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Georgian Young Lawyers Association

International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy

Transparency International Georgia

Recommendations for the Local Self-Government Electoral System

An important part of successful self-government reform is choosing the type of electoral system for

local self-government that will promote fair elections and ensure that votes are proportionately

translated into seats.

The following self-government elections are scheduled to be held in the period of May-June 2014.

Therefore, we believe that at this stage the election reform should focus on changing of the electoral

system. Notably, the existing electoral system has long been criticized by non-governmental

organizations and political parties due to its inability to translate votes into seat numbers

proportionately, due to high risk of losing votes and the lack of protection of equality of votes. Further,

European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) and OSCE Office for

Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) recommend that the electoral system for both

parliamentary and local self-government elections be reviewed in order to ensure the equality of

suffrage. 1

Even though the necessity of modifying the election system has long been discussed (we raised the

issue before the inter-factional group for immediate discussion as early as in 2013), the inter-factional

group failed to address the issue and postponed it. Regrettably, inter-factional group on elections could

only be assembled in January 2014 to openly discuss the issue for the first time.

We support the election system that will be successful in solving todays systemic problems and in improving reflection of constituents will. Consequently, in the process of elaboration of the present recommendations it was our aim to propose the municipal elections systems that would successfully

address todays challenges.

We believe that if the government makes the political decision in a timely manner and introduces the

amendments to the Election Code by mid-February, it will be possible to make important steps

forwards in improving the election system; however, if the process will be delayed, considering that in

1 EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMMISSION) AND OSCE OFFICE

FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (OSCE/ODIHR) JOINT OPINION ON THE DRAFT

ELECTION CODE OF GEORGIA, 2011, Page 8.para 22

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addition to training of election administration personnel and addressing other technical and

administrative issues, modification of the election system is also requires a large-scale campaign to

raise public awareness, the authorities may or may not be able to make any comprehensive changes in

the system.

We remain hopeful that the decision to change the electoral system will be made in a timely manner, in

view of best interests of Georgian citizens.

In choosing the electoral system for local self-government, we considered priorities that the new

system should focus on, including:

Proportionality votes are proportionately translated into mandates;

Wasted votes reduced to minimum

Promote representation of small parties and independent candidates;

Representation of different groups the society (minorities) and gender equality;

Increased public trust in elections;

Candidates centered system

Less likelihood of repeat elections

Simplicity

NGOs believe that Single Transfer Vote (SVT) system is best suited for the local self-government

elections. Because of the complexity of administration of the SVT system and the lack of time

before the upcoming elections, adoption of the SVT system is not feasible. However, we support it

for future consideration.

At this stage, in view of the foregoing criteria, we propose the following election systems for IATFs consideration:

Elections for local councils (Sakrebulos)

a) Proportional elections Party List proportional representation system (List PR) for proportional elections; majoritarian elections block voting for multi-mandate constituencies and alternative vote for single-mandate constituencies;

b) Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system as an alternative option

For the election of Gamgebeli (Mayor) we support the 50% barrier, which is envisaged by the election

system put forward by us. We think that the barrier will reflect will of the majority of voters and will

ensure high degree of legitimacy of the elected candidate.

Gamgebeli/Mayoral Elections the system of Alternative Vote

Below is a detailed description of the electoral systems proposed, including their advantages and

disadvantages.

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Proportional Representation Voting System

For proportional elections of Sakrebulo we suggest use of Party List Proportional Representation

voting system (List PR).

List PR belongs to the family of proportional voting systems and is used for multi-mandate voting

districts. Ballot structure is party-centered, while each voter has a single vote.

Through the List PR system voters vote for candidate, while mandates are allocated in proportion to

votes obtained by a political party. Number of votes received by a party determines how many

candidates from the party list are actually elected2. However, open lists allow voters to indicate

individual candidate preferences and vote not only for political parties but for independent candidates

as well. In particular, after giving a vote to a political party, the voter is also able to give his/her vote to

any candidate on the list (number of candidates can be limited e.g. a voter may be able to give his/her vote to 5 or 10 candidates), who s/he wants to see in the representative body. This allows striking a

balance between interests of voters and political parties in the process of creating party lists.

A voter may simply give his/her vote to a particular candidate on a ballot or candidates are chosen

through a preference vote (a voter marks his/her first choice, then his second choice, etc.). To simplify

vote counting procedures, we suggest to use a simple vote (as opposed to preference vote). If several

candidates receive equal number of votes, winner will be identified based on his/her place on the party

list. If a party receives more mandates than number of candidates elected, remaining winners will be

identified based on their place on the party list.

We believe that compared to close lists, open lists are far more democratic as voters have more

influence on the order in which a partys candidates are elected. This helps grow the connection between voters and candidates and increases responsibility of voters in election of candidates and their

participation in shared decision-making. It also increases accountability of candidates before voters.

Candidates become directly dependent on voters will as opposed to that of party leaders, which should bring candidates closer to the electorate and promote strong candidates.

By virtue of Article 162 of the Civil Code of Georgia, an electoral subject should obtain at least 4% of

votes to receive a seat in Tbilisi Sakrebulo, while Article 148 of the Code provides for a 5% threshold

for receiving seats in Sakrebulos of other municipalities.

We believe that the foregoing rule puts some electoral subjects to a disadvantage and is therefore

unreasonable. In light of this, we believe that all municipalities should be subject to equal electoral

threshold set at 4%. This will increase chances of small parties to obtain seats in local representative bodies.

Majoritarian Elections of Sakrebulo

For multi-mandate majoritarian districts, we suggest that the government use block voting.

Block voting belongs to the family of majoritarian-pluralist systems; it is used for multi-mandate

districts and voters have as many votes as there are mandates to be allocated. Ballot structure

2 Electoral Systems Design, The New International IDEA Handbook, 2005, p.60

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candidate-centered. Voters may vote for candidates, despite their party affiliation3. The candidates with

the highest number of votes win.

The system is preferable because it allows voter to simultaneously vote for candidates from different

parties, as well as for independent candidates and it doesnt require a second round of elections. In addition, the system is simple for voters to perceive and promotes organizational development of

parties. 4

If the government opts for maintaining single-member districts of majoritarian elections of Sakrebulo,

we recommend it to consider the system of alternative vote, similar to Mayoral/Gamgebeli elections. 5

Sakrebulo elections Option B Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system

First we would like to clarify that for election of local self-government body Sakrebulo through majoritarian system, we support the use of block voting in multi-member districts. However, if the

government decides against turning electoral districts into multi-mandate districts and opts for

maintaining the existing single-member districts, we recommend using alternative voting system or

MMP system for single-member districts. This will be more effective in ensuring equal distribution of

mandates.

The MMP system belongs to the family of mixed systems and is comprised of the following two

systems: proportional and majoritarian-plurality. It is known for compensating the disproportion

created as a result of majoritarian system; in particular, if a party garnered some support through

proportional system but failed to obtain any seats through majoritarian system, based on proportional

system it will receive the number of seats equal to the size of the support.6

MMP is used in countries like Albania, Bolivia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lesotho, Mexico, New

Zealand, Venezuela. Majoritarian elections mostly use the system of simple majority in which the

candidates with the highest number of votes win. Proportional elections mostly use list proportional

system.

A voter has two votes one for the party list and another for a majoritarian candidate. The system is preferable because it ensures proportional results and geographic representation of voters. It also

ensures equal distribution of mandates and an opportunity for small parties to receive a mandate.

Gamgebeli (Mayoral) Elections Alternative Voting System

We propose alternative voting system for Gamgebeli (Mayoral) Elections. The system belongs to the

family of majoritarian-plurality systems and is used in single-member electoral districts. Ballot

structure is candidate-centered.

As noted before, we support the alternative voting for majoritarian elections of Sakrebulo as well if the

government decides to maintain single-member districts. In alternative voting voters ranks candidates

in order of preference (each voter has one vote, but rather than an X, they put a '1' by their first choice

3 Electoral Systems Design, The New International IDEA Handbook, 2005, p.44 4 http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/?PageID=479 5 See the section above about Gamgebely/Mayoral elections for more information about alternative vote 6 Electoral Systems Design, The New International IDEA Handbook (IDEA), 2005

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a '2' by their second choice, and so on7). This way, the system enables voters to express their

preferences between candidates rather than simply their first choice. For this reason, it is often known

as preferential voting. 8

A candidate who has won an absolute majority of votes (50%+1) is elected. If no candidate has an

absolute majority after preferences are counted, candidates with the lowest number of first preferences

are eliminated from the count and his/her ballots are examined for their second preferences. Each

ballot is then transferred to whichever remaining candidates has the highest preference in the order as

marked on the ballot paper. The process is repeated until winning candidate is identified.

We believe that marking preferences should not be mandatory. A voter should be able to mark as many

preferences as s/he wishes to.

The system is preferred because it allows election of candidates through absolute majority of votes,

which allows a broad spectrum of voters to influence on the process of identification of winners. Their

influence also increased at the expense of preferences, because second or third preferred candidates

may become winners. This minimizes the number of wasted votes. In addition, the system requires

voters to familiarize with election program of candidates, their ideology and make informed decision

in ranking of candidates.

Candidates elected through alternative vote have more legitimacy because high electoral threshold

requires high voter support, including from different social groups. In addition, candidates will need to

have further-reaching campaigns that target not only their supporters but also supporters of their

opposing candidates in order to receive second and third preferences. This will promote positive

campaigning and help the development of political culture. It will also reduce the need of second round

of elections.

We are ready to participate in discussions about the proposals outlined in the present document as well

as proposals put forward by other interested parties, and to provide more detailed recommendations.

Motion of no confidence against elected Mayors and Gamgebelis

Because the parliament of Georgia is currently reviewing the Draft Code of Local Self-Government,

we deem it fitting to reiterate our position about motion of no confidence against elected Mayors and

Gamgebelis.

The draft Code submitted to the Parliament of Georgia introduces an important initiative of direct

elections for offices of Gamgebelis (Mayors), which we have been advocating for a long time.

Regrettably, the proposed draft also contains a provision that weakens the importance of the institute of

elected Gamgebelis and Mayors.

In particular, Article 48 of the Code envisages a motion of no confidence against elected Gamgebelis

(Mayors). The motion can be raised by more than half of member of Sakrebulo on current nominal list

or 20% of registered voters in the municipality.

Contrary to the principle of representative democracy, the foregoing provision allows Sakrebulo to

raise a motion of no confidence against Gamgebelis (Mayors) elected by majority of voters with as few

7 http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/alternative-vote/ 8 Electoral Systems Design, The New International IDEA Handbook (IDEA), 2005, p.47

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as 15-20 votes maximum. Further, the draft does not envisage grounds for initiating a motion of no

confidence, thus allowing Sakrebulo to resort to the measure in an event of a confrontation between

majority members and Gamgebeli (Mayor) on grounds of party affiliation or on any other grounds.

In addition to the fact that dismissal of Gamgebeli (Mayor) by a motion of no confidence conflicts with

the choice of voters and expression of their will, it may also promote politically unstable environment.

Para.4, Article 48 of the draft authorizes Sakrebulo to initiate the motion of no-confidence several

times during Gamgebelis (Mayors) term of office, which will further increase the influence of Sakrebulo members (political parties) on his/her work and affect his/her decisions.

The purpose of direct election of self-government officials is to ensure citizen involvement in

formation of self-government authorities, stability and independence of elected official/agency, while

delegating Sakrebulo with any such power will not lead to any meaningful changes in the existing

reality where Sakrebulo Chairperson is authorized to dismiss Gamgebeli with the consent of

Sakrebulo, as illustrated on a number of occasions throughout 2013. Therefore, such stipulation

diminishes the essence and importance of direct election of these officials.

In light of these, we believe that the motion of no confidence should be removed from the Draft.