Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser...

110
an international review of peace initiatives Issue Editors Aguswandi and Judith Large the Indonesia – Aceh peace process Reconfiguring politics: Issue 20 2008 Conciliation Resources

Transcript of Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser...

Page 1: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e v i e w o f p e a c e i n i t i a t i ve s

Issue Editors Aguswandi andJudith Large

the Indonesia – Aceh peace process

Reconfiguring politics:

Reconfiguring politics: the Indonesia – Aceh peace process

The Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Government ofIndonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Helsinki in August2005 signalled an end to more than three decades of armed conflictand suffering in Aceh. The peace agreement provided a basis forreconfiguring politics in the province, outlining the principlesunderpinning new ‘self-government’ arrangements, as well asprovisions for political participation, revenue sharing, reintegrationand human rights.

This Accord issue offers an analysis of developments leading toAceh’s peace agreement, with contributions from the parties’negotiators as well as the mediator. It also examines the subsequentprocess of putting the agreement into practice. The successes,difficulties, and controversies of translating the agreement into law,contesting elections, enabling reconstruction and reintegrating ex-combatants all signal important ongoing challenges for Aceh’sfuture. Finally, the publication discusses key peacebuilding issues thatoften receive less attention, such as women’s roles, the impact ofShar’ia law, and consolidation of political parties.

Conciliation Resources and the Accord seriesConciliation Resources (CR) is an international non-governmentalorganization that supports people working to prevent violence,promote justice and transform armed conflict. CR’s Accord projectsaim to inform and strengthen peace processes, providing a uniqueresource on conflict and peacemaking.

“Bringing together direct experience and serious analysis,Accord is an invaluable resource and inspiration for people

around the world who are struggling to transform violent conflict and influence policy.”

Diana Francis, Chair of the Committee for Conflict Transformation Support, UK

The full text of all issues in the Accord series can be found on theConciliation Resources website at http://www.c-r.org

Issue 20 2008

Accord 20

Conciliation ResourcesThe Ind

onesia – Aceh p

eace process

Conci l iat ion Resources

£16.99

Accord20 Cover AW 03 10/9/08 21:05 Page 1

Page 2: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Conciliation Resources

London 2008

Reconfiguring politics: the Indonesia – Aceh peace process

Issue Editors: Aguswandi and Judith Large

Page 3: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Acehnese who said they were victims of human rights abuses take part in a protestoutside the Aceh Monitoring Mission in Banda Aceh, on 14 December 2006.

Source: Reuters/Tarmizy Harva

Acknowledgements

Issue Editors Aguswandi and Judith LargeAccord Series Editor Aaron GriffithsDirector of Policy, Communications and Comparative Learning Celia McKeonEvents and Publications Officer Michelle HuntingTranslators Muammar Vebry and Vina RahmatiExecutive Director Andy Carl

Conciliation Resources would like to give special thanks for the editorial advice and assistance providedby Laurence Broers, Edward Aspinall and Kirsten Schulze in the development of this publication.

In addition we extend grateful thanks to our authors, peer readers, photographers and all those whocontributed to the conception and production of this publication, especially: Nashiruddin Ahmad,Martti Ahtisaari, Leena Avonius, Hamid Awaludin, Nazamuddin Basyah Said, Patrick Barron, Hendra Budian, Juha Christensen, Afridal Darmi, Muslahuddin Daud, M. Nur Djuli, T. Faisal MG, Lina Frödin, Jesse Grayman, Faisal Hadi, Glory Hall, Antje Herrberg, Konrad Huber, Lawrence Jackson,Sidney Jones, Jusuf Kalla, Suraiya Kamaruzzaman, Riikka Marjamäk i, Bernhard May, Lesley McCulloch,Michelle Miller, Blair Palmer, John Penny, Gembong Prijono, Nurdin Abdul Rahman, Palinasamy Ramasamy, Anthony Reid, Henry Soelistyo, Rizal Sukma, Tarmizi, Fadlullah Wilmot andIrwandi Yusuf.

The publication was made possible thanks to financial support from the UK Department forInternational Development (DFID), the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Swiss FederalDepartment of Foreign Affairs and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA).

Copyright for the Map of Aceh, Indonesia on page 5 is held by the East-West Center.

Published byConciliation Resources173 Upper StreetLondon N1 1RGUnited Kingdom

Telephone +44 (0)20 7359 7728Fax +44 (0)20 7359 4081Email [email protected] www.c-r.org

© Conciliation Resources 2008

Permission is granted for reproduction and use of these materials for educational purposes. Please acknowledge your source when using the materials and notify Conciliation Resources.

UK charity registration number 1055436

ISSN 1365-0742

ISBN 978-1-905805-13-6

Page 4: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Contents

3Contents

Acronyms and glossary 4Map 5Introduction 6Judith Large and AguswandiThe conflict in Aceh: context, precursors and catalysts 12Michelle Ann Miller

An overview of the peace processAceh’s arduous journey to peace 16Konrad HuberDelivering peace for Aceh 22An interview with President Martti Ahtisaari Why is peace in Aceh successful? 25Hamid AwaluddinThe Helsinki negotiations: a perspective from Free Aceh Movement negotiators 28M. Nur Djuli and Nurdin Abdul RahmanPerspectives on Aceh’s peace process 31The Brussels ‘backstage’ of the Aceh peace process 32Antje HerrbergA sensitive mission: monitoring Aceh’s agreement 36Kirsten E. SchulzeCivil society engagement in the peace process 40Afridal Darmi

The transition from conflict: making peace real The Law on the Governing of Aceh: the way forward or a source of conflicts? 42Bernhard MayElections: consolidating peace 46Edward AspinallPerspectives on post-agreement experience 51The political process in Aceh: a new beginning? 52AguswandiThe challenges of reintegration in Aceh 54Lina FrödinManaging the resources for peace: reconstruction and peacebuilding in Aceh 58Patrick BarronEconomic injustice: cause and effect of the Aceh conflict 62Nazamuddin Basyah SaidThe challenge of hidden economies and predation for profit 64Judith Large

Challenges for building peaceHuman rights and justice in Aceh: the long and winding road 66Faisal HadiAgents for change: the roles of women in Aceh’s peace process 70Suraiya Kamaruzzaman Keeping the peace: security in Aceh 72Sidney JonesShari’ah in Aceh: panacea or blight? 76Fadlullah WilmotAceh’s new era 80An interview with Irwandi YusufCompromising for peace 82An interview with Jusuf KallaKey texts 84Profiles 92Chronology 98Further reading 103Accord Series 104About Conciliation Resources 106Order form 107

Page 5: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

4 Accord 20

GlossaryBrimob paramilitary police in Aceh (abbr. of Brigade Mobil) Bupatiadministrative chief in a rural district, mayorGeuchikvillage headKabupatenadministrative districtKecamatansubdistrict Kota cityMakar rebellionOrganic/non-organic forces‘Organic’ denotes troops recruited within their ownprovince and permanently attached to the local territorialcommand structure. ‘Non-organic’ refers to troopsdeployed to a province on a short-term basis for specificcombat exercises and counterinsurgency operations.

Pancasilathe founding ideology of the Indonesian state whichemphasizes unityPemekaranprocedure for creating new administrative units (lit. blossoming)Provokatora term widely used to attribute violence to unknownactors, though over time associated increasingly withthe Indonesian military Qanun provincial administrative regulationReformasiprocess of social and political liberalization followingthe fall of the Suharto regimeUlamaIslamic religious scholarsWilayah district

AcronymsABAS Proposed new province in Aceh, Southwest

Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan)ALA Proposed new province in Aceh

(Aceh Leuser Antara)AMM Aceh Monitoring MissionASEAN Association of Southeast Asian NationsASNLF Aceh Sumatra National Liberation FrontBIN National Intelligence Agency

(Badan Intelijen Nasional)BRA Aceh Reintegration Board

(Badan Reintegrasi Aceh)BRR Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Board CMI Crisis Management InitiativeCoHA Cessation of Hostilities AgreementCRT Civilian Response TeamCSO Civil society organizationDPD Senate (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah)DPR People’s Legislative Assembly

(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat)DOM Military operations zone GALAKSI Gayo-Alas-Singk il, three ethnic groups

represented in a proposed new province in Aceh

GAM Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka)GoI Government of IndonesiaFKK Communication and Coordination Forum

(Forum Komunikasi dan Koordinasi)FPSG Resistance Front Against GAM Separatists

(Front Perlawanan Separatis GAM)HDC Henry Dunant Centre for

Humanitarian Dialogue

JSC Joint Security CommitteeKOMNAS HAM National Commission on Human RightsKPA Aceh Transitional Committee

(Komite Peralihan Aceh, demobilized GAMarmed forces)

LoGA Law on the Governing of AcehMoU Memorandum of UnderstandingMOI Mobil Oil IndonesiaMPR People’s Consultative Assembly

(Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) NAD Aceh province (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam,

lit. Aceh Land of Peace)NGO Non-governmental organizationNII Islamic State of Indonesia

(Negara Islam Indonesia)PAN National Mandate PartyPETA Indonesian army-backed militias

(pembela tanah air, ‘homeland defenders’)PKS Justice and Welfare Party POLRI Indonesian National Police

(Kepolisian Republik Indonesia)PPP United Development PartySIRA Aceh Referendum Information Centre

(Sentral Informasi Referendum)TNA Military wing of GAM (Tentara Negara Aceh) TNI Indonesian military

(Tentara Nasional Indonesia)UNDP United Nations Development Programme

Source: T. Faisal MG

Page 6: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

5Map

This map does not show the new district of Pidie Jaya, established in Aceh on 2 January 2007 under the proposal for the expansion of districts by the Indonesian parliament.

Page 7: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Introduction:the forging of identity, theimperative of political voiceand meeting human needs

Judith Large and Aguswandi

‘Violence, hatred and intolerance are bred out ofinjustice, poverty, and a thwarted sense of politicalfulfillment’ Edward Said (2000)

At the height of the 1999 NATO bombings of Serbia in defence of Kosovo, a fleeting international newsbroadcast drew attention to a demonstration of localactivism thousands of miles away. Somewhere on theisland of Sumatra, villagers and activists had managedto draw huge letters on an expanse of roadway,rendering them visible from the air. ‘NATO’ the messagesaid in English, ‘Save us as well’. The site was Aceh, andthe then emerging notion of ‘liberal interventionism’was not lost on people look ing for a way out ofrepression and protracted armed violence in theirhomeland. The regional jurisdiction of NATO was ofcourse inappropriate to Aceh and the two situations are obviously very different. Moreover many peopleoutside of Indonesia were not yet familiar with theconflict that had raged there for years.

And yet a government in exile for Aceh sat inStockholm, Sweden, while a government in situ inJakarta was undergoing historical and massive change from single party dictatorship to a multi-partydemocracy, with reformasi on a scale never before seenin the region. Five years after this local appeal to theoutside world, Aceh would hit the headlines for adifferent reason, due to devastation incurred by thetsunami of late December 2004.

The war in Aceh is a salutary reminder of the historicalforging of identities, the imperative of political voiceand the need for meeting human needs. It is an internalconflict fuelled by a failure of imagination in the state-building process, by years by exclusion and lack ofaccess to resources and power. Almost a decade sincethe NATO bombings, the status of Kosovo is stillpainfully being crafted. In Aceh a peace agreementbased on democratic process and (in principle) bothpolitical representation and redistribution, rather thanfull independence, is a test case of utmost importance.

6 Accord 20

Judith Large is Honorary Research

Fellow at the Richardson Institute for

Peace and Conflict Studies, Lancaster

University, UK. She worked

intensively in Indonesia from

1999-2003 for various international,

national and non-governmental

organizations.

Aguswandi is a conflict adviser, human

rights advocate and a political analyst

of Indonesian affairs.

Free Aceh Movement members shake hands as they bidfarewell to other prisoners before departing a prison in

Lhokseumawe, Aceh on 31 August 2005. Source: Reuters/Stringer Indonesia

Page 8: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Key dimensions to the conflict in AcehTwo key insights are essential for understanding boththe evolution of conflict in Aceh and the currentparameters for conflict resolution there. One is itshistorical location and its importance as a nexus fortrading links and previous independent sultanates, witha particular Acehnese legacy of Islamic social form andstrong leadership, including queens, who withstoodinvasion fiercely. The other is the configuration of theIndonesian state itself, and in particular the principle ofdwi fungsi which gave the military internal (domestic)and external (defence) functions as well as license to dobusiness for profit, given the relatively empty coffers of apost-independence struggle and the post-war nationalproject under Presidents Sukarno and then Suharto.

Who are the Acehnese? The inhabitants of Aceh are divided into earlier pre-Malayan hill peoples, the Gayo and the Alas, and the low land coastal people who are the product of centuries of intermarriage between the Batak,Dravidians, North Indians, Javanese, Arabs, Chinese and Minangkabau. At the last national census the

administrative capital city Banda Aceh had 2,389,000inhabitants. The province then had eight regencies(Aceh Selatan, Aceh Tenggara, Aceh Timur, AcehTengah, Aceh Barat, Aceh Utara, Aceh Besar and Pidie)and two municipalities (Banda Aceh and Sabang), aswell as two Administrative Cities (Lhokseumawe andLangsa); 142 districts and 5596 villages.

Aceh emerged as a sultanate or sovereign state in the16th century and preserved its independence againstthe Portuguese until the Dutch took 35 years of conflictto complete their East Indies colonization. The provinceis located at the northwest corner of Sumatra island inIndonesia, bordering on the Malacca Strait (North andEast), the Indonesian Ocean (West) and North SumatraProvince (South). It has a population of approximately four million, and a variety of natural resources holdingpotential for economic development. These range fromfertile agricultural land for growing spices, peppers andfruits; forests, fisheries and water as well as oil and liquidnatural gas, with many types of minerals including afamous red gold. Until recently forests were 75 per centof the land and 2.47 per cent was cultivated by smallholders. The economy of the province is based onagriculture, fishing and mining.

7Introduction

Page 9: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Legend has it that in the late 1940s, the Acehnese gavefinancial and material assistance to the new centralgovernment while being incorporated into the newlyborn Indonesian Republic – even donating theirpersonal gold for the first Indonesian national aircraft.But belonging to a new post-colonial state, and thecurbing of de facto autonomy meant being ruled fromJava and consequently within a decade seriousdiscontent had emerged. There were classic ‘centre-periphery’ dynamics here (decisions made in Jakarta,taxation going to Jakarta, political appointmentscoming from Jakarta). Fearing the role of Islam wouldbe undermined, local elites and, in particular, Aceh’sinfluential Islamic scholars supported an armedrebellion from 1953 until the early 1960s. In response,President Sukarno returned Aceh’s provincial status and its autonomy in religious and cultural matters. But when Suharto replaced Sukarno the promise ofautonomy was once again broken. Because of patternsin the exploitation (and plunder) of natural resources,long-standing grievances simmered over governance,underdevelopment and revenue drain to Jakarta elites.In 1976 a full secessionist uprising began, with theGerakan Aceh Merdeka – Free Aceh Movement (GAM) –fighting intermittently for an independent state. Thiscoincided with the growth of oil- and gas-basedindustries in the north-east of the province.

The legacy of the DOM From the late 1970s and particularly in 1989 and theearly 1990s, the experience of military repression andhuman rights abuses deepened already severealienation from the Indonesian state, acceleratingpopular support for independence. The status ofMilitary Operations Zone (Daerah Operasi Militer, orDOM) was imposed in Aceh between 1989-1998. Underit, mass violations were committed indiscriminatelyduring an anti-insurgency campaign. According to theInternational Crisis Group, between 1989 and 1998between 1000 and 3000 people were k illed, andanother 900 -1400 were missing, believed dead. Deathtolls are controversial and much disputed, and someestimates by Acehnese NGOs are much higher. Afterthe lifting of the DOM and the fall of Suharto, humanrights activists traveled to Jakarta to offer publiceducation (‘socialization’) on the scale of suffering andstate violence in Aceh, offering documentation throughrecords of disappearances, k illings, rapes and assaults,and photos of mass graves. A wave of re-examination of the past, demonstrations and rapid change wassweeping Indonesia. This was the time of thereferendum in East Timor, which went horribly wrongand led to both war and Timorese independence. Smallwonder then, that students (SIRA) spearheading the

movement for a referendum on independence for Aceh got little formal hearing in Jakarta. In Banda Aceh,however, the legacy of the DOM contributed to themobilization of a million people in public protest,memorably gathering in front of the main mosque inBanda Aceh.

‘Self-determination’ versus the sovereignintegrity of the Republic of Indonesia There is much controversy about the history of theresistance movement in Aceh and the evolution ofGAM, in particular the growth of other groups such asthe Free Aceh Movement Council (MP-GAM) based inEurope with a representative in Malaysia. Hasan di Tirofled Aceh in 1979 and set up residency (and agovernment in exile) in Stockholm. The rival SecretaryGeneral of GAM, Teuku Don Zulfahri was assassinated inKuala Lumpur in June 2000. Di Tiro, who called himselfPresident of the Aceh/Sumatra National Front and Headof State, Aceh, was a respected academic who claimedhereditary leadership from sultans in Aceh. Hestudiously developed and argued a case for self-determination according to his understanding ofinternational law. For example, di Tiro claimed (inappeals to the United Nations (UN)) that the DutchGovernment had illegally ‘annexed’ Aceh to the DutchEast Indies in 1873, citing a proclamation by USPresident Grant of impartiality in the war between the Netherlands and Aceh and quoting The Times ofLondon in the same year to the effect that Aceh wasnever defeated in that war. He argued for theapplication of UN resolutions on legitimacy of thearmed struggle, on colonial transfer and the right ofpeople to fight for liberation against colonialism (in this case, Javanese).

As government changed in Jakarta at the end of the1990s, and with the backdrop of financial crisis, oldclaims for power and local control (as well as newgrievances) erupted across the archipelago. In an erafollowing on from the violent disintegration ofYugoslavia and wars of separation in Ethiopia andSomalia, the ‘international community’ could notcountenance the ‘Balkanization’ of Indonesia throughviolent conflict in Aceh, Kalimantan, east Java, Sulawesiand Maluku, not to mention then Irian Jaya (now WestPapua, where similar and specific claims of self-determination are held). For the political elite in Jakarta,the threat to Indonesian sovereignty was seen ashaving both external and internal dimensions. The‘external’ dimension was perceived as link ing Acehneseseparatism (and the revival of similar claims in WestPapua/Irian Jaya) with attempts by foreign powers tocarve up Indonesia. Many government officials were

8 Accord 20

Page 10: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

suspicious of foreign NGO agendas. The linkage ofseparatism with foreign subversion became a long-standing element in official Indonesian discourse onseparatism. Hence the principle of ‘non-interference’was evoked for dealing with it, particularly after the East Timor disaster.

The humanitarian pauseIt was in 1999 that the new Henry Dunant Centre of Geneva or HDC (now known as the Centre forHumanitarian Dialogue) entered the scene, on the basis of discussions with the new President Wahid and a needs analysis in Aceh. HDC had not worked inIndonesia before, in fact Aceh was their first test case for what became known as humanitarian dialogue. As a Swiss private agency they were acceptable to somemembers of the government in Jakarta and beganfacilitating discussions in Geneva for an end tohostilities to enable humanitarian access. This led in2000 to a ceasefire known as the ‘humanitarian pause’,that held into 2001, and a major breakthrough inDecember 2002 when the parties signed the Cessationof Hostilities Agreement (CoHA). This agreement outlineda ceasefire followed by demilitarization measures andan ‘all-inclusive dialogue’ on autonomy provisionsfollowed by provincial elections in Aceh. Withinmonths, however, it broke down, and Indonesiansecurity forces launched their largest-ever militaryoperations in Aceh.

In fact the suffering of the people of Aceh had resumedafter the brief interlude of the lifting of the DOM.Between January and the beginning of August 2000approximately 300 people were killed in Aceh andinternally displaced people were attacked in the verycamps where they had sought shelter. In early Augustthe visiting head of the US-based International Forum for Aceh, Jafa Siddiq Hamzah, disappeared in Medan. Hisbody was later discovered outside the city. Later in thesame month Oxfam local staff were tortured and held bysecurity forces in south Aceh. This sent a clear signal thatinternational agencies that were perceived as supporting‘the enemy’ were not wanted in Aceh. Local peopledescribed being ‘between the lion and the tiger’ ascombatants jockeyed for control and both governmentbuildings and schools burned. Some forms ofintimidation had no clear ownership, promptingspeculation of a ‘hidden hand’ at work to destabilize thesituation. The killing of the commander of GAM’s militarywing, Teungku Abdullah Syafi’ie, by the security forces on22 January 2002, three days after the provincial governorof Aceh invited him to peace talks, was a huge loss.

HDC fielded dedicated staff in Banda Aceh and workedthrough local joint monitoring teams to oversee

compliance and document incidents. But there werehuge problems from the start in terms of gaps betweenpolitical voice/intent and military presence/behaviours.‘Security’ in Aceh was the realm of Brimob, aparamilitary police brigade, and the Indonesian militarywhich held de facto control over Aceh’s affairs and theamount of influence Jakarta could bring to bear wasquestionable. Continued violations demonstrated thatthe Indonesian Military (TNI)/Brimob were unwilling orunable to control their forces in the field; it was clearlyin their interest to maintain a security situation in whichmilitary force was seen to be the only answer. GAMmeanwhile gained in confidence in terms of theirprofile, using pauses to rearm and to bring out moreopenly their own information campaigns. Oftenmembers of the Joint Monitoring teams were caughtbetween the two forces with demands for money andloyalty. At one stage (July 2001) police arrested six GAMrepresentatives on the security and humanitariancommittees facilitated in Banda Aceh by the HDC,accusing them of abusing their status as negotiators.

GAM wanted to internationalize the talks brokered inGeneva (which they saw as legitimizing their cause) andbroaden their advocacy. The Government of Indonesia(GoI) took a counter- position, maintaining that allnegotiations would only take place at the localgovernment level, as a domestic problem which waspurely internal. This allowed the Jakarta government todistance itself, while publicly accusing the HDC ofoperating beyond their original mandate. A completecollapse of talks took place in 2003 and martial law wasimposed once again, this time under PresidentMegawati. We now know that key government figureswho had been brought into HDC processes directly orindirectly – Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (thenCoordinating Minister for Security and Politics), JusufKalla and Farid Husain, maintained an interest in anegotiated outcome during this period.

Local realities, and the shock of tsunamiLocal realities for the affected population includedpersonal loss, poverty, displacement, rape, abduction,intimidation and threat of attack or loss of trade orlivelihood. The picture ‘on the ground’ was also one ofpragmatic co-operation between opposing forcesfurther down the command chain, as TNI soldiers andGAM affiliates or other local gangs forged their owntrading deals in drugs, gold, or even weaponry, in ashadow economy. With little trust in local ‘governance’structures, the mosque and religious leadershipfrequently offered sanctuary, food aid and advice forthose in need. ‘Civil society’ in the sense of humanrights NGOs, women, students or academicorganizations, had no formal channels of input into

9Introduction

Page 11: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

high-level talks on the future of Aceh. Then on 26 December 2004, a 9.1-magnitude underwaterearthquake caused a tremendous tsunami whichdevastated Aceh, resulting in the deaths of over128,000 people. Fragile wooden homes and shop fronts in Banda Aceh and along the coast quite literally disappeared.

Breakthrough, and the Helsinki processIf the conflict in Aceh between GAM and the GoI mighthave been called ‘asymmetrical’, the cruel impact of thetsunami rendered suffering in symmetry unprecedentedin the province. As one former combatant put it twoyears later at a meeting in Bangkok, ‘My family wasgone; the people were gone; the Enemy was gone.What is there to fight for?’ But let it not be said that the‘tsunami won’ in Aceh. True, GAM might have been onthe verge of an all-out military defeat, but nationalistcauses can go underground for the long term whenthis happens. Rather, there was a shake-up incircumstances that meant talks could begin again, on anew foundation. This publication examines exactly thisprocess – how a Finnish businessman took the initiativeand led the way to high-level mediation; how astatesman brokered not only an agreement but theassistance of the European Union and the Associationof South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to bring weight tobear on a monitoring process that was acceptable toboth sides.

Moreover, the agreement is predicated on meetingthose basic needs – for self-governance, for poverty-reduction, education, revenue sharing and meaningfulelectoral participation and representation – that hadfuelled violent conflict in Aceh for years. Similargrievances, based on exclusion and lack of access toresources and power and channeled through strongidentity reinforcement and claims, are central toneighbouring conflicts in southern Thailand orMindanao. This is why democratic process and theoutcome of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)signed in Finland in August 2005 matter so much. Eventhree years later, it is early days.

Political process and political culture will take time todevelop, in tandem with recovery and healing fromdecades of crisis. Difficulties in passing the post-MoULaw on Governing Aceh (LoGA) in Jakarta taught manythat negotiations with central government willcontinue to be a feature in building the peace for Aceh.Oil and natural gas reserves are finite and requiremanagement. Ironically, the improved security situationhas meant a drastic increase in illegal logging. Formercombatants and their families are still mak ing personaltransitions; old personal or inter-group enmities may

remain unresolved. Calls for transitional justice andaccountability will resonate for many, as they dothroughout the wider archipelago. The physicalchanges to infrastructure and building through post-tsunami reconstruction have brought about a newlandscape for many, while rural areas may feel leftbehind or forgotten. Generational and political factionscan grow and splinter long after weapons have beenput down, and one great test will be the cultivation of responsible and accountable local leadership. Thisstudy will explore exactly these tensions andopportunities, as ongoing challenges, in the hopeof being relevant to Aceh and elsewhere.

Key dimensions to the peace processGiven Indonesia’s sensitivity about internal interference,the Aceh mediations (both HDC and CMI) wereproducts of ‘private diplomacy’ rather than UN or inter-governmental brokerage. Michelle Miller’s backgroundstudy casts light on the asymmetrical nature of theconflict and the maturing of a rebel movement toreadiness for legitimized political negotiations. Theimportance of trust and building relationships with athird party is brought out by Konrad Huber in hisoverview of the peace process, while interviews withkey participants in the Helsink i process provide theirown personal insights and anecdotes. You will find herethe voices of both Nur Djuli and Jusuf Kalla, as well asMartti Ahtisaari. Private diplomacy, however, was wellconnected in order to ensure international support anda monitoring mission acceptable to both parties. AntjeHerrberg gives here an ‘insider view ’ of the Brussels sideto the AMM, while Kirsten Schulze offers overallreflection and analysis of the mission.

Even during the Helsink i talks there were voices ask ing‘who speaks for civil society?’ This is a critical issue forscholars and practitioners concerned with thesustainability of agreements and whether they deliver a peace dividend to populations themselves. In recentyears new instruments such as UN Security CouncilResolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security havebeen brought into being with this in mind. In spite of avibrant record of human rights advocacy and studentactivism, in Aceh it was not until the debates on thegoverning law that civil society found recognizedchannels for their views on the peace. This volumeincludes Suraiya Kamaruzzaman’s account of women’sparticipation during and after the war. Afridal Darmitakes on the question of who and what is civil society inAceh today and how does it function, interspersed withlocal voices sharing their own experience.

Essentially the ‘reframing’ process – from autonomy toself-government – finally accepted at the negotiating

10 Accord 20

Devastation in front of the Baiturrahman mosque in Banda Aceh following the December 2004 tsunami.

Source: T. Faisal MG

Page 12: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

table, was realized in principle in the LoGA. BernhardMay examines this as the key legislative and enablingstep to a new foundation, followed by election process unprecedented in Indonesia. The standing ofindependent candidates and the ushering in of newlyelected (formerly GAM) officials is here recounted byEdward Aspinall. Aceh was undergoing huge changessimultaneously, as described by Patrick Baron in hisarticle on reconstruction. The role of the internationalcommunity, the influx of post-tsunami resources andagencies have had their own impact.

Aceh is in a process of transition. That transition will bevery much dependent on how we learn the lessons ofthe past, and how the many actors working to sustainpeace in the province address some of the concernshighlighted by this publication’s authors. Key questionsand challenges remain. We read of hopes and grievancesconcerning human rights in the words of Faisal Hadi. Theissue of ‘reintegration’ as a process is well examined byLina Frödin, and Fadlullah Wilmot tackles questions ofjustice in his examination of Islamic law (Shari’ah). Thevolume touches on the challenge of hidden economieswhich became ingrained during the conflict, and the dire

reality of current illegal logging. Alongside implicationsof the human security need for long-term development,reform and socio-economic justice, Sidney Jones reflectson conditions to do with security and the rule of law. Theweaving together of these strands, and more, are pivotalfor the future of Aceh.

11Introduction

Page 13: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

The conflict in Aceh context, precursors and catalysts

Michelle Ann Miller

T here are diverging accounts of the primarycauses of Aceh’s contemporary conflict. Thisarticle charts causal factors and antecedents to

the contemporary conflict during the colonial period of Acehnese history and the early decades ofindependence, before considering the immediatecauses mediating the emergence of Free AcehMovement (GAM) in the 1970s. Finally the processesunleashed by Aceh’s transformation into a ‘MilitaryOperations Area’ (DOM) and the subsequentdemocratic breakthrough of 1998 are considered interms of how the context for addressing the conflict in Aceh was transformed.

Legacies of colonialismThe narrative of colonial domination has been central to the interpretation of the conflict promoted by GAM,widely accepted in Aceh but rejected by most otherIndonesian and foreign sources. In GAM’s view theconflict stemmed from the 1873 Dutch invasion of the‘State of Acheh-Sumatra’, and was perpetuated by the‘illegal transfer of sovereignty’ in 1949 from the ‘old,Dutch colonialists to the new, Javanese colonialists.’ GAMjustified its claim to territorial sovereignty through theconstruct of a singular Acehnese national identity basedon ethnicity, language, culture, history and geography.

This narrative of outsiders’ repeated attempts atsubjugation of a singular Acehnese nation is debatable.It is true that a distinctive Acehnese identity linked tosovereign statehood had existed for four centuries priorto Aceh’s incorporation into Indonesia. Aceh’s strategiclocation along the Malacca Straits trading route also ledto the development of a Malay-Islamic written andcultural tradition, setting the Acehnese apart frommany other ethnic groups in the archipelago closergeographically to the island of Java. However, even atits pre-colonial zenith the state of Aceh sequestered anumber of smaller states whose indigenous ethnicgroups never completely assimilated into Aceh. Almost20 per cent of Aceh’s population is not ethnically

12 Accord 20

An Acehnese boy watches a tank make its waythrough his village in Samalanga, Aceh, 2003.

Source: Reuters/Supri Supri

Michelle Ann Miller is a postdoctoral

fellow at the Asia Research Institute, at

the National University of Singapore.

She is the author of Rebellion and

Reform in Indonesia.

Page 14: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Acehnese, claiming membership of at least sevenlinguistically and culturally distinct indigenous ethnicminority groups (Gayo, Alas, Kluet, Aneuk Jamee,Tamiang, Singk il and Puloe) and non-indigenous ethnicminorities (the largest comprising Javanese settlers).GAM’s argument about Aceh’s illegal incorporation intoIndonesia is also refuted by the weight of historicalevidence that the contribution of the Acehnese to theIndonesian nationalist struggle was wholly voluntary,both in terms of human and economic resources(including the Acehnese’ famous purchase of the firstaeroplanes for the new Republic). Nevertheless, of thewhole archipelago the Dutch confronted the mosttenacious resistance to colonial rule in Aceh, resistancethat was never completely quelled. As one Dutchcolonial governor famously put it, the defiant spirit ofAcehnese resistance against outside rule was nurturedby ‘a fanatical love of freedom, reinforced by a powerfulsense of race, with a consequent contempt forforeigners and hatred for the infidel intruder.’

Precursors in the 1950s and 1960sWhile most sources acknowledge the historical‘difference’ of the Acehnese people, there is generalconsensus that the activities of the Indonesian statewere the primary cause of the contemporary conflict.Even GAM agreed that Acehnese resentment towardsthe Indonesian state was aggravated by the latter’sexploitation of Aceh’s natural resources, brokenpromises about the province’s ‘special region’ status,and depredations committed against Acehnesecivilians during military operations. As the site oflucrative oil and gas assets, Aceh’s resource wealthinfluenced Jakarta’s decision to deploy large numbersof security forces to the province, whose aggressive

response to perceived security threats producedthousands of civilian casualties.

The roots of the contemporary conflict can be tracedback to the Darul Islam (House of Islam) rebellion,which began in 1948 in West Java and spread acrossthe archipelago, reaching Aceh in 1953. The rebellionloosely integrated disparate agendas to form afederation of Islamic states (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII).Aceh’s agreement to membership of the newIndonesian state in 1949 was locally understood asbeing contingent on equitable treatment reflectingAceh’s contribution to the anti-colonial struggle andthe upholding of Islamic principles. However, Acehenjoyed less than one year of broad autonomy beforeincorporation into the province of North Sumatra aspart of Jakarta’s administrative reorganization of thecountry into just 10 provinces. The strong sense ofbetrayal over this decision in Aceh was exacerbated bythe subsequent influx of non-Acehnese, non-Muslimmigrant workers and military troops into the region, aswell as deteriorating socio-economic conditions as agreater portion of the national budget began to beallocated to Java than to the outer islands.

Acehnese resentment erupted into insurgency inSeptember 1953 when local rebels led by Aceh’s mostprominent Islamic religious leader (ulama), Teungku M.Daud Beureueh, joined the wider Darul Islam rebellion.It was only after January 1957, when PresidentSukarno’s government reestablished the ‘Province ofAceh’, which raised hopes amongst some Darul Islamleaders that Aceh would soon be free to implementShari’ah, that Acehnese involvement in the Darul Islamrebellion gradually subsided.

13The conflict in Aceh: context, precursors and cata lysts

Page 15: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

As part of Jakarta’s efforts to reach a negotiatedsettlement with the Acehnese Darul Islam rebels,President Sukarno also offered Aceh in principle ‘specialregion’ (Daerah Istimewa) status on 26 May 1959 byconferring broad autonomy to the province in the fieldsof religion, education and customary law (adat). Thisoffer responded to an earlier autonomy proposal by theformer Chief-of-Staff of the Darul Islam army, HasanSaleh, which was rooted in the pragmatic realization thatthe only way to win concessions for Aceh was through aregional approach to the rebellion’s broader Islamicgoals. Though earlier autonomy demands by the DarulIslam rebels had been broadly federalist in nature, Jakartaconsidered an Islamic federation (NII) to be tantamountto returning to the discredited Dutch colonial system, acounter-federalist argument that would resurface indebates on decentralization in the post-Suharto era.

Although Daud Beureueh continued to wage hisstruggle from the mountains, by the early 1960s theDarul Islam movement in Aceh had been seriouslyweakened by a combination of internal factionalism,defections and Indonesian counterinsurgencyoperations. By September 1961, Beureueh was forcedto modify his earlier demand for the establishment ofan Islamic state in Indonesia to the ‘implementation ofIslamic law in Aceh, in particular, and Indonesia, ingeneral.’ Responding to Beureueh’s compromisedmilitary capacity and softer rhetorical stance, Jakartareopened negotiations with the rebels. In early 1962,these talks culminated in a peaceful settlement inwhich Jakarta allowed Aceh to start enforcing Islamiclaw for Muslims within its borders.

The New Order, centralization andrebellion in the 1970sAfter more than a decade of relatively peaceful centre-periphery relations, Acehnese discontent resurfaced inthe early 1970s. The centralizing policies and practicesof Suharto’s New Order did not fulfill Acehneseexpectations of the restoration of Islam as a dominantsociopolitical force. As Acehnese ulama becameincreasingly politically marginalized by the New Order’s‘secular’ nationalist policies, so too did their calls toimplement the Daerah Istimewa formula. Provisions tocreate institutions to promote and enforce Islamic lawfailed to materialize and the jurisdiction of Islamiccourts became increasingly restricted under the NewOrder. By 1974, when the New Order issued LawNo.5/1974 on ‘The Principles of Regional GovernmentAdministration’, Aceh’s Daerah Istimewa formula hadbeen completely stripped of meaning. This law furtherincreased Jakarta’s grip over regional administrations byestablishing presidential control over gubernatorialappointments and gubernatorial responsibility formanaging provincial government.

The New Order’s centralized rule was solidified throughthe reorganization of Acehnese society. Reflecting itsdual priorities of national stability and economicdevelopment, the regime nurtured two key groups inAceh. First, the armed forces became permanentlyembedded in the province to defend nationaleconomic interests, to prevent the emergence ofopposition forces, and to monitor and control those‘legitimate’ political parties that had helped to elevateSuharto to power. Second, Suharto fostered the growthof a class of indigenous Acehnese technocrats toimplement national development directives andcounteract the influence of the ulama. Thisbureaucratic elite tended to be highly conscious oftheir distinctive Acehnese identity and sought toelevate Aceh’s position within the Indonesian state bygenerating regional development.

Acehnese discontent was also fuelled by the 1971discovery of vast oil and natural gas reserves in NorthAceh and the subsequent growth of the LhokseumaweIndustrial Zone (Zona Industri Lhokseumawe, ZILS). Mostof the profits were siphoned out of Aceh, with the resultthat development under the New Order produced fewsubstantive improvements to the local economy.Although parts of Java and eastern Indonesiaexperienced higher poverty levels than Aceh during the New Order, the expansion of ZILS compoundedregional anger as villagers were forced to resettleoutside the industrial zone and large numbers of sk illednon-Acehnese, non-Muslim workers were introduced tooperate the oil and gas companies. Lucrative assets inNorth Aceh also attracted thousands of Indonesiansecurity forces personnel, whose depredations againstthe civilian population hardened local attitudes againstIndonesian authority.

It was within this context of growing regionaldiscontent that Aceh’s first separatist insurgency wasborn. On 4 December 1976, Tengku Hasan Muhammaddi Tiro, a successful businessman and self-appointedDarul Islam ‘ambassador’ to the UN in New York,returned to Aceh to launch the Acheh-SumatraNational Liberation Front (ASNLF, also called GAM). TheASNLF/GAM shared some common grievances with theDarul Islam rebels. Like Daud Beureueh, Hasan di Tirohad previously promoted a federal state of Aceh withinan Islamic Indonesian Republic and only pursued theextreme option of armed separatism after the DaerahIstimewa formula produced no fundamental change tothe relationship between Aceh and Jakarta. However,unlike the Darul Islam rebels who sought to change theform of the Indonesian state but not to secede from it,the ASNLF/GAM ‘re-declared’ the ‘free and independentSovereign State’ of ‘Aceh-Sumatra’ with the intent ofsevering all ties with the ‘foreign regime of Jakarta andthe alien people of the island of Java.’ Also in contrast

14 Accord 20

Page 16: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

to the earlier generation of Darul Islam rebels, GAM’sdemands were not religious and were explicitlynationalist in nature. Though virtually all GAM rebelswere Muslim, they based their claims to territorialsovereignty on the construct of a distinctive ethnic,cultural, historical and geographically specific identityand never sought to establish ties with Islamicmovements in Indonesia or elsewhere.

The different responses by Jakarta to the Darul Islamand GAM insurgencies reflected the varying objectivesof the two uprisings, as well as the changing characterof the central government from Sukarno’s so-called ‘Old Order’ to President Suharto’s New Order. WhereasSukarno had relied on a combination of military forceand negotiations to contain the Darul Islam rebellion in Aceh, Suharto’s New Order demonstrated itsintolerance of separatism by relying primarily onmilitary force. By the late 1970s the rebels had beenforced underground and only resurfaced as a cohesivefighting force after 1986. In large part, GAM’sresurgence was made possible by Hasan di Tiro’s abilityto secure support for GAM from Libyan dictator ColonelMuammar al-Gaddafi. GAM’s growth was also madepossible by continued central government neglect and interference.

In 1989, Jakarta forcefully responded to the expansionof GAM by launching a large-scale counterinsurgencycampaign against the Acehnese rebels. Aceh wasofficially transformed into a ‘Military Operations Area’(Daerah Operasi Militer, DOM), widely understood as theimposition of martial law, for the next decade. It isunclear how many Indonesian troops were stationed inAceh during DOM as no official figures were released,but most sources estimate that about 12,000 securityforces personnel were involved. The number of conflict-related deaths from the DOM period is also disputed,and the more time passes the less likely it is ever to beclarified. A 1998 Indonesian National Human RightsCommission (Komnas HAM) investigation into theatrocities committed against civilians during DOMproduced contradictory findings that while 944Acehnese were k illed or disappeared during DOM,some 3000 women were widowed and 15,000 to20,000 Acehnese children were orphaned. Since mostsources do not distinguish between ‘victims ofviolence’ and ‘fatalities’, even relatively uncontroversialestimates of DOM-era fatalities tend to fall within thebroad range of 1600 to 6000 deaths. What did becomeclear when DOM ended was that the human rightsviolations that accompanied these operations hadfurther alienated Acehnese society from Indonesianrule and created ripe conditions for the regeneration ofGAM in the post-Suharto era. By mid-1998 Acehneseantipathy towards Jakarta had become deeplyentrenched and manifested itself in widespread

demands for retribution, compensation and socialjustice. It was Suharto’s appointed successor, B. J.Habibie, who formally ‘lifted’ DOM in August 1998 andwithdrew thousands of security personnel from Aceh.

Democratic breakthrough – a catalyst for peace?By mid-1998, Indonesia had also initiated a process ofdemocratization after four decades of authoritarianrule. Regime change was precipitated by the Asianfinancial crisis of 1997-98, and its especially severeimpact in Indonesia, where rising unemployment andpoverty levels and soaring food prices translated into asharp increase in crime and general socio-economicunrest across the archipelago. The social impact of theeconomic meltdown in Aceh, along with the island ofJava, East and West Kalimantan and parts of Sumatraand eastern Indonesia, was particularly profound. Thissociopolitical and economic instability in turn saw asharp reduction in Indonesian state power andauthority. In Aceh, some centrifugal forces seized thisopportunity to pressure Jakarta into providing redressfor their long-standing grievances, while others beganto look towards the creation of an independent polityin which they would be free to govern themselveswithout fear of state repression and with control overtheir own natural resources and livelihoods.

The ushering in of a new reformasi era in Indonesianpolitics included new initiatives to deal with thecountry’s internal conflicts. Most political leaders inJakarta saw the decentralization of central state poweras the most democratic way of containing centrifugalforces and were prepared to acknowledge a ‘special’place for Indonesia’s troubled provinces within theunitary state. However, the decision by PresidentHabibie to settle the territorial dispute in East Timor bygranting that province a referendum on self-determination was seen by many Indonesians asunacceptable and contributed to his political defeat inthe 1999 presidential election. For Indonesiannationalists, any governmental efforts to contain thespectre of armed separatism had to strengthenIndonesia’s territorial integrity and nationalcohesiveness, not weaken or destroy it. The view thatcontemporary Acehnese nationalism was primarily areaction to the New Order’s counterproductive policiesdid not, according to this logic, require a substantiverethink ing of Aceh’s position within Indonesia. Instead,the prevailing belief in Jakarta was that since the ‘Acehproblem’ had stemmed directly from the excesses ofauthoritarian rule, it could gradually be redressedthrough the democratic accommodation of theAcehnese people within a decentralized state system.

15The conflict in Aceh: context, precursors and cata lysts

Page 17: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Aceh’s arduousjourney to peace

Konrad Huber

T his article briefly tells the story of Aceh’s journeytoward peace. It provides a sketch of the majorperiods in Aceh’s evolution between 1998 and

2006 and concludes with some observations about thenature of peace processes. Aceh’s current peace is itssecond major effort. The first initiative ended inviolence in 2003 after more than three years of highlyfraught mediation by an untested non-governmentalorganization. It collapsed in the face of resistance fromthe conflict’s parties. This effort’s shortcomings,however, proved a boon to those brave and foresightedenough to give peace another try in 2004-2005.

This article explores three interrelated reasons for thesuccess of Aceh’s current peace initiative. First, by 2004,especially after the October election of a new president,different circumstances confronted the two key partiesto the conflict, the Indonesian government and theFree Aceh Movement (GAM). Although the Indonesianmilitary (TNI) had been incapable of dealing a knock-out blow to GAM fighters since the declaration ofmartial law in May 2003, GAM’s battlefield capacity had been significantly degraded. Dialogue-orientedgovernment officials were also reaching out to GAMcontacts behind the scenes. Second, external mediationin 2005 was far more adroit than its unsuccessfulpredecessor, both in terms of managing thenegotiation process and shaping the ultimateagreement. This sk illful mediation, led by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, produced the thirdkey factor. This was the incorporation of an overallpolitical settlement as a central element of the accord,rather than a step-by-step sequenced approach taken in the earlier mediation effort. This deal not onlyallowed for key compromises, but it also empowered arobust peace monitoring operation central to theagreement’s implementation.

Yet Aceh’s 30-year journey from war to peace must alsobe seen in the broader context of the remarkabletransformations in Indonesian politics between 1998

16 Accord 20

Finland's former president Martti Ahtisaari (C) officiates at the signing of a peaceagreement between Indonesia's Justice Minister Hamid Awaluddin (L) and the Free

Aceh Movement's (GAM) Chairman Malik Mahmood in Helsinki, 15 August 2005.Source: Reuters/Ruben Sprich

Konrad Huber was UNICEF’s

peacebuilding adviser in Indonesia

between 2001 and 2003. He now

works for the Office of Transition

Initiatives of the US Agency for

International Development (USAID).

The information and views presented

in this article are solely those of the

author and do not necessarily

represent the views or positions of

USAID or the US Government.

Page 18: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

and 2006, in the dimensions of democratization, thedramatic eclipse of military influence in civil politics,and GAM’s transition from battle-weary insurgents toelectoral politicians. The December 2004 tsunamihelped to push along an incipient peace process;however, it was deeper currents of change which swept Aceh toward a more durable peace.

A democratic opening? Talking peacewhile making warThe year 1998 was a momentous one for Indonesia, andit ushered in a three-year period of sustained upheavaland uncertainty that extended to Aceh as well. Instunningly quick succession, the Asian financial crisissent the country’s economy into freefall, Suharto wasforced from office after 32 years in power, and his Vice-President B.J. Habibie was elevated to the presidency.Under Habibie, armed forces commander Gen. Wirantodeclared an end to the military’s heavy-handedapproach to Aceh and even apologized for abuses by“individual soldiers” during the preceding decade.Habibie also agreed to a UN-supervised referendumprocess through which East Timor voted forindependence in August 1999. Suddenly, it seemed tothe Acehnese that anything – even independence –was possible.

In October 1999, Indonesia’s legislature elected a newpresident: Abdurrahman Wahid, a Muslim clericrenowned for his commitment to political pluralism,dialogue, and reform, including his desire to reduce the

military’s long-standing political influence. Knownsimply as Gus Dur, Wahid vacillated between areferendum or negotiations to settle Aceh’s status.Fundamentally, however, he was committed todialogue. The arrival of the Henry Dunant Centre forHumanitarian Dialogue (HDC) on the scene in late-1999was therefore extremely serendipitous.

Now known as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue,the HDC was a brand-new, Geneva-based organization,established by humanitarian practitioners formerlyassociated with International Committee of the RedCross and the UN and aimed at protecting civilians fromarmed conflict by helping to resolve underlyingdisputes. The East Timor crisis prompted HDC to send a senior staff member to the region, and widespreadspeculation about Indonesia’s possible break-upinduced HDC to focus on Aceh. Much to their surprise,HDC staff quick ly found themselves meeting seniorIndonesian officials, including Gus Dur, and reachingout to GAM leaders in exile. A dialogue process startedin early 2000 soon yielded a May agreement on a JointUnderstanding on a Humanitarian Pause, intended toopen up humanitarian access to the most war-affectedparts of Aceh and start a process of confidence-building between GAM and the TNI.

In a harbinger of later events in 2002-03, HDC in factstumbled into a larger, more ambitious role as a thirdparty than it had expected or planned for. Suddenly,HDC was faced with managing joint government-rebelcommittees on security and humanitarian issues,

17Aceh’s arduous journey to peace

Page 19: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

guiding dialogue on implementing provisions in thePause, and fielding more international staff to supportexpanded operations in Banda Aceh. GAM enjoyed thegreater international status that the HumanitarianPause seemed to confer and looked forward tocontinued talks that could further their cause, andhumanitarian operations were briefly able to reachmore of the war-affected population. But stingingcriticism of the government by national legislators andeven top military commanders underscored criticalweaknesses in the Pause: that it provided cover for GAMto increase its revenue, augment its membership, andextend its control at the local level while governmentforces were prohibited from offensive operations.Ultimately, the HDC-led monitoring effort was unableto stem provocative let alone belligerent behaviour bythe parties, and it could never get past security-focuseddebates at the level of “colonels and one-star generals,”as one HDC staffer put it.

The Humanitarian Pause itself finally fell apart in 2001.Attacks against ExxonMobil’s liquefied natural gas (LNG)facilities, blamed on GAM, caused them to be closed forthe first time in Aceh’s war. This only strengthened TNIclaims that GAM was using the Pause to regroup if notgrow. GAM retorted that the Indonesian governmentwas talk ing peace while waging war. The TNI sentfurther reinforcements, and Jakarta finally announcedits formal withdrawal from the Humanitarian Pause. Byearly 2001 the military leadership had begun to regainthe upper hand in its struggle with the president. Facedwith the patent failure of the Humanitarian Pause andlimited political capital, Gus Dur authorized all-outsecurity operations against GAM in April, and HDC-ledpeace efforts broke down almost entirely.

Political machinations finally led to Wahid’s downfall in July. His successor Megawati Sukarnoputri wasexpected to bring the country greater stability and asmaller appetite for ambitious reforms. She didcontinue to seek a negotiated solution to the Acehconflict, albeit half-heartedly. One of PresidentMegawati’s first acts was to sign legislation grantingAceh “special autonomy” after decades of governmenthostility toward this idea. This deal, while never fullyimplemented at the time, renamed the provinceNanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) and provided for astrong governor’s office, Islamic law (Shari'ah) withinNAD, and direct elections at the provincial and districtlevels. It also included revenue-sharing in LNG proceedsat a generous 70-30 split in Aceh’s favour during aninitial period of eight years (after which revenues wouldbe shared equally). The autonomy deal – which thenational parliament passed in a non-consultativefashion that only engendered further hostility toward it– was rejected by GAM out of hand.

Humanitarian dialogue: full steam aheadin 2002Undaunted by the collapse of the Humanitarian Pause orthe resumption of large-scale military operations, HDCploughed ahead in late 2001 and 2002. Externaldevelopments aided these efforts. First, the September11 attacks in New York and Washington suddenlychanged the calculus of groups, such as GAM, that reliedon violence. Megawati also appointed an urbane,popular officer, Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, ascoordinating minister for political and security affairs.Dialogue was intensified in meetings in Geneva inFebruary and May, resulting in an HDC documentindicating GAM’s acceptance of the autonomy law as a“starting point” and a statement on an “all-inclusivedialogue” to review possible changes to the autonomylaw, and the need for an effectively-monitored ceasefire.In the eyes of HDC, these meetings produced anagreement on a sequence of steps for a morecomprehensive settlement: from ceasefire to “all-inclusive dialogue” and provincial-level elections tochanges to the autonomy law. The government,however, saw the already-passed autonomy law as theirmaximum offer, not an opening gambit, while GAMreiterated that special autonomy was not the end of theirindependence struggle.

Despite these fundamental discrepancies, negotiationsproceeded under HDC auspices, though largely throughmonths and months of shuttle diplomacy and drafttexts faxed between key actors in Jakarta, Banda Aceh,and GAM-Sweden. Coordinating Minister Yudhoyonowas reportedly indispensable in winning over PresidentMegawati and fellow generals and ministers on keyprovisions in the agreement. Recognizing importantfailures in the Humanitarian Pause, the text envisioned aJoint Security Committee (JSC), which would be a morevigorous monitoring presence than the earlier TNI-GAM“commander-to-commander” mechanism. In the end,the JSC would be constituted as a tri-partite mechanismencompassing GAM, TNI, and a neutral third-party in theform of unarmed military observers from suitablenearby countries.

HDC announced in November 2002 that an agreementwas within sight, and planning began for a December 9signing ceremony in Geneva. To augment internationalawareness and back ing for the deal, the Japanesegovernment held a donor conference on December 2in Tokyo. In the meantime, the TNI had stepped upbattlefield pressure on GAM insurgents, and a HDC-organized group of former senior diplomatic andmilitary personages from Sweden, Thailand, the US, andYugoslavia – known collectively as the “Wise Men” –increased their entreaties that the parties conclude the

18 Accord 20

Page 20: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

deal. The involvement of such experts seemed toconfer on the process gravitas and hint at importantlinkages to influential countries (particularly the US)that wanted a signed agreement.

Peace deferred: CoHA and the returnto warThe Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) was dulyratified in a signing ceremony at HDC’s Genevaheadquarters. HDC quickly set about recruiting andfielding personnel to staff the Joint Security Committee(JSC), including non-active Thai and Filipino military, andhiring specialists to guide the all-inclusive dialogue (AID)and other functions. The CoHA posted some earlysuccesses such as a reduction in violence, a dramaticincrease in freedom of movement, and the establishmentof a limited number of so-called “peace zones.” Thesewere zones demilitarized by agreement between the TNIand GAM. Peace zone inaugurations tended to turn intopro-GAM independence rallies, however, deeply ranklingto the military brass and nationalist politicians whofollowed these events in the media.

Almost immediately the deal began to fray. The TNI’shigh command was never uniformly supportive of theagreement, and GAM largely considered CoHA as achance to advance its political struggle, not as anopportunity to compromise on core demands or buildconfidence with an adversary it fundamentallydistrusted. In a reprise of the Humanitarian Pause, GAMused the relative openness of the CoHA period to seeknew recruits, increase “taxation,” and agitate forindependence, despite earlier statements acceptingautonomy as a “starting point.” (Some GAM actions, like flag-raising and rallies, were not explicitly bannedby the CoHA, which was also silent on the specificprocedures for investigating or punishing the extortionthat GAM considered legitimate taxation.)

Starting with a mid-January rebel ambush that resultedin a soldier’s death in 2003, ceasefire violations by bothparties quick ly began to mount. These incidents soonsurpassed the JSC’s ability to investigate and adjudicatealleged violations, especially when TNI representativeson the JSC rejected two February findings against thegovernment and top commanders openly questionedthe JSC’s neutrality and professionalism. Thisatmosphere prompted GAM to veto action on a caseagainst their side, and the JSC soon became paralyzedby an intransigence that even the foreign militaryobservers were not able to resolve. By March, JSCinstallations were being attacked by civilian mobsinstigated by the security forces, and goodwill betweenthe parties was all but gone.

Seizing on this chaos as pretext, the TNI then moved to scuttle the deal outright. By May, the Indonesiangovernment announced its intention to launchoperations to annihilate GAM within months. Efforts tosave the CoHA at an international conference in Tokyocollapsed on May 18, and the following day, PresidentMegawati, with the unanimous support of her cabinetand parliamentary leadership, imposed martial law onthe province. This cleared the way for the TNI’s largest-ever operations in Aceh, ultimately mobilizing some35,000 troops. These operations proved largely effectivein military terms, especially when coupled with effortsto cut off rebel supply chains, to mobilize largersegments of the civilian population in support of thecounter-insurgency, and to offer amnesty to rebelsprepared to turn themselves in. By mid-2004, the TNIannounced that almost 2000 GAM fighters had beenk illed, another 2100 arrested, and some 1300 forced tosurrender (although these figures were impossible toverify independently).

On the face of things, peace in Aceh began to lookmore and more remote. Below the surface, however,perhaps senior Indonesian officials, both civilian andmilitary, realized that an exclusively security-drivenapproach would not ultimately be successful. Likewise,perhaps enough of GAM’s rank-and-file had beendecimated and remaining fighters driven into the moreinaccessible Acehnese interior that some senior fieldcommanders – rather than GAM’s leadership in exile –were ready to talk peace.

The promise of democracyThe watershed event of 2004 was Indonesia’s first directelections for the president, and this historic momentalso deeply affected Aceh in ways that would notbecome apparent for months. The main characters inthis new chapter of Aceh’s drama were more moderateAcehnese outside of GAM’s leadership in exile andYusuf Kalla, who was first Megawati’s coordinatingminister for people’s welfare and then vice-presidentunder the newly-elected president. The new presidentwas in fact Megawati’s coordinating political-securityminister, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Their earlycommitment to continued dialogue set the stage forthe later engagement of former Finnish presidentMartti Ahtisaari, whose organization Crisis ManagementInitiative (CMI) ultimately became midwife to theMemorandum of Understanding (MoU) in August 2005.

In early 2004 – even before the national elections thatwould confer on him the vice-presidency – then-Minister Kalla launched a secret process that reachedout to moderate Acehnese and that simultaneouslyalso came across Ahtisaari and CMI as a potential

19Aceh’s arduous journey to peace

Page 21: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

mediator. Once President Yudhoyono and Vice-President Kalla were sworn in, Kalla renewed his secretefforts in earnest. Through Acehnese intermediaries,GAM’s top field commander Muzakk ir Manaf –presumably without the knowledge of GAM leaders in Sweden – authorized secret contacts in Malaysiabetween lower-level rebel representatives andgovernment negotiators. In late October 2004, thesedelegates came to an agreement on a deal that wouldensure implementation of Aceh’s autonomy law andprovide economic benefits for select GAM membersand other Acehnese constituencies in exchange fordisarming some fighters.

Whether or not Muzakk ir fully endorsed this agreementor merely saw Jakarta’s overture as a temptingopportunity to engage in a time-honored Acehnesetradition of double-crossing one’s military opponent,the Indonesian government clearly interpreted thisepisode as evidence of an opening to talk with battle-weary GAM commanders rather than just the Swedish-based leadership. Regardless, GAM politicalheadquarters in Sweden quick ly issued a denunciationof this initiative, but clearly GAM’s political leadershipmust also have been re-evaluating options during 2004. Meanwhile, other secret attempts by Kalla’sintermediaries to contact the Swedish exiles led insteadto the involvement of Ahtisaari (by way of a Finnishbusinessman who had earlier resided in the vice-president’s home province and befriended someonewho was to become a key Kalla adviser). By DecemberAhtisaari was told that both sides were ready to talk.

From the tsunami to HelsinkiIt was just at this moment that the Asian tsunami struckin December 2004. Faced with such destruction andsuddenly caught in the international spotlight, GAMdeclared a unilateral ceasefire, and President Yudhoyonopromptly sent a government negotiating team toFinland to meet at CMI with the leadership in exile.

Including these late-January 2005 talks, a total of fiverounds took place. A major breakthrough occurredearly on in February when GAM accepted “self-government” as opposed to outright independence.Apparently this sudden reversal followed internal GAMrecognition that talks with Jakarta could collapse onceagain without a decisive move on their part; debatesfocused on how “self-government” could be enhancedto include significant symbolic and substantiveimprovements over the “special autonomy” that hadbeen on offer from Jakarta since 2001. Though thisdeclaration provoked intensely negative reactionswithin broader circles of GAM sympathizers and someconfused public disavowals, this new stance proved

genuinely durable and set the stage for otherimportant concessions. For example, the governmentagreed that – in contrast to the terms of the CoHA – the new deal would permit the creation of local-levelpolitical parties. This was a significant departure fromJakarta’s previous policy, which had hitherto insistedthat all parties be national in character, and thisinnovation allowed for the possibility that GAM betransformed from a rebel group into a non-violentpolitical force.

Another major improvement was to authorize a farmore robust third party to monitor the agreement thanthe feeble Joint Security Committee that HDCattempted to manage. The MoU called for a 300-strongforce of EU and ASEAN personnel, and the Chair of CMI,Ahtisaari himself, was empowered as the final arbiter ofdisputes that could not be resolved at lower levels.

Despite an abiding sense of betrayal anddisappointment engendered by the CoHA’s collapse,the parties were genuinely keen to sign the MoU inAugust 2005. This was testament to the changedcalculus the parties had, including their view of theconflict’s broader context and the need for a deal. But Ahtisaari and the negotiators also worked hard atre-establishing a climate of trust. The third-partymechanism conceived of to guide peaceimplementation – the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)– also proved to be highly effective, as charted inKirsten Schulze’s contribution to this volume.

Peace negotiations as learning process?Aceh’s long road to conflict settlement – lasting someseven years between 1999 and 2006 – invitesreflections on how learning takes place in and acrosspeace processes. The context in Aceh did change overtime, and ultimately those changes were probablycritical in setting the stage for the successful efforts in2005-2006. (In 2003-2004, the TNI had exacted a hugetoll on GAM’s military capacity and ability to movefreely within the province, but the government was alsostarting to feel the mounting human and financial costsof operations that President Yudhoyono later estimatedat US$130 million per year.) But many of the key playerson both the GAM and government sides wereacquainted with each other and with peace efforts fromthe HDC period. The mediation team at CMI supportingAhtisaari reportedly read up on and studied theshortcomings of those efforts.

In addition, there were important differences andindeed improvements that characterized the Helsink ieffort. First, while the personal engagement of keyfigures in the CoHA negotiations, especially Yudhoyono,

20 Accord 20

Page 22: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

was indispensable, his and Kalla’s commitment to the second process carried the full weight of theIndonesian government. Ultimately, they were willingto take risks and search for non-military solutions.Specifically, they probably learned important lessonsfrom Megawati’s difficulties in managing the differentplayers at local, national, and international levels. Theycertainly learned the value of removing spoilers orother impediments to reform (Megawati’s armed forces chief Ryacudu was one of the first victims ofYudhoyono’s new administration), and they includedefforts to win over those who objected to compromisein the army and the national legislature.

The other important difference was the nature of thepeace talks, in both content and style. The government,for example, deliberately fielded a team that was not“Javanese” in complexion and engaged in a far moreconstructive, less take-it-or-leave-it fashion. Mostcritically, however, Ahtisaari had far greater stature andfirsthand political experience as a former president thanHDC mediators. He also had direct access to topdecision-makers at the UN and EU as a result of hispost-presidential career in international peacebuilding.In addition to appreciating the need to plan for acredible third-party monitoring mission, he aptlyfocused not on a sequenced approach to establishing arobust ceasefire first and deferring difficult politicaldecisions for later. Rather, his mantra was “nothing isagreed until everything is agreed,” forcing the parties to

come up with necessary compromises, but also creativetrade-offs, as part of a larger deal. In instituting litmustests for the parties and even traveling to Jakarta tourge the removal of military engaged in human rightsabuses, he also demonstrated to both sides that he wasprepared to be fair and tough. The parties themselves,however, were ultimately the ones who had to makethe toughest calls – and choose the path toward peace.

21Aceh’s arduous journey to peace

Source: Reuters/Ruben Sprich

Page 23: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Delivering peacefor Acehan interview with PresidentMartti Ahtisaari

Accord: Were you familiar with the details anddynamics of the Aceh conflict or familiar with any ofthe key parties prior to the tsunami of December 2004?

President Ahtisaari: Only in very broad terms. I did notknow the parties personally. As early as February 2004 I had been contacted by Farid Husain and JuhaChristensen. My message was that the Indonesiangovernment should start think ing seriously about whatthey could offer that would be interesting enough tobring the other party to the table. The elections laterthat year – the first direct presidential elections in thehistory of Indonesia – brought Susilo BambangYudhoyono to power, which was a positive sign. Juhacame to see me a few days before Christmas 2004 andsaid that the parties were prepared to come to Helsink iif I was ready to mediate their talks. It was agreed thatthe Swedish-based GAM parties would come toHelsink i so that I could get to know them as well. Thishappened in early January 2005.

In late 1999, Husaini Hassan of the Free AcehMovement Government Council (MP-GAM) contactedthe Finnish government (then under your presidency)about whether Finland would offer its good offices innegotiations between GAM and Jakarta.

Interestingly – and probably due to the many otherdemands – I do not recall being aware of this at thattime, and it was probably a communication that wentthrough the foreign office. At that time, the Acehnesewere watching Kosovo very closely, look ing forinternational assistance and brokerage.

What had changed by 2005 that made progresspossible?

A major change was the new government, whichincluded prominent individuals who had been involvedin previous ceasefire talks brokered by the Centre forHumanitarian Development (HDC) and were familiarwith the issues.

There was a clear mandate with clear parameters.There had been time to think through earlier failures.History matters – and time itself is important forweighing up options and opportunities. There was acertain realism about the political trajectory – andindeed the tsunami made it a historical juncture in thatso much depended on getting the agreement right. Iwas rather tough with the parties on several occasions.If demands were totally impossible, I had to tell themso in no uncertain terms. At these talks they hadcommitment to a serious outcome.

22 Accord 20

President Martti Ahtisaari was President

of Finland from 1994 to 2000. In 2000 he

founded the Crisis Management

Initiative (CMI), which he chairs. He is

currently Special Envoy of the Secretary-

General of the United Nations for the

future status process for Kosovo.

Page 24: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Was the new Indonesian government’s increasedlegitimacy and political authority over the military afactor in the success of talks?

The new administration was important and abreakthrough in terms of credibility and confidencebuilding. But you must remember that the role andbehaviour of the Indonesian military are historically part of a structure that will take time and multiplereforms to change. As the institution only received partof its operating income from the national budget, it had licence to raise revenues in other ways and throughbusiness activities. Over the years, a web of opportunitiesfor extortion, illegal transactions and business deals builtup – and in Aceh a kind of competition with the rebelsfor local revenues, taxes and fines.

Of course, some behaviour needed to stop immediately.We received detailed information from the GAM in springof 2005 about atrocities in Aceh that led me to visitJakarta in May. I voiced my concern strongly and advisedthat certain offending parties be withdrawn from theprovince immediately. Their presence would have causedanxiety and mistrust in the negotiation process.

How important was it that talks were held in Finland?

It was important that they be held outside Indonesia forseveral reasons and there were strong points in favour ofa European setting. I felt from very early stages that themonitoring of any agreement was going to be crucial andthat European Union (EU) involvement would bedesirable. Also, it was necessary that the parties beisolated from the press. Of course this is not alwayspossible, given the ease and speed of modern

communications, but the parties agreed to say very littleto the media during the negotiations. Both mediationteam and parties had a choice – be nice to the press orwork to try to solve real problems and find an agreement.

An underlying principle of the talks was that ‘nothingis agreed until everything is agreed’ – which meantthat neither party could claim any victories during theprocess. All the agreements were included in the MoU,which was published only at the end. Would thisformula transfer easily to other talks settings?

What you call a ‘formula’ is only possible if the partiesthemselves are disciplined. In this case the partiesbehaved rather well: there was no ‘leak ing’ and ameasure of seriousness. Such discretion is, after all, anindication of whether negotiations are genuinely ameans to an end (the end to violence for a peacefuloutcome) or a vehicle for point scoring and morecombativeness. To a certain degree many contestedissues are inter-connected, and there will be ebbs andflows in the ‘give and take’ of negotiations. Hence theneed to work towards a whole picture and a fullagreement before claiming progress.

CMI frequently advocates that ‘a mediator must know where he or she is taking the negotiations.’ Doesthis mean you formulate your own favoured vision ofthe outcome?

‘Tak ing the negotiations’ here is like enabling safepassage rather than a detailed final destination. As Imention in the book Making Peace, a good mediator islike a harbour pilot, alerting others to the places toavoid so as not to run aground. I am rather critical of

23Delivering peace for Aceh

Source: Reuters/Lehtikuva Lehtikuva

Page 25: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

open-ended processes in which third-partyintervention becomes a new vehicle for the conflictitself. Realism is critical. It was clear that thegovernment was not offering independence and I had to work out with GAM how they could obtain thethings they wanted, which they thought independencewould have fulfilled. Our task was to examine whetherwe could reach an agreement on this basis. Theoutcome would be the next best alternative toindependence and it needed to be guaranteed byproper legal arrangements.

It is often pointed out that these are unequal or‘asymmetrical’ talks. The question for the mediator isone of balance, how to best achieve a fair deal for both.A clear mandate also implies a clear time frame. If thereare genuine needs and reasons for an extension, this isacceptable. But it simply cannot be an open-endedprocess or it will go on forever.

Did your personal good offices also bring both the EUand ASEAN on board for the Aceh Monitoring Mission(AMM)? How important was this body and would moredirect international oversight be helpful even today?

One thing that history teaches us is that NGOs shouldnot monitor peace agreements. Very early on the EUmonitoring role was a key idea. We need to know whocan do what – what one can and cannot do. There wasno question of UN involvement after the East Timorexperience. The government did not want tointernationalize the Aceh question – for them it was aninternal matter. The government had already looked ina constructive way for a role for the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the EU-ASEANcombination proved to be both acceptable and highly successful.

I originally thought that the AMM was leaving Aceh tooearly. The mission did receive a necessary extension ofoperational time. Staying too long is not good either.The duration of international oversight is a difficult call.It is crucial that new political arrangements moveforward, and that agreed mechanisms work and willdeliver the peace. For example, the elections in Acehwere a milestone in the transfer of responsibility. The EU and ASEAN are not formally present now asmonitors but relationships continue.

In retrospect, could both amnesty and reintegrationhave been better articulated in the MoU so as to avoid layers of subsequent misunderstanding and disagreement?

The mechanisms for amnesty have by and largeworked. On reintegration, I believe it is beneficial tohave local ownership of these issues in terms ofdefining terms and process. In our own societies policy

formation is not a smooth, straight line – leaders andpolitical actors argue, political parties split, personalitypolitics can dominate and alliances rise and fall. The keything in the implementation of the MoU is that thegovernment and GAM should do what they havepromised to do. It follows that we must emphasize therule of law in democratic development. To guaranteehuman rights we must have the rule of law.

Are there lessons that third parties still need to learnabout provisions for decision-making onimplementing agreements, particularly when theagreements are very concise and general?

It is vital to get the legal structure right. This has been true for amnesty and reintegration and will be acontinual challenge for the management of oil and gas revenues.

I have already referred to the importance of thegovernment delivering on what it has promised.Political leadership should not use the parliament as cover for not following the MoU in spirit.Accompaniment, high level follow-up and mentoringroles are extremely important. We can better learn howto give indirect assistance while letting actualresponsibility remain with the parties.

In explaining the breakthrough of the Helsinki talks,what balance would you say there was in the Acehtalks between your skill as a mediator and the‘ripeness’ of the conflict to be solved?

Certainly the conflict was more ‘ripe’ in 2005 than in2000. I brought quite a bit of previous experience to thetable, but you have to be lucky too. With all the sk ill inthe world, I cannot make a mediation process‘pregnant’ in the sense of bearing the fruit of peace.The parties themselves must do this. If the partiesgenuinely are ready for the birth of a peace processthen a mediator can be the midwife, so to speak.

I would emphasize the fact that one should never dealwith such a thing alone. I had the privilege of work ingwith great people. My colleagues from CMI played avital role. Many others worked quietly and behind thescenes, being very supportive: UN Secretary-GeneralKofi Annan, the EU’s Javier Solana and Benita Ferrero-Waldner and their staff, the Olof Palme Centre, andmany governments and research institutes. There is the danger that we compartmentalize roles andresponsibilities, do not cooperate fully and do not usethe expertise available. But in this case there was willingsupport and the EU acted and responded very quick lyand professionally.

We have to keep in mind why we are in this business. Itis to solve problems.

24 Accord 20

Page 26: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Why is peace inAceh successful?Hamid Awaluddin

A ceh today is a place of peace. Guns are silent.Women no longer become widows because ofpolitical violence. Children freely develop their

dreams to have a brighter future because they canattend schools. The economy is running well. Socialinteractions are uninterrupted. The people of Acehhave already elected their own leaders through free,democratic and fair local elections. The clear linebetween ‘we’ and ‘they’ has already been deleted – wehave only one clear line, ‘we’. These realities were emptydreams during the three decades of bloody conflict.They became possible in August 2005 in Helsink i withthe peace accord signed by the Government ofIndonesia and the leaders of the Free Aceh Movement(GAM). In short, past differences had already beenovercome to achieve a suitable future dispensation.

The government’s offersThere are several reasons why peace in Aceh has beenachieveable. First, the government entered the peacenegotiations with clear action plans and reasonableoffers. It started with the offer of amnesty to GAM,allowing all their prisoners and detainees to be releasedtwo weeks after the signing of the peace accord. All thelegal charges against the GAM’s activists would bedropped and those who lived overseas could returnhome unconditionally. The government held about2700 prisoners and detainees. They are now free.

Along with this, the government offered concreteeconomic programmes. The Acehnese governmentwas to be allowed to keep 70 per cent of Aceh’srevenues. These revenues can undoubtedly propel theeconomy forward, which was ruined during the war.Such a high percentage of revenues was anunimaginable hope during the war. In short, theunfairness of the previous share of revenues led tothree decades of bloody conflict. This is now over. Acehis developing a better economy now.

25Why is peace in Aceh successful?

Hamid Awaluddin was the Indonesian

government’s chief negotiator during

the Helsinki process and served as

Minister for Law and Human Rights. He

is now the Indonesian government’s

Ambassador to the Russian Federation.

Page 27: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

The impact of the tsunamiThe tsunami that devastated Aceh and caused the lossof almost 200,000 human lives became another factorthat led to a successful outcome. The tsunami createdcommon ground which allowed the Indonesiangovernment and GAM to start peace negotiations. Bothsides felt pity for all those who were suffering. Bothsides realized that helping the victims of the tsunamiwas much more important than continuing the conflict.Besides, the international community was in Aceh forhumanitarian purposes, so both sides were reluctant tokeep fighting. Sadness seemed to bury the will to fight.

High-level commitmentA further reason for success is the full commitment ofthe government to settle this bloody conflict throughnon-violent means. President Susilo BambangYudhoyono convinced the military to support thepeace talks, Vice-President M. Jusuf Kalla made themoves, from outlining the plan of the talks to lobbyingthe parliament. They both worked in tandem to stopthe war. They both believed that peace is the bestvehicle for addressing the past differences. As abusinessman, the Vice-President made calculations interms of the costs and benefits of continuing the war.

The next factor is the support of armed forces. In thebeginning, pessimism overshadowed the peace talks.People believed that the armed forces would be anobstacle to peace, because they would lose theeconomic benefits they had derived from the war. Thisis wrong. I received full support from the Commanderin Chief of the Armed Forces, General Endiartono.“Enough of the war. The armed forces also lost theirmen in the battle. No general would sacrifice his men,”Endiartono said.

International supportInternational support was also key to our success. Vice-President Kalla invited the Ambassadors of the USA,United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, Japan, Australia, andSingapore and asked them to support the plan. “Pleaseask your government to approach and put pressure onthe leaders of GAM who live in Sweden to enter thepeace negotiations,” Kalla said to those Ambassadors.“You are all in Aceh now for humanitarian reasons,helping the Acehnese after the tsunami, but youcannot be effective in your mission if the guns stillsmoke and food supplies are intercepted. You cannotbuild roads and bridges if there is no guarantee thatyou are not going to be k idnapped. The achievement ofyour mission here depends greatly on your support toenter peace negotiations and establish peace in Aceh,”continued Kalla. This tactic worked very well.

26 Accord 20

Page 28: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

The leadership of the mediator, Martti Ahtisaari, wasunmistakably decisive. He never allowed either side to discuss issues other than those he provided on theagendas and itinerary. “The only agenda and vehicle we have is special autonomy, nothing else,” he said.Ahtisaari was also easily able to find appropriate wordsto avoid the sensitivities of both sides. He had thecourage to say to both sides: “Do not waste my time if you just come to my place to curse each other. Youcome here for a solution, not for condemnation.” Inaddition, Ahtisaari said, “if you keep talk ing about theidea of independence, please leave my room and nevercome back. But remember, you will never get what youdream. Not in my lifetime. I will use all of my muscles toinfluence Europe and the world not to support you. Youwill never get independence.”

The design of the negotiationsAgreement on a ‘zip mouth policy’ during the sevenmonths of negotiations contributed significantly to theestablishment of peace. Neither the government norGAM was allowed to leak information to the media onthe substantive issues being discussed. Both sidesobediently observed this policy, so the peace talkscontinued without being interrupted much byunnecessary controversial issues in the media. Thispolicy prevented the media from developing andprovok ing unhelpful debate.

Along with this, the format of the peace process –direct and informal talks – played an important role.Direct talks meant both sides could see each other andtalk directly, heart to heart. Both sides could see intoeach other’s eyes. Messages were not delivered by thethird party, but conveyed to each other directly.Therefore both parties did not come withinterpretations, but conclusions.

Another key to the process’s success has been theloyalty of GAM’s followers in obeying the commands of their leaders who conducted the peace talk. Not asingle casualty occurred during the peace talks. Thiswas a huge help in allowing the talks to continue andreach agreement.

Finally, the willingness and ability of both sides tomaintain personal relations was crucial. No singledifficult issue was left unsolved. Deep personal relationsand ongoing conversations enabled us to find solutionsto unresolved issues from the negotiation table.

27Why is peace in Aceh successful?

Indonesia's Minister for Information Sofyan Djalil (L) and Minister for Law and Human RightsHamid Awaluddin, talk at the residence of Indonesia's ambassador to Helsinki, May 2005. Source: Reuters/Lehtikuva Lehtikuva

Page 29: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

28 Accord 20

M. Nur Djuli was a GAM negotiator at the

Helsinki peace talks and is now

Executive Director of the Aceh

Reintegration Board.

Nurdin Abdul Rahman was a GAM

negotiator at the Helsinki peace talks

and is currently bupati (head) of the

district of Bireuen.

Nur Djuli, Bakhtiar Abdullah and Damien Kingsbury areinterviewed in Espoo, Finland, 31 May 2005.

Source: Reuters/Lehtikuva Lehtikuva

The Helsinkinegotiations a perspective from Free AcehMovement negotiators

M. Nur Djuli and Nurdin Abdul Rahman

T he seed for the Helsink i peace talks was plantedsoon after the collapse of talks between the FreeAceh Movement (GAM) and the Government of

Indonesia mediated by the Centre for HumanitarianDialogue (HDC) in May 2003. Despite the immediatedeclaration of martial law in Aceh, GAM leadersremained committed to peace talks as a way to resolvethe conflict. However, the opportunity to realize thiscame from an unexpected source. Soon after thecollapse of the talks, the Finnish businessman JuhaChristensen contacted GAM to act as the new mediator.GAM’s leadership in Stockholm, Sweden, was initiallycool about this approach as it was still hoping that HDCwould be able to persuade Indonesia to return to thenegotiating table, and Christensen was not known forwork in the conflict resolution field.

The new initiative eventually led to talks for two mainreasons. Firstly, Christensen not only had a very closerelationship with the Indonesian leadership (especiallyYusuf Kalla, elected Vice-President in September 2004),but was also able to bring in the high profile formerFinnish President Martti Ahtisaari and his CrisisManagement Initiative (CMI) to strengthen themediation. Secondly, the tsunami of December 2004gave the international community strong reasons toconvince Jakarta to come to the table. GAM alsoperceived that there was no alternative to tak ingwhatever road was available to end the war, anddeclared a unilateral ceasefire three days after thetsunami in order to allow in emergency assistance. Withthe HDC initiative, the involvement of the internationalcommunity had been limited, a problem that theHelsink i process avoided.

Overcoming a rocky startThe first round of talks in Helsink i went quite badly. AsGAM negotiators we perceived that President Ahtisaariknew little about Aceh or the Acehnese character andthat the premise of the talks was that we were rebelswho had to return to the fold. Ahtisaari started bytelling us that this was not to be a negotiation betweenequals, that the government of the Republic ofIndonesia was recognized and that we were not, andthat, “I don’t want to hear about independence orreferendum, we are going to discuss your acceptanceof the autonomy status. Don’t waste your time trying tosmuggle in ideas of independence or referendum – ifyou want to do so you’d better go back to whereveryou have come from.” This prompted a quick retort thatwe were Ahtisaari’s guests, and if we were not welcomewe were ready to pack our bags and go somewhereelse. The option in mind at that time was that theNorwegians had made several approaches to us whiledealing with the Sri Lankan conflict.

Page 30: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

29The Helsinki negotiations

Learning quick ly from his error, Ahtisaari apologized on the second day for his “bluntness”, but could notprevent the round ending in failure when theIndonesians rejected our offer of a ceasefire andinsisted we accepted the status of ‘autonomy.’

If the words ‘independence’ and ‘referendum’ weretaboo to Indonesia, we were allergic to ‘autonomy,’which represented for us an abhorrent system of brutal oppression and impunity for murders, rapes,disappearances, massacres and all sorts of otherbrutalities. We knew that people in Aceh would notaccept another autonomy law. However, we had comeprepared with a hierarchy of plans that we could fall backon. Plan A proposed that Jakarta allow Aceh to have aceasefire for 15 years, during which time it could build upAceh as much as it liked – cover Aceh with gold, as wesaid – but afterwards the Acehnese must be allowed tohave a referendum. This was rejected by the Indonesianside who said GAM would consolidate and at the endwould continue their pursuit of independence.

On the first day of the second round of talks, wedecided that if we insisted on that proposal, the peacetalks would collapse. That evening, we communicatedwith GAM field commanders, explaining that Plan Awas not bearing fruit. We waited for about six hours toget a decision from the ground about Plan B. Plan Bproposed ‘self-government’ for Aceh - terminology thatallowed our delegation to venture into new ground inrelations with Indonesia without accepting the unjustautonomy law. In many ways, self-government wasanother word for autonomy, but without the sameabhorrent connotations. Coincidentally, that sameevening Ahtisaari talked on television in Finnish andsaid there was a great chance for peace in Aceh if it wasgiven self-government. Initially we were not sure

whether the Finnish word he used was self-governmentor self-determination. So we invited Ahtisaari to ourroom on the second day and asked what he had meant,and he said it meant self-government. We grabbed theterminology as a Godsend and pursued it relentlessly,starting to do away with other associated terminologysuch as ‘governor’ and ‘bupati’. There was strongresistance from Sofyan Jalil on the Indonesian side, andback in Jakarta the team received heavy criticism fromopponents in the military and parliament. The presshowever termed GAM’s proposal ‘brilliant’ and itattracted tremendous public support. Eventually theIndonesian side accepted self-government in principleand we began to iron out what it meant in practice.

There was another crucial factor that made thisadvance possible: in the first round Ahtisaari hadcoined an excellent phrase that made it possible for usto return to the negotiation table without acceptingthe Indonesian demand for autonomy and forIndonesia to continue without losing face: “Nothing isagreed until everything is agreed.” This became helpfulwhen we explored difficult issues like self-government,because it meant if any one agenda item did not reachan agreement, all points were unacceptable.

Making progressAs talks went on, the sides became friendlier and wefound it easier to negotiate directly with theIndonesians without interference from Ahtisaari, whohad initially had the habit of responding when weaddressed questions to the Indonesian side.

Our delegation also increasingly took the initiative,work ing hard into the early hours so each morning wewere ready with proposals. We had the advantage of

Page 31: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

30 Accord 20

being very small in number, while the Indonesiansseemed to be governed by different interests in Jakarta:some six ministries, the police and the military wereinvolved. Their decision-mak ing was slow andcumbersome and their in-fighting quite obvious,especially between the Vice-President’s team and thosefrom Foreign Affairs or the military. So we took the leadin forging new ground and the Indonesians principallyhad to agree, disagree or modify our demands. This wasa mode reversal from the Geneva and Tokyo talks,where we were basically handed the government’s ormediator’s proposals.

There was a brief crisis when – probably as a result ofmilitary pressure and the Indonesian chief delegate’slegal and political problems – Hamid Awaluddin said ina press interview that Indonesia still insisted GAMaccept the prevailing autonomy law. GAM promptlydeclared the failure of the peace talks, but fortunatelythis matter was resolved through consultations. It was also confirmed that the military had pulled itsrepresentative, Brig. Gen. Safruddin Tippe, out of theIndonesian support team, signaling a growing riftwithin the Indonesian delegation. In Jakarta the militaryand foreign affairs people increased their rhetoricagainst the talks, especially on the Indonesianconcession to allow self-government status for Aceh.

Make or breakThe ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’modality came to a climax at the fifth round in whichwe discussed the thorniest issues: security issues andlocal political parties.

On security, we hit a deadlock over the number oftroops to remain in Aceh: we initially proposed 4000 andJakarta proposed 25,000. Even in the biggest and mostpopulated provinces of Indonesia the number is nevermore than 6000, so we were shocked when themediators revealed that the proposed level of troops to remain in Aceh was 14,700 and 9200 police.Furthermore, although these were ‘organic’ troops itwas obvious to us that non-organic troops (units ofarmed forces and police sent to Aceh from otherprovinces) would simply change insignia on theiruniforms and become ‘organic.’ After prolonged andheated arguments we voted to accept these numbersafter strong assurances from the CMI that the AcehMonitoring Mission would ensure that the military’s rolewould strictly be in external defense, as per the clausewritten into the agreement. Had we decided to rejectthis, the peace talks would have been at a stalemate.

The other really difficult issue was the refusal ofIndonesia to allow the formation of local politicalparties in Aceh for constitutional reasons. The branches

of national political parties were, according to theIndonesian side, local parties. But for us these were stillnational parties and having local parties was a ‘bottomline’ issue for us. So at one point we packed ourcomputers and told Juha Christensen that we wereleaving. He dramatically insisted he had the right tohold us until 5pm and refused to provide us transportinto town. Adamant about our position, we asked theIndonesians one last time to give us a yes or no answerto our demand. They came up with wording for thisclause – ‘local parties with national characteristics’,which we were willing to agree to, and Sofyan Jalilcalled Vice-President Jusuf Kalla and obtained a directorder to accept.

At 11 o’clock on the third day of the fifth round we putinitials on the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).

The process in perspectiveNearly three years on, the peace is holding well, despitesome ugly incidents involving ex-militias, some internalGAM disputes and the far-from-complete reintegrationof ex-combatants.

Of course we could not secure all our demands inHelsink i. With the benefit of hindsight and experience,there are areas we might have liked to have securedmore, such as being given more opportunity to decideon our own fiscal policy – currently all taxes are decidedby Jakarta. These are areas we discussed but could notget through. We would also have liked to have agreedthat human rights violations predating the agreementwould be investigated, not only those afterwards.Hopefully some of the Generals involved will still haveto face justice, as more pressure builds on them fromwithin Indonesia, especially from a new, young andeducated generation.

We have to accept what has been agreed and be carefulnot to fuel tensions. But there are still many clauses inthe MoU that have not been properly addressed by theLaw on the Governing of Aceh that was promulgatedspecifically to implement it, such as the role of themilitary, the distribution of resources and the division ofauthority between Jakarta and the Aceh government.The government also seems to want to regulate the wayGAM reintegrates itself into society, quarrelling aboutthe use of the name and logo of the party. If thisprevents GAM from forming a political party in enoughtime for the 2009 elections it would be dangerous. ThatGAM is no longer interested in armed struggle shouldbe enough of a victory for the government, who shouldnot be trying to exert pressure on its erstwhile enemy.There should be more sincerity and less strategizing ifpeace is to hold permanently.

Page 32: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

31Perspectives on Aceh’s peace process

Nashiruddin was the Chief GAMRepresentative andNegotiator during theHumanitarian Pause and the Cessation ofHostilities Agreement

“The peace agreement is a reality and I think GAMmembers accept that. Yes we can fight, but we arenot sure that we can win through war. What is a warlike that? Only war for war. We have the MoU, sowhy don’t we use our time learning how to run ourcountry, instead of fighting and war.

The Aceh Monitoring Mission did an okay job butleft too early. They did not want to take risks. Theywanted to show they had done a good job in a veryshort time – and they thought if they stayed herelonger the success of their mission would havebeen questioned!

The main steps required now are implementing the agreement and socializing it – because mostpeople don’t know the details of the MoU. Withoutsocialization of the MoU, maybe another group willcome with ideas that can spoil the peace, a groupthat talks about independence and persuadespeople to follow them. Also the people shouldbenefit from the peace. This is important, because ifthey benefit then maybe they won’t be persuadedby such a group. Economic and political justice isthe key.

We hope hardliners don’t win the 2009 elections. Itwould affect the peace process, but that will alsodepend on the international community and theirpressure on Indonesia. The internationalcommunity don’t think only about peace, but theydo have an interest in what they can get out ofpeace – it’s human, it’s natural.”

Mukhtar Hassan, from Jangka Bireuen

“I was a teacher, but then I gotinvolved in GAM. The peaceprocess has brought security, nomore feelings of fear. Like manyothers, I have been able to come back home, tostart my job. Without fighting, I can work.

Has the process brought justice? If we talk aboutjustice, no, it is not just, the world is not a place forthe just. However, if all the points in the peaceagreement are implemented fully, I will be happywith the process. But the key is that all points haveto be implemented, especially on the economicempowerment of former combatants. Besides theeconomy, there must be education facilities fororphans and assistance for the families of formercombatants. That will make many families of formerGAM combatants happy and can erase memories ofthe past.

In terms of reintegration, in practice there isdiscrimination. Some have benefited and somehave not got any support at all. I am not yet happybecause I want the whole Acehnese population tobe helped. The economy must be addressed toimprove the income per capita, education, andquality of life of local people. Without this there willbe a long-term problem. A great number ofeconomic pilot projects must be organized. Iexpect that to happen.

I still communicate with my former GAM comrades,but my activities right now are all about improvingmy economic condition. What I want for myself andothers in the long term is that those in charge ofAceh address the problem of poverty, with no gap between villagers and rural areas. No morerepetition of past oppression. Aceh is very rich, wedeserve better.”

Perspectives on Aceh’s peace process

Page 33: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

32 Accord 20

The Brussels‘backstage’ of the Acehpeace processAntje Herrberg

W hilst a considerable amount has been writtenon the Aceh peace talks held in Helsink i underthe auspices of the Crisis Management

Initiative (CMI), less has been said on how the EuropeanUnion (EU) got involved in supporting this initiative.After the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding(MoU) in August 2005, the EU broke new ground inlaunching the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), whichwas the first EU cooperation with the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the first instanceof such an integrated civil-military mission. This accountis drawn from my own experiences and interviews withsome key individuals who worked ‘behind the scenes’to support the peace process. It will also offerreflections on lessons learned for future application.

The early days: careful discussionsIn 2004, the CMI was a new, emerging non-governmental organization with nine staff, with justone person based in Brussels. It had been created moreor less as an extension of the office of former FinnishPresident Martti Ahtisaari to enable his engagement inindependent projects relating to crisis managementand conflict resolution. He had been approached tomediate renewed talks between the Government ofIndonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), and heworked closely with his staff in the wake of the tsunamicrisis in January 2005 as it became clear that a meetingbetween the sides was imminent.

The role that CMI and its chairman played wasunofficial, informal and independent. This ‘privatediplomacy’ aspect was crucial, particularly for theIndonesian government, which did not want tointernationalize ‘domestic’ affairs. CMI was well placedfor the mediation role given Ahtisaari’s widely acceptedimpartiality as a mediator and access to networks withgovernments, with the added advantage of being a‘Nordic’ presence in close geographical proximity toSweden, where the GAM leadership was based.

The Finnish Foreign Ministry responded favourably tothe involvement of CMI and indicated its readiness tofacilitate the talks. It made it clear that it did not desire apolitical profile but would provide technical support(venue, transportation and logistics, and security).Ahtisaari’s private contacts with President Halonen andForeign Minister Tuomioja helped ensure politicalsupport for the process. It was not known how long thetalks would take, so the government’s commitment wasnot specified in terms of money or modalities, but wasopen-ended. Under-Secretary of State Hannu Himanenstressed that money was not an issue for Finland: ‘Wedid not anticipate nor had any detailed information onpossible EU support to CMI. It never affected theForeign Ministry’s decisions’. At the same time, however,

Antje Herrberg was the European

Policy Director of the Crisis

Management Initiative 2004-07.

She is now CMI’s senior mediation

advisor and a consultant for various

initiatives. She recently co-founded

the European Forum for International

Mediation and Dialogue.

The European Commission headquarters in Brussels.Source: Reuters/Francois Lenoir

Page 34: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

33The Brussels ‘backstage’ of the Aceh peace process

Ahtisaari took the view that broader EU involvementwould be advantageous in the long run for support toany ensuing peace process.

The EU connection The EU framework for dealing with conflict at that timedid not include explicit provision for mediation, butemanated from the European Common Foreign andSecurity Policy (CFSP), the European Security andDefence Policy (ESDP) and assistance schemes focusedon conflict prevention and crisis management. Inaddition, there was the Rapid Reaction Mechanism(RRM) that could be activated in response to crisis, in thiscase following the tsunami. While there had beensupport from Brussels for previous attempts atbrokering ceasefires in Aceh, the tsunami relief effortdominated institutional responses at this time. In totalthe EU and its member states mobilized !1.5 billion forall tsunami-affected areas, most of which was eventuallychannelled to the Indonesian Multi-Donor Trust Fund.

In 2005 the Commission was willing to go beyondhumanitarian support to fulfil a political role infacilitating peace. It had already invested in the peaceprocess, providing !2.3million to the Centre forHumanitarian Dialogue’s mediation efforts in 2002.According to one of the RRM managers, Patrick Dupont(one of the earliest supporters of the CMI mediation):“We wanted to work on peace, not only on ahumanitarian crisis. We were on common accord on thefundamental elements for a peace process in Aceh.

EU institutions and mechanisms

Whereas the European Commission (hereafterthe Commission) is a supranational institutionthat administers and implements importantfinancial budgets, the Council of the EuropeanUnion (hereafter the Council) representsindividual member states’ political will.

The EU Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM)streamlined existing areas for the alleviation ofcrisis (human rights work, border management,election monitoring, civil emergency assistanceand so forth). In 2007 it was replaced by theInstrument for Stability, (which does not carry the RRM’s six month limitation) as aresponse instrument for the Commission,accessed through the Directorate-General forExternal Relations.

The European Security and Defence Policy(ESDP) is a major element of the EU’s CommonForeign and Security Policy (CFSP), formallyunder the domain of the Council. The ESDP’scivilian dimension involves tasks in manydifferent areas, including police and rule of lawoperations, civil administration and protection,monitoring and support for EU special envoys.

Page 35: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

34 Accord 20

We wanted to provide the hardware (forreconstruction) and the software (peace). We werefavourably disposed towards work ing with NGOs onthe Aceh peace process. We had experience with theHDC and knew of the advantages and needs of a lowprofile, less political edge and more flexibility.”

The European Commission’s Predrag Avramoviç took upposition in the RRM in January 2005, and shortly afterhe travelled to Indonesia with his colleague Aldodell’Ariccia to assess the situation. While there heinvestigated the function or role CMI played inIndonesia, and he recalls encountering a certainscepticism about the organization as they had nopresence on the ground, neither local presence norpartners. In retrospect, however, he recalls that this ‘wasprobably good’: in other words, CMI offered a ‘freshstart’ and there were no perceptions of complicatedagendas or vested interests.

From the beginning of February, CMI was in dailycontact with Avramoviç to seek assistance from theCommission for the Aceh peace negotiations. Thesubmission of an application was not a ‘one off ’ affair.Indeed a number of proposals were submitted, eachone reflecting lengthy discussions with Avramoviç whoworked with his hierarchy to find a suitable formula. Herecalls that a ‘team’ spirit evolved over time – ratherthan one of a donor and an applicant for a project –and it focused on substance and results.

The Commission approved the RRM grant proposal for amaximum of !269,375 for the period of six monthsstipulated for the peace talks. Many questioned whetherthe six-month time frame would be conducive for apeace process as it would put all parties underconsiderable pressure. However, it was an opportunityfor the parties and the mediator to focus on the‘essentials,’ as well as reducing the potential for toomuch political manoeuvring by the parties – a kind of‘make or break’ arrangement. It also propelled a numberof EU actors (member states and the Council Secretariat)to start thinking ahead to the eventual consequences ofsuccessful talks.

EU financial backing for ‘political projects’ – the CMItogether with its support for the Centre for Strategic andInternational Studies in Jakarta who received a grant forcapacity building of local democracy (!220,000) –amounted to about less then 0.25 per cent of the amountof the Commission’s support to Aceh in response to thetsunami. This should exemplify that is not the size ofgrants that mattered as much, but the initiative andquality of working relations between CMI and the EU.

The fact that the Commission supported the peacetalks in Helsink i, and that these were endorsed by Javier

Solana, High Representative for the CFSP, also had atrigger effect that provided a sense of commonpurpose between the two institutions: the Commissionand the Council became stakeholders in the peaceprocess. The network ing and high-level politicalcontacts would also pave the way for a new precedent:European monitoring of the eventual peace agreement.

Towards the AMMFrom the very first round of talks in Helsink i in January2005, the possibility of monitoring was a theme. As theIndonesian government was very clear about notwanting to ‘internationalize’ (in the sense of formal UNinvolvement), the EU appeared to be a credible monitorin partnership with ASEAN.

From the point of view of one Finnish national work ingin the Council Secretariat, the planning of a monitoringmission was already beginning then. The CouncilSecretariat’s DGE IX (civilian crisis management) andEUMS/Civilian Military Cell had each established theconcepts it needed (Monitoring, Rule of Law, andCivilian Administration) whilst civilian capabilities forcrisis management (including monitoring missions) hadbeen examined through the ‘Civilian Headline Goal’approved in December 2004. Enthusiasm was high, andthe Council Secretariat and member states wanted tomake the conceptual framework a reality.

However, many in Brussels still believed that an EU role in monitoring an eventual peace process was a riskypolitical business because of Aceh’s remoteness andrelatively minor political importance for EU memberstates. There were questions over whether the partieswere really committed to peace, whether there would be ‘spoilers’ in the province, how precarious the securitysituation was, and how fast monitors could be deployed.But the ‘tsunami effect’, the desire for the EU to play apolitical role, institutional competition and thepersuasive power of Ahtisaari translated into newpolitical momentum. After discussions of whichinstitution would take leadership in an eventualmonitoring of the agreement, the EU was able to act inunison. According to a number of people involved thiswas also due to the determination of Pieter Feith, DeputyDirector General of the Council, who was intrigued bythe challenge and the potential of a monitoring mission.His long-standing friendship with Ahtisaari played a roleas well. According to Feith, ‘If Martti believed in this as anopportunity for EU, I was ready to support him.’

As it became clear that the peace agreement wasbecoming a reality and would require on-the-groundmonitoring, Ahtisaari probably echoed Brusselsdecision-makers’ think ing when he announced: “I amafraid that this will work.”

Page 36: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

35The Brussels ‘backstage’ of the Aceh peace process

Over the spring and summer months, planning wentinto greater detail and a number of difficult questionsloomed large. There were practical issues aboutassessing security for the mission and how to solve theimmense logistical issue in terms of financing.Considerable discussions took place over the questionof sending in unarmed monitors. According to theplanners, think ing evolved over time as confidencegrew in the parties’ commitment to peace. Pieter Feithsaid that what struck him most was ‘the parties’willingness to reconcile, which was amazing when onelooks at the Balkans, for example. The EU should rewardsuch willingness for peace and that’s what we did’.

A fact-finding mission went ahead from 24 June – 2 Julyand included CMI’s military advisor Jaako Oksanen andconsultant Juha Christensen. While the Council had nofinancing provision for including NGOs or experts inadvance missions, a motivated and innovative staffmember at the Commission found ways that made this‘mission possible.’ The growing involvement andpartnership between the Commission, the Council andCMI on the work ing level were also exemplified inEuropean backstage presence during the last stages ofthe talks (EU observers were sent to the fourth and fifthrounds). This provided assurances for all sides on thecommitments by parties and supporters of the talks,possibly providing also an additional impetus for allto succeed.

An Information Note from the Commission on 18 Julyprovided a groundbreak ing proposal for financing themission, which provided for more debate in theBrussels arena not about how to finance it but who wasallowed to finance it. The AMM was financed throughmember states and the CFSP budget line. Following theformal decision of the EU’s Political and SecurityCommittee on 18 July, the Technical AssessmentMission went on to its assessment, landing in Aceh on26 July, the same day that Javier Solana, in the presenceof Ahtisaari, addressed the Political and SecurityCommittee and commended the success of the fifthand last round of negotiations and urged memberstates to deliver on a monitoring mission mentioned inthe Memorandum of Understanding, to be signed on 15 August. The final push by these two leaders markedthe beginning of a further level of EU engagement: toprovide measures for monitoring and support tosustainability of a peace agreement.

Lessons learned for supporting mediationMany lessons could be drawn from this experience. Oneset of lessons concerns inter-governmentalpartnerships with NGOs in peacebuilding. Increasingly,the EU is promoting partnerships with NGOs in

peacebuilding, and the way in which an NGO workedwith the EU structures during the Aceh peace processsensitized the EU further to the value of effectivepartnership with NGOs. The Aceh experience helped tosharpen the concept of the Civilian Response Team(CRT ). In June 2005 the Council Secretariat established apool of pre-selected and pre-trained experts. MemberStates are covering the costs and can include expertsfrom NGOs in their national pools.

Moreover, it has been shown that ‘just throwing somemoney’ at a ‘project’ is not what matters for the EU orpossibly other regional and international organizations.Rather, when work ing on a ‘political project’ like theAceh peace process it is about the ability of actors to be able to form genuine work ing relationships – teamrelationships, rather than simply those of a donor and implementer.

For track two organizations that seek partnerships with the EU, a solid network and ‘know-how ’ about the politics of the EU can be a distinct advantage. Thisfacilitates the forging of a culture of co-operationbetween the EU institutions and non-state actors. As much as the EU can help to forge a culture ofcooperation, NGOs must make the human investmentto work with political and financial stakeholders. Thiscannot be done artificially, or overnight. It almostrequires a gradual paradigm shift that NGOs and non-state actors are important players in forging a Europeanforeign policy culture.

Another set of lessons can be learned around investingin mediation support. The building of capacity formediation support and mediators that can work with the EU and in turn with other regional organizationsrepresents an enormous potential. A systematizedunderstanding of the mechanisms, methods andpractice of peace mediation could facilitate the EU abilityto act in a responsive and cost-effective manner. TheAceh peace talks required relatively minute resourcesfrom the overall budget – consider what the costs couldhave been had there not been peace mediation.

The EU could continue to work with ASEAN and otherregional organizations to build a common capacity torespond to the challenge of crisis response throughmediation, and develop ways and methods ofdispatching monitoring. The setting up of the UNMediation Unit is one example where this has alreadycome to fruition. ‘Think ing ahead’ about mediationsupport in the forthcoming External Action Service(which will support the new EU ‘foreign minister’)provides another key opportunity. With the support ofall of these strands, we could possibly see more EUsuccess stories like Aceh.

Page 37: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

36 Accord 20

Dr. Kirsten E. Schulze is senior lecturer

in International History at the London

School of Economics. She has

published widely on the Aceh conflict

and peace process.

AMM officials cut up weapons as part ofthe decommissioning process.

Source: T. Faisal MG

A sensitivemission monitoring Aceh’s agreement

Kirsten E. Schulze

The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) included theestablishment of a mechanism for overseeing itsimplementation, the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM).The AMM’s objective was to assist the Free AcehMovement (GAM) and the Indonesian government withthe implementation of the MoU and ‘to contribute to apeaceful, comprehensive and sustainable solution tothe conflict in Aceh.’ Its specific tasks were to:

• Monitor the demobilization of GAM and thedecommissioning of its weapons;

• Monitor the redeployment of ‘non-organic’Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) and police;

• Monitor the reintegration of GAM, the human rights situation, and legislative change;

• Rule on disputed amnesty cases;• Investigate violations of the MoU.

The AMM was set up as a civilian mission headed by the EU’s Pieter Feith, reporting directly to the Secretary-General of the European Council, Javier Solana. Itcomprised monitors from the European Union (EU),Norway and Switzerland as well as five Association ofSouth East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries: Thailand,Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines and Singapore. TheAMM’s first mandate period was six months, extendedthree times until 15 December 2006. During this timethe number of monitors was progressively decreased asthe security situation improved. From 15 September to31 December 2005 the AMM had 125 EU and 93 ASEANmonitors on the ground. At the end of the missionthere were only 29 EU and 7 ASEAN monitors left. TheAMM had its headquarters in the provincial capital ofBanda Aceh.

It was then initially divided into 10 and later 11 districtoffices covering all of Aceh. They were based in Sigli,Bireuen, Lhokseumawe, Langsa, Lamno/Calang,Meulaboh, Blang Pidie, Tapaktuan, Kutacane, and Takengon.

Week ly meetings of the Commission on SecurityArrangements (COSA) were held at the Banda Acehheadquarters, chaired by Feith and attended by seniorrepresentatives of GAM and the Indonesiangovernment, police and military. The engagement ofsuch senior representatives as GAM’s Irwandi Yusuf andthe Indonesian military commander in Aceh, Major-General Bambang Darmono, was key to its success.There were also meetings at the district level (DiCOSA).

These meetings provided a forum at which to raisesecurity issues, questions and complaints in a speedymanner and to resolve them before they became realobstacles. The COSA and DiCOSA meetings werefurther supported by the dispute resolution

Page 38: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

37A sensitive m ission

mechanism, although most differences proved to beresolvable within COSA. In the few incidents of violencethat did occur the AMM listened to both GAM and TNIparties, carried out its own forensic investigation, andissued a ruling on the incident. Attesting to the AMM’simpartiality, neither GAM nor the TNI challenged any ofthe rulings handed down.

Dealing with combatantsThe AMM’s initial focus was on security issues. Its role inthe parallel processes of GAM decommissioning and TNIredeployment became the mission’s greatest success.

Amnesty In order to build GAM’s confidence in the peace processthe amnesty had to be implemented early and quickly.The AMM’s key function was to monitor the releases andsustain pressure on Jakarta to ensure that amnestieswere carried out speedily and completely. Indeed, thefirst round of releases came only two days after the MoU,with 298 released to mark Indonesia’s Independence Dayon 17 August 2005. On 30 August the official amnestywas granted through Presidential Decree 22/2005, afterwhich another 1424 were released.

A small number of disputed cases delayed thecompletion of the amnesty process. As the amnesty

applied only to those GAM prisoners who wereinvolved in the insurgency, not to those convicted oncriminal charges, disputes arose as to whether certainprisoners had been involved in criminal activity. Thesedisputed cases created discontent within GAM, whichto some extent, rightly or wrongly, blamed the AMM.

DecommissioningDecommissioning was a litmus test for the peaceprocess. It was over precisely this issue that the 2002-03Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) had started to unravel. Four specially trained decommissioningteams supervised the handing in of weapons. The firstphase of decommissioning was scheduled to start on15 September, effectively giving the decommissioningteams only two weeks to put everything in place.Nevertheless, 62 weapons were surrendered in BandaAceh on schedule and three days later the round wascompleted when a further 279 weapons were handedover, of which 243 were accepted.

The second round of decommissioning took place inmid-October and resulted in a total of 291 weaponsbeing handed over, of which 58 were rejected. Thisphase further strengthened the Indonesiangovernment’s confidence in the process because manyof the weapons were surrendered by a reputed GAMhardliner, Bireuen commander Darwish Jeunib. The

Page 39: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

38 Accord 20

third round of decommissioning in November almost collapsed when GAM’s representative on thedecommissioning team was suddenly replaced and the new representative declared there were no moreweapons left, when EU monitors had observed moreweapons. In the end, GAM surrendered 286 weapons inNovember (222 accepted) and another 162 weapons in December (142 accepted). The last weapons-cuttingceremony was held in Banda Aceh on 21 December,representing a total of 840 weapons accepted anddestroyed. Despite the challenges, all parties involveddeclared the process a resounding success.

RedeploymentThe four rounds of Indonesian troop redeployment ranfrom September to December 2005. The first phase of redeployment began on 14 September with thewithdrawal of 1300 mobile police (Brimob), followed bythe redeployment of two military units of the TNI. Bythe end of redeployment 25,890 TNI and 5791 Brimobhad been withdrawn, bringing the total to 31,681 ‘non-organic’ security forces redeployed.

While the process as a whole went smoothly, the AMMraised two issues during the early period. The first wascontinued aggressive patrolling by the TNI andallegations of harassment, beatings and extortion byBrimob. The second was repeated reports of intimidationof ex-GAM by members of the TNI intelligence unit. Bothissues could have undermined the process, but ceased tobe a problem once the AMM brought them to theattention of Major-General Darmono.

The troop redeployments were verified by the AMMand GAM was informed at each COSA meeting. Thiswas followed by an overall verification from 14 Januaryto 15 February 2006 in which the AMM monitored theremaining troops in the various districts and concludedthat the Indonesian government had fully compliedwith the MoU.

ReintegrationOnce the decommissioning had been completed, thereintegration of former GAM combatants became a keypriority. According to the MoU, the AMM’s role was tomonitor the reintegration of GAM ex-combatants intosociety, including amnestied prisoners. Implementationof the reintegration programs was to be carried out byinternational agencies, local government, and a newgovernment agency called the Aceh ReintegrationBoard (BRA).

As Lina Frödin describes in her article in thispublication, there were many problems withreintegration schemes, including delays in thedisbursement of funds and reports of ex-combatantsreceiving less money than intended. Tensions ensued

over the ultimate fate of funds disbursed, compoundedby unrealistic expectations among ex-combatants andlack of capacity. Although the bulk of the criticism waslevelled at the Indonesian government and BRA ratherthan the AMM, some blamed the AMM for not pressingthe government harder.

Other criticisms came from within the AMM itself. Somebelieved that the main problem was inexperience inreintegration processes as a whole, starting with therapid drafting process of the MoU itself. The AMM wasfaced with monitoring the implementation of a process,on the final form of which there was no real consensus.Moreover, the AMM did not start focusing fully onreintegration until after decommissioning wascompleted. And finally, there was criticism of the AMM’stop-down structure, which had been adopted tosafeguard its personnel in a hostile environment andallow for speedy evacuation. However, this structureproved less appropriate to dealing with complex socialissues such as reintegration.

The AMM and political transition in AcehIf security issues were tack led efficiently, the politicalissues proceeded at a slower pace and movement onthe human rights provisions of the MoU was almostnon-existent. The key political processes that the AMM had to oversee were the drafting of the Law onGoverning Aceh (LoGA), followed by the first directelections for governor. The AMM was also responsiblefor monitoring the human rights situation and theestablishment of the Human Rights Court and Truthand Reconciliation Commission (TRC).

According to the MoU, new legislation was to bedrafted for Aceh based on the principle that it wouldexercise authority within all sectors of public affairsexcept foreign affairs, external defence, nationalsecurity, monetary and fiscal matters, justice andfreedom of religion, which belong to the Governmentof the Republic of Indonesia. Aceh was to be consultedby the Indonesian Government on internationalagreements relating to matters of special interest toAceh. Decisions concerning Aceh by the nationallegislature were to be taken in consultation with thelegislature of Aceh and with its consent. Finally, by-laws(Qanun) were to be re-established for Aceh respectingits historical traditions and customs as well as reflectingmore contemporary requirements.

Drafting and redrafting the LoGA only started afterdecommissioning and redeployment had beencompleted and then took more than five months.Indonesian parliamentarians in Jakarta, aware that Acehundoubtedly would become an example for otherprovinces, wrangled over how much autonomy the

Page 40: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

39A sensitive m ission

province should receive. They missed the deadline of 31 March 2006 stipulated by the MoU, finally passing theLoGA on 12 July. It comprises 40 chapters and 278 articles.

Pressure from the AMM was important in getting thelegislation passed. According to Indonesian JusticeMinister Hamid Awaluddin, ‘they played a significantrole in pushing us to keep to the timeframe but withoutinterfering in the substance.’ From an Indonesian pointof view, this confirmed the AMM’s impartiality. However,there was criticism from GAM and a wide range of civilsociety organizations. At the local level Acehnesepolitical and human rights activists thought the role ofthe central government was still too great, criticisms tosome extent reflected in GAM’s concerns about thescope for interference from Jakarta, as the LoGA allowsthe central government to ‘set the norms, standards,and procedures as well as monitor’ governance in Aceh.Some GAM members blamed the AMM for failing toput more pressure on the government to bring theLoGA into line with the MoU.

At a national and international level, human rightsorganizations pointed out that the LoGA, especially itsprovision for Shari’ah Law, contradicted internationalconventions recently ratified by the Indonesiangovernment guaranteeing minority rights, religiousfreedom, freedom of expression and gender equality. Itwas also not in line with the MoU’s stipulation that ‘thelegislature of Aceh will redraft the legal code for Aceh onthe basis of the universal principles of human rightsprovided for in the United Nations Covenants on Civiland Political Rights and on Economic, Social and CulturalRights.’ Human rights organizations contended that theAMM, tasked to monitor legislative drafting, should haveprevented or at least discouraged the inclusion ofprovisions incompatible with human rights. After theLoGA was passed the date for the first direct electionsfor governor and vice-governor as well as 19 regentsand mayors was set for 11 December 2006. For the 2.6million Acehnese eligible to vote, the elections were asign that the peace process was becoming irreversible.

While the political processes were concluded late butfairly successfully, there was little progress on humanrights issues. By the time the AMM ended its missionneither the Human Rights Court nor the TRC had beenestablished. This was the result of four factors. First, theAMM had to work in a highly sensitive environmentwhere pushing too hard on human rights risked themission as a whole. Second, the AMM had nosanctioning power. Third, its mandate only covered theviolations by either GAM or the Indonesian securityforces. And fourth, there was reluctance within theAMM leadership to push on human rights. As one AMMofficial pointed out, ‘human rights is not well

coordinated or competently represented. The conceptis non-existent, there are no policies and the area isweak, confused and aimless.’ Several other AMMmembers claimed that every time they wanted to raisehuman rights or be more pro-active in this area theywere ignored, marginalized or even silenced. Ironically,the AMM’s reluctance to push for the implementationof those aspects of the MoU contributed to themission’s achieving its overall aims.

ConclusionsThere is no question that the AMM as a whole was asuccess. Aceh has been transformed from a battlefieldinto one of the most democratic areas of Indonesia.Without the AMM’s monitors and expertise the Acehpeace process may have collapsed early on. Indeed, itwas the impartiality and the confidence the AMMinspired in both GAM and the Indonesian military thatallowed for the crucial decommissioning andredeployment to be carried out and the subsequentpolitical changes to take place. Yet it is also very clearthat monitoring the MoU’s security elements was farmore successful than monitoring the agreement’spolitical and human rights elements. One of thereasons for this was the fact that the AMM had anactive, well-defined role in decommissioning andredeployment, and was fully supported by theinternational community.

The mandate on human rights was less well definedand the EU provided neither guidance nor politicalback ing for a more assertive AMM approach. Thepresence of the ASEAN member countries on the AMMundoubtedly also played a role. The AMM’s role withrespect to legislative change and human rights wasconsequently interpreted more as one of passivemonitoring with a focus on process rather thansubstance. The AMM did not consider it appropriate tocomment on the content of the LoGA and considersthe fact that neither a Human Rights Court nor a TRCwere established during its mandate period to be afailure of the Indonesian Government, not its own. Notsurprisingly, views on this point differ markedly. Humanrights activists, including those from within the EU andthe AMM, believe that it was the responsibility of theAMM to push harder on human rights. It may well bethat the human rights mandate of future internationalmonitoring missions needs to be more limited orsequenced so that the overall mission is notjeopardized. What is certain is that any human rightsmandate and the role of the mission in implementing itneed to be more clearly defined. Monitoring missionsmust also receive unequivocal political back ing andguidance from their ‘home institutions.’

Page 41: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

40 Accord 20

Afridal Darmi is an advocate and

human rights worker. He has served as

the Director of the Board of the NGO

Coalition for Human Rights and of

KontraS Aceh and has been director of

Banda Aceh’s legal aid foundation

since 2003.

Civil societyengagement in the peaceprocessAfridal Darmi

P eacebuilding is a relatively new role for civilsociety in Aceh compared to more conventionalactivities such as human rights advocacy,

community development and economic development.Despite this, Acehnese civil society organizations (CSOs)have become actively involved in the peace process.

The Humanitarian PauseThe Joint Understanding on a Humanitarian Pause for Acehof June 2000-January 2001 was the first chance forAcehnese civil society to become involved. Activistsparticipated in both the formal bodies established for the Pause, the Joint Committee for Humanitarian Action(JCHA) and the Joint Committee for Security Capital(JCSC), as well as the monitoring teams established foreach. The duties of the JCHA were mainly to distributeemergency aid to internally displaced persons (IDPs), and this benefited from access to the NGO humanitarianvolunteers’ network. The JCSC, whose tasks were toensure no military offensive actions took place, was alsohelped by the NGO human rights monitoring network,which effectively became the JCSC’s eyes and ears inmonitoring the security situation in the field. Theindependent monitoring mission also received valuableinputs from a large network of civil society institutions inthe field.

Explaining the peace processAs peacemaking efforts developed, the demands oncivil society increased further, with the burden ofcontinuously building and maintaining the trust of thepopulation in the peace process itself. From within boththe conflict parties and the general public, there weremany who believed more in violence as the finalsolution to the political conflict in Aceh. CSOsencouraged people to adopt a more pro-peaceorientation by facilitating many open discussionsfocused on humanitarian issues and the termination of violence. They also persuaded people to temporarilypostpone resolution of the sensitive issue of‘independence versus unified national integrity’. Thisquestion had in the past increased tension andweakened trust in the process. CSOs worked to explainto the public that less sensitive issues, such ashumanitarian concerns, the conditions of IDPs and thesecurity of civilians, were easier topics on which to begindialogue and build momentum in the peace talks.

CSOs were also significant in building trust in theinstitutions behind the ongoing peace process. Manypeople were initially sceptical about a peace processmediated by international NGOs and expressedconcerns about their capacity compared to ‘state-sponsored mediation’. Again, CSOs encouragedpragmatic acceptance of the mediation on offer. Theyargued that while it might look as though only a small

Former Aceh rebels from the Free Aceh Movement (GAM)are greeted by Indonesian soldiers during a peace rally inthe town of Lhokseumawe, Aceh, September 2005.Source: Reuters/Stringer Indonesia

Page 42: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

41Civil society engagement in the peace process

NGO was in charge, actually the backbone of theprocess included some important international actorsincluding the Japanese government, the EuropeanUnion and the World Bank.

Consolidating peaceFollowing the signing of the Memorandum ofUnderstanding (MoU), CSOs also played significant rolesin minimizing the potential for new conflict bypromoting dialogue on sensitive issues, such as thepotential further splitting of Aceh into new territorialunits (ALA/ABAS). They also encouraged change in publicperceptions of violence. In the post-agreement period,spoilers presented a real challenge to the consolidationof peace. CSOs tried to portray violence by spoilers ascriminal rather than political violence that should bedealt with by the police and institutions of law, so as toprevent the peace process being undermined.

Long and substantial experience in supportingcommunities’ economic empowerment has also provedimportant in supporting the peace efforts. CSOs havebeen involved in reintegration efforts for ex-combatants,through activities such as the provision of loans for smallbusinesses or jobs in the agricultural sector or othersmall businesses, as well as in conducting trainings onsmall business management skills.

Democratic participation and localmediationVarious civil society institutions have made determinedefforts to strengthen democracy through forms ofcritical education, including increasing publicawareness and trust in the contents of the MoU, and inthe political process (including elections) that followed.

The drafting of the Law on the Governing of Aceh (LoGA)can be seen as a high point for people’s engagement inthe peace process and provided an opportunity forextensive public participation in its drafting anddevelopment. CSOs actively conducted various publicconsultation forums, trying to reach a wideconstituency to ensure that the draft would secure asmany inputs as possible. CSOs were involved in pushingforward important issues to be addressed in the law,such as proposals on how to make the Acehnesegovernment more participative and accountable. Theyalso pushed forward a formal democratization agendain the form of direct general elections. It is notable thatdespite concerns that the final draft of the law wasweakened on aspects related to the division of powersbetween the central government and Aceh, there isgeneral satisfaction with the articles on participationand accountability issues with regard to the localdemocratic process.

One of the genuine innovations of Acehnese civil societyhas been the capacity-building of informal leaders andthe strengthening of customary institutions such as theGeuchiks (village chiefs) and Mukim (subdistrict chiefs),enabling them to defuse dissatisfaction at the local level.This was significant in the process of ex-combatants’reintegration into communities. The presence and rolesof local leaders and customary institutions serving asmediators to directly solve problems at the first levelwere important and effective.

CriticismsAcehnese civil society was not well-equipped toengage in the peace process, particularly in terms ofknowledge and experience in conflict management. Asa result some CSOs became pawns in the political gameplayed between the conflicting parties. This creatednegative perceptions among CSO members, andamong less experienced individuals, frustration withslow progress in the peace process occasionallyresulted in radicalization and regression to militaristicapproaches. There is also a lack of records of theseexperiences. It is a source of concern that so manyinvaluable experiences and lessons might bediminished one day because they have not beenadequately documented and recorded.

Positive and negative impacts of civilsociety engagementSome Acehnese CSOs believe that their engagement inthe peace process in Aceh resulted in it receiving stronginternational support. Some even claimed thatinternational involvement was the result of years oftireless campaigning on Aceh’s issues in variousinternational forums.

Internally, involvement in the peace process offeredsubstantial experience and many lessons which willcertainly be useful in the future. Just recently someAcehnese CSOs were entrusted with providing expertiseand know-how for peace processes in other countriesby sharing their experiences and lessons learned.

However, there were also significant negative impactson civil society. These included pressure and evenviolence towards CSOs who were involved in peaceprocess mechanisms, with some becoming targets ofviolence ranging from threats to murder. Some of thosewithin the conflict parties directed their anger atunarmed civil society groups. However, thesedevelopments were considered by individuals withinAcehnese civil society as intrinsic risks deriving fromtheir own choice to be engaged in peacebuilding in themidst of armed conflict.

Page 43: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

42 Accord 20

The Law on the Governing of Aceh the way forward or a source of conflicts?

Bernhard May

T he Helsink i Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)foresaw the promulgation of a new Law on theGoverning of Aceh as an essential precondition

and cornerstone of the peace process. The new law wassupposed to provide Aceh with the framework foreffective self-government that previous laws had failedto deliver and expectations in Aceh were high.However, the drafting process, which involved a largenumber of stakeholders, resulted in a legal product thatdisappointed many, particularly within the Free AcehMovement (GAM).

Law No. 6/2006 on the Governing of Aceh (LoGA) waspromulgated with considerable delay in August 2006. It isan extremely complex piece of legislation that is not limitedto the core issues of ‘autonomous’ regional governance,but covers numerous aspects that are usually regulated insectoral laws. It includes, for example, regulations on publichealth and education, natural resources management,including fisheries and mining, economic developmentand investment, human rights, the armed forces, the policeand the judiciary. This wide scope of rather superficialregulations, which necessitate many references to the moredetailed sectoral laws, distracts from focusing on the basicprinciples of ‘special autonomy.’ In seeking to ascertainAceh’s control over as many governance issues as possible,the proponents of the law have instead achieved theopposite. Furthermore, the direct involvement of anunusually large number of stakeholders with a vast scopeof varying interests in all stages of the drafting process hasled to many compromises, which often come at the cost ofclarity and consistency of the law.

While GAM itself had originally proposed a rathercondensed and focused draft of the law (albeitcontaining some fairly radical ideas of how Aceh’s “self-government” should look, including Aceh’smembership in certain UN organizations), the intentionof the provincial parliament and government toaccommodate as many opinions as possible ledeventually to a rather complex and voluminous draft.The work of four local universities charged by the

Bernhard May is advisor to the

Governor of Aceh and Team Leader

of the EU-financed Aceh Local

Governance Programme,

implemented by the Deutsche

Gesellschaft für Technische

Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)

An Acehnese child carries a placard during a rallyoutside the United Nations office in Jakarta, July 2005.

Source: Reuters/Dadang Tri

Page 44: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

43The La w on the Governing of Aceh

provincial authorities with preparing inputs for the lawwas merged into a single draft, which was discussedwith various parties in the region before being exposedto an assembly of (reportedly) around one thousandstakeholders in Banda Aceh. Then, the provincialgovernment took over from the provincial parliamentand finalized the draft with the help of an advisoryteam of legal experts, and submitted it to the centralgovernment. Here, the Minister of Home Affairs hadestablished its own drafting team consisting ofgovernment officials and academics, who used thedraft submitted by the province as reference for theirwork. The draft was reviewed and reformulated over sixmonths to harmonize it as far as was deemed necessarywith existing laws and regulations, drawing onexpertise from relevant central government agencies.Considerable changes were finally introduced throughthe deliberations of the national parliament, whichobviously felt free to see the MoU rather as generalguidelines than as commitments to adhere to, becauseit was not one of the negotiating parties.

The main reason for concern on the part of GAM andmany other stakeholders in Aceh is indeed that someparts of the LoGA deviate considerably from thestipulations of the MoU. The four main legal principlesthat GAM had negotiated in Helsinki promised afundamentally revised relationship between Aceh andthe central government. The way they have beentranslated into the law does not do justice to this promise.

Aceh and the exercise of authorityThe first and probably most fundamental principle ofthe MoU (article 1.1.2 a) reads, ‘Aceh will exerciseauthority within all sectors of public affairs…except inthe fields of foreign affairs, external defence, nationalsecurity, monetary and fiscal matters, justice andfreedom of religion, the policies of which belong to theGovernment of the Republic of Indonesia in conformitywith the Constitution.’ The definition of centralgovernment responsibilities in the law (article 7) is abone of contention: ‘governmental affairs having thecharacteristics of national affairs, foreign affairs,defence, security, judicial, monetary, national fiscal, andcertain affairs in the religious sector.’

GAM (and some other stakeholders in Aceh)misinterpreted the MoU principle as meaning that Acehwould have the right to exercise all authorities within allsectors of public affairs – and that the centralgovernment’s authority in Aceh would be restricted tothe six sectors mentioned in the MoU. The wording ofthe MoU does not justify this interpretation, and suchan arrangement would also be unrealistic as there arenumerous functions outside the six sectors mentionedin the MoU that need to be regulated and/orimplemented by central government. This is particularlytrue for those government functions that constitute theconstitutional obligations of the central government,are related to international conventions that have beentranslated into national law, or to government

Page 45: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

44 Accord 20

functions, the implementation of which by thegovernment of Aceh would affect other regions ofIndonesia or even other countries.

The potential for conflicts has been aggravated by thefact that the national parliament chose to elaborate onthe additional functions of the central government inAceh by calling them ‘governmental affairs having thecharacteristics of national affairs’ and proceeding toelucidate on this in a way that leaves room for multipleinterpretations. Making use of another imprecisestipulation of the law, the central government hasdecided to regulate its own functions in Aceh by aGovernment Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah). The draftof this regulation, which has been submitted to Aceh forcomments, suggests that the central governmentintends to exercise largely the same responsibilities inAceh as in all other provinces of Indonesia (except forPapua). Judging from comments from GAM and highranking provincial government officials so far, furtherheated dialogue between Aceh and the centralgovernment on this draft regulation can be expected.

The controversy will not end here, but will extend toissues regarding the way in which the centralgovernment intends to implement its responsibilities inAceh. The stipulation of the LoGA that ‘the centralgovernment sets norms, standards and procedures andconducts the supervision over the implementation ofgovernment functions by the Government of Aceh andDistrict/City governments’ (article 11.1) suggests abroad range of central government authorities over theimplementation of regional governance. This seems farfrom what the proponents of the MoU, principally GAM,understood by effective self-government. While theimposition of national norms, standards andprocedures may be justified in many cases, this must behandled with care if the basic idea of special autonomyfor Aceh is to be safeguarded. The potential for asubstantial diminution of Aceh’s perceived specialauthorities by tight central government rules andstandards is particularly great when it comes to theissuance of concessions, permits and licenses,particularly related to investment and the exploitationof natural resources.

A further problem arises in article 7: ‘The Governmentsof Aceh (province) and Kabupaten/Kota (districts) havethe authority to regulate and implement governmentfunctions in all public sectors except governmentfunctions that are the authority of the centralgovernment.’ In other words, the law demands sharedresponsibility between the province and the districts inimplementing Aceh’s special autonomy. GAM intendedthat full responsibility for the implementation of specialautonomy be assigned to the provincial government.Instead, the LoGA assigns authority to both levels of

government without providing sufficient clarityregarding the distribution of government functions.Therefore, Aceh has to find a way of establishing power-sharing arrangements between the province and thedistricts in order to avoid conflicting regulationsbetween the two levels of government. Lack ofconsistency between provincial and district levelregulations could lead to legal uncertainty, whichwould have a detrimental impact on Aceh’s investmentclimate. Equally, an overly dominant role of theprovince in determining the regulatory framework forAceh’s special autonomy might nourish the impressionthat centralism has shifted from Jakarta to Banda Acehand reinforce tendencies in some districts to breakaway from Aceh and form their own provinces.

Further deviations There are other ways in which the LoGA deviatessubstantially from the first principle of the MoU that willprobably have less immediate consequences for theway Aceh will be governed. The national parliament aswell as the central government’s drafting teamregarded the MoU’s additions of ‘external’ to the term‘defence’ and of ‘national’ to the term ‘security’ aslimitations of the roles of the Indonesian Armed Forcesand the police respectively. These additions were seenas irreconcilable with existing laws and regulations andthe terms have therefore not been adopted in theLoGA. Instead, article 202 states, ‘the Indonesian ArmedForces (TNI) are responsible for maintaining the securityof the state and for other duties in Aceh in accordancewith laws and regulations.’ The reference of the LoGA toexisting laws and regulations (in this case the Law34/2004 on the Indonesian Armed Forces), indicatesthat the TNI will have the same duties in Aceh aselsewhere in Indonesia, including dealing with internalsecurity disturbances, although in cooperation withother institutions (article 6.1c and respectiveelucidations of Law 34/2004). Whilst some in GAM hopefor an amendment of the LoGA to bring it in line withthe MoU in this respect, it may be more realistic tohope for an amendment of the TNI Law, restricting themilitary forces to their external defence role, except fordisaster-related and humanitarian tasks.

A particularly sensitive field of potential conflict isopened up by another major LoGA deviation from MoUprinciples. The second MoU principle (article 1.1.2b)states that, ‘international agreements entered into bythe GoI which relate to matters of special interest toAceh will be entered into in consultation with and withthe consent of the legislature of Aceh,’ and the thirdprinciple (Article 1.1.2 c) says that, ‘decisions withregard to Aceh by the legislature of the Republic ofIndonesia will be taken in consultation with and withthe consent of the legislature of Aceh.’ Both were

Page 46: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

45The La w on the Governing of Aceh

substantially altered when they were translated into lawbecause the national parliament in agreement with thecentral government regarded these provisions of theMoU as constitutionally problematic. As they wouldinfringe upon the constitutional authorities of thePresident and national parliament respectively, theirinclusion in the LoGA might have led to a judicialreview by the constitutional court. The principles havetherefore been translated into the LoGA (article 8) byusing the formula: ‘in consultation with and with theconsideration of DPRA’ (the provincial parliament ofAceh) – in other words, replacing ‘with the consent of ’with ‘with the consideration of.’

Similarly, the fourth MoU principle (Article 1.1.2 d),stating that, ‘administrative measures undertaken by theGovernment of Indonesia with regard to Aceh will beimplemented in consultation and with the consent ofthe head of the Aceh administration,’ has beentranslated into the LoGA with the phrase ‘in consultationand with the considerations (not the consent) of theGovernor.’ This adjustment was seen as necessarybecause the governor, neither as head of the region noras the representative of the central government in theregion, can have the authority to approve centralgovernment decisions. Again, the MoU’s proposal wouldprobably have prompted a judicial review.

The question which has been raised, but not answeredsatisfactorily, is why the Indonesian governmentrepresentatives were ready to sign agreements with GAMof which it was to be expected that their implementationcould raise serious constitutional concerns. Someobservers of the Helsinki process have hinted at thepossibility that Jakarta advised its negotiation team toaccept potentially problematic provisions in order tomake sure that GAM would sign the MoU, hoping at thesame time to be able to hide behind the nationalparliament’s sovereign authority, should the latter chooseto reject the adoption of such provisions in the law.

The need for further regulationsThe LoGA stipulates that the way in whichconsultations with Aceh are to be conducted and theprovincial parliament’s and Governor’s considerationsare to be obtained will be determined by a PresidentialRegulation. The prolonged process of discussionsbetween Aceh and the central government on the draftof this Presidential Regulation suggests that neitherside will easily give up its position. Aceh insists that anyconsultative mechanism determined by the PresidentialRegulation must lead as close as possible to ‘consensusas a rule,’ while the central government maintains itsclaim for the final decision-mak ing authority of thenational parliament and President. It is not easy toforesee a workable compromise on this difficult issue.

On the other hand, it is critical that some of the centralgovernment regulations mandated by the LoGA, whichmust pass through the above mentioned consultationprocess, be issued as soon as possible. This applies inparticular to the Government Regulation on the JointManagement of Oil and Gas Resources by theGovernment of Aceh and the Central Government.Given the parties’ highly conflicting interests in thisfield, an orderly consultation is of utmost importance.The establishment of a participatory, transparent andfair consensus-finding mechanism will also be criticalfor resolving potential conflicts around the above-mentioned draft Government Regulation on CentralGovernment Authorities of National Character in Aceh.Likewise, it will help to come to terms with such criticalissues as the presidential regulations on thecooperation of Aceh with foreign institutions andparticipation in events abroad, and on the transfer ofresponsibilities of the National Land Agency to theprovince and the districts.

ConclusionsThe way in which Jakarta regulates and conductsconsultations with Aceh on essential national policiesthat have a direct impact on Aceh will be critical forbuilding trust and confidence between Aceh (not onlyGAM) and the central government. Likewise, inimplementing the LoGA and particularly its ownauthorities in Aceh, the central government must respectthe spirit of the MoU if it wants to show commitment topeace. It would be detrimental to peace and stability inthe province if it proves right those critics who claim thatthe LoGA not only fails to fulfill the promises of the MoU,but generally offers very little to justify the notion ofspecial autonomy, except for the allocation of additionalfunds. In view of the lack of clarity and the ambiguity ofmany regulations, and the constraints on the way inwhich Aceh can exercise its special autonomy, the LoGAhas the potential to become a source of substantialconflicts between Aceh and the central government,rather than an effective means of fostering andstabilizing their relationship. However, with both sidesapparently open to a pragmatic approach to itsimplementation, the LoGA may indeed become a wayforward, albeit a less good way than could have beenexpected had it been more loyal to the MoU andinternally consistent. This pragmatic “way forward” willcertainly be tested if the consultations on substantiveissues related to its implementation reach deadlock. Thereal test, however, will come should a revision of the lawbe initiated as requested by many parties in Aceh,particularly GAM. However desirable a revision in view ofthe LoGA’s many shortcomings may be, it is equallynecessary to keep expectations at a realistic level.Readiness to grant even greater concessions to Aceh will,rather, diminish as time goes by.

Page 47: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

46 Accord 20

Edward Aspinall is a fellow in the

Department of Political and Social

Change, Research School of Pacific

and Asian Studies, Australian

National University.

Electionsconsolidating peace

Edward Aspinall

O ne of the most remarkable outcomes of thepeace process in Aceh came with the 11 December 2006 elections. Against most

predictions, the former Free Aceh Movement (GAM)strategist and propagandist Irwandi Yusuf was electedas Aceh’s governor. He gained 38 per cent of the vote,far ahead of his nearest rival who won 17 per cent. Onthe same day, candidates nominated by GAM were alsoelected as mayors and district heads (bupati) in six outof the 19 municipalities and districts where electionswere held. By early 2008, following run-offs and delayedelections, GAM-affiliated candidates had won a total ofnine such district races, and look set to win one more.

Just two years earlier Irwandi had been in prison, but heescaped and made his way overseas when the tsunamiof 26 December 2004 destroyed his jail, k illing manyinmates. His running mate, Muhammad Nazar, a formerpro-independence student leader, remained in jail inJava throughout the Helsink i peace talks that led to theMemorandum of Understanding (MoU) in August 2005.The stories of many of the newly elected bupati andmayors contain comparably dramatic turnarounds ofpolitical fortunes. In attempting to explain these events, this article explains the background andimplementation of the elections, analyses theirsignificance for the wider peace process and points toreasons for the success of GAM-affiliated candidates.

Elections and parties in the peace process The elections represented a crucial step in the peaceprocess. One of the most contentious parts of the MoUwas the section on political participation. Thismandated that, ‘free and fair local elections will beorganized under the new Law on the Governing of Acehto elect the head of the Aceh administration and otherelected officials in April 2006’ (section 1.2.3). Section1.2.2 explained that, ‘Upon the signature of this MoU,the people of Aceh will have the right to nominate

Local election officials check the ballotsafter counting them in a polling station in

Banda Aceh, December 2006. Source: Reuters/Tarmizy Harva

Page 48: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

47Elections: consolidating peace

candidates for the positions of all elected officials tocontest the elections in Aceh in April 2006 andthereafter.’ In addition, section 1.2.1 required that thegovernment, ‘create, within one year or at the latest 18 months from the signing of this MoU, the politicaland legal conditions for the establishment of localpolitical parties in Aceh in consultation with Parliament.’

These provisions may seem uncontroversial, yet theyalmost caused the collapse of the Helsink i talks. Tounderstand why, it is necessary to recall the conditionsthat accompanied Indonesia’s transition to democracyafter President Suharto’s downfall in 1998. Amidstviolence and political turmoil in many regions, nationalpolitical leaders feared that democratization wouldunleash centrifugal forces that would tear the countryapart. To counter this, they built a number of supposedsafeguards into the new democratic politicalarchitecture, including measures specifically designedto prevent localist forces from gaining a foothold informal politics. Thus, according to Indonesia’s nationalpolitical party law, only parties with a demonstrablepresence in half the districts in half the provinces of thecountry can register with the government. According tothe national elections law, to compete in elections theymust show a presence in two thirds of the districts intwo thirds of the provinces. In the law, which allows for

direct elections of local government heads, it is not ‘thepeople’ (as in section 1.2.2. of the MoU) who nominatecandidates for such positions, but the national politicalparties (or coalitions of parties) that have won aminimum percentage of the vote or seats in the mostrecent legislative election in the region concerned.

For GAM negotiators in Helsink i, it was crucial toexempt Aceh from these Indonesia-wide rules. Inexchange for giving up their arms and their goal ofindependence, GAM leaders wanted to be able totransform their organization into a peaceful, democraticmovement and compete for power in Aceh. If onlynational parties and their nominees were allowed torun for office, acceding to a peace deal would havemeant GAM was effectively liquidating itself as apolitical movement.

On the other hand, government negotiators in Helsink i(and, even more so, politicians back in Jakarta) werevery reluctant to concede on these issues, fearing thatallowing an exception to the national rules would leadto their unravelling. An even greater fear was that avictorious GAM party or GAM-nominated candidateswould weaken ties with the rest of the country or evendeclare independence.

Page 49: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

48 Accord 20

In Jakarta, national political party leaders kept up aconstant barrage of public commentary rejectingcompromise. GAM was equally insistent that localparties and independent candidates were democraticrights of the people of Aceh. At the last moment, whenit looked like the talks would collapse and the GAMdelegates were pack ing their bags, governmentnegotiators ‘blinked’ (in the words of one GAMnegotiator) and offered ‘Aceh-based political partiesusing national criteria,’ setting in train the compromiseembodied in section 1.2 of the MoU.

But this was not the end of the road. During thenegotiations between Acehnese actors and thenational government and parliament leading to theformulation of the Law for the Governing of Aceh (LoGA)in 2006, there were again attempts to water downthese provisions. Eventually, it was agreed that localparties would be allowed to compete in the legislativeelections, starting from 2009. The LoGA stresses thatthese parties cannot violate Indonesia’s constitution orits founding ‘national philosophy’ of Pancasila, whichstresses the importance of national unity. For the firstdirect elections of local government heads (whicheventually had to be postponed from May to December2006, giving GAM more time to prepare for them),independent candidates would be allowed providedthey could prove they were supported by three percent of the population in the province (governorelections) or district/municipality (bupati and mayorelections). In subsequent elections only candidatesnominated by parties would compete.

The candidates: divisions in GAM Several sets of candidates in the elections were fromAceh’s existing political establishment. Among the mostimportant were former acting governor, AzwarAbubakar, nominated by the National Mandate Party(PAN), and his running mate Nasir Djamil, nominated bythe Justice and Welfare Party (PKS), who formed anIslamically-oriented ticket. Malik Raden, a prominentpolitician from the Golkar party – the former rulingparty under the Suharto regime – was considered tohave a chance because he had the back ing of hisparty’s formidable electoral machinery.

Another favoured candidate was Ahmad HumamHamid, a prominent and respected local academic whohad been active in various civil society and politicalactivities over the preceding decade. He secured theendorsement of the Unity Development Party (PPP), an established Islamic party. Unlike most othermainstream candidates, he was acutely aware of thelikely electoral appeal of GAM and tried hard to secure arunning mate with a GAM background. He settled uponHasbi Abdullah, an academic who had served terms of

imprisonment despite not being a GAM leader himself.Hasbi was backed by most of the older generation ofGAM leaders, including his brother Zaini Abdullah(GAM’s ‘foreign minister’), the GAM ‘prime minister’Malik Mahmud, and other individuals who had joinedthe movement in the 1970s and formed its ‘blue blood’group. They backed Hasbi both for personal reasonsand because they feared that GAM candidates wereunprepared to hold power in their own right, whereas a coalition with a ‘national’ politician would betterpreserve the peace process. Their critics in GAMclaimed this argument was mere rationalization.

During the conflict years, GAM had been remarkablyunified and disciplined, unlike many comparableinsurgencies. The movement’s military commanders inthe field were loyal to the leaders exiled in Sweden anddeferred to them on political matters. Now, the oldergroup’s endorsement of Hasbi caused a dramaticbreakdown of this unity. Many of GAM’s former fieldcommanders, younger men who were now organized in the Aceh Transitional Committee (KPA), felt that theywere being railroaded into supporting Hasbi-Humam.Their opposition reflected frustrations over issues thathad been building up since the beginning of the peaceprocess and resentment over what they saw asautocratic behaviour by the older leaders. They alsoviewed as a betrayal the idea that GAM should enter acoalition with a candidate supported by a national party.

The divisions came to a head immediately after a GAMmeeting to select a gubernatorial candidate in late May.In an open vote, Hasbi came a close second – but as acandidate for governor, not deputy. The winningcandidate, Nashruddin Abubakar, said he was unwillingto stand and preferred to take a back seat, advisory role.GAM’s Government Council, dominated by the olderleaders, declared that the movement would notofficially endorse any candidate, but that GAMmembers were free to stand in the election asindividuals. This freed them to back the Humam-Hasbiticket, and they did so. But the decision also opened theway for Irwandi Yusuf to stand for election as anindependent candidate. Irwandi won the back ing ofmost of the KPA district commanders and therefore ofthe majority of GAM’s structure down to the villagelevel. His running mate, Muhammad Nazar, was knownas a fearless government critic. Untainted bycooperation with ‘national’ political forces, Irwandi-Nazar were able to present themselves as heirs toGAM’s tradition of struggle and as the most likely tostand up to the national government in pushing for fullimplementation of the MoU.

At the local level, there were some bitter splits in theranks of former GAM members in the lead-up to theelections. These even spilled over into violence in some

Page 50: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

49Elections: consolidating peace

places (for example, a bus carrying Humam Hamid wasattacked during campaigning in Bireuen). Mostly,however, the campaigning proceeded peacefully.

Explaining GAM’s victory What explains the victory of Irwandi-Nazar and ofdistrict-level candidates affiliated to GAM? Severalfactors were important. First was widespread voterdisillusionment with the mainstream political partiesand their candidates, into which GAM candidates couldtap to present themselves as agents of real change. Thedisillusionment had accumulated over preceding years:while local politicians had been virtually powerless toinfluence the course of the war, Aceh’s population hadbecome deeply mired in the poverty caused by theconflict and the province had earned a reputation asone of the most corrupt in Indonesia. GAM candidatesalso made promises of accelerated economicdevelopment, improved infrastructure, more jobs andbetter government services central to their campaignmessages. Some of their promises lacked credibility tomore sophisticated urban audiences: according to twowitnesses interviewed by the author, the GAMcandidate for bupati in North Aceh, Ilyas Hamid,publicly stated at one campaign event that hisgovernment would finance health and educationservices for the local population by printing money. But these promises resonated powerfully in poor ruralcommunities where people felt neglected by thegovernment and where local GAM commanders wereoften admired for their honesty and for having ledaustere lifestyles during the guerrilla years.

A second factor was the movement’s superiororganization. During the conflict years, GAM haddeveloped the highly effective political-militaryorganization it needed to run an insurgency. In manyrural districts GAM’s network was virtuallyindistinguishable from the familial and social networksthat infused rural life, with entire villages providingeither passive or active support to the guerrillas. Duringthe elections, GAM-affiliated candidates relied on thisnetwork to mobilize voters. In many places, this wasdone very systematically, with members of ‘successteams’ campaigning door-to-door. GAM candidates’teams often had far less money than rival teams, whichoften distributed cash, foodstuff or other necessities tovoters; yet such actions helped to reinforce GAM’smessage that their opponents were corrupt. Elsewhere,it was more a matter of former GAM commandersmak ing it known publicly to people in ‘their’communities where their loyalties lay, and this wasenough for many GAM base areas to vote en bloc.Tellingly, it was the gubernatorial candidates who hadthe back ing of the major part of GAM’s former militarywing in the KPA who were victorious on election day.

Importantly, too, this organization worked hardest andbest in the rural areas where most of the populationlived. Hence, in East Aceh, members of the ‘successteam’ of the former guerrilla leader Muslim Hasballahbegan by systematically assessing likely support inindividual villages and appointing campaign organizersfor each village. They hardly bothered to campaign inthe towns and ‘along the main roads.’ Muslim did notcarry the vote in the towns or in villages near urbancentres, but he won convincingly in rural areas and theinterior. Likewise, in West Aceh, the successful GAM-affiliated candidate for bupati told the author that hehad emphasized during his campaign that, “if I amelected I will emphasize development of the villagesfirst, from the grassroots first. This is because the rootsof rebellion in the past were always in the villages. Inthe interior, they are all GAM, in the towns, they werepublic servants.”

Finally, GAM-affiliated candidates did well because theywere able to present a message which melded supportfor the peace process with stress on continuity withtheir past struggle. GAM candidates knew that theirpromise to abandon the independence goal wascentral to the Helsink i peace deal, and they were carefulnot to violate this pledge during the election campaign.Indeed, they presented the Helsink i MoU as the fruit ofGAM’s struggle and emphasized that GAM was bestplaced to safeguard it. But they also did not shy awayfrom evok ing memories of their old struggle. In electioncampaign rallies witnessed by the author (in Bireuen inJune 2007 and South Aceh in November 2007), localheroes of the guerrilla campaign as well as GAMsymbols and songs featured prominently.

Patterns of voter support The victory of GAM-affiliated candidates seeminglyresolves the question of whether or to what extent themovement had been a popular insurgency. During theconflict years, analysts had debated to what extent GAMhad secured its goals by intimidation and coercion ofthe rural population. While violence of course did formpart of GAM’s repertoire of behaviour (and there wereeven some scattered reports of GAM intimidation ofvoters in 2006), it is very unlikely that, had themovement relied primarily on coercion in the past, itsleaders would have won so handsomely in the polls.

The geographic breadth of the support was alsostrik ing. Irwandi-Nazar carried the vote in 15 out of theprovince’s 21 districts. GAM-affiliated candidates, notsurprisingly, did best in areas where the movement hadbeen strongest during the insurgency: east coastdistricts that had been GAM base areas since the 1970swere won resoundingly by GAM candidates (Bireuenand North Aceh by Irwandi-Nazar and Pidie by Humam-

Page 51: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Hasbi). Irwandi-Nazar also won convincingly in areas onthe west coast that had been conflict hot spots sincethe late 1990s, notably Aceh Jaya and South Aceh.

GAM’s votes were generally much lower in urban areaswhere the insurgency had been weak. They also wereless successful in the less-developed, more sparselypopulated and remote districts of the interior and thesouth-west, where populations were also moreethnically heterogeneous than in the predominantlyethnically Acehnese GAM strongholds. Politics in thesemore remote areas also tends to resemble those inother backwoods parts of Indonesia, with locally-powerful bureaucrats, business people and other‘strongmen’ retaining considerable political influence.

This phenomenon partly accounts for one strik ing butrarely discussed aspect of the election results: thediscrepancy between the gubernatorial and district-level votes. In 8 of the 17 districts where Irwandi-Nazaror Humam-Hasbi won the gubernatorial vote, non-GAMcandidates were elected as bupati or mayor. Forexample, in Aceh Besar, the district surrounding BandaAceh, Irwandi-Nazar came first with 30 per cent of thevote in the gubernatorial poll, but the victor in thebupati race was Bukhari Daud, a respected academicnominated by PAN with 26 per cent. In other words,many voters who backed GAM-aligned candidates forgovernor voted for GAM’s rivals at the district level.

This does not necessarily mean that the Irwandi-Nazarcampaign was better organized than campaigns for thedistrict-level GAM candidates; on the contrary, often thecampaigns were run by the same people and wereindistinguishable. Instead, the discrepancy illustrates therelevance of the old axiom, ‘all politics are local.’ When itcame to choosing district heads, voters had a choicebetween candidates who were often well-known andinfluential locally. Voters often knew personally bupatiand mayoral candidates, or were linked to them bypatronage ties. Sub-districts were often carried bywhoever was the ‘hometown candidate.’ In contrast,when voters cast votes for the governor of the province,they were thinking more about Aceh’s wider interests,identity and relations with Jakarta. At this Aceh-widelevel, GAM’s appeal was more powerful.

Looking forward The elections did not mark the end of the peaceprocess. Risks and unfinished agenda items still remain.There is potential for future conflict between Aceh’snew leaders and the national government on issuesranging from how to divide natural gas revenues tohow to deal with the legacy of past human rightsabuses. The divisions within GAM which opened during

the campaign have already caused local-level violenceand could spiral if not managed carefully, especiallywhen exacerbated by conflicts over the division of theeconomic spoils provided by government.

The elections, however, did help to consolidate thepeace process in several important ways. Theydemonstrated to Aceh’s population that dramaticpolitical change was possible. They also helped formermembers of GAM to integrate into Indonesia’s governingstructures, and begin to abandon their previous postureof opposing them from the outside. Elections alsoencouraged GAM leaders to turn their attention towardthe mundane and technical issues of economicdevelopment that concerned voters, and away from themore elemental issues of identity and ethnic pride thathad motivated GAM in the past. Even the divisions whichopened up within the movement during the electionswere arguably a healthy sign of the movement’stransition toward ‘normal’ democratic politics.

50 Accord 20

Page 52: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

51Perspectives on post-agreement experiences

Tarmizi, Director of theAceh People’s Forum

When I was a student I joinedthe anti-Suharto movement.During martial law I escaped toMalaysia where I worked withthe Aceh refugee centre. I am now in Banda Acehand the Director of the Aceh People’s Forum, anumbrella NGO in Aceh which works on politicalissues, development, and civilian participation.

Aceh’s current political problems are around theformation of GAM as a political party and alsoaround GAM’s lack of inclusiveness. There is afeeling that those who feel excluded would fomentrebellion. It would be very dangerous if thegovernment and GAM leaders do not solve thisproblem. I think the Indonesian government iscontributing to splits in GAM, think ing that it willmake them weak. But it is not really like that. Afterthey split there will be many factions and each willrecruit other people not previously involved.

The reintegration programme only benefits theelite in GAM. This will have a big impact onhorizontal conflict at village level… I think theyhave to change the programmes – do regionaldevelopment in areas affected by the conflict, makeinfrastructure, make small-scale economic activity,but now they only make a priority of some victims.

There are not enough civil society activistsparticipating. Intellectual civil society is not allowedto contribute. GAM has a stagnant programme –their only programme was independence. Therewas a long-term process of building GAMcombatants’ awareness of the goal of anindependent Aceh. The peace process stopped this so now they have no idea how to makedevelopment run well in Aceh within Indonesianlaw and government. We need to change theirthink ing. We have to supply training, bring them ideas.

Rusyidah H. Mahmud,from Bireuen

After my two brothers werek illed, I was approached by GAMleaders to join the movementand I received two months’military training in 2000. I joined GAM because I wanted to defend Aceh and the dignity ofAcehnese and to avenge the k illing of my family. I don’t want Aceh to ever beoppressed again.

Because of the peace process I can return to beingan ordinary person again and live peacefully. I canalso work and start my small business. I am veryhappy with the peace process. But my concern ismany people have not been looked after. Somepeople have received aid, but many others havenot. I got some money from reintegration. I got Rp.10 million to start a small business. I have alreadyenrolled in a course for fashion and mak ing clothes.I hope to receive a grant so I can build a businessusing the sk ills I learned from the course.

Since I joined this co-operative with TengkuNashiruddin, we have organized and got help. Butmany other female former combatants have notreceived any attention. In general, femalecombatants have not received help, especially inthis area. I did hear some other female combatantswere helped in other regions.

Not all things have been satisfactory. Not manypromises have been fulfilled. Especially in thecontext of justice, the k ids of my late brothers havenot received any assistance. It seems like there is nofuture for them.

Perspectives on post-agreement experiences

Page 53: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

52 Accord 20

The politicalprocess in Aceh a new beginning?

Aguswandi

A ceh has become the most politically dynamicspace in Indonesia as a result of new politicallandscapes engendered by the 2005

Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). There isnowhere else in the country where a former rebel cancompete in an election to become governor, where aformer political prisoner can become director of amajor agency such as the Aceh Reintegration Board(BRA), or where former insurgents and their supporterscould become district heads and mayors (bupati). Thispolitical dynamism has transformed the context inAceh and Indonesia at large. Initiatives driving thepeace settlement in Aceh have established importantprecedents for contexts elsewhere in the country. Some have advocated the deployment of conflicttransformation strategies used in Aceh in West Papua.The Acehnese example has also encouraged thepossibility of independent candidates without partyaffiliation standing for – and winning – elections. It hasalso promoted discussion on the possibility of localpolitical parties being established not only in Aceh, butanywhere in Indonesia.

From rebels to administratorsThe peace process in Aceh received a significant boostwhen in 2006 Irwandi, a former Free Aceh Movement(GAM) rebel, was elected the new governor. Despite theemergence of a split within GAM’s leadership, theelections encouraged the political reintegration ofmany former combatants into society. Irwandi’s electionsignified the end of an old way of life, an old politics,and the beginning of new alternatives. Former GAMcombatants, sk illed in guerrilla warfare, now facedifferent tests of their sk ills as administrators,government officials and representatives of the people.

Political realities nonetheless challenge thistransformation of the rebel into the administrator.Although Irwandi has a strong, democratic mandate as the governor of Aceh, at the same time he has noexperience of public office and is not supported byeither a political party or the Acehnese parliament. Thisabsence of support has resulted in significant delays, forexample, in securing parliamentary approval of theprovincial draft budget. Within GAM, Irwandi alsocontinues to lack the full support of the top leadership,especially those from Malik ’s camp. However, thissituation has improved with the progress of the overallreconciliation process within GAM.

Reform of Aceh’s administrative structures and theofficials who staff the apparatus is one of GovernorIrwandi’s imperatives. Among the many realities thatofficials must face in the new situation is the mostdifficult reality of all – their familiarity and ease with theold situation. The government apparatus in Aceh hasnot gone through any significant reform, turnover of

Acehnese read local morning newspapers declaring the results of the governor election in Banda Aceh, December 2006.Source: Reuters/Tarmizy Harva

Page 54: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

53The politica l process in Aceh

personnel or modernization; in short, the way thingsare done now is the way they were done before.However, there was a significant breakthrough with thehighly competitive and open selection process of theheads of the dinas (government sector agencies). Theseimprovements have remained isolated at the top level,however, and have as yet to filter down to lower levels.

The weak capacity of local government is even moredemonstrable at some of the district (kabupaten) levels.The 23 districts of Aceh province, seven of which were won by former GAM members, have differentcapacities. In most districts the head of theadministration, who in practice exercises a wide marginof autonomy from central authority at the local level, isrunning the kabupaten under a regime of ‘business asusual’. The ability to absorb the peace process, to takethe initiative and to implement real change as theresult of the political settlement offered by the MoU isvery difficult to discern at this level. This situation iscompounded by the fact that governance assistance isavailable predominantly at provincial, not district, level,while real power is exercised predominantly at district,not provincial, level.

Former anti-separatist groupsAceh’s provincial government has also faced challengesfrom former anti-separatist groups established duringthe conflict era. Most of these groups are affiliated to anumbrella association called PETA (Pembela Tanah Air,‘homeland defenders’). Like former GAM members,members of groups affiliated to PETA have also receivedassistance from the BRA. However, there are no parallelprocesses of change transforming PETA into a politicalparty or other institutionalized entity; rather, as before,PETA’s constituent groups continue to pursue theircollective interests. The fact that the Aceh TransitionalCommittee (KPA) is a very visible player catering to theneeds of demobilized GAM members gives even lessincentive to groups within PETA to disband and ceasetheir existence. In the longer term both KPA and PETAhave the potential to contribute to renewed conflict ifthe transformation of both groups is not organizedproperly. Many figures associated with PETA nownumber among the advocates of splitting the provinceof Aceh into new territorial units (ALA/ABAS; see below).

Splitting AcehA key challenge to peace in Aceh is the proposal tosubdivide Aceh by creating new provinces – the so-called ALA/ABAS provinces. Proponents of the changeare mainly composed of elites from the highlands ofAceh – Central Aceh, South East Aceh and BenarMeriah. In 2005 while government representatives andGAM leaders met in Helsink i to labour on the peaceagreement, these elites met in Jakarta to strengthen

their demands for a new province called Aceh LeuserAntara (ALA). They have recently continued to promotethe idea in the Indonesian parliament through thenationalist Democratic Party of Indonesia.

These demands are rooted in the perception that thecurrent process is neither politically nor economically intheir favour. The MoU defined Aceh’s borders as thosedetermined in July 1950, which include the centralhighlands as part of Aceh’s territory. The government’sreintegration program, while allocated huge amounts of money for economically empowering former GAMcombatants through the BRA fund, is not accessible tothem. This has fuelled anger, resentment and even theaccusation that the government is discriminating againstits “own true sons and daughters of the Republic”.

To be fair, some of their arguments about the under-development of the central highlands are partly true.Although the central highlands and west coast of Aceh are places abundantly rich in natural resources, as yet they produce very little. Yet this is not sufficientcause for further territorial adjustment. An effectivestrategy for meeting demands for development in the central highlands in ways compatible with thebroader prosperity and peace of Aceh as a whole isurgently needed.

Political partiesThe future of Aceh and its celebrated peace process areintegrally linked to the process of GAM’s transformationfrom an armed group into a political movement. In May2008 GAM, together with 11 local political parties, waslegalized as a formal political party that can compete inlocal elections. The decision to establish a political partyshows that former GAM members have the aspirationand intention to participate in a normalized, democraticpolitical process. This is a significant gauge ofimprovement and the implementation of the MoU.

Aceh nonetheless still faces the challenge of discussingsubstantive issues. GAM and other local political partiesmust rise to the challenge of talk ing about theeconomy, education, governance and a range of otherthings crucial to the future of Aceh and Acehnesesociety. They have also to compete with ideas fromother political parties and civil society groups and toconvince others of their own ideas in political debate.Overall this is the best scenario for the conflicttransformation in Aceh. The 2009 election will be thefirst opportunity for this sort of constructivecompetition between both national and local politicalparties. Some early polls have suggested that localpolitical parties will be popular. While this may be thecase, popularity will only be sustained if political partiesare able to address the populace with effectiveplatforms for development.

Page 55: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

54 Accord 20

The challengesof reintegrationin Aceh Lina Frödin

The MoU and reintegration The August 2005 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)between the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and theFree Aceh Movement (GAM), included several clauses(under heading 3.2) on ‘reintegration into society’.Under the terms of the MoU reintegration assistancewas to be focused on three key groups: GAM ex-combatants and supporters, amnestied politicalprisoners and civilians affected by the conflict, termed‘victims of the conflict’. A national reintegration fund,established by the central government but managedby the provincial government of Aceh, was mandatedto cover economic facilitation, employment, allocationof suitable farming land and social security benefits forincapacitated individuals. In the MoU the GoI alsocommitted itself to funding the rehabilitation ofproperty damaged and destroyed in the conflict;central government funding allocated for reintegration,moreover, was both forthcoming and significant atapproximately !68 million, allocated in three phases2005-2007.

When almost three decades of armed and politicalstruggle ended in 2005 there were few sectors in theAcehnese society unaffected by the conflict. Thenumber of ex-GAM combatants, active supporters and associated dependents has been estimated atapproximately 25,000 people, a figure far in excess ofthe 3000 armed combatants claimed by GAM duringthe peace negotiations (itself a figure related to the 840weapons that GAM agreed to submit, a quantificationof weaponry approved by the GoI). This raised the issueof how to distribute reintegration funds among a muchlarger population of ex-combatants and supportersthan originally envisioned. Political prisoners grantedamnesty after the signing of the MoU amounted to afurther 2000. Arriving at a number for the thirdcategory of ‘victims of conflict’ and defining thisconcept proved to be more challenging. This articleidentifies problems in defining and identifying both the beneficiaries and precise function of reintegrationassistance, the impact of parallel post-tsunamireconstruction efforts, and institutional problemshampering a comprehensive reintegration process.

The Aceh Reintegration Agency (BRA)In February 2006 the Acehnese provincial governmentestablished the Aceh Reintegration Board (BRA, BadanReintegrasi Aceh). Its mandate is regulated bygubernatorial decree but its activities are closelyfollowed and directed by Indonesia’s nationaldevelopment planning agency, BAPPENAS.

One of the immediate issues confronting BRA wasestablishing who would be entitled to reintegration

Lina Frödin worked for the European

Union in Aceh from 2005 - 2008 as an

expert on reintegration and

peacebuilding. She previously worked

on human rights issues in Aceh and on

the West Bank.

Former militants of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM)stay at their post, which also acts as their residence, in

Leupung, Aceh, April 2006.Source: Reuters/Tarmizy Harva

Page 56: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

55The ch a llenges of reintegration in Aceh

assistance. This led directly to the question of what areintegration programme was aiming to achieve inAceh. Was the aim compensation, providing reparationsfor the loss or hardship suffered by particular individuals,and if so to what extent? Or was the aim to enhancelonger-term social and economic opportunities forvulnerable groups whose vulnerability could make themspoilers? A compensation programme would allocatereparations to all those suffering losses regardless oftheir socio-economic situation. Upon payment theprogramme would be complete. By contrast areintegration programme would aim to improve thesocio-economic situation of former combatants andvictims of the conflict at risk of resorting to violence orincapacitated as a result of the conflict, and would relyon an individual needs assessment. Targeting andprioritization criteria for reintegration assistance wouldrely on these needs assessments.

The who? questionEx-combatants Early in the peace process GAM was ambivalent aboutthe concept of reintegration, arguing that its membershad never been dislocated from their society andtherefore needed no ‘re-introduction.’ On the contraryGAM members saw themselves as the defenders ofAcehnese society. At various times and locations GAMhad established shadow governments and in alldistricts there had been a shadow GAM governor.However, by 2005 many, particularly younger,combatants had very limited or no education or workexperience. Many were severely traumatized byextremely stressful experiences, still carried bullets intheir bodies or had other conflict-related disabilities

restricting their capacity for work. Due to theirsocialization into military life many Acehnese men arefamiliar with weaponry and a communal existencewhere following orders, solidarity and loyalty are thebedrock of social cohesion. While direct orders requireno consensus, all wider issues relating to the whole unit were determined through popular opinion. Undersuch circumstances the transition to civilian life can be challenging, and without proper training andsustainable integration into local economies,reintegration efforts run the risk of failure. Someobservers believe that Acehnese civilians still haveaccess to weaponry, in the form of residual weaponscaches held since the MoU. Familiarity with and accessto this weaponry can represent a desperate choice forformer combatants left alienated and destitute after thecessation of hostilities.

‘Victims of the conflict’ Defining, conceptualizing and identifying civiliansaffected by the conflict proved to be a majorundertak ing. Most people living in Aceh had beenaffected by the conflict: many had lost land, beendisplaced, recruited to provide intelligence underduress or simply assaulted. Questions abounded: wassomeone facially scarred following an incident relatedto the conflict a victim of the conflict? Where shouldthe line be drawn? Being limited by the budget and the political sensitivity surrounding Aceh’s relationshipwith Jakarta, the BRA did not manage to define,conceptualize or identify victims of the conflict in anysatisfactory way. Rather, the BRA kept the categorybroad and undefined. Significantly, this hazy definitionstill allowed for the exclusion of one group: womensuffering rape as an act of war. Social taboos and

Page 57: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

56 Accord 20

stigmatization of rape limited reporting of rape to theBRA, which had not established special mechanisms foraddressing such sensitive issues.

The what? questionA second key issue was defining what reintegrationassistance would entail and what ‘successful’reintegration would look like: reparations for lossesinflicted by the conflict or the creation of longer-termopportunities. The BRA established two componentswithin its structure, the socio-cultural and economicdepartments, indicating that its programming wasintended to go beyond cash grants. Due to timeconstraints, continued central control over its spendingand the lack of capacity to design a comprehensiveneeds-based reintegration programme including land-reform, recovery of livelihoods or creation ofemployment opportunities, the BRA resorted to cashallocations for all beneficiaries. In doing so the BRAopted for the immediate gratification of vulnerablestakeholders, rather than the sustainable economicdevelopment of its target community.

Another issue is the definition of jobs or employment.According to the MoU the former combatants areentitled to ‘employment’. Yet when asked about theirwork, most ex-combatants report that they areunemployed, as are their friends. Employment for manyAcehnese means formal employment in an office,industry or being self-employed. However, when askedabout their sources of income, many report that theysell fish in the fish market, have a small chilli farm or aremembers of a cooperative – occupations not regardedas a formal job. Micro-credits and in-k ind assistancetend to consolidate the informal sector in this contextand do not necessarily contribute to ‘employment’ or a‘job’ in the interpretation given by many ex-combatantsto these words in the MoU.

Funding and post-settlement/post-tsunami contradictionsOther problems befalling the reintegration processderived from institutional funding arrangements andthe parallel process of post-tsunami reconstruction. The BRA’s capacity for long-term planning wascompromised by the annual basis of its funding. Sinceits inception the BRA has had to make decisionsbearing in mind the uncertainty of continued funding,and more significantly, it cannot commit to long-termallocations or the release of funds in tranches.

The BRA was, of course, operating in the same contextas the massive effort to reconstruct post-tsunami Aceh,and in the footprints of the leading post-tsunami

recovery agency, the Agency for Reconstruction andRehabilitation (BRR). The BRR has enjoyed incomparablymore resources and funding, a ministerial mandate andtechnical assistance from experts from all over theworld. For example, while !7000 (2007 rates) would beallocated for the reconstruction of a house destroyedby the tsunami, only !3500 would be allocated for thesame house destroyed in the conflict. Simultaneous butunequally resourced processes led to an uneven paceof reconstruction and an unnatural divide betweenpost-tsunami and post-settlement recovery atprovincial and community levels. Lessons learnt in oneprocess were not incorporated into the other, as thereintegration effort has remained largely disconnectedfrom the broader stream of planned social andeconomic development.

Agencies mandated to address post-tsunamireconstruction have been careful not to becomeinvolved in the post-conflict reconstruction. Post-tsunami funding has hitherto remained rigorouslyrestricted to tsunami-related reconstruction and hasnot allowed for integrated work addressing bothtsunami- and conflict-related damage. One of theconsequences of this bifurcation has been an unevendevelopment between the hardest-hit tsunami area,namely Banda Aceh and the south-west coast, and themost conflict-afflicted areas on the north-east coastand in the central highlands.

International organizations were initially reluctant toget involved in the reintegration process. Those that did have tended to provide either direct assistance toformer combatants and victims of conflict or technicalassistance to the BRA. Few or none have providedassistance to the local governmental agencies such asthe social affairs department, housing department,health department and so on, in order to form aprogramme linked to longer-term development andservice provision.

With funding from the European Commission, theInternational Organization for Migration (IOM) designeda reinsertion and reintegration programme for 2000amnestied prisoners and 3000 former combatants. In itsinitial phase the programme covered a health check-up,small grant, a set of clothes and toiletries; the nextphase included sk ills training and in-k ind assistance. Butas the post-tsunami recovery evolved and created anenormous labour market in Aceh, many formercombatants were hired by the BRR and becameinvolved in projects as labourers or contractors. In anumber of cases former combatants are alleged to haveextorted money from reconstruction projects or even astandard share of the contracts. Many INGO and donorreconstruction programmes have reported instances of

Page 58: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

57The ch a llenges of reintegration in Aceh

disruption to contractor construction activities invillages, usually involving violent threats againstworkers and sometimes leading to the suspension ofworks for lengthy periods. Most of these occurrencesappear to be related to the demands of individuals orsmall disaffected groups for financial gain, employmentof favoured individuals or preferential purchase ofmaterials from local cartels. Broadly speak ing, crimerates in Aceh have increased significantly since thesigning of the MoU. Illegal logging is also an emergingmarket providing quick revenues in domestic andnearby international markets.

JusticeThe question of reintegration and compensation leadsindirectly, through the payment of reparations, to thequestion of transitional justice. Reintegration funds inAceh have been used primarily for cash compensation,without formal official acknowledgments orceremonies. The MoU stipulates the establishment of aTruth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Althoughnot the main purpose of the work of TRCs, reparationpayments to victims are a common follow-up. Clearly,the payment of reparations is a process more closelylinked to justice and fact-finding than reintegration.

The inclusion of the concept of ‘victims of conflict’ inthe MoU’s section on reintegration has somewhatblurred the two processes. Victims of conflict arearguably not primarily in need of reintegration formallyunderstood as a process aiming for stability andsecurity, following disarmament and demobilization. A reintegration process commonly includes income-generating activities, basic health provisions and otherinterventions for former combatants in order tofacilitate their transition from combatants to normalcivilians. Reintegration does not necessarily target thepoorest or most economically vulnerable, but shouldtarget individuals prone to resorting to violence whomay jeopardize the peace process.

It is indeed justified to facilitate social and economicopportunities for all those who have suffered significantlosses, and, as established in the MoU, their lossesshould be recognized in a TRC if they so wish. Now,what is happening in Aceh is something in-between.The BRA transfers between !300 and !1000 to thenatural heirs of the deceased or missing, the disabled,the internally displaced and those orphaned by theconflict. Former combatants receive !2500, whereaspolitical prisoners, GAM supporters and militiamembers receive !1000.

BRA, being an ad hoc reintegration agency, distributingfunds allocated by central government at provincial

level, needs to be clear about its function and mandateas well as its limitations. By the end of the reintegrationprocess, the GoI can claim that it has also fulfilled itscommitment to reconciliation by allocating funding tovictims of the conflict, and could thereby argue thatthere is no need for a separate truth and reconciliationprocess. The reintegration process has therefore beenbalanced between the GoI’s wariness of giving moneyto its former enemy, the BRA’s lack of vision and goals,and longer term needs for the solidification of thepeace process.

ConclusionsAlthough gloomy conclusions might be drawn fromthe above analysis and much indeed remains to bedone in terms of reconciliation, socio-economicdevelopment, security sector reform and therelationship between central government and the localAcehnese administration, it has to be acknowledgedthat the progress achieved since the signing of theMoU is significant, not to say dramatic.

For many ex-combatants the transition has notnecessarily been easy and many recall with nostalgiathe camaraderie, loyalty to the movement andfriendships forged in war. Ex-combatants are nowchallenged by dichotomies between hierarchical and communal loyalties of the conflict era and newimperatives of individual responsibility and providingfor families. Post-settlement varieties of criminality(extortion, robbery, illegal logging, irregularinvolvement in contracting procedures) are rampantand challenge the promotion of Aceh as a stable andsafe area, also in the eyes of potential investors.

Legitimate leadership and the development of anAcehnese cultural identity will be key for the furtherconsolidation of the peace process, including thedevelopment of a pluralistic yet integrated Acehnesesociety. The absence of armed vertical conflict does notnecessarily mean that the root causes are resolved, onlythat the tools are different. When asked whether theywould take up arms again and under whatcircumstances, ex-combatants commonly state thatshould their former commanders order them to do so,should the central government cheat them again,should Aceh not receive what it is entitled to in terms ofcontrol over its economy and resources, they would beready to fight again. However, when asked to whatextent they identify as combatants or “normal” civilians,most of the former combatants said that they feelthree-quarters normal civilian and one-quarter formercombatant, and emphasized the enormous tollrenewed conflict would take on them as individualsand on the Acehnese as a people.

Page 59: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

58 Accord 20

Patrick Barron is a Social Development

Specialist at the World Bank, Indonesia.

Since 2005, he has managed the Bank’s

programme of support to the Aceh

peace process.

Managing the resources for peacereconstruction andpeacebuilding in Aceh

Patrick Barron

T he reconstruction of damaged infrastructure andthe rehabilitation of the economy in areaspreviously affected by civil war are vital from both

a developmental and security perspective. Conflictdestroys infrastructure, increases poverty (although itmay enrich some) and affects the delivery of basicservices. Capital flight is compounded by thesuspension of new inward investment. Breakdowns insocial cohesion and trust make it even more difficult fordevelopment to occur. Poverty and lack of economicopportunities, and accompanying mistrust ofgovernment, can in turn fuel a return to conflict. Thedifficulties of re-starting economies after conflicts end,and of providing a real peace dividend thatdemonstrates progress on the ground, is one reasonwhy, according to the World Bank, 44 percent ofcountries reaching the end of civil war return to conflictwithin five years. Getting the economy going, creatingjobs (especially for former combatants) and rebuildingdamaged or destroyed private and public infrastructureare thus key conflict prevention activities in theaftermath of civil wars.

The need for post-conflict reconstructionin AcehAceh is no exception. Conflict devastated Acehnese life;and economic reconstruction and development arecrucial for sustainable peace in Aceh. The thirty-yearconflict between the Government of Indonesia and theFree Aceh Movement (GAM) resulted in an estimated15,000 deaths, the displacement of over 100,000, andwidespread trauma. World Bank studies highlightsevere economic impacts. Thousands of houses weredamaged or destroyed. During the 1989-98 period, 527schools were burned or destroyed, and an estimated880 closed due to damage in the first half of 2003 afterthe collapse of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.Twenty-two per cent of village health clinics weredamaged by the conflict. Between 11-20 per cent of alltransport infrastructure in Aceh was directly damagedby the conflict and similar damage was recorded forwater and electricity infrastructure. Lack ofmaintenance, closely related to the presence of conflict,resulted in even more damage.

Poverty rates unsurprisingly increased significantly,from 14.8 per cent in 1998 to 28.4 per cent in 2004. By2005, poverty in rural areas stood at 36.2 per cent. Acehis the only province in Indonesia where poverty ratescontinued to increase after 2000, turning it into one ofthe poorest areas of the country despite its abundantnatural resources (including large oil and gas reserves).In 1990, Aceh contributed 3.6 per cent to Indonesia’sgross domestic product; by 2001, this had fallen to 2.2 per cent. The conflict seriously reduced inwardinvestment and markets were distorted: 18.5 per cent

Page 60: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

59Managing the resources for peace

of village markets were damaged and many more werelargely empty because farmers were unable to tendtheir land or travel to the urban centres.

The conflict has its roots in discontent over Aceh’sfailure to prosper despite its natural wealth, related toperceptions of exploitation and failed promises byJakarta. The peace process devolves significant politicalauthority and economic resources to Aceh whileensuring sovereignty remains with the Indonesianstate. If this settlement does not result in increasedeconomic prosperity felt locally, there is every chancethat over time people will become disillusioned.Anywhere between 15,000 and 25,000 former GAMcombatants and civilian members are look ing for jobs,with expectations running high. Many other conflict-affected persons feel they are also due somerecompense after the conflict, if not a new house, atleast the opportunity for salaried employment.However, unemployment was at 12 per cent in 2006.Tack ling these problems is imperative if peace is to last in Aceh.

The tsunami of aidThe Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004, whichk illed approximately 167,000 in Aceh alone, led toadditional devastation. According to a World Bank /Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency study,500,000 lost their homes; 3000 k ilometres of roads wereimpassable; 2000 school buildings were damaged; over60,000 hectares of farming land was damaged. Yet the

tsunami also helped fertilize the seeds of peace thathad been sown by Indonesia’s newly-elected Presidentand Vice-President. It provided an additional moralimperative for both sides to find a peaceful solution,further fuelled by the global spotlight suddenly fallingon an area previously largely shut off to foreigners.

The tsunami also brought the global aid machine toAceh. US$8 billion of aid (5.3 billion of it from outside ofIndonesia) was pledged for reconstruction. By January2006, some 3645 non-governmental organizations had registered at the United Nations’ compound.Importantly, unlike many post-disaster contexts, almostall the pledged aid has actually arrived. With damagefrom the tsunami estimated at US$6.1 billion, adjustedfor inflation, that leaves US$1.9 billion for ‘building backbetter’ including attending to other post-conflict needs.Nor has there been donor fatigue: new commitmentscontinue to arrive, in part driven by hopes from manythat Aceh can be a beacon and stimulus for governancereform across Indonesia.

Unusually for a post-conflict situation, the level ofresources that can be used for development purposesin Aceh will not fall after the internationals pack theirbags. As a result of the 2001 decentralization laws and asubsequent special autonomy law, Aceh alreadyreceived significant resources from Jakarta. The passingof the Law on the Governing of Aceh (LoGA), whichimplements many of the provisions of the Helsink iMoU, will result in Aceh retaining 70 per cent of ‘allcurrent and future hydrocarbon deposits and natural

fig 1.Conflict and tsunami-affectedsub-districts in AcehSource: BRR/World Bank, 2005

Page 61: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

60 Accord 20

resources in Aceh as well as in the territorial seasurrounding Aceh’ (MoU article 1.3.4). Moresignificantly, given declining oil and gas deposits, theLoGA provides for an extra 2 per cent of the DAU (thediscretionary block grant to the regions) to flow to Acehfor 15 years, starting in 2008, and an additional 1 percent for five years after, provisions included tocompensate Aceh for damage from the conflict. In all,the provincial and district government budgets in Acehare likely to amount to close to US$1.7 billion per yearand should remain stable over the next quarter of acentury. In stark contrast to countries such as Liberia,Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, lack of resources foreconomic reconstruction and development should notbe a barrier to peace enduring.

Problems with the post-conflictreconstruction effortDespite the vast resources present in post-conflictAceh, a number of factors have limited the extent towhich development and reconstruction resources arebeing effective in consolidating peace.

Inequalities between tsunami-affected and conflict-affected areasFirst, restrictions on the use of post-tsunami funds havemeant that conflict-affected areas have been less likelyto get assistance. This has resulted in large geographicdisparities, providing a potential basis for future unrest.The vast bulk of aid has been programmed in areasdirectly affected by the tsunami. The initial mandate forthe government’s Reconstruction and RehabilitationAgency (BRR) was to target only areas directly impactedby the tsunami (two narrow belts of land on Acehcoasts). The Multi-Donor Fund, which pools resourcesfrom 15 donors, has also largely limited its projects tosuch areas: only two of the projects funded to dateoperate outside the areas directly affected by thetsunami. Most bilateral aid agencies and NGOs havealmost entirely focused on tsunami-hit areas.

There are a number of reasons for this. Needs intsunami areas were great. Given the scale of thedisaster, it made sense to focus efforts on these areasfirst, especially given the fact that the conflict was stillongoing for eight months after the tsunami. Manyagencies also felt that their funds were effectively tied.NGOs (who hold around one-third of tsunamireconstruction resources) had appealed for funds fromthe public on the basis that these would be used for thetsunami response. Some governments felt restricted tousing their funds for directly-affected tsunami areasonly. The appropriation of funds in the US, for example,was specifically for tsunami reconstruction; it was felt

that it would be necessary to return to Congress if thesefunds were to be used for other purposes.

Yet the restriction of funds to tsunami areas hasinadvertently had adverse impacts. As Figure 1 shows,while there are some overlaps between areas affectedby the conflict and the tsunami, there are manyconflict-affected areas that the tsunami did not directlyhit, especially on the east coast and in the centralhighlands. Needs in these areas are great.

One consequence has been rising inequalities betweentsunami- and conflict-affected populations. A recentWorld Bank assessment shows that poverty rates havealmost fallen to pre-disaster levels in tsunami-affectedareas; in contrast, in 2005 conflict-affected areas were44 per cent more likely to be poor than average sub-districts in the province. Conflict-affected infrastructureis built back at half the speed of that damaged by thetsunami. This has an impact at the household level. Percapita consumption is markedly lower in conflict areas,as interviewees attest:

‘There is a gap [in living standards] between thetsunami-affected people and conflict victims. There is aneed to focus on the latter” (NGO, West Aceh district).

“In Nagan Raya district, there are 222 villages. Only 16were directly affected by the tsunami. The services in thetsunami areas are now very good, while in the non-tsunami areas they are not yet good” (Security Guard,Nagan Raya district).

Specific post-conflict assistance is dwarfed by thatearmarked for tsunami reconstruction: around US$230million for the former, compared to US$8 billion for thelatter. This is also resulting in poorer quality assistancein conflict-affected areas. The average house for atsunami victim now costs around US$8000. In contrast,houses provided by the Aceh Reintegration Agency(BRA) for conflict victims cost US$3500.

Rising inequalities in aid provision are starting to lead tosignificant tensions on the ground. Local level conflictsare rising, many relating to disputes over who is beingtargeted for development aid. From March 2007,development disputes have averaged almost thirty per month.

Uneven opportunities for different groupsSecond, assistance to different categories of conflict-affected people – combatants, civilian victims, displacedpersons – has been uneven. Inequalities in post-conflictaid and access to resources have caused some tensionsand may provide a basis for problems later on.

Page 62: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

61Managing the resources for peace

The vast amount of tsunami aid has createdexpectations from those affected by conflict. Yet certaingroups have benefited more than others. Manycontractors from elsewhere in Indonesia arrived soonafter the tsunami, creating an unfortunate sense formany of Javanese business profiting from Acehnesemisery. Among the biggest winners have been those inGAM with high-level connections. The December 2005local elections resulted in a GAM-affiliated governor andGAM-linked winners in over half of Aceh’s districts. Therise to political power of the GAM elite has led to manynew opportunities for educated former combatants.GAM contractor conglomerates have won largecontracts. Most notably, former GAM leader MuzakkirManaf now runs a large contractor firm, PT PulauGading. In Aceh Barat Daya district, it is alleged that theDistrict Head has allocated Rp. 12 billion (around US$1.3million) in contracts to former GAM members.

Others in GAM have received less. One of the greatestchallenges of the ‘reintegration programme’ has been thedisjuncture between the number of GAM combatantsmentioned in the MoU (3000) and the true number onthe ground. One result has been that reintegration aidpackages have been spread inequitably across GAMmembers. Both BRA’s assistance to combatants anddonor assistance (largely through the InternationalOrganization for Migration) has been channelled eitherthrough GAM commanders or to lists of combatantsprovided by them. Combatants with lower status orweaker links to commanders have seen little money.Civilian conflict victims have also had unequal access toassistance. First, those living in tsunami areas are morelikely to receive aid (many were victims twice-over, firstfrom the conflict, then from the tsunami). Second, themechanisms used for distributing assistance to victimsrisk excluding many in need. As Lina Frödin describes inher article, the BRA has been through several differentapproaches to targeting them, causing much confusion.

Experience in development programming in placesemerging from conflict across the world has shownhow perceived inequalities in assistance can lead tofresh conflict. Studies have also shown howcommunity-based approaches – which provide spacefor communities themselves to decide on resourceallocations, and which contain social controls that canhelp minimize resource capture – are much less likely tolead to violent conflict. Unfortunately, after thesuspension of the previous victims programme, theseapproaches have not been used extensively in Aceh.

Lack of capacity and transition strategyThe third major problem with the post-conflictreconstruction effort in Aceh is the relative lack ofattention paid to developing strategies for transitioningfrom immediate assistance to longer-term conflict-sensitive development programming.

Aceh is unlike most former conflict-affected areas in thatit lies within a middle-income state with internal sourcesof funds, operating markets, and a functioningbureaucracy that extends to the local level. The post-disaster and post-conflict aid machine is much less usedto operating in such contexts than in places such as SierraLeone or Sudan. In Aceh, the government has remainedin control of the tsunami and post-conflict reconstructioneffort, with internationals playing a supporting role. Whenthe extra LoGA resources come on stream, governmentfinancing of development in Aceh will far outstrip that ofthe international agencies combined.

Despite this there has been relatively little planning for the transition from the emergency and post-emergency aid model to longer-term domestically leddevelopment. A few governance programmes havestarted up and there has been initial work on thetransfer of assets built by aid agencies to governmentministries. Yet, by and large, international post-conflictand reintegration projects are still focusing ondelivering direct assistance to communities, bypassinggovernment structures. Projects are still focusing onassisting vulnerable individuals and groups, rather thanstimulating the economy as a whole. In the medium-run, efforts to support the transition of the localeconomy will be necessary to ensure sustainabledevelopment and recovery. The Multi-Donor Fund isplanning an economic financing facility, and there areplans for a new Fund focused on peacebuilding andeconomic development, but funds for this will beminimal compared to needs.

The need for a transition strategy is compounded byproblems with the Acehnese bureaucracy. Localinstitutional capacity to plan and distribute the vastfunds that will be available is extremely low. Theconflict also masked widespread corruption. Given thatthe conflict was historically driven by grievancesagainst the state and dissatisfaction with how resourceswere used, building state capacity and transparency isnecessary if conflict is not to re-emerge.

ConclusionsThere is great potential for economic reconstruction tohelp build peace in Aceh. Resources are relativelyplentiful. However, there is a risk that if these resourcesare not managed well, they could undermine peace byinequitably targeting areas or groups, by being used forunproductive investments, or if corruption or weakcapacity limits their impacts on the ground. Aidagencies have not paid enough attention to buildinglocal government systems to manage developmentresources. More support in this area will be key ifeconomic reconstruction is to contribute to peacerather than conflict in Aceh.

Page 63: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

62 Accord 20

Nazamuddin Basyah Said is a researcher

at the Syiah Kuala University and co-

founder of the Aceh Institute.

Economicinjusticecause and effect of the Aceh conflict

Nazamuddin Basyah Said

Root causes and a chaotic periodOnly two years after the discovery of the Arun naturalgas field, Hasan di Tiro declared Acehneseindependence on 4 December 1976. Natural gasproduction and exports reached their peak in 1994 andgradually declined thereafter. For some decades, theAcehnese witnessed a contrast between the lifeamenities enjoyed by the white collar workersoperating within the enclaves of PT Arun, Mobil Oil, anddownstream enterprises around Lhokseumawe andtheir surrounding slums. Export-oriented naturalresource exploitation did not generate enough jobs for less sk illed workers, and in most cases, very limiteddownstream industry linkages were created.

It was only in 2002 when the earlier special autonomylaw took effect that Aceh received a seventy per centshare of oil and natural gas revenues. For many yearspreviously the gas dollars were fully controlled by acentralized authority in Jakarta, with only around threeper cent of the total revenues from Aceh’s oil andnatural gas – all related taxes included – returned toAceh in the form of central government’s transfers tothe poor province. Infrastructure in Aceh was and ispoor. A quarter of the population lives below thepoverty line. Rich natural resources, poor infrastructureand public services, and centralized authorities,combined with poverty and lack of opportunities havebeen causes of the conflict. Some of these factors havealso been its effects. Rising levels of unemployment andpoverty, especially in rural areas, prompted theescalation of the conflict in the early 2000s. Yet theongoing conflict only made these trends worsen.

The 2004 tsunami occurred in this context. It deprivedover half a million people in Aceh of not only theirsources of income but also their household andproductive assets. They were displaced and forced to livein tents, temporary barracks or with their relatives formore than eleven months. Seventeen of Aceh’s twenty-one districts were affected and a total asset loss of US$4.4 billion – equivalent to 97 per cent of Aceh’s Gross Regional Product – was incurred. More than threequarters of the losses were incurred by the private sector.

A big push for sustainable peaceThe tsunami and the signing of the peace agreementbetween the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and theGovernment of Indonesia (GoI) on 15 August 2005marked important milestones in Aceh’s history. Giventhe influx of huge amounts of funds from internationalorganizations as well as the GoI, there are highexpectations of real changes to benefit the Acehnese.Aceh represents a unique case of how to revive andredevelop a region whose people’s infrastructure,

Marjuni Ibrahim, a former GAM member, leads 'guerrillatours' in the jungle, taking visitors with a taste forextreme hiking and an interest in Aceh's conflict. Source: Reuters/Tarmizy Harva

Page 64: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

63Economic injustice

livelihood and opportunities for economic growth werenearly totally destroyed. A strategy is needed forrecovery not only from the tsunami, but from thephysical as well as psycho-social destruction caused byboth the disaster and armed conflict.

Reconstruction efforts combined with a substantialredevelopment strategy can help ease the economicsituation and create construction and related jobs. Yetthe scale of the damage suggests that full economicrecovery will take more than the four years planned bythe government. The objective should be to changethe whole idea of Aceh’s redevelopment to promotesustainable development after the completion of thereconstruction phase. Long-lasting peace andeconomic growth become prerequisites for oneanother. This can occur as a result of massiveinvestments in infrastructure and the influx of workersto the region during the reconstruction phase, togetherwith improved knowledge and application oftechnology. The goals for this phase should includenormalized livelihoods for victims of both the tsunamiand the armed conflict, the creation of more productivejobs, increased income, and sufficient social security. Allof these will require conducive economic policies, lawenforcement, and institutional improvement. Peace willonly last if there is an improvement in the social andeconomic welfare of the Acehnese people.

A transition to sustainable growth andreintegration of GAM ex-combatantsImproved political stability and the institutionalsupports provided by international agencies havecreated the preconditions for economic growth.However, a coherent economic growth strategy is notyet in place. This would consist of a sustainable, private-sector-driven, export-oriented economy in whichproducts move up the value chain, creating moreemployment and improved productivity.

Policymakers should consistently pursue ongoing steps,such as removing the institutional barriers to growth,sustaining infrastructure investment (especially beyond2009 when the mandate of BRR, the government-established reconstruction agency, terminates),educating and training the workforce to suit acompetitive labour market, and helping expand accessof small and medium enterprises to capital and land.

The majority of GAM returnees belong to a productiveage group, with over 75 per cent aged between 18-35years. Most of them are primary and junior secondaryschool educated. School dropouts and unemployedyoung men, especially in villages, have in the past been

targeted for recruitment by GAM, and remainvulnerable. While physical reintegration, in the sensethat ex-combatants are accepted in their communities,seems to be successful, full reintegration has been lessso. If these work ing-age young men remainunemployed, there is a high risk that crime increasesand tensions rise.

Many unemployed GAM returnees depend on theirrelatives for their livelihood. A World Bank surveyindicates that 74.9 per cent of GAM returnees are notyet employed. Before joining GAM, around 30 per centof them worked as farmers and many of these peoplewho still have access to land can easily start work ingagain. However, for the majority, livelihood revival, interms of providing access to capital markets withtechnical assistance, is a major need, next to thesecurity of living in permanent housing. About half ofthem reveal that they want to be small traders. Theurgency of launching economic empowermentprogrammes targeted specifically at GAM returnees hasso far been disregarded, while attention has focused ondifficulties with the provision of Jadup (livingallowances) to around 3000 ex-combatants.

There is a whole range of activities that internationalagencies and local government can get involved in.First, there should be greater support to the AcehReintegration Board (BRA). Secondly, ex-combatantsshould be made confident of the immediate benefitsfrom the peace process. Labour-intensive projects suchas rebuilding or repairing local public infrastructurewould create cash-for-work types of temporaryemployment before more sustainable economicactivities emerge. This would be far preferable to simply distributing Jadup to the communities withoutproductive impacts. It is also easier to implementbecause it does not require an agreed list of GAM ex-combatants, which is a sensitive issue.

For longer-term impacts on the economy and welfareof the Acehnese people, and to avoid future conflict,larger-scale private investments are necessary. Acompetitive future economy would rely on whetherproducts and services provided by the private sectorare competitive in the global market. Privateinvestments will then play a greater role in creating jobsand having trick le-down effects on local businesses.Local entrepreneurship will grow and exploit theavailable opportunities in Aceh.

A long-lasting peace may not be an utopian ideal.Currently there are certainly pebbles in the shoe. Theconflict has ruined the ‘joints’ of the Acehnese economy,but the building blocks that are being created providehope for a peaceful and prosperous future.

Page 65: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

64 Accord 20

The challenge of hiddeneconomies and predationfor profit

Judith Large

B oth the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) andLaw on the Governing of Aceh (LoGA) came intobeing in a setting complicated not only by the

legacies of war and the 2004 tsunami, but alsohistorically ingrained practices which constitute Aceh’shidden, often predatory economy. For years layers ofpersonal interest and decision-making have operatedoutside any domain of scrutiny or law, due in part tostructural roots inherited from the Suharto era. TheIndonesian military (TNI) was known in Aceh as a corruptinstitution, managing a series of enterprises includingillegal logging, drug production and trafficking, andprostitution, as well as ‘security’ payments viewed bymany as extortion. There was a long-standing sayingabout serving with the military in Aceh: ‘You leave withan M-16 and return with 16 M’, referring to the military-issue rifle and Rp. 16 billion (equivalent to US$1.76million – an exaggerated estimate of the earnings ofcorrupt officers). This practice was not limited to Aceh.Soldiers posted to the conflict zone on the eastern islandof Ambon in the same period were known to smuggleout everything from exotic parrots to coral for the openmarket. The role of natural resource extraction in WestPapua is also notorious for its negative impacts.

The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) for its part was knownat times to mirror such practices. Through control ofinterior upland areas (particularly from 1998-2002)income was gained from taxing logging operations, ormore unusually active involvement in illegal logging onthe part of some GAM members themselves. Todayunemployed former GAM soldiers can find daily labourin illegal logging, which has been on the increase sincethe end of the war. Challenges for the peace processand for the future of Aceh include: the legacy ofsecurity sector business and illegal operations forfinancial gain, corruption as a way of life and the fate ofnatural resources which up to now have beenabundant in this fertile area of Sumatra.

Patterns in military self-financingMilitary self-financing as accepted practice in Indonesiaoriginated in part from the merging of professionalmilitary units and regionally based guerrillas or people’sfronts to form the first national army. This beginning lednaturally to the establishment of semi-autonomouslocalized units responsible for independent fundingand logistics arrangements. Military commercialactivities became common, even accepted, practice –not an abuse of power but convention. The TNIreceived only 30 per cent of its operating expensesfrom the national government and self-financed theremaining seventy percent. For a recent example ofthis, a study by Suzanne Burford documents the 2006defence budget as 23.6 trillion rupiah or US$2.6 billionwhereas the actual needs are estimated at US$ 6.2

An Indonesian soldier patrols at the Arun ExxonMobilCorp outside Lhokseumawe in Aceh, May 2003.Source: Reuters/Supri Supri

Page 66: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

65The cha llenge of hidden econom ies and predation for profit

billion. This ‘off-budget’ funding (extra-budgetary andunaccountable) is derived from formal military-ownedenterprises, non-institutional or informal business andmafia-like criminal activity.

Tempo Interactive documented that under the DOMperiod more than 100 military posts in theLhokseumawe Industrial Zone vicinity of theExxonMobil refinery meant the company channelingapproximately US$4000-10,000 per day to the TNI. A2003 study by Lesley McCulloch observed that duringthe war “many of the villages in the area surroundingLhokseumawe …are among the poorest in Aceh. Tooafraid to farm the fields because of the level of violencein the area, and with their infrastructure destroyed in‘sweeping’ operations by the locally based military, thecivilians suffer social and economic impoverishment asa direct result of the economic activities of the securitypersonnel in their area.”

Military self-financing thus became intrinsically linked toabuses of power, corruption and human rights violations.The conflict of interests between providing security andprofit-seeking entailed abusive and routine behavioursincluding intimidation, extortion, property seizures andprofiteering. It was common knowledge that the militaryand police were involved in various protection rackets,also controlling legal and illegal trade in fishing, drugs,coffee, peppers, logging and weapons. One visiblepractice was the levying of fees on private and publicvehicles traveling on the Banda Aceh-Medan east- andwest-coast highways by the military and police,particularly the paramilitary police. Recent evidenceindicates that in the immediate aftermath of the MoUthere was a restructuring of corruption and rent-seeking,rather than any significant reduction in such activity. Itshould be recognized that the current Indonesiangovernment is making efforts to control military businessactivities nation-wide. Under 2004 legislation militaryfoundations will now be supervised by the DefenceDepartment with the Indonesian government takingover all military business holdings by 2009.

Timber reserves and the rise of illegal loggingAceh is rich in tropical hardwood trees, with timbersecond only to oil and natural gas in importance as anexport. The World Bank and the Indonesiangovernment estimated in the late 1990s that 69 percent of Aceh’s total land area remained forested. Withcurrent rates of deforestation, predictions are thatremaining forests could be only 40 per cent by 2010.

Long an economically and politically significant exportcommodity for Indonesia, demand for wood wasfuelled internally by reconstruction after the tsunami.

Under both Sukarno and Suharto timber concessionswere rewards for political cooperation, initially extendedto military elites and locally influential individuals inexchange for alliances with emerging political parties.Destructive logging has cleared vast rainforests to feedtimber-based industries exporting plywood, pulp, paper,furniture and other wood products to consumercountries. A study prepared by the Down to Earthproject of the International Campaign for EcologicalJustice in Indonesia concluded: ‘[t]he forests are beingfelled to make way for large-scale commercialpulpwood and oil palm plantations; for mining, gas andoil projects; for roads and industry. The profits go to theinvestors, while local communities are left to bear thesocial and environmental scars.’

Lines of authority, bureaucracy, and corruptionSidney Jones points out that enforcing regulationagainst illegal logging is complicated by the complexdecentralization measures approved by the Indonesianparliament as early as 1999. In Aceh, additional layers ofconfusion appeared with the special autonomylegislation in 2001, the tsunami in 2004 and efforts torevise the special autonomy law in 2006. It is not alwaysclear who has actual authority for enforcing the lawagainst illegal logging at different levels of government.Even at district level the division of labor between thelocal forestry office and police is not always clear, andthe result is inaction. Where there is a will to address theproblem, corruption can render measures ineffective.Corruption takes many forms: in an International CrisisGroup study, Sidney Jones observes patterns of‘[b]uying and selling logging permits to unscrupulousentrepreneurs; seizing illegal logs and then resellingthem; falsely declaring illegal logs to be legally logged,for a price.’ There are additional problems withIndonesian national bureaucracy and sheer red tape,with as many as 21 transactions in differentdepartments required to get permits to log legally.

In 2006 it was estimated that local government in Acehreceived revenues five times higher than beforedecentralization in 1999. In the same year, two studies,one conducted by the Central Bank and another byPadjajaran University, concluded that as a result ofdecentralization and special autonomy Aceh wasbecoming one of the most corrupt rather than one ofthe richest provinces in Indonesia. Many people inIndonesia are aware of the danger of ‘KKN’ - collusion,corruption and nepotism – being decentralized ratherthan reformed. This will be a long-term challengecalling for structural change; national reform in militarypractices, new governance with accountability andtransparency in Aceh, and the creation of legitimatesources of income and gain.

Page 67: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

66 Accord 20

Faisal Hadi has been Executive Director

of the Human Rights Coalition (Koalisi

HAM), a leading human rights advocacy

group in Aceh, since 2003.

Human rightsand justice in Acehthe long and winding road

Faisal Hadi

F or the people of Aceh, telling the story of theirdaily lives during the conflict means talk ing abouthuman rights violations. Over the course of its

thirty-year long history, armed conflict in Aceh wascharacterized by appalling violations of the humanrights of the civilian population at the hands of theIndonesian military (TNI), especially during the MilitaryOperations Zone (DOM) era (1989-1998). Althoughstatistics are still disputed, some indication of the scaleand nature of human rights abuses is clear from datacollected by the Aceh Reintegration Board (BRA). In June2007 the BRA noted that some 33,000 people had beenkilled over three decades of conflict. Data gathered in 17 districts of Aceh by a joint International Organizationfor Migration (IOM) and Harvard Medical School surveyshowed that 35 per cent of informants had reportedhaving to flee burning buildings, 24 per cent hadexperienced forced labour and 40 per cent hadexperienced the expropriation or destruction ofproperty. Other serious human rights abuses, such asrape, were widely attested during the conflict butremain significantly under-reported in official statistics.The extent to which the Free Aceh Movement (GAM)was also responsible for abuses is debated, but it isknown that they executed suspected collaborators,pressured non-Acehnese migrants to leave the province,and extracted money from the general population.

Securing a space for human rightsAceh initially remained isolated from the successfulpromotion of human rights elsewhere in the countryfrom the late 1990s. In 1998, pro-democracy activists inJakarta forced President Suharto out of power, and inAceh the demand to bring those responsible for humanrights violations to justice was voiced out loud by civilsociety. But while the collapse of Suharto’s New Orderbrought significant new political freedoms and humanrights reform at the national level, such positive changewas barely felt in Aceh as the conflict re-ignited. Instead, human rights abuses worsened as the conflictraged on, culminating in a repressive period of martiallaw in 2003-04.

Although national law No. 26/2000 on Human RightsCourts established four human rights courts inIndonesia, including one in Medan in the neighbouringprovince of North Sumatra, no cases of violations inAceh were heard in it. Only a handful of soldiers havefaced justice, such as the 24 convicted by a joint civil-military court in May 2000 for a mass k illing of civiliansin Beutong Ateuh in 1999; no senior military officer has been prosecuted by the Human Rights Courts forany violation.

Indonesians stage a peaceful rally to protest the extention of martial law in Acehand a plan to break up Papua into several provinces, Jakarta 2003.

Source: Reuters/Dadang Tri

Page 68: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

67Hum an rights and justice in Aceh

Human rights in the peace processThe situation in Aceh finally changed with the tsunamiof December 2004, which focused the minds of thewarring parties and the international community onreaching a workable peace agreement. Yet despitebeing a key Acehnese grievance during the conflictyears, human rights abuses were not very conspicuouson the agenda of the Helsink i peace negotiationsbetween GAM and the government. Both parties hadvarying levels of anxiety about committing themselvesto robust justice measures, whilst the mediatorpreferred to allow the parties to set their own agenda.Those voices in favour of more extensive justicemechanisms, such as civil society human rightsactivists, had little opportunity to influence the process.

Nevertheless, when the negotiations resulted in theMemorandum of Understanding (MoU) in August 2005and were accompanied by an end to violence on theground, it opened another pathway of hope forsurvivors. Unlike previous peace accords, levels ofviolence dropped to very low levels as soon asimplementation began, stimulating high expectationsof redress for past violations. In the MoU, the principalmeans for redressing human rights violations wereembodied in two articles: article 2.2, ‘A Human RightsCourt will be established for Aceh’; and article 2.3,

’A Commission for Truth and Reconciliation will beestablished for Aceh by the Indonesian Commission ofTruth and Reconciliation with the task of formulatingand determining reconciliation measures.’

Despite the strik ing lack of detail in these articles,Acehnese human rights activists welcomed them. Theapparent progressiveness of the MoU was cemented inits commitment that the Government of Indonesiawould adhere to the UN International Covenants onCivil and Political Rights and Economic, Social andCultural Rights (ICCPR and ICESCR; article 2.1). Just asthe government’s ratification of the ICCPR and ICESCRprovides the basis for altering national laws inaccordance with them, the MoU provided similargrounds for revising local laws in accordance with theCovenants (article 1.4.2).

Among other positive steps were: • the call for conventional identity cards to be issued

to all Aceh residents (article 1.2.5), ending thediscriminatory KTP merah putih (ID cards) used undermartial law, which each resident of Aceh was obligedto carry and triggered discrimination againstAcehnese outside Aceh;

• the provision to try any military personnelcommitting civilian crimes before civil courts in Aceh(article 1.4.5);

Page 69: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

68 Accord 20

• special human rights training for police personnelconducted in Aceh or overseas (article 4.12).

Under the chapter on ‘amnesty and reintegration intosociety’ there were several provisions related to justice.Articles on amnesty provided that ‘political prisonersand detainees held due to the conflict’ would bereleased unconditionally. The reintegration sectionpromised that, ‘All civilians who have suffered ademonstrable loss due to the conflict will receive anallocation of suitable farming land, employment or, inthe case of incapacity to work, adequate social securityfrom the authorities of Aceh.’

The Human Rights CourtThe peace has held but the euphoria surrounding theMoU gradually diminished. It became clear thatpeople’s dreams for justice were not about to cometrue and that they would need to pursue their dreams abit longer before enjoying their rights. When the Lawon Governing Aceh (LoGA) came into effect on 1 August2006, its many compromises on human rights issuescast a thick cloud over the peace accord.

The establishment of a human rights court and thetruth and reconciliation mechanism were laid down inthe LoGA with clear time limits (12 months), ostensiblyrecognizing the difficulties Papua experiencedestablishing the human rights court availed by the 2001law on special autonomy. Yet these deadlines havesince passed. It appears that what were once primaryhuman rights agendas have become perceived as badideas and there is unwillingness to make them happen.

The human rights court issue also suffers from multipleinterpretations. Although GAM negotiator Nur Djuliannounced early on that the Human Rights Court (HRC)would have retroactive powers, according to the LoGA(Article 228), the HRC can only try cases of abusesoccurring after enactment of the LoGA, rendering itmeaningless for resolving past human rights crimes.Look ing back to the period before the signing of theMoU, various people involved in the process indicatedthat negotiations on human rights would beconducted with a spirit of ‘look ing to the future’, andindeed the negotiations almost collapsed over theprinciple of retroactive prosecution. Centralgovernment’s standpoint has not yet changed – or atleast dares not change due to weak political power.Retroactive prosecution for human rights crimes is stilltechnically possible, however, through Law No. 26/2000on Human Rights Courts dating from the year 2000. Thislaw allows for serious human rights violations prior to2000 to be tried in ‘ad hoc human rights courts’established by the president with the agreement of

parliament. In theory Indonesia’s National Commissionon Human Rights (Komnas HAM) takes its findings tothe parliament, which then decides whether there wasa gross human rights violation and if so, can establishan ad hoc court.

For crimes after 2000 regular human rights courts maybe used, such as the one established at Medan in NorthSumatra province. However, as noted, although thiscourt technically has jurisdiction over Aceh, andtherefore fulfills the MoU stipulation that a human rightscourt be established for Aceh (no other court fitting thisdescription has been created since the passing of theLoGA), no cases relating to Aceh have been heard there.The core obstruction to both the retroactive and morecurrent prosecution of human rights violations is thesame: the government and parliament in Jakarta do notgive the necessary support for the judicial system towork. The law needs to be amended to eliminateparliament’s political role in judicial practice, and toprovide Komnas HAM with sharp enough teeth for it tooffer a feasible domestic remedy to injustices. At amilitary ceremony attended by retired generals of TNIand POLRI in Jakarta on 28 April 2008, senior figuresexpressed their explicit rejection of investigations beingconducted by Komnas HAM. This illustrated thenarrowing political support for such investigations. TheMinister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono has publiclydiscouraged retired generals from complying ifsummoned by Komnas HAM, while PresidentYudhoyono himself keeps silent. The Minister of Law andHuman Rights, Andi Mattalatta, accompanyingYudhoyono in receiving President Marti Ahtisaari inJakarta on 7 May 2008 to discuss progress on the peaceprocess, explained to the press that because governmenthad given amnesty to GAM, it would not be proper toenforce the law against the TNI. The space for fair andjust remedies for Aceh seems to be shrinking.

Truth and reconciliationA further key component to transitional justice is theestablishment of a Truth and ReconciliationCommission (TRC). TRCs can play an important role incountering cultures of revisionism, impunity and thepostponement of justice, providing a supplementarychannel to judicial processes enacted by ad hoc orpermanent human rights courts. As a transitionalremedy, it should not postpone the rights of survivorsso long that they can no longer be seen as transitional.It is also supposed to be based on voluntaryparticipation and as such is less coercive than otherjustice mechanisms.

Page 70: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

69Hum an rights and justice in Aceh

Both the MoU and the LoGA assumed theestablishment of an Acehnese TRC as part of thenational TRC structure. However, in late 2006 theConstitutional Court in Jakarta over-ruled nationallegislation establishing the national TRC, citingconcerns about provisions for amnesty and legalimpunity for perpetrators of gross abuses. This pushedthe formation of a national TRC further into the futureand placed the whole Aceh process in legal limbo. Thecurrent debate is whether Aceh should wait for anational TRC or whether one can be established basedon provincial regulations (qanun) together with theLoGA. There are questions here over whether qanuncould provide enough legal force to handle caseswhere those responsible number among the politicaland military elite, and also the consequences of such anapproach for the provincial budget.

Whether the TRC is eventually established at thenational or Acehnese level, it should guaranteemeaningful involvement for the survivors of humanrights abuses. These people reside mostly in rural areasand it is very important to engage them in the TRCdiscourse and facilitate their understanding in order toequip them to approach and receive justice. They arethe primary stakeholders in the process. No otherstakeholders have as much of a legitimate right toshape the truth and reconciliation process. Truth andreconciliation cannot be imported or copied from otherexperiences; it is crucial to build ownership of such aprocess by providing as much relevant knowledge andinformation to victims as needed to guarantee theirmaximum access to the process. Considering thenumber of affected people is spread across such a largearea, these efforts will demand much time and plentifulresources. However, as noted in Lina Frödin’scontribution to this volume, reparations for the broadcategory of ‘victims of the conflict’ have been paid outwithout recourse to a truth-telling mechanism.

Human rights for allIn summary, it is becoming clear that the provisions ofthe MoU related to dealing with past human rightsviolations were too vague to be effective in the face ofconcerted political and institutional obstacles withinIndonesia, combined with the international community’sindifference or lack of leverage over Indonesia, and thelimited scope for civil society to influence legislativechange. But if the MoU, the LoGA and existing laws donot provide reliable remedies for past human rightsabuses, then the ultimate challenging question is whatthe best course of action is on rights issues.

There are grounds for optimism in considering theother dimensions of human rights. Compared to civiland political rights, economic, social, and cultural rights

are still overlooked in Aceh because the prolongedviolence has led human rights to be associatedprimarily with bloodshed and physical violence.However, economic, social and cultural rights havebecome increasingly important for Aceh, for example inaddressing the right to adequate housing for tsunamiand conflict survivors. This has become a priority indefining a new realm for the integrated fulfillment ofhuman rights in Aceh, together with education andhealth services.

The culture and structure of human rights in Acehneeds to be revolutionized. People should know theirrights, so they can mentally transform themselves fromvictims who ask for aid from the government tosurvivors who claim their rights. Aceh governmentofficials must understand them well too, so they can go beyond delivering aid and fully bear the duty torespect, fulfill and to protect human rights in Aceh. Bytransforming these mentalities and educating thepeople, the post-conflict and post-tsunami generationshould be able to develop their full potential.

Aceh must look backwards and forwards at the sametime. The problem of past human rights abuses needsto be resolved so that a new foundation can be built,where people will be free from the fear of similarviolations in the future. At the same time it is importantto look forward to build a new era of prosperity anddignity, in which everyone is allowed to live a decentand humane life.

Page 71: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

70 Accord 20

Suraiya Kamaruzzaman is a

women’s human rights

defender in Aceh.

Agents forchange the roles of women in Aceh’s peace process

Suraiya Kamaruzzaman

S cant attention has been paid to the role thatwomen played in the conflict in Aceh, theirsurvival efforts or their involvement in

development and peacebuilding. According to thehistorical narrative of violence and humanitariantragedy in Aceh, women are vulnerable, victimized,suffer in submission and bear the consequences ofbeing the wives and relatives of ‘the enemy.’

This is not the whole truth: Acehnese women playedstrategic roles, generated bright ideas and were able tofind unique ways to survive. They were able to becomeagents for change, performing negotiations betweenthe two parties involved in the conflict or engaging inefforts to save their husbands, sons or their community.When insecurity forced men to flee their villages,women became the main breadwinners and decision-makers and took over most of the social roles played bymen in their community life. In addition, they workedtogether to clean and repaint meunasah (Islamicschools), went to the fields or gathered firewood. Theytook care of the children and financed their education.They hid boys being hunted because of their fathers’and uncles’ political choices, and sometimes they hadto carry them home and bury their dead bodies.Women also undertook various religious programmessuch as rotating Koranic recitation gatherings from onehouse to another to build continuous communication,and accompany and console those who lost familymembers to the conflict.

Unified voicesWomen have also taken organized action in responseto the conflict. Groups of women have undertakenpeaceful campaigns, lobbying, informationdissemination, human rights education, negotiationand data collection. Some brought human rightsviolations to the UN Commission on Human Rights inGeneva. Many of these women faced pressure,intimidation, terror, rape or sexual harassment becauseof their actions.

In October 2000 the United Nations passed SecurityCouncil Resolution 1325 on the theme of women,peace and security. It stressed the importance ofwomen’s roles in conflict prevention and resolution andhighlighted the need for women’s equal participation inmaintenance and promotion of peace and security.Months before this, Acehnese women had rolled outtheir own agenda at the first All Acehnese Women’sCongress (Duek Pakat Inong Aceh). Nearly 500 womenfrom all possible backgrounds, many of whom hadsuffered the direct consequences of armed conflict, sattogether in dialogue in February 2000. They sharedtheir painful experiences, formed strong bonds and

Women at an Aceh peace rally in Jakarta 2003. Source: Reuters/Supri Supri

Page 72: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

71Agents for ch a nge

planned for the future. Sharing the hope that theywould be able to make Aceh better – and that peacewas an absolute requirement for a better Aceh – theycalled for the prioritization of dialogue towardsresolving the conflict and for greater women’sparticipation in all political decision-mak ing. Theydistributed their 22 recommendations to variousparties, including to Indonesian presidentAbdurrahman Wahid. That summer, a women’s grouplobbied various parties to involve women in theprocess of negotiating and implementing theHumanitarian Pause then being facilitated by the HenryDunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.

Exclusion from peacemakingUnfortunately their voice did not resonate for long, andwhen the conflict parties engaged in peace talks,women were once again excluded. Despite a record ofadvocating for peace and fostering reconciliation,women were barely involved in the stop-start dialogueprocesses spanning over five years that finallyculminated in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)between the government and GAM in August 2005. Thekind of gender-aware conflict resolution mandated bySecurity Council resolution 1325 was not achieved.

This was mirrored in other political processes as well:when Islamic Shari’ah law was introduced to Aceh,women’s representatives were once again not involved.Women were considered only as objects of politicalprocesses, not active subjects.

Without underestimating the great importance of theMoU and the hard work, sk ill and patience of itsarchitects, it ignores the contribution of civil society,including women’s groups, to peacemak ing. The peaceprocess was simplified into an issue between thegovernment and GAM, negating other dimensions ofconflict that had lasted for nearly 30 years, whereinnumerous and complex issues intertwined andimpacted upon the life of all Aceh’s people. As a resultof women’s exclusion from the peace processes, theirinterests are poorly covered by the agreements.

Peace is not realized simply at the negotiating table:sustainable peace can only be achieved if it involveswomen and men equally in processes of reconciliation,rights-based development, the rule of law and thedignified fulfilment of justice for victims. Signing thepeace agreement is only the beginning; the next great task for all of Aceh’s people is to undertakereconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation. Variousinstitutions have been established to facilitate this, butwomen’s voices are still not receiving the attention theyshould. Of the 43 members of the Aceh Reintegration

Board (BRA), only three are women. The Aceh TransitionCommittee (KPA), the organization for ex-GAMmembers, does not have a single woman in a strategicposition in its decision-mak ing and policy group. In thefirst-stage list of compensation receivers for formerGAM combatants, there was not a single womanamong the 3000 names listed, despite the fact thatsince 2000 photos and information about troops fromGAM’s women’s wing (Inong Balee) have frequentlybeen used in media campaigns to show women’s rolein GAM’s struggle.

PersistenceDespite such negations by the policy-makers, Acehnesewomen have not been sitting idly, but have respondedwith new determination. The Women’s Policy Network(JPuK) (established 2004) has been monitoring thedevelopment and implementation of the Law on theGoverning of Aceh (LoGA) and of qanun (local laws) thatwill detail provisions of the LoGA to promote theequitable inclusion of women’s interests. The Women’sPeace Network (JpuD) (established December 2005)comprises 26 organizations and seeks to socialize theMoU and strengthen women’s participation inpeacebuilding strategies. A Gender Work ing Group(GWG) has been established as the hub for monitoringthe policies of all parties involved in the reconciliation,reconstruction, and rehabilitation processes to ensurethat they take into account the gender perspective inpolicy mak ing and application and budgetdevelopment. At the grassroots level, women’s groupsperform political education and strengthen individualand organizational capacity through various training,workshops and seminars.

Such efforts are not sufficient in themselves. The big,unanswered question is: when will the policy makersstart to open their minds and harness the greatpotential of women as a force for building a lastingpeace in Aceh? It is imperative that the Indonesiangovernment implements UNSC Resolution 1325 in itsnational policies and builds a monitoring system usingclear indicators. Civil society needs to be involved andinformation on 1325 widely disseminated. Thegovernment should engage women in efforts to buildpeace in conflict areas like Papua. In Aceh, the BRAshould consult women’s organizations before carryingout any intervention. Applying women’s experienceshould be a basis for strategy and ensuring that genderis mainstreamed in all programmes. More than lipservice needs to be paid engaging them equally inreintegration and reconciliation processes. There needsto be affirmative action to promote women as leadersand ensure their involvement in decision-mak ing,especially ahead of the 2009 elections.

Page 73: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

72 Accord 20

Sidney Jones is Senior Adviser to

International Crisis Group’s Asia

programme, based in Jakarta. She

worked previously with Human Rights

Watch, Amnesty International and the

Ford Foundation.

Keeping thepeace security in Aceh

Sidney Jones

T he 2005 Helsink i agreement brought about adramatic change for the better in terms ofsecurity – the shooting stopped. After 29 years of

low-intensity conflict, a series of failed ceasefires, and amilitary offensive from May 2003 that resulted inhundreds of civilian deaths, the sudden end to k illingswas extraordinary. Violence that many predicted atvarious stages of the peace process did not materialize:in the months following the agreement, there were noclashes between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) andmilitia, no revenge k illings, and few confrontationsbetween GAM and security forces.

The reasons for the lack of violence were the same asthose that led to the agreement in the first place. One wasa new government, elected in September 2004, that wascommitted to peace and willing to make major efforts tobring the army on board. The second was the impact ofmartial law, which had left GAM much weakened andeager for an exit strategy. When the agreement made itclear that they would be allowed to compete in localelections, the attractions of the non-violent optionincreased. Finally there was the devastating tsunami.Given the trauma so many had suffered, everyoneunderstood that there would be no support for conflictwhile rebuilding and reconstruction were underway.None of these factors by themselves would have beenenough to ensure a post-agreement peace, but togetherthey were a potent disincentive for violence.

The local elections in December 2006, contrary to manypredictions, were also generally peaceful. Resource-based disputes, some of them intra-GAM, led tooccasional violence as time went on, with distributionof reintegration funds a particular sore point. The crimerate skyrocketed, with extortion, armed robberies andk idnappings especially prominent, some of themcommitted by former GAM members. In general, theshort-term security mechanisms set up to monitorimplementation of the Helsink i agreement workedreasonably well, but as the third year of peace nearedcompletion, there were some clouds on the horizon.

Dispute resolution mechanisms remain in very shortsupply. The formal court system, poor to begin with,atrophied during the conflict, as judges andprosecutors were intimidated and courthouses burned,particularly in the districts along the east coast. Theagreement brought courts back into operation but, aseverywhere else in Indonesia, endemic corruption, lowprofessionalism, and limited access are major problems.

Donors have made law enforcement a focus of post-agreement programmes, hoping to inculcate the ideaof community policing in a force that was marginalizedby the military during the conflict. The police unit that

Page 74: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

73Keeping the peace

most Acehnese used to know and dread was theparamilitary Mobile Police Brigade, Brimob. Changingperceptions of the public toward the police was asmuch of a challenge as changing the attitudes of thepolice themselves, but intensive training, combinedwith the willingness of former GAM leaders at a locallevel to work with them seems to be producing results.While there are still sporadic reports of brutality, andcorruption continues, the police have been better atresponding to reported crimes than many predicted.

Security during the first post-agreementphase Security fears in the first post-agreement phase focusedon GAM and the military. But demobilization anddisarmament under the Helsink i Memorandum ofUnderstanding (MoU) proceeded smoothly, largelybecause of clear deadlines, good faith on both sides,and the robust mandate of the Aceh MonitoringMission (AMM). A Commission on SecurityArrangements (COSA), comprising representatives ofGAM and the armed forces and chaired by the head of AMM, provided an effective forum for discussion ofsecurity concerns.

The big problem in this first phase, and one that wouldcontinue to haunt the post-agreement period, was

reintegration. The initial reintegration programme wasbased on the idea that GAM would turn over a list of3000 names as per the terms of the MoU and financialpackets would be handed out accordingly. GAM officialsresisted releasing names, ostensibly on security grounds,concerned that they could become a hit list in the eventof future conflict. That was a genuine fear, given itsexperience with past ceasefires, but the real problem washow to divide up the money among a much largerpopulation. The solution was to give it to commandersand hope they divided it equitably. Inevitably, it did notwork and became a new source of conflict.

A further problem during the first eighteen months was the functioning of the Aceh Reintegration Board(BRA). The poorly planned and even more poorlyadministered BRA generated enormous problems foritself at the outset by soliciting proposals for livelihoodprojects from “conflict victims”. When this approachresulted in a staggering volume of proposals, the BRAchanged tack and proposed a community-ledapproach channelled through the World Bank, causingconsiderable anger.

A further sensitivity associated with the BRA was thegovernment’s de facto acknowledgement of theexistence of militias.

Source: T. Faisal MG

Page 75: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

74 Accord 20

To avoid accusations that it was rewarding rebels, theagency decided to give Rp.10 million (about US$1000)to 6500 militia members, otherwise known as “anti-separatist fronts” or “homeland defenders” (PembelaTanah Air, PETA). Inclusion of militia members in thereintegration programme was probably a necessarystep to avoid tensions. The Indonesian military hadalways denied any role in creating these fronts, but inthe end, it was the district military commands thatprovided the names of those eligible for funding. Whilefears that militias, backed by intelligence operatives,could become election spoilers did not materialize, thefault line between ex-rebels and loyalists remained,particularly in Central Aceh and Bener Meriah districts.This tension resurfaced dramatically in early 2008 whenfive members of the KPA – (Komite Peralihan Aceh, AcehTransition Committee, the new name for the old GAMmilitary structure) were k illed in the worst act ofviolence since the peace agreement was signed.

Intra-GAM problems had been brewing for some timebetween the old guard, based in Sweden and led byMalik Mahmud, who had headed the negotiating teamin Helsink i, and the younger field-based faction, led byIrwandi Yusuf. The rift initially had few securityimplications, but an attack in November 2006 onHumam Hamid, the old guard’s candidate for governor,raised concerns about more violence to come,particularly in Bireuen district, where the camps werelocked in bitter contention.

If KPA vs militias was one source of tension and GAMfactionalism another, a third was that between Acehand the central government, as illustrated by thedifferences over the Law on the Governing of Aceh(LoGA). The self-government promised to Aceh inHelsink i was considerably diluted in the law, and whatGAM leaders view as the unimplemented provisions ofthe Helsink i agreement could become the basis forresumption of conflict in the future.

No serious security problems arose during theDecember 2006 elections in which Acehnese votersdecisively chose a GAM governor and GAM candidatesin seven out of nineteen races for district heads (bupati).In the general euphoria over the results, concerns overextortion and intimidation on the part of some KPAmembers went largely unnoticed.

Shortly after the elections, the AMM left Aceh, leavingin its wake no agency with the same authority toresolve disputes and defuse conflict. A new body calledthe Communications and Coordination Forum (ForumKoordinasi dan Komunikasi, FKK), on which KPA andIndonesian military officers both sit, was set up in April2007 as part of the Aceh desk under the CoordinatingMinistry of Politics, Law and Security but its mandate

was narrower. It has been a useful forum when securityincidents occur, such as the March 2008 attack inCentral Aceh described below. But it is less effective forresolving struggles over administrative authoritybetween Aceh and the central government.

Security developments in 2007Most security problems in 2007 were linked to districtelections or rising crime. Some of the latter was linkedto gang members coming up from Medan, NorthSumatra (motorcycle thefts rose 300 per cent) butmuch of it to ex-GAM fighters, most of whom remainedunemployed. Resentment rose in the GAM rank-and-fileagainst their former commanders, some of whom weregrowing rich through contracts handed out by newlyelected GAM officials, and there were several incidentsof grenade or other attacks on KPA members,apparently by disgruntled associates. Extortion by KPAmembers was also increasingly reported.

A disputed election for bupati in Southeast Aceh inDecember 2006, in which the notoriously corruptincumbent was edged out by a rival, led to a string ofviolent acts in 2007 as efforts to install the winner wererepeatedly set back. The district capital, Kutacane, washit by riots in August, followed by a grenade and arsonattacks. Similar disputes over local election results havetaken place across Indonesia, but in Aceh they tend toraise additional concerns. In this case the loser, ArmenDesky, whose supporters were responsible for much ofthe violence, had close ties to Jakarta and was a strongbacker of a plan to carve two new provinces out ofAceh, Aceh Leuser Antara (ALA) and Aceh Barat Selatan(ABAS) – which would be a clear violation of the MoU.Indonesian intelligence is widely believed in Aceh to besupportive of the division, in part because the NationalIntelligence Agency, BIN, was involved in the partitionof Papua into two provinces in 2003.

An incident in Nisam, North Aceh in March brought theIndonesian army and KPA into conflict for the first timesince the elections, when Indonesian soldiers beat up14 villagers after a KPA-orchestrated attack on four oftheir colleagues the day before. The four soldiers hadbeen moonlighting as security guards to protect a localschool from KPA extortion; the KPA reportedlyorganized a “spontaneous” attack by villagers, who beatthem up, claiming they were intelligence agents. Thearmy then retaliated with force. Such direct clashes,however, were rare. There was more concern on GAM’spart about the influx into Aceh of plainclothesintelligence personnel, whom they believed were goingto find ways to discredit GAM, deepen intra-GAM rifts,or more generally cause trouble in the lead-up toparliamentary elections in 2009.

Page 76: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

75Keeping the peace

As Indonesia’s national day approached on 17 August,hundreds of Indonesian flags were torn down acrossthe districts of East Aceh, North Aceh andLhokseumawe. Police suspected local KPA membersbut then proceeded to beat up twelve villagers in thecourse of their investigation, alienating the community.

Police performance in response to security problemswas mixed. Despite intensive post-conflict humanrights training provided through international donorsto the police, reports of brutality and petty extortioncontinued. And in some GAM strongholds, policereportedly felt their numbers were too few toeffectively challenge KPA offenders so they did nothing.The MoU fixed the number of police in Aceh at 9100 fora population of about 4.4 million; with reinforcements,the figure in 2008 stood at about 13,000, still low.

Resentment over distribution of reintegration fundscontinued to fester, even after the reorganization ofBRA in April 2007, further complicated by the slowtransfer of funds from Jakarta. The new head, seniorGAM member Nur Djuli, scrapped the idea ofcommunity projects and returned to a policy ofindividual payments, focused on housing, generatingnew anger, this time from communities who had beenpromised payments.

Security developments in 2008In 2008, the k illing of five KPA members, an intensifiedcampaign for ALA and ABAS, and continuing criminalactivity were the main security preoccupations.

The incident in Atu Lintang, Central Aceh, began as astruggle over control of the local bus terminal betweena militia-backed group of thugs known as IPT and localKPA members. On 29 February at a meeting at the localtransportation office to settle the dispute, four KPAmembers were attacked as they arrived. That night textmessages began circulating that there was going to bewar in Takengon, and both sides started mobilizingtruck loads of supporters. Muzakk ir Manaf, the head ofKPA, ordered his men not to do anything. In the earlyhours of 1 March, a mob of some 200 people attackedthe KPA office in Atu Linge in what was clearly apremeditated and organized attack. They set it on fire,burning four to death; a fifth man was also k illed. Thehead of the district council (also linked to the militias)claimed that people were tired of KPA extortion, as if tojustify the attack.

The good news was that police swiftly arrested theringleaders of the attack, and the KPA did not retaliate.But it was an incident very similar to this one, and in thesame area, which led to the unravelling of a 2002

Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. Central Aceh andneighbouring Bener Meriah are the districts where theprospects of GAM-militia violence erupting have alwaysbeen highest, in part because the militia there is one ofthe few with a genuine support base, rooted in reactionto GAM attacks there in 2000-2001.

The ALA and ABAS campaign were given an unexpectedboost in January 2008 when the Indonesian parliamentrecommended their creation. This was followed by alobbying visit to Jakarta of 430 village heads from theprospective provinces, raising questions about who paidfor their tickets. Former president and perpetualpresidential contender Megawati Sukarnoputri receivedthe delegation, saying she supported the campaign, asign that funding from the Yudhoyono government’sopponents could be channeled to it. But GovernorIrwandi has made it clear he opposes the division, andany effort to go around him to bring it about couldmean the torpedoing of the MoU.

Meanwhile, police claimed that the number of armedcrimes was twenty-two times higher than before theHelsink i agreement was signed. On March 13, MukhlisGayo, the man responsible for organizing the villageheads’ trip to Jakarta, was k idnapped in Central Aceh byan armed group led by a KPA member. Police were ableto rescue him and arrest two of the k idnappers. It wasthe twelfth reported k idnapping in Aceh since June2007. Then in April, five Chinese nationals werek idnapped for ransom in Gayo Lues district; theaffiliation of the perpetrators as of this writing wasunclear. The victims were released after ransom moneywas paid.

ConclusionNo one should take peace in Aceh for granted. Majorsocial and political tensions remain, and as the AtuLintang incident illustrates, it does not take much to seta spark to the k indling. But overall the level of violencehas been low, and most of the incidents have not takenplace along the fault lines of the old conflict betweenGAM and the Indonesian state. There are dangersahead, however, particularly if political interests inJakarta see benefits to be gained from meddling inAceh, as in the ALA-ABAS issue. Continuedmisbehaviour on the part of KPA members couldprovide an opening for that meddling. But the vexingissue of reintegration also needs addressing. As long asex-combatant unemployment remains high, thereintegration programme remains dysfunctional, andresentment grows over the perceived gulf betweenhaves and have-nots, the potential for securityproblems remains high.

Page 77: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

76 Accord 20

Fadlullah Wilmot taught at Syiah Kuala

University in Aceh from 1970-1975. He

was later head of the Rector’s office of

the International Islamic University in

Malaysia and contributed to relief

efforts in Aceh after the tsunami.

Shari’ah in Acehpanacea or blight?

Fadlullah Wilmot

A ceh is the only place in Indonesia with the legalright to apply certain aspects of Shari’ah lawoutside matters related to family and

inheritance. The history of Shari’ah in the modernIndonesian state is complex and although there arereligious courts which mainly deal with family mattersincluding inheritance, only in Aceh are they referred toas Shari’ah courts. Although some form of Shari’ah hasbeen applied at different periods in Aceh’s history, itscurrent form of implementation raises serious issues asit seems to be founded on a superficial, conservativeand narrow interpretation of Islam, in contrast to themore moderate understanding of Islam that has existedin Aceh for centuries.

Whilst the Helsink i Memorandum of Understanding(MoU) as well as the new legislation on Aceh’sgovernance and associated international monitoringmight have been an opportunity to revise theintroduction of the Shari’ah, in reality application of anarrowly legalistic interpretation has continued. Thisarticle traces these developments, highlights some ofthe particular problems, and reflects on how thecurrent mode of implementing Shari’ah poses serioustheological and philosophical questions.

Islam in AcehDespite its reputation for devoutness, Aceh’s identity isnot based on Islam alone, but is made up of ethnic,political, economic and historical factors. The conflictswith the Dutch and the central government have beenassociated with calls for Shari’ah law, but Islam was onlyone of many strands of the struggle. Teungku DaudBeureueh, the leader of Aceh’s ulama (the legal scholarsand arbiters of Shari’ah law) and Military Governorduring the struggle for Indonesian independence(when Aceh was the only area of the Dutch East Indiesnot re-occupied by the allies after the defeat of Japan),demanded special status for Aceh within Indonesia,including – but not restricted to – the right to applyShari’ah. Yet his vision of Shari’ah was not one based on

Islamic shari'ah law officers arrest a woman in BandaAceh for not wearing a headscarf, December 2006.

Source: Reuters/Tarmizy Harva

Page 78: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

77Sh ari’a h in Aceh

severe punishments. He led Darul Islam’s (DI) struggleagainst the centralizing tendencies of the Indonesiangovernment in the 1950s due to disillusionment of thepeople of Aceh with the new republic’s policies. TheFree Aceh Movement (GAM) was, like the DI movement,more of an ethno-nationalist movement with economicand cultural underpinnings than an Islamist one.

After Suharto’s fall some Jakarta-based political leadersbelieved that offering Aceh Shari’ah could undercutGAM’s appeal, as well as restore public trust in thecentral government. But when President Wahid offeredShari’ah to strife-torn Aceh, many suspected a politicaltrick and GAM leaders portrayed the move as part of agovernment effort to paint GAM as fundamentalists.Senior GAM representative Amni Marzuk i said in aninterview with Reuters in 2000, “the Indonesiangovernment wants us to look like Afghanistan.” Otherleaders said they did not want the sort of Shari’ah beingoffered by Jakarta.

Law No. 44/1999 (on the implementation of Aceh’sspecial status) called for implementation of Shari’ah forMuslims and gave the local government authority toset policies on religious life, custom, education and theulama’s role. Regulation No. 5/2000 (on theImplementation of Islamic Law) established that allaspects of Shari’ah would be applied. In 2001 theprovincial government created a Shari’ah office (DinasSyariat Islam). That same year, the Special Autonomy Lawfor Aceh (Law No.18/2001) allowed for the creation of

Shari’ah courts with jurisdiction over not just the areasof family and property issues covered by existingreligious courts but also criminal cases.

The introduction of Shari’ah in Aceh has been in theform of a narrowly conservative interpretationillustrated in the Qanun passed in 2002 whichcriminalized what is regarded as un-Islamic dress,providing a basis for punishing women who do notwear a headscarf. In 2003, a Qanun was passedcriminalizing gambling, the sale and consumption ofliquor, and illicit relations between men and women(including being caught in close proximity, or khalwat)specifying for the first time punishments such as caningin public.

It is not entirely clear how Shari’ah criminal laws can co-exist with secular laws or how to regulate thezealous enforcers of religious criminal laws. Mostconspicuously, the increasingly unpopular enforcers ofShari’ah in Aceh, the wiliyatul hisbah, are, as anInternational Crisis Group report states, a “haphazardlyrecruited, poorly disciplined, poorly supervised forcethat distinguishes itself more by moral zeal than legalcompetence.” They seem to lack a properunderstanding of their role, often tak ing people to theiroffice for ‘advice’ despite the fact that legally they haveno police powers and cannot make arrests. There havebeen many notorious incidents of their zealotry, such asthe one in August 2006 when they forced their way intoa UN compound in Banda Aceh, peering into staff

Page 79: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

78 Accord 20

bedrooms (violating international conventions ondiplomatic privilege and immunity), thus promptingthe Acehnese authorities and the Ministry of ForeignAffairs to apologize on behalf of the government. Therehave been other incidents of corruption and brutality.

The narrow, legalistic approach to Shari’ah in Aceh hascaused much consternation to moderate and secularMuslims. They asserted that Shari’ah – especiallyregarding criminal law – was out of line with Indonesia’sconstitution. Of particular concern was the focus of theQanun on morality and women, and especially raidsagainst women where they have been publiclyhumiliated and verbally abused. On 9 March 2005(International Women’s Day) 1000 Acehnese marched inprotest accusing the officials responsible for enforcingShari’ah with unfairly targeting women.

Some had hoped the peace agreement between thegovernment and GAM would provide a basis forlegitimate political reform that would create anopportunity to reverse the more debatable elements ofShari’ah implementation. GAM leaders, including MalikMahmood, had expressed their opposition to the wayShari’ah was being implemented. The MoU determinedthat the legal code for Aceh would be redrafted ‘on thebasis of the universal principles of human rights asprovided for in the United Nations InternationalCovenants on Civil and Political Rights and onEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (article 1.4.2).However, this seems to have had little effect. The Lawon Governing Aceh (LoGA) passed in 2006 included 16articles on Shari’ah effectively giving the provincepermission to apply Shari’ah criminal legislation.Women were sidelined in the LoGA deliberations.

Many GAM candidates came to power in the 2006elections for Governor, Mayors and Regents, includingGovernor Irwandi Yusuf, who promised to block themore extreme provisions being proposed, such as thepunishment of cutting off hands for thieves. However,elections to the provincial and regional assemblies arenot due until 2009 and therefore the legislators whopassed these laws (mainly from national politicalparties) are still in power. This has meant that the newGAM leadership does not have the votes in parliamentto reverse the existing Qanun on Shari’ah even if theywere willing to invest political capital in an enterprisewhich might lead them to be condemned by the ulamaas irreligious. A new religious bureaucracy – the DinasShari’ah with its enforcement arm, the wilayatul hisbahmade up of otherwise unemployable religiousgraduates, has been established which will be verydifficult to dismantle.

The first laws on Shari’ah in Aceh were drawn up withlittle public participation by the unrepresentative and

corrupt parliament chosen in the 1999 elections thatwere boycotted by a large percentage of thepopulation. The current Aceh Provincial RepresentativeAssembly (DPRA) is more representative, but it onlyrepresents Jakarta-based political parties. These parties– including some Islamic parties – did poorly in the 2006local elections in which the big winners were quitedistinctly not the ones using Islamic rhetoric in theircampaigns. It remains to be seen if the locally-basedpolitical parties which will participate in the elections forthe first time in 2009 will be willing to invest politicalcapital and develop policies on the issue of rolling backthe Shari’ah or whether they will regard it as too risky.

Imposition without consensusBeyond all these institutional and political problems,important philosophical and theological objections tothe current implementation of Shari’ah must be made.

Firstly, the claims of those supporting the imposition ofShari’ah in Aceh, who believe they have the right toforce people to live according to Islam, must bechallenged. As El-Affendi writes, “Shari’ah can never beimposed. When it is imposed it is not Shari’ah. Whenonly coercion underpins Shari’ah, it becomeshypocrisy.” In Islam the right to use force may only beexercised through the consent of the community andexecuted by legitimate authority. Thus no law shouldbe implemented by a Muslim community withoutpopular support and consent. There is no precedent inclassical Islam for bypassing the popular will. In fact, itwas the consensus (‘ijma’) of the community thatconstituted the main argument in favour of theintegrity of the Islamic tradition and the acceptance ofits claim to be true.

The majority of Acehnese have long believed andpractised a faith based on persuasion rather than top-down enforcement of a restrictive interpretation.Although some claim that Shari’ah is the desire of thepeople of Aceh, the people have never been asked.According to an important Islamic scholar, MuhammadAssad, “… we have no longer any way of ascertainingthe opinions of the community except by means ofpopular vote.”

Neither can Shari’ah be imposed simply because it isGod’s law. On a philosophical level, it needs to beunderstood that the Shari’ah is interpreted throughhumans who are imperfect. According to the Islamicscholar Abou El Fadl:

‘Shari’ah as conceived by God is flawless, but asunderstood by human beings who are imperfectand contingent. … Regardless of how clear andprecise the statements of the Qur’an and Sunnah

Page 80: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

79Sh ari’a h in Aceh

are, the meaning derived from these sources isnegotiated through human agency. … But the lawof the state, regardless of its origins or basis, belongsto the state. Under this conception, no religious lawscan or may be enforced by the state. All lawsarticulated and applied in a state are thoroughlyhuman and should be treated as such.’

For state authorities to claim that they have the authorityto interpret and implement Shari’ah could, from a certainperspective, be seen as a form of shirk (associating otherswith God), one of the greatest sins in Islam as it giveshumans power to act in the name of God.

A second area that must be challenged relates to theparticularly conservative and intrusive interpretation ofShari’ah that is being implemented. The fact is that thereis no justification either in the Qur’an or the hadith (oraltraditions relating to the words and deeds of theProphet) for the government enforcing head coveringfor women or for punishing those who drink intoxicantsby caning. The Qanun passed by the DRPA also fails toacknowledge contemporary realities or make necessaryadjustments to some of the legal rulings andinterpretations of Islamic jurists (fiqhi) dating from pre-modern times. Aceh’s Shari’ah laws do not differentiatebetween Shari’ah and fiqh and in formulating themthere seems to have been little effort to carry outindependent reasoning or interpretation of the sourcesof law (known is Islam as ijtahad). Unfortunately theShari’ah laws of Aceh do not seem to have taken intoaccount the importance of the overriding values andfoundational goals (maqasid) of Shari’ah.

Aceh’s Shari’ah laws have made the private spherepublic, as they are mainly concerned with personalissues like dress, drink ing alcohol, gambling, and menand women being in close proximity. In a democraticand Islamic society, the authorities have no businessinterfering in the private lives of consenting adults. Inencouraging reporting on friends and neighbours forsuspected breaches of moral behaviour, Shari’ah inAceh is encouraging Muslims to commit the sin ofspying on others which is forbidden. In Islam, one issupposed to hide the sins of others, not publicize themnor parade and punish offenders in public. One of thenames of God is Ghafur, The Most Forgiving and Hiderof Faults. The Prophet taught that if we cover the faultsof others, God will cover our faults in the hereafter. TheShari’ah laws of Aceh have ignored the call for theforgiveness and compassion for offenders that cannurture the prospects for their reformation and returnto society, as Hashim Kamali has noted in his study ofthe Shari’ah laws of Kelantan “the Qur’an leaves thedoor of reformation and repentance open to all hududoffences without any exception”. Those implementingthe Shari’ah seem to have forgotten this, despite

positive precedents from Achenese history. DaudBeureueh offers a good example of a broad-mindedunderstanding of the Shari’a: he never consideredstoning or whipping prostitutes or cutting off thehands of thieves, but advocated providing them withsk ills so that they could be self-sufficient.

ConclusionThe way Shari’ah is being implemented in Aceh isincreasing rather than decreasing injustice and willadversely affect Aceh’s intellectual development, itseconomy, its community and above all Islam. Theenforcement of Shari’ah laws as currently understoodand legislated for risks derailing the ideal of the newAceh as an open society, so widely cherished after yearsof conflict and isolation.

Although a poll in Aceh in 2007 indicated that only 7.2 per cent saw the Shari’ah as an important issue andonly 23.3 per cent were happy with its implementation,87.3 per cent felt that it could solve the problems of thepeople of Aceh. The answer to this apparentcontradiction is that people understand Shari’ah fromits broad principles like economic and social justice, notthe legalistic interpretations and punishments forpersonal infringements being implemented in Acehtoday. In Indonesia and Aceh today the Shari’ah is seenfrom an idealistic perspective due to the failure of thestate to ensure security or justice – a view propoundedby the religious scholars. The corruption of the judicialsystem has created a lack of trust in the civil courtsamong Indonesians and particularly Acehnese. Thesatisfaction rate amongst religious court clients is veryhigh (80 per cent) and in Aceh tens of thousands ofinheritance cases brought after the tsunami weresettled with a very low number of appeals.

The important issues facing Aceh are not women’sdress but justice, equity, honesty, good governance,and care of the environment. It is unfortunate that theShari’ah debate has obscured many other importantdiscussions in Aceh, and distracted attention away fromthe issue of how to build a better Aceh after the peaceagreement, towards issues such as headscarves forwomen. Yet the elimination of poverty is a Shari’ahprinciple – and poverty afflicts 65 per cent of Aceh’spopulation, much more so in rural areas. The Governor’svision of introducing and developing a people-orientedeconomy and intensifying economic and educationalprograms to empower poor families would seem to bemore in line with the Shari’ah than what is currentlybeing implemented in its name. If Shari’ah is to beimplemented in Aceh those drafting and implementingthe laws will need to consider how to implement itsdeeper principles. This is an important task for localpolitical parties competing in the 2009 elections.

Page 81: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

80 Accord 20

Irwandi Yusuf is the Governor of

Aceh. A former commander in the

Free Aceh Movement (GAM), he was

imprisoned in 2003 but escaped

when the Keudah Prison was

destroyed by the tsunami of

December 2004. He subsequently

participated in the Helsinki

peace negotiations.

Aceh’s new eraan interview with Irwandi Yusuf

Accord: What made peace possible in 2005 when theconflict had seemed so intractable?

Irwandi Yusuf: The peace process started before theDecember 2004 tsunami but the tsunami speeded it toa conclusion. Previously, messengers from Jakartavisited me in prison seek ing negotiations with the GAMin exile. I told them, no way – you must bring aguarantor to guarantee that an agreement would beimplemented. GAM still didn’t trust the Indonesiangovernment. But after the tsunami, both sides becamemuch more understanding. There was some resistanceto talks from the Indonesian military because they stillwanted to prove they were able to crush themovement. But in fact GAM’s military was regainingstrength while the government troops were starting tolose their morale. Had there been no tsunami, the warwould have got even bloodier and I don’t know whatthe outcome would have been.

What has the peace agreement achieved?

The peace accord achieved peace. After two and a halfyears Aceh is still peaceful and I hope it’s going to beeternally peaceful. Beyond that, Aceh has been openedup, which is almost unprecedented in recent history.Especially under martial law, Aceh was a closed doorwhich you could only sometimes peep through. Thetsunami held the key to the openness of Aceh,empowered by the Helsink i talks.

During the conflict, the people of Aceh and thegovernment community were poles apart. The peoplewere alienated from the local and central governments– both were seen as belonging to Jakarta. Now there isa reintegration – not among the people of Aceh butbetween them and the government community. It hashelped that I’m now part of government, because I’mfrom the other side – the people’s side. By developingtrust between the government and people, we are nowtrying to boost our economy and attract investors.

Are you satisfied with progress in implementing thepeace agreement?

We cannot say we are satisfied because there are so manyitems not yet even touched. Aceh now has its autonomylaw, the Law on the Governing of Aceh (LoGA). But in orderto implement this law we need six or seven regulations orbylaws from the central government, and so far only onehas been produced. We particularly need the PresidentialRegulation on Consultation and Consensus, which isabout how the central government consults the Acehgovernment when producing other bylaws. Without thisregulation, we don’t know how to proceed.

Beyond that, we need the human rights court, eventhough the LoGA says it is only for human rightsviolations tak ing place after the promulgation of the

Irwandi Yusuf drops his ballot in a polling station inBanda Aceh, December 2006.Source: Reuters/Tarmizy Harva

Page 82: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

81Aceh’s new era

law. We also haven’t seen the truth and reconciliationmechanism yet, nor the joint claims settlementcommission required by the Memorandum ofUnderstanding (MoU). We need these in the immediatefuture – or at least straight after the 2009 election if it istoo difficult to get done now.

You were the GAM representative with the AMM: doyou think they did a good job in Aceh?

In terms of keeping the peace, yes, an excellent job. Butin terms of monitoring the interpretation of the MoU inlaw, they did a less satisfactory job. They abandonedAceh too soon, while we were still struggling to get thelaws. Everyone can see that the LoGA is not compatiblewith the MoU. It gives with one hand and takes awaywith the other. Now we feel the difficulty when wecome to implement this law, because of conflictingarticles and missing bylaws.

As the first governor elected after the peaceagreement, the hopes and expectations of the peoplemust be extremely high. Do you feel the need tomanage these expectations?

Yes, they are too high. I think this is a symptom in all theex-conflict zones in the world, especially when the newleader comes from the side of the people. They expecteverything from him – you’ve got to change this, you’vegot to change that, you’ve got to give us prosperity in avery short period of time. I think even God would beafraid of that! Or a little worried!

The peace agreement was a great achievement, butpeople sometimes can’t feel the peace, or they forget tofeel it – like a man look ing for a lost horse while he isriding on it. Of course, everyone feels an emptystomach, and an empty stomach makes the mouthgag, and the gagging mouth can spell out many things,some dirty. So I need to fill the empty stomach step bystep. We are focusing on the rural areas, communityforestry and agribusiness, which doesn’t depend onhighly developed infrastructure. God has bestowedupon us rich forests and agricultural land, butdevelopment is not going to be accomplished withintwo weeks.

If you could go back to Helsinki, what things that youdidn’t ask for would you ask for? For example, do youwish the police were under Aceh’s administration?

We demanded that police in Aceh be regulated by thegovernor, but the central government would not agreeand we couldn’t gain support from the internationalcommunity on this. We had to justify which goals wecould achieve at the talks, and which ones we couldnot. So we took the middle way. The Aceh governor hasthe right to approve the chief of police and prosecutors,but they remain in the vertical structure of central

government as policing falls under one of the six areasof authority stipulated as coming under centralgovernment, in this case ‘national security.’

What else would we adjust with the MoU if we could goback in time? On the issue of hydrocarbon mining, theMoU only stipulates that Aceh retains 70 per cent of thehydrocarbon resource revenues, but it doesn’t mentionwho will regulate and govern this, or who has theauthority to give licences for new exploitation. TheLoGA says only that the central and Aceh governmentswill manage these resources jointly. We should havemade it right in the MoU.

What are the necessary steps to make peacesustainable and is there a role for the internationalcommunity?

The peace in Aceh was not generated only by theIndonesian authorities and GAM; it was also generatedby the international community, who have obligationsto watch and to warn the parties when they seesymptoms of pathologies in the peace process.Countries with a stake in the peace process should usetheir diplomatic relations with Indonesia to advise orcensure the government and the leaders of GAM.

Having our own local political party or parties, asstipulated by the MoU, will hopefully strengthenpeaceful discussion in Aceh. In 2009, we will have ourown parliament based on local and national parties,and this is expected to generate a new era of peacefuland democratic politics.

So do you think GAM will have one political party?

Yes. I do hope the troubles with central government onthis issue can be overcome. GAM has done everythingJakarta requested – changing the symbol and so forth. Idon’t think there are new reasons for Jakarta to rejectthis party. I hope Jakarta will also understand that apeaceful solution in Aceh has been achieved in adignified way. GAM wasn’t a loser in the war. Thegovernment wasn’t a loser. So I don’t want one side totreat the other like the loser.

Could the national elections in 2009 pose a threat tothe peace process?

I am afraid that if ultra-nationalists win, they would notrespect the peace in Aceh. But the current Presidentand the Vice-President are very committed people and Ithank them for that. Of course, there are many peoplein the government so they cannot control everything. Itis not enough that only they understand the Aceh case.We find Jakarta officials who understand the LoGA areeasy to deal with, but those who do not are verydifficult. Jakarta must now do more to socialize theAceh case within the government community.

Page 83: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

82 Accord 20

Jusuf Kalla is Vice President of

Indonesia and Chairman of the

Golkar Party and oversaw the

government negotiating team for

the Aceh peace process in 2005.

Compromisingfor peacean interview with Jusuf Kalla

Accord: How did you approach the problem of finding a negotiated settlement to the Aceh conflict?

Jusuf Kalla: I had been involved in Aceh since 2003. Inearly 2004 I visited Europe to try to meet GAM leaderMalik Mahmud, but did not make direct contact. It wasonly after the December 2004 tsunami that I really hadsuccess. In January 2005, I set up a meeting with GAMwith the help of a number of European ambassadors.Two weeks later, with the authority of the President, thefirst meeting with GAM took place.

Initiating the talks required you to sanctioncontacts with an armed group. Did this posedilemmas for you as a state representative?

Yes, but if there are problems, go directly to theproblems, don’t avoid them. To address the problemswe had with GAM, I knew we had to make contact withtheir leaders with a clear vision and mission on what wecould achieve. I always ask myself who the top leadersare and make contact with them. I called MalikMahmud directly, even though I didn’t know himpersonally. I also went to GAM leaders in the field,sending Farid Husain to the jungle to meet GAMcommander Sofyan Dawood during the Helsink i talksto make sure that combatants followed the agreementthrough if it was achieved.

What did your government ‘put on the table’ tomake the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)possible, and how difficult was it to commit tomaking the necessary concessions?

Peace means compromise, and compromise meansconcessions. That’s why we put a number ofcompromises on the table: on the legal matters ofAceh, the economy and the problem of combatantsand weapons and an amnesty for all GAM members.

Some concessions were quite controversial. Howdifficult was it for the government toaccommodate GAM’s desire for local politicalparties to be allowed in Aceh?

We knew the issue of local political parties would be adifficult one for parliament in Jakarta. And weunderstood that we had to make the MoU in such away that parliament would be able to adapt it into law.We were finally convinced to agree to allow localparties in Aceh on the last day of the talks. I made twopoints in response to political opposition on thismatter: we had local parties in Indonesia in the firstelections in 1955; and Papua’s special autonomy has aprovision for local parties – even though it is notimplemented, it means parliament has agreed to allowlocal parties before.

Indonesian Vice President Jusuf Kalla (R) and Aceh actinggovernor Azwar Abubakar talk to journalists in BandaAceh, March 2005. Source: Reuters/Tarmizy Harva

Page 84: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

83Comprom ising for peace

How did you engage with parliament andconvince them about the Aceh talks?

I didn’t engage with parliament on it until after thesigning of the MoU. I never informed them about thesubjects of the negotiations, nor a single paragraph ofthe agreement. Parliament wanted to know what wewere talk ing about, but I said, ‘you don’t need to know!’If I had informed the parliament, they would haveopposed me. They insisted that if there was a peaceprocess or war announcement, it should be approvedby parliament. I responded, ‘yes, if it is peace or warwith other countries – but this is not other countries,these are our people and I don’t need parliamentaryapproval.’ It is all according to the law. Some peoplewere very upset but I had good reasons.

What are the main differences between theautonomy resulting from the peace agreementand the special autonomy provisions granted toAceh before?

You can see that the Law on the Governing of Acehreally means special autonomy and is about how togovern the province, how the economy will bemanaged, the system of financial support for localgovernment and so forth. The old law on specialautonomy was not so detailed. All this was adaptedfrom the MoU and is different from the other provinces.

Trust is essential in any peace process. How didyou and your negotiating team gain the trust ofthe GAM negotiators?

Of course it was not easy to trust GAM and not easy forGAM to trust us. An important role for the mediatorswas to help build trust between the sides. After thesigning we put together a committee with the EU andthe Aceh Monitoring Mission to continue to build trust.

Also, remember that trust between GAM and theIndonesian military was very important. Each one wouldsay to me, ‘how can we trust the other side to implementan agreement?’ I always said to the military leadership:‘Do you think GAM fighters are comfortable in thejungle? Do you think they will go back when they have ahouse in the town, and a motorbike?’ And as for GAM Isaid ‘Do you think the soldiers are happy, living in theirbarracks, far from their families, scared of the bullet?’

Are you satisfied with the progress ofimplementation so far, in particular thereintegration of ex-combatants?

Yes, I am satisfied, but of course you can’t solve a 30-year problem quick ly. The problem withreintegrating GAM’s ex-combatants is the numberkeeps getting bigger and bigger. Perhaps the 3000

GAM combatants in the MoU cut was just a politicalfigure and that is why it is now increasing, but that waswhat they agreed.

Is there still a role for international actors insupporting the consolidation of the peace in Aceh?

Now the people of Aceh can solve problems internallyand there is no need for more internationalinvolvement. Of course, there are evaluations andobservations to be done, but there is no need for directinvolvement anymore. It’s more about the economynow, no longer about political grievances.

Given the agreement was reached under thepresent Indonesian administration, some fear the 2009 elections may negatively affect Aceh’speace process.

The agreement has now been transferred into law – orat least 90 per cent of it. So it’s no longer aboutpersonal support, but the law.

One issue that is in the news at the moment is theidea of having three provinces for Aceh, withautonomy for Aceh Barat Selatan and Aceh LeuserAntara. Do you think this is an issue that couldnegatively affect the peace process?

No, I have said this is not possible and so has thegovernor of Aceh. The legal border of Aceh province isNorth Sumatra, we cannot have another province inbetween. And special autonomy is only for Aceh, notfor others. Some may want a new province, but theywill get no special budget, no special treatment, andthey will have many problems with the people.

What can others involved in trying to address armed conflict learn from your approach towardsconflict problems?

I go direct to the problem – and also the solution. I putan offer on the table. In order to solve problems, youhave to understand what is behind them, whether theyare economic issues, political issues or cultural issues. Iread all the books on the history of Aceh – I spent amonth doing the research myself. I learned the problemin Aceh was not about allegiance but economicinequality and fairness. Now, with Aceh’s system forautonomy, people should support the agreement.

Page 85: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

84 Accord 20

Peace process

! Bavois Agreement, 27 January2000.

! Joint Understanding onHumanitarian Pause for Aceh, 12 May 2000.

! Provisional Understanding betweenthe Government of the Republic ofIndonesia and the Leadership of theFree Aceh Movement, 9 January2001.

! Cessation of Hostilities: FrameworkAgreement Between Governmentof the Republic of Indonesia andthe Free Aceh Movement, 10 May 2002.

! Memorandum of Understanding

Indonesian laws

! Law of the Republic of IndonesiaNo. 18/2001 dated August 9, 2001on Special Autonomy for theProvince of Nanggroe AcehDarussalam

! Law of the Republic of IndonesiaNo. 21/2001 on Special Autonomyfor the Papua Province

! Law of the Republic of IndonesiaNo. 11/2006 regarding Governingof Aceh

Other documents

! Brussels, 15 April 2005 RELEX/A4REG PA (05) D/508248INFORMATION NOTE TO THECOUNCIL Subject: Support to theAceh Peace Process Negotiationsunder the EC Rapid ReactionMechanism

! Council Joint Action2005/643/CFSP of 9 September2005 on the European UnionMonitoring Mission in Aceh(Indonesia) (Aceh MonitoringMission – AMM)

Cessation of Hostilities

Framework AgreementBetween Government of theRepublic of Indonesia and theFree Acheh Movement

Preamble

The Government of the Republic ofIndonesia (GOI) and the Free AchehMovement (GAM) have been engagedin a process of dialogue since January2000 and concur that the priority inAcheh is the security and welfare ofthe people and therefore agree on theneed for finding an immediate peacefulsolution to the conflict in Acheh. On 10May 2002, the GOI and GAM issued aJoint Statement set out below:

1.On the basis of the acceptance ofthe NAD Law as a starting point, asdiscussed on 2-3 February 2002, to ademocratic all-inclusive dialogueinvolving all elements of Achehnesesociety that will be facilitated by HDCin Acheh. This process will seek toreview elements of the NAD Lawthrough the expression of the viewsof the Achehnese people in a free andsafe manner. This will lead to theelection of a democratic governmentin Acheh, Indonesia.2.To enable this process to take placeboth parties agree to work with allspeed on an agreement on cessationof hostilities with an adequatemechanism for accountability of theparties to such an agreement. Thiswill also provide the opportunity andenvironment for much needed socio-economic and humanitarianassistance to the people of Acheh.

The GOI and GAM share the commonobjective to meet the aspirations ofthe people of Acheh to live in securitywith dignity, peace, prosperity, andjustice. In order to meet theaspirations of the people of Achehand permit them to administer

themselves freely and democratically,the GOI and GAM agree to a processwhich leads to an election in 2004and the subsequent establishment ofa democratically elected governmentin Acheh, Indonesia, in accordancewith the review of the NAD Law, asprovided for in point 1 of the 10 May2002 Joint Statement.

To this end, the GOI will ensure andGAM will support the development ofa free and fair electoral process inAcheh, which will be designed toensure the broadest participation ofall elements of Achehnese society.

In light of the delicate nature of theconfidence building process, the GOIand GAM further appeal for thesupport of all elements of society andrequest that no party undertake anyaction which is inconsistent with thisAgreement and may jeopardize thefuture security and welfare of thepeople of Acheh.

The immediate requirement is toensure the cessation of hostilities andall acts of violence, includingintimidation, destruction of propertyand any offensive and criminalaction. Offensive and criminal actionis deemed to include violent actionssuch as attacking, shooting, engagingin torture, killing, abductingbombing, burning, robbing, extorting,threatening, terrorising, harassing,illegally arresting people, raping, andconducting illegal searches.

Throughout the peace process themaintenance of law and order inAcheh will continue to be theresponsibility of the Indonesian Police(Polri). In this context, the mandateand mission of Brimob will bereformulated to strictly conform toregular police activities and as suchwill no longer initiate offensiveactions against members of GAM notin contravention of the Agreement.

Key textsDocuments listed in bold are printed here. All materials can be found on CR’s website at http://www.c-r.org.

Page 86: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

The JSC will be the point of referencefor all complaints regarding policefunctions and action that are deemedto be in contravention of the spiritand letter of the Cessation ofHostilities (COH) Agreement. As such,the JSC will be responsible fordefining, identifying andinvestigating when and if the policehave breached their mandate.

With this general understanding, andto bring the peace process forward tothe next phase, both parties herebyagree on the following:

Article 1: Objectives of the Cessationof Hostilities and All Acts of Violence

a) Since both sides have thus agreedthat, from now on, enmity betweenthem should be considered a thing ofthe past, the peace process, which iscontinued by an agreement on thisphase, will proceed by buildingfurther confidence and both sides willprove to each other that they areserious about achieving this ultimatecommon objective.

b) The objectives of the cessation ofhostilities and all acts of violencebetween both parties are (i) toproceed to the next phase of thepeace process, as mutually agreed on10 May 2002 in Switzerland; (ii) tocontinue the confidence buildingprocess with a view to eliminating allsuspicions and creating a positive andcooperative atmosphere which willbring the conflict in Acheh to apeaceful conclusion; and, (iii) toenable, provided hostilities and allacts of violence cease, for the peaceprocess to proceed to the next phases,i.e. the delivery of humanitarian,rehabilitation and reconstructionassistance.

Article 2: Commitment by Both Sidesto Cease Hostilities and All Acts ofViolence

a) Both sides explicitly express theircommitment to meet the terms of thisAgreement to cease hostilities and allforms of violence toward each otherand toward the people in Acheh, byimplementing the steps stipulated inthis Agreement. In expressing suchcommitment, both sides guaranteethat they are in full control of,

respectively, TNI/Polri and GAMforces on the ground. GOI and GAMcommit to control those groups thatdo not share their objectives butclaim to be part of their forces.

b) Both sides further committhemselves to immediately after thesigning of this Agreementthoroughly inform their respectiveforces on the ground of the terms ofthis Agreement, and to instruct themto cease hostilities immediately.

c) Both sides agree that, should therebe other parties taking advantage ofthe situation and disturbing thepeaceful atmosphere, they willendeavour to take joint action againstthem to restore the peace.

d) During this confidence-buildingperiod, both sides agree that they willnot increase their military strength,which includes re-deployment offorces, increase in military personnelor military equipment into Acheh.

e) HDC is requested to strictlyfacilitate the implementation of thisAgreement.

f) Both parties will allow civil societyto express without hindrance theirdemocratic rights.

Article 3: Joint Security Committee(JSC)

a) The senior leadership in charge ofsecurity from each side will meet, inorder to establish the initial contactand understanding between bothsides. They should also (i) reactivatethe Joint Security Committee (JSC),which was established during theimplementation of the HumanitarianPause, and (ii) commence discussion,in order to reach agreementexpeditiously, on a plan of action forthe JSC in discharging its duties.

b) The functions of JSC are: (i) toformulate the process ofimplementation of this Agreement;(ii) to monitor the security situationin Acheh; (iii) to undertake fullinvestigation of any securityviolations; (iv) in such cases, to takeappropriate action to restore thesecurity situation and to agree

beforehand on the sanctions to beapplied, should any party violate thisAgreement; (v) to publish weeklyreports on the security situation inAcheh; (vi) to ensure that no newparamilitary force is created toassume previous functions of Brimob,and (vii) to design and implement amutually agreed upon process ofdemilitarisation. Regarding this lasttask, the JSC will designate what willbe called Peace Zones (see Art. 4(a)).After peace zones have beenidentified, the GAM will designateplacement sites for its weapons. Twomonths after the signing of the COHand as confidence grows, GAM willbegin the phased placement of itsweapons, arms and ordinance in thedesignated sites. The JSC will alsodecide on a simultaneous phasedrelocation of TNI forces which willreformulate their mandate from astrike force to a defensive force. TheGOI has the right to request HDC toundertake no-notice verification ofthe designated sites. With the growthin confidence of both parties in theprocess the phased placement of GAM weapons will be completedwithin a period of five months (seeattached note).

c) The composition of JSC will besenior officials appointed asrepresentatives of the GOI and theGAM and a senior third partypersonality of high standing agreedupon by both sides, Each seniorofficial from the three parties are tobe accompanied by up to fourpersons as members. The heads ofdelegations from both sides have tobe senior and have the authority tobe able to take decisions on the spot.

The third party (HDC) personalityneeds to be able to command therespect and high regard of both sidesin order to be able to assist inresolving problems, as they arise.

d) In order to perform thesefunctions, the JSC is to be assisted bya monitoring team or monitoringteams, which would be providedsecurity guarantees by both sides inmonitoring the security situation andin investigating any violation.

85Key texts

Page 87: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

e) The composition of each of themonitoring teams are appointedofficials as representatives of theHigh Command of the security forcesof the GOI and the High Command ofthe forces of the GAM in Acheh and asenior third party military officeragreed upon by both sides reportingto the senior third party personalityof high standing in the JSC.

f) JSC and the monitoring team(s)would be provided with the necessarytechnical and administrative staff andlogistical support. The HDC isrequested to facilitate theestablishment of these bodies byproviding the necessary funds,logistical and administrative facilities.

g) It is agreed upon that the JSC andthe monitoring team(s) will beestablished and be operational withinone month of the signing of thisAgreement. Civil society has the rightto provide inputs to the JSC.

Article 4: Establishment of “Peace Zones”

a) Following the signing of the COHAgreement, the JSC, with the directparticipation of the senior leadershipfor security from both sides, willimmediately identify and preparelocations of conflict to be designatedas “Peace Zones”. This would facilitateconsiderably the work of the JSCsince it could focus its attention onthese areas in establishing andmaintaining security, and these zones,provided peace could be established,will be the focus of the initialhumanitarian, rehabilitation andreconstruction assistance.

b) For the first two months after thesigning, both parties will relocate todefensive positions as agreed upon bythe JSC. Adjustments to theselocations could be made by the JSCin order to separate the forces of bothparties with sufficient distance toavoid contact or confrontation.Forces of both parties will refrainfrom operations, movements,activities or any provocative acts thatcould lead to contact or confrontationwith each other.

c) In order to build trust andconfidence during these crucialmonths, these zones andsurroundings will be monitored bythe tripartite monitoring teams. TheJSC will be informed by both partiesof any significant movements oractivities in these areas.

d) POLRI will be able to investigatecriminal activities in these areas inconsultation with the JSC.

e) The designation of identified areasof demilitarised zones such asschools, mosques, health institutionsand public places, bazaars, Achehnesemeunasahs, market-places, foodstalls,communication centres includingbus-terminals, taxi-stations, ferry-terminals, public roads, rivertransportation services, and fishingports.

Article 5: Time Frames

a) Both sides agree that hostilities andall acts of violence by both sidesshould cease forever in Acheh.

b) Both sides also agree that hostilitiesand all acts of violence during the firstthree months from the time when theJSC and the monitoring team(s)become operational are very crucial asindicator of the seriousness of thecommitment from both sides. If indeedhostilities and all acts of violencecould decrease dramatically, or evencease altogether, during this first threemonth period, the Achehnese andother Indonesian people, and theinternational community, wouldconsider that the peace process wouldmost likely succeed.

c) During the period between thesigning of this Agreement and thetime when the JSC and themonitoring team(s) becomeoperational, both signatories to thisAgreement commit themselves toexercise the utmost restraint by notmaking any public statement thatwould inflame the feeling andsentiment of the other side, includingthe people, and by ensuring that theirforces will not initiate any hostile acttoward the other.

Article 6: All-Inclusive Dialogue

The parties agree to support theprocess of All-Inclusive Dialogue inAcheh as provided for in the JointStatement of 10 May 2002. Theparties agree to ensure, through thisAgreement, the necessary securityand freedom of movement for allparticipants in the All-InclusiveDialogue to enable the process to beconducted in a safe and fair manner,reflecting the views of all elements ofAchehnese society. The partiesreconfirm their agreement that theprocess of All-Inclusive Dialogue befacilitated by HDC.

Article 7: Public Information andCommunications

a) To ensure national andinternational support for the peaceprocess in Acheh, the Agreement of 10May 2002, and this Agreement and itsimplementation have to be publicisedas widely as possible within one monthof the signing of this Agreement. Theprocess of implementation has to be astransparent as possible and the peoplehave to be regularly informed of theprogress made and difficultiesencountered.

b) Communications to the public willbe given priority, especially throughthe print and electronic media.Television and radio programmeshave to be devised to enableobtaining inputs from the generalpublic provided that they areconducted in a fair and balancedmanner. The JSC remains the finalreference on this matter.

c) Other media, such as communitymeetings, seminars, flyers, bumperstickers, T-shirts, and others couldalso be considered, as appropriate.

d) The HDC is requested to look forsources of funding these publicinformation and communicationactivities.

Article 8: Joint Council

A Joint Council will be established,composed of the most seniorrepresentatives of the GOI and theGAM, and of the third party (HDC).The function of this Joint Council will

86 Accord 20

Page 88: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

be to resolve all issues or disputesarising out of the implementation ofthis Agreement, which cannot beresolved by other Committees orStructures established under thisAgreement. The Joint Council mayamend the articles and provisions ofthis Agreement.

Article 9: Amendment or Termination

This Agreement may only be amendedby agreement between the two partiesin the Joint Council. Should eitherparty wish to unilaterally terminatethe Agreement then they are obligatedto first bring the issue to the JointCouncil and engage in and support allefforts by the Joint Council to resolvethe problem within a sufficient periodof time (no less than 30 days). If theJoint Council is unable to resolve thematter, then either party has the rightto unilaterally withdraw from theAgreement.

For the Government of the Republicof Indonesia:Amb. Mr. S. Wiryono

For the Leadership of the FreeAcheh Movement:Dr. Zaini Abdullah

Witnessed byHenry Dunant Centre forHumanitarian Dialogue (HDC):Mr. Martin Griffiths

Explanatory Note for Article 3b

This note is intended as HDC’sinterpretation of the clauses in theFramework Agreement relating toGAM weapons (Article 3) and provideguidance in the manner to carry outthe responsibilities to the HDC in thatpart of the Agreement.

By this agreement the GAM hasagreed to place its weapons indesignated sites according to the timeperiod outlined in Article 3b. Thesesites will be designated by GAM andtheir location communicated to HDC.

It is our interpretation that under theagreed upon system, GAM will not beable to move the weapons that havebeen placed in the designated siteswithout the consent of HDC. GAMhas to comply with the request of

HDC to conduct no-notice inspectionsat any time.

HDC will keep the JSC informed ofthe results of these visits i.e. that thesites visited contain the weaponsplaced there and whether theycontinue to remain in the designatedsites. Any breach will becommunicated to the JSC.

sgd.Martin GriffithsDirectorHenry Dunant Centre forHumanitarian DialogueGeneva, Switzerland

87Key texts

Page 89: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Memorandum ofUnderstanding betweenthe Government of theRepublic of Indonesiaand the Free AcehMovement

The Government of Indonesia (GoI)and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM)confirm their commitment to apeaceful, comprehensive andsustainable solution to the conflict in Aceh with dignity for all.

The parties commit themselves tocreating conditions within which thegovernment of the Acehnese peoplecan be manifested through a fair anddemocratic process within the unitarystate and constitution of the Republicof Indonesia.

The parties are deeply convinced thatonly the peaceful settlement of theconflict will enable the rebuilding ofAceh after the tsunami disaster on 26 December 2004 to progress andsucceed.

The parties to the conflict committhemselves to building mutualconfidence and trust.

This Memorandum of Understanding(MoU) details the agreement and theprinciples that will guide thetransformation process.

To this end the GoI and GAM haveagreed on the following:

1 Governing of Aceh 1.1 Law on the Governing of Aceh

1.1.1 A new Law on the Governing ofAceh will be promulgated and willenter into force as soon as possibleand not later than 31 March 2006.

1.1.2 The new Law on the Governingof Aceh will be based on thefollowing principles:

a) Aceh will exercise authority withinall sectors of public affairs, whichwill be administered in conjunctionwith its civil and judicialadministration, except in the fields of

foreign affairs, external defence,national security, monetary and fiscalmatters, justice and freedom ofreligion, the policies of which belongto the Government of the Republic ofIndonesia in conformity with theConstitution.

b) International agreements enteredinto by the Government of Indonesiawhich relate to matters of specialinterest to Aceh will be entered intoin consultation with and with theconsent of the legislature of Aceh.

c) Decisions with regard to Aceh bythe legislature of the Republic ofIndonesia will be taken inconsultation with and with theconsent of the legislature of Aceh.

d) Administrative measuresundertaken by the Government ofIndonesia with regard to Aceh will beimplemented in consultation with andwith the consent of the head of theAceh administration.

1.1.3 The name of Aceh and the titlesof senior elected officials will bedetermined by the legislature of Acehafter the next elections.

1.1.4 The borders of Aceh correspondto the borders as of 1 July 1956.

1.1.5 Aceh has the right to useregional symbols including a flag, acrest and a hymn.

1.1.6 Kanun Aceh will be re-established for Aceh respecting thehistorical traditions and customs ofthe people of Aceh and reflectingcontemporary legal requirements ofAceh.

1.1.7 The institution of WaliNanggroe with all its ceremonialattributes and entitlements will beestablished.

1.2 Political participation

1.2.1 As soon as possible and notlater than one year from the signingof this MoU, GoI agrees to and willfacilitate the establishment of Aceh-based political parties that meetnational criteria. Understanding theaspirations of Acehnese people for

local political parties, GoI will create,within one year or at the latest 18months from the signing of this MoU,the political and legal conditions forthe establishment of local politicalparties in Aceh in consultation withParliament. The timelyimplementation of this MoU willcontribute positively to this end.

1.2.2 Upon the signature of this MoU,the people of Aceh will have the rightto nominate candidates for thepositions of all elected officials tocontest the elections in Aceh in April2006 and thereafter.

1.2.3 Free and fair local elections willbe organised under the new Law onthe Governing of Aceh to elect thehead of the Aceh administration andother elected officials in April 2006as well as the legislature of Aceh in2009.

1.2.4 Until 2009 the legislature ofAceh will not be entitled to enact anylaws without the consent of the headof the Aceh administration.

1.2.5 All Acehnese residents will beissued new conventional identitycards prior to the elections of April2006.

1.2.6 Full participation of allAcehnese people in local and nationalelections will be guaranteed inaccordance with the Constitution ofthe Republic of Indonesia.

1.2.7 Outside monitors will be invitedto monitor the elections in Aceh.Local elections may be undertakenwith outside technical assistance.

1.2.8 There will be full transparencyin campaign funds.

1.3 Economy

1.3.1 Aceh has the right to raise fundswith external loans. Aceh has theright to set interest rates beyond thatset by the Central Bank of theRepublic of Indonesia.

1.3.2 Aceh has the right to set andraise taxes to fund official internalactivities. Aceh has the right toconduct trade and business internally

88 Accord 20

Page 90: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

and internationally and to seekforeign direct investment and tourismto Aceh.

1.3.3 Aceh will have jurisdiction overliving natural resources in theterritorial sea surrounding Aceh.

1.3.4 Aceh is entitled to retainseventy (70) per cent of the revenuesfrom all current and futurehydrocarbon deposits and othernatural resources in the territory ofAceh as well as in the territorial seasurrounding Aceh.

1.3.5 Aceh conducts the developmentand administration of all seaports andairports within the territory of Aceh.

1.3.6 Aceh will enjoy free trade withall other parts of the Republic ofIndonesia unhindered by taxes, tariffsor other restrictions.

1.3.7 Aceh will enjoy direct andunhindered access to foreigncountries, by sea and air.

1.3.8 GoI commits to thetransparency of the collection andallocation of revenues between theCentral Government and Aceh byagreeing to outside auditors to verifythis activity and to communicate theresults to the head of the Acehadministration.

1.3.9 GAM will nominaterepresentatives to participate fully atall levels in the commissionestablished to conduct the post-tsunami reconstruction (BRR).

1.4 Rule of law

1.4.1 The separation of powersbetween the legislature, the executiveand the judiciary will be recognised.

1.4.2 The legislature of Aceh willredraft the legal code for Aceh on thebasis of the universal principles ofhuman rights as provided for in theUnited Nations InternationalCovenants on Civil and PoliticalRights and on Economic, Social andCultural Rights.

1.4.3 An independent and impartialcourt system, including a court ofappeals, will be established for Acehwithin the judicial system of theRepublic of Indonesia.

1.4.4 The appointment of the Chief ofthe organic police forces and theprosecutors shall be approved by thehead of the Aceh administration. Therecruitment and training of organicpolice forces and prosecutors willtake place in consultation with andwith the consent of the head of theAceh administration in compliancewith the applicable nationalstandards.

1.4.5 All civilian crimes committed bymilitary personnel in Aceh will betried in civil courts in Aceh.

2 Human rights2.1 GoI will adhere to the UnitedNations International Covenants onCivil and Political Rights and onEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights.

2.2 A Human Rights Court will beestablished for Aceh.

2.3 A Commission for Truth andReconciliation will be established forAceh by the Indonesian Commissionof Truth and Reconciliation with thetask of formulating and determiningreconciliation measures.

3 Amnesty and reintegrationinto society

3.1 Amnesty

3.1.1 GoI will, in accordance withconstitutional procedures, grantamnesty to all persons who haveparticipated in GAM activities as soonas possible and not later than within15 days of the signature of this MoU.

3.1.2 Political prisoners and detaineesheld due to the conflict will bereleased unconditionally as soon aspossible and not later than within 15days of the signature of this MoU.

3.1.3 The Head of the MonitoringMission will decide on disputed casesbased on advice from the legaladvisor of the Monitoring Mission.

3.1.4 Use of weapons by GAMpersonnel after the signature of thisMoU will be regarded as a violationof the MoU and will disqualify theperson from amnesty.

3.2 Reintegration into society

3.2.1 As citizens of the Republic ofIndonesia, all persons having beengranted amnesty or released fromprison or detention will have allpolitical, economic and social rightsas well as the right to participatefreely in the political process both inAceh and on the national level.

3.2.2 Persons who during the conflicthave renounced their citizenship ofthe Republic of Indonesia will havethe right to regain it.

3.2.3 GoI and the authorities of Acehwill take measures to assist personswho have participated in GAMactivities to facilitate theirreintegration into the civil society.

These measures include economicfacilitation to former combatants,pardoned political prisoners andaffected civilians. A ReintegrationFund under the administration of theauthorities of Aceh will beestablished.

3.2.4 GoI will allocate funds for therehabilitation of public and privateproperty destroyed or damaged as aconsequence of the conflict to beadministered by the authorities ofAceh.

3.2.5 GoI will allocate suitablefarming land as well as funds to theauthorities of Aceh for the purpose offacilitating the reintegration tosociety of the former combatants andthe compensation for politicalprisoners and affected civilians. Theauthorities of Aceh will use the landand funds as follows:

a) All former combatants will receivean allocation of suitable farmingland, employment or, in the case ofincapacity to work, adequate socialsecurity from the authorities of Aceh.

b) All pardoned political prisonerswill receive an allocation of suitable

89Key texts

Page 91: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

farming land, employment or, in thecase of incapacity to work, adequatesocial security from the authorities of Aceh.

c) All civilians who have suffered ademonstrable loss due to the conflictwill receive an allocation of suitablefarming land, employment or, in thecase of incapacity to work, adequatesocial security from the authorities of Aceh.

3.2.6 The authorities of Aceh and GoI will establish a joint ClaimsSettlement Commission to deal withunmet claims.

3.2.7 GAM combatants will have theright to seek employment in theorganic police and organic militaryforces in Aceh without discriminationand in conformity with nationalstandards.

4 Security arrangements4.1 All acts of violence between theparties will end latest at the time ofthe signing of this MoU.

4.2 GAM undertakes to demobilise allof its 3000 military troops. GAMmembers will not wear uniforms ordisplay military insignia or symbolsafter the signing of this MoU.

4.3 GAM undertakes thedecommissioning of all arms,ammunition and explosives held bythe participants in GAM activitieswith the assistance of the AcehMonitoring Mission (AMM). GAMcommits to hand over 840 arms.

4.4 The decommissioning of GAMarmaments will begin on 15 September 2005 and will beexecuted in four stages andconcluded by 31 December 2005.

4.5 GoI will withdraw all elements ofnon-organic military and non-organic police forces from Aceh.

4.6 The relocation of non-organicmilitary and non-organic policeforces will begin on 15 September2005 and will be executed in fourstages in parallel with the GAMdecommissioning immediately after

each stage has been verified by theAMM, and concluded by 31 December2005.

4.7 The number of organic militaryforces to remain in Aceh after therelocation is 14700. The number oforganic police forces to remain inAceh after the relocation is 9100.

4.8 There will be no majormovements of military forces afterthe signing of this MoU. Allmovements more than a platoon sizewill require prior notification to theHead of the Monitoring Mission.

4.9 GoI undertakes thedecommissioning of all illegal arms,ammunition and explosives held byany possible illegal groups andparties.

4.10 Organic police forces will beresponsible for upholding internallaw and order in Aceh.

4.11 Military forces will beresponsible for upholding externaldefence of Aceh. In normal peacetimecircumstances, only organic militaryforces will be present in Aceh.

4.12 Members of the Aceh organicpolice force will receive specialtraining in Aceh and overseas withemphasis on respect for human rights.

5 Establishment of the AcehMonitoring Mission 5.1 An Aceh Monitoring Mission(AMM) will be established by theEuropean Union and ASEANcontributing countries with themandate to monitor theimplementation of the commitmentstaken by the parties in thisMemorandum of Understanding.

5.2 The tasks of the AMM are to:

a) monitor the demobilisation ofGAM and decommissioning of itsarmaments,

b) monitor the relocation of non-organic military forces and non-organic police troops,

c) monitor the reintegration of activeGAM members,

d) monitor the human rights situationand provide assistance in this field,

e) monitor the process of legislationchange,

f) rule on disputed amnesty cases,

g) investigate and rule on complaintsand alleged violations of the MoU,

h) establish and maintain liaison andgood cooperation with the parties.

5.3 A Status of Mission Agreement(SoMA) between GoI and theEuropean Union will be signed afterthis MoU has been signed. The SoMAdefines the status, privileges andimmunities of the AMM and itsmembers. ASEAN contributingcountries which have been invited byGoI will confirm in writing theiracceptance of and compliance withthe SoMA.

5.4 GoI will give all its support forthe carrying out of the mandate ofthe AMM. To this end, GoI will writea letter to the European Union andASEAN contributing countriesexpressing its commitment andsupport to the AMM.

5.5 GAM will give all its support forthe carrying out of the mandate ofthe AMM. To this end, GAM willwrite a letter to the European Unionand ASEAN contributing countriesexpressing its commitment andsupport to the AMM.

5.6 The parties commit themselves toprovide AMM with secure, safe andstable working conditions and pledgetheir full cooperation with the AMM.

5.7 Monitors will have unrestrictedfreedom of movement in Aceh. Onlythose tasks which are within theprovisions of the MoU will beaccepted by the AMM. Parties do nothave a veto over the actions orcontrol of the AMM operations.

90 Accord 20

Page 92: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

5.8 GoI is responsible for the securityof all AMM personnel in Indonesia.The mission personnel do not carryarms. The Head of Monitoring Missionmay however decide on anexceptional basis that a patrol will notbe escorted by GoI security forces. Inthat case, GoI will be informed andthe GoI will not assume responsibilityfor the security of this patrol.

5.9 GoI will provide weaponscollection points and support mobileweapons collection teams incollaboration with GAM.

5.10 Immediate destruction will becarried out after the collection ofweapons and ammunitions. Thisprocess will be fully documented andpublicised as appropriate.

5.11 AMM reports to the Head ofMonitoring Mission who will provideregular reports to the parties and toothers as required, as well as to adesignated person or office in theEuropean Union and ASEANcontributing countries.

5.12 Upon signature of this MoU eachparty will appoint a seniorrepresentative to deal with all mattersrelated to the implementation of thisMoU with the Head of MonitoringMission.

5.13 The parties commit themselvesto a notification responsibilityprocedure to the AMM, includingmilitary and reconstruction issues.

5.14 GoI will authorise appropriatemeasures regarding emergencymedical service and hospitalisationfor AMM personnel.

5.15 In order to facilitate transparency,GoI will allow full access for therepresentatives of national andinternational media to Aceh.

6 Dispute settlement6.1 In the event of disputes regardingthe implementation of this MoU, thesewill be resolved promptly as follows:

a) As a rule, eventual disputesconcerning the implementation ofthis MoU will be resolved by the Headof Monitoring Mission, in dialoguewith the parties, with all partiesproviding required informationimmediately. The Head of MonitoringMission will make a ruling which willbe binding on the parties.

b) If the Head of Monitoring Missionconcludes that a dispute cannot beresolved by the means describedabove, the dispute will be discussedtogether by the Head of MonitoringMission with the senior representativeof each party. Following this, theHead of Monitoring Mission willmake a ruling which will be bindingon the parties.

c) In cases where disputes cannot beresolved by either of the meansdescribed above, the Head ofMonitoring Mission will reportdirectly to the Coordinating Ministerfor Political, Law and Security Affairsof the Republic of Indonesia, thepolitical leadership of GAM and theChairman of the Board of Directors ofthe Crisis Management Initiative, withthe EU Political and SecurityCommittee informed. Afterconsultation with the parties, theChairman of the Board of Directors ofthe Crisis Management Initiative willmake a ruling which will be bindingon the parties.

GoI and GAM will not undertake anyaction inconsistent with the letter orspirit of this Memorandum ofUnderstanding.

Signed in triplicate in Helsinki,Finland on the 15 of August in theyear 2005.

On behalf of the Government of theRepublic of Indonesia:Hamid Awaludin Minister of Law and Human Rights

On behalf of the Free AcehMovement:Malik Mahmud Leadership

As witnessed by:Martti AhtisaariFormer President of FinlandChairman of the Board of Directors ofthe Crisis Management InitiativeFacilitator of the negotiation process

91Key texts

Page 93: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Profiles Government of IndonesiaSince securing independence from the Netherlands in1949 Indonesia has struggled to release politics from theinfluence of the military and the tendency to centralizepower in Jakarta. Under the country’s first twopresidents, Sukarno (1945-1967) and Suharto (1967-1998), the country became increasingly authoritarian.The Suharto period in particular was marked by theconcentration of power in the executive (and in thenational capital Jakarta), the overwhelming influence of the military in politics, and restrictions on politicalorganization and expression, including elections.

Far-reaching reforms were introduced under PresidentHabibie (1998-1999), who succeeded Suharto after thelatter’s resignation in May 1998 in the face of popularprotests in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis. UnderHabibie restrictions were lifted on political parties, thecountry’s first democratic elections since 1955 wereheld, regional autonomy laws were introduced, andEast Timor was permitted to hold a referendum onindependence. However, under the ineffectualpresidencies of Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001) andMegawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), Indonesia’stransition to a more democratic politics remainederratic and inconsistent. A retired army general, SusiloBambang Yudhoyono, won the country’s first directpresidential elections in September 2004.

President Susilo Bambang YudhoyonoAfter a successful career in the Indonesian military,including deployment in East Timor in the 1970s, SusiloBambang Yudhoyono became a government ministerin 1999 under President Wahid. He ran for presidentalong with his deputy Jusuf Kalla in 2004, defeatingMegawati Sukarnoputri in the second round.Yudhoyono’s military background lent legitimacy to hisassertion that the conflict in Aceh could not be resolvedby military means alone; his influence and contacts in

92 Accord 20

Page 94: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

the army also allowed him to shield the peace processfrom spoilers within the Indonesian military (TNI).During his army career Yudhoyono became associatedwith the pro-reformist faction. Although he was given a strong personal mandate to govern in the 2004election his Democratic Party is a minority party,mak ing Yudhoyono not only vulnerable to theinfluence of his deputy and chair of the Golkar party,Jusuf Kalla, but also to the numerous other politicalparties which have major representation in theparliament and cabinet.

Vice-President Jusuf KallaAs a minister under President Megawati Jusuf Kallafacilitated peace talks in local conflicts in Maluku (theMoluccas) and his native Sulawesi. Following hiselection as vice-president he was also elected Chairman of Golkar, the largest party in the People’sRepresentative Council. This gave Kalla a powerfulposition from which to persuade other national politicalparties to agree to the Helsink i initiative. Kalla workedto lay the basis for the legalization of local politicalparties in Aceh, in order to provide a legitimate andpeaceful channel for the institutionalization ofAcehnese aspirations. The apparent synergiescharacterizing the Kalla-Yudhoyono relationship duringthe Helsink i process were however shadowed from thestart by speculation on rivalry between the two men.

The People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR)and People’s Representative Council (DPR) The MPR is constitutionally the highest state bodywhose functions include determining state policy andamending the Constitution, and until 2004, when directelections for the presidency were introduced, electingthe president and vice-president. The MPR consists of695 deputies, including all 550 deputies of the DPR and130 regional representatives elected by 26 provinciallegislatures and until 2004 65 appointees from varioussocietal groups, including the Indonesian armed forcesand police. In 2004 the Senate (DPD) was created; DPDdeputies are elected through a Single Non-TransferableVote system allocating four representatives per province.

The DPR is the main legislative institution, consisting of 550 members elected through an open listproportional representation system. Until 2004 the DPRalso featured 38 appointees from the Indonesian armyand police force, a provision ending with the 2004parliamentary elections. Although the presidencyremains a powerful force in Indonesian politics, one ofthe main features of the Reformasi period since 1998has been the strengthening of the legislature, with theDPR now becoming a powerful actor with the ability to

assert oversight over the executive and initiatelegislation.

Government security forcesThe Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) The Indonesian military was the key force in Indonesianpolitics under President Suharto, himself a general.Formerly known by the acronym ABRI, throughout itsexistence the TNI has been deployed for internalsecurity and counter-insurgency operations rather than for external defence. Military officers have playedimportant roles in politics since independence and until 2004 the TNI (with the Indonesian Police) wasrepresented not only in the DPR but also in regionallegislatures around the country. Restrictions on localgovernment employment for serving officers have alsoserved to reduce military influence in regionaladministration. Under reformasi, serving officers are nolonger appointed to important positions in the civilianbureaucracy. Reform in some areas, such as militaryfunding, has been less successful, and there has beenlittle progress in ending impunity for military officersaccused of human rights violations.

Until 1999 the Indonesian National Police (POLRI)formed part of the TNI; its separation was formallycompleted in July 2000. POLRI forces have been widelydeployed in a paramilitary role, often (as in the case ofAceh) in joint TNI-POLRI operations. Brimob (BrigadeMobil) is a POLRI special operations force, originallyestablished in 1945 to disarm Japanese combatantsand later assuming paramilitary functions.

With substantial shortfalls in funding (reportedly to theextent of 75 per cent) the TNI has been widely involvedin business activities in order to finance itself. Highlyprofitable foreign-owned businesses, such as theExxonMobil sites in Lhokseumawe in Aceh, have beensubject to TNI ‘protection policies’. In Aceh theabundance of natural resources also attracted illegalTNI involvement in fishing, logging, drug traffick ing,coffee, palm oil and trade in wildlife. These financialinterests were widely believed to be significant inmotivating TNI resistance to withdrawal from Aceh.

Significant human rights violations by the TNI have beendocumented down the years, especially during itsoperations in East Timor, Aceh, Papua and againstalleged communists in the 1960s. Counter-insurgencyoperations in Aceh targeted civilians as well as GAMguerrillas, resulting in high numbers of civilian casualties.

93Profiles

Page 95: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Political parties For much of the Suharto period until a genuinemultiparty system was introduced in 1999, only threepolitical parties were legal in Indonesia. These were the United Development Party (Partai PersatuanPembangunan, PPP), an amalgam of Muslim parties, the Indonesian Democracy Party (Partai DemokrasiIndonesia, PDI), a grouping of nationalist and Christianparties, and the Golkar party, the ruling party underSuharto, which was dominated by state functionariesand military personnel. Since 1999 the party arena hasbecome highly fragmented, with 17 parties achievingrepresentation in the People’s Representative Council(DPR) in the 2004 legislative elections and seven ofthem achieving ‘large party’ status by securing over fiveper cent of the popular vote. The other large parties arethe Islamic-oriented National Awakening Party (PKB),National Mandate Party (PAN) and the ProsperousJustice Party (PKS), as well as President Yudhoyono’sDemocratic Party.

Golkar leaders, many of whom were accused ofcorruption, dominated the provincial Acehneseadministration prior to the special autonomy lawsigned in 2001 by the DPR. Golkar leader AbdullahPuteh was elected governor in November 2000 by theregional legislature but was dismissed and imprisonedon corruption charges in 2005. The PPP also has astrong regional presence in Aceh. By allowing for localpolitical parties in Aceh the Memorandum ofUnderstanding overturned a long-standing proscriptionof local or regionalist parties in Indonesia.

Local government of Aceh province(Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, NAD) Aceh’s local government structures are the same asother provinces of Indonesia, featuring a governor anddeputy governor directly elected since 2006. Theprovince is divided into 23 districts (kabupaten) andcities (kota). Acehnese local government was known asone of the most corrupt in the country, prompting ananti-corruption drive under President Yudhoyono andthe dismissal of Governor Abdullah Puteh. In December2006 former GAM member Irwandi Yusuf wongubernatorial elections to become Governor of Aceh.

The Memorandum of Understanding envisaged a higherlevel of self-government for Aceh relative to otherprovinces of Indonesia, granting it authority over allspheres except foreign relations, national security andexternal defence, fiscal and monetary policy, justice andfreedom of religion (though in fact this phrasing isidentical to that found in the autonomy law whichapplies to all other regions of Indonesia). However, the

eventual Law on the Governing of Aceh attenuated theseprovisions and weakened the powers assigned to localgovernment structures.

Pro-government militiasNumerous pro-government self-defence groups andlocal militias, all recruited, supported and equipped bythe Indonesian army, were active in Aceh. Theiractivities increased after the declaration of militaryemergency in May 2003. Eighteen ‘anti-GAM fronts’were established between December 2003 and March2004 under the umbrella of the Resistance FrontAgainst GAM Separatists (Front Perlawanan SeparatisGAM, FPSG); these ‘fronts’ served to provide additionalintelligence to local TNI command. Pro-governmentmilitias were also responsible for three attacks onoffices of the Joint Security Committee tasked withmonitoring the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.

Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan AcehMerdeka, GAM) GAM was founded on 4 December 1976 and wasknown initially as the Acheh-Sumatra NationalLiberation Front (ASNLF). Its founder was Tengku HasanMuhammad di Tiro (widely known as Hasan di Tiro), amember of a prominent family of religious scholars inthe Pidie district of Aceh and a participant in theIndonesian national revolution in the territory. In theearly 1950s he moved to the US where he became astudent, an international advocate for the Darul Islamrebellion and eventually a businessman. GAM’s agendadiffered from the more religious demands of the priorDarul Islam rebellion by explicitly embracing anationalist ideology aiming at sovereign independence.

Counter-insurgency operations mounted by the armyquick ly ended GAM’s first attempt to begin a pro-independence rebellion. In 1979 Hasan di Tiro wasforced to flee Indonesia. He eventually made his way toSweden, where he established a government-in-exile(GAM-Sweden), styling himself as a ‘head-of-state’. WithLibyan support GAM was able to regroup in the late1980s and restart its insurgency in Aceh, engendering aprolonged period of violent and repressive militaryresponse in the early 1990s.

During the military phase of the conflict GAM, throughits military wing (known from 2002 as the NationalArmy of Aceh (TNA)), used a strategy of urban andjungle guerrilla tactics to attack TNI and Brimobpositions. GAM deployed a decentralized structuredividing Aceh into 17 wilayah (regions), each with itsown regional commander maintaining independentdirect contacts with GAM-Sweden. GAM has been

94 Accord 20

Page 96: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

criticized for human rights violations, includingk idnappings of civilians, indiscriminate bombings,particularly of schools, and its treatment of Javanesemigrants in Aceh. GAM also dealt ruthlessly withinternal dissent, crushing an internal challenge insouthern Aceh in 2001. However, GAM supporters havecountered that human rights violations perpetrated byGAM are far less significant in scale than those of theTNI, and that actions against ethnic Javanese weremotivated by the latter’s alleged involvement in pro-government militias.

GAM entered negotiations with the Indonesiangovernment in 2000 in talks brokered by the HenryDunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC). Theeventual failure of the HDC-brokered talks and theCessation of Hostilities Agreement led to a resumption of hostilities that seriously weakened GAM’s militarycapacity. When the tsunami struck at the end of 2004GAM was on the defensive. In the aftermath of thetsunami GAM declared a unilateral ceasefire, and theorganization later renounced the use of violence as partof the August 2005 Memorandum of Understanding withthe government. Malik Mahmud the ‘Prime Minister’ ofGAM, headed the GAM negotiating team. GAM wassubsequently confronted with new imperatives: thecreation of an effective structure to participate in civilpolitics and the reintegration of GAM fighters intocivilian life. To respond to these respective challengesGAM established new structures, the most important of which was the Aceh Transition Committee (KPA),which was designed to coordinate the activities of theformer TNA combatants. The KPA was instrumental inmobilizing support for former GAM members runningin the 2006 elections, especially in rural areas.

Major rifts opened up in GAM over electoral strategyand related issues in the lead-up to the elections. Manyof the older leaders based in Sweden and their alliesalienated many of the younger generation leaders inAceh, especially those in the KPA. GAM’s transformationinto a civil political force with a stake in the politicalprocess appeared to be secured with the strongperformance of former GAM members or nominees inthe 2006 elections. By late 2007 almost one half of Acehwas being governed by individuals with GAMaffiliations at the district level. However, althoughgovernor and former GAM member Irwandi Yusufremained popular and free of association withcorruption, the image of the movement as a whole hasarguably been tarnished by corruption scandals, risingcrime and difficulties with reintegrating and findingemployment for former GAM members.

Irwandi Yusuf Born in Aceh in 1960 Irwandi Yusuf joined GAM in 1990.While studying veterinary science in the US in 1993 hesays he travelled to Latin America to be trained inguerrilla warfare. On his return he worked as a GAMstrategist and propagandist. Arrested in 2003 andsentenced to seven years’ imprisonment in Banda Aceh,Irwandi escaped captivity when his prison was floodedby the 2004 tsunami. Renouncing his previous pro-independence agenda, Irwandi ran for office in the2006 elections for governor of Aceh as an independent,winning with 38 per cent of the vote.

Civil society actorsThe Aceh Referendum Information Centre (SIRA),headed by Muhammad Nuzar, was founded in 1999.SIRA was formed from a coalition of studentorganizations around the demand for Aceh’s right tohold a referendum on remaining part of Indonesia orbecoming independent. SIRA played a significant role in supporting Irwandi Yusuf and other GAM-affiliatedcandidates in the 2006 elections. Established in 1989Flower Aceh was the first Acehnese women’s group toaddress women’s rights in the context of the conflict. Ithas worked with internally displaced women andengaged in advocacy relating to gender-based violenceby state and non-state actors. KontraS Aceh(Commission for Missing Persons and Victims ofViolence) and the Legal Aid Institute (LBH-Aceh) are twomajor human rights organizations documenting humanrights violations perpetrated by all parties to the conflict.

Monitoring mechanismsThe Joint Security Committee (JSC) was originallyestablished under the terms of the Joint Understandingfor a Humanitarian Pause for Aceh of May 2000. It wasreactivated on 20 December 2002 within the terms ofthe Cessation of Hostilities Agreement to monitorcompliance with the agreement and investigateviolations. Its 150 monitors were composed of 50apiece from the TNI, GAM and an internationalcontingent of mainly Thai and Filipino soldiers.International monitors were withdrawn, however, aftera series of attacks on JSC offices by pro-governmentmilitias supported by the TNI.

The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was developedand financed under the European Security and DefencePolicy of the European Union (EU), in partnership withfive ASEAN states. It was deployed in September 2005with a six-month mandate to monitor all aspects of theHelsink i accords, including weapons destruction,relocation of ‘non-organic’ military forces, reintegrationof demobilized GAM members, legislative changes andthe human rights situation. The AMM was also mandatedto mediate in disputes over amnesties and to rule on

95Profiles

Page 97: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

complaints about violations of the Helsinki accords. Itwas the first EU monitoring mission in Asia andcomprised 226 monitors from the European Union,Norway, Switzerland and five members of ASEAN(Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines andSingapore), deployed through 11 offices. The AMM waswidely seen as effectively enforcing the peaceagreement and preserving a reputation for neutrality,although it lacked sufficient resources to effectivelyinvestigate alleged human rights abuses. Its mandatewas renewed but with reduced personnel in March 2006,and terminated after Aceh’s local elections in December.

The Aceh Reintegration Agency (Badan ReintegrasiAceh, BRA)The Aceh Reintegration Agency (BRA) was formed inFebruary 2006 with the purpose of dispensing funds toprojects providing livelihoods to ex-GAM members,proposals for which were submitted by the AcehTransition Committee (KPA). BRA funds were alsodistributed to former members of pro-governmentmilitias and GAM members who had surrendered beforethe Memorandum of Understanding. The reintegrationeffort was compromised by a lack of review andaccountability mechanisms, inefficiency and excessivelybroad definitions of BRA’s intended beneficiaries. TheKPA consolidated significant power and patronagenetworks through its control over the process ofsubmitting names to BRA, and on 4 April 2007 GovernorIrwandi appointed Nur Djuli, a former GAM negotiator,as BRA’s new director. Although Nur Djuli reorganizedBRA, problems remained with the timely receipt offunds from Jakarta and their local distribution.

International actorsCrisis Management Initiative The Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) was founded in2000 by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari as aNGO engaged in advocacy work for sustainable securityand other dimensions of conflict resolution. The CMIwas asked to facilitate talks between the Indonesiangovernment and GAM through personal contactbetween Farid Husain, Indonesian Deputy Minister for Social Affairs and Finnish businessman JuhaChristensen. Talks began after the tsunami of December2004 and resulted in the signing of the Memorandum ofUnderstanding in August 2005.

Martti Ahtisaari Martti Ahtisaari began to work for the Finnish Ministryof Foreign Affairs at the end of the 1960s. First posted asambassador to Tanzania in the early 1970s he laterplayed a key role in Namibia’s transition toindependence in 1990. In 1994 Ahtisaari was electedPresident of Finland. His involvement in resolving a

number of conflicts, notably persuading SlobodanMilosevic to withdraw his forces from Kosovo in 2000,earned him a strong reputation as an internationalmediator and at the end of his presidency he foundedthe Crisis Management Initiative. He first met FaridHusain in February 2004 and was preparing to inviterepresentatives of the Indonesian government andGAM to Finland when the tsunami struck Aceh.

Henry Dunant Centre/ Centre for HumanitarianDialogue The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (still referred toin Indonesia by its original name, the Henry DunantCentre (HDC)) is a Geneva-based foundation which wasformed in 1999 to provide facilitation services to partiesin armed conflicts. The HDC began mediating betweenGAM and the Indonesian government in 2000, in theaftermath of Suharto’s fall from power when theIndonesian military was in disarray and scope for peacein Aceh increased. These talks resulted in the JointUnderstanding on a Humanitarian Pause for Aceh in May2000 and later to the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement(CoHA) in December 2002, which was an agreement ona framework for arriving at a comprehensive peaceagreement. HDC-facilitated talks came to a halt in April2003 following the failure of the demilitarizationprocess envisaged in the CoHA.

Development and reconstruction agencies The International Organization for Migration (IOM)played an especially important role early in the peaceprocess, ensuring reintegration support was providedto former combatants and prisoners. The IOMsupported programmes for the reintegration of ex-GAMcombatants, the release and reintegration of amnestiedpolitical prisoners and for host communities. Theseprogrammes are administered through a network ofnine IOM-sponsored Information, Counselling andReferral Services (ICRS) offices around Aceh. Theycontinue to provide livelihood assistance tounemployed youth in conflict-sensitive areas and thecentral highlands.

The World Bank (WB) began developmentprogramming in Indonesia in 1998. Following thetsunami the WB brought 15 donors together into theMulti-Donor Fund for the reconstruction of Aceh andNorth Sumatra (MDF), which it chairs together with theEuropean Union and the Rehabilitation andReconstruction Board (BRR). The WB has also beeninvolved in supporting programmes addressing,amongst other issues, health assistance, reintegrationand post-settlement recovery through assistance to theAceh Reintegration Board and the empowerment ofwomen. The WB is further initiating a second MDF forpost-settlement recovery.

96 Accord 20

Page 98: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

In August 2005 the WB also launched theReconstruction of Aceh Land Administration System(RALAS) project, which seeks to re-establish landownership across territory laid waste by the tsunami as aprecursor to property reconstruction. The National LandAgency (BPN) and local NGOs administered the project,resulting in disputes over the most appropriate meansto systematize land titling where lands were uncertifiedprior to the tsunami or were held communally. WhileNGOs favoured a participatory system allowing forcollective adjudication of disputed boundaries and theconsolidation of plots, the BPN was oriented moretowards identification of pre-tsunami land rights. Thestatus of land previously held on a communal basisremains a source of potential future conflict.

The United Nations Development Programme(UNDP) has been responsible for implementing a totalof 33 projects in Indonesia overall, oriented towards fivethematic strands of which rehabilitation andreconstruction in Aceh is one. UNDP is engaged in theimplementation of the Aceh Justice Project, an initiativewithin the European Union’s Aceh Peace ProcessSupport strand. One component of the project is a two-year project building the capacity of the judiciary inAceh, launched in February 2008 and implemented inconjunction with the National Development PlanningAgency (BAPPENAS).

International corporations ExxonMobil came into being as a result of the merger of the oil and gas corporations Exxon and Mobil inNovember 1999. ExxonMobil Oil Indonesia is asubsidiary of ExxonMobil, which in a previousincarnation as Mobil Oil Indonesia (MOI) openedoperations in Indonesia in the late 1960s. In 1971 MOIdiscovered one of the largest natural gas fields in theworld in northern Aceh, leading to the construction ofextensive extraction facilities in the area, which becameknown as Lhokseumawe after a local town. In 2002ExxonMobil’s facilities at Lhokseumawe employedapproximately 2000 local residents; the Lhokseumaweoperation accounts for a sizeable share of Mobil Oil’sglobal revenues (reportedly 25 per cent) and some 20per cent of Indonesia’s foreign exports.

In June 2001 11 Indonesian citizens, through the officesof the International Labor Rights Fund, initiatedlitigation proceedings against ExxonMobil for allegedcrimes of murder, torture, sexual violence, k idnappingand other abuses, allegedly committed by ExxonMobilsecurity staff hired from the Indonesian army (TNI).

Multilateral actors Relations between Indonesia and the European Union(EU) date back to the 1970s. The EU has provided

several strands of assistance to the peace process inAceh, through the EU Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM;replaced by the Stability Instrument in 2007), as well asbeing a major donor of relief and reconstruction aidfollowing the tsunami. EU support to the peace processtook the form of five strands: funding of the CrisisManagement Initiative’s mediation effort, funding anddeployment of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM),provision of an election observation mission to observethe local elections on 11 December 2006, assistancewith the reintegration of ex-GAM combatants and asupport package supporting the rule of law anddemocracy in Aceh.

Since 2005 the European Commission of the EU hascommitted !285 million towards relief efforts in post-tsunami Aceh, support which is channelled through theMulti-Donor Fund for the reconstruction of Aceh andNorth Sumatra (MDF). Since the tsunami the EU hasalso set up the ‘Europe House’ as the formalrepresentative of the EU in Aceh.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)was established in 1967 to promote economic growthand regional stability, and Indonesia was one of the fivefounder nations. ASEAN members are bound by theprinciple of non-interference in each other’s internalaffairs and may only intervene if requested to do so.From May 2003 international human rightsorganizations documented the mistreatment anddeportation from Malaysia of Acehnese refugees andasylum seekers fleeing military operations in Aceh; theMalaysian government claimed these were illegalimmigrants. ASEAN members provided militarypersonnel to staff the Joint Security Committee, taskedwith monitoring the implementation of the Cessation ofHostilities Agreement, and later the Aceh MonitoringMission monitoring the implementation of theMemorandum of Understanding. ASEAN members alsoprovided monitors to observe the December 2006 localelections, as well as post-tsunami relief andreconstruction aid.

97Profiles

Page 99: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Chronology

The pre-colonial past and resistance tocolonial rule Regional records document a Buddhist, rice-growingsociety in the area covered today by Aceh in 500 C.E. By medieval times Aceh had become a nexus for traderoutes from Malay k ingdoms, Africa, India, China, Arabiaand Europe. Between the ninth and the thirteenthcenturies waves of Middle Eastern and Gujarati tradersspread Islam to the area now known as Aceh, whichbecame a gateway for Islam to disseminate to the widerarchipelago. By the end of the thirteenth century k ings,referring to themselves as sultans and maliks, wereconsolidating power bases in port-states along thecoast of Aceh.

It was only in the early sixteenth century that Aceh wasunited, coinciding with and partly triggered by thearrival of Portuguese traders and adventurers in theregion. By the early seventeenth century successivesultans had consolidated Aceh into a regional maritimepower controlling the Straits of Malacca. During this‘golden age’, Aceh was one of the richest and militarilymost powerful indigenous states in Southeast Asia.

However, warfare, rivals for trade and internal dissenttook their toll and over time Aceh lost its influence. Atthe same time, European powers began to consolidatetheir authority in the region. In 1641 the Dutch captureMalacca from the Portuguese; British influence alsorises following the establishment of a base at Penang in1786 and the founding of Singapore in 1819. In theearly nineteenth century Aceh becomes a focal pointfor Anglo-Dutch rivalry. The 1824 London Treatybetween Britain and the Netherlands provided forAcehnese sovereignty; however, the 1871 SumatraTreaty allowed Dutch involvement in Acehnesecommerce. The Dutch invade Aceh in 1876, beginninga 30-year war characterized by the fiercest localresistance to Dutch colonial rule in the region.Although the Dutch capture the last Acehnese sultan in1903, sporadic and small-scale resistance continuesuntil the Japanese invasion.

Indonesian independenceIn 1942 Japanese forces bring an end to Dutch rule ofthe (then) Dutch East Indies. In 1945, following theJapanese surrender, the Republic of Indonesiaproclaims independence; Dutch sovereignty istransferred to Indonesia in December 1949. During theyears of armed struggle (1945-49), the Acehnese wereamong the strongest supporters of Indonesianindependence; indeed, mainland Aceh was the onepart of the Indies which the Dutch did not evenattempt to re-conquer. Shortly after independence,

98 Accord 20

Page 100: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

however, Aceh was merged into the province of NorthSumatra. A perception that Aceh was being treatedinequitably, as well as disagreements over the place ofIslamic law, gave rise to widespread disillusionment inAceh with the new Indonesian state.

In 1953, many Acehnese supported the Darul Islam(‘House of Islam’) rebellion, originating in the majorisland of Java and led in Aceh by Daud Bereueh, areligious leader and ousted governor of the province.The rebellion aimed to establish an Islamic state inIndonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII), but waseventually put down, and in 1959 the Indonesiangovernment gave Aceh ‘special territory’ (DaerahIstimewa) status. This ostensibly granted autonomy inreligious, cultural and educational matters. Aceh’snationalist political leaders continually presented achallenge to Jakarta’s centralizing Indonesian nation-building project under President Sukarno (1945-67) andactive resistance to the highly centralized developmentideology of President Suharto (1966-98).

Under the authoritarian and military-based regime ofPresident Suharto Acehnese grievances once againbegan to mount. Special territory status came to beseen as increasingly meaningless in the face of thecentralizing tendencies of the government in Jakarta,reflected in the latter’s over-ruling of attempts toimplement local laws in various fields, including Islamiclaw. Industrial development, following the discovery ofmajor natural gas reserves in northern Aceh in 1971,prompted the migration of substantial numbers of non-indigenous workers to the territory and wasexperienced by many local people as disruptive andexploitative. In the 1970s only a tiny proportion of therevenue from the Lhokseumawe Industrial Zone filteredback to the local government.

1976Hasan di Tiro and a group of youths and former DarulIslam fighters form the Free Aceh Movement (GerakanAceh Merdeka, GAM) on 4 December and declareAcehnese independence. Many GAM members arearrested and some of the movement’s leaders are k illed by Indonesian government efforts to repress the movement. Counter-insurgency operations beginin 1977.

1979GAM’s leader, Hasan di Tiro, flees Indonesia. Heeventually arrives in Sweden where he establishes agovernment in exile based in Stockholm. Hasan di Tirolobbies internationally for the self-determination ofAceh, and arranges for GAM members to train in Libyain 1986-89.

1989GAM re-launches guerrilla operations against theIndonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI)and other targets. This prompts President Suharto toimpose a Military Operation Area (DOM) in Aceh.

1990-1991Intense counter-insurgency measures drive much ofGAM’s leadership abroad. Official records and humanrights groups put the death toll in the region at least1000, with a similar number of disappearances andthousands of others injured, widowed or orphaned.

1998 In May President Suharto is forced to resign in favour ofVice-President Habibie, who initiates democraticreforms, ends restrictions on free media and lifts Aceh’sdesignation as a Military Operation Area. TNI chiefGeneral Wiranto issues a public apology on 7 Augustfollowing the exposure of human rights violations in Aceh.

1999President Habibie announces in January that East Timorwill be granted the right to hold a referendum includingan option for independence. In February a meeting ofstudent and youth activists formulates a campaign for areferendum in Aceh. They form the Aceh ReferendumInformation Centre (Sentral Informasi Referendum, SIRA)to coordinate their campaign. In March PresidentHabibie visits Aceh and apologizes for atrocitiescommitted by the military under his predecessor. Hisgovernment introduces a Regional Autonomy Law inMay. Indonesian human rights activists take up thecause of atrocities committed under the DOM, openinga process of documenting human rights violationsengaging Acehnese civil society too. Nonethelessviolence intensifies. Well-publicized massacres ofcivilians by security forces in North and Central Acehtake place in May and July. On 30 August the populationof East Timor votes overwhelmingly in favour ofindependence in a referendum.

OctoberAbdurrahman Wahid becomes President of Indonesia. On 4 October Law 44/1999 on the Realization of the SpecialStatus of the Province of Aceh is enacted; among otheritems the law provides for the introduction of Shar'iaIslam and education, the enactment of customary law(adat) and the creation of a board of religious leaders.

NovemberThe student movement in Aceh gathers momentum.Mass demonstrations in Aceh and Jakarta call for areferendum on self-determination in Aceh.

99Chronology

Page 101: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

2000 Between January and May the Henry Dunant Centre(HDC) of Geneva brokers talks between the Indonesiangovernment and GAM representatives in Geneva.

MarchIndonesian Secretary of State Bondan Gunawan meetsinformally with the head of GAM’s military wing,Abdullah Syafie, in Aceh. It is the first high-level meetingbetween GAM and an Indonesian government official.

MayOn 12 May the Joint Understanding on a HumanitarianPause for Aceh is signed. The Pause begins in June, butlevels of violence remain significant through the end ofthe year.

2001 January HDC arranges another meeting for both parties inGeneva. As the Humanitarian Pause reaches its expirydate of 15 January, ‘sweeping operations’ are resumedby the TNI in Aceh. Civil society representatives call for a ceasefire.

MarchExxonMobil temporarily closes its gas extraction facility at Lhokseumawe in response to the worseningsecurity situation.

April Under pressure from the military to declare a state ofemergency President Wahid issues PresidentialInstruction No.4 with a six-point plan to resolve theconflict, including by allowing more security operations.

June Eleven Indonesian citizens open litigation proceedingsagainst ExxonMobil at the United States Supreme Courtfor alleged human rights abuses perpetrated bysecurity personnel hired by ExxonMobil from theIndonesian military.

July-AugustPresident Wahid is removed from power and MegawatiSukarnoputri (the daughter of former PresidentSukarno) takes up the presidency. On 8 AugustPresident Megawati signs a Law 18/2001 on SpecialAutonomy for the province of Nanggroe Aceh Darusslam(NAD, the title of Aceh province according to the law).This law contains more far-reaching provisions than the1999 Regional Autonomy Law, including the right of theprovince to retain a larger share of natural resourcerevenues than other provinces and the right toimplement aspects of Shar'ia law.

2002In January the Indonesian military raids GAMheadquarters and k ills GAM commander AbdullahSyafie. In February Geneva talks mediated by the HDCresume, culminating in an agreement in May on thestructure of future dialogue and negotiationmechanisms; government sources announce, wrongly,that GAM had accepted autonomy. Counter-insurgencyoperations intensify.

AugustThe government gives GAM three months to ceasearmed resistance and accept autonomy.

December A Preparatory Conference on Peace and Reconstructionin Aceh meets in Tokyo, co-chaired by Japan, the UnitedStates, the European Union and the World Bank, andestablishes a set of priorities for post-conflictreconstruction. On 9 December the government andGAM sign the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA)in a meeting brokered by the HDC. Under the CoHA,the Indonesian military agrees to move from offensiveto defensive positions and in designated ‘peace zones’GAM members agree to put their weapons into storage.The Joint Security Committee (JSC) is formed tomonitor the peace process, comprising representativesof both parties and independent monitors fromThailand and the Philippines. Levels of violence dropsignificantly in the aftermath of the agreement.

2003January-February The five-month CoHA implementation phase begins: thefirst peace zones are established and monitors deployed.

March-April Violence escalates. Talks between the Indonesiangovernment and GAM break down on 24 April.President Megawati accuses GAM of failing to disarmand orders the military to prepare for a new counter-insurgency offensive in Aceh. On 28 April thegovernment gives a two-week ultimatum to GAM toend resistance and accept autonomy within a unitaryIndonesia. GAM refuses to do so. Militia attacks oninternational monitors prompt their withdrawal.

MayThe US, Japan and the European Union urge theIndonesian government and GAM to avoid armedclashes and extend peace talks in Tokyo. On 16 May the Indonesian government reiterates that specialautonomy is its final offer and threatens GAM with arenewed military offensive. GAM negotiators do notrespond, citing arrests of GAM members en route toTokyo as the reason. On 19 May President Megawati

100 Accord 20

Page 102: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

imposes a six-month ‘military emergency’ in Aceh inwhich the military is given greatly expanded powers topursue counter-insurgency operations and to supervisecivilian affairs. An estimated 30,000 soldiers and 12,000police officers are deployed to Aceh and an Indonesianmilitary offensive (referred to as Operasi Terpadu)commences, representing Indonesia's biggest militaryoperation since the deployment in East Timor in 1975and ultimately seriously weakening GAM’s militarycapacity. Operasi Terpadu is accompanied bybackground screening of civil servants in Aceh, theobligatory distribution of new identity cards for allresidents of Aceh and forced participation in oaths ofloyalty to the Indonesian state.

November Coordinating Minister for Political and Security AffairsSusilo Bambang Yudhoyono confirms that martial law isextended.

2004MayMartial law is replaced by a state of “civil emergency”,although troop levels of 40,000 remain in Aceh. Thehighest security command is transferred from the armyto the police.

SeptemberFormer General and Security Minister Susilo BambangYudhoyono is elected President of Indonesia on a ticketwith his deputy Yusuf Kalla as Vice-President.Yudhoyono visits Aceh in November, with pledges ofamnesty, economic aid and provincial autonomy.However, the ‘civil emergency’ remains in place.

December On 26 December a 9.1-magnitude underwaterearthquake and ensuing tsunami devastates Aceh,k illing at least 160,000 in Aceh and causing massivedestruction to coastal areas and the capital Banda Aceh.In the aftermath of the tsunami Aceh is opened up toforeign aid workers; GAM declares a unilateral ceasefire.

2005January On 19 January Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajudaannounces that the government will resume talks withGAM to fully restore security and political stability in thetsunami-stricken province. On 27-29 January thegovernment and GAM meet again for the first timesince May 2003 in Helsink i, at talks brokered by theFinland- and Brussels-based Crisis ManagementInitiative (CMI), headed by former Finnish PresidentMartti Ahtisaari.

FebruaryAt the second round of talks in Helsink i (21-23February) GAM accepts ‘self-government’ withinIndonesia as opposed to the discredited autonomypreviously offered. GAM spokespeople confirm thattheir long-standing goal of independence is no longer‘on the table.’

April The third round of the Helsink i talks takes place 12-16 April.

MayThe fourth round of the Helsink i talks takes place 26-31 May. The state of emergency is lifted in Aceh andcivilian authority restored. Nonetheless some 39,000Indonesian troops remain.

JulyThe fifth and final round of the Helsink i talks takes place12-17 July. On 17 July the Memorandum ofUnderstanding (MoU) is agreed in Helsink i, with termsincluding the withdrawal by Indonesian government of all ‘non-organic’ troops (reinforcements sent fromoutside Aceh) and demobilization by GAM along withthe decommissioning of weapons.

AugustThe MoU is signed formally in Helsink i on 15 August.The Indonesian government immediately grants anamnesty to GAM members and the release of GAMprisoners proceeds immediately.

SeptemberThe European Union-led Aceh Monitoring Mission(AMM) begins its work on the basis of an extendable six-monthly mandate. The decommissioning of GAMweapons and withdrawal of ‘non-organic’ security forcesfrom Aceh proceeds successfully. Between Septemberand December extensive consultations take place inAceh on a draft law on self-government in Aceh.

October GAM creates a new National Assembly (MajelisNasional) in Banda Aceh, as its supreme politicalauthority, and the Aceh Transition Committee (KPA) tosupervise the demobilization of combatants.

DecemberOn 4 December, supporters of the creation of two newprovinces in Aceh demonstrate in Jakarta. A draft Lawon the Governing of Aceh (LoGA), replacing the 2001special autonomy law, is submitted to Jakarta on 5December; many in Aceh perceive the draft law ashaving been ‘diluted’.

101Chronology

Page 103: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

2006JanuaryThe Ministry of Home Affairs submits a reworked draftLaw on the Governing of Aceh to the state secretariat; thedraft is widely perceived as weakening the powersenvisaged for Aceh vis-à-vis the central government.Another disputed issue is whether independentcandidates would be able to run in Aceh elections.

FebruaryOn 11 February the Aceh Reintegration Board (BRA) iscreated, mandated to manage the reintegration offormer GAM members and combatants. On 17 Februaryan office of SIRA, the Aceh Referendum InformationCentre is attacked by ex-militia members.

MarchThe first six-month phase of the AMM ends; a three-month extension with a reduced number of monitors is agreed.

MayAt a Congress held on 22-23 May GAM decides, amidstbitter and growing factionalism, not to contest localelections as an organization but to allow its membersto run as independent candidates. This decision reflectsthe onset of an internal rift within the GAM leadership.

December On 11 December simultaneous provincial and districtelections take place in Aceh. Former GAM memberIrwandi Yusuf wins the governorship with 38 per centof the vote (his nearest rival wins 17 per cent), a voterepresenting a GAM victory. The second place ticketwas supported by a national party, the UnitedDevelopment Party (PPP) and a rival group in GAM.Simultaneously GAM-affiliated candidates win in six of 19 municipality and district elections (in delayedelections over succeeding months they pick up threemore districts).

The AMM completes its mandate of monitoring andsupporting the peace process.

2007January-MarchA number of extortion scandals involving the KPA cometo light; there are also reports of increased crime. On 28 January state airline pilot Pollycarpus Priyanto isjailed for 20 years for the 2004 murder of Munir Thalib, ahuman rights activist known for exposing human rightsabuses in Aceh and elsewhere in Indonesia.

AprilGovernor Irwandi appoints former member of GAM’snegotiation team in Helsink i, Nur Djuli, as director ofthe BRA.

JuneIn a local by-election GAM wins the key east littoraldistrict of Bireuen with 60.2 per cent of the vote.

AugustHundreds of Indonesian flags are torn down in EastAceh; although the identity of the perpetrators remainsunclear in Jakarta this is perceived as a re-emergence ofseparatism. On the second anniversary of the signing ofthe MoU a group of GAM figures write to PresidentYudhoyono, the EU and CMI expressing concern overthe non-implementation of the MoU’s terms.

NovemberIn district elections in South Aceh the winner is anotherGAM-nominated candidate.

2008April In the worst violent incident since the MoU, a KPA officeis attacked by a mob in Alu Lintang, Central Aceh. Sixpeople, including members of the KPA, are murdered.The incident was triggered by a dispute over control ofa local bus station between GAM and former pro-government militia members.

MayTwelve local political parties, including partiescomprising former GAM members, are formallyamalgamated and legalized as a single party, enablingAceh’s local parties to compete in the parliamentaryelection in 2009.

102 Accord 20

Page 104: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

103Further reading

The peace process! Aspinall, Edward. The Helsink i

Agreement: a more promising basisfor peace in Aceh? (East-West Center,Policy Studies 20, 2005)

! Aspinall, Edward. Peace withoutjustice? The Helsink i peace process inAceh (Geneva: Henry Dunant Centrefor Humanitarian Dialogue, 2007)

! Barakat, Sultan; David Connolly andJudith Large. ‘Can ProactiveHumanitarianism Create SustainableSolutions? Challenges to third-partyintervention in Aceh’ in SultanBarakat (ed.) After the Conflict:Reconstruction and Development inthe Aftermath of War (I.B. Tauris & CoLtd, 2005)

! Barakat, Sultan; David Connolly andJudith Large. ‘Winning and Losing inAceh: Five Key Dilemmas for ThirdParty Intervention’ Civil Wars Vol. 5,No 4 (Winter 2002)

! Feith, Pieter. The Aceh peace process:nothing less than a success(Washington, DC: USIP Special Report184, 2007)

! Husain, Farid. To see the unseen:scenes behind the Aceh peace treaty(Jakarta: Health & Hospital Indonesia,2007)

! Huber, Konrad. The HDC in Aceh:promises and pitfalls of NGOmediation and implementation(East-West Center, Policy Studies 9,2004)

! International Crisis Group. Aceh: anew chance for peace(Jakarta/Brussels: ICG Asia Briefingno. 40, 15 August 2005)

! Merikallio, Katri. Making peace:Ahtisaari and Aceh. (Juva: WSBookwell Oy, 2006)

! Morfit, Michael. ‘The Road toHelsink i: The Aceh Agreement andIndonesia’s DemocraticDevelopment’ InternationalNegotiation Vol. 12, No. 1 (2007)

Background! Reid, Anthony (ed.) Verandah of

Violence: the background to the Acehproblem (Washington, DC: Universityof Washington Press, 2006)

! Schulze, Kirsten. The Free AcehMovement (GAM): Anatomy of aSeparatist Organization (East-WestCenter, Policy Studies 2, 2004)

! Sjamsuddin, Nazaruddin, TheRepublican Revolt: A Study of theAcehnese Rebellion (Singapore:Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,1985)

! Sukma, Rizal. ‘Security Operations inAceh: goals, consequences, andlessons’ (East-West Center, PolicyStudies 3, 2004)

Other! Aguswandi. ‘Aceh: civil society – the

missing piece of peacebuilding’ inAnnelies Heijmans, Nicola Simmondsand Hans van de Veen (eds.)Searching for Peace in Aisa Pacific: anoverview of conflict prevention andpeacebuilding activities (Boulder, CO.:Lynne Rienner, 2004)

! Assad, Muhammad. The Principles ofState and Government in Islam(Gibraltar, Dar al-Andalas, 1980)

! Patrick Barron, Samuel Clark, andMuslahuddin Daud. Conflict andrecovery in Aceh: an assessment ofconflict dynamics and options forsupporting the peace process.(Jakarta: World Bank, 2005)

! Barron, Patrick, Rachael Diprose andMichael Woolcock. ‘Local Conflictand Community Development inIndonesia: Assessing the Impact ofthe Kecamatan DevelopmentProgramme’ Indonesian SocialDevelopment Paper No. 10. (Jakarta:World Bank, 2006)

! Braud, Pierre-Antoine and GiovanniGrevi. The EU Mission in Aceh:implementing peace (Paris: The EUInstitute for Security Studies,Occasional paper no. 61, December 2005)

! Burford, Suzanne, ‘An increasing rolefor the TNI in Indonesian securitypolicy’ coombs.anu.edu.au/SpecialProj/ ASAA/biennial conference/2006/proceedings.html

! Burke, Adam, and Patrick Barron.Aceh after Helsink i: strengths andlimitations of internationalinvolvement in the peace process(Washington, D.C.: East-West Center,Policy Studies, 2008)

! Community Development inIndonesia: Assessing the Impact ofthe Kecamatan

! Crisis Management Initiative. TheAceh peace process: involvement ofwomen (Crisis Management Initiativereport, August 2006)

! Development Program’ IndonesianSocial Development Paper No. 10.(Jakarta: World Bank, 2006)

! Down to Earth (DTE), ‘Aceh: Logginga Conflict Zone’, Eye on Aceh series,http://dte.gn.apc.org

! Human Rights Watch. Too High aPrice: The Human Rights Cost of theIndonesian Military’s EconomicActivities’ (New York, Human RightsWatch, 2006)

! International Crisis Group. Indonesia:how GAM won in Aceh(Jakarta/Brussels: ICG Asia Briefingno. 61, 22 March 2007)

! McCulloch, Leslie. ‘Greed: the silentforce of the conflict in Aceh’http://www.preventconflict.org/portal/main/greed

! Schulze, Kirsten. ‘Free AcehMovement (GAM): Anatomy of aSeparatist Organization’ (East-WestCenter, Policy Studies 2, 2004)

! Schulze, Kirsten. Mission Not SoImpossible: The Aceh MonitoringMission and Lessons learned for theEU (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,International Policy Analysis, July 2007)

Further reading

Page 105: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

104 Accord 20

Powers of persuasion: incentives, sanctions and conditionality in peacemakingIssue 19 | 2008International policymakers frequently useincentives, sanctions and conditionalityas tools to influence intra-state conflicts.Using a range of case studies, this issueasks whether and how these toolsconstructively influence conflict parties’engagement in peacemak ing initiatives.

Peace by piece: addressing Sudan’s conflictsIssue 18 | 2006This issue reviews the peace process thatled to the 2005 Comprehensive PeaceAgreement in Sudan, exploring the issuesremaining to be tack led and arguing thatfuture Sudanese initiatives must be moreinclusive and better coordinated.

The limits of leadership: elites and societies in the NagornyKarabakh peace processIssue 17 | 2005Since the 1994 ceasefire, the conflictbetween Azerbaijan and Armenia overNagorny Karabakh has remaineddeadlocked. This issue explores thedynamics of polarization, the obstacles to a sustainable agreement and thechallenge of overcoming resistance to compromise.

Choosing to engage:armed groups and peace processesIssue 16 | 2005Non-state armed groups, key actors inmany internal armed conflicts, haveparticipated in peace processes across theworld. This issue draws on theseexperiences to explore the case forengaging with armed groups, and thedifferent options, roles and challenges forsuch engagement.

From military peace to social justice?The Angola peace process Issue 15 | 2004The Luena Memorandum of 2002brought an end to Angola’s 27-year civilwar. This issue reviews Angola’s history ofpeacemak ing efforts, and analyses thechallenges remaining if the absence ofviolence is to develop into a sustainableand just peace.

Alternatives to war: Colombia’s peace processes Issue 14 | 2004This issue provides an overview of morethan 25 years of peace initiatives withColombia's guerrilla and paramilitarygroups. It includes analysis of civil societyefforts at local, regional and national levelsand identifies the necessary elements of anew model of conflict resolution.

Owning the process: public participation in peacemaking Issue 13 | 2002The first thematic publication documentsmechanisms for public participation inpeacemaking. It features extended studieslooking at how people were enabled toparticipate in political processes inGuatemala, Mali and South Africa. It alsocontains shorter pieces from Colombia,Northern Ireland and the Philippines.

Weaving consensus: The Papua NewGuinea – Bougainville peace process Issue 12 | 2002Accord 12 documents efforts leading tothe Bougainville Peace Agreement of2001. The issue describes an indigenousprocess that drew on the strengths ofMelanesian traditions, as well asinnovative roles played by internationalthird parties.

Protracted conflict, elusive peace:initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda Issue 11 | 2002While a meaningful peace process inNorthern Uganda remains elusive, thisissue documents significantpeacemak ing initiatives undertaken byinternal and external actors and analysestheir impact on the dynamics of theconflict and attempts to find peace.

The Accord seriesAccord: an international review of peace initiatives is published by Conciliation Resources (CR). It provides detailed narrativeand analysis on specific war and peace processes in an accessible format. The series is intended to provide a practical resourcefor reflection for all those engaged in peacemaking activities.

Page 106: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

105The Accord series

Politics of compromise: the Tajikistan peace processIssue 10 | 2001Accord 10 describes the aspirations of the parties to the conflict in Tajik istan and documents the negotiation processleading to the General Agreement ofJune 1997. It looks at the role of theinternational community, led by the UN, as well as local civil society, in reaching anegotiated settlement.

Paying the price: the Sierra Leone peace processIssue 9 | 2000The Lomé Peace Agreement of July 1999sought to bring an end to one of themost brutal civil wars of recent times.Accord 9 explores earlier attempts tobring the conflict to an end and in doingso seeks to draw valuable lessons forSierra Leone’s transition.

Striking a balance: the Northern Ireland peace processIssue 8 | 1999Accord 8 explores the factors that led to the negotiations resulting in the BelfastAgreement, describing the complexunderlying forces and the development of an environment for peace.

2003: Supplement issue

A question of sovereignty:the Georgia–Abkhazia peace processIssue 7 | 1999The publication explores the backgroundand issues at the heart of the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict, provides a uniqueinsight into a political stalemate and pointstowards possible avenues out of deadlock.

Compromising on Autonomy: Mindanao in TransitionIssue 6 | 1999The GRP-MNLF 1996 Peace Agreement was a milestone in many ways. The publication analyses features of peacemaking inMindanao and examines the challenges of implementation.

2003: Supplement issue

Safeguarding Peace: Cambodia’s Constitutional ChallengeIssue 5 | 1998This publication documents issues around the signing of the 1991 Paris agreementswhich officially "brought to an end"Cambodia's long war and the violentcollapse of the country's governing coalition in July 1997.

Demanding Sacrifice: War and Negotiation in Sri LankaIssue 4 | 1998The Sri Lanka issue documents the cyclesof ethnic/national conflict which haveblighted the country since 1983. It analysesnegotiations and other peace initiativesthat have taken place since 1993 andoutlines fundamental issues that need to be confronted in futurepeacemaking efforts.

The Mozambican Peace Process in PerspectiveIssue 3 | 1998The Mozambique issue documents thediverse initiatives which drove the partiesto a negotiated settlement of the conflictas well as illustrating the impact ofchanging regional and internationaldynamics on Mozambique.

Negotiating Rights: The Guatemalan Peace ProcessIssue 2 | 1997The signing of the peace agreement in1996 brought an end to 36 years of civilwar in Guatemala. The publication analysesissues of impunity, indigenous rights,political participation and land reform.

The Liberian Peace Process 1990–1996Issue 1 | 1996The Liberia issue documents the lengthyand fractious Liberian peace process andprovides insight into why thirteenindividual peace accords collapsed in half as many years.

Page 107: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

106 Accord 20

conciliation resources

Conciliation Resources (CR) is an internationalnongovernmental organization registered in the UK asa charity. We work mainly in the Caucasus, Uganda andWest Africa in partnership with local and internationalcivil society organizations and governments. We alsopublish Accord: an international review of peaceinitiatives and are involved in projects in Colombia, Fijiand the Philippines. Our funding is through grants fromgovernments, independent trusts and foundations.

CR’s organizational goals are to:• Support people working at local, national and

international levels in developing innovative solutionsto social, economic and political problems related toviolent conflicts

• Provide opportunities for inclusive dialogue andimproved relationships within communities and acrossconflict divides at all social and political levels

• Influence governments and other decision-makers toemploy conflict transformation policies that promotealternatives to violence

• Improve peacemaking practice and policies bypromoting learning from peace processes around the world

• Challenge stereotypes and increase public awarenessof human rights, conflict and peace issues individed societies.

For more information or to make a donation contact:

Conciliation Resources173 Upper StreetLondon N1 1RGUnited Kingdom

Telephone +44 (0)20 7359 7728Fax +44 (0)20 7359 4081Email [email protected] www.c-r.org

Charity Registration no. 1055436

Source: Conciliation Resources

Page 108: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

107Order form

Accord: an international review of peace initiatives

I would like a subscription to Accord1 year subscription includes: - Two issues of Accord

- Annual Review- Supplementary policy and comparative learning project documents £29.99 !!

I would like copies of the latest AccordsIssue 20 Reconfiguring politics: the Indonesia-Aceh peace process £16.99 !!Issue 19 Powers of persuasion: incentives, sanctions and conditionality in peacemaking £16.99 !!

I would like copies of previous Accords (50-70% off the original price)

Complete set of back issues (1-18) £99.99 !!

Please indicate number required against issues requested

SupplementsReframing: a strategy for conflict transformation £4.99 !!

Dilemmas of third-party involvement in peace processes: reflections for policy and practice from Colombia and the Philippines £4.99 !!

Engaging armed groups in peace processes: reflections for practice and policy from Colombia and the Philippines £4.99 !!

Subtotal £ ___________________

Postage and packaging (Please add 15% to the subtotal for the UK, 25% for Europe and 40% for the rest of the world) £ ___________________

TOTAL £ ___________________

Method of Payment

Online: visit www.c-r.org

Cheque: made payable to ‘Conciliation Resources’ in pounds sterling only !!Credit card: Mastercard !! Visa !! Name as it appears on card _______________________________________

Card number !!!!!!!! !!!!!!!! !!!!!!!! !!!!!!!! Expiry date !!!! /!!!!

Signature ______________________________________

Your details

Name

Organization (if relevant)

Address

Postcode

Telephone EmailPlease turn over

Issue 18 Peace by piece: addressing Sudan’s conflicts £8.49 !!

Issue 17 The limits of leadership: elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process £8.49 !!

Issue 16 Choosing to engage: armed groups and peace processes(including 2003 supplement) £8.49 !! Supplement only £1.99!!

Issue 15 From military peace to social justice? The Angolan peace process £8.49 !!

Issue 14 Alternatives to war: Colombia’s peace processes £8.49 !!

Issue 13 Owning the process: public participation in peacemaking £8.49 !!

Issue 12 Weaving consensus: the Papua New Guinea – Bougainville peace process £8.49 !!

Issue 11 Protracted conflict, elusive peace: initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda £8.49 !!

Issue 10 Politics of compromise: the Tajikistan peace process £4.99 !!

Issue 9 Paying the price: the Sierra Leone peace process £4.99 !!

Issue 8 Striking a balance: the Northern Ireland peace process (including 2003 supplement) £4.99 !! Supplement only £1.99!!

Issue 7 A question of sovereignty:the Georgia–Abkhazia peace process £4.99 !!

Issue 6 Compromising on autonomy: Mindanao in transition (including 2003 supplement) £4.99 !! Supplement only £1.99!!

Issue 5 Safeguarding peace: Cambodia’s constitutional challenge £4.99 !!

Issue 4 Demanding sacrifice: war and negotiation in Sri Lanka £4.99!!

Issue 3 The Mozambican peace process in perspective £4.99!!

Issue 2 Negotiating rights: the Guatemalan peace process £4.99!!

Issue 1 The Liberian peace process 1990–1996 £4.99 !!

Page 109: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Electronic mailingsWe would like to keep you informed about the latest news from Conciliation Resources. Tick here if you would like to receive these periodic updates. You can unsubscribe at any time at www.c-r.org !!

Our details

Please return your completed form to: Accord, Conciliation Resources, 173 Upper Street, London N1 1RG, UK

For further information Telephone +44 (0)20 7359 7728 Email [email protected] +44 (0)20 7359 4081 Website www.c-r.org

Page 110: Reconfiguring politics · Aceh (Aceh Barat Selatan) ALA Proposed new province in Aceh (Aceh Leuser Antara) AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e v i e w o f p e a c e i n i t i a t i ve s

Issue Editors Aguswandi andJudith Large

the Indonesia – Aceh peace process

Reconfiguring politics:

Reconfiguring politics: the Indonesia – Aceh peace process

The Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Government ofIndonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Helsinki in August2005 signalled an end to more than three decades of armed conflictand suffering in Aceh. The peace agreement provided a basis forreconfiguring politics in the province, outlining the principlesunderpinning new ‘self-government’ arrangements, as well asprovisions for political participation, revenue sharing, reintegrationand human rights.

This Accord issue offers an analysis of developments leading toAceh’s peace agreement, with contributions from the parties’negotiators as well as the mediator. It also examines the subsequentprocess of putting the agreement into practice. The successes,difficulties, and controversies of translating the agreement into law,contesting elections, enabling reconstruction and reintegrating ex-combatants all signal important ongoing challenges for Aceh’sfuture. Finally, the publication discusses key peacebuilding issues thatoften receive less attention, such as women’s roles, the impact ofShar’ia law, and consolidation of political parties.

Conciliation Resources and the Accord seriesConciliation Resources (CR) is an international non-governmentalorganization that supports people working to prevent violence,promote justice and transform armed conflict. CR’s Accord projectsaim to inform and strengthen peace processes, providing a uniqueresource on conflict and peacemaking.

“Bringing together direct experience and serious analysis,Accord is an invaluable resource and inspiration for people

around the world who are struggling to transform violent conflict and influence policy.”

Diana Francis, Chair of the Committee for Conflict Transformation Support, UK

The full text of all issues in the Accord series can be found on theConciliation Resources website at http://www.c-r.org

Issue 20 2008

Accord 20

Conciliation ResourcesThe Ind

onesia – Aceh p

eace process

Conci l iat ion Resources

£16.99

Accord20 Cover AW 03 10/9/08 21:05 Page 1