READINGSCARTER CH 14 , BEASLEY CH 2 -4 , KAGAN,

MORAVCSIK, BRZEZINSKI

US FOREIGN POLICY AND EUROPE

Guiding Questions

What unified the transatlantic relationship during the Cold War era?

What conceptions of power shape British foreign policy? French foreign policy? German foreign policy?

What is the state of the transatlantic relationship in the post Cold War era?

Can the relationship be saved?

Cold War US/Europe Relations

Acceptance of CW boundaries in Europe resulted in the creation of two alliances: NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Western Europe was crucial for

US foreign policy goals. In theory, relations should have

been relatively easy to maintain. The US and Europe shared similar

identities. European governments wanted the

protection of the US nuclear umbrella.

Most governments agreed that economic cooperation was necessary to rebuild economies.

In practice, the relationship was not always so simple. Rebuilding Germany, Suez Crisis,

Nuclearization of NATO, Ostpolitik, French Third Way

Both sides questioned the resolve of the other

Mutual Tensions

US provision of public goods promoted shirking. Once nuclear umbrella

provided Europe unlikely to pay

Anti-Washington position-taking by European governments.

Dependence on the US would make Europe a “junior” partner. France ‘s “Third Way”

Fear over US commitment to fight a continental war over Europe. US “Forward Defense”

strategy scared Europe. Fostered “glass plate/trip

wire” strategy to keep US in Europe.

US CONCERNS EUROPEAN CONCERNS

The End of the Cold War

November, 1989 The Berlin Wall came down. Germany eventually unified

Neorealists expected Europe to “return to history” War would break out in the

absence of a common threat Instead, Europe has remained

mostly peaceful. Integration seen as a way to

“mitigate” the effects of anarchy

Raises questions about whether or not the transatlantic relationship is obsolete

Whither the Transatlantic Relationship?

What is the role of NATO? Euro-American antiterrorism alliance? Should it be disbanded?

What is the future of European-American relations? Disagreements over the 2003 Iraq War. Increasing economic competition

What is the future of the European Union? Increased political integration. How far east will it expand? Ukraine? Russia? Will it challenge the US as an “alternative soft power” superpower?

What is the status of ESDF? Praline Summit sought to balance NATO. Current British, French and German governments seek ESDF that

compliments NATO

Europe as an Idea

Habermas and Derrida 2003 Protests surrounding second Iraq War prompted authors to determine what

constitutes a “core Europe” mentality UK and eastern Europe often not included in any discussion of “core

Europe” European “political mentality” includes:

1) Privatization of faith 2) Acceptance of state/distrust of markets

State should step in to correct market failures 3) Limitations on the value of technological progress

Progress vs. traditional forms of life 4) Struggle for “social justice”

Support for the welfare state 5) “Sensitivity to injuries to personal and bodily integrity”

Be it on the battlefield or by the state (i.e. ban on death penalty) 6) Support for multilateralism (via the EU, UN, etc.)

STRUCTURAL FACTORS POLITICAL FACTORS

Power: UK as a middle power Suez Incident made this apparent.

Institutions: Globalization has constrained

state autonomy. EU membership makes European

institutions key players in the British policy process.

Ideas: Concept of insularity

Very Eurosceptic Atlanticism (Special Relationship) “Bridge building” approach to

project a larger role in the system.

The PM/Government key actor in shaping foreign policy. Blair’s decision to call for a

vote in Parliament over Iraq was precedent setting; increased role of Parliament.

Opposition historically sides with the Government on issues of national security. EU splits this bipartisan

consensus. Public opinion:

Broad support for Atlanticism Iraq has strained this to some

extent.

British Foreign Policy

The “Special Relationship”

First classified as “special” by Churchill in 1946. Common language, heritage,

etc often cited as a basis for this relation.

Response post Suez Crisis: repair relations with the US. Wanted to act like the “older

brother” who could advise the US. Ended up in the position of “junior

partner” With the exception of the

Heath government, maintaining this relationship has been the top priority of British foreign policy. Although the current coalition has

suggested that the relationship should be re-calibrated.

Anglo Saxon Consensus?

Politically, the US and the UK are not all that similar Blair paid a high political

price for maintaining the relationship.

Came at a cost: greater distance between the UK/EU.

Brown sought to maintain the relationship. Particularly with Obama

Re-evaluation occurring under Cameron. Cameron believes the

relationship is special but should be re-evaluated.

Clegg believes the UK should focus more on the EU.

Anglo Saxon Consensus?

STRUCTURAL FACTORS POLITICAL FACTORS

Power Middle power. Suez incident made this

apparent.Interdependence

Boost EU presence to project influence

Ideas Maintain or boost French

status. Nuclear force.

(Pre-Sarkozy) Multipolar world with a European pillar.

President is critical in the field of foreign policy.

Political elite consensus on foreign policy goals.

Focus strongly on maintaining strong ties with Germany to boost EU influence.

French Foreign Policy

EUROPEAN SECURITY HUMAN RIGHTS

Diplomacy key tool in France’s arsenal Budget would not support military

reorganization. French national security is tied to its

relationship with Germany, the EU, and NATO. Franco-German relationship key

Chirac began the debate on a French “re-think” over NATO Pushed the possibility of allowing

European control of some forces under circumstances where the US does not want to intervene.

Expanding ESDI takes place within this discussion over NATO.

Chirac publicly accepted responsibility for the Vichy collaboration with Nazi Germany. Publicly chastised the

entrance into government of the Freedom Party in Austria.

Began distancing France from its colonial ties France was often seen as

propping up unsavory dictators in Africa.

Often seen as possessing a special role in African and Middle Eastern diplomacy.

French Foreign Policy Emphases

Evaluating French Foreign Policy

EU remains fundamental; Franco German relations key despite personality conflicts with Merkel Hollande: Talk of “re-evaluating” EU monetary and budgetary policies does not

go down well in Berlin Uses connections within the Middle East and Africa to boost

French influence in multilateral negotiations Chirac: Theoretical rationale for avoiding Iraq conflict well founded Sarkozy: Criticism between the US and France should be done in the

appropriate manner Sarkozy: France first state to recognize Libyan rebel forces

Increased Atlanticism under Sarkozy Brought France back into NATO Sent French troops to Afghanistan EU should not “balance” the US

Hollande has suggested that he will not alter this relationship

Improving France/US relations a means to the same ends Projecting French influence

STRUCTURAL FACTORS POLITICAL FACTORS

Power Germany is too big to ignore. Unification was Cold War goal.

Interdependence Strong commitment to alliances. Motor of the EU; Accepted

integration and EMU for unification.

Ideas Committed to preservation of

human rights. Committed to democracy. Collective/cooperative action. Germany as a civilian power.

Chancellor and the cabinet shape foreign policy.

Party leaders from both the government and opposition parties play large roles in shaping public policy. Big decisions usually made by

unanimity. Basic Law prohibits the

mobilization of the German army outside of regional, collective security purposes. Federal Constitutional Court has

been critical regarding military intervention.

Public opinion: pacifism, humanitarianism, opposition to nuclear weapons exert a large influence over policy.

German Foreign Policy

PERSIAN GULF SOMALIA

Hyde-Price 2003 US asks Germany to provide troops

for Operation Desert Shield. Articles 24 and 87 of the Basic Law

appeared to preclude a German role within the conflict. Forbids military involvement

outside of region Changing the Constitution was a

no go as the opposition controlled the Bundesrat.

SOLUTION: Government agreed to provide

monetary support to states most effected by the war.

Refused to send troops or direct military aid.

Hyde-Price 2003 UN voted for a relief mission to

Somalia to provide humanitarian aid. UN asked for assistance in the

form of financial aid and troops Kohl: wanted to send 1,600 troops

but was unsure a consensus could be reached.

Opposition refused to sign on without a change to the Basic Law.

SOLUTION: Start talks to change the Basic

Law (abandoned) Commit troops under the UN as

part of a multinational force Buy time to allow for support

while dealing with constitutional issues

Evolution of Postwar German Foreign Policy

Interpreting the Basic Law

Hancock and Krisch 2009; Hyde-Price 2003 Case initiated by the SPD/Greens who argued that

intervention outside of the region and that peace enforcement extends beyond the Basic Law CDU/CSU/FDP: Collective security missions are allowed

under the Basic Law regardless of location. 1994: Constitutional Court rules:

1) German military involvement in peace enforcement and peace keeping missions is acceptable No distinction between the two

2) German military participation within a collective security arrangement outside of the region is acceptable Necessary to maintain alliance cohesion

3) Governments require majority support in the Bundestag for intervention Informal agreements codified by parliament in 2004

KOSOVO AFGHANISTAN

1998: SPD/Greens enter government. Majority in the Bundestag to

allow German forces to deploy against Serbia

Air attacks were the first military offensive since WW2.

Call for ground troops threatened the government’s support. Support tenuous within the

Green party. SOLUTION: Continue the air war

(support NATO) and seek a diplomatic solution (bring Russia to the table). Bundestag sent troops on a

peacekeeping mission after the war.

Expressed solidarity with the US following 9/11

Schröder proposal to provide German military support for NATO efforts created a backlash Red/Green backbenchers balk

Previous support for involvement depended upon CDU votes

SOLUTION: Authorization a vote of confidence Willing to use political means to

force desired outcome Exposes German soldiers to risks Reduced role over time; irritates

others NATO members

Evolution of German Foreign Policy

Schröder Merkel

Willingness to use German foreign policy, to achieve civilian AND national ends. Involvement in multilateral endeavors

promotes collective security (civilian) while also advancing national goals (permanent UN seat)

German-US relations Close ties before Iraq war ended

after 2002 elections German-French relations

Critical; Push for ESDP that could balance NATO

German-Russian relations Bridge between EU and Russia Dependence on oil creates

vulnerability

Also willing to use German foreign policy (including military) to achieve civilian AND national ends. Support for Afghanistan mission

(civilian) advances national goals (permanent UN seat)

German-US relations Sought to repair relations with the US ESDP should compliment NATO

German-French relations Personality conflicts exist Willing to work with other nations

where necessary German Russian relations

Takes a much tougher line on Russia (pushes democracy and human rights)

Evaluating German Foreign Policy

Can This Relationship Be Saved?

Moravcsik 2003Pundits say Iraq killed NATO; both sides

realized something…. Terror is a threat for the US, not for the EU. Unilateral intervention proves US can act without the

EU But, winning the peace is rougher than winning the

war. Is this a question of diverging ideologies or temporary

differences in domestic political situations?

Mars vs. Venus?

Kagan 2003 US and EU view threats in

fundamentally different ways US is Mars and the EU is Venus

US embracing the use of power in an increasingly anarchic world (Hobbesian). Technological gap in capabilities

boost willingness to fight. Prefer to act with others but are

not compelled to do so. Sees the world in black and

white. Strength and perspective make it

the primary target. Seeks to share defense burden with

the EU. US is BOTH a military and

economic power; EU is not

Mars vs. Venus?

Kagan 2003 EU is moving “away from power”

towards international law (Kantian). Support UN Security Council

legitimation of conflict. Push for universal applicability of

ICC. See the world in shades of gray.

Nuanced view privileges diplomacy rather than force.

Do not believe that 9/11 really targets them directly.

Strategic dependence on the US for military resources; unwilling to spend on defense. Economic but not a military

power. Domestic politics prevents

increases in defense spending.

Should It Be Saved?

Kagan 2003 Yes; But be realistic; the nature of the relationship has changed. Fundamental worldviews of both sides are unlikely to change. BUT, these differences are not as unmanageable as they appeared after the

Iraq war. Moravcsik 2003

Yes; Transatlantic cooperation remains the most important diplomatic relationship in the world.

Three possible paths: “agree to disagree”, part ways, or good cop/bad cop. The latter has the greatest potential for returns; ending the alliance would

require Europe to build its own military. Brzezinski 2012

Yes; A renewed west is key for enhancing the principles of the West US must promote unity within the West and be able to balance and

conciliate the East US/EU connections could pull Russia and Turkey into the orbit of the West Critical for US/Asian relations

Conclusions: Repairing the Rift

Kagan 2003US/EU cannot allow the relationship to deteriorate.

US can provide military might while the EU can provide legitimacy.

EU must realize: US will sometimes have to act unilaterally.

US hegemony is good for the EU. Should build up at least a token force; would help EU shoulder

some of the defense burden.US must realize:

A strong Europe is a good thing. Pay respect to multilateral institutions Needlessly provoking the EU is counterproductive

Build political capital for use when you have to act unilaterally.

Conclusions: Repairing the Rift

Moravcsik 2003 Preventive interventions

US should avoid when possible; commit to quiet consultation without public attacks

UN Security Council EU cannot use UN to restrain the US (UN wasn’t intended

to do this). US cannot keep thinking that WW2 gives them a blank

check Push for EU Defense Force?

Unlikely; Would just duplicate the US capabilities Develop comparative advantage

US brings military strength and the EU brings civilian strength (access to economic markets)

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