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REDACTION KEY A. CLASSIFIED FBI INFORMATION RE-REVIEWED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE

ORDER 14040. C-1. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT

THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT PENDING FURTHER CONSULTATION TO BE COMPLETED BY THE DEADLINE IN EO 14040 SECTION 2(D).

D. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE IS

REQUIRED. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION IS OBTAINED WILL BE RELEASED.

F. ADMINISTRATIVELY DESIGNATED FBI FILE AND/OR SERIAL NUMBERS OR

HANDLING INFORMATION. G. SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION WITHHELD PURSUANT TO THE

LAW ENFORCEMENT PRIVILEGE. J-1. SECTION 102A(i)(1) OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, AS AMENDED BY

THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1).

J-2. INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE BY THE BANK SECRECY ACT

(BSA) AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE BSA. SEE 31 C.F.R. § 5311 ET SEQ; 31 C.F.R. CHAPTER X.

J-3 INFORMATION DETERMINED BY ANOTHER DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY TO BE

PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f). O-1. INFORMATION WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT

AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT. P. INFORMATION RESTRICTED FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE PRIVACY ACT

OF 1974. SUCH INFORMATION WILL BE PRODUCED IN MDL 03-1570 (S.D.N.Y.) PURSUANT TO THE PRIVACY ACT PROTECTIVE ORDER ENTERED IN THAT CASE.

P-1. INFORMATION SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS, DATES OF BIRTH, AND

OTHER SENSITIVE PERSONAL INFORMATION. S. NAMES AND OTHER PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OF LAW

ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL. NOTE: Classification markings (classification banners and portion markings) are redacted

without a code throughout the release.

Case Background

On 11 September 2001 four coordinated suicide attacks occurred in the

United States in New York City and the Washington D.C. area. 19

terrorists from the Islamist militant group, al-Qaeda (AQ), hijacked four

passenger jets and intentionally crashed two planes, American Airlines

Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175, into the Twin Towers of the

World Trade Center in New York City. Hijackers crashed American Airlines

Flight 77 into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. The fourth jet,

United Airlines Flight 93, crashed into a field near Shanksville,

Pennsylvania, after passengers attempted to take control before it could

reach the hijacker's intended target in Washington D.C.

The FBI investigation into the attacks, internally named PENTTBOM,

which included the cooperation of local, state, and other federal

agencies, identified the 19 hijackers and linked the hijackers to AQ.

Subsequently, in a number of publicized video, audio, interview, and

printed statements, senior members of AQ asserted responsibility for

organizing the September 11 attacks. Ultimately, the core investigation

revealed that Usama Bin Laden (UBL) and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) each

played critical roles in the 9/11 attack plot.

In June 2007, the FBI’s New York field office (NYO) opened a

subfile under the PENTTBOM investigation file to organize information

obtained from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets that were

previously identified throughout the PENTTBOM investigation.

Specifically, the NYO sought to obtain a greater understanding of 9/11

hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi's (Hazmi) and Khalid al-Mihdhar's (Mihdhar) past

interaction with and connectivity to the Southern California Muslim

community in an attempt to explain how they may have gained assistance

after their arrival in Los Angeles in January 2000.

In October 2007, the NYO administratively moved the

Title: To administratively close caseRe: 05/27/2021

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aforementioned subfile to its own separate NYO investigation casefile

named “Operation Encore.” The predication of the investigation had the

same purpose as the original PENTTBOM subfile investigation in that it

served as an enterprise counterterrorism investigation into a possible

network of individuals who were suspected of providing assistance to the

hijackers and as an intelligence gathering operation into AQ’s tactics

and tradecraft. Specifically the named main subjects, Fahad Al-Thumairy

(Thumairy), Omar Al-Bayoumi (Bayoumi), and Musaed Al-Jarrah (Al-Jarrah),

allegedly provided (or directed others to provide) Hazmi and Mihdhar with

assistance in daily activities, including procuring living quarters and

assistance with assimilating into Southern California. The investigation

sought to determine whether these three subjects wittingly provided such

assistance with the knowledge that Hazmi and Mihdhar were here to commit

an act of terrorism.

Additionally, separate full investigations on other associated

individuals from other field offices, some of which were opened before

and after Operation Encore, were also administratively consolidated under

the Operation Encore casefile. Refer to Serial

Thumairy, Bayoumi, and Al-Jarrah, all NON-USPERs, remain

OCONUS, and are believed to live in Saudi Arabia.

Investigation Summary

The investigation was predicated upon the theory that Al-Jarrah

used his position as the Head of Islamic Affairs at the Saudi Arabian

Embassy in Washington D.C. to oversee and direct the facilitation of the

hijackers through his subordinates, Thumairy and Bayoumi, as well as, his


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(A),(G),(J-1)

(F)(F)

(F)

(G)

revealed outside of the CHS reporting and telephone information.

Al-Jarrah was also the subject of an FBI

investigation opened in January 2003 predicated upon information

He was interviewed

twice by the FBI in 2004 in connection with that investigation. Al-

Jarrah permanently departed the United States in July 2006

. While Al-Jarrah maintained regular

contact with the Saudi Embassy after leaving the United States, he was

no longer employed there. The investigation was closed in July 2007.

Thumairy

Thumairy, a Saudi national, was an Imam at the King Fahd

Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in United

States State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at

the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles,

California.

Prior to Operation Encore, Thumairy was a main subject of a

Los Angeles full investigation based on his phone connectivity with

Bayoumi and his potential association to Hazmi and Mihdhar.

Furthermore reported that he was a "hard core extremist"

whose sermons at the KFM appealed to the extremist and militant

attendees of the mosque.

Lastly, a review of Thumairy's financial transactions revealed

connections with a Saudi individual, Jarallah Al-Jarallah, which were

believed to be linked to a Saudi based money laundering scheme to move

money around the Middle East region. FBI Los Angeles opened a full

investigation into those transactions in April 2005 and closed it in


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(A),(G),(J-1)

(A),(G),(J-1)

(C-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(J-3)

(J-3)

Hazmi and Mihdhar in San Diego, California in February 2000 because

the hijackers did not have the necessary credit history for the rental

application and also because the leasing company did not permit cash

payments. In the fall of 2000, Bayoumi moved to Birmingham, England,

where he resided with his family and attended Aston University.

Bayoumi was detained by New Scotland Yard (NSY)

In a 2003 interview in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Bayoumi stated

he received a salary from his employer, Dallah AVCO, and a stipend to

cover tuition fees, housing, and other living expenses while he

attended school in the United States.

According to Telephone Application (TA) there was telephone

connectivity between Bayoumi and Thumairy beginning in December 1998

and then sporadically until Bayoumi left the country in the fall of

2000. Connection periods included periods of time when Hazmi and

Mihdhar were in the Los Angeles and San Diego areas; however the

nature and/or content of those discussions were not revealed as part

of the investigation efforts.

Investigative Evidence

As part of the investigation that spanned from 2007 to 2016, the

case team reviewed financial records, telecommunication records, travel

records, conducted hundreds of interviews relating to the main subjects

in addition to known associates (voluntarily ,

conducted search warrants of various residences in Southern California,


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(C-1)

(C-1)

(D)

including a review of materials collected by New Scotland Yard via search

warrant, and coordinated

efforts with foreign partners, in order to determine if the Southern

California Muslim community had a pre-existing support network in place

with advanced knowledge that the hijackers, Hazmi and Mihdhar, were in

the United States to commit an act of terrorism.

Additionally, during 2019 and 2020, the FBI re-examined the

Operation Encore case file to identify any missed leads, opportunities,

or investigative actions which may advance the case, including the

summarization ECs serials in Serials

documented in April 2016. Various CONUS based persons of interest were

re-interviewed; no additional information was obtained as part of those

interviews and no material contradicting statements were made as compared

to the initial interviews.

AQ Tradecraft

Consent statements from various AQ members, including KSM,

Abdul Rahim Abdu Al Nashiri, Walid Muhammad Salih Khallad Bin Attash,

Ramzi Bin Al Shibh, Abd Al Aziz Ali Ali aka Ammar Al Baluchi, and Mustafa

Ahmed Al Hawsawi, regarding the operational planning of AQ's larger scale

terrorist attacks, 9/11 and USS Cole, indicated that the AQ leadership

compartmentalized the attack groups and roles within the operation. They

did not make the attack plans known in advance to others for fear the

nature of the attack would be discovered, which is consistent with the

FBI's assessment of the last two decades of large scale AQ-related

attacks. Specifically, in relation to the 9/11 attacks, the hijackers

knew there was a martyrdom operation, but did not know about the nature

of the operation until shortly before the attack for operational security

reasons. Refer to Serials

This information corroborated that Thumairy, Bayoumi, and Al-


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(F)

(F) (F)

(F)

(A),(G), (J-1)

(F)

Jarrah did not knowingly conspire to assist the AQ hijackers in

furtherance of the 9/11 attack.

Material Support to Terrorism

For federal criminal charges of conspiracy to provide material

support and resources to terrorists to be filed in accordance with 18

U.S.C. 2339B, the totality of evidence from the investigation needed to

establish that Thumairy, Bayoumi, and Al-Jarrah each had "knowledge that

the organization is a designated terrorist organization...that the

organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity...or that the

organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (section 6603(c)(2))."

As further explained in United States vs Warsame, 537 F.Supp.2d

1005 (D.Minn. 2008), “under the plain language of 2339B...the government

must prove that the defendant ‘knowingly provides material support or

resources to a Foreign Terrorist Organization [FTO]’, rather than to

individuals who happen to be FTO members...In other words, even where a

donor’s contribution to an individual FTO member confers some benefit

upon the terrorist organization, the prosecution must prove that the

donor knew the intended recipient of his contribution was a designated

FTO...Whether the donor knew the recipient was a member of a FTO could,

of course, be relevant to a determination that the donor ultimately

intended the contribution to go to the FTO itself. Nonetheless, the

prosecution must prove that the donor knowingly provided material support

or resources to the FTO.”

Based on the the totality of these investigative efforts and in

coordination with the Assistant United States Attorneys of the Southern

District of New York, it was jointly determined, that insufficient

evidence existed to prosecute Thumairy, Bayoumi, and Al-Jarrah for

wittingly conspiring to assist the AQ hijackers in furtherance of the

9/11 attack. The United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern


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District of New York (USAO-SDNY) was consulted regarding FBI-NYO’s intent

on closing this investigation. USAO-SDNY had no objection to the closing

of this investigation.

Conclusion

After nearly twenty years after the attack, the FBI has not

identified additional groups or individuals responsible for the attack

other than those currently charged, which is consistent with the final

conclusion of the 9/11 Commission Report which stated that "no new

information to date that would alter the original findings of the 9/11

Commission regarding the individuals responsible for the 9/11 attacks or

for supporting those responsible for the attacks."

The NYO completed all logical and reasonable investigative

steps in accordance with established CTD guidance. No potential criminal

violations or priority threats to national security warranting further

investigation were identified. All leads have been completed. The NYO is

closing captioned matter. In the event additional derogatory information

is discovered regarding the captioned subjects, NYO will consider re-

opening this investigation.

Lastly, the SDNY concurs with the closing of the investigation;

SDNY is willing to re-engage investigative measures if new information

comes to light which may bear investigation.

♦♦


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Addendum to Operation Encore Closing Electronic Communication Title: Re: , 09/08/2021

3

offered case managers the ability to electronically filter for specific

types of files such as FD-302, FD-1057, etc. As documents were migrated

from ACS to Sentinel, the text of documents that were entered into the

ACS system were usually, but not always, available in Sentinel, and were

all classified as “legacy” documents. This migration, however, did not

allow any electronic filtering of specific types of files, such as what

was offered via Sentinel.

A manual re-review of the Operation Encore case file to

quantify the number of interviews conducted to include both FD-302s,

which are most commonly used for interviews, and the ACS legacy files,

showed that approximately 60 interviews were conducted between 2007 and

2016 as it related to the case's main subjects and associates, and not

hundreds as previously stated.

Therefore, the statement should be modified in the closing EC to

state that the FBI conducted approximately 60 interviews between 2007 to

2016 relating to the main subjects in addition to known associates

(voluntarily and via Grand Jury).

♦♦

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