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1Reconsidering Transparency

Reconsidering Transparency: Finding a

Cooriented State in a Disoriented Concept

Burnett Competition and Developing Ethical Theory Across the Field


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IntroductionIn 1964, United States Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart coined one of the most famous

phrases to come out of the institution when he stated I know it when I see it. Although Justice

Stewarts reflection was focused upon the slippery definition of what constitutes obscenity, the

phrase is just as applicable to the current struggle in scholarship to define the concept of

transparency. Lacking a clear definition and, even worse, a clear sense of measurability,

transparency has become the abstract concept that many continue to practice without a real sense

of whether what they are doing is actually transparent in the first place.

New media technologies, particularly the Internet, are playing a substantial role in forcing

business, government and media practitioners to be more transparent in both their intentions and

actions their intentions. Craft and Heim (2009) point out that the problem of defining

transparency is that despite the concepts rise in rhetoric and practice it has not been

accompanied by much consensus on how best to define or measure it (p. 219). The process of

defining transparency is difficult because of the swiftly changing nature of the ways we

communicate.

However, despite the struggles of professionals and professors to find ways to define and

measure transparency, individuals and other watchdog organizations armed with the Internet

are vigilantly calling on institutions to fully disclose information:

Several forces have contributed to this clamor for transparency. Globalization and the

spread of democracy have created a more integrated and interdependent world where itcan be critical to understand the actions and motives of people thousands of miles away.

At the same time, advances in information technology have made it harder than ever tokeep secrets. In the past, governments or corporations (or news organizations) could

easily control the flow of information, but today the Internet has empowered individualsand grassroots organizations to learn, share their knowledge, and mobilize.

(Craft and Heim, 2009, pp. 218-219)


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It is important now, more than ever, to begin finding methods to measure transparency and to

delve into the dynamic of interaction that occurs between a sender and the receiver. As Craft and

Heim clearly point out, the real world is seemingly unwilling to wait for institutions and

academics to agree upon a working definition of transparency. Allen (2008) notes that the

popular push and focus on transparency coincided with a surveillance society where

government, private corporations and individuals monitor the activities of citizens (p. 323).

However, the tables are also turning on the very governments, corporations and other institutions

watching the public. With new media technology, citizens armed with easy access to information

and the growing ability to mobilize with each other on the Internet are creating their own

surveillance focus that may make us look at transparency in a whole new way. At times this

work of the public and/or others is effective; however, it also raises concerns about the

perceptions some may have about the actual effectiveness of new media technologies to enhance

states of transparent actions.

This new surveillance component raises serious questions about how a shifting power

structure affects who determines what is transparent and what is not. Transparency now seems to

exist in three states of interaction: The first state, what we might call transmissional

transparency, where much of the power resides with the sender because of the messages

reliance on the transmission model of communication; the second, which we might refer to as

transactional transparency, where access of new media gives the regular citizenry, or receiver,

more power to watchdog over institutions and, at times, even demand and influence more

transparency from the sender in a more ritualistic, or cyclical, communication practice; lastly, we

have hypertransparency, which we might envision as the cognitive state of belief where Internet

and other new communication users feel, through computer-mediated communication (CMC),


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that they are more informed about what is happening than they actually are and that information

is more readily available than it actually is. This is based loosely on J.B. Walthers theoretical

observations about hyperpersonal states in CMC relationships.

In order to measure the interactive perceptions of transparency between the sender and the

receiver, one possibility might lie in the model of coorientation. The coorientation model,

developed by T.M. Newcomb, was expanded upon by Chaffee and McLeod (1973) who discuss

the model as a way to offer empirical measurement to assess perception and communicative

behavior in relationships between the sender, or A, and the receiver, B, as they

simultaneously cooriented to an object of communication, X (p. 474). Recently, the model has

appeared in public relations and health communication scholarship, but could have very real

applications measuring different states of transparency proposed by this essay.

This explication first begins with an epistemological review of transparency and how it is

being considered in modern scholarship. From there the paper will focus briefly on how

transparency is being considered in specific disciplines, ranging from business, public policy and

especially journalism; how a new consideration of transparency in three states might offer us a

better understanding about what is going on in the interactive dynamic of transparency and how

the power in that relations may be shifting in lieu of the advent of new media technology. Lastly,

we can look briefly at how the coorientation model may be a practical first step in designing

studies to measure transparency.

Defining theUndefined - Epistemology

Transparency is defined as a state of being frank or obvious, easily seen through, evident and

clear. But outside the pages of dictionaries, the definition of transparency becomes a multi-

layered concept used in various micro- and macro-levels across many disciplines in which most


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think they know what it is but have a hard time articulating what it really encompasses if asked

to put pen to paper. It is time to offer very real explanations of how this elusive concept should

be considered in not only interpersonal communication practices, but across a vast array of

disciplines and professional practices where transparency has become a term of cachet, a

buzzword used to trumpet integrity in government, business and media (Plaisance, 2007, p.

187).

On a very simple level, Craft and Heim (2009) outline two recognizable practices of

transparency. The first is a passive state of availability, where documents, statistics,

procedures, motives and intentions are open to public view (p. 219). The second state of

transparent actions is disclosure, an active practice by senders, individual or institutional,

that conveys information to stakeholders actively. In a passive state, i.e., making documents

available for the public if they are so inclined, removes much of the guesswork by senders as to

what the stakeholders want because they are pursuing it themselves actively (though often after

having jumped through at least a few bureaucratic hoops).

According to Craft and Heim (2009), unless we can find that consensus about transparency,

it will be difficult if not impossible to know whether it is worth promoting and whether it is

likely to actually produce greater accountability or trust (p. 219). Onora ONeill (2002) tells us

that even if there is a very honest and clear intent for individuals to be transparent, the concept of

trust at times cannot be restored, but that if we want to restore trust we need to reduce

deception and lies rather than secrecy (p. 69).Transparency requires that the receiver has a

sense of trust in the sender and the message, but ONeill tells us that the simple act of being

transparent does not ensure that trust will be restored.


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But how do we look at transparency out of the abstract, I know when I see it concept, and

into a concrete method from which to practice? In the literature on transparency we see common

terms: disclosure, trust, accountability, intent, and clarity/understandability. Oliver (2004) likens

the abstract definition of transparency to that found in a physical sense, breaking down the Latin

prepositions to arrive at a current definition that transparency must require active disclosure

that is putting new responsibilities on the observed because of many factors, mostly because of

the easy availability of information from new media technology (pp. 3-4).

Although Oliver suggests in a new transparency in business practices that there must be

active disclosure, the real question becomes what is it for a relevant thing to be transparent?

(Craft & Heim, 2009, p. 219). Institutions, whether businesses, media outlets or governments,

can actively disclose all day long, but if the perception of the receiver views the information as

either being irrelevant or indecipherable, does the attempt by the institutions to be transparent

count for anything at all? Probably not. The real thrust of transparency will always rest in the

need to establish a normative working model of the concept that works both with the Kantian-

like categorical rule as to how we treat people on an individual level (Plaisance, 2007), while

also considering how that ethical theory can translate into a political theory might allow us to

understand the internal structures of organizations on a macro-level in order to begin to capture

the mission of institutions that are so central to the functioning of democracy (Allen, 2008,

p.329).

Plaisance (2007) offers a normative notion of transparency based upon Kantian ethical

consideration when he tells us that the concept does not simply address the contentof our

messages to other people, but it requires us to think about the form and nature of our interaction

with others. Not only is transparency an issue regarding whatwe say, but regarding why we say


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it and even how we talk (p. 187). The Kantian model tells us that the best actions are those that

we would want every other person to follow as well as universal rules or practices in an attempt

that we all will inevitable treat each other as ends in themselves, and not simple treating

individuals as means to an end. In communication interaction, applying Kants theory to

transparent behavior becomes an attitude of proactive moral engagement that manifests an

express concern for the person-as-ends principle when a degree of deception or omission can

reasonably be said to risk thwarting the receivers due dignity or the ability to exercise reason

(Plaisance, 2007, p. 187). In this definition, the concept of transparency takes on an imperative

moral dimension in interpersonal communication. We hope in our sender-receiver relationships

that, whether we are the former or the latter, that there not only truth in the message but a good

intent behind it.

This view of transparency, that good intentions and treating people as autonomous beings

that should not be used as instruments toward an end goal by the sender, works well normatively

on micro-level interaction where the power relationships between each individual are often, if

not equal, at least on the same playing field. And most times it works, whether for ethical reasons

or because there exist within us other compelling reasons that often keep us honest and

transparent in interpersonal relations (i.e., intimacy, relationships, kinship, sense of community

and being a good neighbor, etc.). However, Allen (2008) tells us that ethics in the institution of

journalism, which seems to translate to the macro-level of institutions of business and

government as well, is not simply about individual action (p. 329) and, therefore, we must look

at defining transparency, as a concept, relative as it appears in each political system (p. 325) on

a more macro level.

In the business world, Thomas Hale (2008) states that An institution is transparent if it


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makes its behavior and motives readily knowable to interested parties. This definition covers

both access to information answering inquiries and general disclosure making unsolicited

information available (p. 75). The ability to access information by stakeholders has become a

standard practice by business organizations, whether it is voluntary or forced by government

regulations in the wake of scandals or economic meltdowns in a society.

Access to information is important in the process of transparency, but it is not enough. Many

in scholarship rely on the actions of the sender to either make information accessible, whether in

a passive or active state. Transparency is changing as we will further discuss the concept of

transactional transparency that perceptively shifts the power from the sender to the receiver.

Cotterrell (1999) tells us that transparency as a process involves not just the availability of

information but active participation in acquiring, distributing and creating knowledge. It also

involves responsibility for providing personal accounts. It other words, it involves

accountability (p. 419). The value of transparency is its ability as an instrument or means

through which greater accountability may be achieved, credibility may be enhanced, and truth

may be told (Craft and Heim, 2009, p. 222). Accountability is also an essential element in a

just civil society, in that we have responsibilities and obligations to each other in our

communities to give and take reasons/accounts for our beliefs and actions in order to ensure

mutual understanding and agreement (Ranson, 2003, p. 461).

It is very clear from a survey of the literature in all fields that there is now occurring a real

shift in power from the sender to the receiver when it comes to transparency. Oliver (2004)

recognizes this when he makes a distinction between an old transparency (being open and

forthright, should anyone happen to ask) has given way to a new transparency, more active in

calling attention to deeds, both intentional and unintentional (p. 4). I believe there is a new


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way of looking at transparency, but disagree with Oliver because in both his old and new

transparency definitions, both rely on a transmission model of communication that gives the

power to the sender because messages are still essentially a one-way affair (Carey, 2009). I

propose transparency as a concept that follows a path along a dynamic of interaction that exists

upon at least two levels of communication and, subsequently, power. First, there appears to be an

everyday, status-quo level of transparency interaction, or what we might call transmissional

transparency, that expects that the sender, whether it be an individual or an institution, to convey

messages in good faith to the receiver and to establish good policy and procedures (either by

profession or by institution) to ensure such action. This state certainly calls for a leap of faith

by the receiver to expect that the sender will, facing possible consequences, adhere in most

instances to good practices of transparency at least on the level of passive action by making

information or documents available to stakeholders upon request.

However, a transmissional transparent state in the traditional transmission model of

communication is quickly becoming a state that receivers are unsatisfied with. Institutions and

organizations are feeling an intense amount of pressure to be more transparent. Why? Because of

the advent of new technology we are seeing a shift in the power structure where The publics

right to know is steadily and inexorably eroding the secret, opaque lives of individuals and

organizations (Oliver, 2004, p. 24). When circumstances arise that the receiver is not satisfied

with the availability or disclosure of information by the sender, or a crisis situation arises that

prompts stakeholders and the population as a whole be more informed and make demands for it,

a second state arises during the interaction, one we might define as a state oftransactional

transparency which might be considered using a more ritualistic, or even cyclical, model of

communication. In this state, new technology and its ability to offer regular folk surveillance


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capabilities shifts some of the power from institutions to those surveying those institutions. The

third state ofhypertransparency is important, but it should not necessarily be considered a state

of communication. It is, instead, a cognitive state of belief as an argument that the public may

believe at times that they are informed and/or affecting change when in truth they are not.

In the literature on transparency we see common terms: disclosure, trust, accountability,

intent, and clarity, among others. Essentially, we hope that people will disclose information that

is relevant and important to us, especially if we can be adversely affected by not knowing

information. We expect that we can trust that the information from the person we are talking to is

clear, understandable and true because we hope we are able to trust the person, that they are

telling us the information with good intentions because they have our best interests in mind. And

when we are unable to trust that person, we hold them accountable.

Newspaper and Media Culture

How does transparency work in journalism? According to David S. Allen (2008), we can

define journalistic transparency as making public the traditionally private factors that influence

the creation of news, but Allen argues that rather than serving as a normative standard,

(transparency) has become an instrumental value enlisted to protect institutional legitimacy and

stave off criticism (p. 323). In this role transparency has become, as it has in the business world,

essentially a buzzword to keep the vultures, or the literal critics, at bay. Unfortunately for

institutions, the availability of information through new technology and the growing

surveillance state in our society described by Allen is shifting the power dynamic of

interaction and creating a hype-transparent state where the receivers of information are no longer

satisfied with the status-quo.

Allen (2008) tells us the ethic of transparency has a dual role in news. That is, it is an


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important part of the discovery of social truth, but it is also a way to gain access to truth about

the manufacturing of news (p. 324). Several proposals have been made in the profession of

journalism to make the practice more transparent. Rules of Transparency in journalism,

proposed by Kovach and Rosenstiel (2001), suggests that transparency might be better

accomplished in news reports by embeddinga sense of how the story came to be and why it

was presented as it was (p. 83). In The Case for Full Disclosure, TIMEmagazine columnist

James Poniewozik (2008) suggests that political journalists come to terms the more-than-subtle

suspicion that readers have of journalists that they are not objective and do have opinions:

The reason not to say whom youre voting for boils down mainly to the interests ofjournalists, not those of reader and viewers. It would be a pain in the neck. Campaign

sources would mistrust you. Radio hosts and bloggers would have a field day.Readers would become suspicious. But more suspicious than they are already?

(p. 22)

The current journalism practice rooted in the idea of objectivity raises interesting questions

about the professions understanding of the public perception. Allen (2008) believes that

journalists tend to skirt around the issue of transparency by claiming that they are simply

reporting facts, despite the fact that the whole story may not be present:

Transparency as journalistic practices becomes a way for journalists to describe theconstructed reality of pseudo-events without making judgments about the legitimacy of

the story and separating themselves from responsibility for the deceptive nature of thestory. Or put another way: journalists know that what they are reporting is deceptive, but

they are not responsible for that deception as long as they report the fact that they know itis deceptive. (p. 328)

The historical shift into objectivity in newspaper practices was an obvious reaction to the

preceding yellow journalism practices of newspapers. Perhaps it is time to let evolution, or

revolution, occur again in newspapering. However, Plaisance and Allen both seem to reject the


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notion that in order to be transparent journalists should take a confessional stance by revealing

their own personal biases, or an unthinking process of shoveling everything onto the plates of

audiences (Plaisance, 2007, p.193). Both question, as do Craft and Heim, the concern that too

much transparency can be just as bad as too little. The real issue becomes the quality and

relevancy of the act of active disclosure, not the quantity. Allen cautions that more information,

instead of increasing trust, rather provides more reasons to challenge the authority of the

journalistic text. Transparency can provide the raw materials to undermine trust (p. 326).

Despite the idealized democratic nature of journalism (Allen, 2008) seemingly to serve as a

tool to shed light on other institutions within a society, there is a real hesitancy in the profession

to justify or explain news practices. Is it hypocrisy, or self-preservation, that a profession that has

the normative goal of demanding transparency in society, to be the publics watchdog, is

resistant to coming clean about why it does what it does? Habermas argued that the press was the

public spheres preeminent institution, but also considered how professionalization weakened

the presss ties to the public sphere (Allen, 2008, p. 330). According to Plaisance (2007),

journalists have long been reluctant to expose newsroom deliberations to public scrutiny for

various reasons, including a fear of undermining another central journalistic tenet: autonomy

from outside influences (p. 193). However, autonomy is quite able to function in conjunction

with a state of open explanation and accountability. The profession of journalism, given a

constitutional mandate to shed light on the practices of others institutions, itself fails the same

test it applies to others. It is for that fact of hypocrisy, among others, that newspapers are facings

extinction in their current form.

Rupar (2006) studied the content of nearly 700 newspaper articles about genetic engineering

in New Zealand in order to determine whether a lack of background information about the news


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gathering process really affected the information presented in the articles. Rupar argues that

being transparent about the newsgathering process is important because it clarifies the

mediating character of communication in news media; it reminds the reader that there is a

journalist between reality and representation of reality (Rupar, 2006, p. 128). Rupar found in his

content analysis of New Zealand journalism that unexplained articles, articles that did not

indicate how the news was assembled and lacked transparency about the methods, had an

impact on news clarity, and affected the meaning of the news (pp. 134-137). However, when

more explanation appears in a story, as is often apparent in the interpretative journalism

practiced in Europe, the ability of the reader to place the story into context and understanding

was heightened.

Recent attempts by professional journalism organizations to call for more transparent actions

and more active disclosure to readers is a good first step, but one has to seriously question the

culture of journalism that continues to insist in positioning itself in the stance of objectivity.

Though there are many different views about how the media can be more transparent, there

seems to be almost unanimous agreement that the level of trust that readers have in media

practitioners is low and plummeting. How can this be resolved? Perhaps it cant, but it is clear

that the current model that relies on methods of a supposed objectivity is not working. This does

not mean that journalists and other media practitioners should strive to be as confession-based as

Poniewozik suggests, but there is a very real need to consider a new model.

That is not to say that transparency for its own sake is always good. Many have argued that

too much transparency is not necessarily a good thing. For one, it can overwhelm receivers or, in

the case of journalism, readers with information that may confuse the story and may not be

relevant to understand. Smolkin (2006) uses wit to dramatize the situation when he observes that


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You can almost hear the hot air seeping from our bloated egos, replaced by groveling apologies

and overwrought explanations to our fleeing readers (p. 16).

One possible solution to create more transparency and legitimacy in journalism is to not talk

atreaders, but talkwith them in a more conversational way. Regardless of whether journalists

and other media practitioners like it or not, everyday people are joining the conversation and,

more frequently, refusing the status-quo, transmission model of gaining information.

The Public Sphere

The nature of transparency is important in business and journalism, working professional

practices, but perhaps even more important is the definition and practice of the concept in the

public sphere. This public sphere involves our human interactions in society both on micro- and

macro-levels of interaction. The essential need of understanding and trust in our social and

public interactions is described by many in scholarship as being the metaphoric glue that holds

us together.

Allen (2008) argues that a Kantian consideration of transparency, a concept that dates back to

the Enlightenment period of thought, can be bridged with the works of German philosopher

Jurgen Habermas if we take the concept from the realm of ethical theory into the realm of

political theory (p. 329). Habermass work in political theory and the public sphere requires an

understanding of how important transparency is when we consider the importance of

communication discourse and mutual understanding in any social system, especially democracy.

Allen (2008) discusses Habermas further and the notion of transparency appearing as

universal pragmatics :

In its simplest form, universal pragmatics refers to the assumptions made by citizens


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when they engage in discourse. Universal pragmatics refers to the notion that whenpeople enter into a discourse, they do so based on the assumptions that speakers will try

to communicate clearly and that they will tell the truth. Without that assumption, it wouldbe impossible, in Habermass mind, for citizens to achieve understanding, the goal of all

properly situated discourse. (p. 330)

Habermas seems to be considering the same action that James Rachels professes with the

ideas of soft universalism (term coined by Nina Rosenstand). Rachels believed that there are at

least three universal values:

1. A policy of caring for enough infants to ensure the continuation of the group.

2. A rule against lying3. A rule against murder. (Rosenstand, 2006, p.125)

Rachels' view against lying, although universal, seemsprima facie to expect that people will

at times lie, but "only that, on the whole, the acceptable attitude is one of truthfulness"

(Rosenstand, 2006, p. 126). It gives us some wiggle room. The expectation apparently is to

attempt to be honest as much as possible, a "majority" of the time, but allows for exceptions.

Why must we be honest and, therefore, transparent in our social interactions? Because it is the

ultimate way we relate and are able to live with each other. As Plaisance (2007) states, society

would not be possible if we did not place a premium on the spirit of openness, or transparent

behavior (p. 191). Rosenstand (2006) explains the second rule of Rachels' theory more

succinctly, although she does admit that there may be relativistic concerns with this view:

Why do all cultures have a rule against lying? Because if you can't expect a fellowcitizen to tell the truth most of the time, there is no use attempting to communication, and

without communication human society would grind to a halt. ...The only trouble with thelast two rules is that they seem to apply to 'fellow citizens' only. As a member of society,you are expected not to lie or murder members of your own social group, but there is

really nothing preventing you from being morally free to lie through your teeth to anoutsider or to an enemy government. (p. 126)


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The real question is whether individuals within a community really consider the idea of

"human dignity" when they communicate, or does it devolve into a quid pro quo relationship:

that is, do we tell the truth to one another on a "most-often" basis because we want to promote

human dignity, or is it that we attempt to be truthful because if we do not we assume that we will

not get the truth in return? Do we want to be treated with dignity? Yes, we ultimately do. But, in

turn, we tell the truth because we know that if we don't do it ourselves we can't expect it in

return, or that we will be labeled as being unreliable and therefore become a black sheep symbol

within our society. This raises the idea of social contract theory and whether there is an element

of self protection that exists.

Balkin (1999) takes the move of transparency from the ethical to the political realm and

argues that there are three separate political virtues in the concept of transparency, virtues that

may work together but remain distinct concepts:

The first kind of transparency is informational transparency: knowledge about governmentactors and decisions and access to government information. Informational transparency can

be furthered by requiring public statements of the reasons for government action, orrequiring disclosure of information that government has collected. A second type of

transparency is participatory transparency: the ability to participate in political decisionseither through fair representation or direct participation. A third kind of transparency is

accountability transparency: the ability to hold government officials accountable either tothe legal system or to public opinion when they violate the law or when they act in ways

that adversely affect peoples interests. (pp. 393-394)

Does Allen's suggestion that transparency should be considered in political theory, toward a

greater sense of realizing the potential of institutions like journalism as democratic institutions,

assume that democracy is the best form - is it relativistic and ethnocentric? Bakhtin sees

transparency as a potential threat to autonomy in that it cannot be politically neutral (as cited in

Craft and Heim, 2009, p. 223). The real question here may be the concern about whether


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democracy is the best mission of institutions? A true democracy may be, but then again

communism in its ideal abstract form isn't all that bad, either - but neither ideal is ever met. And

the U.S. as a democracy is based in the foundation of capitalism, which has itself proven to be an

un-transparent economic practice time and time again, choosing concealment over disclosure

time and time again. According to Gunaratne (2006), Habermass social theory, based on public

sphere and pragmatics, has been criticized because of their implicit Eurocentric bias and their

universalizing tendencies that promote domination through globalization (p. 95).

In the public sphere, where institutions are ideally serving and representing the public,

accountability is a key component of transparency. But there is also a real need for a shared and

clear understanding, which we will look at further when discussing transparency in business. If

there is a shared understanding, there can be some trust. According to Ranson (2003), Public

trust will be established when the different participants and constituents of an institution strive to

reach shared understanding and accounts about its purpose and practices (p. 461).

A

ccountability,D

isclosure

and Succinctne

ss in Busine

ssT

ranspare

ncy

Succinctness, or simplification, is just as an important normative component of transparency

in business as it is political theory and public sphere considerations. Simply disclosing an

abundance of information is not enough. In order to be transparent, there must be a clear ability

for stakeholders to reasonably understand the information.

Unfortunately in business practices, transparency is lagging behind because there does not

seem to be a common, or coorientated, perception of what constitutes transparent business

practices. Thomas Hale (2008) calls transparency the buzzword sister to the less ethical twin of

democracy deficit for the problems of global governance (p.73). But Hale is pessimistic that

the use of transparency as a term is mostly just a catchphrase, and notes that Few can specify


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how or even if openness and disclosure actually alter the behavior of global actors to promote

accountability (p. 73).

In Hales use of the word, the definition of transparency becomes the Siamese-twin of

accountability. However, the mechanisms of transparency are too soft in the global world of

business to create real accountability, Hale instead argues that that bad publicity is

insufficient to make global actors change behavior (p. 74). With investor monies involved,

accountability is important, and transparency becomes the almost fake prescription to keep

stakeholders at bay.

Pagano (2004) argues that transparency in business exists in varying levels of maturity. The

concept is a well-developed model from a financial governance standpoint; full financial

disclosure is an essential part of securities laws. Yet transparency is in a more adolescent stage as

it applies to management and, more specifically, leaders (p. 2). Security laws continue to be

passed to ensure regulated transparency when companies fail to do so voluntarily. According to

Tapscott and Ticoll (2003), the U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 after the

financial meltdowns of Enron and WorldCom, requiring publically traded companies to more

actively disclose information to its stakeholders.

Despite the call for active disclosure and the establishment of regulations, there is a need in

business institutions to not view transparent practices as the release of information by companies,

not wanting to be viewed as attempting to conceal or deceive, are too often taking the everything

and the kitchen sink approach when releasing documents. And there are apparent dangers in

being too transparent. Oliver (2004) describes how corporate financial reports frequently default

to volumes of information in an attempt, depending on the politics of the observer, to either

comply or confuse (p. 32). Balkin (1999) describes a legal tactic by law firms when faced with


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disclosing information in civil cases, where the tactic is to flood the other side with so much

information and so many documents most of them extraneous that the other side lacks the

time or ability to find the relevant information (p. 395).

In addition to accountability, there appears an added element to transparency in regard to

active corporate disclosure: succinctness. Oliver (2004) expands on this with an anecdote of

former Securities and Exchange Commission chief Harvey Pitt suggesting that more and better

disclosure lay in simplified, shortened reporting that clarified and communicated public company

accounts in a few pages (p. 32). Even in a new transparency proposed by Oliver, active

disclosure does not seem to be enough without the added elements of both clarity, or the ability

for stakeholders to understand what is being disclosed, and a certainness that there will be

avenues through which the public can achieve accountability through either retribution or a

regulation that ensures mistakes will be corrected.

The Effects of NewMedia on Transparency

If there is anything that is driving the movement toward more transparency it is the

accessibility of new technology in democratic societies. Scrutiny of media outlets is a 24/7

operation with bloggers calling traditional media to the mat about the whole truth of stories.

Plaisance (2007) tells us that the increased activity and prominence of Web-based media

watchdog groups and independent bloggers have contributed to the intense public scrutiny of

media behavior (p. 192). Other professions have also felt the pressure to be more transparent

because of the appetite for information by the public and the accessibility to it.

The new media also seems to be shifting the flow of information and, consequently, changing

the power structure that once existed. As mentioned before in the introduction, Craft and Heim

(2009) suggest that today the Internet has empowered individuals and grassroots organizations


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to learn, share their knowledge, and mobilize (p. 219).

However, does the presence of new media, and the accessibility to more information, truly

make us more transparent in the long-run? It is true that, as ONeill (2002) discusses, that

Openness and transparency are now possible on a scale of which past ages can barely dream

(p. 66). But the key word is possible and many current articles in the scholarship do not fail to

mention that they worry that too much transparency may have just as an adverse effect as does

too little. As weve seen in the discussion of both business and public policy issues, people can

be overwhelmed by too much disclosure if it does not have the good intent to be understandable,

or have clarity.

Although the Internet is an instrumental tool in gathering information and prompting other

institutions to be more transparent, Computer-Mediated Communication (CMC) itself is fraught

with issues of being non-transparent. Tompkins (2003) assesses communication and telepresence

to find that truthfulness and trustworthiness as interactive concepts that are more difficult

when all communication is computer-mediated because the humanness we have in face-to-

face communication to be able to determine trust and transparency is condensed and refracted

in cyberspace (pp. 206-207). Tompkins calls this lack of humanness a state of being

dematerialized because what exists in the realm of cyberspace, including its inhabitants and

objects, may have little or no correspondences to those in the physical world (p. 198).

Because there is such a veil of anonymity in CMC, or at least the possibility of it, it is very hard

to gauge those things that are essential to being transparent, including intent, disclosure

accountability and understandability. This raises real questions about how we consider

transparency, and what evolutionary changes will happen to the concept, as we as a society rely

more and more upon CMC interactions in our lives. The possibilities of new media technology to


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democratize and educate the world seems limitless, but there are real dangers and concerns by

some (Carey, 2009) that it may do more to restrict us and further reinforce the hegemonic power

that controls our lives as advanced nations and institutions control the space of Internet access.

However, some argue that the Internet itself is not simply a social tool, but that it also

embodies a mytha narrative containing both utopian visions of alternative realities and

ideological discourses about how we should conduct our lives and organize society (Mosco,

2008, p. 56).

Three States ofTransparency

Carey (2009) tells us that the U.S. culture has historically followed a transmission view of

communication, where one-way messages call for the audience to accept a passive role in the

process and, in essence, be controlled. Although we see it happening already in examples of

social networking and other interactive new media technologies, Carey proposed in 1987 that the

public will begin to reawaken when they are addressed as a conversational partner and are

encouraged to join the talk rather than sit passively as spectators before a discussion conducted

by journalists and experts (Carey, 1987, p. 15). Careys reawakening is occurring on the

Internet. In early 2009, a protest movement began building against Facebook, the popular social

networking site that claims nearly 300 million members, after it announced changes to its terms

of use policy that would make any pictures and/or other information posted by its members the

property of the site in perpetuity (Wong, 2009).

The reaction was significant: members of Facebook ultimately used the site against itself as a

rallying and organizational tool to protest the new policy. In a matter of days, Facebook backed

off from the new policy and began addressing the concerns raised by the protestors. In

reaction, Facebook solicited opinions from its membership about what policies would be


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acceptable as part of the user agreement in what appeared to be an attempt at fostering

democratic discourse.However, the real truth is likely based in economics: Facebook had much

to lose (advertising, sales, and overall worth) with unsatisfied audience members and inner

protests. Facing this outpouring, Facebook was forced to be more transparent about its actions

and intentions. This example, among hundreds of others, is evidence of a shift from the state of

transmissional transparency to transactional transparency, where access to and use of new

communication technologies gives the regular citizenry, or receiver, more power to watchdog

over institutions and, at times, even demand and influence more transparency from the sender in

a more transactional, or cyclical, communication practice.

It is very clear from a survey of the literature that there is now occurring a real shift in power

from the sender to the receiver when it comes to transparency. Oliver (2004) recognizes this

when he makes a distinction between an old transparency (being open and forthright, should

anyone happen to ask) has given way to a new transparency, more active in calling attention to

deeds, both intentional and unintentional (p. 4), apparently deeds that businesses may have

done, both good and bad. Oliver is right in saying that there is a new way of looking at

transparency, but not exactly the way that he envisions it to be. Both Olivers old and new

transparency definitions rely on a transmission model of communication that gives the power

to the sender because messages are still essentially a one-way affair (Carey, 2009). Craft and

Heim (2009) outline two states of transparency, the passive and the active seem to also be an

oversimplification of the concept.

I propose transparency as a concept that follows a path along a dynamic of interaction that

exists upon at least two levels of communication and, subsequently, power. First, there appears

to be an everyday, status-quo level of transparency interaction, or what might be called


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transmissional transparency, that expects that the sender, whether it be an individual or an

institution, to convey messages in good faith to the receiver and to establish good policy and

procedures (either by profession or by institution) to ensure such action. This state certainly calls

for a leap of faith by the receiver to expect that the sender will, facing possible consequences,

adhere in most instances to good practices of transparency at least on the level of passive

action by making information or documents available to stakeholders upon request.

However, a transmissional transparent state in the traditional transmission model of

communication is quickly becoming a state that receivers are unsatisfied with. Institutions and

organizations are feeling an intense amount of pressure to be more transparent. Why? Because of

the advent of new technology we are seeing a shift in the power structure where The publics

right to know is steadily and inexorably eroding the secret, opaque lives of individuals and

organizations (Oliver, 2004, p. 24). When circumstances arise that the receiver is not satisfied

with the availability or disclosure of information by the sender, or a crisis situation arises that

prompts stakeholders and the population as a whole be more informed and make demands for it,

a second state arises during the interaction, one we might define as a state oftransactional

transparency which might be considered using a more ritualistic, or even cyclical, model of

communication. In this state, new technology and its ability to offer regular folk surveillance

capabilities shifts some of the power from institutions to those surveying those institutions. The

third state ofhypertransparency is important, but it should not necessarily be considered a state

of communication. It is, instead, a hypothesis that the public may at times that they are informed

and/or affecting change when in truth they may not be.


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Hypertransparency A Definition

Hyperpersonal Model: An Overview

The growing popularity of Internet communications used for social relationships was quickly

followed by theories to account for these relationships, including how they form and how they fit

into the understanding of existing relationships. Initial scholastic considerations were suspect of

the ability of individuals to form intimate relationships in a CMC environment because of the

lack of specific cues, mostly non-verbal, found in face-to-face (FtF) communications.

Walthers (1996) introduction of the hyperpersonal communication model found that, against

previous assumptions, CMC allowed individuals to actually form and experience intimate levels

of closeness. Three necessary conditions for hyperpersonal communication to occur were

outlined by Walther included the receiver's idealization of the other due to over-attributions,

whereby the receiver assigns values of positive feeling to his or her partners; the sender works on

selective self-presentation, in which the sender has the advantage of being able carefully craft a

message before sending it out; and feedback loop or reciprocity of interactions, whereby the

interplay of idealization and self- presentation becomes a dynamic process and creates a self-

reinforcing cycle (Walther, 1996;Hian, Chuan, Trevor & Detenber, 2004). If these conditions

are apparent it is then that they can develop an intimate closeness with others through CMC

interaction. It is these three conditions that can hopefully be applied to the perceptions one might

have in hypertransparency, with a primary on the receivers idealization of the other and the

assignment, or magnification, of positive values. Ramirez, Walther, Burgoon and Sunnafrank

(2002) argue that the hyperpersonal perspective suggests that individuals go beyond group-level

perceptions toward idealized, yet individuated knowledge structures (p. 216).

Walthers hyperpersonal model has found applications, and support, in a range of other


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studies. Walther (1995) went on to find that CMC interactions already exceeded FtF interactions

with respect to relational intimacy after the first meeting. This hyperpersonal model not only

argues that individuals can develop relationships through CMC, but that these relationships

seemingly seem to be just as, if not more, intense that they would be if they had developed

through FtF interactions. The fact that this is apparently true has to do not only with the nature of

CMC communication, but the ability of the Internet user to over-attribution and create

exaggerated perceptions of online partners as well as communication situations (Ramirez,

Walther, Burgoon and Sunnafrank, 2002, p. 216). These exaggerated perceptions have to do

more with what the Internet user wants to be true as opposed to what is indeed the truth.

Hypertransparency

The term "hypertransparency" is currently being used in various ways. A simply Yahoo

search finds the term used as state of opening up information to everyone in a marketing or

business sense, which really is a characteristic of transmissional transparency according to this

essay. Transmissional transparency, as I understand it here, it an organization or entity, even an

individual, releasing information (though still maintaining a certain control over what is

released). For this reason the usage of "hypertransparency" by various marketing or business

companies should be considered, if nothing else, a colloquial term used by these entities for their

purposes and a misinterpretation of what hypertransparency really likely is for our purposes.

Hypertransparency is the idea that individuals perceive, through the presence of and exposure

to new media like the Internet, that it is more informed about what is happening, perhaps

considered as false state of belief that they are more informed about the operations of institutions

(business, government, their social circles) when, in fact, they may really not be. This is based on

some of J.B. Walther's observations about the hyperpersonal states in CMC relationships. It


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seems logical there may exist within common Internet users an illusion of access that they

equate to increased transparency of institutions that most likely, in most instances, does not exist.

The hyper component implies the speed at which people develop relationships or trust, and

sometimes the problems that speed creates. It allows for the perception of trust and credibility to

develop faster, but it also may create false perceptions in the development of those trust

relationships.

The hypothetic assumptions of this work imagines that Internet users are fooled into

thinking they are able to access information readily when indeed things are not as transparent as

they would believe. This is considered a state of hypertransparency. A hypertransparent state

can be either negative or positive, but the real concern might be how it happens in the first place.

Certainly there are instances where a hypertransparent state of communication can be considered

positive, or good: that is, there is a free and honest exchange of information and the relationship

is accelerated through the use of CMC. However, this is not always the case. Walthers

Hyperpersonal Model cautions that as part of the hyperprocess that receivers engage in

attributional processes to reduce uncertainty and, in doing so, are susceptible to making

exaggerated attributions based on limited information (Ramirez, Walther, Burgoon and

Sunnafrank, 2002, p. 216).

The concept of transparency is most often associated with the institutional responsibility of

disclosure. That is, governments and businesses are often expected to be transparent about their

operations, especially when those operations are either funded by public monies (i.e., taxpayers)

or have a direct effect on the public as a whole (a business that might sell things like Tylenol or

Toyotas, products that can endanger the public). However, it is also important to consider the


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concept of transparency in the formation of one-on-one, interpersonal relationships.

Transparency is just as important in these relationships for it requires elements of truth and

honesty in order to form those relationships and make them significant. It is perhaps here that the

concept of hypertransparency may have the most relevance in that just as individuals may have

hyperpersonal relationships in CMC, they may at the same time believe that they have access to

information about those individuals that they in truth do not, a state of hypertransparency.

It seems possible, and probable, that individual Internet users assume that institutions are

more transparent, that more information about what is going on is available, because of the

Internet itself. It might be assumed that there is perception of access to information, that there is

an abundance of information to be had; that information can be attained quickly; and that the

information is complete and accurate. That is, the individuals may attribute positive views of the

accessibility of information through the medium. This reflects the key variable in the

hyperpersonal model is that the communication is mediated electronically through the Internet,

that cues are limited more so than they would be in FtF communications, and that the receiver

attributes qualities to the sender.

The concept that simple exposure to media may give individuals the perception that they are

more aware and knowledgeable than they really are is not new and is indeed well documented.

Mondak (1995) found that individuals who were exposed to newspapers did not measurably

enhance their knowledge about political affairs; however, the exposure did contribute to the self-

perceived knowledge individuals thought they had about political campaigns. According to Park

(2001), simple exposure to media may create within individuals an illusion of knowing, self-

perception that can often be flawed when tested:


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Self-perceived knowledge results from peoples abilities to monitor their own knowledge.Feeling knowledgeable does not necessarily imply any concrete knowledge. It may

merely be based on familiarity with an issue. Self-perceived knowledge is not a matter ofright or wrong, it only reflects the amount of how much a person thinks he or she knows

about an issue. The discrepancy between actual and self-perceived knowledge may be

called the illusion of knowing phenomenon. (pp. 419-420)

Park argues that sometimes the gap between perceived and actual knowledge is actually quite

small, especially when individuals are personally invested in issues. However, the perceptions

(illusion) of knowledge are consistently more rich and informed than the actual. This is the

concern of hypertransparency.

Communication technologies may influence a perception of hypertransparency. If we

consider the concern about relevant information toward transparency and the concern raised by

many (Plaisance, 2007; Allen, 2008; and Craft and Heim, 2009) there may be problems of

having too much transparency, or determining what is relevant, coorientation may be the solution

toward bridging the very real gaps of perception that seem to exist between senders and receivers

when considering transparency.

Coorientation and the Road Ahead

The struggles with defining transparency, as well as what appears to be the shifting nature of

the concept and the possibility that it exists in different planes of interaction, calls for some way

measure the concept empirically to see what is really going on in the perceptual relationship

between sender and receiver.

One possible first step could be the application of the Coorientation Model. First introduced

by T.M. Newcomb in the 1950s, this design was expanded upon by Chaffee and McLeod (1973)

who discuss the model as a way to offer empirical measurement to assess perception and


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communicative behavior in relationships between the sender, or A, and the receiver, B, as

they simultaneously cooriented to an object of communication, X (p. 474). Chaffee and

McLeod expand on Newcombs model by expanding on the object, or X, that both persons in

the communication act perceive. That is, they argue that a person does not orient himself to a

single object in his environment, but to a discrimination between objects (p. 479).

The application to transparency is in the conclusion by McLeod and Chaffee (1973), citing

early work by Chaffee, that it is not the attitudes toward objects that determine orientation (or

coorientation), but it is the attributes involved in X that are the key elements of orientation; by

extension, we would assume attributes to be similarly critical in coorientation (p. 479). This

seemingly allows us to focus on the message itself, and the evaluation of that message by each

person, to begin measuring what constitute a transparent message.

Of course, the process of constructing a measurable design from McLeod and Chaffees

suggestion is too complicated to detail here, butprima facie it seems to point to a path down the

road to a great understanding of transparency. If we consider the concern about relevant

information toward transparency and the concern raised by many (Plaisance, 2007; Allen, 2008;

and Craft and Heim, 2009) there may be problems of having too much transparency, or

determining what is relevant, coorientation may be the solution toward bridging the very real

gaps of perception that seem to exist between senders and receivers when considering

transparency.

Conclusion

Transparency appears to have the connotation of simplification, obscurantism is taken away

because everything is laid bare what you see is what you get (Bankowski, 1999, p. 428). It is

very clear after surveying literature on transparency that it is not enough to have the intention of


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being transparent or even actively disclose information, although that seems to be the general

practice of many institutions. It is important to understand that transparency is not a static

concept, but one that is evolving and changing as how we interact and communicate with each

other changes. Much work needs to be done to understand how transparency is changing and

how new media technology is fostering it. However, there are key elements to transparency that

dont go away: the need for trust, a good intention by the sender, accountability, disclosure, and

clarity. As Bankowski tells us in the quote above, simplicity of a message helps us make things

transparent, but simplicity alone is not enough to ensure that a transparent state will exist.

Understanding transparency as it exists in the traditional, transmissional model of

communication is quickly becoming antiquated. Although the transmissional model permeates

our culture through newspapers and television broadcasts, things are changing. Transmissional

transparency is giving way to a more transactional transparency as the public becomes more

interactively involved in gathering information and performing surveillance on institutions which

traditionally controlled the flow of information. Hypertransparency is its own unique beast

worth exploring in further cognitive research.

There is a real need to come up with studies that can measure transparent perceptions. Too

many times it seems that these parties, receivers and senders, are talking past one another. Using

coorientation, which has been a tool utilized by other social science researchers, may be a good

first step toward operationalizing transparency. The biggest problem in transparency seems to be

the current inability to reconcile the perceptions between sender and receiver, institutions and

stakeholders. It is this first step that might offer us the first real insights that could lead to a solid

definition of this elusive concept.


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