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Realism & Allison & Zelikow

& Foreign Policy

Lecture Notes

Jennifer L. Bailey

24 January2005

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Morgenthau and Waltz: Theories that don’t predict (specific) behavior “The complexities of international affairs make simple solutions and trustworthy prophecies impossible”. (p. 21) They are also difficult as prescriptions to statesmen: General guidelines only Caution to would-be “idealists” – and ideologues (resists counting on the good nature of others and puts national interest at the center rather than universal ideals -- the problem of Kissinger. ) Morgenthau: “Political realism does not require and does not condone, indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible – between what is desirable everywhere and at all times, and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place”. (p. 7)

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Allison (& Zelikow)

A classic that has remained in print and in the classroom. Used far beyond the academy Pioneered certain approaches, now offers excellent summary of these approaches. The discussion of realism is particularly useful. Great notes – a annotated bibliography of the literature Note that this literature includes people very

influential in both theory-building and in the making of US foreign policy: Thomas Schelling, George Kennan, Hans J. Morgenthan, Herman Kahn

New edition: first synthesis of all the new evidence on Cuba Summary of critical event from three (two) perspectives

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Allison is a good bridge between IR and Foreign Policy Accounts for (explains) an event: why did the CMC happen the way it did? (very messy) Draws upon (and adds to) leading theories

Each Model has a theory and a “practice” (application) chapter

Gets at what actors thought they were doing and how they thought Practioners’ applications of “models” Realism & Bits of Models II & III

Kennedy and Neustadt (Presidential Politics)

Explores usefulness/limitations of these

approaches as tools in actually making FP decisions Tension between theory and tool is most clearly presented in the case of Model I (RAM/realism)

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Allison’s RAM (Model I) “The attempt to explain international events by recounting the aims and calculations of nations or governments is the trademark of the Rational Actor Model” p. 13. “Most contemporary thought about public policy, especially foreign policy, proceeds within this conceptual model.” P. 13 .... value-maximizing choices Approach that relies most heavily (and explicitly) on RAM has been realism But realism is more than just rational choice, and this becomes important

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Model I: Rational Actor Model (RAM) Paradigm (pp. 24-25) Basic Unit of Analysis: Government

Action as Choice Organizing Concepts:

Unified National Actor (Anthropomorphized)

The Problem: Chose action in response to strategic situation actor faces

Action as Rational Choice Objectives: national security and

interests Options: actions to advance objectives Consequences: costs/benefits relative

to objectives Choice: value maximizing

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RAM Dominant inference Pattern: If a nation performs an action, that action must have been selected as the value maximizing means for achieving the actor’s objectives. Must find out what purpose the action is designed to serve General Propositions: estimates of alternative and consequences guide actions Increase in costs decreases likelihood of

choice Decrease in costs increases likelihood

of that choice

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RAM Useful for decision-makers Especially useful

In a crisis situation in which fast action required

When information is incomplete When the stakes are high (survival, for example)

Schelling: “one major advantage of the RAM is that “you can sit in your armchair and try to predict how people will behave by asking how you would behave if you had your wits about you. You get, free of charge, a lot of vicarious, empirical behavior.”

But can be dangerous and misleading – If you mistake this exercise for reality If you seek no evidence If you uncritically infer intentions from

actions

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If the only evidence of what he wanted is what he did, the two statements are empirically equivalent, p. 49)

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RAM & Realism Clear theoretical linkages But Realism (in various versions) has assumptions about goals

In rational choice literature “much of the heavy lifting is being done by further, more specific, assumptions or evidence about the agent’s objectives, the agent’s conceptualization of the situation, and the agent’s assessment of benefits and costs”

General vs. Bounded Rationality (Simon) General: no assumptions about objectives Bounded: accepts values, beliefs and steoreotypes of actors, accurate or not. Simon: “There is nothing obvious about these bounds; there is no way to predict a priori, just where they lie.” (Allison, p. 20, quoting Simon, Human Nature in Politics p. 297).

Realism includes a theory about what (state’s, statemen’s) objectives are

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Goals: Classic Realism Morgenthau (Politics Among Nations)

Conservative roots: “human nature as it is . . . has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece.”

All politics is struggle for power (level of analysis unimportant, timeless, states are epiphenomenal). “The tendency to dominate, in particular is an element of all human associations. . .” (p. 37)

“International politics, like all politics is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim. Statesmen and peoples may ultimately seek freedom, security, prosperity, or power itself. They may define their goals in terms of a religious, philosophic, economic, or social ideal. They may hope that this ideal will materialize through its own inner force, through divine intervention, or through the natural development of human affairs. They may also try to further its realization through nonpolitical means, such as technical co-operation with other nations or international organizations. But whenever they strive to realize their goals by means of international politics, they do so by striving for power. (p. 29)

All politics, domestic or international, . . reveals three basic patterns; that is, all political phenomena can be reduced to one of three basic types. A political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power. All history shows that nations active in international politics are continuously preparing for, actively involved in, or recovering from organized violence in the form of war.” P. 42

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Waltz (TIP) & Neo-realism

Systemic theory of international politics – anarchic system with a certain distribution of power (structural realism) Theory of the firm - rationality Goal: state survival Two logics: rational choice and evolution (survival of the fittest) Dominant theme is “tragedy” not “evil”

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Power Morgenthau: Power: its content and the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment. Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man. (Morgenthau, p. 9) Three sources of power: expectation of benefits, fear of disadvantages, respect or love for men or institutions Power is more than just how large a military one has – although in many was this the heart of it Knutsen Punitive Remunerative Normative

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As a prescription, or a predictor, then, RAM & Realism are problematic

What is power? What is the national interest? (Geostrategic thought) What will maintain or enhance power in any given situation? What will a statesman actually do? (Will statesmen be able to perceive, understand what enhances power? Are they smart enough? Do they accept this view of the world?) Vietnam is a classic example: What was it the US wanted? How did this enhance US power? Realists frequently highly critical of this (Morgenthau; Kennan’s critique of containment) whereas other, realist-sounding arguments (such as arguments about prestige and credibility) were used to justify continued involvement.

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Why the Cuban Missile Crisis? October 14-28, 1962 1 November missile sites being dismantled (U-2)

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a central event in the Cold War

Almost certainly the closest the US & USSR came to nuclear war US went to DEFCON 2 (only time, ever) Resulted in desire for “detente” on both sides (TBT) Weakened USSR with respect to China Enhanced Kennedy’s prestige, weakened Khrushchev The key event of the Kennedy presidency: long regarded

as text-book example of how to make tough decisions (in opposition to the “Bay of Pigs”, a text-book example of a bad decision)

High-politics of the first order, with huge degree of direct

control by the President against similar situation in Soviet Union – as close to a “black-box” situation as is likely to occur.

US decision-making restricted to a relatively small group

of 34 or so people – helps us apply theories

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The Cold War, 1962 US v. USSR; NATO vs. Warsaw Pact, divided Europe (Berlin) US “pacto-mania”: NATO, CENTO, SEATO, ANZUS, Rio Treaty Soviets now reaching beyond immediately adjacent areas (Egypt, 1958) Flashpoints: Berlin was focus (Berlin Wall erected 1961, Vienna summit 1961)

– showdown expected after series of statements by Khrushchev The United States was clearly dominant in nuclear weapons (despite Sputnik

1957 (obs- date corrected) – but Soviets do much testing (despite understanding with Eisenhower) and also bluffing. US also testing large weapons in Pacific

US has clear “first strike” and “second strike” capability, tests missiles in Pacific in 1962

Obs: There were lotsa, lotsa nukes about, strategic and tactical Smallest nukes on US side were “Davy Crockett” Soviets also had such weapons --deployed nuclear coastal defenses, torpedoes in Cuba says Allison Eisenhower: more bang for the buck – i.e., decrease in “conventional forces”

and increased reliance on nuclear missiles Strategic triad: land-based, air-based (SAC), sea-based (submarines) US dominant in all three (despite “missile gap”) US USSR 180 ICBMs 20 ICBMs 12 Polaris subs (12 missiles ea.) 6 submarines with SLBMs

630 strategic bombers 200 strategic bombers Soviets had never stationed nuclear weapons beyond the Soviet Union before (compare: US, the Jupiter missiles in Turkey & Italy, bombers and tactical

nukes elsewhere) US increasingly involved in Vietnam Khrushchev in power in Soviet Union, 10 years after death of Stalin (but out in 1964) Sino-Soviet Split 1959+, public in 1960 Cuban Revolution 1959

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Cold War The first experience US has with this kind of power

Nuclear Age: not just great power but one of two SUPER POWERS

Nuclear weapons give new meaning – and urgency -- to the question of national survival. Deterrence, strategic theorists (Schelling & Kahn) were extremely influential

The opposition (USSR) was thought of as at least a dictatorship, at worst a totalitarian state – as unitary an actor as you could get, and as much of a black box as you can get (as opaque as they could be)

The US had arrived at new point in its history: never before had either the national government or POTUS been so powerful (unitary)

US had adopted NSC 68 & Containment doctrine, assuming Soviets sought world domination (goal)

Conclusion: situation particularly well-suited to adoption of RAM/Realism by US

(US transforms Classical Realism into Rational Choice, Game Theory, etc.)

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The Crisis:

1. Soviets begin installing missiles in Cuba in September 1962

2. US U-2 flight photographs Soviet

missiles (October 14)

3. President Kennedy publicly demands removal of the missiles, initiates “quarantine” on Soviet weapon shipments to Cuba (October 22)

4. Khrushchev orders Soviet strategic

forces to alert and threatens to sink US ships if they interfere with Soviet ships (October 23) – construction speeds up

5. Soviet ships stop short of the US

quarantine line (October 24)

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6. Private letter from Khrushchev suggests no need for Soviet deployment to Cuba if US pledges not to invade (October 26); Public letter demanding withdrawal of US missiles from Turkey in exchange for withdrawal of Cuban missiles (October 27)

7. US accepts first letter, RFK says

privately Jupiters will be withdrawn soon (but only if Khrushchev keeps this quiet)

8. Khrushchev publicly announces that

the USSR will withdraw its missiles in Cuba (October 28)

9. US U-2 overflight November 1

shows missile sites being dismantled

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The Deployment (Allison, p. 204-6). A “truly massive” buildup in Cuba Conventional and nuclear weapons Many more nuclear weapons in Cuba than the Kennedy administration was aware of MRBMs – nuclear warheads Goal: 36 MRBMS + 6 decoys (range; 1,100 nautical miles) IRBMs -- nuclear warheads (but not missiles) Goal: 24 IRBMs (2,200 nautical miles) Bombers – 6 nuclear bombs for IL-28 aircraft Goal: 42 IL-28, range 600 miles Sopka Coastal defense cruise missiles (40 nm range) 16 34-foot launchers/80 missiles Short range tactical nuclear rockets (Luna, or FROGs)– 12 warheads Torpedoes (submarines)

Strategic submarine base and base for squadron of warships

Conventional 24-SA-2 sites, total of 144 launchers 30 miles, altitude of 80,000 feet Extensive radar system to support the SAMs KOMAR Guided Missile Patrol Boats MiG-21 Aircraft Soviet Troops (trip-wire effect) 40,000+ present, thousands more to arrive equipped with tanks and assault guns

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The evidence Memoirs of key participants (JFK, RFK, Khrushchev) Series of oral history conferences (US, Soviet & Cuban participants) Declassified documents (US) (culminating in 1997-98) Previously classified documents (US) Foreign Relations of the United States National Archives Presidential libraries Interviews with lower level officials involved (US and Soviet) Second order interviews Soviet archives (Fursenko and Naftali: One Hell of a Gamble) Secret tapes of the Kennedy administration

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The Questions to be Answered

1. Why did the Soviet Union place missiles in Cuba?

2. Why did the US respond with a blockade?

3. Why did the Soviets withdraw the missiles?

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Model I

Action understood as (strategic) intention

Model II Actions as organizational output (intention + implementation) Unitary actor and rationality thrown in doubt

Model III Actions as negotiated output (mixed motives and intentions) doubt

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RAM:

1. Why did the Soviet Union place missiles in Cuba? (What did they intend to do with them? What sort of threat did this constitute?)

a. To defend Cuba from US attack b. Cold War Politics (general

challenge to US credibility in a zero-sum world)

c. To change the strategic balance of power

d. To bargain about Berlin i. A-Z find this the most

convincing explanation ii. No explanation accounts for all

the details Lack of camouflage, sequence of construction, persistence in face of warnings

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Model II: Organizational Behavior Logic of appropriateness rather than logic of calculation Basic Unit of Analysis: Governmental Action as Organizational Output. Decisions of leaders trigger organizational routines but most

of the behavior is determined by previously established procedures

Existing capacities constitute the range of effective choices Organizational outputs structure the (narrow) situation within

which leaders must make choices Innovation beyond established regimes is problematic Organizing concepts Actors are organizations – constellations of loosely allied

organizations on top of which government leaders sit Factored problems and fractionated power Organizational missions (interpret tasks in these terms) Operational Objectives, Special Capacities, and Culture Action as organizational output – programmed character Compliance/targets, sequential objectives, SOPs,

programs and repertoires, uncertainty avoidance, Decentralization vs. Control Shift in government behavior requires shifts in use of this

machinery – or the creation of new

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Dominant Inference Pattern: The best predictor of behavior at time T is

T-1; best prediction of future action is T+1 General Propositions (some): Existing organized capabilities influence

government choice Organizational Priorities Shape

Organizational Implementation Implementation reflects previously

established routines Leaders neglect calculations of

Administrative Feasibility at their peril

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Model II: CMC

Opens with operational background US procedures: EDP & QRA which potentially gave NATO (US) commanders authority to strike with nuclear weapons under certain circumstances

Casts doubt on using the characteristics of the

deployment as the principal guide to Soviet intentions:

Suggests this was an incremental decision, not a single strategic decision

Originally decided to send arms in fall of 1959, Castro requests weapons, Soviets (Khrushchev) decides on nuclear weapons (does this on-going process suggest something to Khrushchev?)

Specifics of deployment are odd “soft” sites, reload missiles

Tactical nuclear missiles a secret – so couldn’t be a deterrent

Explains bits the RAM never could (well). For

Example: The lack of camouflage, obvious building techniques, sequence of installation, not shooting down American U-2

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Model III: Governmental Politics More “refined” level than Model II Basic Unit of Analysis: Governmental Action as Political Resultant Not chosen as the best solution to the problem but as product of

compromise, conflict and confusion of official with diverse interests and unequal influence

Organizing Concepts (selected) Governmental actor as a number of individual players

(individuals in jobs) “Positions” important – define what plays may and must do

These color parochial priorities and perceptions, goals and interests, stakes and stands, deadlines and faces of issues, player’s power, relevance to action channels, rules of the game

Dominant inference pattern: If a nation performed an action, that action was the resultant of

bargaining among individuals and groups within the government General propositions: Many factors influence the “game”, and they vary by and along

action channels Governmental action does not presuppose government intentions Emerge from games among individuals Rarely flow from a agreed doctrine Not a coordinated government strategy and are thus hard to

read as signals Problems and solutions Not a single problem but sets of smaller problems Chief search for solutions, Indians search for problems Where you stand depends on where you sit Chiefs and Indians have different perspectives, demands

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Model III: CMC

Even with the new evidence about the soviet side of this equation, the Soviet decision process in deploying missiles to Cuba or withdrawing them remains more opaque

Offers no explanation Does do a great job of illustrating the US side Focus on the Ex Com The politics involved in discovering the

missiles – Recognizing need for U-2 flights, controlling flights, operational detail of flights, interpretation of information from flights How status of individuals making argument influenced perception of them

Example: McCone and “Mongoose”

The US decision on the blockade

Soviet Withdrawal

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The models, reprise: Allison is dealing with a crisis, perhaps THE crisis During the CMC, president controlled policy to a degree that seldom

occurs – assumptions of Model I apply more in such as case than in most others

Even at this time, significant misunderstandings occurred. Events occurred beyond Kennedy’s control or knowledge Models II and III, however, as difficult to use as a guide to foreign policy

They suggest what may be happening

But they require enormous amounts of intelligence (information) – even with all the evidence available today we still don’t have the Soviet side

For decision-makers, they can serve to warn D-Ms of dangers of being too certain about their RAM conclusions Kissinger: crises must be handled quickly – even when critical information may be lacking.

What is the function of these models? Help understand “what happened”, tell the story(ies) Suggest caution of D-Ms in interpreting “signals”

Are Models II & III really equally positioned with Model I, or are they only refinements or extensions?

RAM seems to be best at dealing with the big questions

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But much of what foreign policy is, is not crises among extremely opaque actors

Theory building IR theory has been very much a US (and British) activity Most of theory I have read uses US, Cold War events, as application or case study Allison’s abstract models are drawn from and applied to the US government, despite disclaimers -- highlighting the need for information in using these models as well