RECONSTRUCTING IRAQ: INSIGHTS,

CHALLENGES, AND MISSIONS FOR MILITARY

FORCES IN A POST-CONFLICT SCENARIO

Conrad C. Crane

W. Andrew Terrill

February 2003

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Dr. Conrad Crane was in charge of an Army War College facultyteam that included Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, Colonel George Oliver,Colonel Stephen Kidder, Colonel Tom McShane, LTC Mike Esper, andProfessor William Kiehl. Colonel Robert McClure of DCS, G-3coordinated support from the Army Staff. Interim reports wereprepared and presented to a joint and interagency workshop conductedby Dr. Crane and Dr. Terrill in December. Outside attendees were fromthe Department of Defense, the State Department, the Joint Staff, theArmy Staff, National Defense University, Joint Forces Command,AUSA/RAMP, and SAIC. Especially notable were contributions fromDr. John Finney, RADM(ret) John Siglar, Colonel Paul Hughes, Colonel(retired) Scott Feil, Mr. Joseph (Barry) Hughes, LTC Guy Sands-Pingot,and Ms. Sarah E. Peter.

NOTICES

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and donot necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department ofthe Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Thisreport is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

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ISBN 1-58487-112-1

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FOREWORD

During World War II, the U.S. military’s extensiveplanning for the occupation of Germany was a major factorin achieving long-term strategic objectives after the warwas won. More recent examples of military operations alsoemphasize the challenges of post-conflict operations and thecriticality of detailed planning and preparation. As thepossibility of war with Iraq looms on the horizon, it isimportant to look beyond the conflict to the challenges ofoccupying the country.

In October 2002, the U.S. Army War College’s StrategicStudies Institute, in coordination with the Office of theArmy Deputy Chief of Staff/G-3, initiated a study to analyzehow American and coalition forces can best address therequirements that will necessarily follow operationalvictory in a war with Iraq. The objectives of the project wereto determine and analyze probable missions for militaryforces in a post-Saddam Iraq; examine associatedchallenges; and formulate strategic recommendations fortransferring responsibilities to coalition partners or civilianorganizations, mitigating local animosity, and facilitatingoverall mission accomplishment in the war againstterrorism.

The Strategic Studies Institute organized aninterdisciplinary team under the leadership of Dr. ConradC. Crane and Dr. W. Andrew Terrill. The team’s initialfindings were vetted at a joint and interagency workshopconducted in December. The final report of the projectconsists of three parts: a discussion of historical insightsfrom 20th century postwar occupations and post-conflictoperations; an analysis of the unique challenges Iraq willpresent for an occupying power; and a mission matrix thatlists 135 specific tasks that must be performed to build andsustain a state. The matrix arrays those tasks across fourphases of occupation and designates whether coalition

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military forces or civilian agencies should perform them.The study has much to offer planners and executors ofoperations to occupy and reconstruct Iraq, but also hasmany insights that will apply to achieving strategicobjectives in any conflict after hostilities are concluded.

In recent decades, U.S. civilian and military leadershiphave shied away from nation-building. However, thecurrent war against terrorism has highlighted the dangerposed by failed and struggling states. If this nation and itscoalition partners decide to undertake the mission toremove Saddam Hussein, they will also have to be preparedto dedicate considerable time, manpower, and money to theeffort to reconstruct Iraq after the fighting is over.Otherwise, the success of military operations will beephemeral, and the problems they were designed toeliminate could return or be replaced by new and morevirulent difficulties.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute

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SUMMARY

During the latter half of the 20th century, U.S. militaryleaders and planners focused heavily on winning wars, andnot so much on the peacekeeping or nation-building thatcomes afterwards. But national objectives can often beaccomplished only after the fighting has ceased. With thewinds of war swirling around Iraq, it is time to beginplanning for the post-conflict reconstruction of that state.This monograph presents some historical insights from pastoccupations and peace operations, provides some additionalanalysis of the unique requirements involved in remakingIraq, and, most importantly, develops a detailed list ofpotential tasks to help contemporary military commandersplan for post-conflict operations there.

Most analysts and commentators focus on World War IIfor insights about occupying states and replacing regimes.Clearly, the American experience with occupations aftermajor wars provides valuable insights about the importanceof long and detailed planning for such missions, and aboutjust how difficult demilitarization and democratization canbe, even under the best of conditions. The world has changeda great deal since 1945, however. The experiences of the1990s are generally more relevant to shape post-conflictoperations in Iraq. They reveal past inadequacies in Armyplanning and preparation, and the difficulties in findingcompetent and resourced civilian agencies to assumeresponsibilities from the military. Recent experiences alsoshow that even when the Army plans and performs well in apost-crisis environment, as it did in Haiti, strategic successis not guaranteed. That state quickly reverted back to chaoswhen military forces left.

Iraq presents far from ideal conditions for achievingstrategic goals. Saddam Hussein is the culmination of aviolent political culture that is rooted in a tortured history.Ethnic, tribal, and religious schisms could produce civil war

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or fracture the state after Saddam is deposed. The IraqiArmy may be useful as a symbol of national unity, but it willtake extensive reeducation and reorganization to operate ina more democratic state. Years of sanctions have debilitatedthe economy and created a society dependent on the UN Oilfor Food Program. Rebuilding Iraq will require aconsiderable commitment of American resources, but thelonger U.S. presence is maintained, the more likely violentresistance will develop.

The monograph concludes by developing and describinga phased array of tasks that must be accomplished to createand sustain a viable state. The 135 tasks are organized into21 categories, and rated as “essential,” “critical,” or“important” for the commander of coalition military forces.They are then projected across four phases of transition—Security, Stabilize, Build Institutions, and Handover/Redeploy—to reflect which governmental, nongovern-mental, and international organizations will be involved inexecution during each phase. To reduce the amount ofresentment about the occupation in Iraq and thesurrounding region, it is essential that military forceshandover responsibilities to civilian agencies as soon aspracticable. They, in turn, should relinquish control fairlyquickly to the Iraqis, though not until well-defined coalitionmeasures of effectiveness have been achieved for each task.

The U.S. Army has been organized and trainedprimarily to fight and win the nation’s major wars.Nonetheless, the Service must prepare for victory in peaceas well.

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RECONSTRUCTING IRAQ: CHALLENGES ANDMISSIONS FOR MILITARY FORCES IN A

POST-CONFLICT SCENARIO

INTRODUCTION

By the time Germany surrendered in May 1945, detailedAllied planning for the occupation of that nation had beenongoing for 2 years. All staff sections at Supreme

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CONCLUSIONS:

� To be successful, an occupation such as that contem-plated after any hostilities in Iraq requires much detailedinteragency planning, many forces, multi-year militarycommitment, and a national commitment to nation-building.

� Recent American experiences with post-conflictoperations have generally featured poor planning,problems with relevant military force structure, anddifficulties with a handover from military to civilianresponsibility.

� To conduct their share of the essential tasks that mustbe accomplished to reconstruct an Iraqi state, militaryforces will be severely taxed in military police, civilaffairs, engineer, and transportation units, in addition topossible severe security difficulties.

� The administration of an Iraqi occupation will becomplicated by deep religious, ethnic, and tribaldifferences which dominate Iraqi society.

� U.S. forces may have to manage and adjudicateconflicts among Iraqis that they can barely comprehend.

� An exit strategy will require the establishment ofpolitical stability, which will be difficult to achieve givenIraq’s fragmented population, weak political institu-tions, and propensity for rule by violence.

Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces and Army Groupheadquarters invested considerable resources in developingwhat became Operation ECLIPSE. The plan correctlypredicted most of the tasks required of the units occupyingthe defeated country. Within 3 months, those formationshad disarmed and demobilized German armed forces, caredfor and repatriated four million POWs and refugees,restored basic services to many devastated cities,discovered and quashed a potential revolt, created workinglocal governments, and reestablished police and the courts.1

In contrast, LTG John Yeosock, commander of ThirdArmy in Operation DESERT STORM, could get no usefulstaff support to assess and plan for post-conflict issues likehospital beds, prisoners, and refugees, complaining laterthat he was handed a “dripping bag of manure” that no oneelse wanted to deal with.2 Neither the Army nor theDepartment of Defense (DoD) had an adequate plan forpostwar operations to rebuild Kuwait, and civilian agencieswere even more unprepared. The situation was onlysalvaged by the adept improvisations of Army engineersand civil affairs personnel, and the dedicated efforts ofKuwaiti volunteers and the Saudi Arabian government.3

Some of the deficiencies in postwar planning forDESERT STORM can be attributed to the fact that ThirdArmy was the first American field army in combat since theKorean War. Post- conflict planning historically has been afunction of headquarters at echelons above corps, andcontinuing problems with more recent operations are atleast partly attributable to the generally small scale ofAmerican interventions. Difficulties also result from thefact that for at least the latter half of the 20th century, U.S.Army leaders and planners focused predominantly onwinning wars, not on the peacekeeping or nation-buildingthat comes afterwards. But national objectives can often beaccomplished only after the fighting has ceased; a wartactically and operationally “won” can still lead to strategic“loss” if post-conflict operations are poorly planned orexecuted.

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With the winds of war swirling around Iraq, it is alreadypast time to begin planning for the post-conflictreconstruction of that state. Many historical insights can begained from past occupations and peace operations. Withsome additional analysis of the unique requirementsinvolved in remaking Iraq, a list of potential tasks can bedeveloped to help contemporary military commandersenvision what they need to do in order to achieve theeffectiveness of Operation ECLIPSE if a lengthy occupationof Iraq is required.

PART I: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF AMERICANOCCUPATIONS

The American army of occupation lacked both training andorganization to guide the destinies of the nearly one millioncivilians whom the fortunes of war had placed under itstemporary sovereignty.

COL Irwin L. Hunt, 19204

Recent history provides a number of useful examples toillustrate the missions and challenges involved inpost-conflict operations. Though recent cases have moreoften involved restoring regimes than changing them, manyvaluable insights still can be gained from careful analysis.

Panama. Operations in Panama leading to theoverthrow of the Noriega regime have been touted as amodel use of quick and decisive American military force,5

but post-conflict activities did not go as smoothly. The crisisperiod was exceptionally long, beginning with publicrevelations about General Manuel Noriega’s nefariousactivities in June 1987 and culminating with the executionof Operation JUST CAUSE in December 1989. Planning formilitary intervention began as early as February 1988.6

When Noriega annulled the election of May 1989, sent hisparamilitary thugs to assault opposition candidates, andincreased his harassment of Americans, the United Statesexecuted Operation NIMROD DANCER. This show of force,

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executed by U.S. Southern Command, was designed to showfurther American resolve, in the hope that it would pressureNoriega to modify his behavior. When there was no obviousmodification, the President directed the execution ofOperation JUST CAUSE. A textbook example of the qualityof the new armed forces and doctrine developed in theUnited States, it encompassed the simultaneous assault of27 targets at night.7

Due to a focus on conducting a decisive operation and notthe complete campaign, the aftermath of this smaller scalecontingency (SSC) did not go as smoothly, however.Planning for the post-conflict phase, Operation PROMOTELIBERTY, was far from complete when the short period ofhostilities began. Missions and responsibilities were vague,and planners failed to appreciate adequately the effects ofcombat operations and overthrowing the regime.8 Thoughguidance from SOUTHCOM on post-hostility missions wasfairly clear, tactically oriented planners at the 18thAirborne Corps (in charge of the joint task force carrying outthe operation) gave post-conflict tasks short shrift. Forinstance, the plan assigned the lone MP battalion theresponsibility for running a detention facility, conductingsecurity for all of the numerous convoys, and providingsecurity for many key facilities, as well as for being preparedto restore law and order.9 Though the battalion was mainlyconcerned with a relatively small geographic portion of thecountry, it was quickly overwhelmed by its responsibilities.

With the elimination of the Panamanian Defense Force,the task of restoring law and order became particularlydemanding, as looting and vandalism spread throughoutthe country. Chaos reigned as American forces scrambled torestore some semblance of order.10 Military policementrained in law and order missions did not perform well inunfamiliar combat operations, and were inadequate innumbers to deal with the problems they faced in theaftermath.11 They also could not handle all displacedpersonnel and the enemy prisoners of war for which theywere now responsible. Similarly, there were not enough civil

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affairs personnel or engineers for the rebuilding effort.Personnel deficiencies were exacerbated by slow anddisorganized Reserve call-ups relying on volunteers.Political-military interagency cooperation was also poor, asmany agencies were excluded from DoD planning and theembassy was severely understaffed.12

Senior commanders admitted afterwards that they haddone poorly in planning for post-conflict operations andhoped the Army would remedy that situation in the future.13

Despite these deficiencies, the U.S. Military Support Group,activated in January 1990 to support the growth ofindependent Panamanian institutions, was able to bedeactivated just 1 year later in a much more stable country;though whether it or Panamanian leaders deserved mostcredit for this success was unclear to observers.14

Haiti. Like Panama, this was another SSC in response toa long-festering crisis. It began with the military overthrowof President Jean-Bertrande Aristide by LieutenantGeneral Raoul Cedras in September 1991. On April 1, 1993,the JCS sent the first alert order to CINCUSACOM to beginplanning for contingency operations in Haiti. Planning foractive intervention intensified in October of that year afterarmed protesters in Port Au Prince turned away a shiploaded with UN peacekeepers. During the next year,international pressure on the military leaders of Haitiincreased, and was intensified even further by obviousAmerican preparations for an invasion. The decision of theHaitian government in September 1994 to return PresidentAristide to power was to a large extent taken because theyknew Army helicopters and 10th Mountain Divisionsoldiers aboard the USS Eisenhower, along with elements ofthe 82nd Airborne Division deployed from Fort Bragg, wereheading for Haiti.15 In fact, General Cedras did not begin tonegotiate seriously with the American diplomaticdelegation until he had confirmed that the 82d Airbornecontingent was in the air. The overwhelming force deployedin the initial occupation and the soldiers’ professional anddisciplined conduct and appearance in continuing

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operations did much to deter and control the actions ofpotential troublemakers.16

The long lead-time between the beginning of the crisisand actual military intervention, combined with lessonslearned from operations like those in Panama and Somalia,greatly facilitated planning for Operation UPHOLDDEMOCRACY.17 USACOM prepared operational plans forboth forced and unopposed entry, while the DoD conductedextensive interagency coordination.18 Its Haiti PlanningGroup, with the assistance of other government agencies,prepared a detailed “Interagency Checklist for Restorationof Essential Services.” The lead agency for all majorfunctional areas was the U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID), with DoD support (mostly fromArmy units) in reestablishing public administration,conducting elections, restoring information services,assisting the Department of Justice with setting up andtraining a police force, planning disaster preparedness andresponse, running airports, and caring for refugees.Military units did have primary responsibility for securitymeasures, such as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD),protecting foreign residents, and demobilizing paramilitarygroups. These were mostly Army functions, and the serviceprovided 96 percent of deployed military forces.19

These plans and their execution were affected by thedesire of military leaders to avoid getting involved with“nation-building” missions such as those that had led to somuch grief in Somalia. Army lawyers wrestled withinterpreting humanitarian requests for reconstruction toclassify them as related to the mission or as nation-building.Those requests that fell into the former category wereapproved, while those interpreted as nation-building weredenied.20 Medical units were told to focus on supporting theJoint Task Force (JTF) and not humanitarian assistance, asleaders were concerned about not replacing the medicalfacilities of the host nation.21 This reluctance to embracepeacekeeping or nation-building had its most regrettableresult on September 20, 1994, when restrictive rules of

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engagement prohibited American forces from interveningas Haitian police killed two demonstrators. The next day,American officials expanded the rules of engagement toallow more military involvement in restoring andmaintaining law and order.22

Similar expansion of Army roles and missions happenedin most other areas of the restoration efforts.23 Theattorneys eventually rationalized that any action that madeAmericans look good lessened security risks and couldtherefore be approved as mission-related.24 Othergovernmental agencies were slow to arrive or build upresources, so the military picked up the slack. Generally,the other departments had not done the detailed planningthat DoD had, and often wanted more support than DoDhad expected to provide.25 A typical example was when theAmbassador to Haiti asked for military advisers to help newgovernment ministries get established until efforts fromUSAID and the State Department could begin to bear fruit.The result was the hasty deployment of a ministerialadvisor team from the 358th Civil Affairs (CA) Brigade, “thefirst large scale implementation of a civil administrationeffort since World War II.”26 The scope and pace of CAmissions increased so rapidly that they threatened to getout of control, and raised fears that such actions would onlyheighten Haitian expectations that U.S. forces could fix allthe nation’s problems, and thus set the people up for greatdisappointment later.27

These expanded missions caused many other problems,to some extent because CA units are relatively smallorganically, and require considerable support from otherorganizations. Engineer planning, equipment, andpersonnel were inadequate for their required civil affairsand reconstruction projects. Soldiers had to develop newpolicies and procedures to help set up internal securityforces and expend funds. This often required “workingaround” Title 10, U.S. Code, restrictions. They assumedexpanded roles in maintaining law and order, includingmanning and operating detention facilities and developing

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new crowd control techniques. Items like latrines and policeuniforms were in short supply. Doctrine and personnel werenot available to establish proper liaison with the myriadcivilian organizations working in the country. Intelligenceassets were severely taxed, and the force in Haiti had to relyheavily on theater and national intelligence assets to makeup for deficiencies.28

However, the military in general, and the Army inparticular, has received much praise for its performance inHaiti. Nonetheless, since the last American troops left theisland in April 1996, the situation there has deteriorated toconditions approaching those early in the 1990s. Withoutlong-term military involvement, most U.S. policy goals havebeen frustrated. The civilian agencies that replacedmilitary forces have not had the same resources available,and persistent flaws in the Haitian economy, judicialsystem, and political leadership have obstructed reform.American officials have decried the results of recentelections, and admitted the failure of their policies. Even theSecretary General of the UN recommended againstrenewing the mission there.29 Between 1992 and 1995, theUnited States spent over 1.6 billion dollars for operations inHaiti. Over $950 million of that was expended through DoD,and mostly for Army operations, to include theadministration of large refugee camps.30 One key lessonfrom that frustrating experience is that the redeployment ofmilitary forces should be predicated on the achievement ofdesignated measures of effectiveness, and not based on timelimits. Another is that follow-on civilian agencies must becapable of maintaining those standards as well as achievingnew ones.

The Balkans. The U.S. Army has picked up its usualpredominant load of post-conflict tasks requiring severalthousand troops in Bosnia and Kosovo, and seems resignedto a long-term commitment in the region. Rotationalschedules have been prepared through 2005, and there havebeen discussions in Washington about establishing a“permanent presence” there.31

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Current American operations in the Balkans againreveal how force and mission requirements change duringthe post-conflict phase. Eighteen months after the signingof the agreement between NATO and the Yugoslav Armyover Kosovo, U.S. Army troops there were still engaged in“peacekeeping with an iron fist.” They were primarilyfocused on establishing a safe and secure environmentunder the rule of law, with patrols backed by armoredvehicles and detention centers to control troublemakers.The UN-NATO justice system has been heavily criticized,and a Judge Advocate General Legal Assessment Teamfound the UN mission in Kosovo so severely short offacilities and personnel to establish the rule of law that itrecommended teams of 15 Army lawyers be rotated throughthe country to reinforce the UN effort. Additionally, theresentment of impatient Kosovars has grown against a UNpresence that seems to be making little progress toward atransition to local control.32

Efforts in Bosnia are more advanced, and theenvironment more secure and peaceful. Deployed Armytask forces have become lighter with every rotation, andhave moved from immediate security concerns towardsenhancing long-term stability. By late 1997 it becameapparent to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) that a largedisparity existed between the ability of military forces toachieve their initially assigned tasks of the GeneralFramework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) and that of theirless-capable civilian counterparts to meet their ownimplementation requirements. SFOR realized it could notdisengage with such a large “GFAP Gap” remaining, andexpanded its mission to “assist international organizationsto set the conditions for civilian implementation of theGFAP in order to transition the area of operations to a stableenvironment.” U.S. military leaders on the scene recognizedthey were moving into the area of nation-building, but sawno alternative if SFOR was ever going to be able to withdrawor significantly reduce its commitment without risking thepeace.33

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As the nature of the stability operations and supportoperations in Bosnia evolved, so did the requirements of thepeacekeeping force. It needed fewer combat troops and moreengineers, military police, and civil affairs personnel.Intelligence requirements changed and expanded.After-action reports highlighted many shortfalls in theBalkans force structure and peacekeeping policies, many ofthem common to previous SSCs. Army lawyers again provedadept at “thinking outside traditional fiscal rules andapplications” to support operational requirements.34 Theroles of military policemen expanded to include performingas maneuver battalion task forces and working withinternational law enforcement agencies.35 Difficulties withtactical MPs trying to perform law and order missionsreappeared.36

There were problems again with shortages and recallprocedures for Reserve Components engineer, militaryintelligence, and civil affairs augmentation.37 The massiveengineering requirements for Operations JOINTENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD especially highlightedbranch deficiencies with command and control,construction unit allocations, and bridging.38 A split-basedlogistics system trying to meet requirements in the Balkansand back in the Central Region of Europe requiredconsiderable augmentation, but still strained combatsupport and combat service support assets considerably.39

Liaison officers were in great demand, not just as JointCommission Observers with the Entity Armed Forces, butalso to coordinate with the myriad non-governmentalorganizations and other civilian agencies.40 There wereshortages of linguists throughout the theater, whichespecially exacerbated problems with intelligence. Militaryintelligence doctrine was completely inadequate forsupporting peace operations, and understaffed intelligenceunits had to adapt as best they could for the complex“multi-service, multi-agency, and multi-national” situationfurther complicated by a host of treaty requirements.41

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A Defense Science Board study concluded that Balkanoperations revealed many shortcomings in psychologicaloperations, as well, especially in planning and resources tosupport engagement and post-conflict activities for all thegeographic combatant commanders.42 Even with all theseproblems, Army units in Bosnia have continued to compile asuperlative record of accomplishments. However, the“GFAP Gap” remains, with recurring UN problemscoordinating and directing civilian agencies. Recentelections were dominated by continuing politicaldivisiveness, reflecting the limited progress in changingpeople’s attitudes.43 However, while American militaryleaders have complained about the troops remaining in theBalkans, the fact that decisions about their redeploymenthave been based on achieving measures of effectiveness andnot on reaching a time limit has at least insured stability inthe region.

Insights from Major Wars.

The world has changed a great deal since the massiveoccupation efforts that followed World War II, and theexperiences of the 1990s are generally more relevant inshaping possible post-conflict operations in Iraq. However,a number of important guidelines can be obtained fromanalyzing major American wars of the 20th century.

The Philippines. In the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, the United States began a long occupation ofthe Philippine Islands that officially ended with theirindependence in 1946. This lengthy transition to self-government is not typical of American experiences withoccupation, and the most useful insights are to be gleanedfrom the early years, when American forces were trying tosubdue resistance and establish control in the formerSpanish colony.

One aspect of post-conflict operations that becomes veryclear from the Philippines example is that they aremisnamed. To be successful, they need to begin before the

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shooting stops. “Transition Operations” is probably a betterterm, and they will be conducted simultaneously withcombat. Appropriate planning must be completed before theconflict begins, so military forces are prepared to beginimmediately accomplishing transition tasks in newly-controlled areas. All soldiers will need to accept duties thatare typically considered in the purview of CA detachments.There will not be enough CA troops to go around, andimmediate needs will have to be met by whomever is on thescene. Even in the midst of combat, leaders and theirsoldiers must keep in mind the long-term goals of peace andstability, and conduct themselves accordingly.44

In the Philippines, both military and civilian officialsrecognized that the best agent for local pacification was themilitary leader on the spot. Considerable decentralizationwas required for a situation where village attitudes andcharacteristics varied widely. Officers had great discretionand were not closely supervised, though they also had cleardirectives from higher headquarters providing guidelines.The requirement for local familiarity meant that soldierscould not be rotated quickly. In village societies personalrelationships are important, and take considerable timeand effort to establish. The Army had to accept some declinein the combat efficiency of its units in order to keep them inlengthy occupation duties. Troops had to be aware of thecultures they were in, and not try to force American values.Knowledge of the Koran and local customs were importantfor everyone. Even John J. Pershing could spend hourstalking to local imams about religion. This does not lessenthe requirement to achieve the right balance of force andrestraint, but the long-term consequences must beconsidered for every action. General Leonard Wood’spredilection for punitive forays in response to even minorincidents like theft did cow many Moro chiefs, but he alsoundermined many alliances and relationships pain-stakingly established by local commanders. Instead ofquieting small disturbances, Wood’s expeditions oftencreated larger problems by driving pacified or neutral

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villages into joining more rebellious ones, and made it moredifficult for his subordinates to gain local trust.45

Germany. The United States has been involved in theoccupation of Germany twice in the past century. At theconclusion of World War I, 200,000 American troops movedto positions around Coblenz, preparing for the possibilitythat the Germans would not sign the peace treaty. Whenthey agreed to the Versailles Treaty in the summer of 1919,the occupation force rapidly diminished, numbering only16,000 a year later. By the end of 1922 that figure was downto 1200, and all left the next year.46 Though the bulk ofresponsibility for the details of the occupation and regimechange fell on other Allied governments, occupyingAmerican troops did find themselves in charge of a millioncivilians. The U.S. Army and government had not reallyaccepted the administration of civil government in occupiedenemy territory as a legitimate military function after theMexican War, Civil War, or Spanish-American War, and theofficer in charge of civil affairs for the U.S. militarygovernment in the Rhineland after World War I lamentedthat the American army of occupation “lacked both trainingand organization” to perform its duties.47

As World War II approached, Army War Collegecommittees went back to the World War I reports anddeveloped formal doctrine for military government. In thespring of 1942, a School of Military Government wasestablished at the University of Virginia, and thinkingbegan there about postwar reconstructions of Germany,Japan, and Italy.48 This new emphasis produced OperationECLIPSE and the impressive success described previously.Despite the many differences between Iraq and Germany,valuable insights can still be gained from that occupationexperience, the most important of which is the value of along detailed planning process far in advance of the start ofoccupation.

Before any Allied armies entered Germany, plannersdesignated specific military governance units to follow

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combat forces closely. The first civil affairs detachment inthe country set itself up in Roetgen on September 15, 1944,only 4 days after U.S. troops entered Germany. Once theThird Reich surrendered, small mobile detachments weresent out immediately to every town in the U.S. occupationzone. Typically, unit commanders confronted mayors with anumber of demands: a list of local soldiers and partymembers; the turn-in of all military and civilian firearms;and housing for American troops. In addition, detachmentleaders imposed curfews after dark and immobilized thepopulation. They also had the authority to replaceuncooperative mayors.49

The regime in Germany was changed from the bottomup. Local elections and councils were allowed to function,and responsibility was shifted to local authorities as quicklyas possible. State governments were next in priority, andonly after they were working effectively were nationalelections considered. At the same time, political life wasstrictly controlled to prevent any resurgence of radicalism,although public opinion polls were conducted on an almostweekly basis to monitor what the German people thoughtabout occupation policies. The German legal profession wastotally corrupted by the Nazis, and each occupying ally tooka slightly different approach in reestablishing courts. TheBritish used a lot of old Nazi lawyers and judges, while theAmericans tried to reform the whole system, a slow process.The best solution was probably the one the Soviets applied,where they found educated and politically loyal people andgave them 6 weeks of legal training. Their system builtaround these “lay judges” got criminal and civil courtsystems working very quickly.50

One of the most vexing problems for occupationauthorities was how to dismantle the Nazi Party and itssecurity apparatus while retaining the skills of somemembers who performed important functions. This wasaccomplished by having every adult German fill out adetailed questionnaire about their associations. There wereheavy penalties for lying or failing to answer questions. A

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board of anti-Nazi Germans reviewed the Fragebogen(German for “questionnaire”) and determined which peoplehad held leadership positions and deserved to have theirpolitical and economic activities curtailed for theoccupation. By the time they were allowed to regain theirrights, democratic Germans were so solidly established thata Nazi revival was impossible. A similar approach mightwork to demobilize and reintegrate members of the BaathParty and security forces in Iraq.51

Japan. The occupation force for Japan, a country slightlysmaller than Iraq, included almost 23 divisions amountingto more than 500,000 soldiers in 1945. Most ground forceswere American, though allies were used in some sensitiveareas, such as British and Australian units in Hiroshima.52

While there had been ongoing interdepartmental delib-erations in Washington about occupying Japan since theaftermath of Pearl Harbor, the actual planning in thePacific for Operation BLACKLIST did not begin until May1945.53 Within 2 years, most Japanese soldiers had beendisarmed and repatriated (except from Soviet-controlledareas), a “purge” list of persons restricted from politicalactivity had been completed, basic services were restored,police reform programs were implemented, the economywas restarted, land reform was begun, and the nationadopted a new democratic constitution that renounced waras an instrument of national policy.54

In October 2002, reports emerged that the Bushadministration was looking at the Japanese occupation as amodel for achieving democratization and demilitarizationin Iraq. Since then, the administration appears to havewithdrawn from that position, and many experts havehighlighted the important differences between thescenarios. The Japanese surrendered unconditionally aftertotal defeat, and the whole world acknowledged the legalityand necessity of Allied occupation. Millions were dead, citieswere in ashes, and the populace was destitute and cowed.Their more homogeneous culture did not feature the ethnic,tribal, and religious divisions so evident in Iraq, and the

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Japanese were conditioned to obey the command of theemperor to accept defeat and submit to their conquerors.They also had some experience with limited democracy,though it may be argued that Iraq had some similarexperiences during their earlier history this past century.An additional major difference is that Iraq is much richer innatural resources than Japan, providing another set ofopportunities for occupying powers.55 However, OperationBLACKLIST does provide useful insights about purgingundesirable political elements, and on how to design theinsertion of military forces into a situation where thepossibility of armed resistance remains ambiguous.Similarities exist between the way Americans viewed theJapanese in 1945 and the way they perceive Iraq today, as atotally foreign and non-Western culture.56

These factors will be discussed in more detail in the restof this monograph. While the success of DouglasMacArthur’s experience illustrates the benefits of havingstrong centralized leadership of the occupation force, he alsohad the advantage of years of relative quiet to carry out hisprograms. Policymakers and most of the rest of the worldwere more concerned with developments in Europe. Thatwill not be the case with post-conflict Iraq in the midst ofMiddle East tumult. All American activities will be watchedclosely by the international community, and internal andexternal pressure to end any occupation will build quickly.John Dower, who has written the seminal work on theAmerican occupation of Japan, argues strongly that it doesnot provide a useful model for Iraq, with the importantcaveat that it should give a clear warning to currentpolicymakers, “Even under circumstances that turned outto be favorable, demilitarization and democratization wereawesome challenges.”57

Applying Historical Insights to Iraq.

While none of the historical cases described aboveprovide an ideal model for reconstructing Iraq, some

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insights should be applied there. Detailed long-terminteragency planning for occupation is important, and canconsiderably smooth transition. MacArthur’s staff managedto develop Operation BLACKLIST in just over 3 months,but analysis for such a course had been going on for yearsback in the United States, it required little interagencycoordination, and the Far East Command staff made manyadjustments on the fly during the early years of occupation.The ideal approach is exemplified by the interagencyplanning for Haiti, which produced a detailed list ofpost-crisis tasks and responsibilities well in advance of anypossible combat. That operation eventually failed, however,because civilian agencies proved incapable of completingthe mission once military forces left, due to inadequateresources or inflated expectations. In Iraq it will also beimportant to lessen military involvement as expeditiouslyas possible, so interagency planners must be sure thatgovernmental, non-governmental, and internationalcivilian organizations are ready to perform assigned taskswhen required. This handover problem is discussed ingreater detail in Part III of this monograph. The primaryproblem at the core of American deficiencies in post-conflictcapabilities, resources, and commitment is a nationalaversion to nation-building, which was strengthened byfailure in Vietnam. U.S. leaders need to accept this missionas an essential part of national security and better tailorand fund the military services and civilian governmentalorganizations to accomplish it.

There are other implications of past experience for acontemporary occupation of Iraq. The German andJapanese examples furnish some possible alternatives forpurging the Baath Party and security forces of potentiallydisruptive elements while maintaining the services of someindigenous expertise. Since a new Iraqi regime is bestconstructed from the bottom up, similar evaluations willhave to be conducted for local mayors and administrators.The more an occupation can rely on dependable Iraqis, thebetter. American occupation forces will have to nurture

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such essential relationships, which can take much time andeffort to establish and maintain in a society like Iraq’s.Units and their leaders cannot be rotated out after shorttours, which will strain force structure and possibly degradecombat readiness. The nation and the Army must beprepared to commit considerable time, manpower, andmoney to make an occupation of Iraq successful in the longterm.

PART II: CHALLENGES OF A MILITARYOCCUPATION OF IRAQ

Iraq has always been a border state between civilizations and aplace where empires collided and armies clashed. Violence hasbecome ingrained in the Iraqi character.

Mohamed Heikal58

The attack against Iraq that U.S. leaders areconsidering seeks to eliminate the Saddam Hussein regimeand replace it with a government with respect for humanrights as well as an interest in democracy and economicreform. To implement this change and control postwarchaos, U.S. and allied forces will be required to occupy Iraqfor an extended period of time following Saddam’s defeat.The exact circumstances and special challenges of anoccupation cannot be predicted with certainty, although anassessment of the general types of problems inherent insuch a situation is possible.

If the war is rapid with few civilian casualties, theoccupation will probably be characterized by an initialhoneymoon period during which the United States will reapthe benefits of ridding the population of a brutal dictator.Nevertheless, most Iraqis and most other Arabs willprobably assume that the United States intervened in Iraqfor its own reasons and not to liberate the population.Long-term gratitude is unlikely and suspicion of U.S.motives will increase as the occupation continues. A forceinitially viewed as liberators can rapidly be relegated to the

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status of invaders should an unwelcome occupationcontinue for a prolonged time.59 Occupation problems maybe especially acute if the United States must implement thebulk of the occupation itself rather than turn these dutiesover to a postwar international force. Regionally, theoccupation will be viewed with great skepticism, which mayonly be overcome by the population’s rapid progress towarda secure and prosperous way of life.

A U.S. military occupation of Iraq will involve a numberof special challenges and problems that relate directly toIraqi political culture and wider regional sensitivities aboutthe military domination of an Arab Muslim country by aWestern power. Despite a relatively short experience withFrench and British occupation, the Arab world today isextraordinarily sensitive to the question of Westerndomination and has painful memories of imperialism.

Many Iraqis can also be expected to fear hidden U.S.agendas. The United States is deeply distrusted in the ArabWorld because of strong ties to Israel and fears that it seeksto dominate Arab countries to control the region’s oil. Iraqis,even before Saddam’s rise to power, have been especiallydistrustful of the West and uncompromisingly hostile toIsrael.60 Throughout any occupation, the United Statesshould expect to face a series of demands from the Arabworld to place pressure on Israel over Palestinian issues tocalm passions created by an occupation of Iraq.Additionally, flare-ups in Israeli-Palestinian violence couldhave a direct influence on the willingness of Iraqi citizens tocooperate with U.S. occupation forces.

Religious factors may also become important. Muslimshave a formal religious duty not to submit to the authority ofnon-Muslim rulers such as found in the Judeo/ChristianWest. Such an injunction may not be taken to apply to atemporary occupation force in Iraq and has been ignored bylarge Muslim minority communities in countries such asIndia and Nigeria. Nevertheless, sensitivities on this issuewill require watching in Iraq. The combination of religious

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and Arab nationalist motives for wishing a speedydeparture to U.S. occupation troops could allow U.S. forcesto wear out their welcome even more rapidly than would beexpected in most cases of foreign soldiers reordering thepolitical structure of a defeated country.

The special circumstances of Iraq, therefore, need to beexamined with considerable care when deciding uponworkable policies to conduct an occupation of Iraq and towin the support of the Iraqi population. Obstacles to such agoal are enormous, and a successful occupation will notoccur unless the special circumstances of this unusualcountry are used to inform occupation policy.

Historical Background.

Iraqi political values and institutions are rooted in atortured history that must be understood before it ispossible to consider the rehabilitation of Iraqi society.Additionally, Western understanding of Iraq has not beenparticularly deep, and that country is often seen as a remotepart of the Arab world. Few Westerners have spentsignificant amounts of time in Iraq, and since 1990 even lesscontact has existed between Americans and Iraqis.Moreover, many Western visitors to Iraq who have traveledthroughout the Arab World consider that country to be aculture apart, more hostile and less welcoming than otherArab countries.61 Understanding Iraq is therefore a muchgreater challenge than considering the political culture ofmost other Arab nations.

While Mesopotamia has been home for a variety ofancient and proud civilizations, Iraq itself is a relativelynew nation state. It was formed by the British out of theformer Ottoman Turkish vilayets of Baghdad, Basra, andMosul following World War I.62 Previously, these provinceswere directly ruled from Istanbul, often having littleinteraction with each other.63 Nor were each of the vilayetspleased to be included in the new state. The population ofthe Kurdish-dominated vilayet of Mosul considered its

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inclusion in the new state as a betrayal of great powerpromises of Kurdish independence in the Treaty of Sevres.64

Leaders of the Shi’ite province of Basra rightly suspectedthat their own interests would be subordinated to the lessnumerous but more politically powerful Sunni Muslims inBaghdad. Kuwaiti scholar Shafeeq Ghabra has noted thatIraq was so fractured after the Ottoman collapse thatseparate neighborhoods in the Shi’ite city of Najaf declaredindependence with their own constitutions. In the northerncity of Mosul civil strife erupted between neighborhoods.65

Tensions among the Iraqi communities were thereforesevere, but were also viewed as controllable by a strongcentral government supported by the British.66 The firstIraqi government was led by the Hashemite King Faisalwho was installed by the British from the Hajaz based on hiswartime alliance with them. As an Arab nationalist leader,Faisal had some popularity and his position as King wasconfirmed by an Iraqi referendum. Nevertheless, Faisalbegan his reign as a client of the United Kingdom, andBritish troops helped him consolidate power and establishauthority. Such tasks were often difficult. Tribal uprisingsand isolated acts of terrorism against British troops were aproblem from early in the occupation. Moreover, Shi’iteclerics proclaimed a jihad against British forces from theShi’ite holy city of Karbala in southern Iraq. The situationstabilized in February 1921 after the British had sufferedaround 2,000 casualties. Britain remained involved in Iraqdespite the bloodshed because of that country’s oil wealth.67

Iraq’s Hashemite dynasty remained in power until 1958when it was ousted by military coup. Additionally, at thistime, Iraqi politics began to emerge as considerably bloodierthan usually seen in the rest of the Arab world. The 1958coup that overthrew the monarchy led to a massacre inwhich the young king and a number of his associates weremurdered, with hostile crowds desecrating the bodies of thedead. Not a single military unit rose to defend themonarchy, which in 37 years of existence made littleprogress consolidating power. The instability of this period

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can be seen in the appointment of the amazingly high figureof 58 cabinets during the years of monarchy.68

In the 10 years between the ouster of the monarchy andthe second Baath regime, Iraq experienced instability andviolence with various contenders for power killed in coupsand coup attempts. Occasionally, the armed supporters ofvarious factions clashed, and in one case the paramilitaryNational Guard fought against the Iraqi Army in the streetsof Baghdad. Jet aircraft armed with rockets were also usedin this encounter.69 In other instances, demonstrations byopposition groups such as the Iraqi Communist Party wereput down with severe brutality. Moreover, massive purgesof the Armed Forces became an ongoing feature of Iraqipolitics as various strongmen attempted to consolidatepower.70 Throughout the series of new governmentsfollowing the monarchy, the Sunni Muslims remaineddominant.

Saddam Hussein emerged as a product of Iraqi politicsand not an aberration from that system. His firstwell-known act of notoriety was to participate with a Baathassassination team in an unsuccessful attempt to murderIraqi dictator Brigadier General Abdul Karim Qassim (whowas later killed by Baathists in a 1963 coup). Later,Saddam, as a rising Baath party leader, continued to focuson the importance of violence as a tool for achieving politicalgoals, strongly advocating the assassination of BaathSecretary-General al-Saadi in 1963 due to al-Saadi’s wildand irresponsible leftism, which was undermining the basisof Baathist rule.71 Saddam’s advice was ignored in thisinstance, and the Baath party fell from power, not toreemerge until 1968. Saddam had by then totallyinternalized the idea of disciplined violence to control Iraq.Methodically building the machinery of repression, Saddamremained Iraq’s secondary leader until 1979 when he tookfull power as absolute dictator.72

While Saddam is a product of the Iraqi system, he mayalso be its culmination. As one of the most repressive

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dictators in the world, Saddam has broken the previousIraqi pattern of authoritarian governments that maintaincontrol for a handful of years before being removed frompower by coup and street violence. Saddam, by achieving ahigher level of brutality, cruelty, and repression than hispredecessors, has been able not only to seize power, but tomaintain it under exceptionally difficult conditions.Independent centers of power have not been allowed todevelop and threaten him as they did with earlier Iraqileaders.

Saddam has also built one of the most impressivepersonality cults in the post-Stalin era, with a system that iscurrently rivaled only by that of North Korea. It is thissystem that will have to be dismantled and replaced in anypost-Saddam era. While many Iraqis may currently only gothrough the motions of believing the propaganda associatedwith this cult of personality, nevertheless a number may bepro-Saddam true believers. Such individuals will have norole in the future of a reforming Iraq and vetting will benecessary to insure that they are not retained in positions ofresponsibility.

Issues of Pluralism, Stability, and TerritorialIntegrity.

The establishment of democracy or even some sort ofrough pluralism in Iraq, where it has never really existedpreviously, will be a staggering challenge for any occupationforce seeking to govern in a post-Saddam era. Essentially,such a force must support changes in the fundamentalcharacter of the Iraqi political system, where anti-democratic traditions are deeply ingrained just as they arethroughout the wider Arab World.

It is also reasonable to expect considerable resistance toefforts at even pluralism in Iraq. Iraq’s Sunni Arabs, havingenjoyed disproportionate power under a series of regimes,have every reason to assume that a democratic opening willoccur at their expense by allowing traditionally disen-

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franchised groups to claim larger shares of power. Varioustribes will also fear the rise of rival tribes within agovernment. All may fear a situation where rival groupstake a significant share of power and then refuse to yield itunder whatever constitutional processes might be put inplace.

Currently, Iraq has only one legal political party, theBaath, and this organization is expected to have no role in apost-Saddam government. Yet, the basis upon which newparties will be formed is currently unclear. The most likelydevelopment would be for parties to emerge based on ethnic,religious, tribal, and other such factors. Thus, even underfree elections, differences within Iraqi society may befurther exacerbated. Ethnically-based political partiesgenerally increase divisions rather than mitigate them inhighly fractious countries. Moreover, the current Kurdishpolitical movements are also armed militias and thus setthe wrong kind of example for others to follow by estab-lishing political organizations which also maintainpara-military forces.

Nor would it be easy for the United States to accept thebreakup of Iraq while it is under occupation as analternative to managing factional strife. The United Stateshas committed itself to the territorial integrity of Iraqfollowing Saddam’s ouster, and would face severe inter-national problems if it allowed the dismemberment of theIraqi state. Future relations with Turkey and the Arabworld could be undermined severely due to strong concernsthroughout the region about Iraqi stability and territorialintegrity.

The Turks have made it clear that an independentKurdish state in the north is an unacceptable provocationand have also warned Iraqi Kurds against seeking too muchautonomy within any future Iraqi federation. Turkey fearsthat its population of between 12-20 million Kurds willagitate for any type of concessions that are granted to IraqiKurds. Ankara has correspondingly announced that it will

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intervene militarily in northern Iraq if the Kurds declareindependence or if Kurdish military forces seize Kirkuk.Kurdish spokesmen have replied that any Turkish actionsalong these lines will make it easier for Iran to intervene inIraq as well.73

Many Arabs also view a dismemberment of Iraq asfavoring Israel by destroying a large and important Arabstate whose military potential traditionally has been ofconcern to a series of Israeli governments. Occasionally,some Israeli leaders and analysts have stated theirpreference for an Iraq broken into three separate states, allfighting each other. While such statements should beexpected from a democratic state allowing divergentopinions, they are viewed with absolute suspicion in theArab world. Additionally, previous Israeli efforts to armand support the Kurdish guerrillas are taken at face valueas an attempt to undermine the unity of Iraq. These effortsare now widely known and have been discussed in thememoirs of right-wing retired Israeli General Raful Eitan.74

Should democracy or even pluralistic political stabilitybe established in Iraq, this would be a tremendousachievement of which all could be proud. Nevertheless, U.S.policymakers sometimes assume that a democraticgovernment will also be friendly to U.S. policies in theMiddle East. This cannot be assumed in the case of Iraq. Atthe present time, the only Arab leader who has been electedin a fair election is Palestinian President Yassir Arafat, whois clearly not the favored U.S. choice. Likewise, in the Gulf,Islamists have done extremely well in recent legislativeelections in Bahrain. The Kuwaiti parliament has a strongIslamist grouping, and free elections in other states couldduplicate this situation. Free elections in the Arab worldseldom produce pro-Western governments.

Addressing the Sunni/Shi’ite Divide.

Shi’ite Muslims comprise the majority of the Iraqipopulation, and a vast majority of the Arab population of

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Iraq (since most Iraqi Kurds are Sunni Muslims). DespiteShi’ite numerical dominance, all Iraqi governments sincethe formation of the state have been Sunni-dominated. Thisdomination has been a source of Shi’ite resentment,although Saddam’s regime has made strong attempts toappear open to Shi’ite participation. This effort to showcaseShi’ite leaders is impressive, although Saddam’s actualpower base is centered on Sunnis from his hometown ofTikrit. A few key Sunni tribes also are part of Saddam’sbase of power, although they are less central than theTikritis.

Shi’ites are, nevertheless, present at all levels of theIraqi government, including Saddam’s inner circle andthroughout the Baath party. Some Shi’ite leaders, such ascurrent Speaker of the Assembly and former Prime MinisterSadun Hammadi and senior Presidential Advisor GeneralAmer Al-Saadi, are among the most public faces of theregime. While this upward mobility has helped the Shi’itecommunity in Iraq, it has by no means eliminateddiscrimination as a serious problem. The service ofprominent Shi’ites has, however, helped Saddam appear asa leader of all Iraqis above the issues of faction and ethnicitythat so dominate the Iraqi mindset.

When calling upon members of the Shi’ite community toserve in the regime, Saddam exhibits a predictable bias infavor of well-educated secular elites. Secular regimeofficials are held up as important models for emulation inIraq since secularism helps to lessen tensions betweenShi’ites and Sunnis. Consequently, secular Shi’ite leaders,in some contrast to the clergy, have a more clearcut record ofcollaboration with the regime. This background ofcollaboration by individuals with Ph.D.s rather thanIslamic education may be held against them by ordinaryShi’ites in a post-Saddam regime. Secular elites have beenwilling to participate in the structure of repression. This isless so with clerics.

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Saddam traditionally has been especially distrustful ofShi’ite religious leaders and seems to view these people asthe greatest potential subversives within the Shi’itecommunity. This distrust may be a partial result of the8-year war with Iran and the recurring Iranian calls for anIslamic Republic in Iraq. There is also a natural tensionbetween the Baath regime and religious leaders since thelatter can, if not carefully managed, form an alternativesource of authority. Saddam’s distrust of Shi’ite religiousleaders has been translated into a particularly long string ofassassinations of untrustworthy clerics by the Iraqi intel-ligence and security services.

The Tehran-based Supreme Council for the IslamicRevolution in Iraq (SCIRI) is Iraq’s largest Shi’ite Muslimdissident organization. Its leader, Ayatollah MohammadBaqer al-Hakim, and his family have a sterling record ofopposition to the Saddam Hussein regime. Their recordincludes suffering torture, imprisonment, and murder atthe hands of the security police.75 This background leavesthem untainted by the stain of collaborationism and will bean asset in seeking a share of power in a postwar environ-ment. Nevertheless, SCIRI will have real problems ingenerating a popular following in Iraq because it is soclearly and unequivocally a tool of Iranian foreign policy.Most Iraqi Shi’ites have proven themselves to be unwillingto cooperate with Tehran against their own country. Theycorrespondingly resent SCIRI people attempting to play aprominent role in government. The public would probablyfavor cooperation with the Iranians only in cases of extremeneed or clear political disenfranchisement by an emergingpost-Saddam government in Baghdad.

Some of this logic may change if Iraq breaks apart andthe fragments are fighting with each other. It might also benoted that a rump Shi’ite state in the southern area of Iraqwould be a prime target for Iranian influence andsubversion if it was placed under pressure by Sunni elitesfrom the central portion of the country. Iran could then beviewed as a natural ally of the former Iraqi Shi’ites, and

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these Shi’ites would at least consider seeking Iraniansupport to help counterbalance the influence of the SunniArab regimes in the Gulf area. The establishment of apro-Iranian Shi’ite government in Iraq would also be ofconcern to other Sunni-led states in the region with asignificant number of Shi’ites within their borders. Kuwaitand Saudi Arabia would be especially concerned.

Additionally, fragmentation also exists within Iraq’sSunni community. Some Sunni tribes have been clear andenthusiastic supporters of the Saddam regime, whereasothers remain more clearly outside of the circles of power.Once Saddam has been removed, the potential for tensionbetween pro-Saddam Sunnis and other Sunnis who weremore clearly victims of Saddam would be high.

Addressing the Kurdish and Turkoman Factors.

Iraqi Kurds have long dreamed of independence. A weakcentral government in Baghdad following Saddam’s ousterwould therefore serve as an invitation for a renewedpolitical effort to seek broad autonomy that may serve as astepping stone to independence. Kurdish independence is aspecial concern for Iraqi Arabs because of its financial anddefense implications. Much of Iraq’s oil is located in theKurdish regions of the country, and significant oil revenueswould be lost to the central government following a Kurdishsecession. Likewise, many of Iraq’s neighbors, includingIran and Syria, as well as Turkey, fear independent or evenautonomous Iraqi Kurds who might then provide anunwelcome model to their own Kurdish minorities.76 Thesecountries might also be inclined to fund and supportfactions sympathetic to their interests.

Kurds comprise around 20-25 percent of the Iraqipopulation. They are divided by tribe, religion (althoughmost Iraqi Kurds are Sunni), and two distinct languages(Surani and Bahdinani). Iraqi Kurds also have a longhistory of internecine fighting among factions, tribes, andmajor political groupings. For example, in the mid-1990s,

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thousands of Kurds were killed in fighting between thePatriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the KurdishDemocratic Party (KDP), with both parties seeking outsideassistance against their rival. The PUK received Iranianassistance while the KDP turned to Saddam’s regime inBaghdad to assist them. This KDP decision led to massivecasualties once Iraqi troops re-entered Kurdish areas.77

This phase of the conflict also underscored the level ofKurdish disunity, whereby working with Saddam or theIranians was considered an acceptable part of inter-Kurdish conflict.

Currently, Kurdish leaders are stressing reconciliationand unity as a way of demonstrating that they can bereliable allies with the United States in helping to shape apost-Saddam Iraq. Nevertheless, even now, major Kurdishgroups have repeatedly been unable to present more thancosmetic shows of unity. Kurdish inability to cooperate evenwith other Kurds suggests that it is extremely doubtful thatthey can work with Iraq’s other minorities to build afunctioning government, without severe and unrelentingpressure from outside forces.

Another key Iraqi minority are the Turkomans.Turkomans comprise a significantly smaller percentage ofthe Iraqi population, although their exact numbers aresubject to considerable disagreement. Most U.S. sourcessuggest they constitute between 3 and 5 percent of the Iraqipopulation.78 Turkish and Turkoman scholars dispute thesefigures and claim they are tainted by official Iraqiestimates, which downplay Turkoman numbers. Turkishscholarship suggests that around 2 million Iraqis areTurkomans out of a population of 22 million.79 Largenumbers of Turkomans are located in some of the sameareas as the Kurds and have overlapping and conflictingclaims to various areas in northern Iraq including the keycity of Kirkuk, which is located near some of Iraq’s mostimportant oil fields. The Turkomans would resist any drivefor Kurdish independence, and any large-scale mistreat-ment of them by Kurds could provoke Turkish intervention.

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Addressing the Tribal Factor.

The Sunni, Shi’ite, and Kurdish populations of Iraq arefurther subdivided by affiliation with hundreds of tribesscattered throughout the country. While previous Iraqigovernments have viewed tribes as suspicious alternativesources of authority, Saddam has increasingly come to viewthem as forming important fault lines upon which tosplinter and further factionalize potential sources of oppo-sition within larger ethnic and religious communities.80

Additionally, Sunni tribes have been key recruiting groundsfor the officer corps of the Iraqi military. Thus, Saddam isignoring Baath ideology which proclaims tribes backwardand an obstacle to modernization, in order to use the tribalsystem as a bulwark of his own power. Saddam has evencalled the Baath party “the tribe encompassing all tribes.”81

Saddam’s retribalization of Iraq began in the late 1980sand has progressed sufficiently enough to cause townsmen,several generations removed from the countryside, to“rediscover” their tribal identities and affiliations. Some ofthese same people have sought out a tribal sheikh to askpermission to affiliate with his tribe in cases where theirown lineage has become unclear. This is done to seek theprotection and support of the tribe and improve chances forindividual advancement.82

Tribalism also appears to have strengthened in theKurdish areas during Saddam Hussein’s presidency as aresult of central government policies dating back fordecades. During the Iran-Iraq War, Kurdish conscriptswere exceptionally prone to desertion at the earliestopportunity, leading Baghdad to switch to a tribal strategyto manage the Kurds and address the manpower drain. In amove away from the conscription of individual Kurds, theIraqi government paid the leaders of Kurdish tribal militiasto perform various security duties useful to the war effort.Tribalism was strengthened accordingly.

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Any post-Saddam government will thus be faced withthe requirement to operate within a highly tribalizedsociety, even if the new government seeks to transform andmodernize such a society over the long term. Moreover, inany post-Saddam government a new President might bequick to turn to his own family and tribal supporters to helpremain in power. Once Saddam is ousted, the successorgovernment will probably seek to reestablish ties to amyriad of tribal leaders, many of whom are now eitheractually or nominally loyal to Saddam. This could be anexceptionally difficult task.

Other Sources of Potential Iraqi Fragmentation.

Beyond ethnic, tribal, and religious cleavages, otherdifferences among Iraqis may also aggravate politicalfragmentation. One potentially problematic difference isbetween exiles and non-exiles. Iraqi citizens who havesuffered under Saddam could well resent Iraqis comingfrom outside the country following a war and claiming adisproportionate amount of power. Some returning exilesmay also be more readily viewed as the tools of foreignpowers such as the United States, Iran, and perhapsTurkey. Some might even be seen as friends of Israel.

It is doubtful that the Iraqi population would welcomethe leadership of the various exile groups after Saddam’sdefeat. Many Iraqis are reported as hostile to the externalIraqi opposition groups despite the fact that a post-Saddampower struggle has yet to take place. According to formerCIA analyst Judith Yaphe, “[Iraqi exile leader Ahmad]Chalabi and the INC [Iraqi National Congress] are knownquantities and extremely unpopular in Iraq.”83

Another potential cleavage is between civilian andmilitary opposition to Saddam Hussein. Some former Iraqiofficers seem like attractive alternatives to Saddam, andvarious U.S. Government officials are reported in the pressas favoring the possibility of an ex-Iraqi general replacingSaddam.84 The accession of a moderate general may

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increase the likelihood of a stable government remaining inpower and also decrease the possibility of a civil warerupting from postwar chaos. Such a military accession topower will, nevertheless, be challenged by civilians seekinga government completely free of the influence of a politicizedmilitary. Moreover, any Iraqi officer leading a newgovernment will be viewed with suspicion as a potentialstrongman seeking permanent power. It is highly probablethat a strong military figure would at least initially seek acivilian front man.

A Force for Unity: Dealing with the Iraqi Military.

While a struggle for power between civilian and militaryelites would contribute to Iraqi fragmentation, the militarycan also serve as a unifying force under certain conditions.In a highly diverse and fragmented society like Iraq, themilitary (primarily the ground forces) is one of the fewnational institutions that stresses national unity as animportant principle. Conscripts are at least publiclyencouraged to rise above parochial loyalties and may bestationed in parts of the country far from their ethnickinsmen. To tear apart the Army in the war’s aftermathcould lead to the destruction of one of the only forces forunity within the society. Breaking up large elements of thearmy also raises the possibility that demobilized soldierscould affiliate with ethnic or tribal militias.

The role of the current Iraqi military in a post-Saddamregime is unclear. Some of the elite units with specialregime protection functions will clearly have to bedisbanded, but it is less certain what to do with the moremainstream units. Officers in the regular army have oftenresented Saddam’s interference in military activities andbeen particularly angered by the actions of Baathistpolitical officers in their units. Moreover, regular armyunits are of low priority for resupply with equipment, spareparts, and other military provisions. Under thesecircumstances, at least some underlying discontent is

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possible, and it is conceivable that the Iraqi Army would bewilling to work with U.S. or coalition forces in a postwarenvironment under the proper conditions. U.S. occupationpolicy may therefore be well-served by attentiveness to thepotential willingness and capabilities of key elements of theIraqi military in rebuilding the country.

Sizing and Funding an Occupation Force.

Initial projections of the number of troops that may beneeded for an occupation of Iraq are somewhere around100,000. This figure is based on studies of past U.S. militaryoccupations, including Germany and Japan. Testimonybefore the U.S. Senate has suggested that the occupationwould need at least 75,000 troops to carry out a complexseries of postwar functions.85 Nevertheless, any projectionsof actual troop numbers remain highly speculative until theactual postwar situation becomes clear.

An occupation force would also have to be large enoughinitially to discourage neighboring powers, particularlyIran, from meddling in Iraqi affairs and carving outinformal areas of interest within Iraq. Later, U.S. troopscan be assisted in these efforts by reformed Iraqi forces.Coalition troops of some kind may have to be placed directlyon the Iranian border to contain Iranian influence. If U.S.forces are stationed there, such deployments would beviewed with the utmost concern in Tehran and possiblyhave an influence on the ongoing Iranian power struggle.Conservatives in Iran would have a golden opportunity topoint at tangible examples of the U.S. threat. Reformersmay attempt to use the situation to force the government toseek better relations with the United States, although theywould undoubtedly be accused of being tools of a foreignpower for choosing to do so.

According to the Congressional Budget Office,maintaining a force of between 75,000 and 200,000peacekeeping troops in Iraq would cost between $17 billionand $46 billion per year.86 None of these occupation costs

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should be funded by Iraqi oil revenues, which are expectedto be diverted entirely to reconstruction efforts. Any effortto divert these funds to occupation costs would be viewed asan effort to plunder Iraq’s economic resources. Conversely,the use of oil revenues for improving the lives of the Iraqipopulation will be one of the most important tools that theoccupation force has to contain and defeat potentialnationalistic, sectarian, and religious anger with theoccupation.

In addressing the needs of postwar Iraq, there may alsobe considerable domestic pressure to limit the duration andextent of the U.S. occupation. Large Reserve and NationalGuard mobilizations and deployments may be necessary tohelp staff the occupation. Regular Army units would facethe need to train their troops in a very different set of skillsrequired for occupation duties as opposed to warfighting. Inparticular, young soldiers must be trained to interact withlarge numbers of foreign civilians as something similar to aconstabulary force. They must also learn that, unlike inwarfighting, force is often the last resort of the occupationsoldier. Moreover, while troops are serving on occupationduty, many of their warfighting skills could deteriorate,requiring them to undergo a period of retraining when theyreturn to more traditional duties.87

The Potential for Terrorism against U.S.Occupation Forces.

The longer a U.S. occupation of Iraq continues, the moredanger exists that elements of the Iraqi population willbecome impatient and take violent measures to hasten thedeparture of U.S. forces. At the same time, a prematurewithdrawal from Iraq could lead to instability and perhapseven civil war. By ousting the Saddam Hussein regime, theUnited States will have placed itself in the position where itwill be held responsible by the world should anarchy andcivil war develop in a post-Saddam era. Having entered into

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Iraq, the United States will find itself unable to leaverapidly, despite the many pressures to do so.

If the campaign to eliminate Saddam is short andinvolves few civilian casualties, it is likely that U.S. troopswill be greeted with enthusiasm by Iraqi citizens who havehad the burden of Saddam’s tyranny lifted from theirshoulders. Nevertheless, the United States should notexpect that occupation forces will be protected by abottomless well of gratitude. Most Iraqis will assume thatthe United States has intervened in their country for its ownpolitical purposes and not to liberate them from oppression,an argument that is not terribly difficult to make. Indeedsome sources, such as the London-based Economist, suggestthat the Iraqi population already appears to distrust U.S.motives for an invasion, assuming such an act would beinitiated primarily to help Israel’s strategic situation and todominate Iraqi oil.88 Major postwar improvements in thequality of daily life of the population may soften suchconcerns, but they are unlikely to eliminate them.

Although Iraq is one of the most repressive countries inthe world, it is not a disarmed society. Unlike a variety ofother dictatorships, many Iraqi citizens have access tofirearms. One of Saddam’s most common ways of rewardingloyal tribal sheikhs is to allow them to arm their followers.Moreover, a variety of militias in Iraq have been equippedwith weapons as part of a regime defense strategy. Theseweapons can become a problem following the war.

It is likely that in a post-Saddam era both the UnitedStates and the new Iraqi government will seek a lessmilitarized civil society. Disarming the population willnevertheless be a difficult task. Arab chieftains who havebeen permitted to arm their followers would view efforts todisarm them as the actions of an enemy. Additionally, in theaftermath of a war, many individuals may feel the need tomaintain personal weapons for self-defense in case there isa breakdown in public order. Yet, to leave weapons inprivate hands invites the possibility of terrorism. A

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potential compromise is to allow some individual weaponsto remain in public hands, while larger crew-servedweapons are removed to government control.

In the past, Shi’ite Arabs in other countries have shownthemselves to be particularly dangerous when they turnedto terrorism, due to the special religious sanction given tothe concept of martyrdom in Shi’ite Islam. Shi’ites inLebanon developed and perfected the technique of suicidecar bombing which they applied to Israeli occupation forcesduring the 1980s and 1990s with considerable effect. Thistactic is now popular in the Palestinian territories, but wasutilized only after careful attention to the Lebanese Shi’iteexample.

Following Saddam’s defeat, the United States willfurther need to seek indigenous forces to aid in law andorder functions and help prepare for a post-occupation Iraq.This approach is an inevitable part of rehabilitating Iraq togovern itself without U.S. military forces. Nevertheless, bydeveloping local allies, the United States makes itself atleast partially responsible for the behavior of those allies.Hence a pro-U.S. force that attacks any other Iraqi force forprivate reasons threatens to involve the United States inthe complex web of sectarian, tribal, or clan warfare.

The Israeli example in Lebanon is also instructive here.While occupying Lebanon, Israeli forces supported andstrengthened pro-Israel militias which they viewed asuseful for reducing their own manpower requirements andcasualties. Unfortunately for the Israelis, many of themilitia members brought their own political and factionalpriorities to their tasks as militiamen. In one case, Druzemembers of the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA) militiarandomly murdered thirteen Shi’ite villagers in response toan ambush of their troops. While both the SLA leadershipand the Israelis denounced this crime, the tension betweenIsraeli occupation forces and Shi’ite Lebanese was pushedto a new level.

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Another danger of occupation is that terrorists mightgenerate strategies to alienate Iraqis who are initiallyneutral toward a U.S. occupation. In Lebanon, for example,militants would occasionally hide weapons in mosques totempt Israeli occupation troops into conducting searches ofthese sites. The sight of a mosque being ransacked byforeign, non-Muslim soldiers is offensive to many believers,no matter how good the reasons for such a response mightbe. As a result, the Israelis further alienated the population.Such actions are particularly problematic when no weaponsare found. Moreover, damage created by a search remainsto be viewed by devout believers after the troops depart.

Also, any expansion of terrorism or guerrilla activityagainst U.S. troops in Iraq will undoubtedly require aforceful American response. Such U.S actions could involvea dramatic escalation in the numbers of arrests, interro-gations, and detentions of local Iraqis. While such actions doimprove security and force protection, they seldom winfriends among the local citizenry. Individuals alienatedfrom the U.S. occupation could well have their hostilitydeepened and increased by these acts. Thus, a small numberof terrorists could reasonably choose to attack U.S. forces inthe hope that they can incite an action- reaction cycle thatwill enhance their cause and increase their numbers.

Finally is the question of suicide bombers. As noted,suicide bombings were popularized as an anti-occupationtactic by Lebanese Shi’ites fighting to rid their country of anIsraeli army in the mid-1980s.89 Since then, the tactic hasbeen used by Arab radicals to help equalize the strugglebetween a heavily-armed Israeli force and a terrorist groupoperating within a civilian population. Currently, suicidebombings are front page news in the Middle East due toPalestinian suicide strikes against the Israelis. Forexample, on Sunday, November 17, 2002, Sheikh HassamNasrallah, the head of the Lebanese terrorist groupHizballah, stated that suicide bombing attacks were “themost powerful and most effective” tactic that thePalestinians could employ.90

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This ongoing media attention to suicide bombingsuggests that any future Iraqi terrorist leaders could havethis tactic at the forefront of their minds. Moreover, allArabs who pay attention to the Israeli-Palestinian confron-tation are now learning stunning lessons about theeffectiveness of suicide bombers. Suicide bombings againstIsrael are currently showing frightening results. The mostnotable impact came from 39 recent suicide attacks thatcumulatively killed 70 Israelis and wounded over 1,000.91

Additionally, while some of the bombings by both Lebaneseand Palestinian terrorists have been quite spectacular,many bombers were willing to settle for killing only two orthree soldiers or civilians. In Lebanon, such bombers wouldsometimes drive up to a checkpoint and then detonate theirexplosives at the roadblock, killing a few guards.Sometimes, but not often, women were used for suchmissions.

The impact of suicide bombing attacks in Israel goesbeyond their numbers, and this fact will also capture theimagination of would-be Iraqi terrorists. Israel’s populationhas been demoralized and the economy has been crippled, asfewer people patronize businesses where they can berandomly attacked. Israel remains unable to cope withthese tactics, and the Israeli government has now chosen tofund a security fence along the entire border between Israeland the West Bank. Obviously such a tactic cannot beduplicated by occupation forces in Iraq.

The Potential for a Popular Uprisingagainst U.S. Troops.

A mass uprising against occupation forces is unlikely inthe early stages of any U.S. occupation of Iraq, probably upto at least the first year. Gratitude for the removal ofSaddam Hussein and an uncertainty over the degree towhich U.S. troops can be pushed are virtual guarantees ofthe limits to which even a restive population can reasonablybe expected to adhere. After the first year, the possibility of

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a serious uprising may increase should severe disillusion-ment set in and Iraqis begin to draw parallels between U.S.actions and historical examples of Western imperialism.

Mass uprisings have occurred in that part of the world inseveral key historical instances and therefore are known tothe local population. In the final death agonies of the lastIranian shah’s regime, millions of individuals took to thestreets to protest and resist Imperial authority. Shi’ites andKurds in Iraq also rose up against Saddam Hussein in 1991but were then crushed in a ruthless campaign by the Iraqiregime. While it is hoped that nothing that the UnitedStates could do would provoke the same kind of reaction asSaddam’s actions, the potential for an uprising against U.S.authority cannot be wholly dismissed, especially if it isencouraged by false and escalating rumors of U.S. anti-Muslim activity.

The Iraqi population is, as noted, diverse, and manyinternal grievances exist among the various factions, tribes,ethnicities and religious sects. Any occupation authoritywill assume the responsibility for mediating amongopposing groups and attempting to resolve differences in anonviolent way. Some of these differences are centuries oldand cannot be resolved by any third party. Thus even themost scrupulous effort at fairness can nevertheless alienatevarious tribes and ethnicities from the occupation forcesand cause them to respond to occupation policies as a group.This discontent could fuel mass action or even an uprising.

The Requirement for Large-Scale EconomicAssistance to Iraq.

Iraq is a country with important natural resourceswhich is, nevertheless, stricken by poverty as a result ofrecent historical events. Ten years of sanctions followedupon the heels of the Gulf War in 1991. Earlier, from1980-88, Iraqis were absorbed in an extremely bloody warwith Iran. While Saddam initially attempted to fund bothwar requirements and social spending during the conflict

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with Iran, circumstances forced him to shift to a total wareconomy by 1981. If the United States assumes control ofIraq, it will therefore assume control of a badly batteredeconomy.

Upon ousting Saddam, the United States will then haveresponsibility for providing some level of comfort andsubsistence to Iraq’s impoverished population. Based onthe people’s current plight, these tasks will be exceptionallychallenging. Moreover, regional or international publicopinion will have little tolerance for a lethargic aid programunder which people starve while waiting for relevantbureaucracies to work out their problems. Any incidents ofsuffering, neglect, or U.S. indifference can be expected tocome to the prompt attention of the regional andinternational media.

Some of the economic burden of rebuilding the countrymay be borne by reliance on the Iraqi oil industry. It isdoubtful, however, that oil wealth will pay for all of Iraq’sreconstruction needs, even if the oil infrastructure survivesthe war relatively intact. Estimates of the cost of rebuildingrange from $30 to $100 billion and do not include the cost ofoccupation troops.92 Such troops will be maintained as aseparate expense from that of reconstruction and are notexpected to be maintained through Iraqi revenues.Moreover, Iraq also has an exceptionally heavy burden ofdebt, the management of which was one of Saddam’s majorreasons for invading Kuwait in 1990. On the plus side, Iraqdoes have a well-educated population that could participatein reconstruction efforts.

It is not clear what the condition of the Iraqi oil industrywill be in the aftermath of war with a U.S.-led coalition. IfSaddam perceives his regime as crumbling, he could orderthe destruction of the wells just as he did with the Kuwaitioil wells in 1991.93 While the destruction of Kuwaiti wellsmay have had s