Recent migration trends in and from the MENA region

8/10/2019 Recent migration trends in and from the MENA region

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MOBILISING MIGRANTS’ SKILLS FOR DEVELOPMENT IN

THE MENA REGION

Making the Most of Young Migrants’ Skills

Conference jointly organized by UNFPA-ASRO & OECD

Tunis, 13-14 May 2013

Conference Background Paper

Martin Baldwin-Edwards

Mediterranean Migration Observatory, Athens and ICMPD, Vienna

RECENT MIGRATION TRENDS IN AND FROM THE REGION



Introduction

Patterns of labour migration into, within and from the MENA region were already in flux by

the late 2000s, and were then impacted by two massive events – the economic crisis of

advanced capitalism (most notably the eurozone’s austerity measures in the South) and the

Arab Spring. This paper begins with the state of the region up until the advent of the

economic crisis. The effects on migration flows of the economic crisis and the Arab Spring

are then examined; this is followed by an evaluation of their implications for managing

future labour migration flows concerning the MENA countries.

Migration patterns in MENA prior to the global economic crisis

A glance at estimates of MENA migrant stocks globally circa 2005 indicates the great

variation of migration history across the region (see Fig. 1).

Figure 1

Source: Holzmann (2010)

In absolute numbers, the greatest stocks of expatriates come from the three North African

countries of Morocco, Egypt and Algeria. As a proportion of population, the largest numbers

are from West Bank and Gaza, Lebanon and Jordan. Even Kuwait and Bahrain have emigrant

proportions comparable with those of North Africa, though. At face value, these data tell us

little more than the extent of past emigration: more detailed analysis of patterns of

migration is required.



Broadly, there are three migration systems within the MENA region (Baldwin-

Edwards, 2005: 4). These consist of the Maghreb countries1 (historically large emigration

flows, primarily to France), the Mashreq countries2 with a post-Ottoman migration history

amongst them, and the GCC countries3 where large-scale oil production since the 1970s has

utilized mass ‘temporary’ labour immigration on a continuous basis.Taking the entire Arab region, labour migration flows are shown for 2008 in Figure 2,

below. About 50% of emigration is within the Arab region – predominantly to the GCC

countries. Half of labour migration is to OECD countries, of which France is the primary

destination (see Figure 3).

Figure 2

Source: IOM compilation of World Bank data, cited in Haque and Debnath (2010)

1 Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria and Mauritania

2 Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen3 Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman



Figure 3

Source: IOM compilation of OECD data, cited in Haque and Debnath (2010)

The Maghreb

Over the last decade, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria continued to have France as both theprimary locus of their diaspora and also as a major destination country for recent flows.

However, new labour migration corridors opened up – mostly directed towards Spain and

Italy – and by 2007 stocks of Moroccans in Spain and France were roughly the same,

according to host country data4 (CARIM database, 17/09/2009). The latest available

remittance data5 (with the caveat of variable remittance behaviour) tend to confirm the

importance of Spain and Italy with remittances of 25 and 16 per cent, respectively, of the

total for Morocco, in comparison with 28 per cent from France. Remittances to Algeria are

almost exclusively from France, while those for Tunisia are primarily from Italy and Libya.

Libya, until the revolution, was not a country of significant emigration, but rather of very

large labour immigration – both regular and irregular. Its immigrant stock in 2005 of

between 1.1 and 1.8 million constituted 25-30% of population: they were from Egypt,

Tunisia, Morocco and sub-Saharan African countries (Baldwin-Edwards 2006: 313). More

4 The stock of Moroccans in France is significantly undercounted, owing to exclusion from the data of those

with French citizenship and “sans papiers”. The Moroccan consulate estimate is almost double for that year

(Di Bartolomeo et al., 2009). For both Spain and Italy, the figures are more reliable owing to mass

regularizations conducted in the mid-2000s (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler, 2009).5 World Bank 2012



recent estimates (Hafez and Ghaly 2012: 8) suggest a figure of around two million Egyptians

working in Libya, often travelling and working informally.

The characteristics of recent legal flows to OECD countries from the Maghreb are

significantly divergent. For Algerians, the most important flows are to France, Spain and

Canada; whereas recent flows to Canada were 70% highly educated and 11% aged 15-24,for Spain and France they were around 20% highly educated and 5% youth. Additionally, the

flows to Spain were 70% male (OECD 2012a: 272). Moroccan flows have favoured Spain

over both Italy and France since 2003, although declining markedly from 2008. The

proportion of highly educated migrating to Spain and Italy has been exceptionally low (5-

8%), with 18% of migrants aged 15-24 (OECD 201a2: 290-1). Tunisian flows retain France as

the most favoured destination, followed by Italy and (much smaller numbers) Germany and

Canada. The flows to France consist of around 20% highly educated, whereas those to Italy a

mere 2%; to Canada, the proportion is 70%. The proportion of youth migrating is very low to

all countries – less than 10% (OECD 2012a: 300-1). Libya, until the Revolution, was a countryof low emigration levels: in 2010 the primary destinations were the UK, Germany, Canada

and the USA – primarily for study, but also for employment or residence. The proportion of

highly educated was high, except for the small numbers going to Italy and Israel (OECD

2012a: 288-9).

Survey data (OECD 2012a) taken over the period 2008-10 on the desire or intention

to migrate show similar patterns across the four countries. Between 24 and 29 per cent of

the population expressed a desire for permanent emigration; 32-44% of young people (15-

24); and 18-31% of the highly educated. 22-26% of respondents (excluding Libya) stated

their intent to migrate permanently within the next 12 months.

The Mashreq

The Mashreq countries – despite their historical commonalities – exhibit a wide range of

characteristics with regard to migration. However, all have a high youth population (25-42%

under 15 years) and very high unemployment (Haque and Debnath 2010: 54). There are also

very large population flows – both historically and contemporaneously – involving refugees,

legal and irregular labour migrants, and family members. Three countries (Jordan, Syria and

Lebanon) have had massive stocks of refugees for decades. All of the Mashreq other than

Yemen and Palestine has inflows of unskilled labour migration, both from within the region

and from Asia and Africa. All of the Mashreq also has significant outflows of skilled labour

migration to GCC countries, and to a lesser extent to the USA and Canada. There is also

some circular migration, especially involving contiguous territories: these include flows

between Syria and Lebanon and between Egypt and Libya, most of which are unregulated.

Since labour markets are weakly regulated across the region, irregular status of migrants is

extensive and results in impressionistic data that are weakly related to reality on the

ground. It is difficult to provide reliable data on migration flows involving Mashreq

countries.



Over the last decade, the most important labour migration corridors within the Arab

region are shown in Fig. 4, below – distinguished by average skill level.

Figure 4

Principal labour migration routes of Mashreqi nationals

Source: own compilation from multiple data sources

Note: large flows are indicated in bold type

From outside the region, there are also some significant undocumented inflows of unskilled

and semi-skilled migrants from Asia and Africa (see Fig. 5).

Figure 5

Labour immigration channels into the Mashreq

Source: own compilation from multiple data sources

The most important Mashreq country for labour emigration is Egypt. Despite various pieces

of putative research concerning Egyptian irregular migration to Europe,6 proportionately

few migrate either legally or illegally to the OECD area. In 2010, the main legal flows into the

OECD were to Italy and the USA – at just under 10,000 persons each (OECD 2012a: 277) –

and comprised high proportions of the highly skilled. There are also small flows for seasonal

work in Italy and Greece (23,000 and 7,000 respectively, in 2008). Although there are some

irregular flows to the EU, the numbers are trivial. In contrast, migration within the MENA

region constitutes the principal labour migration flows: in 2008, out of 1.1 million permits

6 E.g. various surveys on intention to migrate, made by Eurostat and the ETF

High degree of high-skilled workers Predominantly low-skilled workers

Egypt GCC Yemen Saudi Arabia

Egypt Libya Egypt Jordan

Lebanon GCC Syria Lebanon

LebanonUSA, Canada EgyptLebanon

JordanGCC SyriaJordan

SyriaGCC

AsiaLebanon

AfricaLebanon

AsiaJordan

AsiaSyria



granted by the Egyptian state, 96% were within the MENA region, 97% were to males, and

45% were initial permits (CAPMAS data).7 The proportion of highly qualified workers is put

at 26% and those working abroad and obtaining a qualification there is put at 36% – a high

ratio. The number authorized to work in Saudi Arabia for this same year is stated as 522,000

(49%) and in Kuwait as 180,000 (17%). Although CAPMAS provides no recent data for flowsto Jordan and Lebanon, the older data show in 2001 a stock of temporary workers in Jordan

of 227,000 and in Lebanon of 13,000 (Baldwin-Edwards 2005: Table 4). Hassan (2010: 75)

reports that 205,500 Egyptians were granted work permits in Jordan in 2008, of which 86%

were with incomplete schooling. Jordanian census data for 2004 show Egyptians as being

28.7% of the foreign population (Blangiardo 2012: 26), amounting to some 98,000 persons.

Lebanese work permit data for 2007 show around 17,000 Egyptians registered (Tabar and

Rassi 2010: 97-98) – obviously, a rather trivial number.

Trends in remittances to Egypt indicate a shift away from the USA which was the

leading source country over the period 1999-2009 (El-Sakka 2010). Remittance data for2011 totalled US$14.32b and put Saudi Arabia in first place at 28%, followed by Jordan

(19%), Kuwait (11%) and Libya (10%).8 Remittances from the USA, Qatar and the UAE are at

much lower, similar levels. Although remittance data are not such reliable indicators of

migration stocks or flows, these data show fairly conclusively that Egyptian labour migration

since the mid-2000s is increasingly focused on Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other GCC countries

and until the Arab Spring both labour migration and remittances were increasing

significantly on an annual basis.

Survey data on desire to migrate permanently (conducted over 2008-2010) show

19% of the total population, 22% of the highly educated and 27% of youth. These figures are

well below those of all the Maghreb countries. The most favoured countries of destination

were stated as being Saudi Arabia (34%), Kuwait (11%) and the USA (10%) (OECD: 2012a:

277).9

Lebanon has a long history of forced emigration owing to its extended period of civil war

(1975-1990); similarly it became quite dependent on remittances over that period. Since

then, many émigrés have returned, amounting to around 85% by the year 2000 (Tabar and

Rassi 2010: 91). The Lebanese economy since 1990 has been unable to provide employment

for its skilled workforce , and there is high unemployment – especially of the youth (Tabar

and Rassi 2010). Highly skilled emigration to the GCC is extensive, with an estimated third of

the labour force working in GCC countries in 2008 (some 350,000 persons). Moreover, the

presence of highly-skilled Lebanese in top managerial positions across the GCC is highly

visible, and estimated at around a third of all director positions (Hourani 2010: 10). Although

7 Available from Egypt’s statistical service, http://www.capmas.gov.eg/

8 Own calculations from World Bank 2012

9 Actually, these results indicate a poor construction of the OECD survey methodology. Clearly there is no

possibility to migrate permanently to GCC countries, so the question focused on permanent emigration has

little meaning for most labour migrants.

http://www.capmas.gov.eg/






high-skill migration to the Gulf continues as a major labour migration stream, there are still

no proper data on flows. One estimate for the period 1997-2007 suggests that around 50%

of migration was directed to the GCC countries (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2010: 2). At the

beginning of the global crisis, one commentator notes that some 40,000 Lebanese returned

from the GCC since they had no job security there (Tabar and Rassi 2010: 93). Recentremittance data are not helpful in determining temporary migration destinations either,

since they are dominated by the very large (and affluent) diaspora communities in the USA,

Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Sweden et al.; for 2011, remittances from Saudi Arabia

amounted to $639m at 8% of total remittances, and were zero or negligible from other GCC

countries.10

The Lebanese economy for some time has had a shortage of unskilled menial labour,

and has significant labour immigration. In particular, since the 1960s there has been large-

scale circular migration of unskilled male Syrians for seasonal or temporary work. This was

estimated at around 400,000 in 2008, almost all with no official status and no work permit(Tabar and Rassi 2010: 98-101).11 In addition to the Syrian immigration, Lebanon has an

immigration policy for temporary labour immigration (similar to the GCC kafala system, see

below); in 2007 some 120,000 work permits were issued. There is a wide mix of immigrant

nationalities, including non-Arab Africans (31%), Filipinos (19%), Sri Lankans (18%),

Egyptians (14%), and smaller numbers of non-Arab Asians and other Arabs (Tabar and Rassi

2010: Figure 20). In previous years, the estimated number of immigrants (excluding Syrians)

was around 200,000 with only 87,000 work permits issued (Baldwin-Edwards 2005: 10); it is

unclear if the same pattern of a high degree of irregularity pertains.

Jordan, like Lebanon, is a country with significant high-skill emigration alongside significant

low-skill immigration. It also hosts the largest refugee population ratio in the world – around

50% (Baldwin-Edwards 2005: 9). Emigration of the highly-skilled began in the 1990s, with

very high unemployment, and was directed primarily to the GCC and the USA. By 2008 the

number of expatriate Jordanian workers was stated as being 350,000,12

of which 162,000

were in oil-producing countries – primarily the UAE (34%), Qatar (32%), Kuwait (19%) and

Oman (12%) (Blangiardo 2012: 26). Some 71,000 were resident in the USA, and another

55,000 distributed across a range of other countries. Remittances to Jordan in 2011 show

only three significant sources: these are the West Bank and Gaza ($1.5b), Saudi Arabia

($900m) and the USA ($450m). The significant remittances from Saudi Arabia contradict the

10 Own calculations from World Bank 2012

11 There is an open border policy with Syria, such that entry is permitted with merely an ID card and Syrians are

not required to leave Lebanon after expiry of their labour contract.12

This figure is much lower than the estimates made for the mid-2000s by Kapiszewski. He suggested that the

stock of temporary workers from Jordan within the GCC was 490,000 of which most were in Saudi Arabia

(260,000) and the UAE (110,000). However, this figure also includes Palestinians with Jordanian passports

(Nassar 2010: 23).



data cited above, and are in accord with the estimates made by Kapiszewski in 2006 (see Fn.

12).

Immigration into Jordan is extensive and largely unskilled, and is thought to contain

a mix of authorized and mostly irregular immigrant workers (Baldwin-Edwards 2005: 9).

According to the Ministry of Labour, in 2008 there were 303,000 legal immigrant workers, ofwhich 70% were from other Arab countries (Nassar 2010: 23). 206,000 of these were

Egyptians – of which 99% were male, 86% with less than completed secondary education

and working in agriculture (34%), industry (17%), commerce (17%) and services (12%)

(Hassan 2010: 75). Data from the 2004 census show 342,000 residents, at 7.7% of total

population; 82.5% were from other Arab countries, the most numerous being Egyptians at

98,000 persons13 (Blangiardo 2012: 26). Data on remittances sent from Jordan in 2011 seem

to confirm the pattern of large-scale temporary immigration – mostly from Egypt and Asia.

Remittances totalled $5billion (very high for the population size) of which the largest flows

were to Egypt (53%), Syria (10%), China (9%), Sri Lanka and Indonesia (4% each), Lebanon(3%) and Bangladesh, India and the Philippines at 2% each.14

Syria, even before the current civil war, has been a difficult country to assess in terms of

emigration and immigration. It has also been a recipient of fairly large numbers of refugees

in recent times, although not at the level of Jordan. Syria has never provided information on

emigration of its nationals, and very limited information on its small labour immigration

flows. One report cites official estimates of Syrians in the GCC in 2010 as being over a

million, with 700,000 in Saudi Arabia and 500,000 in Kuwait (Seeberg 2012: 9), but there is

no other evidence supporting such a large presence.15 The primary destinations of Syrians

prior to the conflict were Lebanon (see above), Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the USA, as

well as various EU countries. The skill level is thought to vary according to destination, with

the lowest-skilled going to Lebanon and Jordan, and high-skill migrants going to the GCC and

OECD countries. In 2010, the principal legal migration to OECD countries was to Germany,

the USA and Sweden but the numbers involved are small, and trivial in comparison with the

probable flows to the GCC. Survey data (2008-10) show a medium level of desire to migrate

(24%), but with the most favoured destination cited as the United Arab Emirates, at

20%(OECD 2012a: 299). Remittance data16 for 2011 show a total of $2.08b, of which 25%

came from Jordan, 17% from Kuwait, 13% from Saudi Arabia and 9% from the USA.17

Immigration into Syria is no less a mystery: even the large refugee communities have

not been properly counted. In 2010 these were thought to number just under half a million

13 Presumably, irregular workers and residents are mostly missing from these data; this might imply that the

actual numbers are two or three times higher.14

Own calculations from World Bank 2012.15

Kapiszewski (2006) estimated for 2003/4 that there were 100,000 Syrians in each of Kuwait and Saudi

Arabia, and trivial numbers elsewhere in the GCC.16

It should be borne in mind that the most substantial (circular) migration into Lebanon will not show up in

remittance data, as money transfer will simply be made by carrying them across the border.17

Own calculations from World Bank 2012.



Palestinian refugees and their descendants, around 1 million Iraqis and another 300,000

stateless Kurds (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2012: 3). With a new immigration law of 2010, the

Syrian state started to record legal labour immigrants: these were estimated as just under

one thousand in 2010, despite press estimates of 5,000 to 7,500 skilled foreign workers.

Domestic workers, regulated since 2001, were estimated at 75-100,000 women, mainlyfrom Indonesia, the Philippines and Ethiopia (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2012: 4). There are no

data in the World Bank database concerning remittances sent from Syria, so a cross-check is

not possible.

Yemen has had a long history of labour migration to the GCC, but this was dealt a severe

blow after the second Gulf War when 850,000 workers were deported from the GCC for

security reasons: entire camps of Yemeni in poverty were set up, and were dependent on

the state for assistance (Baldwin-Edwards 2005: 10). Economic conditions have not

obviously improved since, and there is little legal emigration from Yemen to the OECD area.Survey data on intention to migrate show a very high level for high-skill workers (42) with

the preferred destinations being predominantly Saudi Arabia (56%0 and the UAE (13%)

(OECD 2012a: 305). Remittance data for 2011 show remittances only from Saudi Arabia, at

just over $1b.

Despite the poverty of Yemen, there are also some immigrants in the country: these

consist of high-skill Egyptian and Syrian workers, and refugees from Sudan (Di Bartolomeo

2010b: 2). The presence of these is confirmed by remittances sent from Yemen in 2011,

showing $181m sent to Egypt and $124m to Sudan.

The GCC countries

The Gulf countries since the 1970s have engaged in mass importation of temporary labour

(expatriates), resulting in the highest immigrant/population ratios in the world. Figure 6

shows recent recorded immigrant labour stocks and proportions for the GCC countries –

ranging from 51% in Saudi Arabia to 94% in Qatar.

Figure 6

Foreign labour force in GCC countries, circa 2008 (000s)

Total labour

force

Foreign labour

force% foreign

Saudi Arabia 8,455 4,282 50.6

Kuwait 2,093 1,742 83.2

Bahrain 597 458 76.7

Oman 1,169 809 69.2

Qatar 1,265 1,193 94.3

UAE 3,043 2,588 85.0

TOTAL 16,622 11,072 66.6

Source: Baldwin-Edwards 2011, Table 2



The GCC countries (with the exception of Oman) are very reluctant to provide detailed data

on immigration stocks or any data at all on flows. This is partly owing to the semi-regulated

immigration system – Kafala – which allows citizens and businesses to “sponsor” an

immigrant worker and accept responsibility for his/her presence on the territory. It is also

partly owing to the political sensitivity of such high immigrant stocks in quite conservativesocieties with increasing unemployment of their nationals. However, given that the great

majority of immigrant workers (some 70%) are resident for less than ten years, immigrant

stocks give a picture of cumulative migration flows over the last decade.

As previously noted, a very large proportion of migration from the Mashreq is

directed to the GCC countries, mostly as skilled workers. The proportion of Arab workers in

the GCC has been declining consistently since 1970, from a peak of 72%, to 56% in 1985 and

31% in 1996 (Nassar 2010: 20). For 2007, it is calculated at 22% of the GCC stock of foreign

workers, although with significant differences between countries. Figure 7 shows the

proportions of Arab, Asian and Others (Europe, America, other) as provided by the ArabLabor Organization. The highest ratio of Arab workers is in Qatar (40%), Kuwait (36%) and

Saudi Arabia (30%). The total stock in the GCC is 2.45 million and the largest stock is in Saudi

Arabia at 1.25 million (ALO data). However, this stock of 2.45m Arab expatriates represents

only 22% of expatriate workers: the main origin is Asia, at 72%.

Figure 7

GCC labour force by nationality group, ca. 2007

Source: Arab Labor Organization data

Using IOM data, Haque and Debnath (2010) construct a pie-chart of principal origins of

migrant workers in the GCC countries for 2007. (Presumably these are stock data.) The chart

is reproduced below, as Figure 8. From these data, it can be seen that the most important

sources countries are India at 23%, Bangladesh (13%), Pakistan (12%), Egypt (11%) and the



Philippines at 7%. By region, South Asia is the most important at 55%, followed by Arab

countries (28%) and South East Asia (12%).

Figure 8

Origin of expatriate workers in the GCC, ca. 2007

© IOM and Haque and Debnath (2010)

Recent data on labour emigration flows from Asia have been collected by the OECD. Figure 9

shows labour migration flows out of the Asian countries into MENA,18 for 2010/2011

(excepting Pakistan, 2008).

Figure 9

Labour emigration flows to the MENA region, 2010/2011 (000s)

18 Almost all the flows are to the GCC, with three small exceptions: Bangladeshi (37,000), Filipinos (22,000) and

Sri Lankans (16,000). 50% or more went to Libya, and the remainder to various Mashreq countries.



Source: own calculations from OECD (2012b: Table III.A.1.2)

In contrast to the stock data, these flow data indicate a rather greater presence of Filipinos

and Pakistanis as well as Sri Lankans and Nepalese. However, the destination countries vary

widely by nationality, and the OECD data are able to identify these (also by gender, for some

nationalities). Figure 10 shows a breakdown of which GCC countries Asian migrants went to,for this period.

Figure 10

Labour immigration into MENA from Asia, 2010/2011 (000s)

Source: own calculations from OECD (2012b: Table III.A.1.2)

As can be seen from the chart, each country has a very different mix of immigration

nationality inflows. Saudi Arabia has the largest stock and receives the largest total inflow,

with an emphasis on Filipinos and Indians. The UAE currently takes in almost as many

immigrants as Saudi Arabia at just under 900,000 for 2010; its preferred nationalities are

Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Filipinos. Qatar has an unusual preference for Nepalese workers,

whereas Oman prefers Indians and Kuwait Filipinos. Four sending countries (Nepal,Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Thailand) provide gender data: apart from Sri Lankans, for whom

48% of the flow is female, the female ratios are very low within the range 2.5 –11.3%. One

GCC country –Kuwait – has an unusually high proportion of women in its migrant inflows.

Relative to the known stocks of expatriates (see Figs. 6, 7, 8), the total Filipino

inflows are extremely high – presumably reflecting a general trend in increased household

employment. The inflows into the UAE are much higher than might be expected (at 900,000

in one year, with a known stock of 2.6m), whereas those for Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman

are roughly one quarter of previous stocks (reflecting the modal employment duration of



are now diversifying in their labour immigration needs. In particular, the large inflow of

Filipinos (no gender data) is doubtless for household employment, whereas Pakistani and

Bangladeshi migrants are associated with construction and other unskilled work. Kuwait also

has large remittances to India (37%) along with Egypt (21%) and Bangladesh (12%).

Household employment is suggested by the presence of Sri Lankans and Filipinos; and this isconfirmed by the high female proportion of inflows into Kuwait. Oman and Bahrain also

have Indians as their primary remitters (at over 60%), along with other Asian countries and

Egypt. Remittances from Qatar are predominantly from Indians and Nepalese (31 and 25%),

followed by Pakistanis (16%) and Filipinos (13%). Egyptians remit 7% of the total.

Two shocks – an economic crisis and an Arab Spring

The global financial crisis

Since 2008, there have been two major global events that have impacted heavily on

migration in the MENA region. The first is the global banking crisis, with its knock-on effect

within the European Union and particularly in the Mediterranean North. Since these

countries – primarily Spain and Italy20

– had become the focus of large-scale unskilled male

migration from the Maghreb, the collapse in employment levels in Spain in particular

inevitably have had a major impact on both the employment of immigrants and the flows of

labour immigration. Italy has had a small decline in immigration flows since 2008, but there

are no OECD data for recent years; Spain has had a large reduction in inflows since its peak

in 2007 (OECD 2012b: Statistical Annex). More recent data for Spain from the NationalStatistical Institute (INE) show overall nett emigration of foreign nationals since January

2011, which increased to around 14,000 a month by late 2012. Moroccan migration flows in

2011 show an inflow into Spain of 41,000, which is nett emigration for that year of around

20,000 persons (INE online datasets). Subsequent to Spain’s economic crisis, Italy has also

entered one: the impact on employment and migration are similar, but lagged behind Spain.

Despite the severe economic situation, the known voluntary returns to the Maghreb

remain small. The economic crisis has had a major impact on migration from Morocco to

Spain and Italy for the following four reasons (Arango and Quiñones 2009: 11):

(a)

The unusual severe impact of the crisis on employment(b) The unusual volume and intensity of immigration flows in the 2000s

(c) Because in Spain (and Italy to a lesser extent) immigration is primarily labour

immigration

(d) The primacy of the construction sector, which is the most responsive to economic

downturn and also the sector most important for male immigrant employment

20 Although Greece was the first affected by a serious economic downturn and collapse of employment

opportunities for immigrants (as well as natives), the primary nationality affected has been Albanians.

However, some long-term Egyptian residents in Greece have returned to Egypt, but their number is not

significant relative to Egypt’s population size.



Indeed, one of the stranger effects of the economic crisis in the most affected countries has

been the loss of male (immigrant) employment alongside the relative stability of female

employment. Given two specific conditions – that Maghrebi immigrants in Spain and Italy

are predominantly unskilled male workers, and that they rely on short-term contracts fortheir employment – it was certain that these would be the first to face unemployment. This

situation pertains, and little is actually known about the living conditions and survival

techniques of the large Moroccan populations still residing in Spain and Italy. What is

certain, is that it will be a long time before significant labour migration along this corridor

resumes.

Within the MENA area, the financial crisis had a direct impact only on Dubai owing to

its reliance on financial services; this has been resolved with assistance from other Emirates.

The GCC countries all survived the global crisis rather well: their problems lie more with the

Arab Spring and its implications – both direct and indirect.

The Arab Spring

Starting with the sad yet powerful act of self-immolation of a young Tunisian in January

2011, the Arab world has gone through dramatic and – in some countries – violent changes.

In February 2011, as the Libyan city of Benghazi started its revolt against the Gaddafi

regime, Egyptians, other immigrants and Libyans started to flee Libya through the Egyptian

border. This was followed by flight of others across the Tunisian, Algerian and other African

borders. Far smaller numbers (27,000 recorded in 2011) of Libyans and immigrants sought

asylum by boat crossing to Italy and Malta, but were not received with a welcome. By the

end of the Libyan crisis, a minimum of 1.2 million persons had fled Libya into neighbouring

countries.

Figure 11

Refugee flight from the Libyan crisis during 2011

Libyans seeking asylum abroad 422,912

Tunisians returning to Tunisia 137,000

TCNs arriving in Tunisia 208,489Egyptians returning to Egypt 173,873

TCNs arriving in Egypt 89,681

TCNs crossing into other African country 130,600

All crossing into Algeria 13,962

Refugees by boat reaching Italy or Malta 27,465

TOTAL 1,203,982

Sources: [row 1], Fargues and Fandrich (2012); Aghazarm et al. (2012)

However, these figures are not conclusive. In particular, there are claims that out of theestimated two million Egyptians working in Libya, some 800,000 returned (Hafez and Ghaly,



2012: 8): it is very difficult to confirm or disprove the larger number, since the figure of

173,000 is from IOM records which may well be incomplete owing to the extreme

circumstances of war.21 Regardless, it is evident that the Libyan crisis has had a significant

impact on neighbouring countries with both loss of employment and return of their

nationals (plus Libyan refugees) into their labour markets. With the stabilization of a newregime in Libya, oil production has resumed and other economic sectors such as

construction, agriculture, retail, private security and domestic work are again flourishing

(Attir, 2012). Irregular immigration (along with authorized recruitment) has resumed and

has been increasing; the use of Libya as a transit country for irregular migration to Europe

has also resumed, with much weaker state structures to detect and control it than had

existed under Gadafi.

A year later, and the Syrian crisis has also led to massive flows of refugees, mostly

Syrian but also some immigrants. The number is officially put at just over one million, but

informed sources indicate that it is actually over two million already (and likely to increase).The impact , as with Libya, is primarily on its neighours – Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan.

Whereas Turkey has maintained some degree of control, by establishing refugee camps on

its border with Syria (and the explicit hope that they will all return, in the not-too-distant

future), the flows into Lebanon and Jordan have been effected through an open border

policy, and less regulated. In particular, owing to the delicate political balance in Lebanon,

there are indications that the large refugee presence there is starting to upset political

stability (Van Vliet and Hourani, 2012). Jordan already has a substantial refugee population,

but not such a fragile political scene as Lebanon. The impact there is more likely to be

financial and economic, with ramifications for Jordan’s utilization of its temporary labour

immigration schemes (such as that with Egypt).

The Arab Spring in the GCC countries has taken a different form, other than in

Bahrain where civil uprising has been brutally suppressed by Bahraini and Saudi Arabian

forces, with the implicit support of the USA and the EU. Elsewhere, there are serious worries

about socio-political stability – especially with very youthful populations – in the context of

increased indigenous labour forces and rising unemployment alongside immigrant presence

in the labour market of 50 –94%. Youth (15-24) employment rates in the GCC ranged in 2010

from 11% in Saudi Arabia to 43% in the UAE, with only Qatar achieving a high level of 67%;

these compare with a world average of 52% (ICAEW 2013). In this context, there is some

agreement by expert commentators that GCC governments have decided in practice (but

not officially) to abandon their previous “nationalization” policies and instead to

21 The return of 200 –800,000 persons to Egypt might be expected to impact on labour force and

unemployment levels. Quarterly labour force survey data 2009 –2012 (CAPMAS data) show a massive increase

in male unemployment on 31/3/2011 (up to 9.0%, from 4.8% on 31/12/2010). This was caused entirely by loss

of male employment; an increase of the male labour force in the third quarter of 300,000 was entirely offset

by an identical increase in male employment. This would suggest that the return of skilled workers from Libya

had no impact on unemployment levels, and that the loss of employment earlier in 2011 was a direct result of

the Egyptian revolution and its economic impact. It also implies that the number of returning Egyptians was no

more than 200,000 – confirming the IOM estimates.



concentrate on reducing the unemployment of their educated youth and improve general

living standards (e.g. Winckler 2012: 10). In order to achieve this, most of the GCC have set

record budgets in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman and Dubai – focusing on public sector

employment increases in areas such as education and healthcare (ICAEW 2013). Although

these measures are targeted at indigenous employment creation, they will have a significantknock-on effect of large increases in imported labour.

Implications for bilateral and multilateral migration agreements

with destination countries

Here, I set out three propositions derived from the above evidence, along with their

secondary consequences.

Proposition 1

The future for mass unskilled labour migration from MENA is bleak

From the Maghreb countries, unskilled labour has been quite successfully absorbed by

Spain and Italy over the last decade or more. There is little chance that it can resume in

the medium term. For Egypt, the principal route for unskilled labour has been a recent

success story – the 2007 revised labour agreement with Jordan. Remittances from Jordan

in 2011 were astonishingly high at $2.66billion, and presumably came from a very large

stock of temporary unskilled workers. This arrangement is now under threat owing to the

influx of refugees from Syria and regional instability.

Two logical consequences arise from this prognosis. First, is that in the context of

very high youth unemployment and poor economic growth, irregular emigration from

North Africa (which has been at very low levels for several years) may take off again. The

second consequence is that skilled emigration is likely to be perceived as the only way

into employment, resulting in increased youth demand in MENA for education and

training.

Proposition 2Intra-regional labour migration will increase in importance

The Maghreb countries can no longer rely on Europe – not even France – as recipients of

excess labour supply, owing to the severe economic crisis of the European Union. Limited

opportunities for skilled migration to North America are likely to continue, but the region

with strong economic growth and need for immigrant labour is the GCC. The Maghreb

will therefore be obliged to follow the pattern of the Mashreq, and look more to the GCC

countries. Currently, most opportunities are for skilled and highly skilled workers in the

GCC countries, as all GCC countries recruit unskilled labour almost entirely from Asia.



The former role of Libya as a major employer of both skilled and unskilled labour is

returning, but its management is questionable. The previous informality of labour

migration into the country may well continue, and political stability is still uncertain.

A secondary issue is that of management of the intra-regional flows. The Arab world

outside of the GCC (the Maghreb and Mashreq) has not participated in the Abu DhabiDialogue established in 2008, and is not covered by the 2012 Framework of Regional

Collaboration. There is now the paradox that Asian workers in the GCC may end up with

more protection alongside better organized recruitment mechanisms than are available

to Arab workers. This is a serious deficit of political management and something that

could be taken up by the Arab Labor Organization, amongst others. In particular, the

provisions of the Framework are very positive steps toward better management of

temporary labour immigration and protection of migrants’ rights.

Proposition 3

Continuation of the EU “security regime” concerning migration, alongside migration for

youth education, training and short-term work experience

The EU will doubtless continue to clamp down on irregular migration – especially as

southern labour markets are no longer able to absorb foreign workers. As far as skilled

migration is concerned, the EU “Blue Card” is such a poorly formulated policy – unable to

compete with either North America or the GCC – that its take-up will be largely irrelevant

(Baldwin-Edwards 2009). Another poorly formulated EU policy – that of circular migration

– is likely to be abandoned as a meaningless piece of political jargon. Circular migration in

practice consists of attributes that the EU would never consider desirable – such as

informal labour markets and ease of border crossing (Fakhoury 2010). The European

policy approach seems merely to be an attempt to appease far right opponents of

immigration, rather than to effectively manage labour market needs. Circular migration

(other than seasonal labour migration) is not a serious policy option for MENA-EU flows.

Replacing these failed policies, there is already some attempt being made to provide

education and training routes for MENA youth to go to EU countries. It is possible that

these would be extended to include limited work experience, in addition to training.

These could provide useful mechanisms for economic development and skills utilization

in MENA countries, although many other structural failings also need to be addressed.



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Recent migration trends in and from the MENA region

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