Reactive Power Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Open Meeting December 15, 2004.
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Transcript of Reactive Power Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Open Meeting December 15, 2004.
Reactive Power
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Open Meeting
December 15, 2004
Reactive Power Policy
• Review of Current Policy– Blackout– New Generation Filings
• Staff White Paper in Progress
• March 3, 2005 Technical Conference (tentative date)
Reactive Power Sources & Users
Photos courtesy of Areva Transmission & Distribution, Hitachi, and NREL
Sources: Generators, Transmission Equipment (Capacitors, Static Var Compensators)
Users: Transmission Lines, Transformers, Loads (motors)
AEP Methodology
1) Generator and its exciter;2) Accessory electric equipment that supports
the operation of the generator exciter; and3) Remaining total production investment
required to provide real power and operate the exciter
* Apply allocation factor to sort annual revenue requirements of these components between real and reactive power
AEP’s Financial Impact
• Estimate of all Form 1 reactive power charges is $3.5 to $4.0 billion
Goal of Reactive Power Policy
• Promote Reliable and Efficient Infrastructure Investment, Production, and Customer Use
Market Issues
• Comparable Treatment of Generation Resources
• Interconnection Standards
• Reactive Power Planning and Procurement
• Supply Incentives
• Demand Side Incentives
• Public Good
Reactive Power Capacity Options
• Cost of Service
• Forward Market Procurement
• Pay Nothing
Reactive Power Real-Time Options
• No Payment within Bandwidth, Opportunity Costs Outside
• Strict Opportunity Cost
• Market Clearing Prices
• Fixed Payment
Major Conclusions• Align incentives with desired outcomes
– Pay for reactive power
• Apply comparability to reactive power
• Treat capability and production differently– Pay more for dynamic than static capability– Review AEP method– Pay all sources same price for production
• Mitigate existing market power– Entry may reduce future market power