeration. Still,Illinois will lose one seat in the U.S. House ofRepresentatives, down from 20 seats to 19despite a population gain of nearly one millionsince 1990, because other states have seengreater increases. As Table 1 shows, Illinois hasnot gained any seats in the U.S. Congress since1910, and with the exception of 1960-1970, it hassteadily lost seats every decade since 1930.

Redistricting is the process of dividing a geo-graphical area (e.g., a state, a county, a city, etc.)

into a number of smaller contiguous and non-overlapping areas. These districts are supposedto be optimized with regard to equality ofpopulation, and they are supposed to haveacceptable levels of compactness with as littlecrossing of established governmental bound-aries as possible.

Prior to the 1960s, it was commonplace fordistricts to have severe population imbalancesthat often favored certain partisan, factional, orracial interests.

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With the doctrine of “one man, one vote,” aconceptual notion of fairness emerged that hasguided much of the subsequent thinking aboutredistricting and representation. After years ofmalapportioned districts that sometimesdiscriminated against racial minority groupsand urban areas more generally, the courtsapplied more stringent population standards asa measure of representation. In subsequentcases, the courts became involved in redistrict-ing in several states because of political stale-mates among state authorities or because ofproblems with the constitutionality of redistrict-ing plans.

The intervention of the courts brought aboutsubstantial changes in how representatives areallocated. In addition, the Voting Rights Act of1965 and court decision in 1986 in Thornburg v.Gingles required states to maximize the numberof legislative districts that could be expected toelect racial minority candidates. This standardapplied to both state legislative and congres-sional redistricting in the early 1990s. In order

to create districts more likely to elect racialminority candidates, district boundaries wereoften drawn so that minorities were concen-trated in districts so that they comprised amajority or supermajority of the district popula-tion. In Illinois, for example, each of the con-gressional districts that has a congressman ofcolor is also a district that is more than 70percent minority residents.

Almost by definition, these new rules forallocating representatives have benefited somegroups at the expense of others. Thus, redistrict-ing has become one of the many flashpointsresulting from uneven and ethnically diversepopulation change. Some conservative critics ofthe courts suggest that the courts, by creatingcongressional and state legislative districtsspecifically based on race and ethnicity, went tothe extreme in interpreting the FourteenthAmendment’s declaration that governmentmay not “deny to any person within its jurisdic-

tion the equal protection of the laws.” Liberalcritics have suggested that the courts have notdone enough to reduce electoral bias againstracial and ethnic minority groups. The courtshave offered criteria that have made the redis-tricting process more complex. Among thecriteria put forth by the courts are populationequality, compactness, and contiguity. But inaddition to these guidelines, the courts, politicalparties and individual office holders haveadded factors such as racial representation,socioeconomic factors, geography and regionalcommonalities, political party representation,and incumbent protection into the redistrictingprocess. Needless to say, these considerationshave led to controversies. Illinois has not beenimmune to these controversies.

What Difference Does RedistrictingMake to Representation,Especially with Respect to Race?The 1990s brought major change to the racialand ethnic composition of the Illinois’ popula-tion. That change is the central issue for redis-tricting in Illinois. Table 2 shows that popula-tion changes have not been evenly distributedin Illinois. The number of whites (non-Hispan-ics) grew from 8,556,289 in 1990 to 8,424,140 by2000. This represented a decrease of about 1.percent. percentIn contrast, the number ofHispanic (non-black) residents increased from904,449 in 1990 to 1,509,539 in 2000—an in-crease of more than 75 percent. The number ofblacks in Illinois increased from 1,707,405 in1990 to 1,876,875 in 2000. This represented anincrease of 10 percent.

Demographers have noted the flight of whitesfrom central cities to the surrounding suburbs.As a consequence, cities like Chicago havebecome more heavily concentrated with blacks,Hispanics, and Asians. In observing thesedemographic patterns, some analysts have alsoasserted that departing whites were also takingwith them the cities’ industrial base, high-wagejobs, and the tax base that made it possible toprovide quality education and necessarymunicipal services. Others, however, point outthat as people of color have become greaterproportions of the residents in central cities,they have been better able to empower them-selves by electing co-ethnics to city councils, toschool boards, and as mayors. The question forredistricting is whether to favor or resist furtherconcentration of minorities into majorityminority districts.

. . . redistricting has become one ofthe many flashpoints resultingfrom uneven and ethnicallydiverse population change.

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During recent decades, for example, blackpolitical empowerment – the ability of African-Americans to elect their co-ethnics to publicoffice - has been connected to reductions inblack neonatal mortality rates, lower rates andlevels of black political alienation, and increasesin minority employment in administrative,professional, and police and fire departmentjobs in cities.

But black population growth and concentrationare not necessarily synonymous with blackempowerment. There are questions aboutwhether population concentrations of African-Americans provide political consolidation andempowerment or whether patterns of racialconcentration and segregation might better bethought of as apartheid. Indeed, some critics ofblack empowerment strategies that rely on highlevels of racial segregation suggest that innercity communities remain concentrations of pov-erty, not power. In their book, American Apart-heid (Harvard University Press, 1993), DouglasMassey and Nancy Denton, for example, sug-gest that segregation is not empowering. Theydescribe several harmful effects of segregation.Among the most powerful is the loss of civicand commercial services to the segregatedneighborhood in the forms of falling retail de-mand, increasing residential abandonment,business disinvestment, deindustrialization,and massive job loss.

Massey and Denton agree that segregationoffers the appearance of political power invirtually all-black districts because such dis-tricts provide supermajorities and effectivelyguarantee that African-Americans can electtheir own to office. They argue that while “theexistence of solid black electoral districts . . .[does] create the potential for bloc voting alongracial lines” it does not translate into thedelivery of city services nor even patronagejobs. Rather, racial segregation and isolationtranslate into the loss of opportunity to

participate in effective coalition-building withother groups, and the subsequent loss of cityservices. Consequently, many African Ameri-can officials find it challenging to establish

legislative coalitions with their non-blackcolleagues. Even worse, these representativesfrom hyper-segregated districts have littleincentive to dilute their political base by exhort-ing any changes that would reduce levels ofsegregation. Thus, racial segregation makes iteasier for white leaders to disregard anddisinvest in African-American communities.

Indeed, there have been many claims made thatthe creation of the majority-black districts hasparadoxically led to a more conservative (i.e.,less representative) representation than wouldbe the case otherwise in white districts. More-over, there is recent research that suggests that,despite being vital to the election of slightlymore African-American and Hispanic represen-tatives, the creation of new supermajority blackand Hispanic districts has made the U.S. Houseof Representatives and several state legislaturesmore likely to adopt policies opposed by mostAfrican Americans and Hispanics.

On the other hand, it is clearly true that blackrepresentatives are more attuned to the policy

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preferences of black citizens. According to theresults of a survey that examined the correspon-dence between the policy preferences of blackand white residents of Chicago and those oftheir black and white state legislators; the viewsof black residents were more similar to those ofblack representatives than they were to those ofwhite representatives (Herring, 1994). More-over, 64 percent of blacks chose black leaders asbeing most representative of them, and 76percent of whites chose white representatives asbeing most representative of them on the statelevel.

Getting It Right: Does “Good”Redistricting Lead to BetterRepresentation?Most people would readily acknowledge thatgerrymandering is illegitimate and underminesgenuine representation. Historically, suchpractices have been used to dilute the impact ofthose voters who challenge the status quo. So, if“good” redistricting is the opposite of gerry-mandering, we might think of “good” redis-tricting as that which makes it more likely togive voice to those whose views and opinionsthat, historically, have been under-representedin the policy making process.

To the degree that demographic subpopulationsdiffer in their policy preferences, shifts inIllinois’ population base are likely to have animpact on public opinion on several policy

issues and priorities. For example, datafrom the 1995-97 Illinois Policy Surveys(conducted by Northern Illinois Univer-sity) suggest that blacks and Hispanicsdiffer from whites in their spendingpriorities. Figure 1 shows the racial andethnic differences in support for addi-tional spending for various policy issues.This chart shows that blacks (84 percent)and Hispanics (69 percent) are more likelythan are whites (53 percent) to favor morespending for job training programs. Figure1 also shows that African Americans (74percent) and Hispanics (61 percent) arealso more likely than whites (47 percent)to favor additional spending on medicalcare. Similarly, Figure 1 shows that blacks(93 percent) and Hispanics (85 percent) aremore likely than are whites (73 percent) tosupport more money for public schools.Blacks (76 percent) and Hispanics (82percent) are also more likely than arewhites (48 percent) to support moremoney for colleges and universities. The

chart also illustrates that blacks and Hispanicsare more likely than are whites to supportadditional funding for prison inmate education,as 82 percent of blacks, 79 percent of Hispanics,and 53 percent of whites support more fundingin this area. African-Americans (62 percent) andHispanics (64 percent) are also more likely tosupport additional spending to clean up theenvironment than are whites (42 percent).Blacks (39 percent) are more likely than whites(24 percent) and Hispanics (18 percent) to favoradditional spending on roads and highways.Finally, Figure 1 shows that blacks (78 percent)and Hispanics (67 percent) are more supportivethan are whites (36 percent) of additionalspending on low-income families. Again, to thedegree the proportions of African Americansand Hispanics in Illinois increase, it is likelythat their opinions will be weighted moreheavily in the formulation of public opinion inthe state.

People of color constitute nearly 30 percent ofthe population of Illinois. The number ofAfrican Americans and Hispanics in Illinois willcontinue to grow. These demographic trendsshould portend a greater number of electedofficials of color and better representation forpeople of color. Yet, blacks and Hispanics arethe racial and ethnic groups that have the least(racially and ethnically) proportional represen-tation in the Illinois congressional delegation, inboth chambers of the state legislature, and on

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the city councils of many municipalities. Lessthan 14 percent of the Illinois Congressionaldelegation is black, and less than 5 percent ofthe Illinois Congressional delegation is ofHispanic origin. Of the 118 House members ofthe 92nd Illinois General Assembly, 15 (12.7percent) are African Americans, and 4 (3.3percent) are of Hispanic origin. Of the 59Illinois state senators, 7 (11.9 percent) areAfrican Americans, and 2 (3.3 percent) are ofHispanic origin. As demonstrated earlier, thenumber of African Americans and Hispanics isgrowing at a much faster rate than is the whitepopulation, and these racial/ethnic groupsdiffer from whites substantially in their policypreferences on several key issues, but thesedemographic shifts and differences of policyopinions are not likely to have the type ofimpact on public policy that they should unlesselectoral district boundaries appropriatelyreflect the new demographic realities of Illinois.

So we must be clear: The central paradox ofredistricting to increase the likelihood ofelecting black and/or Hispanic representativesby creating districts with supermajorities is thatit decreases the number of districts that willrepresent any of the interests of blacks andHispanics. Also, if people of color are segre-gated into fewer (supermajority) districts, theywill have less political clout than would be thecase if they were to be placed into more districtswhere blacks and Hispanics could act as swingvoters. New gerrymandering has made it morepossible that those whose views are leastconsistent with those of most blacks andHispanics will be elected in all other districts.The issue is not just the number of black orHispanic representatives who can be elected

because of minority supermajorities, but ratherthe quality of representation that black andHispanic residents receive overall. If, as thecourts have held for the past four decades, oneperson’s vote should be worth as much asanother’s, it is incumbent upon those involvedin the redistricting process to be mindful of thefact that race and genuine representation arealso fundamental parts of redistricting.

Cedric Herring is a professor in the Departmentof Sociology at the University of Illinois atChicago and in the Institute of Government andPublic Affairs. His areas of interest and exper-tise include social policy, labor force issues andpolicies, stratification and inequality, and thesociology of Black Americans.

The central paradox ofredistricting to increase thelikelihood of electing black and/orHispanic representatives bycreating districts withsupermajorities is that itdecreases the number of districtsthat will represent any of theinterests of blacks andHispanics.

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�EDISTRICTING IS, BAR NONE, THE MOST PARTISAN

activity in Illinois politics. In the eyes of officialselected from districts, demographics are des-tiny. To them, the redistricting process deter-mines whether they will come back for anotherterm.

The goal of redistricting for individual members– who want ever-safer districts for themselves –clashes with that of the party leaders – whowant to enhance partisan advantage andnumbers in legislative bodies. In this paper Ilook at the practical politics of state legislativeand congressional redistricting as Illinois state

lawmakers embark on the decennial redrawingof district lines, as required by both the Illinoisand federal constitutions. I draw heavily on myexperiences and observations – as a legislativestaffer who worked on redistricting, as secre-tary of state, and as governor – in each of thelast three redistricting processes in Illinois.

The Politics of RedistrictingIn 1971 I was the Illinois Senate Republicanstaffer assigned to redistricting. Once we hadthe numbers from the U.S. Census Bureau, wehad to decide where to start drawing the lines.The county population numbers were releasedfirst, then the township totals, and later moredetailed numbers that we needed for Chicagoand the East St. Louis area.

In those days, before computer number-crunch-ing power, we had to start at one end or cornerof the state or the other, and then move out-ward. Where we started had a bearing on theoutcome, of course.

Back then we worked with adding machines.Then one day a staffer came to a bipartisanmeeting with a marvelous technological ad-vance – the hand-held calculator. By the nextmeeting, we all had calculators. The best werethose that printed out the totals on tapes.

Redistricting computer programs today can beboth a blessing and a curse, because now everymember can ask to have numerous maps run tosee how they would affect him or her. Wesimply couldn’t do that in 1971, so the staff andthe leadership were more able to control theprocess.

In 2001, with the aid of computers, Republicansmight start drawing maps from their base in thesuburbs, and work out toward Chicago andDownstate. Democrats will probably start inChicago, their stronghold.

The staffers in charge must know the stateinside and out. Carter Hendren, longtime chiefof staff for the Senate Republicans, knows everytownship and ward in the state – as well as wholives there. Knowledge of historical votingpatterns and of racial and ethnic makeup isabsolutely necessary. For example, the staffmust keep an incumbent who is Italian-Ameri-can or Lithuanian with his or her base. And thestaff should know where in the suburbs His-panics are moving, and whether they areCubano, Puerto Riqueño or Mexicano.

Knowing the base-line partisan vote of acounty, suburb or Chicago ward is also critical,yet more and more difficult. In past redistrict-ing, we could rely on the votes cast for Univer-sity of Illinois trustees. These candidates wereelected statewide on a partisan basis, but weregenerally unknown to most voters. Politicosthus assumed, for the most part correctly, thatvoters had only the party affiliation of thosecandidates to guide their voting. The vote for U

*With the assistance of James Nowlan.

Redistricting computer programstoday can be both a blessing and acurse, because now every membercan ask to have numerous mapsrun to see how they would affecthim or her.

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of I trustee served as a proxy for the base partyvote in any election unit.

Because U of I trustees are appointed now, theleast visible statewide office, that of treasurer orcomptroller, will probably be used as the proxyfor the party vote.

The leaders provide the staffers direction, ofcourse. They set goals for how many “safeRepublican” districts should be drawn, andhow many “swing districts,” that is, competi-tive districts should be created. Leaders also tellstaffers which preferred incumbents must beprotected at all costs, and who can be sacrificedif necessary.

As the staffers begin drawing possible maps,individual members of the House and Senateare anxious to see how they are being treated.This becomes a problem for the leaders. On theone hand, the leaders will need their members’support on close votes during the legislativesession in progress, so they will want to appearresponsive to their members. On the otherhand, members are never satisfied. They allwant districts so safe that they can’t be beaten.

The legislative leaders can’t, of course, drawthose kinds of super-safe districts for membersand still maximize partisan potential. Theleaders want to elect party majorities so theywill be the top dogs in their chambers. Theleaders try to keep their members away fromthe process as much as possible, offeringgeneral reassurances that, “You’re going to befine, Joe. You know I wouldn’t hurt you.”

Legislators’ emotions become very intenseduring redistricting. One spring night in 1971 ina Springfield bar, a legislator punched aninnocent young Republican Party aide whowasn’t even part of the legislative process, letalone redistricting. The young man was,however, an apartment-mate of a stafferworking on redistricting. The pugnaciouslawmaker thought, incorrectly, that the youngaide was somehow conspiring to put him out ofa district.

Governors try to maintain some distance fromthis legislative activity, in part because of thisintensity of feeling. I certainly did. Whenlegislators called me for help with their dis-tricts, I told them I wasn’t going to get in themiddle of their branch’s responsibilities.Redistricting is a legislative matter, and I hadplenty of other things to do as governor. Ofcourse, when a Democratic map was passed inthe General Assembly in 1991, I vetoed the bill,

despite the suggestion of some of my staff that Itry to work out something with the Democraticleaders. I felt I had to stand with my party onthis most partisan of matters.

The Process of LegislativeRedistrictingIn Illinois, the General Assembly has theresponsibility of redrawing district lines aftereach decennial census. If the state legislatorscannot agree on new district lines for the IllinoisHouse and Senate, of if the governor vetoes theplan, responsibility then shifts to a bipartisaneight-member commission. Each of the fourlegislative leaders appoints two members. Ifthat panel cannot agree, a ninth, tie-breakingmember is picked by the secretary of state who,

literally, draws from a hat one of two namesprovided by the Illinois Supreme Court.

Since 1971, all of the maps agreed upon by thecommission, either with or without thetiebreaker, were challenged in the state andfederal courts, where the final decisions weremade.

In 1971, the legislature failed to agree on newdistrict lines by the June 30 deadline. Thebipartisan commission was triggered and themembers were able to reach agreement on amap without going to the tiebreaker. This ishow the framers of the 1970 Illinois Constitu-tion hoped the process would work. In thefollowing two remap processes, however, thebipartisan commissions failed to agree and the“luck of the draw” tiebreaker was invoked.

I was Secretary of State in 1981, so I was re-quired by the Constitution to select the tie-breaking commission member. The Democratswere convinced I was going to rig the draw.Officials from both parties naturally insisted onobserving me drawing from the hat. We held

The legislative leaders can’t, ofcourse, draw those kinds ofsuper-safe districts for membersand still maximize partisanpotential.

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the drawing in Room 212 of the Capitol, a largeornate hearing room that was at one time thestate Supreme Court chambers.

Democratic leaders sat behind me, as if I might,like a magician, have a trick up my sleeve.

Television cameras and the press also crowdedaround. I drew the name out of a stovepipe hatthat had belonged to Abraham Lincoln.

As it turned out, I drew the Democratic name,which at least showed everyone I was honest.This made the Republicans mad at me. OneGOP leader said, conspiratorially, “You knowthe Democrats would have figured out a way toselect their party’s nominee!” – suggesting that Iwas a turncoat for not somehow rigging thegame.

The name I drew was that of former GovernorSam Shapiro. When I called Governor Shapiroto inform him of his selection, he assured me hewould do a fair job. But I don’t know if he hadany say in the matter. A few days later, the five-member Democratic majority adopted a newmap that favored the Democrats. The plan waschallenged in the Illinois Supreme Court, whichchanged two legislative districts in a minorway. The federal court also redrew some of thedistricts, mainly to counter dilution of AfricanAmerican voting strength. However, the mapwas still highly favorable to the Democrats.

As mentioned above, in 1991 I vetoed the mapsdrawn by the Democratic majorities in theGeneral Assembly. When the commissiondeadlocked, then-Secretary of State GeorgeRyan pulled the Republican name from the hat.

But it still took almost two months for thecommission to draw and file its plan. Afterreviewing the map, the Illinois Supreme Courtordered the commission to hold hearings andinvestigate the constitutionality of some dis-tricts. The commission held hearings in January1992 and then sent the court a revised plan. Thecourt approved the plan when one Democratjustice, who felt his party had mistreated him,joined the Republicans to give them a majorityin the decision.

The outcome from the 1991 experience illus-trates that although redistricting is important, itdoesn’t guarantee partisan outcomes. Republi-cans drew the 1991 legislative map, but theDemocrats elected House majorities in four ofthe five elections held under that map. And yetthe Republicans were able to retain control ofthe Illinois Senate throughout the period. Onereason for this is that incumbency is a verypowerful advantage, probably more importantoverall at the local level than district lines.Incumbent members of both parties – and theDemocrats had more incumbents going into the1992 elections – have a great advantage becauseof their name recognition, knowledge of theterritory, and already-developed campaignteams and financial backers.

Goals and Strategies ofRedistrictingLegislative mapmakers must take the newcensus data and draw districts that are equal inpopulation and also meet – as best they can beinterpreted – evolving state and federal courtrequirements as to compactness, racial fairness,and other factors.

In Illinois, the 2000 census figures show thatChicago and downstate regions lost populationin the 1990s, and the expanding suburban collararound Chicago gained population. That greatcollar is, however, no longer simply a homoge-neous white Republican bloc, if it ever was.Hispanics and other immigrant groups aremoving into the older suburbs along Chicago’swestern borders, and AfricanAmericans havebeen moving into the south suburbs.

In addition, many Republican voters in thesuburbs are displaying more independencethan in the past, especially when voting onenvironmental issues and social issues such asabortion and gun control. In the 2000 election,George W. Bush fared poorly in the suburbs,

The basic game of redistricting isto concentrate your opponents infewer districts and dilute theirstrength in others, so as to reducethe number of opportunities theyhave to win. At the same time,party mapmakers try to extendtheir base to encompass oppositionterritory – while maintaining themajority of voters.

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especially in Lake and Will counties. Clearlyredistricting in the collar around Chicago willbe more complicated than ever.

The basic game of redistricting is to concentrateyour opponents in fewer districts and dilutetheir strength in others, so as to reduce thenumber of opportunities they have to win. Atthe same time, party mapmakers try to extendtheir base to encompass opposition territory –while maintaining the majority of voters. Forexample, in 1981 Democrats extended heavilyDemocratic Chicago House and Senate districts,finger like, into the suburbs to capture Republi-can areas – without giving up their majorities.As a result, they controlled more districtsstatewide than their statewide vote wouldotherwise have reflected.

In 2001 Republicans will undoubtedly try toextend suburban GOP districts into Democraticterritory where possible, with the same objec-tive.

This is a relatively simple game of mathematics,except that the underlying numbers are murky.For example, is a suburb that is changingrapidly from white ethnic Republican toAfricanAmerican going to continue with aRepublican majority, and for how long?

The Redistricting Commissionand the CourtsIn all redistricting processes since 1970 both theredistricting commission and the courts havebeen employed. Legislative leaders select—andthus control—the eight members of the commis-sion, often appointing individuals very loyal tothem. Leaders have an easier time drawinglines at this stage because the legislative sessionis over, and the votes of members for a map areno longer needed.

This is one reason backbench members of theLegislature want to please their party leadersas much as possible, at all times. At the commis-sion stage leaders can say, “We need to takecare of Representative Smith because he was astalwart in my leadership battles,” or, “Wewant a Republican district in that area, but wedon’t need to protect Rep. Jones.”

The Illinois Supreme Court now has a 5-2Democratic majority, rather than the 4-3 marginof recent years. This may have great importancein the Supreme Court’s decisions on redistrict-ing plans. To help assure this majority, in the2000 campaign Speaker and Illinois Democratic

party chair Mike Madigan poured severalhundred thousand dollars into the close race fora high court seat in central Illinois. As a result,little known Democrat Thomas Kilbride edgedout highly regarded state senator CarlHawkinson.

This increased majority gives Democrats anunassailable hammer on state court interpreta-tion. Any map that comes to them will havebeen drawn so that all districts will fit into theequal population guidelines. There is, however,significant subjectivity as to what is “compact”and what accords fairness to “protected”

groups like Hispanics, African-Americans, andeven political parties. No matter how even-handed the Illinois Supreme Court might wantto be, justices – elected on a partisan basis –tend to revert to their partisan roots in inter-preting redistricting maps.

Now before I discuss what we can expect for2001 and beyond, I will address congressionalredistricting. This may begin in the stateLegislature, but there is a different dynamic.

Redrawing CongressionalDistrictsAlthough there is no Illinois constitutionalprovision for congressional redistricting, theGeneral Assembly has the first shot at redraw-ing the congressional district lines. The politicsare different for at least three reasons. First,state lawmakers are much more concernedabout their own district lines than they arethose for officials based in Washington. How-ever, half of the state legislators fancy them-selves in Washington some day, so any interestthey might have is in their own future pros-pects, rather than those of sitting congressmen.

Second, the state redistricting commission does

No matter how even-handed theIllinois Supreme Court mightwant to be, justices – elected on apartisan basis – tend to revert totheir partisan roots ininterpreting redistricting maps.

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not have authority in congressional redistrict-ing. If a congressional redistricting plan is notpassed by the General Assembly, the issue goesdirectly to the Federal District Court, whichcould adopt a map drawn by a group or anindividual, or direct its staff to revise one of themaps presented to the court. The court wouldalso review a map agreed to by the GeneralAssembly and the governor.

Third, the number of congressional districts isdetermined by the decennial census and onceagain Illinois is losing a seat in the House, goingfrom 20 to 19.

The sitting members of Congress from Illinoiswill probably prepare a map for the delegation,or two maps, one each for the Republican andDemocratic members, and present them to theLegislature. Speaker of the U.S. House DennisHastert is a former state House member, so hemay have influence with GOP House members.U.S. Rep. Bill Lipinski (D-Cook County) is closeto Illinois Speaker Mike Madigan, so he couldrepresent his colleagues’ interests to thespeaker. How that map, or those maps, fare inthe General Assembly will have a lot to do withwhich state lawmakers want to run for Con-gress in the near future, and the relationshipsbetween state legislators members of Congress.

In 1971, I played a central role in drawing acongressional redistricting map that increasedRepublican representation in the U.S. House byfive members—but I never expected my map tobe adopted.

One night, state Rep. Ed Madigan, the HouseGOP chief for redistricting, and I redrew thestate’s congressional districts. The members of

Congress had their own map worked out andhad presented it to members of both parties. Edand I called their work the “Sweetheart Map”because it was a dream for sitting members anddid nothing to increase either Republican orDemocratic representation.

Since Ed and I cared little about the incum-bents, we decided to see how many Republicanseats we could pick up. We thought our workwould simply be the basis for negotiations laterwith the Democrats. Our congressional mapwas added to the Republican state legislativeredistricting map bill in the House, whereRepublicans were in control. There was biparti-san agreement to send this Republican bill overto the Senate, where the Democrats could blockany bill they disliked because neither party hada majority. So the GOP bill, a simple vehicle fornegotiations – passed out of the House almostunanimously. Nobody really paid any attentionto the congressional map during the negotia-tions, which failed.

The state legislative map went to the redistrict-ing commission. The congressional map went,however, directly to federal court. The federalcourts are less partisan overall than the IllinoisSupreme Court, but they are not nonpartisan.The three-judge panel selected to hear theIllinois congressional redistricting case wascomprised of two Republicans and one Demo-crat. They accepted the map Ed and I haddrawn, and they used as their authority the factthat it was the only map to receive a near-unanimous bipartisan vote in the Illinoislegislature, that is, the meaningless vote in theIllinois House to send the bill to the stateSenate. In fact, the had nothing at all to do withbipartisan support for the congressional mapEd and I had drawn.

The irony is that we could have made the mapeven more favorable to Republicans, but wedecided early that evening that we wouldn’t gotoo hard on Chicago Democrats, since wethought we would eventually have to work outa compromise with them on a map.

This should give caution to those lawyers andscholars who might read too much into legisla-tive intent.

2001 and BeyondDemocrats have much the stronger hand thanRepublicans in redistricting in 2001 because oftheir control of the partisan, elected state

Democrats have much thestronger hand than Republicansin redistricting in 2001 because oftheir control of the partisan,elected state Supreme Court.Republicans should thinkseriously about a compromiseagreement with the Democrats onstate legislative mapping.

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Supreme Court. Republicans should thinkseriously about a compromise agreement withthe Democrats on state legislative mapping. TheRedistricting Commission is probably a betterplace than the General Assembly to reachcompromise, as only the four leaders (throughtheir appointees) need to agree.

Even if Republicans took their chances with atie-breaking luck-of-the-draw appointment tothe commission, a Republican map would stillhave to pass muster before the Illinois SupremeCourt.

Republican redistricting strategists will seekredress of their grievances in the federal courts.I think, however, that Democratic mapmakerslikely will craft a map that can pass constitu-tional muster.

Of course, Democrats may be unwilling tocompromise; however, even Democrats have toworry about a tie-breaking draw from the hatthat might favor the Republicans, who alsohave the experience, and the skill, to draw apartisan map that appears to meet both stateand federal constitutional criteria. If they drewsuch a map, the Illinois Supreme Court mightbe reluctant to reject it on obviously partisangrounds.

In congressional redistricting, each party in theLegislature will draw its own map. If agreementcan’t be reached, then both maps would go tothe federal courts where the parties would taketheir chances.

There are less partisan ways to redistrict.Neighboring Iowa has, for example, an inde-pendent commission that lets a computer draw

the lines without regard to incumbency. Icannot imagine that a system such as that willever be adopted in Illinois. In my opinion,Illinois lawmakers would never authorize anychange that diminished the partisan nature ofthe Illinois redistricting process. After all, thepresent game of political poker is just toocaptivating and fun for full-time elected offi-cials who believe they should play a central partin trying to determine their own, and others’,political destinies.

Jim Edgar began his career with the IllinoisGeneral Assembly as a legislative intern in 1969and he became a Senate staff assistant in 1970.From 1977 –1981 he was a member of theIllinois House of Representatives. He served asIllinois Secretary of State from 1981-1991, andwas Governor of Illinois from 1991-1999. Hecurrently is a distinguished fellow at theUniversity of Illinois’ Institute of Governmentand Public Affairs.

James D. Nowlan was a member of the IllinoisHouse of Representatives from 1968-1973, astate agency director on several occasions, andis the author of political novels. He is a seniorfellow at the University of Illinois’ Institute ofGovernment and Public Affairs.

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The Institute of Government and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois servessociety by helping to improve public policies and the performance of government.It does this by disseminating research on public policy issues and the publicdecision-making process, and facilitating the application of such research to theissues and problems confronting decision makers and others who address publicissues.

Redistricting ILLINOIS, 2001 is a special publication of the Institute of Govern-ment and Public Affairs. It presents discussion of an important policy issue. Anyopinions expressed are solely those of the authors.


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Redistricting 2001

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