Recent Monographs on the Social History of Central Asia.review
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Recent monographs on the social history of Central Asia Jürgen Paulaa Institute for Oriental Studies, Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, Halle/Saale, Germany
Online publication date: 28 May 2010
To cite this Article Paul, Jürgen(2010) 'Recent monographs on the social history of Central Asia', Central Asian Survey, 29:1, 119 — 130
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/02634931003768765
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REVIEW ESSAY
Recent monographs on the social history of Central Asia
Jurgen Paul∗
Institute for Oriental Studies, Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, Halle/Saale, Germany
Community matters in Xinjiang 1880–1949. Towards a historical anthropology of the
Uyghur, by Ildiko Beller-Hann, Leiden, Brill, 2008, xv + 476 pp., US$171 (hardback), ISBN
978 9004166752. Two maps, illustrations, index and glossary.
Pre-Tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia. Communal commitment and political order inchange, by Paul Georg Geiss, London, Routledge, 2003, xvi + 320 pp., US$158.75 (hardback),
ISBN 978 0415311779. Maps, index and glossary.
Russian rule in Samarkand 1868–1910. A comparison with British India, by Alexander
S. Morrison, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, xxx + 364 pp., US$120 (hardback),
ISBN 978 0199547371. Three maps, illustrations, tables, index and glossary.
Russian colonial society in Tashkent, 1865–1923, by Jeff Sahadeo, Bloomington, Indiana
University Press, 2007, xii + 317 pp., US$45 (hardback), ISBN 978 0253348203. One map,
illustrations, glossary and index.
A collection of Tarkhan yarlı ¨qs from the Khanate of Khiva, by William Wood, Bloomington,Indiana University Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 2005, 55 pp., US$5.50 (paper-
back), ISSN 0893-1860. Nine pages of facsimile reproductions.
The books under review are all contributions to the social history of pre-colonial and colonial
Central Asia, but they cannot easily be compared. Their source basis and their approaches are
quite different, and so is their regional and partly temporal focus, from the eighteenth until
the middle of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, a number of questions emerge, subjects
about which all or most of them have something to say, among them the creation of a ‘colonial’
society, the boundaries that typically go with such a society, and also the ways borders were
crossed; landholding patterns and in general the way the colonizers tried to get something out
of the colony; and the question of how we can make progress in understanding the social
history of colonial Central Asia. The article will address these questions in turn, but will also
make comments on the individual books.
The contribution by William Wood stands out quite clearly. It is not a study so much as a
publication of a number of documents, in facsimile together with an edition and a translation
into English. The documents stem from the eighteenth century which is an additional reason
to publish them since so few sources for this period are available, and they all concern one
family of saiyids who enjoyed tarkhan status, that is, a number of fiscal and legal privileges.
Six of the documents are in Turki, the last two in Persian; this cannot be easily explained. It
is known that the Khivan chancery conducted its work in Turki.
ISSN 0263-4937 print/ISSN 1465-3354 online
# 2010 Central Asian Survey
DOI: 10.1080/02634931003768765
http://www.informaworld.com
∗Email: [email protected]
Central Asian Survey
Vol. 29, No. 1, March 2010, 119– 130
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The editorial part is flawless as far as I can see, and it is good to see the announcement that
more documents out of this particular collection will be published in the hopefully not too distant
future.1 We should not forget that there is a wealth of literary as well as documentary sources for
the history of Central Asia of the period from c.1600 until Soviet times which are not yet well
known, and new sources are discovered practically every year. Thus, for quite a while, the
publication and the processing of sources will remain a major task for researchers within theregion and worldwide.
The most remarkable part of the commentary is a list of legal and fiscal terms used in the
documents. Because of the well-known particularities of Khwarazm, the parallel uses of these
terms, if any, in Bukharan and other documents are not always illuminating. Therefore,
Wood’s explanations are sometimes tentative, and it is laudable indeed that he does not hide
his doubts and incertainties. The publication in general is one of the many stones needed to
build a new understanding of the administrative structure of the Khanates in the pre-colonial
period. For this, painstaking scrutiny of the available documentary evidence is necessary: other-
wise, we will not get out of the polemics surrounding such texts as the Majmac
al-arqa m, the
eighteenth-century handbook of administrative terms2
, and will by necessity continue to relyon ‘colonial’ texts such as Semenov3 or the reports of colonial officers trying to understand
administrative routines they encountered on the ground. Some of these routines are very
nicely illustrated in Morrison’s work.
The work by Paul Georg Geiss in many ways follows an altogether different approach. Geiss
undertakes to construct an overarching theory of what he calls communal commitment and pol-
itical change. Communal commitment defines the group of people an individual feels part of and
commits himself or herself to. In fact, community is one of the big issues in social history, and
thus, analysing which social groups are active in which ways in which historical situations is
evidently a prime necessity. But serious doubts persist as to whether Geiss is able to produce
reliable results. His approach can largely be defined as structuralist: he feels bound to defineand classify, relying on what at places seems to be a pre-conceived theoretical model into
which the empirical data have to be integrated. Indigenous terms of course do not fit so
neatly into structuralist models, and therefore one of his permanent concerns is to find out,
e.g. in his discussion of Central Asian ‘tribalism’, whether the indigenous term A in fact
belongs or corresponds to category X in his system, say, a lineage, a clan, a subtribe, a tribe,
or a confederation. Therefore, it is possible for him to write down sentences such as (p. 39):
‘Ethnographers of the nineteenth century were already complaining about the inconsistencies
of groupings which complicated their work, and explained these with reference to changing
tribal coalitions and names. This is doubtless true [. . .]’ which one would like to read ironically,
but the context precludes this otherwise helpful solution. Data do not fit the theory? Tant pis for
the data.
Geiss follows Krader in his assumptions about genealogically defined political and social
structures encompassing the whole steppe (and part of the settled world). He must be one of
the very last researchers to accept this approach that is patently incompatible with the findings
of both historians and anthropologists.4 I believe this has to do with the sources he uses. In order
to produce a general overview, he has opted for the nearly total neglect of all primary sources,
archival as well as narrative; he relies completely on earlier research, making extensive use of
Soviet as well as Western anthropology and history. Sometimes, his confidence in pre-
revolutionary and Soviet authors is astonishing, such as when he writes that ‘urban mahallahs
originally monopolised the crafts and were closely interwoven with single professional
guilds’ (p. 87, on the basis of Poliakov). We do not know all that much about the pre-colonialorganization of labour and residential quarters, and therefore, such statements are much too
strong.
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Theoretical ambitions sometimes produce tautological or obscure statements. In a section
about tribal communal commitments, we read that ‘segmentary political order was only possible
when tribesmen’s communal commitment was more egalitarian’ (p. 106). If this is not a
tautology, what is? Likewise, on the following page, ‘cephalous tribal political order is based
on political authority relations which inform the obedience of the followers and the commitment
of the leader to give commands’; this is tautological even if one were prepared to accept thetheoretical framework which, however, there are good grounds to reject.
The book is better in places where Geiss lets his theoretical ambitions aside for a moment and
just gives an account of earlier research literature. Thus, his passages about the Kirghiz, the
khanate of Kokand, Russian administration in the steppes and its history are worth reading.
On the other hand, there are numerous factual errors and inadequacies; the pious foundations
(waqf ) are one example (p. 90), the restriction to penal law when discussing Islamic law is a
perezhitok from Soviet anthropology (p. 89), the treatment of the steppe uprising 1916 is
grossly inadequate (p. 185): Geiss prefers to see it as a last convulsion of Kazakh tribalism
instead of noting its scope and importance.5
Geiss discusses the situation in Russian Turkestan without looking beyond the borders intoXinjiang, Afghanistan, Iran or India. This is true for many other studies of the region as well, and
I note this point because the set of monographs under study makes it clear that the region
evidently did not evolve en vase clos, but was closely connected to neighbouring regions.
The remaining three monographs present thoroughly researched and solid results, based on a
mixture of sources. Whereas Beller-Hann has used narrative sources – both indigenous
historiography and external travelogues – as well as oral history, local traditions and her own
fieldwork, she did not have access to locally produced archival material in either Chinese or
Turki. (She has used the archives of the Swedish mission to Eastern Turkestan, and the illustrations
which in their majority show local townspeople at work or in the marketplace are all taken from
these archives.) Sahadeo and Morrison have both worked with a wide range of archival sources,mostly Russian, with an admixture of local languages in the case of Morrison, in addition to
narrative sources. Sahadeo and Morrison have a clear local focus, on Tashkent and Samarkand
respectively; Beller-Hann’s references are to a variety of locations in all parts of Xinjiang. She
is careful to note the provenance of all sources and repeatedly stresses the importance of local
variation. Morrison and Sahadeo treat the same period of time, whereas Beller-Hann takes her
analysis much farther into the twentieth century; this is necessary because of the later takeover
of the Communists in Xinjiang. These three books among the set of monographs presented
here are indeed contributions to the social history of colonial Central Asia, both Russian and
Chinese, with, in the case of Morrison, a systematic comparison with British India. (British
and American consular reports, travelogues of British and American visitors, and material from
British services are an important body of source material for all three authors.)
One of the questions in the social history of colonial societies is whether we are confronted
with just one society or two: the colonizing and the colonized. The division of colonial cities into
two clearly separated zones, one for the colonizers and the other one for the colonized, was noted
by Frantz Fanon, and has since been a recurring theme in colonial and post-colonial studies.6 All
three authors offer a discussion of the separation in town planning and habitat between the
‘Asiatic’ or ‘Muslim’ and the ‘European’ or ‘Chinese’ town. Morrison remarks that many
Central Asian towns were ‘doubled’ in their colonial period with a Russian or generally Euro-
pean counterpart, often separated from the ‘old’ town by a canal or the railway tracks (p. 48), but
he also notes that in many provincial towns, the number of Russians just was not high enough to
warrant a ‘European’ quarter. In Xinjiang, the Chinese garrisons were typically placed in a ‘NewTown’ which in some cases at least did not include Turki living quarters; see the example of
Yarkand in Beller-Hann (p. 91).
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Sahadeo’s book in fact is all about the separation and interaction between locals and
newcomers in colonial Tashkent. Tashkent also is a classical example, not unlike Algiers, of
a completely new ‘European’ town built next to an older ‘Asiatic’ or ‘Muslim’ one. Sahadeo’s
argument first shows how radically the separation was implemented, and how radically it was
conceptualized by the inhabitants of the Russian town. Russian Tashkent was intended to func-
tion as a showcase for European culture, and its shortcomings in cleanliness, orderliness, morals,education and so on were a constant concern of Russian Tashkenti elites because all these were
so many drawbacks in the Russian civilizing mission in Central Asia. The Russian town was not
at first a planned one, but planning started soon, and the geometric layout of the city, still dis-
cernible today, apparently follows the models of St Petersburg (with the Admirality taking
the place of the citadel as the centre) and Paris (with the grands boulevards created by Baron
de Haussmann). Visitors, however, chose Denver, Colorado, as a point of comparison instead:
a frontier town with a rather rough population, unrefined, and with few ‘cultured’ attractions.
Sahadeo then shows how the borders were crossed, and that in fact colonial society is one,
not two. The first essential reason, at least in the case of Tashkent, is water. The European town
depended for its water supply on the canal network of the ‘old’ city until the Soviet period; it wassituated downstream from the ‘old’ city, and all efforts to build an independent system failed.
Russian engineers fell short of what could be attained by local knowledge in water construction
for a very long time. One of the consequences was that the Russian administration had to
cooperate closely with the ‘native’ officials in water management, the aryq aksaqals who in a
way were responsible for the European town as well.
The second essential point is contagious diseases. During the famous cholera outbreak in
1892, Russians feared that the disease would spread through the water conduits. In fact, statistics
show that both parts of the city were affected in roughly equal ways, contrary to what the colo-
nial perception of the ‘Asiatic’ town as very filthy indeed would make one presume. Investments
in the water supply network of the rapidly growing ‘Asiatic’ city had been neglected althoughthe aryq aksaqals had constantly asked for them, but the European majority in the city duma
did not deem them necessary.
The measures taken by the Russian town administration to fight the cholera epidemic led to
serious riots in June 1892. The essential point was a double crossing of the border: the ‘native’
crowd crossed the bridge over the Anhor canal and penetrated the building where the city com-
mander had his office; the city commander Putintsev in turn had paid a visit to the Friday mosque
that morning (on the occasion of the Sacrifice holiday) and had made a speech in Turki (the
‘Sart’ language) in which he stressed Russian military superiority. The documentation
adduced by Sahadeo shows that cross-border communication in both Russian and ‘Sart’ was
possible in many cases. The 1892 cholera riots led Russians to believe that the ‘Asiatics’ had
shown their true face that day. The state of emergency declared during the riots was to last
until the Revolution.
A third point to be discussed when borders are at stake is the mixing at the lower end of
society. Beer and vodka bars, brothels and opium dens functioned in Tashkent in a specialized
area of the town, the Novaia sloboda (‘New suburb’), which was not discussed in the official
records until rather late, in 1883. There, ‘Sarts’ got acquainted with vodka, and Russians
found out about hashish and opium; Russian as well as ‘Asiatic’ prostitutes catered for the
needs of European and native customers. Joint businesses in prostitution are on record also in
Morrison’s book (pp. 28, 261), and they are relatively well documented because prostitution
was legal in the Russian Empire. However, the question of ‘mixed’ offspring was not addressed
so openly. Sahadeo remarks upon the conspicuous absence of the issue in his sources, and hetheorizes that it was the idea of separation between natives and Europeans which was at
stake here.
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‘Mixed’ marriages seem to have been very rare indeed. At least they, too, are absent from the
official record in Tashkent, and Samarkand as well; Morrison apparently has not encountered
such cases. In Xinjiang, on the contrary, marriages between Chinese men (or other ‘outsiders’)
and Turki women, either temporal or permanent, were more frequent than the strict ban on such
relationships under Islamic law would predict. Beller-Hann shows that Turki women even
enjoyed certain advantages when marrying Chinese men: their husbands could not hope toretrieve them if they left because Turki institutions, above all the religious ones, would not
cooperate. Beller-Hann devotes some space to temporary marriage, an instrument to accomodate
travellers, merchants and diplomats alike. Temporary marriage is otherwise known mostly from
Shiite contexts, but apparently the Hanafite qadis and lawyers in Xinjiang accepted and promoted
it as well. Children produced in temporary marriages were often abandoned by their parents,
and the Swedish orphanage in Yarkand housed quite a few of them (Beller-Hann, p. 270).
Last but not least, the European towns could not function without the Muslim ones. Most of
the grocers and other food-producing and distributing businesses in Russian Tashkent were run
by ‘Sarts’. In Xinjiang, on the other hand, there were parallel networks for the Chinese and the
Turki population that led to the impression that both mingled in the bazaar, but everyone didtheir shopping at stalls owned by ‘co-nationals’. In Tashkent, again, the ‘Sart’ grocer became
a much-hated figure during the First World War, when food supply lines broke down: Tashkent
was supplied not only from the region, but also from European Russia via rail. The first famine
riots broke out in 1916, and they involved lower-class Russian women and ‘Sart’ bazaaris.
Sahadeo also gives details about the complicated situation during the steppe revolt in the
summer of 1916, when Russian women (again) cooperated with ‘Sart’ merchants on the
emerging black market.7
For a number of reasons, therefore, the strict separation of the European town in Tashkent
(and also in other places in Russian Turkestan) could not and did not work. Quite a number
of locals settled in the Russian part of the town, and the number of mosques in the Europeanquarters was higher than that of churches: there were 16 mosques in 1913, but only 15 churches
and two synagogues. The relatively small number of churches is, of course, also due to the ban
on missionary activities. The ‘Sart’ population in European Tashkent was already as high as 20%
in 1870.
In summary, Sahadeo gives a vivid and reliable account of European–‘Sart’ interaction in
colonial Tashkent, focusing on the social side; the purely administrative and political history
is less well served, and for good reason. His book therefore is a groundbreaking study in this
field. The history of the ‘common people’, of the Russians in the first place, but also of the
‘Sarts’ as far as it emerges from the Russian archival documents, had not been written before.
The accounts of the cholera riots in 1892 and of the famine riots in 1916 are central to the
book. Sahadeo also keeps track of the Russian perceptions of the ‘Sart’, typically as treacherous,
greedy and cruel.
Morrison’s book in a way is a very useful complement to Sahadeo’s study on Tashkent. His
focus is much more on the administrative side of colonial Turkestan as exemplified in the Samar-
kand region. Samarkand is well chosen. It is a provincial town, and it was a centre of the seden-
tary economy of the Bukharan Emirate; the policies concerning nomads thus need not be
discussed in this context. All this makes the focus on administrative practices, uses and
abuses very clear. Morrison, as Sahadeo, makes much use of Russian archival material, with
the report of the Pahlen commission as a mine of information for all the shortcomings of
Russian colonial rule. It is perhaps this Pahlen-informed perspective that makes him come to
the conclusion that ‘[t]o the historian looking back over fifty years of Russian rule in Turkestan,the administration appears a complete shambles’ (p. 287), as contrasted with British India which
was a ‘resounding success’ (ibid .). His arguments for this possibly slightly over-stated assertion
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are that the British were able to turn a profit from their colony. Not only could it produce the
means to pay for its administration, but it also paid for a very large army that the Empire
could use in its manifold wars. Indeed, India was the very heart of British imperial power. It
is open to discussion whether the comparison is a bit overstretched here: was Russian Turkestan
ever meant to be for the Tsarist Empire what India was for Britain? If it was, did the Russians
ever stand a fair chance of attaining such a goal in view of the very different natural andecological conditions of both regions?
The most important differences between the administrations of British India and Russian
Turkestan, respectively, probably were the ways in which the imperial powers treated the
urban and rural elites they found in place. The British decided to work through them, the
Russians undermined their position and abolished them altogether. This meant that the Russians
had to create a group of intermediaries themselves; direct rule, of course, was out of the question
in both India and Turkestan. This group of intermediaries consisted essentially of the village and
quarter elders, and thus people of very local outlooks. The ‘traditional’ system, at least in the
Bukharan emirate, relied on regional powerholders called amla kda r who all lost their power
basis under Russian rule. Together with the (mostly Tatar) interpreters these newly created inter-mediaries formed what Russian intellectuals came to think of as a ‘living wall’ that the colonial
administrators could not transcend or even look behind. In every respect, they had to rely on
information provided by these intermediaries. It is therefore a central question whom the
Russians wanted as intermediaries; unlike the Britains in India, they had a subject population
of Muslims which had a long record of accomodation to and cooperation with Russian rule:
Tatars and Bashkirs from the Volga region, Siberia or the Crimea. There were Tatar and
Bashkir officers serving in the imperial army, and the administration of Turkestan continued
to be staffed by officers. But the Russian leadership saw to it that only a few Tatars and Bashkirs
ever saw service in Turkestan; the quota of Muslim officers in Turkestan was lower than in the
Russian army at large. It is also important to understand, and Morrison stresses this frequently,how seriously understaffed, badly trained, and underpaid the Russian administration in Turke-
stan was. Since the colony was unable to produce the financial means its administration
needed, the money had to come from various central ministries, the Ministry of War in the
first place. Conflicts between the colony and the capital were the consequence as well as conflicts
between various institutions in the centre.
The Qing bureaucracy left the local elites in place even in the late period, after the Ya cqub
Beg period. The Turki ba g families were integrated into the Chinese system of ranks and titles
and had to adapt to Chinese ways up to a point. Chinese high-ranking administrators had very
little knowledge about what happened ‘on the ground’. Beller-Hann does not discuss the
problem whether Xinjiang ever was ‘profitable’ for the Qing Empire by any of the criteria
Morrison uses in his comparison of Russian Turkestan and British India; it is a pity that Morrison
could not use her data in his study. It would be interesting to see whether the Chinese got more
out of their colony than did the Russians. They invested much less, their administration was
much more centralized and left more room for local elites; it was civilian rather than military.
Conditions for agriculture were roughly comparable to those prevailing in Russian Turkestan.
However, the logistic problems surrounding the exportation of agricultural products were
even more demanding than in the Russian case; Urumqi was not even linked to the Chinese
railroad network until 1962.
Morrison gives very illuminating examples for the communication trap in which the
Russians were caught. The Russians were unable to understand the irrigation system, so vital
for the settled regions of Turkestan, and Samarkand province in particular. They asked forexact measures the traditional water officials were unable to provide. The ‘traditional’ system
of water management rested on ‘traditional’ knowledge, not exact measurements, but a personal
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experience acquired over long years. Also, the heavily localized system of water allocation
meant that a situation explored and understood in a given local setting could prove to be very
different in another location. Attempts at working with Russian (or European) staff in water
management produced very undesirable results.
A number of social relationships such as irrigation, the legal system and landholding were
documented in local languages only few Russians were able to read, or not documented atall; knowledge was transmitted orally. Translators and interpreters were part of the ‘living
wall’; the results they gave could hardly be controlled. (Translations of court proceedings
may have been more reliable than Morrison seems to think as the results of recent research
show). Interpreters are also one of the powerful groups Ildiko Beller-Hann writes about. In
Xinjiang, no previously bilingual group (such as the Tatars of the Russian Empire) was
available, and persons knowledgeable in both Turki and Chinese were few and far between.
Chinese administrators seem to have disdained learning any foreign languages, let alone such
barbarian ones as Turki, and therefore, translation was an indigenous business. It is not quite
clear from the book how many administrators were Han, Manchu or Mongol; but the period
when mostly Manchus and Mongols were in charge in the Outlying Districts ended in Xinjiangin 1884 when Xinjiang was created as an administrative unit and integrated into the provincial
system of ‘China proper’. Translators were known to misuse their position to their own profit,
something Morrison also mentions; but in Xinjiang, misuse probably was more widespread
since fewer translators were available. In Russian Turkistan, locals could have petitions trans-
lated for a trifling sum, something not noted for Xinjiang. Beller-Hann does not say how
Chinese administrators felt about the gap between them and the locals. She has another
perspective and does not follow the internal Chinese debate or the gaze on Xinjiang from
Beijing – Chinese archival materials are absent from her sources – but I guess it is improbable
that something like the Russian complaint about the ‘living wall’ was ever voiced in China.
Morrison’s work is probably the best account of the Russian administration in the settledparts of Turkestan; it is at least the best I have read so far, because he discusses the general
lines of the Russian strategy in some detail. The comparative perspective also helps to
explain many specifics of the Russian situation.
Morrison and Beller-Hann put an end to the isolationist way of doing research on Russian
Central Asia: Morrison in that he explicitly pursues a comparatist agenda, and Beller-Hann
because she provides us with a consistent picture of what happened literally next door. It is
easy to imagine that many people in Russian Turkestan and the protectorates must have been
aware of the situation in both Xinjiang and British India (and also Afghanistan, of course),
and I think that this is true not only for Russian administrators, but for Turkestani intellectuals
including ulama as well.
In summary, Morrison’s study shows how far you can get using Russian documents. The
account of administrative practices and achievements is convincing, and scholars in the field
will be quoting Morrison for quite a long time. The administrative characters from governor
to pristav – the local man – are well drawn, and the reader gets a vivid and memorable
impression of what Russian administration in Samarkand looked like. In some fields, such as
land-holding patterns and rural taxation, the book also shows the limits of the Russian documen-
tation: our understanding of the matter cannot be better than that of the Russians if we do not use
the indigenous sources.
The next section is a kind of excursus about landholding patterns. Landholding patterns and
forms of taxation are a big issue in the colonial world where wealth is mostly derived from agri-
culture (and livestock raising), and it is crucial for the colonial power to understand landholdingand the ways agricultural production can be taxed. Morrison devotes much of his chapter 3 to
this question; it takes up less space in Beller-Hann, but is still important, and Geiss also treats
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it on a number of pages. Morrison works from Russian reports, colonial archives and Soviet
research; Beller-Hann gives the state of the art in Chinese as well as in Turki literature,
adding results from oral history and her own fieldwork; Geiss relies on pre-Revolutionary and
Soviet research. It becomes evident that it is next to impossible to understand pre-colonial land-
holding from the paper trail left by the colonizers: we have to look at the documentation in native
languages instead. Otherwise, we will be trying to understand how much of the landholding pat-terns the colonizers understood, and this is difficult as long as we do not yet understand landhold-
ing patterns well ourselves.
Morrison is quite conscious of this, and in places he just gives an account of what a given
Russian (colonial or, later, Soviet) author had to say, and indeed he retraces some of the con-
fusion which still prevails in the field: ‘the Russians seem to have found the Amlakdari
system as inconsistent and confusing as later historians have done’ (p. 104).
Soviet historians have developed a complex theoretical apparatus to deal with landholding
and taxation. The best example for this is Davidovich’s study, which Morrison also quotes.8
This study uses a relatively large number of Persian documents concerning landholding –
sales as well as allocations – and draws on a number of previous works, among them thoseby O.D. Chekhovich, the other great senior female researcher in the field. Davidovich relies
less on Islamic legal thinking and the corresponding handbooks9 than on the documentary evi-
dence available to her. Her article thus is an early example for the analysis of legal practice.
Davidovich makes a number of essential distinctions that would possibly be useful in the
debate. First, she distinguishes between tax and rent. Both are paid or delivered up by the pea-
sants: tax to the state or ruler, rent to the landlord. Second, she distinguishes between several
forms of landholding. State land is called mamlaka, and according to her, the state (or the
ruler) took around 30% of the produce in tax/rent (the two coincide in the case of state land).
Other landholdings were classified according to the taxes they owed: cushrı land saw a reparti-
tion of the revenue between the landlord who took 20% of the produce as rent and the state (orthe ruler) who got 10% of the produce as tax; in the case of khara jı land, the proportions were
reverted. Khara jı land was typically called milk (Morrison’s mulk ) in her documents. The
tax-free category milk-i hurr-i kha lis is created in a complicated deal between landlords
(‘owners’) of milk land and the ruler. As a result, the ruler forfeited his right to his part of the
revenue against a part of the land itself which was divided up in the same proportion as the
earlier revenue was; one third was created milk-i hurr-i kha lis whereas the remaining two
thirds became mamlaka. It is useful to remember that some documents concerning this type
of deal are extant and that they are the basis for Davidovich’s article. milk-i hurr-i kha lis there-
fore does not come about by tax-exemption (which would be revocable), but is permanent, and if
any category in landholding in pre-colonial Central Asia comes close to ‘private property’ in an
understanding based on Roman law, this is it. On the other hand, Davidovich prefers to style
‘ordinary’ milk (or mulk ) land as a kind of co-dominion between the ruler and the landlord.
There is no mention of amla k in this article, and the author does not treat the mechanisms of
tax/rent-extraction in this particular text. This is her own construction; she does not produce evi-
dence in Central Asian Muslim legal thinking about such a thing. Therefore, it could be said that
she is overextending her evidence on this particular point. It would make more sense to me to
start with the simple observation that plots of land were a commodity in Central Asia very
early on, and that in all the centuries of the Islamic period there seems to have been a brisk
trade in real estate. If you can sell, bequeathe, rent out, or donate something, what is this
object, if not your property? The second very simple statement in the question of landed property
in Central Asia should perhaps be that we have to separate this question very clearly anddefinitely from the question of tax liability. Therefore, a good argument could be made for
the ‘ordinary’ mulk being property as well as the mulk-i hurr-i khalis.
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Morrison in turn does not discuss the relationship between the earlier mamlaka and nine-
teenth-century amla k . He assumes, however, that amla k is state land. Amla kda rı therefore
must be a kind of conditional landholding, revocable on principle, but not in practice. In
Xinjiang, such a form of landholding seems to have existed alongside private property in a
narrower sense (Beller-Hann, pp. 118, 130). Beller-Hann states that private landowners were
called zimindar (from Persian zamı nda r , ‘landowner’) or mu lkdar (Arabic-Persian, mulkda r )(p. 130). She does not discuss mamlaka as a term, either.
Ildiko Beller-Hann’s book does not belong to social history proper, but makes it clear that it
is a contribution to ‘historical anthropology’. The difference between the two fields is none too
clear (at least not to me); one major distinction seems to be that anthropologists (even ‘historical
anthropologists’) are unwilling to restrict their sources to written ones, and perhaps social
historians could learn something from anthropologists in this respect. The book under study
draws on written as well as oral sources and other fieldwork methods. This approach is possible
in Xinjiang where the floating gap has not yet reached beyond the critical threshold of 1949;
there still are living memories of what local people call ‘traditional’ society which means
society before the Communist Party took over. In the former Soviet republics, this evidentlyis not the case, and oral history of the Soviet period is beset with considerable source-critical
problems.10
This situation means that many facets of communal life come into the author’s field of vision
which would not have had if she used only written sources, in particular lifecycle rituals and
other festivities, healing and so forth. Taken together, the written as well as the oral sources
concur in underlining the importance of community. Beller-Hann sets out from the statement
that ‘Uighur culture’ as a distinct and ‘given’ object of study simply does not exist. One of
the most fascinating features in her book is the way she describes the creation as well as the
crossing of boundaries (as e.g. in the case of ‘mixed marriages’). Another fascinating point
for me was the demonstration that healing ceremonies in fact did not only involve the patientand his immediate family on the one hand and the healer on the other, but the entire neighbour-
hood; moreover, healing was based on community and producing and re-enacting community.
The basic unit of community in Xinjiang seems to have been the mosque community (which
is still important). It is open to question whether the Eastern mosque community is largely coter-
minous with the Western mahalla. Research about pious endowments in Khiva has yielded the
result that mosque communities were central in that part of Central Asia as well 11 and a close
scrutiny of the extant documentation for such endowments, most of them fairly recent and
rather small, probably will allow conclusions in that direction for more regions (such as
Bukhara); their role in the colonial administration – as, for instance, the basic unit in elections
– still has to be ascertained. In Xinjiang, the importance of the mosque community is such that
Beller-Hann thinks that rules for veiling, such as those prescribed for women in the presence of
men who are not close relatives (nama hra m, Persian na -mahram), in fact apply outside the
mosque community.
Xinjiang is a landscape of oasis towns, and ‘oasis identities’ seem to have prevailed over
larger ‘ethnic’ ones until quite recent times. But Beller-Hann again warns against static concepts
of identity and stresses the relational qualities of identification, multiple identities and
belonging. Oasis towns were composed of various groups, and gender, genealogy, professional
and religious affiliations, among others, were defining criteria for differing communities.
Community therefore is far from equality. There were tremendous social differences within
the communities, but the well-to-do had certain obligations. Even in the case of corvee labour
the peasants who have to work for their lords are not simply tenants. A vocabulary of neighbour-hood is used so that a kind of commensality between the landlord and his peasants/tenants still
seems possible.
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Beller-Hann offers a detailed discussion of various forms of social dependency. Slavery is
one of them, and again, the economic aspect is only one among many. Well-fed and well-
clad slaves add to their master’s prestige, and therefore, as in many cases in the Muslim
world, Western readers and researchers have to control the ‘Uncle Tom’ way of thinking
about slavery. Most slaves were employed as domestic servants, but some also had to till
their masters’ fields. Slaves originated not only from non-Muslim groups. Cases of familiesselling children into slavery are on record as well as cases of men selling themselves when
caught in debt. Other groups of dependents were serfs and day-labourers (medikar , from
Persian mardika r , p. 136). Serfs must have lived in Xinjiang into the middle of the twentieth
century; the evidence for this is that it was necessary to ban sales of serfs together with the
land they were bonded to.
Xinjiang – and colonial Central Asia in general – is a privileged field for the study of legal
pluralism. The Qing did nothing to remove sharı ca courts, neither did the Russians; the British
Indian experience with ‘Anglo-Muhammadan Law’ was not repeated in either region. None of
the books under study devotes particular attention to the systems of litigation and adjudication: a
major field of study remains there. Some of the differences between Russian and Chinese Turke-stan may be due to differences in the respective imperial legal systems. Russian imperial law did
not recognize slavery, of course. Pre-colonial legal systems in Bukhara and Kokand did not
allow Muslims to sell and acquire other Muslims (that is, Sunni Muslims) as slaves. Thus,
even if it is well known that many things can be made possible by legal fictions and tricks,
no cases of bonded serfdom or selling children into slavery are on record for these regions, as
far as I know. Another interesting point for a trans-regional comparison would be the question
of temporary marriage which was apparently widespread in Xinjiang but has yet to be studied for
Russian Turkestan or the khanates.
In summary, this book stands out among a group of recent publications on the history of
Xinjiang.12
It is the only one to the best of my knowledge to give an outline of what theauthor calls ‘historical anthropology’, that is, a history of everyday life. Ildiko Beller-Hann
demonstrates the potential this field holds on the crossroads between social anthropology and
social history by her mastery of the methods of both fields. The book thus is a major achieve-
ment. Beller-Hann acknowledges the limits of her study quite clearly in her conclusion: ‘The
insider and outsider sources used still need to be augmented by the view from ‘above’, i.e.
sources generated by the colonizers, not to mention a wider range of indigenous documents
(such as marriage, divorce, inheritance documents, court records) than I was able to access.
This study is thus only a first step towards a comprehensive historical anthropology of the
region in the period specified’ (p. 429). That is true – even though I would say that to call
this weighty study a ‘first step’ certainly is a topos of modesty.
The social history of the colonial period is becoming an established field in Central Asian
studies. It is, however and of course, patent that much remains to be done. First, the pre-colonial
period, that is, the period from roughly 1750 to the Russian conquest, still is seriously understu-
died, and we are still at the beginning of making sources accessible and known. This is most
evident in the case of the three khanates, Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand. In these cases at least,
it is known that such sources exist in abundance; much less is known about the situation in
Xinjiang and, for that matter, in Afghanistan. Second, the archival sources produced by the
chanceries of the khanates and emirates as well as the court records and what else remains of
private documents, need to be taken into account much more systematically whenever possible.
This is particularly true for administrative history where progress depends directly on the feli-
citous use of chancery documents, but also for landholding and legal pluralism where courtrecords must be an essential basis of future research. Archival sources in the ‘colonial’ languages
(Russian, Chinese, English) need to be complementd by sources in the local languages (Persian/
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Tajik and Turki). It is in particular the documentation in the local languages that has not yet been
exploited. Third, the barrier between historical anthropology (which is in the process of estab-
lishing itself as a scholarly discipline in Central Asian Studies) and social history needs to be
questioned. Oral history can be a useful tool in the hands of the social historian as well as the
social anthropologist. Interdisciplinary cooperation is thus a necessity. This might be shown
in the case of social groups such as the ‘sacred lineages’ present in many parts of CentralAsia.13 Fourth, a comparative perspective is useful: Central Asia, and in particular the khanates
and Russian Turkestan as well as the early Soviet policies in that area, should no longer be con-
sidered in isolation; as is well known, the political boundaries became hard to cross only in the
1930s. Comparisons should include Afghanistan (and possibly Iran) as well as British India,
especially for the pre-colonial period. For all these research questions, it can be stated with cer-
tainty that there will be no lack of sources.
Notes
1. Recent publications of Central Asian rulers’ documents include: A. Urunbaev, S. Gulomov, andG. Dzhuraeva, Katalog sredneaziatskikh zhalovannykh gramot iz fonda Instituta Vostokovedeniiaim. Abu Reikhana Beruni Akademii Nauk Respubliki Uzbekistan, Orientwissenschaftliche Hefte, 23(Halle: Orientwissenschaftliches Zentrum der Martin-Luther-Universitat, 2007). Even if the pace of publications is not very great as yet and the output still is not extraordinarily wide, an annotatedbibliography of published documents, including documents published in the Soviet academicsystem, is clearly a desideratum. See B. Fragner, Repertorium persischer Herrscherurkunden (publi-
zierte Original-Urkunden bis 1848) (Freiburg/Br.: Schwarz, 1980). Court documents and private docu-ments are another matter.
2. A.B. Vil’danova (ed.), Madzhma al-arkam (‘predpisaniia fiska’). Priemy dokomentatsii v Bukhare XVIII v. (Moskva: Nauka, 1981). See also Yu. Bregel, The administration of Bukhara under the Manghı ts and some Tashkent manuscripts. Papers on Inner Asia 34 (Bloomington: RIFIAS, 2000).
3. Besides a first appreciation of the text later edited by Vil’danova (see preceding note), Semenov alsopublished an outline of Bukharan administration (based on his personal experience): Ocherk poze-mel’no-podatnogo i nalogovogo ustroistva b. Bukharskogo khanstva (Tashkent: Trudy SAGU, 1929).
4. A recent and scathing critique of this approach is David Sneath, The headless state. Aristocratic orders,kinship society, and misrepresentations of nomadic Inner Asia (New York: Columbia University Press,2007). Sneath’s comments on Geiss are on the whole convincing. The argument is directed againststructuralist thinking in general.
5. For a more balanced treatment of the 1916 uprising, see now J. Happel, Nomadische Lebenswelten und zarische Politik. Der Aufstand in Zentralasien 1916 . PhD thesis (Basel: Basel University, 2009), andalso N. Pianciola, Stalinismo di frontiera: colonizzazione agricola, sterminio dei nomadi e costruzionestatale in Asia centrale, 1905–1936 (Roma: Viella, 2009).
6. F. Fanon, Les damne s de la terre. Reprint (Paris: La Decouverte/Poche, 2006 [first published 1961]).The central example of course is Algiers, and it is interesting to note that Morrison states that thecolony Russian Turkestan most resembled possibly was French Algeria.
7. For the politics of famine, see, besides Pianciola quoted above, also M. Buttino, La rivoluzione capo-volta. L’Asia centrale tra il crollo del’impero zarista e la formazione del’URSS (Naples: L’Ancora delMediterraneo, 2003). Also extant in Russian translation: Revolutsiia naoborot. Sredniaia Aziia mezhdu
padeniem tsarskoi imperii i obrazovaniem SSSR (Moskva: Zven’ya, 2007).8. Not in the bibliography, but quoted on p. 99 n. 48. E.A. Davidovich, ‘Feodal’nyi zemel’nyi milk v
Srednei Azii XV-XVIII vv.: Sushchnost’ i transformatsii’, in: B.G. Gafurov,Formy feodal’noi sobst-vennosti i vladeniia na Blizhem i Srednem Vostoke. Bartol’dovskie chteniia 1975 g. (Moscow: Nauka,1979), pp. 39–62. This article can be understood as the summa of Soviet scholarship on the question.
9. The standard study in this field is Baber Johansen, The Islamic law on land tax and rent: the peasants’
loss of property rights as interpreted in the Hanafite legal literature of the Mamluk and Ottoman periods (London: Croom Helm, 1988). Johansen starts much earlier than the thirteenth century,giving an outline also of the pre-Mongol Central Asian authors. The later medieval and earlymodern Central Asian legal literature in the field has yet to be studied in the light of Johansen’s results.
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10. For a recent study of Soviet history where good use is made of oral history methods, see M. Kamp, Thenew woman in Uzbekistan: Islam, modernity, and unveiling under communism (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006).
11. F. Schwarz, ‘Bargeldstiftungen im Chanat von Chiva, 1840-1922’, Der Islam, 80 (2003), pp 79–93.12. For a general overview, see now J. Millward, Eurasian crossroads: a history of Xinjiang (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2007), with a focus on political history, but economic history is also wellserved. For earlier periods in the relationship between what was to become Russian Turkestan andXinjiang, see L. Newby, The Empire and the khanate: a political history of Qing relations withKhoqand c. 1760– 1860 (Leiden: Brill, 2005).
13. For these, a broad documentary basis is available. The relevant body of texts presents enormous source-critical problems, and moreover, the texts have to be linked to oral narratives and present-day situationsin a meaningful way. Preconceived ideas about the significance of genealogy in both sedentary and“nomadic” contexts must be discarded. See A. Muminov and M. Abuseitova (eds), Genealogicheskiegramoty i sakral’nye semeistva XIX-XXI vekov: nasab-nama i gruppy khodzhei svyazannykh s sakral’-nym skazaniem ob Iskhak-Babe (Almaty: Daik Press, 2008). For the source-critical problems, see theintroduction by Devin DeWeese to the quoted volume. More recent publications in this field include:K. Kehl-Bodrogi, ‘Religion is not so strong here’: Muslim religious life in Khorezm after socialism(Munster: Lit, 2008).
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