Red White and Green

8/9/2019 Red White and Green

1/17

Red White and Green:

Vancouvers Diasporic Iranian Youth, Politics,

and New Media

Research Paper Prepared for the Geography

Dept. Seminar on Immigration Research

Mehdi Alaei Tafti


2/17

ABSTRACT

This studys primary objective is to shed some light on the transnational character of the Iranian diasporicyouth, and its various forms of social articulation, and with respect to the rooted and transcendent qualitiesof mobility. Particular attention is paid to emerging use of technology and/or media, and their help inshaping the aforesaid social forms. Questions revolve around both the maintenance of ties with Iran, and the

implications of such ties for each participant. Participants are Iranians between 19-30 years old, living in theGreater Vancouver Region in British Columbia, which age group represents about half of the total Iranianpopulation. The study includes two components: extensive questionnaires and personal interviews with aselect number of participants. In all twenty-eight surveys (allowing for statistically significant results to begleaned) and seventeen interviews have been conducted. These two components allow both for statisticaland contextual analyses of participant responses. A prcis of the political situation in Iran is provided to geta better understanding of the notion of citizenship vis--vis Iran, and the limits imposed on the media.

Who is it that is addressingyou? Since it is not an author, a narrator, or a deus ex machina, it is anIthat is both part of the spectacle, and part of the audience. AnIthat, a bit likeyou, undergoes itsown incessant, violent reinscription, within the arithmetical machinery. AnIthat, functioning as apure passageway for operations of substitution, is not some singular and irreplaceable existence,some subject or light, but only rather moves between life and death, between reality and fiction.

AnIthat is a mere function or phantom. Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, 1972; reproducedin Derrida Documentary


3/17

Research Design, Method, and Analytical Strategy

This study looks at Iranian diasporic youth in the Greater Vancouver Region to learnmore about the transnational movement to support democracy in Iran. Special attention is

paid to emerging uses of technology, with a focus on social networking media, in aimingto find out the effect of these sites on political activism. Initially a prcis of the history ofIranian nationalist struggle for democracy is provided in order to better understand thecomplicated recent challenges. The cohort chosen for study is an age group representingabout half of the overall population in Iran, who are between 19-30 years old. Extensivequestionnaires were designed to probe as to the maintenance of online and offline tieswith Iran, and as to the implications of such ties for each participant. Since someparticipants were recruited based on a rapport built through online networking, there islikely a bias against other media, a bias which may even affect the snowball samplingemployed subsequently. Seventeen semi-structured interviews were conducted and alsorecorded with the consent of participants. It should be noted that a significant number of

those surveyed self-identified as (student) activists to different extents. There is a generalwariness of state spies creeping in on activism (both online and offline), which I had toallay in my search for participants. Inasmuch as this strategy may have led to therecruitment of a more vociferous set of youth, Im open to the charge of misrepresentingthe cohort as a whole. I trust that this may be offset by their knowledgeableness aboutmany pressing social issues, as the qualitative analysis may illustrate. I employ quotes assnapshots that capture sediments of emotional attachment, with respect to issues such asonline social media, Iranian politics, and diasporic identification. These are used to drawa moving picture of recent developments based on the views of interviewees, but are alsoused to draw some conclusions as to future directions for research.

Statistical Analysis of Study Participants

In all, 28 questionnaires were completed, 14 by males and 14 by females. Of these, threewere born outside Iran and couldnt provide answers to a subset of the questions, andtherefore cant be considered for many categories of analysis. The remaining surveysshowed an average age of 24.96 years old, and on average had lived less than half (47.5%)of their lives abroad. Out of these 25 people, 18 indicated having moved to Canada whenfirst leaving Iran, and one didnt reply. Eight people had not returned to Iran since firstleaving, and more than half said they had immediate family members still residing in Iran.While most (68%) had indicated that education had contributed to their familys decisionto leave Iran, data suggests that on average, 62.6% of their years away from Iran were

spent studying. Only a minority (16%) had spent every year away in school, and 36%indicated having had more than minimal interruptions while adapting to a new culture.Most (84%) attested to keeping contact with relatives in Iran, while 73% said the samething about friends in Iran1. Here, emails were ranked the most useful means of keepingin touch, followed closely by phone calls (See Chart A for details) 2. The majority (92%)also said they kept up with their Iranian heritage (see Chart B). Prior to 2009, 40% hadvoted in Iranian elections, and 24% voted in the 2009 presidential elections. When askedto choose a level of awareness of the political climate within Iran prior, and then after


4/17

the 2009 elections, 44% showed having had some increase, and 32% characterized theeffect as profound. A ranking of some eighteen channels through which news about Iranis received, digested, or disseminated, showed Youtube ranked first, followed byFacebook and BBC (almost tied, with each being the first channel to go to for fourparticipants), followed by BBC Farsi (See Chart C for more). 80% were aware of locally

organized events in solidarity with the Iranian victims of political instability and violencein the aftermath of the 2009 Elections and as many people attended some such events(see Chart D). Interestingly 60% had heard messages of support from Canadianpoliticians in solidarity with Iranians at the federal level, while less than a third hadheard from their municipal and provincial counterparts. Only 12% cited these as havingchanged their view of said politicians. Not surprisingly, the events around these electionswere found to strengthen participant connections first within their diaspora here and thento their community in Iran, while on average no change was noticeable as to the rest ofCanada. A set of questions were designed, the answers to which demonstrate the cohortslevel of knowledge and understanding about political circumstances surrounding Iran(See Chart E). Insofar as they checked one of the Iranian/Persian/Canadian/Other boxes

when self-identifying their national character, 36% received a transnational score of 1(see Chart F). About half clearly didnt personally identify with their demographicreligious majority, while for almost all the rest it took on different personal meanings thatare harder to decode3. This finding is similar to others that looked at that politicalidentity, as opposed to religious and/or ethnic identity, had been the key defining factor inthe way they initially related to Iran and positioned themselves outside Iran (Ghorahsiand Boersma, 2009, 672). Asked to designate their language proficiency, the answerstabulated indicate that only 20% lacked bilingualism4, while 32% had some skill in alanguage other than Farsi or English.5 The general picture that emerges from this surveyis one of a very educated cohort, connected to a plethora of information through a varietyof media channels, and in my impression, more diasporic than exilic.6

Background on Iranian Identities and Limits of the Media

Many historians date Irans modern struggle for gaining democracy as distinct frommonarchy back to the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11, though one expert traces itsroots to more than two centuries ago, and finds it closely intertwined for an anticolonialquest for nationhood (Dabashi, 2007). During the 1950s Prime Minister Mosaddeghchampioned this quest by nationalizing Iranian oil, in order to negotiate reasonable profit-sharing with the British company that controlled the Iranian oil industry, thus improvingthe standard of living in Iran. Rather than restructure the scheme that paid a pittance oftheir net profits to Iran, however, the British sought American help to depose Mosaddegh

and return the Shah (monarch) to power. This became the first time the CIA staged acoup detat, as explored by Stephen Kinzer in his study of its terrible and hauntinglegacy7. He chronicles the way the CIA bribed newspapers, mob men, community,military, and religious leaders, to shift Iranian sentiments against the democraticgovernment, finally succeeding on August 19, 1953 to oust Mosaddegh, and devastateparliamentary rule in favour of the Shah. (Kinzer, 2003)


5/17

In concluding his account, Kinzer adverts to insights from historians of the coup, excerptsof which inform my research, and two of which I wish to recall here. Firstly, J. A. Billstresses that the American intervention paved the way for the incubation of extremism,both of the left and of the right. This extremism became unalterably anti-American(Kinzer, 2003, 212-213). Secondly, R. W. Cottam states that In helping eliminate a

government that symbolized Irans search for national integrity and dignity, [the U.S.-sponsored coup] helped deny the successor regime nationalist legitimacy (Ibid). TheShahs obliteration of Irans Community Party and decimation of other leftist groups inthe coups aftermath, probably contributed to his ultimate downfall. Ironically this pavedthe way for entrepreneurs (or bazaaris) to have increasing influence, as suggested in astudy of the link between socioeconomic development and democracy in Iran and thePhilippines (Parsa, 1995). The studys author writes about Iran: economic independenceof bazaaris from the state and the absence of threats from either labor or leftistorganizations reduced their reliance on the state and enabled them to mobilize against thegovernment (Ibid, 814). The author emphasizes that the structure of bazaars tends togenerate strong solidarity against external adversaries. since, by virtue of their centrality

and concentration each of these markets constituted a ready-made communicationnetwork (Ibid). Such network structures should be contrasted with recently emergingonline communication networks (and their offline counterparts), linking the peoples ofboth inside and outside Iran.

A hardliner cleric, Ayatollah Khomeini, eventually posited himself as diametricallyopposed to the progressively weakened Shah. Khomeini seized on populist (nationalist)sentiments to instigate the 1979 revolution and overthrow the Shah, and then madehimself its Supreme Leader. Meanwhile Saddam Hussein, president of neighboring Iraq,was compelled to exploit the political instability, by waging a war with Iran that wasdrawn out from 1980-1988, with mounting expenses (estimated at one trillion dollars)and casualties on both sides. Of the more than one million dead, the majority wereIranians, and of the martyrs most belonged to the underclass8. Demographically, Iran is98% Muslim, and roughly the same percentage had initially voted for making Iran anIslamic Republic. But soon some two million Iranians that included leftists, bazaaris,monarchists, and others uncomfortable with Islamic rule, fled Iran. Many remainingdissidents were purged, imprisoned, and even executed by the new regime.

For would-be exiled activists, the major danger is to become frozen in opposition,increasingly out of touch with the mood back home and increasingly integrated into thelife of the host country., according to a survey of the Iranian diaspora published after theIran-Iraq war (Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi, 1987, 129). One contemporaryanalysis of narrow-casting in Los Angeles, i.e. broadcasting for diasporic communities,found that in the case of Iranians this has meant a shrill and doctrinaire anti-Islamist andpro-royalist political stance (Naficy, 1993, 32). Such fomentation, disdained since thecoup detat days, made Western-produced media the antithetical for conservativeIranian politics, and something to guard against9. Hence the Islamic Republic of IranBroadcasting IRIB remained the only national broadcaster, and the news agencyIRNA too remains government-controlled. Iranian filmmakers have had to findallegiances with liberal elements of the Iranian government and subterfuge their projects


6/17

in order to slowly break taboos (Mir-Hosseini, 2001). Iranian cinema was kept austere inadherence to Islamic jurisprudence or feqh which severely limited its progress, upuntil the 1998 election of president Khatami, who favoured pluralism in the media. As alikely result, a study of satellite TV in Iran, finds its popularity and even fetishization isowed largely to its proscription, since the presence of reception dishes means that

nonconformity is registered in the public space (Barraclough, 2001, 44). Two remarksby Khatami highlighted in this study are pertinent to note. The first was in addressinguniversity students just before his election where he said digital, computer and satelliteborders are jokes (Ibid, 42); and the second, soon after being elected, was that we aredeceiving ourselves if we believe that we can hide the truth from the people in ourcoverage of news and world affairs (Ibid, 26). The former suggest the states failurewhen staking its legitimacy on cultural censorship, and the latter shows the risk to statemedia becoming a mere propaganda piece, and the limits to controlling the flow ofmedia.

Suppression of student activism began in 1980 when, under the guise of the cultural

revolution, universities were closed for three years. A recent historical-structural studyfound that students had carried on their culture of critical discourse within (or despite) thenew system, particularly through the Office for Consolidation of Unity set up throughouttheir campuses (Mashayekhi, 2001, 283). This study notes that [t]he embryonic forms ofchange in student political discourse came to public attention around 1995-1996 (Ibid,301). These changes were driven by the rapidly proliferating (independent) free press andinformation technology in Iran on the one hand, and by a sense of disenfranchisementand disenchantment with Islamic and socialist ideologies on the other. In part due toAmerican-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the reform movement was muffled by anextremist conservatism that presented itself as the nations saviour against Western andZionist threats. In response, Iranian student opposition grew stronger, despite persistentgovernment duress.

Diasporic student activists have long stressed that liberalism based on modern theories ofcitizenship is incompatible with a jurisprudence which is more theocratic than democratic(Davar-Ardakani, 2010). Most notably, the Guardian Council half of whose dozenmembers are directly selected by the Supreme Leader is in charge of vetting candidatesin Iranian elections. In 2004, the Council disqualified some 2400 reformist presidentialcandidates, and half of the 8200 parliamentary candidates, generally using disrespect forIslam as an excuse (Shaghafi, 2004, 16-17). This led to protests and mass resignationswithin parliament, and further disillusioned student bodies. With more than twenty fourmillion Iranians voting, the turnout at the 2004 presidential elections was relatively low,but youth participation was remarkable, with some seven million first-time voters goingto the polls (Ibid, 19). Ultimately these controversial elections brought the hardlinerMahmoud Ahmadinejad to the presidency. One journalist, reviewing the failed attemptsat reform of 1997-2004, foresaw greater tensions ahead: Although capturing the statehas been the central focus of recent elections, it is likely that the attempt by Tehran's newstrongmen to short-circuit the trend toward democracy will not last very long. (Ibid, 22)


7/17

Only four candidates were approved by the Guardian Council for the 2009 elections: twohardliners who included the incumbent Ahmadinejad, and two reformists including MirHossein Mousavi, endorsed by Khatami. On Election Day, June 12, 2009, hundreds ofirregularities were reported to the Council, which eventually declared the incumbent thewinner with about 24.5 million votes, or 65% of total a decision they maintained even

after a random recount of 10% of all ballots, as per orders from the Supreme Leader.Within days a letter purportedly by the Interior Minister addressing the Supreme Leaderwas leaked, which suggested another coup de force. It read that the incumbent had onlygotten 12% of the vote and Mousavi had actually won with some 19 million votes; butthat the incumbent would be kept in power as per the wishes of the Supreme Leader (L.A.Times, 2009). Millions of Iranians poured onto its city streets in defiance of state armedforces and voluntary militia to protest what Mousavi had called a charade (Fisk, 2009a,2009b). Iranians, half of whom are now between 19-30 years of age, were instrumental inbringing to international attention the massive arrests, bloodshed and torture that ensuedsome of which preceded the announcement of the winner (IHRDC, 2010). Amongst anumber of scholarly doubts raised about the results, one election fraud expert found,

based on the minimal data made available, that a crude calculation suggests thatAhmadinejads vote is inflated by at least 3.5 million votes. Whether this is the only kindof fraud perpetrated in the election is unknown. (Mebane, 2010a); and, assuming theaforesaid, that without the ballot-box stuffing fraud the election outcome would havebeen at least [contingent on] a runoff between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi. (Mebane,2010b).

Iranians and the West

According to a recent report, American budget for the promotion of democracy in Iranhad jumped from about 1.5 million dollars in 2004 to some 60 million in 2008, and

increased annual funds were requested from the Obama administration. President Obamadidnt comply however, allocating about 25 million for the entire Middle East regioninstead (VoA, 2009). Subsequent to Ahmadinejads presidency, the Islamic state too hasaggressively recruited its Iranian Cyber Army (ICA), with an estimated budget of $76million and recently ranked in the top five most powerful of its kind (Frontline, 2010a).November 4, 2009 marked thirty years after students had stormed the American embassyand taken its staff hostage. But on this anniversary, instead of the Death to Americachants that had prevailed for so long, many protesters changed their tune to Death to noone (CNN, 2009). Similarly other compromising slogans emerged, which were initiallysupported by reformists in Iran, yet some of which have been criticized as inappropriatesince then (Frontline, 2010b). More recently, Iranian advisors in collaboration with

liberal Washington think tanks, are hoping to embark on a clear policy to liberalize thepower of digital technology, while opposing tougher general sanctions and any movesthat would provoke harsher crackdowns by the regime on civil society. (Frontline, 2010c)So there seems to be a paradigm shift in the role of leadership in both Iran and the U.S.,just as there is a shift in Iranians perceptions of people in the West, whether of Iranianheritage or otherwise. Emerging internet media and their opacity/transparency appear toplay a crucial role in this new paradigm.


8/17

Online Publics and Iranian Diasporic Youth in Vancouver

Both in terms of voting patterns and activism in Iran, there seems to be significantdifference between large cities and smaller towns and villages, with socio-economicconditions and education being the persistent determining factors. One Vancouver

resident, who frequently visits Iran, explained the way (conservative) pro-governmentforces (can) use the rural conditions to commit election fraud:

Theyve kept people so low that, they go some places and tell, say, to a farmer sir, well give you twoyears remuneration, come and vote! I mean, people are satisfied with this. Fundamentally the personmay not know what voting is, may be politically illiterate. [S]he may see the difference betweenAhmadinejad and Mir Hossein Mousavi in their physical appearance; may have no idea whatdifferences these two people have, but just because theyre told well give you two yearsremuneration, theyll go and vote for him. Or in some places, theyve bought citizenship cards,meaning theyve given money, and the economic situation for some people is so bad, so low, that theypaid the equivalent of $80 Canadian. Theyre given $80 and their ID card taken and vote given in their

place. (Male, self-employed, age 29, in diaspora more than nine years)

Another resident who had remained in Tehran10 a few days after the elections described aunity of sentiments that stands in contrast from the rural picture:

In the days after the elections, even in driving even in minor daily affairs people became muchkinder I was a student; in my own university, we had a strong feeling of solidarity. In class,professors, students, everyone, maybe, previously if in taxies or whatnot, if discussions of politics andopposition were secret, know we felt wed all found common point. We became much closer togetherafter this event. It became clear that were all in opposition, but till now no one let it be known. In thisway somehow our nationalist pride became very apparent. Peoples attachment increased significantly.To use traffic as an example, if previously we got stuck behind another car and honked, I personallytried not to honk the horn because I thought this person is like me in opposition. I dont know, it was

an intrinsic feeling. (Female, graduate student, age 27, in diaspora for about one year)

Taxis in Tehran are shared by several people, and as such have been noted as asignificant site of public discourse. They serve to break the dichotomous esoteric/exoteric(baten/zaher) barriers of the self that remain in Iranian culture, by permitting people toshare personal news to varying degrees (Graham and Khosravi, 2002, 224-5). This modeof communication is distinct from the internet cafes that have been mushrooming inTehran since the turn of the century (Ibid, 226), insofar as it is less mediated yetdispersed. However both these forms are generally prevalent in large urban centers, andtypically absent in rural settings. Days before the elections, the largely urban oppositionalso began sporting green apparel, the color representing the reformist Mousaviscampaign. This trend was also observed by many diasporic Iranians around the world,

considered Green supporters. In recalling her experience with Green movement activistsin Vancouver on the day of the elections in Iran, one interviewee highlighted some oftheir challenges:

On June 12 theres no Iranian embassy here and there was no place designated for our voting wedecided to hold a symbolic election on June 11 in front of the Art Gallery on Robson Street We put avoting box there, [people] dropped in their ballots and we declared from the four candidates who hadthe most votes. Thats because we couldnt go to Seattle, or go to Ottawa; because wed have to votethere. And we signed a paper and demanded that the Iranian embassy designate a place for Iranians


9/17

residing in Vancouver, so we can vote in future events. We held this mock elections and, well, thosewho were Green supporters wore their green apparel, and pretty much, we knew that, well, those whowere our favoured candidates, who were also in the mind of people in Iran, got the most votes. Thenext day when we found that [Ahmadinejad who was not prominent in the mind of the majority of

Iranians on both sides of the border] has gotten the votes (Female, student, age 29, in diaspora forfive years)

This very location, a hallmark of the Vancouver downtown core, hosted candlelight vigilsattended by thousands of Iranians dubbed Silent Scream11 for ten nights following theelections, organized by students and advertised in newspapers and online. Vigils werethen held once a week, culminating in the human chain on July 25 which in collaborationwith United for Iran was observed in cities throughout the world. The latter, initiated by aSan Francisco Iranian, became a grassroots movement in over a hundred cities against thepolitical violence, and for civil rights in Iran. This diasporic unity was in solidarity withthe people of, and opposed to theocratic rule in, Iran; as the interviewee explained further:

The omnipresent discussion in Iran is that of religion and politics. The religious leaders now have said

that religion is not separate from politics, and have acted accordingly. These elections, I think, hasdone two things: Firstly, it drew a line between the government and the people. One group becamesupporters of the new government [that of Mr. Ahmadinejad and those whose bread and butter are tied

to his rule]; one group became supporters of people. (Female, student, age 29, in diaspora five years)

She went on to elaborate how this is not just an exilic view, or one experienced withinVancouvers diaspora, but one apparent within Iran. Indeed most participants saw theGreen movement in Vancouver as an act of solidarity with protesters in Iran, who pouredonto its city streets in defiance of the government time and again. Citizen journalism inIran was crucial in providing up-to-the-minute feeds of the political crisis to the outsideworld. Protesters equipped with mobile cameras were particularly hard to control, as theyshot amateur footage of the daily carnage, posted them on personal blogs12, and even sent

them out to mainstream media. Another student activist delved into detail as to the ardentway in which Vancouver Greens relayed this information around the world, whileaffirming that the organizational nature of their participation was ad hoc:

About sharing information: five-ten of us would get in a room when we knew something was goingdown in Iran. We knew that, you know the government has said you cant protest in such and such dayand we knew that people were coming out; they planned for it; so we knew something was going tohappen. For example the inauguration of Ahmadinejad, the day he was inaugurated, we knew thatprotesters would come out and protest this because of the fraudulent way he was elected selectedand so we would sit down with ten laptops in one room, with a T1 [internet] connection. Wed havemaybe 15-20 different blogs and, you know different pages that wed bookmarked each open, alldifferent sources; and wed be constantly going through every single one on a per second basis,

refreshing, and refreshing, and refreshing, just to pull out news. To see what else is coming. We copiedthose names, we paste names to our Facebooks or our Twitters, to our Youtube accounts, re-uploadthese and share them with our social networks. And this would be viral: people in our social networkswould grab them and share them with other people, and there was always one person that would be incharge of sending all of this information to the news institutions: feeding the CNNs, feedings the BBCs,feeding the [VOA]s because they had way more capacity to share this information than ten of us, you

know, with 1000-2000 people in our networks. (Male, student, age 27, in diaspora for about 23 years)


10/17

The names largely referred to those arrested or killed, or other victims of violence. Theanonymity of victims was thus broken in an unprecedented manner. Given that foreignnews agencies were severely restricted in their reporting of these events, internet socialmedia provided a less structured platform for sharing news, and building a dialecticalrapport in part based on personal feelings about the news. As this interviewee highlighted,

the micro-blogging site Twitter was a pertinent tool in allowing for instant snippets ofnews to be aired from the ground, via cellphones. The sinuous nature of this and othersocial networking media made them superior to more traditional, circumvallated media inIran. Such a fresh form of expression was called Irans Twitter Revolution by manyanalysts13, as noted by another interviewee. Also an activist, he went on to explicate thecautious exercise of discerning the situation on the ground, while recalling the viral videoof the brutal shooting ofNeda, (a woman who quickly became a Green folk hero,) on theprimarily representational, online public YouTube14:

The internet played a pivotal role, in terms of spreading the news, in terms of showing whatshappening in Iran. I mean everybody in the world, those who wanted to see, saw, the death of someonelike Neda Agha Soltan. It happened in front of everyones eyes, like, we werent there, but we could

feel, we could put ourselves in that situation. But at the same time, I would say, because obviouslywhat we see, are short clips, theyre not representative of the situation in Iran. So we see a few clips,we think, OK, theres a strong opposition movement in Iran, and there is. But, the reality is that whatwe see are selected portions, and they dont represent the society. (Male, student, age 29, in diaspora

for about nine years)

My analysis here is based on a study of earlier websites which categorizes them as virtualpublics. Its author writes that Internet-mediated publics arein order from least to mostgrounded in geographic placerepresentational; network; and vertical (Parham, 2005,350). In light of this, the aforesaid site Twitter can be seen as a hybrid between both arepresentational and insofar as one can follow specific Tweeters (who in turn can alsoreport on personal news) a networking public. Facebook has elements of all threecategories, including the vertical domain, whose participants are drawn together bymore than a simple or passing interest in discussing a topic of shared interest (Ibid, 357).It allows users to import news articles and links to analyses, while adding personalcomments, thus increasing the potential for the reinscription of writerly texts, as distinctfrom readerly texts15. Video footage posted on sites like Youtube could be unpacked in asimilar fashion, thus inviting people within each readers network(s) to become scriptorsthemselves16. However, since the vertical public is characterized by formal leadershipand by a formal process for establishing membership, including fees (Ibid), the sites inour study and most in use by Iranian diasporic youth, at least in Vancouver) were notvertical in nature. Activists mainly kept use of representational and networking onlinepublics, while recognizing the need to tread vigilantly (to varying degrees) likely due

to the history of meddling in the media already alluded to. One interviewee described hercritical reflexivity17 vis--vis two of these sites in particular, while contrasting her viewwith her insight on the limits to accessing information in Iran:

Well, the observation that we had, was that, definitely Facebook and Youtube changed the way mediawas, starting from the post-election protests. Because, a lot of the times we heard that people in Iran, indifferent locations, they themselves are not aware of, the kind of, the streets [] like the people who arebeing killed, theyre not aware; because the media over there is being filtered. However we on this


11/17

other side, we were seeing all these images; however we dont know how much of it was real, howmuch of it was actually from this time, or if it was from the past and it was being used again, because acouple of times there were clips from the past that were being hijacked to get people excited,

basically we dont know. (Female, student, age 25, in diaspora for about fourteen years)

Despite persistent attempts by the Iranian Cyber Army (ICA) to filter or block access to

information (Frontline, 2010a), some people in Iran circumvented these efforts to accessthese sites18. This holds true for activists here (perhaps even more so), including one whosimilarly remarked a lot of websites were filtered, and so [we] definitely had to usedifferent programs, like Ultrasurf, tunnel programs, proxy servers and sites and links, andso forth, to be able to communicate with Iran. Ultrasurf is a filter-breaker, which letsusers escape state censorship, while encrypting their data to provide security. Thisinterviewee nonetheless recognized his tendency to be circumspect in digesting news ofthe unravelling crisis, elaborating in his interview on how he had his guard up:

I look at everything, I critically analyze everything. But what I mean by [having my] guard up is that Idont let it get to me. Thats what I mean by guard. I dont let it make me go psycho or something,

you know, or I dont let it influence my judgment, um, you know bias my judgment. I try not to let itbias my judgment, and um, you know what I mean? Because when people see that stuff, um, theybecome very emotionally involved; they start either crying or avoiding. And thats not what I mean byguard up; not crying or, or, or having bad dreams about it, or, you know what I mean? Or becomingdepressed, or, or something. A lot of people have that effect; it has that effect on them. What I mean byguard up is I dont, I dont let it have those types of effects on me. Thats what I try to do so thats

what I mean by that. (Male, law graduate, age 28, in diaspora about 26 years)

Though seeming to refer only to representational publics online, these comments areimportant in apprehending a key feature of all online social media, namely their capacityto supersede the once-unrelegable face-to-face time. As one expert notes, For the firsttime in history, the possibility exists for all human interaction to occur in a mediated

realm (UBC Reports, 2010). Forasmuch as this is true, personal judgments can beconstantly balanced against public opinion within online networks.

Conclusions: Future Analysis

The study of online publics that forms a basis for this research, focuses on subalterncounterpublics, insofar as they are parallel discursive arenas where members ofsubordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to formulateoppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs. (Fraser quoted inParham, 2005). Another interviewees remarks shed some light on the push to formulateones personal views online:

I think for me, because, I told you I used to study English literature back home, so, I never felt inclinedto have any sort of, point of view, on any of these things. So the fact that I had many options and that Ihad these variety of things to believe in, or not to believe in maybe, that was comforting. And now thatI feel like, Im being constantly asked what are your political views, or [] your ideology? I feel moreinclined to OK, maybe I should have something, maybe theres something wrong with me. With allthese information that I have, I dont still I cant label myself as being something in particular. So,I think before, it was it didnt matter to me that much when I was back in Iran. Because in Iran, youreally dont have to be, like, you dont have to label yourself in some sort of particular way to say thatI care. But here it seems like in order to have a say, or care about what goes on, you need to be on


12/17

some special side. So now I feel, OK, maybe now it gives me a little anxiety, that confusion. Butbefore, no, that confusion was just the fact that, OK, I still have time to figure out what I want to do.

(Female, Masters student, Vancouver, age 23, in diaspora for about six months)

In response to the question of whether online social networking has the net effect ofreiterating ones biases, or broadening ones worldview, these comments signify the

omnipresence of networking media in shaping our decisions. The overarching question,of whether Vancouvers Iranian youth form a subaltern counterpublic online, is beyondthe scope of analysis here. But previous studies offer some caveats. The first in linewith a contemporary sociologists sentiment that uncoupling communicated opinionsfrom concrete practical obligations tends to have an intellectualizing effect (Habermasquoted in Parham, 2005, 373-4) is the relevance of more traditional methods of debateif they can feed back to their online counterparts. The other caveat is a conception ofdiasporic positioning [that] is not about choosing territories but about newly createdspaces in which territories overlap (Ghorashi and Boersma, 2009, 669). In keeping withthis concept, the initial exilic identity, with its rooted notion of a home left behind, [canbe] replaced by a more rhizomatic network-based diasporic approach to Iran (Ibid, 678).

At least one activist apparently took these caveats to heart, when he travelled with agroup to New York to protest the election results. He, along with a friend, took theopportunity to try to bridge the gap in understanding by speaking to Iranians there,including a couple of permanent representatives of Iran in the UN. He explained howthis led to some scathing within his local relationships, and castigation from severalmembers of his online social network Facebook:

I think When I came back uh we were in New York and we were talking to the Iranian diplomatsand when we came back, I saw that somewhere around ten of my friends, I mean, ten of my contacts,they actually deleted me; just because they found out that we talked to the Iranian diplomats. Andwithout ever knowing what we did there, what we talked about in that meeting and in everything,without any [] They were calling me on my cell phone, and saying did you actually talk tothem? and I said, yeah, I talked to them. And they said OK, I cant, I cant be your friend any morebecause you talked to them. And now, um, my safety is in danger because, we might, we think that yougave out our names or anything. So they dont know the context of the discussions that we had with

the diplomats, so (Male, graduate student, age 26, in diaspora for app. 14 years)

Ironically this story can be used to show that, far from being deterritorialized, home isconstructed by external relationships as much as it is by internal relations; it is unbounded,open, and constantly changing (Staeheli and Nagel, 2006, 1600). Yet it gives us hope tolearn that Political attachment, it seems, may be expanded rather than allocated; it is nota zero-sum, as some of the transnational literature and political debate suggests (Ibid,1613). It remains unclear to me as to whether the threat of Iranian intelligence lurking

in the shadows is indeed the primary cause of dismemberment within online publics,though its study deserves attention. A possible alternative may be that migrant classrelations replicate and reinforce historic class identities, as discovered in a study oftransnational Iranians in London, Sydney, and Vancouver (McAuliffe, 2008, 68). Thesame study found however, that [u]nlike Iran, and to some extent the widersocioeconomic disparities of London, there were fewer socioeconomic barriers tosegregate higher class Iranians from mixing with the lower classes in Vancouver (Ibid,69).And if educational background can be used as a proxy, the majority of my studys


13/17

participants can be considered middle-class. Additional studies looking at elements ofchange in social stratification (offline publics) within this Iranian diaspora and others, caninform us as to any links to cyber capital, that is, social capital within their onlinecounterparts. Further research that follows Iranian diasporic communities links to rootsin Iran though difficult would probably prove of no lesser importance.

Chart A: Means of Keeping in Touch with Relatives and/or Friends in Iran

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Email Telephone Personal

Visit(s)

Reports from

Relatives

Voice Over

Internet

Protocol

Postal Mail

Rank1 (For first 25 participants)

Rank2 (For all 28 participants)

Number for Whom This is the Primary Means (Out of

25)

Chart B: Means of Preserving 'Iranian Heritage'

0

5

10

15

20

25

Still MaintainingCultural Ties

Joining Persian/IranianCommunity Activities

Reading Memoirs fromIran

Reading HistoricalTexts about Iran

Other Means

No. of Participants (Out of 25)


14/17

Chart C: Channels of Receiving, Digesting, and Disseminating News about Iran

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

Youtu

be

Facebo

okBB

C

BBCFa

rsi

Reports

from

Relativ

es

Online

News

Gooya

Websit

e

USFa

rsiTV

CBC

Google

USTV

IranNe

wsOnline

Twitt

er

FarsiP

apers

Ca

nadian

TVOthe

rIRNA IR

IB

PersonalVi

sits

Rank1 (For first 25 participants)

Rank2 (For all 28 participants)

Number for Whom Media is of Primary Use (Out of25)

Chart D: How did you become Aware of locally organized events in solidarity with Iranian victims of

political instability and violence in the aftermath of the 2009 Elections?

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

Twitter Posts Local TV News No Response Local Farsi

Newspapers

Other Facebook Posts Word of Mouth

of Family orFriends



15/17

Chart E: Questions Designed to Gauge the Cohort's Level of Understanding and Political Awareness

0

5

10

15

20

25

Are you

familiar withthe expression

exilesyndrome?

Were you

aware of Iransnuclear

ambitions priorto the disputed

2009

PresidentialElections?

Were you

aware of anychanges in

U.S.Administration

policy toward

Iran prior to thedisputed 2009


Were you

aware of anychanges in

U.S.Administration

policy toward

Iran after to thedisputed 2009


Were you

aware of theStand with the

Iranian PeopleAct (SWIPA),

introduced in

the U.S.Congress?

Were you

aware of theIranian Digital

EmpowermentAct (IDEA),

introduced i n

the U.S.Congress?

Total Score Based on No. of Participants (Out of25) Who Answered "Yes" ['Score 1'] "No" ['Score 0']or "Somewhat" ['Score 0.5']

Chart F: "National Character" + Demographic Majority Status

0

5

10

15

20

25

Iranian Persian Canadian Other Hybrid Demographical ID:

Shia Majority



16/17

Works Cited

Barraclough, S. "Satellite television in Iran: prohibition, imitation and reform." MiddleEastern Studies . 37.3 (2001): 25-48.

Dabashi, H. Iran: a people interrupted. New York: The New Press, 2007.Dabashi, H. "Iran's new chant is 'Death to no one!'." CNN Opinion. CNN, 04 Nov 2009.Web. 26 Apr 2010.


17/17

Naficy, H. "From broadcasting to narrowcasting: Middle Eastern diaspora in LosAngeles." Middle East Report. 80. (1993): 31-34.Parham, A. "Internet, place, and public sphere i n diaspora communities." Diaspora.14.2 (2005): 349-380.Parsa, M. "Entrepreneurs and democratization: Iran and the Philippines." ComparativeStudies in Society and History . 37.4 (1995): 803-830.

Shaghafi, M. "The new landscape of Iranian p olitics." Middle East Report. 233. (2004):16-23.Sreberny-Mohammadi, A., and A. Mohammadi. "Post-revolutionary Iranian exiles: Astudy in impotence."Third World Quarterly . 9.1 (1987): 108-129.Staehil, Lynn, and Caroline Nagel. "Topographies of home and citizenship: Arab-American activists in the United States." Environment and Planning A . 38. (2006): 1599-1614."Social media: changing the shared ex perience." UBC Reports 56.4 (2010). 26 Apr2010. .Valizadeh, R. "Freedom of speech... But not today." Frontline: Tehran Bureau (2010b):n. pag. Web. 26 Apr 2010.."Voice of America (TV) Persian News Network inter view, 06 Nov 2009." NoamChomsky interviewed by Siamak Dehghanpour. Web. 26 Apr 2010..

Works Consulted

Alexanian, J. "Publicly intimate online: Iranian web logs in SouthernCalifornia." Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the M iddle East. 26.1(2006): 134-145.Darznik, J. "The perils and seductions of home: return narratives of the Iraniandiaspora." MELUS. 33.2 (2008): 55-71.Naficy, H. "Identity politics and Iranian exile music videos." Iranian Studies. 31.1(1998): 51-64.Nazeri, H. "Imagined cyber communities, Iranians and the internet." Middle EastStudies Association Bulletin. 30.2 (1996)

Spreen, M., and R. Zwaagstra. "Personal network sampling, Outdegree analysis andmultilevel analysis: Introducing the network concept in studies of hidden populations.

International Sociology. 9. (1994): 474-491.

Vahabzadeh, P. "Where will I dwell? a sociology of literary identity within the Iraniandiaspora."Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East. 28.3 (2008):495-512.Van den Bos, M. "Hyperlinked Dutch-Iranian cyberspace." International Sociology.

21.1 (2006): 83-99.Varis, T. "Peace and communication: an appr oach by flow studies." Journal of PeaceResearch. 19.3 (1982): 241-250.Watts, M. "Are there typical age curves in political behavior? The a ge invariancehypothesis and political socialization." Political Psychology . 20.3 (1999): 477-499.

Red White and Green

Documents

Transcript of Red White and Green