Realpolitik on Trial-2

8/13/2019 Realpolitik on Trial-2

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/realpolitik-on-trial-2 1/19

Realpolitik on trial: The problem of ends and means in modern Russia

Twenty-five years ago, Russians lived in a very different country. Though still living

in a powerful state, the peoples of the USSR had little opportunity to explore the

world outside and when they were allowed out, if was only after being carefully

vetted. !ow different it is today how good it is to see and meet Russians - in Russiaand abroad - without the constant monitoring of the state. "et if much has changed,

much too has stayed the same. There is a case for saying that the internal conflicts that

wrac#ed the Soviet regime at the end of the $%&'s are still going on. The Soviet

collapse was not the end of a process, but (ust one moment in a longer-running

conflict over whether Russia is best governed in an authoritarian way or whether it is

possible to create in Russia a real partnership between state and society.$ The collapse

of the Soviet Union changed a lot but the underlying issues facing the country have

not gone away.

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を営みながらも、その構成員たる諸民族は、自国の外に広がる世界を見聞して回る!"た#$

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)erhaps the central message of the collapse of Soviet communism can be

summed up as follows: if it is to survive and compete on the world stage, Russia

needs to develop a different #ind of realpolitik . Realpolitik is an approach to

government that is associated with *tto von +ismarc#, the )russian hancellor who

defended his countrys interests with blood and iron, and who brought about

/erman unity through force. "et the term has come to be associated with any #ind of

politics that is based on hard-nosed realism and a 0achiavellian disdain for traditional

ethics. 1ccording to this doctrine, the world is a difficult place to operate in, and only

those who loo# after themselves, with whatever methods are necessary, will survive a

strong military and economic power need to be ac2uired at all costs. Realpolitik inthis sense is a survival doctrine for a dangerous world.

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な > K 、世界を™šにして›œ/をž/、Ÿ‚にT¡+には、9の@ABには*)(:は¢£の¤¥B¦§¨©_ª«¬を®;る¯°が[るのV8¥B¦§¨©_ª«はt@AB±²³áªµ¶·¸µ¹vº¦«に » がる国E¼営のrBt@ª½の*:[/、¾は国¿をÀるÁ+ÂÃÄÅÆÇをÈてÉた/、にO"てÊËÌ…rをÍlしたÎÏ:[る8たV、* の Ã Ä !PSÐも;:に、ÍÑrÒÓ/!"たÔÕÖ×…ØÙÚにÛ; る º Ü B^Ý¨Þのßàのáに“s&のOPなÅ†â営にもãäs5ら)てし("て!る8*のåæにO)6、世界はそ*:çèâ営を;るにÉた

$ 3or a variant of this analysis, see Richard Sa#wa, The Crisis of Russian Democracy: The Dual State,

Factionalism and the Medvedev Succession 4ambridge, 5'$$6.



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Realpolitik in this +ismarc#ian sense contains a grain of truth: politiciansshould not be naive no one wishes to be governed by people who are ready to

sacrifice their countrys interests for the sa#e of some illusory ideal. !owever, one of

the difficulties of this #ind of realism is that it does not generally deliver on its

promises 7 at least not in the long-term. 3or example, the methods that +ismarc#

himself used to bring about /erman re-unification meant that he be2ueathed a very

difficult legacy to his successors. +y unifying his country at the expense of 3rance, he

created a permanent enmity at the heart of 8urope, which threatened /ermany itself,

and led on to the 3irst 9orld 9ar and by forging a constitution that was full of

internal tensions, he be2ueathed an unstable political system to his successors. 3rom

the perspective of later developments, +ismarc#s legacy loo#s much less rosy than it

did in his own time.*の¹vº¦«Øなyz:の¤¥B¦§¨©_ª«¬にもそ)な/にÍ

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Russian and Soviet rulers have often been drawn to this #ind of realism, in

part because the challenges of geography have made governing Russia very difficult.

Threats from abroad, whether from the 8ast, South or 9est, have focussed leaders

minds on the need to unify and modernise the country. "et, in using violence and

aggression for the purposes of survival, and in limiting the space for society to ta#ereal responsibility for the country, Russias rulers have often created long-term

problems that were hard to resolve.

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1 good example of this is the reforms of )eter the /reat. t was only )eters

determination to modernise the Russian military that enabled Russia to win the /reat

;orthern 9ar. "et the way he chose to modernise polarised the country at a cultural

level in a way that was never fully resolved under the tsars. <i#ewise, the

strengthening of the Russian state under atherine also had mixed conse2uences:

for example, the carve-up of )oland may have given the country more territory andgreater influence in 8urope, but it brought into the empire a disruptive population that

was always hard to manage. n addition, both )eter and atherine, in spite of their

rhetoric about the need for greater rationality and accountability in government,

refused to countenance any dilution in their own power and they thereby accentuated

divisions between government and people, and in this sense wea#ened rather than

strengthened the state in the longer-term.

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Eを}~ØにóQしたの:はな+、{|§bQ;る*にな"たの:[る8This pattern continued into the $%th and early 5'th centuries: while the territory

and economy of the country grew, the tsars slowness to address peasant unrest, and

failure to listen to the concerns of the emerging intelligentsia, led to increased internal

division and wea#ness. The fact that the political system was not strong enough to

support the countrys imperialistic ambitions became very obvious during the Russo-

=apanese 9ar and 3irst 9orld 9ar the territorial expansion of the empire had not

been accompanied by the #ind of reforms needed to sustain the empire in the long

term. There were, of course, opportunities for a different #ind of political evolution,

most notably with the reforms of Alexander , but the tsars refusal to see any

dilution in the autocratic principle made it difficult for them to bear fruit for example,

it was hard to develop a real legal culture in an environment where the leadersthemselves did not wish to be accountable to law. The constructive reformism of the

zemstva, which could have been the basis for a gradualist pattern of development, was

ignored by an increasingly insecure regime that turned towards a narrow form of

nationalism to try to unify the country. The tsars inability to distinguish between

moderate and radical opposition led 7 in $%'> 7 to a brief alliance between the two,

which threatened to bring down the regime altogether. Sadly, the Stolypin reforms,

which were in many ways strategic and far-sighted, were overta#en by Stolypins

assassination, and by the war.

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The most obvious 7 and indeed most brutal - exponents of this #ind of

realpolitik , were <enin and Stalin. 3rom the very first, <enin enthusiastically

embraced the doctrine that the ends (ustified the means, dismissing with contempt

the idea that politics should be rooted in any #ind of higher ethical system. 9hat was

in the interests of the proletariat 7 as interpreted by the )arty - was right per se so

terror, and civil war, if they were instruments for the consolidation of party rule, were

wholly defensible. 1 readiness to use extreme violence was accompanied byextraordinary optimism that one day, some time in the future, a happier and more

unified society and world could be built. t did not occur to the +olshevi#s that the

means they had chosen, while giving them short-term gains, threatened the long-term

survival of the very state they ruled the fact that the regime was only created through

violence meant that it always lac#ed a deeper form of legitimacy. ;or did it occur to

the +olshevi#s that they were corrupted by their own methods through becoming

habituated to arbitrary rule, they lost the ability to see or to act upon what was right

for the country.

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The Stalin revolution was a particularly vivid example of how short-term gain

was pursued at the expense of a credible long-term strategy of development. *n the

basis of a very distorted reading of Russian history, Stalin embar#ed on a process of

rapid industrialisation, believing that the country could catch up with the 9est in ten

years and at the same time collectivisation - which in practice amounted to a #ind of

civil war - was launched. t was a massive, convulsive underta#ing that had large

numbers of victims, and a lot of opposition. The )arty itself was subse2uently brought

into line during the yezhovschina. Unity was maintained through terror. 1t a very

crude level, these policies achieved some of their aims Stalin did create a war-

fighting machine that defeated !itler and he laid foundations for the country to

become a superpower. "et by modernising through terror, Stalin also created a fear-ridden and closed society that was impervious to criticism or new ideas. t was a

system that was very difficult to reform the stagnation of the +re?hnev era had its

roots in the unbalanced dynamism of the Stalin years. n this sense, the long-term

effects of the Stalinist approach to modernisation were disastrous.

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èに["た8そのyz:は、v¨ª¨¸Š‹ØïðにOるagQKŒがもたらした}œに>たる“”はpLØ:["たもSTる8

The same could be said for Stalins treatment of the nationalities problem. The

deportations of peoples during the Second 9orld 9ar and the repression of U#rainian

and +altic separatism, may have helped to create an artificial #ind of unity but in

dealing with ethnic issues through violence, hatred was simply stored up for the long-

term, and a poisoned legacy passed on to the next generation. 8thnic tensions remain

one of the deepest issues that Russia faces today 7 most obviously in the aucasus.

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Stalins successors found themselves facing a situation that was not dissimilar

to the last tsars they were trying to maintain a high level global ambition without

having the #ind of political system that could sustain it. @hrushchev and +re?hnev both insisted, in different ways, that the timetable for building socialism was being

met, yet refused even to consider the #ind of changes that would have been necessary

to ma#e the system compete with the outside world: from within the system, even the

very modest @osygin economic reforms failed to create a real momentum of reform

while outside the more radical dissidents were silenced, exiled or put into psychiatric

hospitals. The post-Stalinist leadership was not genuinely interested in new or

inconvenient ideas. t was also relatively isolated as the decision-ma#ing process for

the invasion of 1fghanistan revealed, the milieu of the men at the top was far too

narrow.

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て!+4%が¡ら7にした3/、\]îたKをEpるqrのÍÎは[(/にもÚ+kら)たもの:["た81 #ey problem was that Soviet leaders wanted reform on their own terms.

1las this was the case with /orbachev as well as his predecessors, even though he

was more radical and innovative than they. The proponents of perestroika rightly

understood the need for a significant degree of political reform. "et, for all their

emphasis on abandoning dogmatic 0arxism, their reform agenda was pursued within

a relatively narrow ideological framewor#. They did not want to let go of control.

This was illustrated by the policy of glasnost , which seemed li#e a good way of

mobilising popular support for the regime, but was initially pursued within a <eninist

framewor#. *f course, it 2uic#ly gained a momentum of its own.

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n a general sense, the collapse of the Soviet Union - li#e the collapse of

tsarism - grew out of a mismatch between ambition and reality. n addition, its failure

was rooted in the fact that there was no ade2uate connection between morality,

legality and politics in Soviet politics and ideology. The methods used by <enin and

Stalin, particularly their use of terror, had turned out to be wholly unsuited to creating

the #ind of new civilisation they dreamed of, let alone establishing a stable state. twas not possible to create a healthy society through violent methods the way in

which these Soviet rulers decided to survive in the world, made life very difficult for

their successors, and in the end led to the very disappearance of the state which they

ruled.

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]連の4KのBHは€のöÍに、s(/、道ˆŸ、ðy‰そしてÅ†y‰!"たものがŠ!に、]^_àÅ†Ë•³@bªにD!ては‹Ýな‡:ãäs!て!な7"た、!PöÍに[る8¥ªó¸v¨ª¨¸が用!たïð、/>5*のŠÎにOる©@¦の使用が、Íは夢見て!たはJの>た

な~¡をŒ;るにはŽ+ë!:[る*、(た、?@した国EをÓÔ;る*なるSP(:もな!!P*は;:に¡ら7:["た8â`な国EをdØïð:-/”;な&>-Nな:["て、*)ら]^_àのýÅîたKが世界の›œ/をSしたそのïðは、!"îたKの›çを‘Véêなものにしたの:[/、ãは(úにその…†;る国Eの’Lに(:“らしEたの:[る8

0ost of these lessons from history concerned both Russia and the USSR, and

reflected patterns of government that were common to both pre- and post-

revolutionary Russia 7 even if the Soviet regimes readiness to use terror was

significantly greater than that of the tsars. !owever, there were features of Soviet

history that were distinctive to it and which also contributed to the failure of theSoviet experiment. entrally important was the regimes economic policies the

regimes inability to deliver consumer goods on anything li#e the level of the 9est

undermined its credibility in a ma(or way. The root of the problem was a flawed

ideology that failed to respect mans natural instinct for private property. The Soviet

suspicion of the mar#et, and accompanying hatred of the peasantry, was a disaster

from which the country has only (ust begun to recover. t was astonishing that at the

end of the Soviet era, a large percentage of the countrys food was being produced on

peoples private plots 7 indicative of an economic system that disregarded private

initiative while at the same time becoming increasingly dependent on it. The problem

did not arise without warning. The philosopher, Semyon 3ran#, in his essay in !ekhi,

The 8thic of ;ihilism, had already warned that the egalitarianism of therevolutionary intelligentsia contained a suspicion of wealth itself: The intelligentsia

loves only the (ust distribution of wealth, not wealth itself. 5 4ntelligentsiia liubit

tol#o spravedlivoe raspredelenie bogatstva, no ne samoe bogatstvo.6

7らの*P!"たö”の–e&は@AB]連9の!J)にも連して!て、vvv!の@ABの!J)にもý3した国E…†)¨ª¸を‚し”して!る8*の*は]^_àbcが©@¦の使用–.にD!てÌ‚ª¨FgO/も—7にø7"たしても=>るもの:はな!8そPはS"てもÖは/、]^_àに独˜の˜™!Pものは[るし、そ)は]^_àØÍšの失敗に›しても!る8|°ú:は中œにžしたのが]^_àbcが©"た¼÷ÅÆ:[る8*のbcは’ŸîにÛして¯°なÏ

5 S.<.3ran#, 8ti#a nigili?ma, !ekhi 40oscow, $%'%6, p. 5'$.



をY'¥¡¦:Æ¢;る*が`+”な7"たたE、信íŸをôœ+£s5る*にな"た8*の問題のB"*はÎ間が¤I¥%にÛして自Zに抱+CNを.外G;る!"た欠¦の[るË•³@bªに["た8§ë¼÷にÛ;る]^_àØな(é、そしてそ)に™P®$にÛ;る¨+©は、@AB!P国がÖ"*)7ら“KV|PしHEたªòの«ê:["た8¬+

Áœ*に、]^_àFgのI>/国i:›%ú)る®は7な/の¯°:国民の自¢にO"て±>)て!たの:[/、²ÎのËóAB©_Dを³Gして!た¼÷Av©Ñ:[/ながらも(;(;国民の自¢自´にYàして!+*にな"た8*の問題は!œな/vµ)もな+›nた>5:はな7"た今

¶·îのu¸sª¸µ¶&¸«は;:に)¹道4ºに»!たÂó6¨ÛÑのÙÚÇ!P`úËの中:、vØË¸©¨³¸½Bの¼½Š‹には¾そのものにÛ;る¿(cがþ()て!るÒにÀÁをÂらして!た8Â*のË¸© ¨³¸½Bがqœなのは¾のÃ¼なOÆに;˜J、¾そのもの:はな!Çƒntelligentsiia liubit tol#o spravedlivoe raspredelenie bogatstva, no ne samoe

bogatstvo.今

1nother lesson that was distinctive to Soviet history was a spiritual one.

Russias turn away from religion had a huge cost. 1dmittedly, the pre-revolutionary

church became so closely associated with tsarist conservatism and nationalism that it

made it seem irrelevant to modern life, and alienated the intelligentsia. "et at the

same time the repression of religion by the +olshevi#s deprived the country of any

independent benchmar# for (udging what was right and wrong. There were two

somewhat different results of this: on the one hand, communist ethics became so

relativistic that all #inds of terrors could be (ustified by them on the other hand, the

experience of overthrowing bourgeois morality turned out to be a burden not a

liberation, for under the new system people had to be constantly chec#ing their

external actions and statements to ensure that they fitted in with whatever new

initiative the state came up with. 9ithout its rich spiritual tradition, the country wascut adrift from healthy roots, and lost its way and people without principles found it

much easier to gain and exercise power. ronically, there is a case for saying that the

regime 7 which was so committed to atheism - actually needed religion if it was to

have set about the tas# of creating the new man. 9ith its richer understanding of

human nature, hristianity challenged egoism in a different and more fundamental

way than communism was ever able to do. n fact, state morality, so often a mas# for

hypocrisy, (ust ended up by breeding cynicism.

]^_àに˜Iの、*)はÃなるö”な"たのが、ghØなそ):[る8’7に、@ABがÄöをÅてÆるにÉた"てはÇôなgÈを»É>な5)6ならな7"た8vvの÷ö$がÌ‚ª¨ÊËをÌ;る_ÀßÖ

民族ßEて6Íな連ÎをるOPにな"た*:、Ï面<はö$lg›çの間にÐPが›n、Ë¸©¨³¸½BをÑ外して!+‡にな"たのは’7:[る8たV、そ)‡FにボÄÝ^_ÜにOるÄöÒRにO"て@ABは„+を独自に=w;るたEのá€をÓ>)る*にな"たの:[る8*の*7らÖÖÃな"たŠsのã0が›nたの:[る8rsは、ý%Š‹ØÙÚが[(/に²ÛŠ‹Øなものにな"たたE、[らÔる£Lの©@¦がボÄÝ^_ÜにO"て÷ÉQ-Nな"てし("た8もPrsのã0は、“ ”D¦1sBØ 道ˆŸのÕÖ!P¼šがRf:はなしに、|×にØnる!Pã0な"た8!Pのも、>たなbcの.:民…は自らのÙ™!ÖSèにÛして˜にÚyをÉ!、国Eが¢K”;>たなÛÜにそ)が&eなもの:[|Pも自OたKがž‡して!る7を見Eな5)6ならな7"た7ら

V8@ABはそのÝ7なghØ×…を失"て、â`なBをËた)て、ï]を失"てÞßPã0な"た8(た民…はghØÇÚを失P*にO/、ˆ



を自Oのものにして行使;る*が!7に*)(:È<にðàな"た7をá"た8âãな*Vが、*のbcのÂh3の5)込みOPは²Éなもの

“ ”:["たのVが、 >し!Î間のŒ!PT題に&手;る段になる、Äöを¯°した!PのがÍï:["た8Î間ŸのÚRにD!てはäåして!たÜ¨vaöは、ý%Š‹思想がなし–たものはÃなる、し7もO/B

HØなïðにD!てùËÛÑにÛ;るæ2を行"て!た8öÍ、国E道ˆ!"たものはç„をè!é;たEのê面:["て、*)は&のë(/、AóAÛÑを›núoるV5:["た8

)art of the problem was that the +olshevi#s too# the view that political change

alone could bring about a new society. n this respect they were rather similar to the

earlier =acobin revolutionaries in 3rance in believing that human nature could be

reshaped through politics. Revolutionaries, in their impatience to see tsarism fall, too#

the rather +a#uninite view that out of the destruction of the old system something new

would be born. t was an extraordinarily naAve idea. The !ekhi authors were again

prophetic in their discussion of this, warning that it was not enough to change a

political system without addressing deeper mentalities. n his essay, !eroism and

1sceticism, Sergei +ulga#ov warned of the impatience inherent in 0arxist circles:

The intelligentsia lives in an atmosphere of expectation of a social miracle, or a

universal cataclysm, in an eschatological frame of mindB 4ntelligentsia ?hivet v

atmosfere o?hidaniia sotsialnago chuda, vseobshchago #ata#li?ma, v

es#atalogiches#om nastroeniia.6 the impatient and superficial heroism of the

revolutionaries needed to be replaced by a more genuine and humbler ethic, he

declared.

*の問題のrìには、ボÄÝ^_ÜがÅ†=vÈ外に>たなŒ$のŒ”は[/–な!ûTた*|に["た8そのÒ:¾らは¶&¸vv~のx~1íXJ¸vEたK7な/LîしてD/、Î間ŸはÅ†にO"て*そ>たなものに-/=Tら)る信nて!た8@ABのvEたKはrWもï+Ì‚ª¨bcのopを見た7"たがたEに、Wbcのšp7ら*そ>たなものが›()て+る;る7な/J«ªó¸Š‹にµ!た見Rを©"て!た今

たV*)はEて‰Ëª^なÏの見ï:["た8¹道4ºのîらは*の問題をûTるにÉた"てもðSîØ:[/、Å†bcを=TるV5:は>ñO:[/、O/Bの深!*|に[るghŸの問題に手を&5な5)6ならな!Àòを®して!た8u¦³ËµD¦nªX¶はその`úËÂóôŠ‹õöŠ‹Çの中:、º¦«vŠ‹諸Åª«¦固IのŸ質もSTるZの欠Èにして€のOPにÀòして!る8ÂË¸©¨³¸½BはŒ$Ø÷øù“は`世界Ø=èが›ne*を~ú;るûü[の中:、IhØ[Oの中:›œて!るのV8Çƒ ntelligentsia ?hivet v atmosfere o?hidaniia sotsialnago

chuda, vseobshchago #ata#li?ma, v es#atalogiches#om nastroeniia.6 vEたKが示;*のç[:<"面なóôŠ‹は、O/ÍV:ý(し!ÙÚØX.にžœþTら)る¯°が[る、D¦nªX¶は¡Sして!る8

t is important not to forget the more ethical and spiritual message inherent in

the fall of communism. <iberals rightly interpreted the events of $%&%-%$ as a

(udgement on a closed society, stressing the need for a more transparent mode of

government and a much stronger commitment to law and there was also an important

patriotic agenda in the late $%&'s that sought the recovery of national identities that

had been long suppressed. +ut the energy that drove the collapse of the Soviet Union

was not (ust liberal or nationalistic it was also lin#ed to a deeper moral unease about

B S.;.+ulga#ov, /eroi?m i podvi?hnichestvo , !ekhi, p. C5.



what had happened under Soviet rule. 1le#sandr "a#ovlev, for all the ambiguities of

his career, was alluding to this when he said that perestroi#a was a revolution of

conscience 4revoliutsiei sovesti6.C ndeed, the concept of conscience was one that

was constantly mentioned in the perestroika era: boo#s and articles appeared

everywhere appealing for the recovery of conscience, and lamenting the immorality of

public life and politicians tal#ed of creating a politics that had a much greaterconnection with morality. f this was partly a reaction to events in the external world,

it was also the outcome of an inner process, as people wrestled with the 2uestion of

whether they themselves had made false compromises, and should have spo#en out

more strongly against communism. This moral unease was accompanied too by a

revival of interest in religion, as some concluded that the countrys tragedies had a

spiritual root.

<にÿÁた*O/も‘にÙÚØ:ghØなメúª1がそもそもý%Š‹opにþ()て!た*を忘)な!*が|°:[|P8¨¡&¦ßは1989 今今今 91 f(:に›nた”öをBざú)たŒ$にÛ;る1=Rÿし今

O/透¡Ÿのø!…†bcO/óなðc3の©/みの¯°Ÿをó¦し

た8(た1980 fg!:に75ては、}fQRú)てœた民族ØBË•¸©_©_の回復が求EOP;る|°な愛国ØT題も["た8たV、]^_à連9のopを¹ŒしたÈ¦bªはÿに¨¡&¦Ø:["た/民族Š‹ØなものV"た!P>5:はな!8そ)は(た、]^_àØ…†.:›nて!た*にÛ;るJ"Bの深!道‹Ø>快úもãäs!たの:[る8B¥«Å¸Ê¦µヤªX^¥¶は、その自らの¼がå‹Ø:[るにも>らJ今

“ ”* の Ò を仄E7 したに、w¥ v a @ Ëˆは ¤cのv ƒ revoliutsiei

sovesti “ ”…なのVÿÁて!る8’7に、 ¤c !P観éは˜に¤w¥va@Ëˆ¬~:œにú)て!たもののrs:[るし、»籍ÖF評が“るì:*の¤cの回復を訴Tては、ÃØ›çの>道ˆŸ3のt嘆を示して!た8(た、

Å†EたKは*)(:O/も‘に道ˆŸãäs!たÅ†を-/”して!+*を語"ても!た8*)がÎ間のNむ外の世界:›nた”ö3のÞ¯のrN:["た;)6、‡n+*の*はÎ間のi面世界:›nて!た*のã0:も["て、*)は民…自らが*)(:4"た妥Žを|ねてたの:はな!7、も"声øにý%Š‹にÞÛのyを4œs5るÁœ:はな7"たの7!P(問格闘してœた7ら:[る8*の道‹Ø>快©には(たÄö3のcの復çも™"て!て、*)にs!てはrNのîが国Eのt劇にghØなBHが[るãして!る3/:[る8

Repentance was another of the dominant concepts of the period. The huge

numbers of people who saw 1bulad?es film, Repentance 4$%$D6, reflected the deeper

spiritual hunger in the country. n $%%$-%5, there were attempts to add a political

dimension to this dialogue about repentance. 1ctivists li#e Eladimir +u#ovs#y triedto create a movement to institute a #ind of ;uremberg process in post-Soviet Russia,

not for the sa#e of creating a violent reaction against former party members, but in

order to confront in a sober way the crimes of the past. !owever, the opportunity for

such a moral rec#oning 2uic#ly passed. 9hether such a process could have credibly

been instituted is a matter of argument, for it was never going to be easy to distinguish

between perpetrators and victims. "et the failure to confront the crimes of

communism in any serious way has been to Russias detriment without an accounting

for the evil actions of the past, the behaviour and attitudes that gave rise to them could

never be seriously addressed. !abits of mind, of refusing to spea# up against things

that are wrong, are never easy to get over 7 whether in Russia or anywhere else.

C 1le#sandr "a#ovlev, "redislovie, #$val, "osleslovie 40oscow, $%%56, p. 5F%.



悔!uEる*がw¥va@Ëˆ~のもPrsのá¦なる観é:["た8BD&´ÐF督-の¹u悛ºƒ1917 f…!P‚画を観たôÕのÎ々はO/深!ghØ飢餓のkXが国iに[る*を省みた81991 今今今 92

fに75て、u悛をEpる*のÛにÅ†Ø€元を?5TOP;る試みがなú)た8^&ヂª¸¦µDX¶vÜªをHE;るçèEたKは§v

aµ]^_`a~の@AB版óュª¦¸¡¦«=をc.Q;るâèをCしOP試みるが、そのØみは7sてのý%þ員にÛしてÍ行使:Û!しOP;るもの:はな+、"#な手段:も"て4Æの$%Û&;る*に["た8し7しながら、そP!"た道‹Ø'復を行P#$は["!P間に4˜てし(P*になる877る1=を信íŸのø!ものしてc.Qし–た7&P7にs!ては(のjQが[/、Í問題して)が$%î:)がその犠牲î:["た7を*Zä¢;る*はSしてðàになし–な7"た7ら:[る8は!T、ý%Š‹bcの$%にÛして*)(:+に]œžTて!な!!PのはUVに@ABに"てのôœな,手:も[る84Æの+行にÉrs¡をTな!((:は、そ)を›núoた行èÖX.が`に(ú)る*はSしてな!:[|P8ghの-!:[る*|の、4

"たものにÛして声をV=る*をÊe:し(P!P-.は/p!Æ/ê+、そ)が@AB:[|Pな7|Pも、Sしてðàな*:はな!8

Repentance, and the ac#nowledgement of wrong, are not a sign of wea#ness.

To ta#e an obvious example, those Russians 4eight of them6 who in $%F& protested

against the Soviet invasion of ?echoslova#ia, were not unpatriotic trouble-ma#ers as

they were accused of being they were right to 2uestion the invasion, because it

poisoned Russias relations with the people of ?echoslova#ia, and made a serious re-

appraisal of socialism very difficult the regimes failure to follow the lead of the

?ech reformers and to embar# on a rethin# of the official ideology set the country

bac# by a couple of decades. n this sense, the demonstration was an act of realresponsibility. ndeed, spea#ing at the subse2uent trial, <arisa +ogora? stressed the

way in which individuals had a responsibility for their nations actions, and that some

actions were right, irrespective of whether or not they were li#ely to be effective:

!ad not done this would have considered myself responsible for these actions of

the government. . . . decided that it was not a matter of effectiveness in so far as

was concerned, but of my responsibility.> 48sli by ia etogo ne sdelala, ia schitala by

sebia otvetstvennoi ?a eti deistviia pravitelstva . . . . a reshila, v #ontse #ontsov, chto

dlia menia eto ne vopros pol?y, a vopros moei lichnoi otvetstvennosti.6

悔!uEる*、そして4Kを0‰;る*は、少しも§úを12;るもの:はな!8そのO7/à!\して、1968 fに]連の½ÝXv@J

ÜBeoにÞÛした@ABÎƒ3数45…はÍ、ÉF2êú)たOPな2愛国Øな67îV"た>5:はな7"た8*のö8に(問を9した¾らが÷し7"た*は、]連のeoが@AB½ÝXv@JÜB国民の‘を+Qúo、Œ$Š‹の再評:をEてéêなものにしてし("た*を見)6O7る8bcは½ÝXのuvßがò];るèœを!追!oJ、し7もÃ;Ë•³@bªの再<=にも©/77らな7"た*:、国は20 fa+も“K°)るã0なる8そのyz:、*の民ŠQを°求;る•>はのyz:hiを©|P;る行è:["た8Í問題、!に行>)た=:®Sした&¨ªÅµボu&Ûは、²Îそ)\)が自らの国の行èにÛしてhiを¢s!Pïðをó¦し、その行èの中には、?0Ø:["た7&P7の¢を問>J、÷し!ものも["たÿÁて!る8Â9回のOPな行èに”て!な7"

> ited in ;atalia /orbanevs#aia, "olden 43ran#furtG0, $%D'6, pp. B5>-B5D.



…たなら6、自OはÅ@の行èにÛしてhiが[るûTて!た:しAP ãの*|、¤しては、自Oに"て9回の*は“”の問題:はな+今

¤²Îの©るÁœhiが問題にな"て!るのV思Pに“"たの:;8Ç

)art of Russias difficulty today is that her neighbours do not trust her. 4*f

course, it is another matter whether her neighbours are always themselvestrustworthy.6 "et when trust-building measures are embar#ed upon, it is noticeable

what a significant affect they can have. 3or example, the Russian governments

decision to publish additional documents about the @atyn massacre immediately

brought a positive response from )oland and the 8U. 1ctions of this #ind - which

would have been very unli#ely in the Soviet era - have a constructive purpose that

increases security and co-operation. 1s other countries have also found in recent

decades, simple acts of apology or ac#nowledgement of wrong-doing have the

capacity to unloc# closed hearts and re-open political dialogue.

@ABが9¾抱Tて!る問題のrsには、そのaB国7らの信íの欠ÈがV=ら)るƒÂ、そのaB国自bが˜に信íにù;るもの:[る7&

P7は(た¢問題Vが…8たV、信í‘を;+ïÆが“てら)るには、その諸Æが!7にUし!?0を¢"て!る7がÈÍにl)る8\T6、@ABÅ@がˆ©_¸のCDëö8に;る追EFをÃ;るS@を行"た今

§ª&¸Ê(ª@´)連ž7らはGHにI@ØなÞ¯が見ら)た8*P!"たLの行è!Pのは、]^_àFgにはòJÈてûTら)な7"たもの:、国E?`_J国E間Ž¦を‹Œúoる!PÓÔØなØØが[る8諸外国が‡n+**数ñfに見てœたOPに、K%Ö4Æの4Kを0Eる!"た行ýV5:も、Bざú)たcを7o、Å†Ûを再して!+が今今今今今今今

)art of "eltsins appeal as a leader was that he understood the moral as well as

the political failure of communism. !is readiness to challenge the )arty establishmentand see# a more democratic way forward, was also impressive 7 even if it was mixed

with populism and opportunism, and his period of rule marred by corruption. "et

Russia was so divided over his reforms that he was never able to move the country

beyond a sense of crisis. n some ways, the economic reforms that were implemented

by his early governments had the impatient, revolutionary 2uality about them that had

characterised the actions of the +olshevi#s - although it should be said that reforming

the old economic system was never gong to be easy or popular. The social

polarisation that resulted from economic liberalisation, combined with the economic

downturn of the late $%%'s, made democracy loo# li#e a grubby 9estern affair that

was destroying all that was good in Russian society and it was easily exploited by

hardliners associated with the security ministries to (ustify a turn to a moreauthoritarian #ind of democracy.

`¨Ì_¸が¨ªLªして訴Tる*|が["たのは、¾がý%þのÅ†Ø失敗67/7その道‹Øな問題にs!てもÚRを示して!た*にも[る8¾がþMNNにæ2し、O/民ŠØな道を*のò-Oして!*P;るX.もÖは/PQØ:、そ*にô…_ž¾R見がSmし、¾のFgがTUにO"てšÂしにú)たしても8たVし、@ABは`¨Ì_¸のuv~を3nて見öな(:に"Šsな"て!たたE、国をそのû#©7ら¡5”úoる*が`+”な7"た8[るÒ:は、¾のx~のÅ@がÍVした¼÷uvにはボÄÝ^_Üの行èを˜™?5て!たWðúを欠!た、vØなŸ格がX"てD/、し7しそ):もWXYZした]^_àØ¼

÷bcのuvがそのÉFðàにŒむもの:はな+、(た)もがYmOPなもの:はな7"た*はÿÁてD!てし7るÁœ:[|P8Œ$のOQが¼



÷自PQにO"て›n、そ*に 1990 fg!~の¼÷>Ùが|な"て、民Š“Š‹bcは@ABŒ$の¤質なNOをŽ+špして!+腐敗に†Kた YZ

”Ø 問題のbを示;*にな"た8そして、*の[を\"て、¨ˆßたKは国E?`_J連の省]連Î;る‡:、ˆ‰Š‹ØなIž!のó!民Šbc3のØþを÷ÉQして!+*になる8

Since "eltsin left the scene, the situation has changed again. The movetowards a freer society that characterised the $%%'s, deeply ambiguous though it was,

has stalled, and under )utin and 0edvedev gone into reverse. The narrowing of the

space for civil society to operate, the manipulation of the electoral system for the sa#e

of stability and the use of the legal system for political purposes are all worrying

phenomena that suggest that Russian leaders are still not convinced that a broader

political system is needed. n addition, an over-reliance on using the military to try to

solve the problems of the aucasus 7 admittedly in difficult circumstances 7 suggests

that the appeal of using violent methods to resolve problems remains. 8vidently,

Russian leaders continue to be attracted by the older forms of realpolitik . The retreat

to a more cynical form of realism may partly be rooted in the fact that Russia, li#e

+ritain and 3rance in recent decades ago, has essentially been facing theconse2uences of a loss of empire and that, as these 9estern 8uropean countries have

found, is a painful business. Thus amongst some Russians there is a han#ering for the

older methods - which seemed to bring at least some good results.

`¨Ì_¸が1rÖを^!て!、kZに再ä=Qが›nた81990 今

gの˜™:["たO/自PなŒ$3のèœは、そ)がÉFは_る`aなもの:["たにoO、9ÖFGし、tª½¸メÊ^ÝªヂÝ¶の.:はそのèœはb]œにな"て!るのがlk:[る8§民Œ$の#N;Áœc間はÚEら)、?@のたEに}Vc.はdeにf-ú)、ðc.はÅ†ØなØØに{用ú)るな&、*P!"た[ø7/なlQは&)もみな、@ABのÅ†\]îたKがUVにO/7)たÅ†c.が¯°:[る*をに0‰;るに“"て!な!*を示して!る8Tて、XªˆÅv問題のRSの<:のõöの4信は、’7に<々にÃな"たkZが[るは!T、&eな問題もgに訴T)6RS”る!"たX.がUVに"て!る*をh>oる8*)は¡iな*Vが、@ABの\]îたKはlmもなDWXYZした¤¥B¦§¨©_ª«¬にM7)n5て!る8O/Aóˆ¦な‡のlÍŠ‹3bj/しss[る*のÇkのrNには、@ABが4Æ数ñfのËb¨vÖ¶&¸vのOPにt国のl失にO"て›nたã0に9もなDV面して!る!PöÍが[るの7もし)な!し、(た*の*は、Ëb¨vÖ¶&¸vがmに[?!て!るOPに、,みを™P*:も[る8そのたE、rNの@ABÎの中には、7sての手ðにÛ;るó!n)のOPなものが["て、7sて

はそ)が少な+もなにがし7の¤!ã0を›e:+)たOPに見TたのV"た8

Rhetorically, )utin and 0edvedev have generally argued for a liberal

conservative #ind of politics, in which a strong state and liberal principles are

combined. This is a thoroughly healthy current and there is also a strong Russian

tradition in this area, represented by such figures as +oris hicherin and )etr Struve

so it can be argued to be an authentically Russian way forward. The problem is that in

practice the conservative principle has mainly been applied in politics, while the

liberal one in economics. The disparity has been so strong that Russias evolution has

effectively become a version of the hinese model of development. The allure of the

hinese model is perhaps that it is yet another version of that tough-minded

realpolitik that has so long been favoured. "et, the problem with autocraticmodernisation hinese-style is that, as late tsarist history shows, it narrows the base



for decision-ma#ing and in that sense can actually wea#en the state. t is also of

course a doctrine that is typically favoured by elites that want to retain their own

power, a point that is illustrated by Russian political life today.

SÐの<V5:ST6、tª½¸メÊ^ÝªヂÝ¶は*)(:そのoPにしてœたのは¨¡&¦_À¨ËtのÅ†V"た>5:、そ*にD!て

はó!国E自PŠ‹ØÇÚがrsにž>ú"て!る8*)自bは`+も"てâ`なM):[るし、*のï面:はó!@ABØ×…が[/、7sてはボ¨vµ½½Ýª¨¸Örsªa¦µva¦ª^ÝがそのgÏ格:["たのV7ら、に@ABØなyz:の道がvŒしss[るnる*は”る8たV問題は、ÍpにD!て_ÀŠ‹ØÇÚが*)(:‹用ú)てœたのがŠにÅ†:[/、自PŠ‹ØÇÚが¼÷にD!て:["た!PÒに[る今

*のq/ž!のなúが[(/にもó7"たたEに、@ABの®CはöÍ<、中国rの®Cのr^‚ª1s¸な"て!る8中国rのs;る*|は@ら+、}fq()てœたótな¤¥B¦§¨©_ª«¬の(たÃな"た^‚ª1s¸V!P*|に[るのV|P8たV、bcŠ‹ØagQの中国Øv¨Ë¦の抱Tる問題は、!~のÌ‚ª¨bcのが示して!る3/、

y思S@のáÙをÚuQし、そのÒ:国EをöÍ<§bQúoる*にもな/7ねな!Òに[る8*)は(たÉZ、自OたKのˆをÀ¢しOP;る`¨ªaたKが/>5qむÊ«a¨¸:も["て、lg@ABのÅ†›çがÈÍに示して!るÒ:も[る8

The fact is that the political system has become, or - perhaps more accurately -

has remained, corrupt. This ma#es it very difficult for the country to address one of its

greatest problems 7 a problem that in fact that has constantly cited by )utin and

0edvedev: the corrupt nature of the Russian economy and society. The population is

never li#ely to listen to sermons about corruption from politicians whose power is

exercised in a seemingly arbitrary way. The fact that Russia ran#s so low on

Transparency nternational measures of corruption is a real blot on its attempts todevelop in the right way. 1part from anything it scares away investors. t also ma#es

Russia a complicated country in which to live. *f course, this corruption can partly be

blamed on the arrival of an unregulated mar#et. !owever, corruption is not new to

Russian political life, even if has ac2uired new characteristics since $%%$ there was

already a lively blac# mar#et in Soviet times, and party leaders were always ready to

allocate themselves special privileges. So this is a longer term issue. !owever, the

decision by the leadership to turn its bac# on real political reform ma#es it impossible

to address the matter. "ou cannot have an economic system that is free of corruption,

with a political system that is so dominated by patronage.

öÍ、*のÅ†bcは*)(:に腐敗がŒ行し、[る!は、も"÷

’を~;)6、*)(:3/腐敗した((のkXに[る8*のkZは国がそのƒôの問題のrsに&手;る*を‘Vêし+して!る8その問題は、Ítª½¸メÊ^ÝªヂÝ¶もËTJvœž!に”してœたもの:、@AB¼÷@ABŒ$のTUb質の*:[る8国民しては、ˆをDOそwにして!るÅ†E7らTU腐敗に;るöに´をµ5るはJもな!8öÍ、@ABはa&¸vwB¥¸AªµË¸¨ª‰As‰¦6腐敗xyzžの&¸Ü¸ƒが2*の*は@ABがZるÁœ®Cを+しŒEて!+<:のôœな´|な"て!る8ÉO/も*の腐敗b質が}EEたKを~込みúoる*にな"て!る7らV8(た*)が«!して@ABは›ç;るのに•€;る国な"てし("て!る8Â、*の腐敗のhiのrìをÂ…cな§ë¼÷の”lにØ;る*も”な+はな!8し7し、腐敗は@ABのÅ†›çに"てみ)

F 今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今



6>し!*:はな+、]^_`aFgにはmにç[[る‚§はàmして!たし、þ\]îにして7らが˜に˜ˆに[/s+*ƒ7:はな7"た8そPûT)6、*の腐敗自bは}œに>たる問題V!P*になる8し7し、Å@MNNがのÅ†uvに„を]5てし(DP;る*:、*の問題3の&手は>-Nにな"てし(P8腐敗のな!¼÷bcな&、»¢îi

ˆが**(:…Õな"たÅ†bcの((:は、†PÁ+もな!81nother problem is that Russias attitude to the 9est remains very ambivalent.

*f course it is understandable that Russian leaders should be frustrated by examples

of 9estern hypocrisy 7 of which there are certainly many. "et there is still a tendency

to blame their countrys problems on the 9est. 1ttitudes to the 9est also seem rather

inconsistent when Russia is in difficulties, either because of an economic downturn

or the threat of terrorism, then the country see#s co-operation with the 9est but when

things are going well, there seems to be a change of tone, and it starts to try to get its

way by using threats. The underlying relationship with the 9est has clearly not

normalised. There is a case for saying that Russias very tendency to compare itself

with the 9est is detrimental to the country. n +erdyaevs essay in !ekhi, he criticised

the revolutionary intelligentsia for putting (ustice before truth.D The point could bemade in a slightly different way about the relationship with the 9est leaders and

thin#ers sometimes evaluate policies in terms of whether they bolster or diminish

national pride, rather than whether they are right or wrong. This ma#es it hard for

Russians to as# in a non-emotive way what is right for the country.

*)は¢の問題して、@ABのY'世界にÛ;るX.S@がUVには"œ/して!な!*がV=ら)る8Â、@ABの\]îらがY'世界の示;ç„ØX.にd“Kを抱+のはÚR”る*|:[るし、そのç„にしても’7に数R+見ら)る8たV、UV自国の問題をY'世界にØしOP;るµ]は見ら)る8Y'にÛ;るX.にしても、7な/r‡Ÿが欠5て!るOPにも見Tるし、@ABはéêな面に[るFに、そのÇkが¼÷>Ù:[|P©@¨ÛÑの/‰:[|P、Y'のŽ¦を-O;るが、öXがˆ¦にŒ行して!るFには語¦に=Qが見ら)、‰‰を用!た独„ØなX.に”OPしHEる8ŠMに[る@ABY'世界の‘はUVには"œ/した‡:÷˜Qú)ては!な!8@ABが自らをY'世界¯‹しOP;るó!µ]は@ABに"てŒ["てr{Âし!Pのにはそ)な/のB2が[る8¡¦ヂíª`¶は¹道4ºの`´uË:、vË¸©¨³¸½BがÍのvに÷‹を¢K”;!"て<=を行"て!る8

今今今

のÒはŽ"た‡:は[るがYZŒ$の‘にs!てもSP*が”る7もし)な!8\]îÖ思想EはFにÅ†ï`般を民族Ø‰信をøEる7‘Eる7!"た*|:’“にø5てし(!、中身の”2:'|P

しな!8そのたE、@ABÎにはÉが国に"て÷し!の7を©ïØにならJに自問;る*がêし+な"て!る、!Pの:[る8

Russia is not 2uic#ly going to regain the #ind of economic strength that made

superpower status possible, and thus its best chance for influence in the world is

through exercising a softer form of power. 1t one level, the country and its elites are

not well-placed to offer that. 1 still very hierarchical society li#e Russia finds is hard

to embrace a more collegial way of operating. ndeed, some are probably sceptical

that the country can ever adapt to different methods of rule, ta#ing the view that

Russian political culture is inherently anti-democratic. The appeal of 8urasianism,

which has been popular since the collapse of the USSR, is probably because, in

suggesting that Russias autocratic traditions are culturally determined, it seems to

D See ;.1.+erdiaev, 3ilosofs#aia istina i intelligents#aia pravda, !ekhi, pp. $-55.& 今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今 1−22 今今今今



legitimise the hierarchical nature of Russian politics. "et while an aggressive form of

realpolitik has certainly been a typical feature of Russian political action, it is

important to remember that there have been other traditions in Russian history. There

is certainly a strong intellectual tradition that could be the basis for a different

approach to power, and one that is much more li#ely to serve Russias interests in the

long term.@ABはlmの*|、7sてô国のQを-NにしたOPな¼÷

を;pú(©/j;*は”な!kXに[/、そのたEに世界:の“”をƒôに®–;るにしてもそ)は*)(:O/も—˜な‡:国を行使;る*を3nて:[る8[る¥¡¦にD!て、@ABその`¨ªaらはそのOPな“”を示;には“ë<[(/¤!kZに[るはSTな!8@ABのOPなUVに×’‘のは"œ/したŒ$に"ては、*)(:È<にž(ØなçèをJ55)るのはðà:はな!kZに[る8’7に、@ABには*)(:は"た…†手段に‹¯;る*に;ら™(ØなÎ々も!るOP:、@ABのÅ†~QはそもそもÞ民ŠŠ‹Ø:[るの見Rを¾らは©"て!る8šª&ABŠ‹!P]連opÈ›にÎ[を)Eて!るûTが[

るが、そ)が訴T75るものな"て!るÚPは@ら+、@ABのbcŠ‹Ø×…が~QØに,@ú)たものしss、šª&ABŠ‹は@ABÅ†が¢"て!る×œØŸ格を÷…なものr見0Eて!るOPに見Tる7ら:[|P8*|が、oØな‡を©"た¤¥B¦§¨©_ª«¬が’Íに@ABのÅ†行èのžrØな˜™:["たにしても、@ABにD!ては*)は¢の×…がàmしてœた*も思!”;*がŸ°:[|P8ˆにÛ;るÃな"たBt@ª½のïを;るたEのá:な/–るótな¡Ø×…が[る*は’Í:[るし、*Kらのïが{|@ABの国¿を}~ØにÀ"て!+-NŸが[るOPに思>)るの:[る8

The late Soviet era alone offers a number of role models for a different #ind of

realism. 3or example, Russias most famous dissidents, Sol?henitysn and Sa#harov,have much to offer 7 if from different ideological positions. n his essay in From

%nder the Ru$$le, Repentance and Self-<imitation in the <ife of ;ations 4$%DC6

4Ras#aianie i samoogranichenie #a# #ategorii nationalnoi ?hi?ni6, Sol?henitsyn tried

to articulate a vision of a humbler form of Russian political action, which emphasised

the importance of spirituality, and the value of repentance and internal development. %

f the realism of his ideas about the development of the Russian ;orth-8ast could be

2uestioned, the general ethical thrust of the essay was impressive. Sa#harovs

commitment to human rights, and his wor# in the late $%&'s to create a constitutional

framewor# in which everyone could be represented, reflected a more liberal, secular

emphasis. n addition, both men gave expression to forms of resistance that were

simple and easily adaptable: Sol?henitsyn with his robust call to <ive not by <ies4Hhit ne po l?hi6$' and Sa#harov with his determination to spea# out against in(ustice

7 in the spirit of Tolstoys essay about capital punishment, cannot #eep silent 4a

ne mogy molchat6.$$ t is possible to see these men and their ideas as representing a

serious Russian tradition of non-violence.

]^_`aFgの!~V5を©"てみても、¢の£LのlÍŠ‹をØ\;¢>•¦が数R+Û示ú)て!る8\T6、@ABのƒもI5なÞb

% See 1.S.Sol?henitsyn, Rass#aianie i samoogranichenie #a# #ategori natsionalnoi ?hi?ni, &z pod

gly$ 4)aris, $%DC6, pp. $$>-$>'.$' 3irst released into sami?dat in $%DC see 1.S.Sol?henitsyn, Hhit ne po l?hiI, "u$litsistika 4)arius,

$%&$6, pp. $F&-$D5.$$ Sa#harov first encountered Tolstoys essay through his uncle see 1ndrei Sa#harov, Memoirs 4<ondon, $%%'6, p. F.



cßの]¦1ÝóªÌ_¸Å£@¶にはそのË•³@bªØ“ëの!は["たにoO、Û示;ÁœものがR+["た8)¹¤¥の.7らºに[る`úËÂ民族Ø›の¦§してのu悛自¨k@Çƒ1974…の中:]¦1ÝóªÌ_¸は、@ABØÅ†行èが*)(:O/もý(し!‡を©るÁœ:[るの¹1s¸を¡ら7にしss、ghŸの|°Ÿu悛i面Ø成}

がó¦して!た128@AByYNの®CをEpる¾の思想のlÍŠ‹が(問のjQを;ものV"たしても、*の`úËが¢"て!るr般ÙÚØなŠÌはPQØなもの:["た8Å£@¶のÎˆ問題3の©/み、©äに1980 fg!~にD!て`国民がgÏな/–る9ðØ€みのŒ”3のªœ75は、]¦1ÝóªÌ_¸O/も¨¡&¦7s世«ØなÒをó¦;るもの:["た8Tて、]¦1ÝóªÌ_¸Å£@¶の!J)もがÿ純¡快にしてðàに‹用-Nな¬!の[/ïにÏlをTて!た8]¦1ÝóªÌ今今今 “ ”®ç/にO/て›œるに[らJ13w固たる¯äø5を行"たのにÛし、Å£@¶は>÷を²手©"て®S;る*をSyしたの:["た8*のSyはa¦vaËの°±をEpる`úËのÂ¤はe"て!ら)な!のVÇ!Pghにa!8*のŠÎその思想が2dŠ‹をEpるÝÍな@ABØ×…をgÏして!

る見る*が”る8

The tradition created by the !ekhi authors also points to a different #ind of

realism. The ideas of Semyon 3ran# 7 another liberal conservative - are a good

example of it. n one of his last boo#s, 3ran# tal#ed of the need for hristian realism

as an alternative to the +olshevi# utopianism that had ta#en over the Soviet Union.$C

!e had in mind a political philosophy that combined a wise gradualism with an

awareness of spiritual and ethical realities. *f course, he was tal#ing about general

principles and it is always so much easier to resolve problems in theory than in

practice. !owever, the concept of hristian realism is another expression of what

might be needed in Russia today.¹道4ºのUîたKが-/”した×…はúらに*)は¢のlÍŠ‹“ ”を\²しても!る8u¸sª¸µ¶&¸«!PもPrÎの ¨¡&¦_À

“ ”の思想がそのq\:[る8³fの[るCの中:¾は Ü¨vaöØlÍŠ‹が]^_à連9を´µしたボÄÝ^_ÜØšªarBŠ‹をg¶;るものして¯°:[るÿÁて!る158¶&¸«のé«に["たのは·¡な‡:¸Œして!+X.ghŸならäにÙÚØ問題の自¹をrsにしたÅ†¶·:["た8Â、¾の語"て!たものはr般ØÇÚにs!て:[るし、ÍpO/もÚ<そ)をRS;るïがðà:[る*は˜:[る8し7し、そのÜ¨vaöØlÍŠ‹のX¸utaはlg@ABに¯°ú)るものを[る!は¢の‡:Ïlして!るものもSTる8

There are in fact plenty of Russian thin#ers who can be seen as intellectual

icons for a different #ind of politics 7 both from the 5' th century and earlier. t is not

in the end true that Russian political thought and culture is best represented by an

autocratic mode of resolving problems. ;ow, in 5'$$, much of the optimism that

characterised Russian politics and society in the early $%%'s has faded and it needs to

be rediscovered if the country is to become what it could be. f a future is be imagined

that involves a different vision of Russian greatness, then Russians will need to live

$5 今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今今 $$>-$>' 今ì|、)¨、1974 今今

$B 今今今1974 fのQ.”版8A.S.]¦1ÝóªÌ_¸Â®ç/にO/て›œるに[らJÇ

ƒ¹評º168-172 今今今今$C S.<.3ran#, Svet vo 'tme 4)aris, $%C%6, p. C'5-C'B.$>



within the framewor# of a different set of icons, and a narrative that is underpinned by

an alternative, more moral form of realism.

*)(:は"たÅ†の[/ïを示;¡ØQ™º»し–る@ABの思想EはÍにはR+àmして!て、そ)は 20 世ªのみならJそ)O/Èvにも!る8@ABのÅ†思想~QのƒもgÏして!るのが問題のbc

Š‹ØRSïðV;るのは、ãの*|ÍïにGして!な!82011 fの9な"ては1990 fgx«の@ABÅ†Œ$を˜™?5て!た楽観Š‹のR+が’T失oてし("て、国がその[/–ÁœÔなるには*の楽観が再ä見”ú)な5)6ならな!8@ABが*)(:は"た¼ôúをも"て想½ú)るたEには、@AB国民は*)(:はÃなるr連のQ™Øàm、O/r’道ˆØな‡を¢"たlÍŠ‹に¾?5ら)たÏ語の€みの中:9!›œて!+̄ °が[るV|P8

Russias internal convulsions did not then end with the collapse of the USSR.

The tension that existed in the late $%&'s between arbitrary party rule, and an

emerging constitutional system, has continued to haunt the country since then. Two

#inds of realism are at war with each other: one which defends a more authoritarian

form of power in the name of survival and stability and another which see#s to

ground politics in a stronger legal framewor# and at the same time a more ethical

tradition of conscience. f such a realism were to flourish in Russia - and it would ta#e

enormous determination and political will by the countrys leaders and people to

ma#e it happen - then a more genuine unity between state and society, and stronger

relationships of trust with Russias neighbours, could be built and then the doors

would be all the more open for Russia to contribute the best of her wisdom and

culture to the world as a whole.

@AB国iの激=は]連9opをも"て[のFI>"た>5:はな! 今

1980 fg!:にD5るý%þのrþ»ÆÉF›()ss["た9ðØbcの間の6Óは9もなD@ABに©/¿!てP)て!な!8Š£LのlÍŠ‹はL2kXに["て、7たÖàn?@!P5Øの<にO/ˆ‰Š‹Øなˆ‡Xを護¢oe;るlÍŠ‹して[/、7たÖO/ó固なðØ€み‡Fに¤cをEpるO/ÙÚØな×…にÅ†をá:?5OP;るlÍŠ‹して[る8êに!îのlÍŠ‹が@ABにÀをs7oる*にな)6、そのëž@ABはô!なるSw*のlÍŠ‹をÍl;Á+国の\]î国民にOるÅ†Øy思S@を.;*になるのV|Pが、そのÁには国EŒ$の間にO/CØな…ž‘を;œ–る:[|Pし、@ABのaB国の間にはO/ó!信í‘が構;”る:[|P8(たそPなる、Âは*)(:È<に7)て、@ABは自らのI;るƒ¤のÃÄ~QにO"て`世界にÅÆ;る*になる:[|P8

t should be said that Russia is not the only country that could benefit from brea#ing with the older forms of realpolitik countries in the 9est, 1sia and 1frica 7

indeed everywhere 7 often face a similar challenge. n a sense, every country, and

every person, constantly faces a choice as to whether to live on the basis of a cynical

realism that might give rise to short-term successes, or a more moral realism that has

the potential to bear fruit in the longer-term.

ÉZながら、@AB67/がそのWXYZたる¤¥B¦§¨©_ª«¬ÇをO7s*:{;る国なの:な!*はS"てD7ね6ならな!今

Y'諸国ÖB1B諸国、そしてB¶¨ˆ諸国、s(/、世界の“る*|にD!て、@AB‡nOPなê題にV面して!る8[るyz、Á国ならäにÁ²Îは、ç~Øな成0をもたらし–るAóˆ¦なlÍŠ‹7、[る!はO

/F間を75てÍ/をãmÈmŸの[るも"道ˆØなlÍŠ‹7、の!J)7をá:した›çの}Éを˜々Êら)て!るの:[る8



¶_¨´tµD´JËヤª、ó国Ë¸aô··N

)hilip +oobbyer, School of !istory, University of @ent, U@

Realpolitik on Trial-2

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