Rebuilding Trust in Government via Service Delivery:

The Case of Medellin, Colombia1

Alejandro Guerrero2

World Bank

1 This paper was prepared as a Companion Technical Note for the new World Bank Public Sector Approach 2011-

2020 and also served as technical basis for Manning, N. and Alejandro Guerrero, ―Trust in Government Around the

World: Evidence from the World Bank‖, in Morgan, Z. (Forthcoming)Trust and Confidence in Government and

Public Services. London: Routledge.

I thank Fernando Rojas, Audrey Sacks, Nick Manning, and Jurgen Renee Blum (all from the World Bank), Victor

Lapuente (Quality of Government Institute), Pablo Barbera and Gonzalo Rivero (NYU), Lluis Orriols (Oxford),

Alvaro Martinez (IRVAPP, Research Institute for the Evaluation of Public Policies), and Luis de la Calle (Juan March

Institute for Social Research) for their useful comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are mine. 2

Public Sector Management Specialist, PREM Department, Latin American and the Caribbean Region (World

Bank)

2

Rebuilding Trust in Government via Service Delivery:

The Case of Medellin, Colombia

Abstract

This paper measures the impact of Service Delivery improvements in basic infrastructure, health,

education and crime on the levels of political and institutional support, looking at the experience of

Medellin barrios (2003-2009). The paper draws on the hypotheses raised in previous interviews by

Medellin public officials, business groups and civil society organizations. The qualitative analysis

suggested that a quick upgrading in the city’s less favored districts, combined with a stronger

enforcement of the rule of law, may have successfully raised the traditionally low levels of political

and institutional support in the city, breaking the equilibrium of distrust in government. This paper

provides quantitative empirical evidence supporting these findings, and it also assess the relative

importance of procedural (or administrative) fairness, perceptions of improvements in service

delivery, actual service delivery, and satisfaction with services, as possible alternative channels to

rebuild trust in institutions. The paper also examines the spillover effects in trust between

institutions. For this estimation, micro data from an extensive local opinion poll (Medellin Como Vamos) is used, covering citizens’ assessments on service delivery and quality of government.

Taking into account spatial and inter-temporal dimensions in Service Delivery, the analysis unveils

how perceived improvements in different public services may have a distinct impact on citizens’

perceptions of government performance and trustworthiness.

1. From Failed City to Shining Metropolis: the Political Economy of Medellin’s Recovery

Medellin was historically both Colombia’s traditional industrial horsepower and one of the most

violent, crime-ridden cities in the world, especially with the drug cartel’s takeover of the city’s

barrios during the 1980s and 1990s. The general retreat of the state in many fronts during these

decades would characterize Medellin in the 1980s and most of the 1990s as a ―failed city‖.

However, in parallel to the recent defeat of the drug cartels and the significant reduction in murder

rates, Medellin started to significantly improve service delivery in many areas, covering all the

services directly provided by the local government. Medellin also improved the management of

schools and hospitals, the police, and other service delivery agencies, including the all-powerful

local State-Owned Enterprise, Empresas Publicas de Medellin (EPM), which is responsible for the

delivery of many key services at the sub-national level3

; Metro de Medellin, an effective metro

system servicing the whole city, including the slums; and EEVV, which provides Medellin with high

quality street cleaning services. In addition, the new mayor after 2004 was strongly committed to

break the status quo and to bring in better education, infrastructures, and in general, greater

cohesion in the city4

. Sergio Fajardo’s mandate (2004-2007) framed a comprehensive response

3 This local State-Owned Enterprise is directly responsible for the delivery of key infrastructures, including electricity,

water, sanitation, gas and, to some degree, telecommunications. EPM is also the main provider of specific social

programs at the local level, such as scholarships and cultural activities. Importantly, a third of the municipal budget

comes from EPM’s annual profits. 4

Devlin, Matthew and Sebastian Chaskel (2010). ―From Fear to Hope in Colombia: Sergio Fajardo and Medellin,

2004-2007‖. Innovations for Successful Societies. Trustees of Princeton University.

3

against the city’s challenges. He broke up clientelistic political networks, raised tax receipts,

improved public services, introduced transparency fairs, established civic pacts and restored

citizen’s ―sense of hope‖, as reflected in comprehensive, annual independent surveys. Metro

system expansion to the slums, even using innovative cable cars which connected marginalized

uphill communities to the network, was a significant step in order to increase the social cohesion in

the city. In addition, the municipality created a set of agencies and decentralized services in the

neighborhoods to better reach citizens, offering social services and psychological support, and

instated accountability institutions to enhance civic transparency. Most important, the Mayor’s

successful management of the public sector agencies, in particular of EPM, and the growing profits

of this public firm, brought subsequent municipal fiscal buoyancy. This budget expansion allowed

for much of the urban upgrading taking place during the mid-2000s, including world-class schools

in poor neighborhoods, public libraries, parks and sport infrastructure, and a vibrant and year-

round cultural agenda. Fajardo left office at the end of 2007 with an unprecedented approval rating

of nearly 90% and a balanced budget.

Perhaps much more important, through this public firm, the municipality guaranteed almost

universal access to relatively high quality basic public services (energy, water and sewage, gas). For

the less affluent customers, and in addition to Colombia’s system of cross-subsidized tariffs

according to income levels5

, EPM designed a variety of innovative mechanisms, such as daily

prepaid energy and water cards instead of bi-monthly bills (which is crucial in societies where many

households work in the informal sector for a small irregular wage earned on a daily basis, thus

unable to face large bi-monthly payments). On the other side, the municipality became also very

strict cutting off access to those who would not pay their bills or free-ride in local services (eg. by

establishing illegal connections to the grid), slowly imposing a civic culture of voluntary payment6

.

EPM’s rate of collectability is among the highest in the Latin American region, even in comparison

with other privately-owned competitors.

In sum, the set of public services delivered by the municipal government and its dependent

agencies were highly visible, and this is particularly true for the local government’s investments in

schools and clinics, fighting crime, urban upgrading and in expanding the transport and basic

infrastructure network to reach marginalized communities. These service areas are directly related

with the quality of life (QoL) of citizens, and recent World Bank research has shown that these

investment priorities are closely associated to wider equality in opportunities for the next

generation (Molina et alt, 2009). Access and quality to these services are not just proxies for the

QoL and housing value at the household, but also at neighborhood level7

. In consequence, the

5

According to the Colombian cross-subsidized scheme in Service Delivery, population in each municipality is divided

into six strata for utility rate purposes. The poorest users are in stratum 1 while the richest users fall in stratum 6. The

utility tariffs are subsidized in stratum1 to 3. Stratum 4 is neutral in the sense that users of stratum 4 pay marginal cost

(where MC=MR).Users belonging to stratum 5 and stratum 6 are charged at higher rates to compensate for the low

rates charged from strata 1 to 3. Not only the public sector companies have followed this criterion for rate purposes to

enhance access of the people to the utilities but the private sector companies have also focused equally on the service

needs of users at all income levels (Sotomayor, Maria Angelica, ―Colombia: Expanding services to low Income areas-

comparing private and public water utilities‖. World Bank Policy Notes, May 2003).

6 This is also the case for the very high number of new-comers, displaced by violence in other parts of the country.

Although they come from other regions where a culture of payment doesn’t exist, no variation in collectability rates

were detected, thus confirming some recent literature arguing that displaced individuals and minorities quickly adapt to

new compliance/defection environments, thus maintaining the existing social equilibrium. 7

Note also that, as access to energy, water and other basic services are generally expanded cluster by cluster inside

neighborhoods, and not just at the household level, neighbors will tend to have a similar opinion and accurate

4

better provision and greater coverage of high quality basic services in Medellin may have been

behind the observed increased levels of trust in government and in particular in several key public

institutions, including EPM, the police, and MetroMedellin, the transports agency. This political

support derived from a good public management, which in some cases (ie. EPM) provided key

additional resources to the local government for social policy, while also effectively providing

services in key sectors that people highly prioritize, would have likely produced an increasingly

strong disincentive for local politicians to pursue patronage politics by fully capturing and

politicizating these high-performing public agencies. In particular, good performance of the

managers in local agencies could also be perceived by the public as good management by the

Mayor, as he is the direct owner of these public firms such as EPM (he heads the Board) and he is

also the main authority of the other autonomous agencies. In this context, the performance and

achievements of these service delivery agencies could become a source of government legitimacy

and electoral support. As noted above, candidates to become Medellin’s Mayor make even explicit

their candidate to CEO of EPM –a sort of vice candidate– during the municipal electoral

campaign.

This virtuous circle of better service delivery in key social sectors, key resources for the investment

budget, increasing satisfaction with and trust in government –especially among those who perceive

the government to be enforcing the law, taxation and fighting corruption– may have generated

enough political support in order to preserve the good management of Medellin.

This paper will focus on deepening our understanding on the relationship between service delivery

and political support/trust in government. At the moment, it is unclear (i) if citizens are rewarding

any kind of service delivery improvement equally; (ii) if citizens are rewarding perceived

improvements in service delivery, or current quality level and/or actual access; and (iii) if citizens

factor other citizens’ experiences in their assessment of government performance.

Next section provides a theoretical framework which provides the micro foundations to interpret

the impact of service delivery on trust in institutions. In the empirical section, I test how changes in

service delivery had an effect on political approval and in trust in government. I also analyze the

impact of performance in trust in one specific institution (the police), and how this affects to trust

in other public institutions and agencies, and in government as a whole.

2. Theoretical Framework: Service Delivery, Political Support and Trust in Government Trust in Government is a multidimensional concept in which citizens expect the system and the

political incumbents to be responsive, honest and competent, even in the absence of constant

scrutiny (Miller and Listhaug, 1990).

Trust reduces transaction costs as it is not necessary for the truster to constantly monitor the

trustee’s behavior (Fukuyama, 1995). A trusting person, group or institution will be ―freed from

worry and the need to monitor the other party’s behavior, partially or entirely‖ (Levi and Stoker,

2000: 496). Applying this notion to the relationship between the citizen and government, then a

citizen is more likely to pay taxes or obey laws that are imposed by a trusted government, as they

perception about the quantity and quality of service delivery in their own area. The same applies for other public

goods such as crime levels, street lighting, paved roads or availability of parks and gardens.

5

are more likely to assume that the taxes are to be used, or the regulations applied, with a good

intention in mind8

.

However, while the concept is clearly important, there are some major definitional problems, and

in the empirics that can be used. Terms such as confidence, trust, consent and legitimacy are often

used interchangeably or at least with meanings that are very specific to the particular situation.

Empirically, the various measures of trust in government that result from surveys are often unclear

about the unit of analysis (what is being trusted?) and whether respondents understood trust or

confidence in the same way as the interviewers.

To avoid the definitional problems, or at least to minimize ambiguity, I offer some operational

definitions of the terms. I then offer some hypotheses about plausible relationships between key

variables, attempting to gain clarity on the units of analysis involved. The next section summarizes

these hypotheses in various functions – that could, at least in principle, be empirically tested for the

case of Medellin. I finish this section by exploring some derivations regarding the relationship

between service delivery, trust in government and perceptions of government procedural fairness.

Definitions

Key concepts Definition

Government performance An empirically observed pattern of past government behavior or outputs.

Trust in government A predicted estimation of how government is likely to act in the future (no

distinction is made between the terms trust and confidence)9

Trust in particular public

institutions or service areas10

A disaggregated estimation of how individual government institutions or

service providers are likely to act in the future

Legitimacy of government Citizens' current assessment of government's entitlement to a monopoly of

the legitimate use of violence in the enforcement of its order11

.

8

From at least Weber on, some form of willing or quasi-voluntary compliance has been considered an important

outcome of trust in government and legitimacy (Levi, 1988). See also Glaser (1999).

9

There is a long tradition of argument that effective government is a source of legitimacy (Lipset, 1961). Key to trust in

government and consent is citizen assessment that government performs reasonably well and meets prevailing

standards of procedural fairness in delivering services, regulating behavior, and making extractive demands (Tyler

1990b; Levi 1997; Rothstein 1998; Rothstein 2005). 10

Note that we focus here on the concept of trust in particular public institutions. But trust in individual political

leaders may also affect general trust in government, as individual political trust involves a person-oriented perspective

whereby citizens become trustful or distrustful of government ―because of their approval or disapproval of certain

political leaders‖ (Citrin, 1974: 974-75). We will account later for this effect in our general model by including a

variable capturing the credibility of government announcements, which obviously is associated to the popularity and

citizens’ previous experiences with the incumbent. 11

Legitimacy as defined by Weber (1968, 212-6) and Levi (2005).

6

Hypotheses

Key variables Hypotheses about their relationship with other variables

Trust in government /

Political Approval

A function of:

(i) the perceived significance of recent performance improvements (actual

differences moderated by prior expectations AND by the fact that some

service improvements are more easily visible to citizens than others AND

by the relevance/priority that citizens concede to each specific service);

(ii) previous trust or cynicism (which provides the lens through which any

improvements are seen), and are taken here as the intercept (or constant) at

the individual/district level;

(iii) perceived administrative fairness of government, which will affect

citizens’ perceptions on the way improvements/deterioration in service

delivery is actually distributed.

(iv) context / social network impact –the degree to which the service

recipients are exposed to positive or negative comments about public

services is also estimated by looking at the cluster/district level. Since

negative comments have greater impact than positive ones (quote), this

estimation is a proxy to the degree of homogeneity in the way the service is

provided to others in the same social network12

.

Summarizing these hypotheses as functions

The perceived significance of recent performance improvements

Performance improvements in service delivery by public agencies could be denoted by

∆ , , where ∆ expresses the variation in output for some specific service provision ( ) at a

given time t. The difference between the current and previous rate of service improvement affects

the evolution of trust over time. Therefore, trust is positively affected when the rate of service

delivery improvement accelerates, and vice versa. When public services expand at the same rate,

trust is not affected.

However, citizens face information problems, and their perception of performance improvements

for specific policy areas may be affected by three different factors: salience of policy for

the citizenry, actual visibility of this policy, and the perceived returns to service improvements, as

denoted below.

1: )

12

The assumption is that the more varied that service recipients' experiences are, then the more diverse opinions that

any individual will hear within their social network. Since hearing negative experiences has more weight than hearing

positive ones, then increasing the range of experiences within the social network will always tend to have the effect of

lowering the recipients' perceptions of the value of the service. Thus, for example, medical consultations with a doctor

(heterogeneous service delivery experiences) are likely to produce a general lowering of perceived value, while public

transport services (homogenous service delivery experiences) are less likely to have this effect (Kampen, Van De Walle

and Bouckaert, 2006).

7

Salience is as derivation here from individuals’ aggregated policy priorities, and it refers to the

importance the citizenry attributes to each issue in time t. There are many alternative reasons for

the degree of salience of specific policies at any given time, but generally an initial level of low

quality or limited access in service provision stands out as one of the main drivers of concern and

issue salience.

Equally, as some policy areas are less visible than others (market regulation vs. health provision),

citizens are less able to discern the performance in some opaque policy areas compared to others,

thus misestimating variations in service delivery. Consequently, improvements in policy areas

which are barely visible for the public will just have a very limited impact on trust levels.

Figure 1. Medellin: Visibility of Different Government Functions or Service Areas

Source: Medellin Como Vamos (2006-2010)

Classification: ―Core Government Departments‖ include the Departments of Planning, Finance, Government, Admin.

Services, Evaluation and Control, and the First Lady Office; ―Sector Deparments‖ include the Deparments of Health,

Education, Transport, Public Works, Environment, Social Welfare, Culture, and Social Development. ―Autonomous

Agencies‖ include 16 public agencies dependent on the Mayor, providing infrastructure, transport, urban upgrading, as

well as some distinctive autonomous institutions on health and education; ―Political Institutions‖ include judicial and

political authorities; and ―Decentralized Services‖ include specific government offices deployed at the neighborhood

level to provide closer services to the citizens. Notice that agencies delivering directly to citizens rank higher. Internal

statistical homogeneity (average values) characterizes these five institutional sub-sets. Annex 1 provides a

comprehensive list of these institutions and functions.

Finally, as countries develop and expand service provision, individuals face increasing difficulties

over time to experience identical satisfaction for similar rates of service improvement. In other

words, there are diminishing returns as citizens perceive less change than in earlier stages of policy

development. This means that some policy areas become less significant for citizens as they reach

Service Delivery Agencies

Decentralized Services

Sector Departments

Political Institutions

Core Goverment

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

VIS

IBIL

ITY

CORE GOV. DEPARTMENTS (6) SECTOR DEPARTMENTS (8)

AUTONOMOUS AGENCIES(16) POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS (6)

DECENTRALIZED SERVICES (6)Citizens Firms

8

certain tipping points in quality and access, switching the attention towards areas of service delivery

where the government is comparatively lagging.

These three dimensions thus determine the importance, or weight, citizens attribute to service

delivery progress by specific government agencies. As a result, we argue that there is a greater trust

payoff for performance improvements in low-quality, limited-access services, which are also very

visible to citizens, and are lagging in comparison to other government policies.

Previous trust or cynicism

We also argue that, leaving aside perceived policy performance, citizens determine the

government's trustworthiness by looking in retrospect to previous experiences. In this sense, the

degree of trust in certain institution or service area in previous periods marks the

baseline from where individuals estimate future government performance.

External factors

Two external factors also shape citizens’ trust in specific public service providers. The way the

incumbent formally announced reform plans and achievements has a direct impact on the

credibility of the government. If previously the incumbent played a repeated game of constant and

misleading declarations on promised changes in service delivery, citizens would be suspicious

regarding any new promise on service delivery improvements. Conversely, incumbents that

underplayed their communication strategy, get more attention and credibility when announcing

extensive reform plans and promising steps forward in service delivery.

At the same time, citizens do not only estimate government performance in specific services by

direct experience, but also by means of their social network. Homogeneity in the service delivery

experience inside the individual’s social network determines the likely variation in feedback

that the citizen will receive from friends and relations. The more heterogeneous is the service

improvement, the greater the variation and, since negative experiences count for more than

positive ones, heterogeneity tends to convince people that the service is worse than homogeneity.

The more homogeneous the service delivery improvement inside the individual’s social network,

the closer will be to 0.

Trust in particular public institutions or service areas

The overall function described above can be formulated as follows:

2:

9

Trust in Government Three additional assumptions would be required in order to step up from trust in single public

institutions and service areas towards the aggregate level of trust in government: first, individuals

have some knowledge about the current performance on the n-set of public services; second, all

government agencies are equally relevant for citizens; and finally, citizens are perfectly able to

correctly attribute every public service area as a government, not private, responsibility13

But, in

order to relax these assumptions, we allow individuals to prioritize the list of public services

according to their salience, visibility and proportionality as described in formula (1). Thus, trust in

government is then an average of disaggregated trust levels in the set of government institutions and

sectors, weighted by the specific relevance ( etc in the formula, below) of their current

service provision14

. We also hypothesize that those services which are more directly related to the

provision of better opportunities for the next generation are generally more appreciated by citizens

than other policy areas15

.

3:

Above we are arguing that trust in government is equivalent to the weighted sum of different

expected levels of government’s service delivery , plus an error term. Note that,

following our argument, we are concluding that there is a dynamic variation in the salience of

different government policies over time . And consequently, as they reach higher

degrees of maturity compared to other lagging policies, the current status and improvements in

some services become less relevant for citizens.

Trust in Government and Perceptions of Government Procedural Fairness / Corruption

Finally, there is an interesting corollary derived from the logic depicted above: as trust in

government is associated with government performance and fair behavior (with the

aforementioned caveats); and trust is a good proxy for perceptions of procedural fairness and

corruption; then we shall conclude that governments successfully enforcing the rule of law and

13

Assessing what citizens see as ―government‖ is relevant in order to select which institutions are regarded as part of

government, and therefore may influence on the general perceptions of government. As shown by Dinsdale (2000)

and Swindell et alt. (2000), citizens have increasing problems to correctly attribute services delivery to the public and

private sectors. Evidence from Belgium revealed that some services (post, health services, educational system) are seen

as government responsibilities more than other policy areas (such as telecommunication services, television and radio

or, to a lesser degree, water and electricity distribution). 14

See footnote 6. 15

Preliminary empirical evidence for Latin America using trust measures (from Latinobarometro surveys) and the

World Bank’s Human Opportunities Index (2009) reinforces this hypothesis at the empirical level.

10

fighting tax evasion or corruption (alternative forms of service delivery) will also receive a boost

both in terms of higher trust in government and better perceptions of administrative fairness.

But, following this logic, we can also argue that any better service delivery will improve perceptions

of corruption in the same way as they will increase in parallel trust in institutions and in

government. Thus, citizens could identify better public provision of goods and services as an

indication of lesser corruption levels, even if the latter did not necessarily changed in a similar

proportion.

11

3. Empirical Analysis: Service Delivery as Driver of Trust in Government

3.1 Data and Methods

Data I explore the relationship between government service provision, trust in government and approval

of the incumbent mayor using the Medellin Como Vamos dataset for 2007 (N=1,415), covering

Medellin’s 16 districts, and 10 basic services delivered locally. The relationship between perceived

fair and effective enforcement of the law (procedural or administrative fairness) and political

support/trust in government is also examined.

Methods

The dataset used for this paper has a clustered structure. Individuals are nested within districts

(comunas), which also roughly correspond to different socio-economic ―strata‖. These strata, as

mentioned earlier, have a direct effect in the provision of public services due to Colombia’s cross-

subsidized system. These districts are the smallest, well-defined geographic units available and -as

strata are defined by the household location- most districts tend to be social and economically

homogenous, thereby producing highly clustered data. In Colombia, socio-economic status plays a

highly salient role in the quality of public services.

Ignoring the neighborhood or spatial spillover effects of our independent variables (service

delivery) on the individual data can generate a number of statistical problems. Respondents

sampled from the same district or stratum level are likely to have similar values and in some cases,

the same values, on key covariates. In other words, service delivery of some public goods (e.g.

police efficacy at the neighborhood level, or number and quality of parks and gardens) is expected

to be quite homogeneous within each district. This generates clustering effects (Kumar et alt, 2006:

498-568). In order to avoid biased parameter estimates and inefficient standard errors, data

clustering becomes necessary (Bennet, 1975; Hattie, 2002). Otherwise, intercepts may be variable

across districts and failure to control for this may result in biased estimates.

I deal with these issues by estimating an ordinal probit regression model with clustered data, which

allows us to estimate categorical ordinal responses using maximum likelihood (Greene, 2003: 736-

740). In addition, by clustering the data into comunas, we correct for biases in parameter estimates

and standard errors due to the aforementioned spillover effects of service delivery at the

neighborhood. This is especially true for public goods delivery, such as crime levels.

12

Treating the dependent variable as an ordinal outcome (1 to 5) and taking into account the

clustered nature of our data, I estimate random intercepts for the districts levels for the Medellin Como Vamos dataset:

See previous theoretical section for model, equation and definitions

For the Medellin Como Vamos dataset, I estimate random intercepts for districts with the

following systems of equations:

Level 1 (Individual): Log [Pi/1-Pi]= β0 + aij (1)

In this model, i and j index the individual and the district levels. The Greek symbols refer to

parameters estimated at particular levels of analysis: β refer to fixed effects at district level. The

random effects of intercepts at the individual and district levels are described by ai and 0.

The estimation is performed using an Ordinal Probit Model, clustered at the district level

(Kennedy, 2010).

Dependent Variables

Trust in the Incumbent The Medellin Como Vamos asked respondents the following: ―How much do you trust the

Mayor?.‖ Respondents' answers were originally coded in a scale from 1 ("Not at all ") to 5 (―A lot‖).

Approval of the Incumbent Performance/Management The Medellin Como Vamos asked respondents the following: ―How do you rank the

performance/management of Sergio Fajardo’s administration?‖. Respondents answered in a scale

from 1 (Very Bad) to 5 (Very Good).

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Incumbent’s Trust and Political Approval

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Trust in the Mayor 80.9% 84.9% 73.1% 66.6% 66.0%

Approval of Mayor's Management 81.5% 86.0% 73.8% 67.9% 66.0%

Sergio Fajardo's Term Alonso Salazar's Term

Source: Medellin Como Vamos (2006-2010)

13

Independent Variables

Socio-Demographic Variables

We control for standard socio-demographic variables that can affect perceptions of the

government institutions performance. Citizens are asked about their age, gender, education,

employment status, children, and city of origin (dummy for natives and outsiders living in the city

for more than 5 years). Interestingly, they are also coded according to the socio-economic stratum

they belong to, which is an objective measure of income in Colombia. In addition, citizens are also

asked if they self-report as not being poor, a measure of current economic situation.

Perceptions of Administrative Fairness and Enforcement of Rules

I include a measure of administrative fairness and the state’s enforcement capacity. Respondents

are asked how likely is that someone would be punished for evading local taxes. Respondents

answered in a scale from 1 (―Unlikely‖) to 5 (―Very Likely‖). This question is capturing both the

perceived enforcement capacity of government, but also the perceived fairness of the system. If

citizens believe that some group (ie. the rich) can gain their way out of civic duties, such as paying

taxes, then they will be less likely to trust in institutions or to support the tax system.

Government Service Delivery Activities

Perceptions of Improvement in Government Service Delivery

I include 5 existing measures of perceptions of improvement in service delivery. Citizens are asked

regarding the perceived evolution in service delivery since the previous year, for (i) education, (ii)

health, (iii) water services, (iv) sewage system, and (v) crime levels. These variables were codified

from -1 (Deteriorated) to 1 (Improved), to allow for ordinal estimations.

Objective Measures of Government’s Current Service Delivery

I include 10 objective measures of service delivery provision. Respondents are asked for i) access

of their children to school; ii) health coverage; iii) household access to water, iv) sanitation, v)

electricity, and vi) tubed gas; vii) paved streets in the neighborhood; viii) street lighting; ix)

availability of parks and gardens; and x) if they were victims of crime in the last twelve months.

These variables are coded as dummies (0-1).

Satisfaction with Current Quality of Service Delivery

Respondents were finally asked to rate (in a scale from 1 to 5) how satisfied they were with the

following 10 public services: i) schools; ii) health provision; iii) water provision; iv) sewage; v)

electricity services; vi) tube gas; vii) state of streets; viii) street lighting; (ix) parks and gardens in the

neighborhood; and, critical in Medellin for historical reasons, (x) satisfaction with levels of crime at

the city level.

14

As anticipated in the previous theoretical section, this paper hypothesizes that perceived improvements in more visible and priority areas of service delivery, especially in those which are

closer to the individual level, will have a greater impact on political/institutional support than other

services which are less visible, less a priority, or more distant from the household. Figure 2

summarizes this hypothetical framework.

Figure 2. Hypothesized Impacts of Improvements

in Service Delivery on Political/Institutional Support

Results

To summarize, as illustrated in Tables 2 and 3, the results suggest that:

(i) Citizens’ perceptions of administrative or procedural fairness are, as expected,

correlated with government’s approval and trustworthiness;

(ii) There is a strong, positive relationship between perceptions of service delivery

improvement and both approval of the current government performance, and trust in

the incumbent;

(iii) The relationship between current government levels of service provision (access) or

quality (satisfaction) is, with some exceptions, not statistically significant for a majority of

services. Only some critical services (water access) seem to have a strong impact on

government’s approval and trustworthiness.

Table 4 estimates the marginal effect of improvements in service delivery on the measures of trust

in the incumbent and approval.

Relevance of

Policy Areas for

CitizensIndividual Level Mixed

Neighborhood

Level

(Public Goods)

Less CriticalGas Service, Fixed Land

Phone

Environment

(Pol lution/Publ ic

Spaces/Urbanism)

Less Critical

but Highly

Visible

SewageTrash Collection, Street

Lighting

Paved Streets, Parks

and Gardens

CriticalWater, Electricity,

Schooling†, Health,

Police Service҂

Public Transportation,

Neighborhood SafetySchooling‡

B: Maximum Impact Medium Impact Less Importance

Imp

ort

ance

Provision Level

‡ "School ing", as perceived by individuals without kids .

† "School ing" provis ion and qual i ty, as perceived by individuals with kids

҂ "Pol ice Service", as perceived by actual victims of crime .

15

Table 2. Trust in Government and Service Delivery in Medellin

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5

FairnessFairness &

Improv.

Fairness &

Access

Fairness &

Satisfac-

tion

Complete

Model

Coef. Sig Coef. Sig Coef. Sig Coef. Sig Coef. Sig

Gender 0.145 ** 0.162 ** 0.142 ** 0.162 ** 0.164 **

Age 0.079 *** 0.081 *** 0.076 *** 0.074 *** 0.081 ***

Native 0.018 0.025 0.017 0.037 0.042

Income 0.037 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.032

Education 0.033 0.017 0.029 0.033 0.022

Children 0.026 -0.053 0.008 -0.079 -0.075

Unemployed -0.031 -0.052 -0.035 -0.049 -0.082

Poor 0.194 *** 0.159 ** 0.176 ** 0.106 0.116

Pe

rce

pti

on

of

Pro

ced

ura

l

Fair

ne

ss

Administrative Integrity 0.094 *** 0.111 *** 0.102 *** 0.086 *** 0.104 ***

Education Services 0.204 *** 0.187 ***

Health Services 0.153 *** 0.107 ***

Water Services 0.212 *** 0.174 ***

Sewage System 0.094 0.024

Crime Fighting 0.124 *** 0.070 ***

Water Access 0.990 *** 0.806 **

Sewage Access 0.399 0.448

Electricity Access -0.702 ** -0.664 *

Gas Access 0.115 -0.360

Paved Streets 0.048 -0.166

Streetlighting 0.360 0.172

Parks and Gardens 0.010 -0.185

Crime Victim -0.001 0.073

Education Access -0.308 -0.294

Health Access 0.134 0.115

Satisf: Water 0.072 0.014

Satisf: Sewage 0.028 -0.004

Satisf: Electricity -0.008 0.027

Satisf: Gas 0.034 0.130

Satisf: Paved Streets (Hood) 0.027 0.035

Satisf: Streetlighting 0.097 ** 0.095 **

Satisf: Parks and Gardens 0.007 0.046

Satisf: Crime Levels (City) 0.184 *** 0.157 **

Satisf: Education 0.080 * -0.008

Satisf: Health 0.051 0.023

Sati

sfac

tio

n w

ith

Se

rvic

e

De

live

ry

*** Significant at 99%

** Significant at 95%

* Significant at 90%

Dependent variable:

Trust in Government ("Mayor")

Pe

rce

pti

on

of

Imp

rove

me

nt

(sin

ce l

ast

year

)

Acc

ess

to

Se

rvic

es

Soci

o-e

con

om

ic a

nd

de

mo

grap

hic

char

acte

rist

ics

16

Table 3. Approval of the Incumbent’s Management and Service Delivery

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5

FairnessFairness &

Improv.

Fairness &

Access

Fairness &

Satisfac-

tion

Complete

Model

Coef. Sig Coef. Sig Coef. Sig Coef. Sig Coef. Sig

Gender 0.109 0.127 ** 0.101 0.118 * 0.125 *

Age 0.069 *** 0.070 *** 0.065 *** 0.062 *** 0.070 ***

Native 0.013 0.021 0.018 0.036 0.043

Income 0.025 0.019 0.017 0.022 0.021

Education 0.014 -0.002 0.009 0.014 0.004

Children 0.025 -0.049 0.002 -0.094 -0.105

Unemployed -0.045 -0.071 -0.061 -0.081 -0.114

Poor 0.208 *** 0.172 *** 0.183 *** 0.112 0.125 *

Pe

rce

pti

on

of

Pro

ced

ura

l

Fair

ne

ss

Administrative Integrity 0.069 ** 0.085 *** 0.077 ** 0.061 * 0.077 **

Education Services 0.179 *** 0.148 **

Health Services 0.186 *** 0.146 ***

Water Services 0.215 *** 0.187 ***

Sewage System 0.073 -0.012

Crime Fighting 0.137 *** 0.070 *

Water Access 0.852 ** 0.653 *

Sewage Access 0.538 0.539

Electricity Access -0.479 -0.328

Gas Access 0.146 ** -0.289

Paved Streets 0.291 0.070

Streetlighting 0.221 0.128

Parks and Gardens -0.007 -0.146

Crime Victim -0.021 0.086

Education Access -0.417 -0.419

Health Access 0.090 0.058

Satisf: Water 0.044 -0.006

Satisf: Sewage 0.051 0.033

Satisf: Electricity -0.003 0.009

Satisf: Gas 0.040 ** 0.118

Satisf: Paved Streets (Hood) 0.040 0.033

Satisf: Streetlighting 0.066 0.066

Satisf: Parks and Gardens -0.008 0.021

Satisf: Crime Levels (City) 0.211 *** 0.187 ***

Satisf: Education 0.086 ** 0.021

Satisf: Health 0.058 0.019

** Significant at 95%

* Significant at 90%

Dependent variable:

Approval of Mayor's PerformanceSo

cio

-eco

no

mic

an

d

de

mo

grap

hic

char

acte

rist

ics

Pe

rce

pti

on

of

Imp

rove

me

nt

(sin

ce l

ast

year

)

Acc

ess

to

Se

rvic

es

Sati

sfac

tio

n w

ith

Se

rvic

e

De

live

ry

*** Significant at 99%

17

Government Service Delivery Perceptions of Government Service Delivery

Findings from Medellin Como Vamos suggest that the indicators of perceptions of improvements

in government service delivery during the last year have a positive impact on both increasing trust

(―Trust in the Mayor‖) and in improving approval ratings (―Approval of Mayor’s Management of

the City‖). In particular, perceived improvements in services which are critical and delivered to the

individual/household level do have a positive impact on trust in the incumbent and approval

ratings.

Objective Measures of Service Delivery

The evidence suggests that the relation between objective measures of service delivery and trust in

government is mixed. Generally speaking, the relationship between provision/quality and trust is

not significant for a majority of the ten areas of service delivery examined here.

However, access to and satisfaction with some specific, critical services (such as water or safety)

seems to have a substantial positive impact on trust in the incumbent and approval ratings. These

exceptions may be statistically significant because water provision and satisfaction with (perceived)

crime levels could be proxies to other variables, such as perceived performance in crime fighting

or perceived performance of EPM, the highly-respected local public utility.

Administrative Fairness and State’s Enforcement

The correlation between administrative fairness and the government’s management and

trustworthiness is statistically significant and strong. In the case of government’s trustworthiness, it

is difficult to disentangle the endogenous nature of this correlation, although the survey design

(ordering, meaning and timing of each question) would suggest that the underlying perception of

government administrative fairness (measured by the homogeneous, non-discretionary

enforcement of taxation) is the predictor of trust in the incumbent. In any case, trust in government

seems to go in hand with the perception of administrative fairness.

Table 4, in the next page, summarizes the estimations for the predicted impact of service delivery

in trust in the incumbent and approval ratings, for statistically significant variables. Although the

precise impact ratios are time- and space-specific (Medellin urban area, 2006-07), this empirical

test has shown that:

(i) Perceptions of service delivery improvement are crucial in rebuilding trust in institutions,

especially when those services are critical and delivered at the individual level;

(ii) A significant impact on trust is possible in a relatively short period of time;

(iii) Actual levels in access and quality of service delivery do not matter (except for key services

such as water or crime), as long as citizens perceive improvements over time;

(iv) Therefore, developing countries which are currently experience limited access and poor quality

in service delivery have more leeway to restore trust in government than highly developed

regions; and,

(v) Perceived procedural or administrative fairness seems to matter, and it is highly correlated with

trust in government – although the direction of causality in this relationship is unclear.

18

Table 3. Predicted Impacts of Service Delivery on Trust in the Mayor and Approval of Performance

3. The Dynamics of Trust in Institutions and Trust in Government. In the theoretical model, it was assumed that individuals are constantly updating the list of relevant

priority services according to their salience, visibility and proportionality. And we argued that trust

in government is an average of disaggregated trust levels in the set of government institutions and

sectors, weighted by the specific relevance of their current service provision.

Medellin recent history offers an interesting case of negative shock on service delivery to test the

validity of these assumptions. After many years of successful fight against crime, Medellin has

experienced a dramatic surge in gang-related homicides since 2008. In Figure 3, below, citizens’

levels of trust in four highly visible service areas16

are displayed, as well as trust in the Mayor. As

expected, trust in the police experienced a significant drop due to the surge in violence17

. This drop

in a key service area is also negatively impacting the levels of trust in the incumbent, although in a

more moderate way. But interestingly, trust levels in other well-performing institutions do not seem

to be affected by the surge in crime or the drop in trust in the Mayor, thus providing empirical

16

The ―most visible institutions‖ means here that more than 90% of the people can recognize these

institutions/agencies and have a positive or negative opinion about them. 17

Specific questions on citizens’ propensity to ―denounce‖ crimes after being victimized also confirm this point,

showing a substantial drop in denounce rates, from 52% in 2006 to 35% in 2009 (MCV, ―Encuesta de Calidad de Vida

2010‖).

marginal

effect

maximum

effect

marginal

effect

maximum

effect

Perceived Procedural Fairness

"Administrative Integrity" 3.7% 14.8% 2.8% 11.1%

Perceived improvements on:

Education Services 6.7% 13.3% 5.3% 10.6%

Health Services 3.8% 7.6% 5.2% 10.4%

Water Services 6.2% 12.4% 6.7% 13.4%

Crime Fighting 2.49% 5.0% 2.5% 5.0%

Combined Impact of Perceived

Improvements: 19.20% 38.40% 19.71% 39.42%

Access to Services

Water Access 28.8% 28.8% 23.4% 23.4%

Electricity Access -23.7% -23.7% n.s. n.s.

Satisfaction with Services

Satisf: Streetlighting 3.4% 13.5% n.s. n.s.

Satisf: Crime Levels (City) 5.6% 22.5% 6.7% 26.8%

Impact on the Probability of…

Trusting the Mayor

Approving Mayor's

Performance

Note: Only statistically significant variables are shown.

19

grounds to the assumption that citizens’ are actually able to discern between different institutions’

performance.

Figure 3. Autonomy of Trust in Institutions vs. Government

Sources: Medellin Como Vamos surveys (2006-2010), Secretaria de Gobierno de Medellin.

4. Sustaining Public Services: the Culture of Compliance with Government as a

Consequence of Increased Trust in Government. One possible explanation for Medellin success (and recent decline) may be related to the fact that

―performance‖ factors may have built trust in government over time. This was for example the case

of the services successfully provided by autonomous service delivery high-performing agencies

such as Metro de Medellin or EPM. Public transportation, energy and water provision are certainly

service areas that rank among the highest in citizens’ priorities and needs. Same applies to

education, health, crime and safety levels. We argue that trust in government in Medellin was built

and remained high in a stable way because (i) citizens acknowledged the improvements in

performance over time in specific services, as they are both critical and very visible, in particular in

comparison to much lower quality services in other Colombian cities; (ii) performance information

on these services was easy to gather at the individual level and easy to understand (as easy as

turning the lights or the tap on); (iii) these are service areas which are homogeneous in that most

people receive a similar type of service in their geographic cluster, thus holding and reinforcing the

same opinions on service quality inside their social networks18

; (iv) the performance change

18

This is important because if service delivery is heterogeneous, such as in the case of doctors’ performance, the

tipping point after which performance improvements are able to change people’s bad image of some service area is

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Tru

st in

Go

vern

me

nt

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Trust in the Police Trust in EPM (Locally-Owned Utilities)

Trust in the Education Department Trust in Metro de Medellin

Trust in the Mayor Murder rate / 100,000 inhab. (right axis)

20

represented a significant improvement on the baseline, especially in the case of new coverage on

areas and communities which were traditionally abandoned elsewhere in Colombia, and may have

been above the level of improvement that citizens felt entitled to; and (v) performance information

came from institutions that had not unduly undermined themselves through overheated rhetoric

on performance improvements –which otherwise would have hampered their credibility.

In concordance with the literature on consent and compliance, this context favored that

improvements in service delivery by Medellin could be traded by higher compliance with

regulations, taxes, and in fees paid by the users to the public utilities and transport systems. As that

context of performance improvement and innovation was accompanied by a strict policy of cutting

services to non-compliant customers and sugar-coated with a flexible variety of payment

mechanisms to ease the costs of compliance, many citizens perceived the government to operate in

a moderately fair, responsive manner. I argue that this may be behind the current equilibrium of

high bill collectability for EPM and other local public agencies, including the local tax

administration, as well as the baseline perception of generalized compliance in the public.

One key competing explanation for prominence in any causal relationship with trust is

accountability and honesty in public life. However, these values were always present and became

the regular expectation in the case of Medellin (eg. EPM management)19

and, maybe because of

that, performance took the main role in determining the satisfaction with and trust in the local

government.

Second, it is possible to counter-argue that, generally, the metrics of performance for any public

institution or firm are complex and public perceptions are far from straightforward to interpret.

However, as noted above, the service areas where the municipality has a major role are clearly and

immediately visible to citizens, and also the municipality and other independent pollsters

(Medellin Como Vamos, a civil society-run pollster) were constantly disclosing the degree of

achievement of the local government.

Third, attitudes towards the incumbent may have some significance in citizens’ satisfaction and

trust in institutions, but trust reflects more than incumbent-specific satisfactions or dissatisfactions

(Levi and Stoker, 2000). As we saw in the previous section, citizens seem to be able to discern

between trust in different institutions, and trust in the current incumbent. Another example was

provided by several authorities during the interviews: In 2002, a Mayor attempted to takeover

politically EPM, in order to distribute patronage and jobs. In that occasion, citizens were able to

discern between bad incumbents and good institutions: the attempt by that mayor to politicize the

high-performing public firm’s management, which was highly trusted by the citizenry, caused a

social revolt which reversed the situation: trust in the local institutions and agencies remained high,

despite the lack of trust on that specific political leader until the end of his mandate.

much higher, as negative opinions count more than positive ones in people’s mind and will usually outweigh new

positive experiences associated with the improvements.

19

No one among the large number of interviewees (see Annex 2) mentioned corruption scandals or bad procurement

practices in the history of the firm, besides the two critical times for EPM when populist politicians sidetracked the

technocratic management of the firm, with the subsequent civil society and staff’s reaction.

21

Fourth, expectations matter, and innovations and performance improvements achieved through

much effort last year may be the baseline this year in citizens’ minds. If the public expectation is

that services should consistently improve, then unless they improve particularly sharply, there is

little credit for the achievement. Thus, as EPM and other well-performing agencies are reaching its

limits in universal coverage and quality improvement in their core activities of service delivery,

individuals are starting to face increasing difficulties over time in experiencing identical satisfaction

for similar rates of service improvement. On the one hand, Medellin’s local government

institutions are and will be facing diminishing returns as citizens will perceive less change than in

earlier stages of policy development (Graham and Pettinato, 2001), except on the areas where

these public agencies are actually building new ―markets‖ of public service delivery, such as

displaced communities or marginalized neighborhoods and towns. On the other hand, at this point

of Medellin development, just efficiency gains and service innovations, both driven by new

technology, may keep up satisfaction with and trust in the government of Medellin.

22

ANNEX 1: DETAILED LEVEL OF TRUST AND VISIBILITY BY AGENCY

LEV EL OF

GOV ER N . Visib. Trust Visib. Trust Visib. Trust Visib. Trust Visib. Trust

MAYOR CENTER 84.4% 80.9% 89.9% 84.9% 64.5% 73.8% 77.5% 67.9% 66.0%

Planning Depart. CORE 30.3% 66.4% 33.5% 64.0% 25.0% 60.0% 30.0% 57.0% 14.0% 62.0%

Social Welfare Depart. SECTOR 28.5% 71.6% 32.4% 68.4% 25.0% 68.0% 26.0% 68.0% 13.0% 68.0%

Civic Culture Depart. SECTOR 28.7% 73.8% 36.7% 71.0% 24.0% 72.0% 27.0% 68.0% 15.0% 81.0%

Social Development Dep. SECTOR 19.9% 70.0% 26.4% 69.6% 17.0% 68.0% 20.0% 65.0% 9.0% 71.0%

Education Dept. SECTOR 54.2% 74.4% 62.8% 69.6% 56.0% 73.0% 55.0% 73.0% 48.0% 78.0%

Eval & Control Dept. CORE 13.1% 67.3% 15.8% 64.3% 9.0% 55.0% 9.0% 53.0% 4.0% 67.0%

Government Dept. CORE 34.4% 68.5% 34.2% 66.8% 31.0% 63.0% 31.0% 58.0% 16.0% 67.0%

Finance Dept. CORE 25.5% 68.1% 27.3% 62.2% 19.0% 62.0% 20.0% 56.0% 10.0% 64.0%

Environment Dept. SECTOR 38.8% 67.5% 42.3% 66.0% 37.0% 62.0% 34.0% 64.0% 22.0% 67.0%

Public Works Dept. SECTOR 39.8% 69.7% 59.9% 64.5% 52.0% 65.0% 50.0% 62.0% 41.0% 59.0%

Health Dept. SECTOR 50.8% 68.2% 44.7% 63.1% 32.0% 67.0% 35.0% 53.0% 22.0% 70.0%

Transport and Transit Dept. SECTOR 58.0% 66.0% 58.1% 62.9% 55.0% 55.0% 47.0% 53.0% 40.0% 53.0%

Adm.Services Dept. CORE 17.4% 66.8% 19.3% 64.7% 13.0% 62.0% 10.0% 67.0% 6.0% 63.0%

First Lady Office CORE 13.9% 70.9% 14.8% 67.6% 9.0% 62.0% 7.0% 70.0% 3.0% 53.0%

Urban Develop. Firm (EDU) AGENCY 17.6% 69.3% 21.1% 68.9% 14.0% 73.0% 16.0% 59.0% 13.0% 63.0%

Basic Infrastructure (EPM) AGENCY 97.8% 76.0% 97.9% 75.9% 91.0% 78.0% 99.0% 80.0% 96.0% 84.0%

Street Cleaning (EEVV) AGENCY 89.4% 77.4% 89.8% 75.7% 80.0% 76.0% 87.0% 79.0% 89.0% 85.0%

EADE AGENCY 33.4% 74.6% 38.5% 71.6%

Telecom (EDATEL/UNE) AGENCY 44.6% 74.7% 53.2% 71.9% 80.0% 75.0% 88.0% 76.0% 85.0% 85.0%

Intern. Convention Center AGENCY 39.8% 78.6% 45.2% 75.6% 31.0% 81.0% 32.0% 81.0% 43.0% 87.0%

Transport Terminals (SOE) AGENCY 74.8% 80.0% 81.3% 76.6% 70.0% 76.0% 71.0% 80.0% 71.0% 83.0%

ESE MetroSalud AGENCY 61.2% 71.5% 68.9% 69.6% 61.0% 68.0% 63.0% 68.0% 55.0% 61.0%

Medellin General Hospital AGENCY 71.4% 79.3% 78.6% 75.8% 81.0% 80.0% 80.0% 80.0% 73.0% 83.0%

INDER - Sports Institute AGENCY 62.4% 79.1% 72.5% 78.7% 66.0% 83.0% 71.0% 87.0% 70.0% 90.0%

Metropol. Tech. Institute AGENCY 38.7% 79.4% 48.6% 76.9% 41.0% 76.0% 48.0% 84.0% 44.0% 88.0%

Metro de Medellin AGENCY 94.6% 88.7% 95.9% 87.7% 93.0% 91.0% 97.0% 92.0% 97.0% 95.0%

Metroparques AGENCY 63.9% 79.5% 71.0% 77.9% 63.0% 82.0% 59.0% 83.0% 49.0% 89.0%

Metroseguridad AGENCY 53.1% 74.4% 58.4% 73.4% 43.0% 77.0% 39.0% 73.0% 24.0% 76.0%

Telemedellin AGENCY 62.1% 78.5% 66.4% 76.1% 52.0% 75.0% 57.0% 78.0% 69.0% 81.0%

Banco de las Oportunidades AGENCY 32.9% 72.7% 36.5% 68.3%

Local Council INSTITUTION 38.2% 65.9% 40.6% 63.3%

Civic Control of Pub. Serv. (JAL) INSTITUTION 24.0% 63.7% 27.1% 63.5% 24.0% 56.0% 28.0% 54.0% 20.0% 44.0%

Medellin Auditing Court INSTITUTION 26.4% 66.8% 28.6% 65.6% 21.0% 66.0% 19.0% 62.0% 14.0% 61.0%

Medellin Ombusman INSTITUTION 26.2% 70.0% 29.2% 66.2% 23.0% 66.0% 20.0% 67.0% 14.0% 66.0%

Civic Control to Dev. Plan INSTITUTION 20.5% 69.4% 23.7% 65.8%

Valley Metropolitan Authority INSTITUTION 39.5% 74.2% 41.6% 70.7% 36.0% 72.0% 35.0% 73.0% 37.0% 84.0%

Metropolitan Police DECENTR. 72.2% 69.2% 81.7% 65.6% 77.0% 68.0% 85.0% 52.0% 82.0% 41.0%

Justices of Peace DECENTR. 24.1% 67.7% 28.6% 66.6% 16.0% 68.0% 15.0% 53.0% 8.0% 58.0%

Construction Licenses Office DECENTR. 25.6% 67.5% 29.0% 65.5% 18.0% 66.0% 19.0% 61.0% 13.0% 60.0%

Decentralized Info Offices DECENTR. 21.5% 69.3% 24.6% 66.3% 15.0% 72.0% 15.0% 66.0% 11.0% 65.0%

Community Regional Centers DECENTR. 71.2% 76.3% 77.1% 73.4% 60.0% 77.0% 60.0% 76.0% 61.0% 77.0%

Social and Psych. Support Centers DECENTR. 57.8% 72.8% 60.3% 70.9% 61.0% 75.0% 51.0% 66.0% 49.0% 67.0%

2007 2008 2009 20102006

23

ANNEX 2 : LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Institution Type Name Position 1 EPM Management Federico Restrepo Chief Executive Officer

2 EPM Management Ruben Dario Avedano Institutional Relations Sub-Director

3 EPM Management Gloria Haidee Isaza Human and Organizational Mgmt Director

4 EPM Management Hernan Dario Vergara Internal Audit and Control Director

5 EPM Management Eduardo Esteban Cadavid Institutional Services Director

6 EPM Management Oscar Herrera Restrepo Finance Director

7 EPM Management Jesus Aristizabal Energy Director

8 EPM Management Jorge Mario Perez Energy Generation Director

9 EPM Management Juan David Echeverri Relations with Sub-National and Local Government Sub-Director

10 EPM Management Adriana Palau Institutional Planning Director

11 EPM Management Margarita Salazar Sustainable Development Director

12 EPM Management CSR Team Corporate Social Responsibility Sub-Director

13 EPM Board Tatyana Aristizabal; Juan Camilo Restrepo; Carlos Guillermo Alvarez

Board Members

14 EPM Board Gabriel Ricardo Maya “Vocal de Control” in the Board

15 EPM Foundation Foundation Paula Restrepo Director of the EPM Foundation. Also, Director of Corporate Social Responsibility at EPM

16 Medellin City Council Local Government John Jaime Moncada Ospina President of the City Council

17 SINPRO Union Union of Professionals

Walter David Navarro Giraldo President

18 Medellin Como Vamos Civil Society Monitoring Organization

Piedad Restrepo “Medellin Como Vamos” Project Coordinator

19 Comite Civico para el Seguimiento a EPM

Civil Society Monitoring Organization

Francisco Piedrahita Former Comité Civico Member

20 Independent Observer Juan Felipe Gaviria Former EPM CEO; Former Mayor of Medellin

21 UNE EPM Subsidiary Company (Telecom)

Ana Maria Calle Currently: Corporate Development Director; Previously: EPM’s Planning Unit Manager

22 IDEA Local Governments Association

Alain Henao Hoyos Chief Planning Office Adviser

23 ProAntioquia Business Association Juan Sebastian Betancurt, Rafael Abaud Lopez

President and Vicepresident.

24 El Colombiano Newspaper Ana Mercedes Gomez Director

25 Personeria Medellin Human Rights Municipal Office

Jairo Herran Vargas and Jesus Amado

Municipal Legal Representative and consultant, respectively.

26 Comision Reguladora del Agua

Water & Sewage Regulatory Commission

Erica Ortiz and Team Director

27 Comision Reguladora de Energia y Gas

Energy and Gas Regulatory Commission

Javier Diaz and Team Commission Expert

28 Direccion Nacional de Planeacion

National Planning Agency

Diego Dorado Director of the national Public Policies Assessment Office

29 Political Analyst Other Ramiro Valencia Cossio Former CEO of EPM; former Energy Minister

30 National Analyst Consultant Fernando Garcia Innovation Analyst

31 Competitive Strategies Think Tank – Univ. El Rosario

Analyst Saul Pineda Hoyos Analyst, previously: Director of Planning at the Aburra Valley Authority

32 Local Analyst Former EPM SubDirector

Luis Guillermo Velez EPM Ex Planning Officer

33 Johns Hopkins University Academia Francis Fukuyama Professor, SAIS

34 Johns Hopkins University Academia Seth Colby Executive Director of Bernard Schwarz Forum for Constructive Capitalism, SAIS

35 Municipality of Medellin Planning Agency Mauricio Valencia Correa Planning Director

24

ANNEX 3 : RELATED VARIABLES IN MEDELLIN COMO VAMOS

Final Code 2006 2007 2008 2009

DEMOGRAPHICS

Gender genero genero genero genero genero

Age edad edad edad edad edad

Income Level (Stratum) nse nse nse nse nse

Neighborhood localida localida localida localida localida

Current Economic Situation for Household ecosituation 5 5 8 8

Difficulties caused delinquency in PS bills difficulties 6A2, 6A3 6A2, 6A3 13.7, 13A

13.7, 13A

Utility Services Cut utility_cut 6A4 6A4 ND ND

Education education 7B 7B 149 149

# Kids under 5 kids_5 13B 13B 21 22

# of Kids(5-17) in the Household kids_17 7 7 15 16.1+2+3

# of Kids Schooled in Private vs Public Schools kids_public 8 8 16 16.1vs2

Why unschooled kids_unschool 9 9 18 ND

Victimization Last Year victim 52D 52D 142 142

Media Consumption (Political info) media ND ND 123 123

Associationism association 53A 53A 73 A to O 71A

Self-reported as Poor poor 6A 6A 10 10

SERVICE DELIVERY

Schools

Provision: edu_prov 8 8 16/15 16

Satisfaction: edu_sat 10 10 19 19

Perceived Improvement edu_impr 11C 11C ND ND

Trust in Relevant Serv. Provider edu_trust 71.6 71.6 ND 105A.E

Favorable view of " edu_view 69.6 69.6 104.E 104.E

Assesment of Management of " edu_mgmt 70.6 70.6 105.E 105.E

Satisfaction with Customer Service: edu_cust ND ND 106.E 106.E

Health Provision

Type of Coverage: health_cov 14A 14A1

23, 146, 24

25, 26

Actual Recent Usage (previous year) health_use 14C1 14C1 25 25

Timing between Request and Delivery health_time 14C3 ND 27 27

Satisfaction: health_sat 18 18 29 29

Perceived Improvement health_impr 19C 19C ND ND

Trust in Relevant Serv. Provider health_trust 71.9 71.9 ND 105A.J

Favorable view of " health_view 69.9 69.9 104.J 104.J

Assesment of Management of " health_mgmt 70.9 70.9 105.J 105.J

Satisfaction with Customer Service: health_cust ND ND 106.J 106.J

Water Provision - EPM

Provision: water_cov 20 20 32.1 33

Satisfaction: water_sat 21 21 33 33

Perceived Improvement water_impr 22B 22B ND ND

Trust in Relevant Serv. Provider water_trust 71.15 71.15 ND 105A.P

25

Favorable view of " water_view 69.15 69.15 104.P 104.P

Assesment of Management of " water_mgmt 70.15 70.15 105.P 105P

Satisfaction with Customer Service: water_cust ND ND 106.P 106.P

Sewage Provision - EPM

Provision: sewg_cov 23 23 32.2 35

Satisfaction: sewg_sat 24 24 35 35

Perceived Improvement sewg_impr 25B 25B ND ND

Trust in Relevant Serv. Provider sewg_trust 71.15 71.15 ND 105A.P

Favorable view of " sewg_view 69.15 69.15 104.P 104.P

Assesment of Management of " sewg_mgmt 70.15 70.15 105.P 105P

Satisfaction with Customer Service: sewg_cust ND ND 106.P 106.P

Electricity Provision - EPM

Provision: elec_cov 26 26 32.3 37

Satisfaction: elec_sat 27 27 37 37

Perceived Improvement elec_impr ND ND ND ND

Trust in Relevant Serv. Provider elec_trust 71.15 71.15 ND 105A.P

Favorable view of " elec_view 69.15 69.15 104.P 104.P

Assesment of Management of " elec_mgmt 70.15 70.15 105.P 105P

Satisfaction with Customer Service: elec_cust 106.P 106.P

Tubed Gas Provision

Provision: gas_cov 29 29 32.7 47

Satisfaction: gas_sat 30 30 47 47

Perceived Improvement gas_impr ND ND ND ND

Trust in Relevant Serv. Provider gas_trust 71.15 71.15 ND 105A.P

Favorable view of " gas_view 69.15 69.15 104.P 104.P

Assesment of Management of " gas_mgmt 70.15 70.15 105.P 105P

Satisfaction with Customer Service: gas_cust ND ND 106.P 106.P

Land Phone Provision - EPM

Provision: phone_cov 32 32 32.4 40

Satisfaction: phone_sat 33 33 41 40

Perceived Improvement phone_impr ND ND ND ND

Trust in Relevant Serv. Provider phone_trust 71.15 71.15 ND 105A.P

Favorable view of " phone_view 69.15 69.15 104.P 104.P

Assesment of Management of " phone_mgmt 70.15 70.15 105.P 105P

Satisfaction with Customer Service: phone_cust ND ND 106.P 106.P

Paved Roads in the Neighborhood - Secr. De Obras Publicas

Provision: road_cov 38 38

Satisfaction: road_sat 39 39 56 56

Perceived Improvement road_impr 40C 40C ND

Satisfaction with status of Street Walks: walk_sat 47 47 62 62

Trust in Relevant Serv. Provider road_trust 71.8 71.8 ND 105A.I

Favorable view of " road_view 69.8 69.8 104.I 104.I

Assesment of Management of " road_mgmt 70.8 70.8 105.I 105.I

Satisfaction with Customer Service: road_cust ND ND 106.I 106.I

Street Lighting in the Neighborhood - Secr. De Obras Publicas

Provision: light_cov 41 41

26

Satisfaction: light_sat 42 42 58 58

Perceived Improvement light_impr ND ND ND

Trust in Relevant Serv. Provider light_trust 71.8 71.8 ND 105A.I

Favorable view of " light_view 69.8 69.8 104.I 104.I

Assesment of Management of " light_mgmt 70.8 70.8 105.I 105.I

Satisfaction with Customer Service: light_cust ND ND 106.I 106.I

Parks and Gardens in the Neighborhood - Secr. Medio Ambiente

Provision: park_cov 44 44

Satisfaction: park_sat 45 45 60 60

Perceived Improvement park_impr ND ND ND

Trust in Relevant Serv. Provider park_trust 71.26 71.26 ND 105A.AA

Favorable view of " park_view 69.26 69.26 104.AA 104.AA

Assesment of Management of " park_mgmt 70.26 70.26 105.AA 105.AA

Satisfaction with Customer Service: park_cust ND ND 106.AA 106.AA

Safety in the Neighborhood - Police - Crime

Victimization Last Year victim 52D 52D 142 142

Denounce denounce 52F 52F 144 144

Satisfaction: safety_sat 49 49 67 67

Perceived Improvement in Crime safety_impr 52H 52H

Trust in Relevant Serv. Provider safety_trust 71.36 71.36 ND 105A.Jj

Favorable view of " safety_view 69.36 69.36 104.JJ 104.JJ

Assesment of Management of " safety_mgmt 70.36 70.36 105.JJ 105.JJ

Satisfaction with Customer Service: safety_cust ND ND 106.JJ 106.JJ

REVEALED POLICY PREFERENCES

Three Main Policy Priorities priorities 68N 68N 78 78

Three Future Priorities for Next Mayor nextmayor 68N2

POLITICAL SUPPORT

Favorable View of the Mayor mayor_view 76 76 118 118

1. Assesment of Mayor's administration mayor_mgmt 78 78 120 120

Trust in the Mayor mayor_trust 77 77 119 119

Medellin Overall Management city_mgmt 1 1 1 1

2. Reasons for trust/distrust (32 options) reasons_trust 79A 79A 121A-B 121A-B

FEAR OF GOVERNMENT

Probability of being punished if… fear 54 54 81

6. Disobey construction and urbanism rules perc_urbanism 54.6 54.6 E

10. Illegal connection to Utilities perc_utilities 54.1 54.1 I

15. Evade local taxes perc_taxes 54.15 54.15 M

17. Avoid transit rules perc_transit 54.17 54.17 O

27

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