Realism and Empiricism in Hume's Account of Causality

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Realism and Empiricism in Hume's Account of Causality

Author(s): Bernard McBreenSource: Philosophy, Vol. 82, No. 321 (Jul., 2007), pp. 421-436Published by: on behalf ofCambridge University Press Royal Institute of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4619739Accessed: 28-07-2015 18:15 UTC

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Realism nd

Empiricism

n

Hume's

Account

f

Causality

BERNARD McBREEN

Abstract

Hume's

empirical

pproach

eems o

drain

he

concept

f

causality

f all

content,

o

that

ausality

n

objects

s reduced o

constant

onjunction.

His use of

language

of

causality,

which

is

necessarily

ealist,

s undermined

y

his

account

of

causality,

which

is not realist.The realist

ntepretation

f

Hume,

by

philosophers

uch as

Galen Strawson, s rejectedbecause it is incompatiblewithempiricism.However,

if

Hume's view that we do not

have

any

sensory

experience

of

causing

is

challenged,

hen the

way

is

open

to

give

an account of

causality

which is

both

empiricist

nd

realist.

Hume

attempted

to show that our

idea of

causality

was

derived from

experience.

And

although

his

analysis

has been

very

influential,

he

rigour

with which he

attempted

this seemed to drain

the

concept

of

causality

of all its

content,

so

that

causality

in

the

objects

is

reduced

to constant conjunction. This has led some people to conclude that

the

empiricist project

is

impossible

and to

embrace the

opposite

position,

namely

that certain

very general

notions

like

causality

are

innate and do not arise

from

experience. Famously,

this was Kant's

reaction to

Hume. And this

reaction has

persisted; according

to

P.F.

Strawson

'the

concept

of

causal

efficacy

s not

derived from

experience

of a world of

objects,

but is

a

presupposition

of

it;

perhaps

better,

is

already

with us when

anything

which

could

be

called

'experience'

begins.'1

However,

a recent trend in

interpretation2 has argued that, contrary to the traditional

interpretation,

Hume had a

full-blown

realist notion

of

causality,

that

he believed that causes

have force and

energy;

but this

interpretation

puts

Hume's

empiricism

in doubt. Hume's

account

1

P.F.

Strawson,

Analysis

of

Metaphysics

(Oxford

University

Press,

1992),

124.

2

The

two

main

statements

f this new

interpretation

re:

Galen

Strawson,

The

SecretConnexion

Oxford:

Clarendon

Press,

1989)

and

J.P.

Wright, The Sceptical Realism of David Hume (Manchester University

Press,

1983).

But

also see

Strawson's

later re-statement

of

his

position

in

'David Hume:

Objects

and Power'. The

New Hume

Debate,

(eds.)

Rupert

Read

and Kenneth A. Richman

(London:

Routledge,

2000).

10.1017/S0031819107000034

@2007

The

Royal

nstitute

f

Philosophy

Philosophy

2 2007

421

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions





Bernard

McBreen

of

causality,

and

the various

responses

to

it,

suggest

that there is an

incompatibility

between

an

empiricist

account

of

causality

and a

realist account

of

causality.

I

will

argue

that it

is

possible

to

give

an

empiricistaccount of causalitywhich is also realist.

1

Although

the traditional

interpretation

of

Hume's account

of

causality

is

that

causality

in

the

objects

is

just

constant

conjunction,

his

starting position

is

quite

different.Hume starts with a

realist

notion of

causality,

with the notion that a cause has two

defining

characteristics: tis commonly supposed, that there is a necessary

connexion

betwixt

the cause

and

effect,

and that the cause

possesses something,

which

we call a

power,

or

force,

or

energy.'

(T656)3

So, first,

a cause

possesses

a

quality

whereby

it

brings

about its

effect.

As

well as

referring

o

this

quality

as

power,

force

and

energy,

Hume

also sometimes refers

to it as

efficacy, gency

and

productive

quality.

He

uses

expressions

like: 'the

efficacy

of

causes,

or that

quality

which makes them be followed

by

their

effect'

T156),

'that

energy

in

the

cause, by

which it

operates

on its

effects'

(T266),

'when we know a

power,

we know that

very

circumstance

in the

cause,

by

which it is enabled to

produce

the

effect:

For

these

are

supposed

to

be

synonymous.'

(E67-8)

Second,

a cause has

a

necessary

connection to its

effect;

central to this

relationship

is

the idea that

given

the

cause,

the

effect

has to

happen.

As

well

as

referring

to this

relationship

as

a

necessary

connection,

Hume also sometimes refers

to it as

simply

a

connection

or tie. And

this

defining quality

and

defining

relationship are related because it is the quality in the cause which

determines this

relationship

between cause and

effect: we

speak

of

a

necessary

connexion

between

objects,

and

suppose,

that

this

connexion

depends upon

an

efficacy

r

energy,

with

which

any

of

these

objects

are endow'd'

(T162);

'the

very

force

or

energy

of the

3

I

refer o

Hume's A Treatise

f

Human Natureed.

L.A.

Selby-Bigge

and P.H.

Nidditch

2ndedition

Oxford:

Clarendon

Press,

1978)

in

the text

by using

the letter

T

followed

by

the

page

number.

This

book also

containsHume's Abstract. 656 is a

quote

from he Abstract. refer o

Hume's

EnquiriesConcerning

uman

Understanding

nd

Concerning

he

Principles f

Morals ed. L.A.

Selby-Bigge

nd P.H. Nidditch

3rd

edition

(Oxford:

Clarendon

Press,

1975)

in the

text

by

using

the

etterU followed

by

the

page

number.

422







Realism and

Empiricism

n

Hume's Account

of

Causality

cause,

by

which it

is connected

with its

effects,

nd is for ever

infallible n its

operation.'

E69)

However,

Hume then

produces

wo

arguments

whichundermine

this realistnotion of causality.Hume's main argument entres n

the

defining uality

of a cause.

To

better nderstand he notionof

causality,

Hume

attempts

o discover the

experience

on which

the

concept

of the

defining quality

is

based,

or,

in

Hume's

terminology,ttempts

o discover

he

mpression

n

which

the dea

of

power, energy,

etc is derived.

However,

there

is

a

problem

straightaway.

When we look about us towards xternal

bjects,

nd consider

he

operationof causes, we are neverable, in a single instance, o

discover

ny

power

or

necessary

onnexion;

any

quality,

which

binds the effect o the

cause,

and renders he one an infallible

consequence

of the

other. We

only

find,

that

the one

does

actually,

n

fact,

ollow he other.

E63)

The

point

of this

demonstration

s that f

power

s a

quality

n the

cause,

we should be able

to

perceive

t.

But,

Hume

says,

we

cannot,

and this

puts

into

question

the

original

notion we

have

of

power

being

a

quality

n

the cause.

Hume's

secondary

argument

centres on the

relationship

of

necessary

onnexionbetween ause and

effect.

t can be set out as

follows:

(1)

The

energy

f

a cause

necessarily

rings

bout its

particular

effect.Hume

understands his

necessarily'

s

meaning

hat

there s an a

priori relationship

etween

cause and effect:

'were the

power

or

energy

f

any

cause

discoverable

y

the

mind,

we

could forsee he

effect,

ven

without

xperience.'

(E63)

(2)

However,

s

Hume

has

argued

lsewhere,

or

xample

E27-

30),

from

the first

ppearance

of an

object,

we never can

conjecture

what effectwill

result

from

t.'

(E63)

We can

only

knowwhatthe

effect

ill be

from

xperience.

(3)

Therefore,

ume

concludes,

we

must

be

mistakenwith

our

original

idea

of a

cause

having energy

which

necessarily

brings

bout ts

effect.

So although eople supposethat .. they erceive hevery orce r

energy

f

the

cause,

by

which t

s connectedwith ts

effect,

nd s for

ever in fallible in its

operation' (E69),

these two

arguments

seem to

suggest

that

we

have

no

idea

of

connexion

or

power

at

all,

and that

423







BernardMcBreen

these words are

absolutely

without

ny meaning,

when

employed

either

n

philosophical

easonings

r common ife.'

E74)

However,

his s not Hume's final

onclusion.

Going

back to his

main argument, e notes that after ne instance f an eventbeing

followed

y

another,

we never

ay they

re

causally

inked;

athert s

when two

sets of similar vents re

constantlyonjoined

hat

we

say

one is the

cause and

the other

s

the effect.

aving

the

experience

f

two

events

being constantly onjoined

will not

reveal

nything

ew

about thetwo

sets

of events.

The

only

hing

hat s new s

that fter

repetition

f similar

nstances,

he

mind is

carried

by

habit,

upon

the

appearance

of one

event,

to

expect

its

usual

attendant ... This connexion, therefore,which we feel in the

mind,

this

customary

ransition f

the

imagination

from one

object

to

its usual

attendant,

s the

sentiment

r

impression

rom

whichwe

form

he

dea

of

power

or

necessary

onnexion.

E75)

And ifthe

dea of

power

nd

necessary

onnexion s derivedfrom

an

inner

impression, feeling

of

expectation,

hen

power

and

necessary

connexion

referto this inner

impression

and not to

anything

hat s in the

objects

or

events hemselves:When we

say,

therefore,hatone objectis connectedwithanother,we meanonly

that

hey

have

acquired

a

connexion

n

our

thought.' E76)

The same

point

s

made

more

emphatically

n the Treatise:

These

ideas

[of

necessity, ower, fficacy],

herefore,

epresent

ot

any

thing,

that

does

or can

belong

to the

objects,

which are

constantly onjoin'd.

T164)

Upon

the

whole,

necessity

s

something,

hat xists

n

the

mind,

not

in

objects T165)

The

necessity

r

power,

whichunities auses and

effects,

ies

n

the

determination

f the

mind to

pass

from

he

one to the other.The

efficacy

r

energy

of

causes

is

neither

plac'd

in

the causes

themselves

...

but

belongs

entirely

to the

soul,

which

considers

the

union

of two

or more

objects

n all

past

nstances.

T166)

Hume is aware

that

people

will

regard

his conclusion

a

'gross

absurdity'

(T168)

or,

in

the more restrained

anguage

of

the

Enquiry

somewhat

xtraordinary'E76),

since the normal view

is

thatforce nd

energy

re

qualities

n causes.He

explainsaway

this

'contrary

biass'

(T167) by saying

the mind has a

great

propensity

to

spread

itselfon external

objects,

and to

conjoin

with them

any

internal

impressions,

which

they

424







Realism

and

Empiricism

n

Hume's Account of

Causality

occasion,

nd

which

lways

make

heir

ppearance

t the

ame

time

that hese

objects

discover hemselves o the senses.

T167)

The

same

point

s

made

in

the

Enquiry

t the end

of E78n.

At

the nd

ofhis

account f

causality

Hume

gives

wodefinitionsf

causality.

These

two

definitionshould be

considered

s a

summary

of

his

account rather han

definitions

n the

ordinary

ense. There

are

two definitions ecause there

are

two

aspects

to his

account.

First,

n terms of

our

experience

of the

objects,

two

objects

are

causality

related

f

they

are

constantly onjoined.

But as

Hume's

discussion

shows,

he is well aware

that

we mean

something

more

than this whenwe talk of causality.We think a cause is a cause

because it has force nd

energy

which

necessarily rings

about a

particular

ffect. he

origin

of

these

ideas,

says

Hume,

is

in

the

determination

f

the mind to

pass

from

he

idea of one

object

to

the

other fter he

past

experience

f their onstant

onjunction.

So Hume has

not abandoned his initial

notion

that a

cause

has a

force and

energy

which

necessarily rings

about its

effect;

only

he

undermines

t. This initial notion of

causality

s realist

because force nd

energy

re

thought

f as

qualities

in

the

cause.

But accordingto Hume's analysis, he ideas of force and energy

are

not derivedfrom

ny sensory

mpression

f

the

objects

and so

do

not referto

any qualities

in

the

objects.

Therefore

Hume

subverts he

ordinary

notion of

causality

from

realist

one

to a

non-realist ne.

2

In the ast fewdecades therehas been a challenge o thetraditional

interpretation

f Hume that ll

there s to

causality

n the

objects

s

constant

onjunction.4

The new

interpretation

rgues

that

Hume

believed that

energy,power,

etc

reside

in

causes. The

way

it is

argued

is

by

referring

o

Hume's

realistic

anguage,

but the

full

argument

an be

presented

s

follows:

(1)

Hume has

shown hatwe

do

nothave

any

sensory

xperience

of

energy

n

causes.

(2) YetthroughoutheTreatisend theEnquiryHume uses terms

like

energy

n

a realist

way;

he uses

these

terms

n a

way

which

clearly

assumes that

energy

resides in the

cause.

And even in

Op.

cit.note .

425







BernardMcBreen

the

many

passages

where Hume

says

we are

ignorant

of

any

energy

in

the

cause,

the

argument

is that:

'One

cannot

be

ignorant

of that which cannot

exist 's

(3) Hume admits that objects may have qualities which are

beyond

human

experience.

In

the Treatise he

says:

'I

am,

indeed,

ready

to

allow,

that

there

may

be

several

qualities

both

in

material and immaterial

objects,

with which we are

utterly

unacquainted.'

(T168)

And in

the

Enquiry

he

talks

about

'the weakness and narrow limits

of

human reason and

capacity.'

(E76)

(4)

Therefore,

Hume

must be

identifying

he

energy

of a cause

with a

quality

in

the

cause which is

beyond

our

experience.

In this way Hume's view that we have no sensory

experience

of

energy

in

causes is not

contradicted

by

his

continual referral

to

energy

in

a realist

way. According

to

Wright,

Hume

'consistently

maintained

the

point

of

view

that there are real

powers

and forces

n

nature which

are

not

directly

ccessible to our

senses.'6

The most

impressive part

of the

realist

nterpreter's

ase is where

theypoint to Hume's consistentuse of termslike energy n a realist

way.

For

example,

when Hume talks of 'the

power,

by

which one

object

produces

another'

(T69),

the

assumption

has

to be

that

Hume

is

talking

about

a

power

which is

in

the

cause,

and

therefore

he believes

that

power

exists

in a

cause.

Winkler,

a critic

of the

realistic

interpretation,

rgues

that these

passages

in Hume should

be

retrospectively

re-interpreted

in

light

of Hume's

completed

analysis.7

However

I

do

not think this

captures

what

is

going

on

here;

and even after Hume has

completed

his

analysis,

his

use of

terms ike power does not change.

Hume's

language

is

clearly

realist. He talks of

a

cause

having

a

force

and

energy

by

which is

necessarily

brings

about its

effect.

This

is the

ordinary

anguage

of

causality;

it

s

part

of

what we

mean

by causality.

Strawson and

Wright

are

correct

n

emphasising

Hume's

use of this

language.

However,

Hume's

analysis

undermines

this

concept

of

causality. According

to his

analysis,

the idea of

energy

does not

arise

from

anything

within the cause but

from

the

mind

of

the

observer.

Therefore we are mistaken

in

thinking

that

energy

resides

5

J.P.

Wright,

he

Sceptical

Realism

f

David

Hume,

133.

6

Op.

cit.

note

5,

129.

7

'The

New

Hume',

The

New

Hume

Debate,

54.

426







Realism and

Empiricism

n

Hume's

Account

of

Causality

in

the

cause.

If

Hume's

analysis

was

applied

consistently

t would

lead to a

withering way

of the

concept

of

causality;

f

you

accept

that

energy

does

not reside

in

the

cause,

you

would not

use

the

languageof causalitywhich mpliesthatenergydoes reside n the

cause.

You

would be able

to

talk about

regularities

ut

not

of

causality.

Some

philosophers

ave taken his

position.

For

example,

t was

strongly

rgued

for

by

Bertrand

Russell,

who bolsters

is

argument

by

referring

o the

practice

of science.

In Russell's

view,

when

science reaches

a

certain evel

of

sophistication-he

s

thinking

f

physics-the language

of

causality

s discarded.

The lawofgravitation ill illustrate hatoccurs n anyadvanced

science.

In the motions of

mutuallygravitating

odies,

there s

nothing

hat

an be called a

cause,

and

nothing

hatcan be

called

effect;

here

s

merely

formula.8

However,

Hume does notmake his

tep

nd

he

is

notconsistent

n

applying

his

analysis

f

causality.

ven after

xpounding

is account

of

causality

e continues

o

use the

anguage

f

causality

nd

thereby

implying

realist iew

of

energy.

Given

his

analysis

f

causality

he

only way

he could rid

himself

of this

inconsistency

s

by

renouncing

he

anguage

of

causality.

ButHume does notdo this.

In

part,

Hume

acknowledges

his

nconsistency

n

the final ection

ofbook 1

of

he Treatise.

We

start

ff,

e

says, hinking

f

that

nergy

in

the

cause,

by

which

it

operates

on its effect.'

T266)

But

his

analysis

teaches us that

energy

ies

merely

n

ourselves.'

T266)

The notion

that

energy

resides

n the cause

is 'an

illusion

of

the

imagination.'

T267)

How

far

ought

we to

yield

to this

llusion,

he

asks:

Formypart, knownotwhat ught o bedone nthepresent ase.I

can

only

observe what is

commonly

done;

which

is,

that

this

difficulty

s

seldom or

never

thought

f;

and even where

t

has

once

been

present

o the

mind,

s

quickly

forgot,

nd leaves but a

small

mpression

ehind

t.

T268)

Hume is not

happy

with his nswer ecause t

s so

dismissive

f

the

endeavour f

philosophy.

But

he

does

not

resolve

his ssue.

Contrary

to Strawson's

and

Wright's

argument,

Hume's

continuing se of thelanguageofcausalitydoes not show thathis

account

of

causality

is a realist one.

Rather

there

is

a

basic

8

'On

the

Notionof

Cause',

Mysticism

nd

Logic

(London: George

Allen&

Unwin, 918),

186.

427







Bernard McBreen

inconsistency

etween

his

use

of

this

anguage,

which

necessarily

s

realist,

nd his accountof

causality,

which s

not realist.

But the

strongest

rgument gainst

the

realist

nterpretation

f

Hume is that the interpretations incompatiblewithempiricism.

Since

Hume

argues

thatwe do not have

any sensory

xperience

f

energy

n

the

cause,

and since the realist

nterpreters

rgue

that

Hume believed

energy

esides

n

the

cause,

it

follows,

or he

realist

interpreters,

hat

energy

has to be a

quality

n

the cause

which is

beyond

our

experience.

This

is

not

a

position

n

empiricist

ould hold.

An

empiricist

akes

theviewthat

ll

our

knowledge

f

the

world,

nd the

concepts

we use

to describe he

world,

come from ur

experience

f the world. And

since we have a conceptof energy, t musthave come fromour

experience

f theworld.

Strawson

s

to some extent ware of

this

problem

forthe realist

interpretation

f Hume. He talksof a

'meaning

ension':

[Hume] officially

olds that no Causation term

power,

energy,

force,

etc.]

can

manage

to

(descriptive-contentfully)

ean

anything

like

Causation,

which

s

what

he

ought

to

say given

his

theory

f

ideas,

yet

he

clearly

oncedes

n

his

usage

that

theymay manage

to mean something ike Causation at least in the sense of

genuinely eferring

o

it.9

The reason

why

term ike

energy

annot

manage

to

mean

anything

like

energy

n

the cause is because we have

no

sensory mpression

f

energy

n

the

cause.

In his

sharpest

statement f this

problem,

Strawson

says

that the realist

nterpretation

s

incompatible

with

Hume's

theory

of ideas.

However,

Strawson

says

the realist

interpretation

s still correctbecause Hume

rejected

his

theory

f

ideas,strictlynd literallynterpreted.10

The

part

of

Hume's

theory

f deas that

herealist

nterpretation

s

incompatible

with is the

principle

that

all

ideas

are

derived

from

impressions.

This can be taken as Hume's statement

of his

empiricism.

his

principle

s annunciated

hroughout

he Treatise

and the

Enquiry.

Hume calls it

our

fundamental

rinciple'

T163)

and

it

plays

a

crucialrole

n his accountof

causality.

For the realist

interpretation

o be

correct,

Hume would have

had to

reject

this

principle.

trawson oes not claim thatHume said

that ll

ideas

are

notderivedfrommpressions, rmorespecifically,hatHume said

9

The Secret

Connexion,

21.

1O

'David Hume:

Objects

and

Power',

The New Hume

Debate,

48.

428







Realism and

Empiricism

n

Hume's Account

of

Causality

that the ideas of

energy,

force,

power,

etc are not

derived

from

impressions.

Rather,

Strawson

supports

his

position by

citing

Hume's use

of

terms like

energy

n

a realist manner.

If realist interpretation is correct, there would be a massive

inconsistency

within Hume's

philosophy.

This

would

be

between

Hume's fundamental

principle

that all ideas

are

derived

from

impressions

and the view that

energy

resides

in

the cause even

though

we do not have

any sensory

impression

of

energy

in

the

cause. If

energy

resides in the

cause and we

do not

have

any

sensory impression

of

energy,

then the idea

of

energy

could not be

derived from an

impression: energy

would

be 'not

directly

accessible

to

our senses.'11 Such a view would

undermine

everythingHume said about causality. His discussion of causality

takes the form of

seeking

the

impression

for which the

idea of

causality

and

the associated

ideas

of

energy,

force,

power,

etc

are

derived.

The

reason

why

it is

wrong

to

say

that Hume

rejected

his

theory

of ideas

in

relation to

causality

is that Hume

claimed to

have

found

the

impression

on which

the

idea

of

energy

is

derived;

only

it

is not an

impression

of

sensation

but

an

impression

of

reflection,

a

feeling

of

expectation

in

the

observer.

And if the

idea

of

energy

s

derived from an

impression

of

reflection,

hen

energy

resides not

in

the

cause but

in

the observer.

I

do not

think

it is

possible

to

give

an

interpretation

f

Hume's

account of

causality

without

revealing

an

inconsistency.

I

have

argued

that the

inconsistency

is

between Hume's

analysis

of

causality,

which

is

not

realist,

and his

continuing

use of the

language

of

causality,

which

necessarily

is

realist.

This

inconsistency

is less

damaging

to

Hume's

philosophy

than

the

one

revealed in the

realist

nterpretation,

nd

also,

I

think,

gives

a more

accurate account ofHume's text.

Hume

briefly

iscusses

the

view

that the realist

nterpretators

rgue

that

Hume

held,

namely

that

the

energy

of

cause is an

unknown

quality

in the

cause. Hume

rejects

this,

because

we

already

have

an

idea of

energy,

and this idea

cannot

be derived

from an

unknown

quality.

For as

they

confess,

that

this

energy

lies not

in

any

of the

known

qualities

of

matter,

the

difficulty

till remains

concerning

the

origin

of its

idea.

If

we

have

really

an idea

of

power,

we

mayattribute

power

to an unknown

quality:

But as 'tis

impossible,

that

that idea can

be deriv'd

from such a

quality,

and

as

there

is

11

The

Sceptical

Realism

f

David

Hume,

129.

429







Bernard

McBreen

nothing

n

known

qualities,

which

can

produce

it;

it

follows that

we

deceive

ourselves,

when we

imagine

we are

possest

of

any

of this

kind,

after he

manner we

commonly

understand it.

(T161)

Strawsonmakes a distinctionbetweenthe

epistemological

statement:

(E)

all we can

ever know

of

causation,

in

the

objects,

is

regular

succession,

which Strawson

regards

as

arguably

true,

and

the

ontological

statement:

(0)

all that

ausation

actually

s,

n the

objects,

s

regular

uccession,

which Strawsonregardsas wildlyimplausible.12Strawsonthinksthat

the traditional

interpretation

of Hume arose

from

confusing

the

epistemological

and

ontological

statements.

According

to

Strawson,

Hume

believes

the

epistemological

statement but

not

the

ontological

statement.

However,

although

it can

be

accepted

that the two

statementshave

different

meanings,

no one should

accept

such

drastically

different

assessments of their

truth. To

say

that the

ontological

statement

s

wildly implausible

is to

say

that

you

have

strong reasons

for

believing

that

there is more to

causation,

in

the

objects,

than

just

regular

succession. And

this is

incompatible

with

believing

that

all

we

can

know of

causation is

regular

succession.

If

it is

true that

the

ontological

statement is

wildly implausible,

then there must be

grounds

for not

accepting

the

epistemological

statement.

Realist

interpreters

are another

example

of

philosophers

responding

to

Hume's account of

causality by rejecting

empiricism.

Normally

philosophers respond

by

putting

forward a different

account of causalitywhich involves a break with empiricism. But in

the case of the realist

interpreters,

hey

have

re-interpreted

Hume

so

that

Hume is no

longer

an

empiricist

This motivation is

clearly

seen

in the case

of Strawson. He makes

clear his own

anti-empiricist

stance.

He declares: 'our

actual

concept

of Causation has

essentially

sensory-experience-

transcending

content,'

and

'could

not

possibly

be

fully

revealed

in

sensory experience.'13

The

problem

with Hume's

account

of

causality,

as

traditionally

understood,

that Strawson is most

concerned with is thatifthere s no quality in the cause by virtueof

which

it

brings

about its

particular

effect,

hen

12

The Secret

Connexion,

1.

13

Op.

cit. note

12,

254.

430







Realism and

Empiricism

in

Hume's Account of

Causality

there s

(provably)

nothing

t

all in

thenature

f

things

n

virtue

f

which

reality

s

regular

n

the

way

that t

s,

so that

he

regularity

f

the world

is,

from

moment

to

moment,

and

knowably,

an

'outrageous unof uck'.14

Strawson

gives

this as

a

reason

against

accepting

he

traditional

non-realist

nterpretation;

t is

such

a

compelling rgument

gainst

Hume,

as

traditionally

nderstood,

hat Hume could not

possibly

have held such a view.

But,

however

highly philosopher

may

be

held,

it does not mean that he is

capable

of

foreseeing

ll the

objections

hat

are

subsequently

made

against

his

theory.

erhaps,

instead f

re-interrupting

he

theory,

t

should

be re-examined.

3

The

problem

for

Hume

occurs

right

t

the

beginning

f his

enquiry

into

causality.

He

looks

at

a

single

nstance f

causality.

He

gives

he

example

of one

billiard

ball

banging

nto nother

ausing

t to

move.

Hume looks

at

the cause and looks at the effect nd can find

nothing

on

whichthe

dea

of

causality

ould

be

based.

But

suppose

he had taken different

xample.

nstead

of

passively

contemplating

billiard

table,

he took an

example

wherehe was

actively

nvolved,

say,

in

pushing

a cart.

He

would then have a

candidateforthe

origin

of

the idea

of

causality,

amely

he

bodily

sensation of

pushing.

This

bodily

sensation

would be his

experience

f

causing

or

forcing

he cart to move. This

experience

is

private

o him.

But

from

imilar

xperiences

nd

watching

ther

people perform

imilar

ctions,

he could

readily

cknowledge

hat

the other

people

have similar

experiences

o him.

Also

we have

experiences f physicalbodies actingon us so we knowphysical

bodies

can

apply

force.

Say

the

cart

is

slowly

beginning

to roll

down an

incline,

he

people

in

front

f

the

cart can

feel

the force

the cart s

applying

o them.And even when

the

physical bject

is

not

applying

force to

us,

but

to

another

physical object,

we

generalize

rom ur

own

experiences

nd

accept

the

physical bject

is

applying

force

o

other

physicalobjects,

for

example,

when the

run

away

cart

bangs

nto and

knocks ver fence

n

its

way.

So,

to

go

backto Hume's

original

illiard

all

example,

t s truewe

cannot see thewhiteball forcingrcausing he red ball tomove;the

experience

f

forcing

s not a

visual

experience.

However,

from

ur

14

'David

Hume:

Objects

and

Power',

48.

But

also

see

chapter

of The

Secret

Connexion.

431







Bernard McBreen

experiences

f

physical

objects

acting

on

us,

we

understand

nd

accept

thatthe

white

ball is

exerting

force n

the red ball.

There

is

nothingmysterious

bout this. We could feelthe force

he white

ball appliesto thered ball bysimplyputting ur hand between he

white nd the red ball. When the

whiteball hits

your

hand

you

feel

a

pressure

n

your

hand,

which

is the force t would have hit

the

red

ball with.

Hume does not

consider

he

possibility

hat

bodily

sensation

f

forcingmight

be the

original

of

the idea of

causality

n

the main

body

of the Treatise.But he

does

consider

omething

imilarfirst

briefly

n

the

Appendix

to

the

Treatise

T632-3)

and

then t

greater

length

n

the

Enquiry

E64-69)

To argueagainst his ttack nhis mainargumentntheTreatise,

i.e.

the

argument

hat

we have

no

idea

of

energy

n

the cause

because

we

cannot see the

energy,

he

relies

on the

secondary rgument,

involvingnecessary

onnection,

which

only briefly ppears

in the

main

body

of the Treatise.

T161-2)

This

argument

s that

we think

the

energy

f

a

cause

necessarily

rings

bout

its

effect

and

Hume

understands his

necessarily'

s

implying

n a

priori

relationship

between ause

and

effect);

ut

from he cause we can never

know a

priori

he

effect;

herefore e are

deceived

n

thinkingwe have an

idea of

energy esiding

n

the

object

which

necessarily rings

bout

its

effect.

Hume uses

this

argument

n

the

appendix

to

the Treatise

nd

the

Enquiry gainst

he

suggestion

hat n the

performing

f actionswe

acquire

the idea

of

force

nd

energy.

n most

of the

cases Hume

considers

the

cause is

an act

of volition

and the

effect s the

corresponding

movement

of

the

body.

Hume considers the

suggestion

hat

n

the act

of

willing

we feel n

energy

nd

force

nd

this s the source of the idea ofcausality. do not believethatthis

experience

s the sourceof our

idea

of

causality

ut the much

more

straightforward

xperience

of

a

person's

action

bringing

about

change

in

the external world.

However,

one

example

Hume

considers s

similar

o thatof

pushing

cart.

It

may

be

pretended,

hat

the resistance

which we meet

with

n

bodies,

obliging

us

frequently

o exertour

force,

nd call

up

all

our

power,

his

gives

us

the

dea of force nd

power.

E67n)

The argument e uses against his, s thesameargument e uses in

the

cases

of

an act of

will

causing

the movement

f

a

part

of the

body,

so all the cases can be considered

together.

Hume

argues

that the act of volition

gives

us

no

privileged

knowledge

of the

effect. As

with other cases of

causality,

we

only

432







Realism and

Empiricism

n

Hume's Account of

Causality

know what effect

cause

will have

by experience.

For

example,

if a

man has

a

stroke it

is

only by

trying

and

failing

to move his arm

that

he

discovers he has lost the use of his arm.

(E66)

'But were the

power or energyof any cause discoverable by the mind, we could

foresee the

effect,

ven without

experience.'

(E63)

Since we

cannot

foresee the effect without

experience,

we cannot

be conscious

of

any power

or

energy.

What is

striking

bout the

argument

s

that the

premise

that there s

an a

priori

relation

between cause and effect

onflictswith the

premise

that fromthe cause we can never know a

priori

the

effect.

Accepting

the

second

premise

as

correct,

which

Hume

certainly

does,

you

would

think

the conclusion Hume would draw is that the first

remise

is

not

true; thatifthe energyof a cause necessarily brings about the effect,

this

necessarily'

should not be understood

in

the sense

that

t

implies

an

a

priori

relationship

between cause and effect.

However,

this

would

be a

mistake

in

interpretation.

t

is clear that

Hume held the

view that the

necessity

involved

in

causality

is that of an

a

priori

relation between cause and effect. For

example

Hume

says:

'We

must

distinctly

nd

particularly

conceive the connexion betwixt the

cause and

effect,

nd be able to

pronounce,

from a

simple

view of

the

one,

that it must be follow'd

or

preceded by

the other.'

(T161)

And:

'were the

power

or

energy

of

any

cause discoverable

by

the

mind,

we

could forsee the

effect,

ven without

experience.'

(E63)

This has to be

understood

historically.

Before Hume there was a

tradition

in

philosophy

which took the view that there was an

a

priori

relationship

between cause

and

effect.15

The

demise of this

tradition was

largely

due

to

Hume. When Kant

said

that Hume

interrupted

his

'dogmatic

slumber'16

he was

referring

o the fact

that Hume

'indisputably proved

that

it is

wholly impossible

for

reason to think such a connection [between cause and effect] a

priori.'17

Kant took from

Hume that

in

the individual case we have

no

a

priori

knowledge

of

the

effect

from

the

cause;

nevertheless

he

argued

that

the

concept

of

causality

was

a

priori

and was not 'as

Hume

had

feared,

derived from

experience.'18

However,

despite arguing

strongly

that,

from the

cause,

we can

never

a

priori

know the

effect,

Hume

retained

the

notion that

part

15

One

account

fthis raditions

givenby

Edward

Craig

n TheMind

of

God and theWorks fMan (Oxford:ClarendonPress,1987), 37-40.

16

Immanuel

Kant

Prolegomena

o

Any

Future

Metaphysics

rans. nd

ed.

by Gary

Hatfield

CambridgeUniversity

ress,

2004),

10.

17

Op. cit. note

16,

7.

18

Op.

cit.

note

16,

10.

433







Bernard McBreen

of what we mean

by

causality

is

that there is an a

priori

connection

between cause and effect.

In

doing

this,

Hume

is

being

inconsistent. This is similar to his

inconsistency

in

holding

that

part of what we mean by causality is that a cause has energy by

which it

brings

about

its

effect

and

arguing

that

energy

does not

reside

in

the cause.

Once the notion that

part

of what we mean

by

causality

is that there

is

an a

priori

connection

between

cause and effect s

rejected,

then

Hume's

argument collapses.

There can still be a

necessary

connection between cause and

effect,

but this

necessary

connection

should not

be

understood as

implying

an a

priori relationship

between cause and

effect.

But in

examining

the

argument,

we

should not ignore the nonsensical nature of Hume's conclusion.

Comparing

a man

in

perfect

health to

a

man

suffering

from a

stroke,

he

says:

'neither

in

the one case nor

in

the

other,

are we

ever

conscious of

any power.'

(E66)

And

to

show that

this is not

some

kind of

slip

on Hume's

part,

he

repeats

the

point

a little

ater. How

indeed can we be conscious of a

power

to move our

limbs,

when we

have no such

power.'(E66) Transferring

his

argument

to

the

type

of

example

I

would

prefer,

Hume would have to

say

that a

person

pushing

a

cart is

not

conscious

of

exerting

a

force

on the

cart.

But

since

part

of

what

'pushing'

means is

'exerting

a

force',

it is

nonsense to

say

that

a

person

pushing

a

cart,

and is conscious

of

doing

this,

is not conscious of

exerting

a force.

At the end

of

his

discussion,

Hume relents

on

denying

the

obvious,

namely

that we have the

experience

of

applying

force.

In

discussing

an

example

similar

to

my

own of 'the resistance which

we meet

with

in

bodies,

obliging

us

frequently

o

exert our force and call

up

all

our

power'

(E67n)-he

states:

It must, however, be confessed, that the animal nisus [strong

endeavour],

which

we

experience,

though

it can afford no

accurate

precise

idea of

power,

enters

very

much

in

that

vulgar,

inaccurate

idea,

which

is

formed

of

it.

(E67n)

But

there are not two different deas of

power,

one

vulgar

the other

not.

There is

only

one

concept

of

power,

which

everyone

shares.

Hume is correct

n

saying

that we

can

only

know the effects f our

actions

from

experience;

but this does not mean that

we

do not

have

the experience ofapplying force.A person may apply a force but it is

only

from

xperience

that he discovers whether the

effect n a certain

type

of

object

is

thatthe

object

moves, or,

for

xample,

that t bends or

it breaks.

434







Realism

and

Empiricism

n

Hume's

Account

of

Causality

In

opposition

to

Hume,

a similar

view

was

put

forward

by

Thomas

Reid

as

to the

empirical origin

of

our idea of

causality.

It is

very probable

that the

veryconception

or

idea of active

power,and of efficient

ause,

is derived from our

voluntary

exertions in

producing

effects;

and

that

if

we were not conscious

of

such

exertion,

we should have no

conception

at all of a cause.19

However,

Reid also

thought

that it is

only

with

regards

voluntary

action that the

concept

of cause should

be

used.

In

relation

to

everything

else,

Reid

took a

very

non-common sensical

position

and held that it was incorrect

to

use the

language

of

causality.

Discussing

an

example

of

holding

a

magnet

close to a

nautical

compass and observing the compass needle to move, he

acknowledges

that

people

would

say

that the

magnet

caused

the

compass

to move.

Yet Reid's

position

is

that: We

deceive ourselves

if

we conceive

that

we

can

point

out the real efficient

ause

...'20

Reid's

position

was

similar

to

Russell's

in

that he

thought

physicists

discovered

laws,

i.e.

regularities,

nd not causes.

However,

if

Reid

accepts

the

experience

of a

voluntary

action

forcing

something

as the

origin

of

the

concept

of

causality,

then he

should also

accept

the

experience

we have

when

physical objects

exert force on

us,

say

the

feeling

of

pressure

on

your

hand when

you

stop

a

billiard ball.

If

the

appeal

is to

experience,

then the

experience

of

acting

on the

external world and the

experience

of

being

acted on

by

the

external world are

equally

valid.

4

Hume started with the everydayrealist notion of causality in which

the cause

has

energy residing

in

it.

However,

because he

was

unable

to

find

any

sensory

experience

we

have of

energy

in the

cause and

to

stay

true

to

his

empiricism,

he

ended

up

with a

theory

that the

origin

of

our idea

of

energy

lies in the

feeling

of

expectation

in

the

observer.

In

this

way

Hume ends

up

with

a

non-realist account of

causality

where

causality

in

the

objects

is

reduced to

constant

conjunction.

19

Essays

on the

ActivePowersof man' in

The Works

f

Thomas

Reid,

D.D.

vol

2

ed

by

William Hamilton

(Edinburgh:

MacLachlan and

Stewart,

872),

604.

20

Op.

cit. note

19,

527.

435







Bernard

McBreen

The realist

nterpreters

ave

re-emphasised

he

mportance

fforce

and

energy.

owever,

ecause

they

avefollowed

Hume in

accepting

his

viewthatwe haveno

sensory

xperience

f force nd

energy, hey

have ended up with the notion of force and energyas being

non-sensory ualities

in

the cause. As an

interpretation

f Hume

this s

not crediblebecause

on this

account

Hume

would

no

longer

be an

empiricist.

t

is

also an enfeebled ccount of

causality

ince,

as

non-sensory ualities,

force

nd

energy

annot

play any

role

in

understanding

he world. Strawsonadmits as much: 'Such terms

[power,

energy,

force,

etc.]

can have no role to

play

in the

explanation

r

understanding

f

particular henomena'

and

are of

no

use to

physics'.21

But

in

reality,

force and

energy

are

fundamentaloncepts nphysics.

I

have

tried

o followHume

in

giving

strictlympirical

ccount.

But

by

rejecting

ume's view that

we

have no

sensory xperience

f

force nd

energy,

am able to show how it is

possible

to

give

an

empiricist

nd realist ccountof

causality.

Liverpool

21

The

Secret

Connexion,

33.

436

Realism and Empiricism in Hume's Account of Causality

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