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Re-Thinking the Emergence of theStruggle for South African Liberation inthe United States: Max Yergan and theCouncil on African Affairs, 1922–1946Charles Denton Johnson aa Department of History , Howard UniversityPublished online: 21 Mar 2013.

To cite this article: Charles Denton Johnson (2013) Re-Thinking the Emergence of the Strugglefor South African Liberation in the United States: Max Yergan and the Council on African Affairs,1922–1946, Journal of Southern African Studies, 39:1, 171-192, DOI: 10.1080/03057070.2013.768448

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Re-Thinking the Emergence of the Struggle for

South African Liberation in the United States:

Max Yergan and the Council on African Affairs,

1922–1946

Charles Denton Johnson(Department of History, Howard University)

This article is about how African American missionary Max Yergan and other African

American anti-colonial activists working through the Council on African Affairs (CAA)

contributed to the emergence of the struggle for South African liberation in theUnited States. It

subsumes Yergan’s arrival in South Africa in 1922 through the establishment of the Council

and its initial campaigns on behalf of black South Africans. My intent is to show that the

struggle for South African liberation in theUnited States developed from transnational contact

between African Americans and black South Africans, and that the struggle began not in the

United States as is most often assumed but in South Africa under the leadership of Yergan, that

the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 pushed Yergan and other anti-colonial radicals more

assuredly into the fight for South Africa’s liberation, and that the Council on African Affairs

was critical to the emergence of the struggle in theUnited States during this early period. It will

have further served its purpose if it overturns the lingering idea that African Americans were

slow to get serious about the anti-apartheid movement. To the contrary, African Americans

were organised and openly protesting for the rights of black South Africans more than three

decades before they had won their own civil rights and at least a decade before apartheid had

been established in South Africa. Liberal whites played an important role too, especially in

providing financial support for the struggle but also through their active participation. My

concern is not towrite them out of the history of the struggle for South Africa’s liberation, but to

more effectively write African Americans into it.

Review of the Literature

The body of material on the anti-apartheid movement in the United States continues to grow,

but the majority of it is concerned with the period after 1948. Francis Njubi Nesbitt’s is a good

effort at presenting the contributions of African Americans to the overall campaign to get

sanctions levelled against the racialist government in South Africa. Nesbitt and I both place

the contributions of African Americans in the foreground. A major distinction between our

approaches is the importance that I place on transnational contact between African

Americans and South Africans, which expresses why African Americans entered the struggle

for South African liberation. Nesbitt also relies largely on a different body of evidence than I

do. Arguably the strongest analysis of this topic is Shelly Leanne’s unpublished dissertation,

which is essentially a study of international relations that seeks to understand why ‘an ethnic

q 2013 The Editorial Board of the Journal of Southern African Studies

Journal of Southern African Studies, 2013

Vol. 39, No. 1, 171–192, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2013.768448

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diaspora might emerge within a state with a distinct foreign agenda’. She examines the work

of the CAA and NAACP from 1937–1955, but she diminishes the significance of their

contribution because neither group was successful at overturning apartheid during this

juncture. I contend that although they may have met with limited success in changing the

position of the South African government toward the non-white racial groups there, they were

successful in stimulating interest in the United States about the situation in South Africa and

launching the anti-apartheid movement.1

There are older works that address the anti-apartheid movement. In 1977, George

Shepard produced a broad overview of the work of the CAA as it relates to the South

African liberation struggle. Five years later, Peter Duignan wrote a paper for the Hoover

Institute published by the University of Natal that gave a negative assessment of the

African-American contribution to the struggle for South African liberation within the United

States. Relying on an analysis that emphasised lobbying capacity and influence on the

United States government, he determined that African Americans did not marshal their

political potency based upon their numerical representation. He blamed African-American

leaders for being disorganised and not appealing to the symbols of American nationhood.

Duignan’s critique, though basically correct – African Americans did not have the most

effective lobbying apparatus – misses the mark entirely and his thesis was an impetus for

this article. Lobbying requires ready access to large sums of capital, and it is widely

accepted that African Americans have disproportionately less capital compared to other

ethnic groups, such as Jews. The major point, however, is that African Americans were in

the vanguard of what became the anti-apartheid movement, they were loyal to the cause of

African liberation, and they did so frequently in opposition to other groups that only joined

much later.2

Janice Love attempts to understand how people used domestic institutions to oppose

apartheid. Published in 1985, her work emphasises the movement to get the United States

government to bring sanctions against the South African government and then assesses the

potential impact of doing so. A less well known but important book on the work of the CAA is

Dorothy Hunton’s self-published biography of her husband William Alphaeus Hunton. She

dedicates two chapters to the work of the CAA. It is especially rich after 1943 when Hunton

takes over as the Educational Director of the Council.3

A handful of works approach the South African liberation struggle from a transnational

perspective. Penny Von Eschen’s Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anti-

Colonialism, 1937–1957 explores the anti-colonial movement in the United States including

the work of the CAA in relation to South Africa. Bernard Magubane’s investigation stands

out as a critical examination of the linkages between African Americans and South Africans.

He dedicates a chapter to the African-American identification with South Africans. He points

out African-American groups and individuals who contributed to the South African

liberation struggle, such as the CAA. Other scholars who have looked at African American

and South African relations through a variety of lenses include James Campbell, Robert

1 F.N. Nesbitt, Race for Sanctions: African Americans Against Apartheid, 1946–1994 (Bloomington, IndianaUniversity Press, 2004); S. Leanne, ‘Africa American Initiatives Against Minority Rule in South Africa’ (PhDthesis, Cambridge University, 1994).

2 G. Shepard, Anti-Apartheid: Transnational Conflict and Western Policy in the Liberation of South Africa(Westport, Greenwood Press, 1977); Another source that addresses the work of the Council is H. Lynch, BlackAmerican Radicals and the Liberation of Africa: The Council on African Affairs, 1937–1955 (Ithaca, AfricanaStudies and Research Centre, Cornell University, 1978); P.D. Duignan, The Anti-Apartheid Movement and SouthAfrica (Durban, University of Natal, 1982).

3 J. Love, The United States Anti-apartheid Movement: Local Activism in Global Politics (New York, Praeger,1985); D. Hunton, Alphaeus Hunton: The Unsung Valiant (New York, Dorothy K. Hunton, 1986).

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Edgar, Milfred C. Fierce, George Frederickson, Manning Marable, Edwin S. Redkey, and

Robert Trent Vinson.4

Yergan’s importance as an African American leader and transnational figure remains

essentially beyond the horizon of public understanding in spite of the good work of David

Henry Anthony III. His biography of Yergan gives a comprehensive examination of Yergan’s

life. The wife of A.C. Jordan, Phyllis Ntantala, remembered Yergan from her days at the

University of Fort Hare in the early 1930s. Ntantala was highly critical of Yergan for his

‘anglophilism’ in her autobiography,ALife’sMosaic: TheAutobiography of Phyllis Ntantala.5

Emergence of the Politics of Transnational Resistance

The Second World War was a watershed in the politics of transnational resistance. Several

processes converged to shape global politics. Democratic justifications for the war overturned

authoritarian rule. Western Europe was in ruins, particularly the United Kingdom and France,

the leading imperial powers at the time.Weakened at the centre, their colonies on the periphery

were vulnerable. African soldiers who had participated in the Second World War returned

home with new ideas about the meaning and cost of freedom. Within the colonies themselves

from Accra to Cape Town, the ideological underpinnings of the war were not lost on African

elites, especially, those who had gone abroad to study in institutions in Europe or in the United

States. These contacts amongblacks in the diaspora redoubled their collective understanding of

the racial basis of Western oppression and their desire for black liberation.

As the nuclear mushroom cloud rose over what had been Hiroshima in August 1945

effectively announcing the end of the Second World War, it also proclaimed the start of a

nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States, which emerged from the

war as the leading world powers. Even before the war was ended, a new Cold War began that

quickly divided the international political landscape between East and West along distinct

mutually exclusive ideological lines: capitalist in the West and Marxist in the East.6 Thus the

context of the larger political processes of that era framed and, to a large extent, bound the

African liberation movements. From the perspective of the Africans what was occurring

between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War background informed and

limited what was occurring in the African foreground and of course the opposite was also

true.

4 P. von Eschen, Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anti-Colonialism, 1937–1957 (Ithaca, CornellUniversity Press, 1997); B.M. Magubane, The Ties that Bind: African-American Consciousness of Africa(Trenton, Africa World Press, 1987). J. Campbell, Songs of Zion: The African Methodist Episcopal Church in theUnited States and South Africa (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1998); R.R. Edgar (ed.), AnAfrican American in South Africa: The Travel Notes of Ralph J. Bunche 28 September 1937–1938 (Athens, OhioUniversity Press, 1992); M. Fierce, ‘Selected Black American Leaders and Organizations and South Africa:Some Notes’, Journal of Black Studies, 17, 3 (March 1987), pp. 305–26. G. Frederickson, Black Liberation:A Comparative History of Black Ideologies in the United States and South Africa (Oxford, Oxford UniversityPress, 1995); M. Marable, ‘Booker T. Washington and African Nationalism’, Phylon, 35, 4 (4th Quarter, 1974),pp. 398–406; E. Redkey, ‘Bishop Turner’s African Dream’, The Journal of American History, 54, 2 (September1967), pp. 271–90; R. T. Vinson, The Americans are Coming!: Dreams of African American Liberationin Segregationist South Africa (Athens, Ohio University Press, 2012).

5 D.H. Anthony, III, Max Yergan: Race Man, Internationalist, Cold Warrior (New York, New York UniversityPress, 2006) and P. Ntantala, A Life’s Mosaic: The Autobiography of Phyllis Ntantala (Berkeley, University ofCalifornia Press, 1992).

6 In the final years of the 1920s, economic collapse and intrigue within the strongest militant black protestorganisation at that time, the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), undermined the blackNationalist agenda in the United States. It was in this climate that black organisations with a labour orientation,such as the National Negro Congress (NNC), flourished. Privation encouraged collective efforts that did notrequire large sums of money and cultivated liberal, progressive, and even Marxist sentiment.

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At home, Africans watched in 1948 as India began its slow emergence from colonialism

after centuries of British intrigue and domination. Black South Africans hoped that the end of

the war would mean new freedoms for them also. Students at Fort Hare, for example, debated

the meaning and applicable significance of the Atlantic Charter to their own circumstances.

Could the triumph of democracy over fascism foretell similar political changes in South

Africa? An imperious response came in 1948, when the National Party stormed into power

under a banner of unabashed white supremacy and with promises to implement its

programme of racial segregation infamously known as apartheid.

In the United States, news of world events internationalised the struggle for human rights.

Joseph E. Harris and Brenda Plummer have shown that African-American interest in Africa

reached a high watermark following the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. Prior to that

time, there had always been a small number of African Americans interested in Africa, but

like most Americans, African Americans were more concerned about their own day-to-day

existence. Interest in international affairs was left to missionaries, a handful of radicals, and

the leisure class, who could expend time ruminating over places the average American could

never afford to visit. Brenda Plummer found that Italy’s invasion caused, ‘the first great

manifestation of Afro-American interest in foreign affairs’.7

The decades from 1935 to 1955 were a period of heightened interest in Africa that helped

to internationalise politics of transnational resistance. Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935

held deep symbolic significance for people of African descent both on the continent and

throughout the diaspora. Ethiopia had successfully fought off the colonial ambitions of the

Italians at the battle of Adowa in 1896. This victory was a mighty blow to Italy’s international

prestige, but it was a symbolic source of pride for colonised people the world over, especially

for people of African descent. When Mussolini’s army invaded Ethiopia in 1935, it was

widely viewed as a desperate attempt to restore the international prestige it had lost during the

1896 reversal. Vindication may have informed the decision of the Italians, but for African

Americans, who held Ethiopia as a symbol of the triumph of democracy over the tyranny of

colonialism, it was a shocking outrage and affront. Shockwaves from the invasion galvanised

interest in African affairs among American blacks like no single incident had before.

Many African Americans began to see themselves as part of a much larger historical

process, one that included struggling against colonialism in Africa and Asia. In the 1930s and

1940s, black activists ‘articulated a common experience of racial oppression rooted in the

expansion of Europe and the consequent dispersal of black labourers throughout Europe and

the New World’. Penny Von Eschen’s recognition that the common experience of racial

oppression under the yoke of colonialism was a unifying phenomenon for continental and

diaspora Africans establishes, at least in part, how resistance to it also became transnational.

Of course, what was missing were the links or contacts between these black labourers

necessary to elevate their consciousness of their shared status as subjects.8 Enter Max Yergan.

Max Yergan in South Africa, 1922–1936

Max Yergan, Foreign Secretary of the Coloured Work Department of the YMCA, arrived in

Cape Town with his wife, Susie Wiseman Yergan, and two small children in January 1922

7 B. Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and United States Foreign Affairs, 1935–1960 (Chapel Hill, TheUniversity of North Carolina Press, 1996), pp. 35–37. Also see, J.E. Harris, African American Reactions to theWar in Ethiopia, 1935–36 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1996).

8 The quote can be found in P. von Eschen, Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957 (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 2.

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and lived in South Africa for the next 14 years. As Foreign Secretary, from his home base at

the Native College at Fort Hare in the Eastern Cape province, Yergan travelled throughout

South Africa preaching and spreading the good news. He attempted to ameliorate racial

tensions by sponsoring conferences on race, by speaking on the subject, and through his

teaching. His roles were therefore ensconced in the philosophy of redemption and social

upliftment through Christian charity, piety and ethics. To a large extent they were

overlapping and mutually beneficial. Segregation and racial discrimination in South Africa

were so intense that they caused him to undergo an ideological apostasy. In the 1920s, as

economic and labour conditions for Africans deteriorated to unspeakably poor levels, Yergan

watched helplessly as J.B.M. Hertzog pushed through his programme of Afrikaner

nationalism and in effect disenfranchised Africans.9 With seemingly little hope of realising

his redemptive dream, by the 1930s, Yergan moved toward more radical thinking. His

diplomatic manner of dealing with people had earned him the respect of many white South

Africans who even recognised him as a spokesperson for blacks on matters of race. He had

also met and befriended many prominent Africans, successfully concealing the full extent of

his mounting frustration with the depressed conditions of the black people in South Africa, so

much so that many of his closely friends did not realise he was in fact living a double life:

Christian missionary by day, Marxist revolutionary by night.10

In 1931, on a return trip to South Africa from the United States, Yergan spent a month in

London. While there he was introduced to the great African American Paul Robeson. If ever

there were someone deserving of the title Renaissance man, it was Robeson. A Phi Beta

Kappa key holder from Rutgers, he was a two-time first team All-American in football, a

winner of 15 varsity letters in four sports, and valedictorian of his graduating class in 1919.

His senior thesis was an examination of the importance of the 14th amendment, one of the

pillars of future civil rights legislation in the United States. He spoke numerous languages

fluently, perhaps as many as twenty. He initially began a legal career, having completed law

school, but racist co-workers limited his effectiveness. Robeson turned to professional acting

and singing, where his talent was unsurpassed. He became arguably one of the most popular

entertainers of the early twentieth century and was loved the world over. Politically, Robeson

was sympathetic to the Soviet Union, believing that through the brotherhood of communism

they had solved both racism and the problem of economic disparities that plagued capitalist

economies. Robeson and Yergan talked world politics, and Robeson arranged for Yergan to

meet several people who had travelled to the Soviet Union. They discussed the Russian

Revolution with Yergan and the need for a similar social revolution in the United States.11

9 Hertzog’s nationalism was based on a combination of anti-(British)imperialism/anti-(British)capitalism andparanoia about the ‘vulnerability’ of poor whites to African competition. See, S. Dubow, ‘Afrikaner Nationalism,Apartheid and the Conceptualization of ‘Race”, Journal of African History, 33 (1992).

10 Govan Mbeki was a student of Yergan’s at the Native College at Fort Hare, now the University of Fort Hare.Mbeki recounted Yergan’s political transformation. Govan Mbeki, interview by the author 1 July 2000 at thehome of the subject, Port Elizabeth, South Africa, tape recording in the possession of the author. Yergan slowlygrew frustrated with his inability to bring about meaningful changes in the conditions of the Africans. Hisfrustrations are apparent in correspondence with Alfred Xuma. See, for example, Xuma to Yergan, 12 June 1935,transcript in Xuma, A.B., Box 206–4, Max Yergan Papers, Moorland Spingarn Research Center, HowardUniversity, Washington, DC. Yergan was on intimate terms with many of the most influential black people of hisday in both South Africa and the United States. For example, he knew D.D.T. Jabavu, Alfred Xuma, W.E.B. DuBois, A. Philip Randolph, Mary McLeod Bethune, Alphaeus Hunton and Paul Robinson. See, D.H. Anthony, III,‘Max Yergan in South Africa: From Evangelical Pan-Africanist to Revolutionary Socialist’, African StudiesReview, 34, 2 (September 1991), p. 1.

11 Yergan discusses his trip to London in correspondence with Jesse Moorland. See, Yergan to Moorland, 27October 1931, transcript in YMCA – Max Yergan – Corr. 1928–1929, Box 126–65, Jesse Moorland Papers,Moorland, Spingarn Research Center, Washington, DC: Howard University [hereafter referred to as MSRC].

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Changes within the South African Communist Party (SACP) also goaded Yergan toward

the radical left. In the 1920s, as a matter of policy, more so than practice, the SACP began to

accept and treat African members on equal terms with whites. Their decision to move toward

racial equality stood in sharp contrast to the policies of the Hertzog administration. Hertzog

founded the National Party in 1914 to protect and advance the interest of Afrikaners over

those of other South Africans. After he became Prime Minister in 1924 he helped to push

several pieces of legislation through that accelerated the erosion of African rights. Removing

Cape Province Africans from the regular voter’s rolls was arguably his greatest legislative

victory. Yergan’s biographer, David Anthony, adds that ‘Coming fresh from a segregated

North America during the 1920s, Yergan would have found this unprecedented interest in

attracting Africans to the SACP a striking phenomenon’.12 Yergan had become a Marxist.

Between 1934 and 1935, Yergan decided to return to the United States and enter into anti-

colonial politics. His concern was with colonialism generally and he focused much of his

work on conditions in South Africa. Yergan could see clearly that there was a problem with

African leadership in South Africa. Indeed, there was not as yet a seasoned, well-organised

and competent black leadership that stood up effectively to the mounting repression

emanating from the National Party. Pixley Seme was the leader of the ANC, but he was a

much older man and his views were moderate. Seme thought that the root of the social

problems confronting Africans was that they were not educated, and those who were severed

ties with their traditional leaders – the chiefs. He also believed that economically, more

African traders and the development of petite African industry were needed. Thus, Seme

advocated nation-building that respected education and traditional mores.13

Holland has suggested that the Riotous Assemblies Act, which gave the government

extra-legal powers to circumvent the courts and banish from any district anyone it deemed to

be hostile, had paralysed Seme and the ANC into inaction. Matters only got worse with

Hertzog’s legislation which was debated in 1935 and passed in 1936.14 Hertzog successfully

tightened the pass laws, and new labour policies were implemented to prevent Africans from

competing with whites for even semi-skilled jobs. African tribal chiefs were brought under

the authority of the Native Administration Act, which permitted their easy dismissal if they

were uncooperative. Furthermore, Africans were removed from the common voters’ roll and

a new set of segregated political institutions was created to retain the semblance of a

democracy while ensuring that Africans were politically emasculated.15

Only the South African Communist Party (SACP) with its small membership actively

protested, in contrast with the ANC, which was dominated by Africans but whose

leadership did not effectively mobilise its constituents or organise itself to oppose the

repressive legislation. The political efforts of the SACP and their position of non-bias were

attractive to Yergan.16

In 1928, he met Alfred Xuma, and they began a long and close friendship. Yergan had

learned of Xuma through a mutual friend named Grover Little from Chicago. Xuma was a

prominent South African, a Western-educated surgeon, and from 1940–1949, president of

12 Discussion of Yergan’s initial turn toward the left is discussed in Govan Mbeki, interview by the author 1 July2000 at the home of the subject, Port Elizabeth, South Africa, tape recording in the possession of the author and ischronicled in D.H. Anthony, III,Max Yergan: Race Man, Internationalist, Cold Warrior (New York, New YorkUniversity Press, 2006), pp. 131–34; also see, Anthony, ‘Max Yergan in South Africa’, p. 40.

13 The difficulties with ANC protest during this period can be found in, See T. Lodge, Black Politics in South AfricaSince 1945 (New York, Longman, 1983), p. 10. H. Holland, The Struggle: A History of the African NationalCongress (New York, George Braziller Inc., 1989), p. 46.

14 Holland, The Struggle.15 Ibid., and Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa, p. 11.16 Holland, The Struggle, p. 46. Yergan and the SACP can be found in Anthony, ‘Max Yergan in South Africa’,

African Studies Review, p. 1.

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the ANC. He was a pupil of Booker T. Washington, and an alumnus of Tuskegee Institute, a

historically black college in Alabama. He also studied at the University of Minnesota and

after completing an internship in general surgery at St. Louis Hospital No. 2 in 1925, he

earned his medical degree from Northwestern University in Chicago in 1926.17 While

studying in the United States Xuma lived among African Americans and adopted many of

their middle-class values, which emphasised punctuality, good manners, and favoured

Western ideas and institutions. These values were essentially the same as white middle-class

values. He also benefited from the financial support of many liberal white benefactors.18

Yergan shared many of his personal feelings about the political situation in South Africa with

Xuma.19

In June 1935, Yergan revealed to Xuma his mounting frustrations with the lack of

political organisation or mobilisation among Africans to effectively address the deteriorating

political situation in South Africa. ANC political protest still relied heavily on deputations of

prominent Africans taking petitions to the South African government or to London. Mass

protest was still more than a decade away for the ANC. In fact, many of its leaders remained

optimistic, in spite of the repercussions of the Afrikaner nationalist agenda of the Hertzog

administration. Xuma and Seme, for example, thought that the future for Africans was bright.

Yergan did not share their optimism. He had spent more than a decade proselytising,

organising conferences on race, and establishing Student Christian Associations (SCA). Yet,

conditions for Africans continued to worsen. Xuma attempted to persuade Yergan to remain

in South Africa, assuring him that there was plenty of work left to be done. Yergan promised

Xuma that he would not do anything ‘rushly’ and thanked him for understanding his

frustrations, although Xuma did not fully agree with them.20

After returning home, Xuma made an impassioned plea for Yergan to stay. He wrote to

Yergan saying, ‘I was happy to hear from you and to get your reassurance that nothing is final

in what is going through your mind’. He added, ‘The principal question to answer here is will

throwing up in despair under the circumstances help the situation forward? If not, I say then

we must make the best of a poor situation. I make bold to say even under the present

circumstances much will be the benefit for the African . . . the greatest obstacles we have

met always recede as we approach’.21 He continued, ‘Whatever advancement the African has

made especially in education in the last 35 years will be doubled in the next ten years’.22

Xuma was steeped in the protest methods of his generation. Progress to him was inevitable.

His rationale was tied to the logic of Western thinking that tacitly assumed that as time

passed, step-by-step, it pulled progress along with it. Even though the pace was slow, Xuma

remained confident in his assumption. He drew an analogy to the workers in a theatre to

illustrate his point for Yergan: ‘Plan to be in the theatre perhaps not as the star actor but

perhaps as a coach or stage manager’. To Xuma, Yergan was not giving his organising,

preaching and teaching a chance to have an effect – he was moving too fast and he was not

recognising the good he had done in South Africa. Thus, Xuma believed that Yergan should

17 S. Gish, Alfred B. Xuma: African, American, South African (New York, New York University Press, 2000),pp. 45–8.

18 A re-occurring theme that runs throughout the narrative of Gish’s biography of Xuma is the numerous ways thatliberal whites supported his professional development. See for example, Gish, Alfred B. Xuma, p. 58.

19 Grover Little wrote a letter of introduction to Xuma in June 1928. They had previously met in the United States.Yergan to Xuma, 5 June 1928, transcript in Xuma, A.B., Box 206–4, Max Yergan Papers, MSRC. Xuma’sconfidence in Yergan is exemplified in his request that Yergan advise him about his future marriage prospects.See, Xuma to Yergan, 27 July 1928, transcript in Xuma, A.B., Box 206–4, Max Yergan Papers, MSRC. Theirrelationship is examined in more detail below.

20 Xuma to Yergan, 12 June 1935, transcript in Xuma, A.B., Box 206–4, Max Yergan Papers, MSRC.21 Ibid.22 Xuma to Yergan, 21 June 1935, transcript in Xuma, A.B., Box 206–4, Max Yergan Papers, MSRC.

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have been more content, not more militant. He told Yergan, ‘To me, the fact that you were

allowed to organise and serve in your capacity with some degree of cooperation from

Europeans is in itself a great gain for our people and a credit to your diplomacy and to black

folk in general’. If Xuma’s rationale indicates anything, it clearly suggestions how severely

Africans were oppressed. When compared to the treatment of most Africans, who were

existing more than living, Yergan’s being ‘allowed’ to organise with ‘some degree of

cooperation from Europeans’ was undeniably an improvement, however ephemeral and

ineffectual it may have been in the long run.23

Xuma’s political near-sightedness can be attributed partially to his own success. He

perceived the world through the lens of a Western-educated surgeon and seemingly

transposed African-American logic to the South African situation. In many ways, it was out

of touch with the flagging hopes of most black South Africans. His studies at Tuskegee at

the feet of Booker T. Washington and under the tutelage of George Washington Carver

inflated his perception of African Americans, and their successes, especially as institution

builders. He became convinced that conditions in South Africa would likewise improve as

more black South Africans became educated. Xuma’s transposition did not adequately

address the apparent differences between the African American and South African racial

situations. Africans represented a numeric majority in South Africa that existed only in a

few southern states in the United States, and so large was the African majority in South

Africa that nowhere were the demographic differences even close to those facing blacks in

the United States. This understanding informed the thinking of whites and the systems of

social control they elaborated, which in the case of the black majority in South Africa

demanded more constraints. In predicting the future of the South African racial situation, he

believed that African Americans had a role to play but had failed to make this important

distinction.

Xuma reminded Yergan of his proud heritage and the responsibility that African

Americans had to Africans. He wrote, ‘You have the reputation of a rising great people who

must use their most meagre opportunities to save their African cousins most guardedly’.

Then, repeating Yergan’s lament, he averred, ‘Your last ten years in this country have not

been in vain’.24 For his part, Yergan was clearly conflicted about whether to leave South

Africa and return to the United States, but he was clear on the need for more radical political

action in South Africa, an untenable option in the eyes of Xuma.

Yergan may have suggested revolution as a possible solution to Xuma. Indeed, he had had

such discussions with Robeson and others in London. Xuma warned him that ‘any extensive

action’ would only serve to victimise Africans. Further, he pointed out that, ‘It would be only

destructive for us with nothing to gain or [to put] in its place for the benefit of our people’.25

Moreover, Xuma believed that any militant action would cause the government to bar African

Americans from entering the country in the future, a potential sacrifice Xuma felt was

unacceptable. He was certain that ‘even under the present prescribed conditions much

progress can still be made and will be made. Your ideal will call for cool calculated

diplomatic marshalling of forces and resources. One cannot sell an idea overnight’.26 Yergan

visited his confidante Xuma multiple times between 1935 and his departure in 1936, for

similar personal political discussions.

23 Ibid.24 Ibid.25 Ibid.26 Ibid.

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Yergan continued to keep his political sentiments private.27 For example, in August, he

received a letter from Channing Tobias that reveals Yergan’s dilemma. Tobias wrote:

I think I can see between the lines something of the nature of the difficulties confronting you asyou again face the task of helping the young leaders of South Africa find a way out of the manydifficulties in which they live and work. I know you feel at times as if you are beating your headagainst a stone wall and perhaps wonder whether it is all worth what it costs.28

Yergan was torn over what to do. He wanted to help black South Africans, but at the same

time, he felt constrained in what he could do openly under South Africa’s repressive racial

climate. This is evident from Tobias’ statement that ‘I can see between the lines something of

the nature of the difficulties . . . ’.

Tobias also gave Yergan a report from the New York Times on the Italian-Ethiopian

situation which was galvanising interest and support among people of African descent

throughout the diaspora and Africa. The report, whose conclusions Tobias accepted, was

optimistic about the way the ‘European powers are putting forth every effort to avert war’.

The clip also included a statement by General Jan Smuts, leader of the United Party and

Deputy Prime Minister of South Africa, supporting the idea that the European powers were

attempting to prevent the Italian invasion. Tobias remained hopeful. He stated that, ‘In spite

of all, however, I have a feeling that you have a very important contribution to make and that

although you are too closely tied into the situation to get sufficient perspective in order to

trace the signs of hope ahead, these signs are nevertheless there’.29

It is not clear exactly which signs Tobias was pointing to.While he was composing his letter

to Yergan, in 1935, America was yet to emerge from its greatest economic depression, which

caused tremendous and disproportionate hardships on African Americans; race politics in the

United States were still being discussed in terms of the ‘Negro problem’, and the civil rights

movement had not materialised in any meaningful way. Considering Italy’s imminent invasion

of Ethiopia neither were the politics of transnational resistance looking bright, as Tobias himself

had noted, and the unwillingness of the League of Nations to take meaningful steps to prevent it

only added to what was surely a disheartening situation for African Americans.30 In early

September,Yergan travelled to Johannesburg.31After his visit he replied toTobias, thankinghim

for the article and responding to the imminent Italian invasion of Ethiopia. He stated, ‘the results

of that situation will constitute the first step in the final overthrow of Western imperialism’.32

The convergence of Western imperialism and racism combined to push Yergan further to

the political left and more assuredly into the anti-colonial struggle. Italy would invade

Ethiopia in October 1935, but in September Hertzog’s legislation was foremost on Yergan’s

mind. He wrote to Tobias that ‘My opinion is that these [Hertzog] Bills are the last straw and

are without defence. Natives all over the country are registering their protest against them.

27 Apparently, YMCA officials briefed Yergan either before he arrived in South Africa or shortly thereafter withregard to how he should comport himself apropos the race question. As early as 1922, he was requesting thatnothing critical of the race issue be published in YMCA literature. Therefore, by the 1930s, he was certainlycapable of keeping his criticism in private rather than public circles. See, D. Willard Lyon to Jesse Moorland, 15March 1922, transcript in YMCA – Max Yergan – Corr. – Jan.– June 1922, Box 126–64, Jesse MoorlandPapers, MSRC. Lyons stated that Yergan had contacted E.C. Carter in London requesting that nothing negativeabout the race question be published.

28 Channing Tobias to Max Yergan, 13 August 1935, transcript in Tobias, C.H., Box 206–4, Max Yergan Papers,MSRC.

29 Ibid.30 See, J. Harris, Africans and Their History, 2nd Edn (New York, Meridian, 1998), pp. 263–64.31 Yergan went to Johannesburg to meet with William and Margaret Ballinger ostensibly to discuss the Hertzog

legislation. Yergan to Xuma, 10 September 1935, transcript in Xuma, A.B., Box 206–4, Max Yergan Papers,MSRC.

32 Yergan to Tobias, 17 September 1935, transcript in Tobias, C.H., Box 206–4, Max Yergan Papers, MSRC.

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A few decent Europeans are also doing the same thing’.33 Under Hertzog several pieces of

racially repressive legislation came into force.34 Thus, year after year, Yergan observed

opportunities decrease for Africans while hardships increased. He was most distressed by the

Representation of Natives Act.

After brief visits to the United States and the Soviet Union, Yergan prepared for the All

Africa Convention (AAC), which was to be held from 29 June to 2 July 1936 in

Bloemfontein. Of course, Bloemfontein held symbolic significance both as an Afrikaner

stronghold and as the birthplace of the ANC. An umbrella organisation, which included the

ANC, the Communist Party, the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union, and other

organisations, the convention was the response of African leaders to the Hertzog legislation.

Eslanda Robeson, wife of Paul Robeson, and her son were also in South Africa at the time

engaged in what appears to be a fact-finding mission. After visiting friends in Cape Town as

well as in the Eastern Cape, she participated with Yergan in the All Africa Convention (AAC)

in Bloemfontein. Robeson thought that ‘the convention in Bloemfontein was impressive’ and

that the African delegates were determined ‘to improve their situation’.35

Yergan had given considerable input into its proceedings.36 Representatives from nearly

50 different African organisations of all types had participated in the convention. Implying

his Marxist sentiments Yergan stated that he ‘and . . . others we were successful in swinging it

far to the left for it is there that I believe it should be’. According to Yergan, the group sought

to accomplish three things:

It united all these bodies in one movement thus making it possible for the people to act with a high

degree of unity; it pledged itself to a campaign of political and economic education amongst the

masses and declared as its goal the achievement of political power for the masses; it appealed to

all lovers of human justice, especially to all workers, whether professional or manual, of all races

to join them in this struggle for the right to live and grow in their native land.37

Mass action was not in the repertoire of African political organisations in South Africa at that

time. So this represented a departure from the norm, but it was consistent with the methods of

the South African Communist Party. Growing nationalist sentiment in other parts of Africa

and the diaspora as a consequence of Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia animated the proceedings

and connected the internal struggle against racism and Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa

to the larger worldwide battle of peoples of African descent against colonialism. Sounding a

bit like W.E.B. Du Bois, Yergan had fashioned a resolution with strong pan-African

principles that made their protests truly transnational and based on the idea of universal

human rights. It specifically condemned the Italian invasion and Western imperialism. The

delegates adopted it. In part the statement read:

33 Ibid.34 Some of these acts included The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924, The Wage Act of 1925, The Colour Bar Act

of 1926, The Masters and Servants Laws, The Natives Service Contract Act of 1932, The Native RepresentationAct of 1935, and the Urban Areas Amendment Act of 1936. Max Yergan, ‘Conflicting Interests in Africa andPossible Adjustments’, an address by Max Yergan at the Canadian Club Toronto, Canada, 1 November 1937,manuscript in Box 206–6, Max Yergan Papers, MSRC.

35 Ibid., pp. 50.36 Yergan mentions his trip to the Soviet Union in Max Yergan to Anne Wiggins, 28 April 1936, transcript in Wa-

Wr, Box 206–4, Max Yergan Papers, MSRC. Xuma to Yergan, 2 May 1936, transcript in Xuma, A.B., Box 206–4, Max Yergan Papers, MSRC. There is a slight possibility that Yergan was able to meet with Xuma prior to themeeting. Eslanda Robeson notes in African Journey that Yergan handed her and Paul Jr. over to Dr J.S. Moroka,an ANC official and Chief of the Barolong people, so that Yergan could prepare for the AAC. Apparently, thistook place a day before the AAC. Yergan may have met Xuma at that time. See, E. Robeson, African Journey(New York, The John Day Company, 1945), pp. 51–2.

37 Yergan to Tobias, 10 July 1936, transcript in Tobias, C.H., Box 206–4, MSRC.

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The All African Convention hereby expresses its utmost condemnation of the savage,unprovoked attack made by Italy upon Abyssinia and declares as its considered opinion that theruthless action of Italy can only be regarded as large scale violence against fundamental humanrights. This Convention hereby declares its conviction that imperialism which has thus resulted inthe ruthless destruction of life, in violent acts of robbery, in increasing exploitation and in thedestruction of African culture is an evil force to be exposed condemned and resisted. The AllAfrican Convention recognizes the value and desirability of establishing contacts with Africansand organizations in other parts of the world. To this end the All African Convention believes thata call to an International Conference of Africans and overseas people of African descent shouldreceive the serious consideration of the Executive Committee.38

Yergan was pleased with the outcome of the AAC, especially the fact that it had committed

itself to the task of ‘political education for the people and the achievement of political power

eventually for the people’.39 These two tasks became objectives of the International

Committee on African Affairs (ICAA). Yergan had already begun soliciting support for the

organisation. Because of his strong commitment to African liberation and specifically

because of his commitment to the South African liberation struggle, delegates of the AAC

appointed him to serve as its Secretary of External Relations. In his new capacity, Yergan

believed he could better link the emerging nationalist movements within Africa with those in

the diaspora. He had already made contact with protest organisations in West Africa and in

Kenya.40 He wrote to Xuma ‘I can assure you that it is my intention to make the greatest

possible use of this relation, for one thing it means that my contacts with South Africa as well

as other parts of the continent will not only remain what they are but will be bound to

increase’. Indeed, the Secretary of External Relations was a key position. H. Selby Msimang,

General Secretary of the AAC, expressed this importance in a letter to Yergan. Msimang

observed:

The Convention believes that this sub-continent cannot achieve this great objective [of self-determination] without active co-operation with the whole continent and such other economicagencies possessed by people of African descent in other parts of the world. You will therefore beexpected to bring about this contact which, I have no doubt, will result in the exchange of ideasand opinions . . . .

Yergan’s years working as a Christian missionary prepared him for his new role as an

anti-colonial activist and a leader of the inchoate struggle for South African liberation in the

United States. Yergan was convinced that the struggle against imperialism, including

liberating South Africa, essentially had to be global. He understood that transnational bridges

linking the diaspora had to be constructed. But he also knew that first in Africa and the

diaspora that political education was necessary to awaken and raise the consciousness of the

masses.

With plans under way for the ICAA and feeling constrained to act through the YMCA,

Yergan resigned his position as External Secretary, and made preparations to return to the

United States.41 As he was preparing to leave South Africa, the AAC sent him a reminder of

the important role he played and a charge to link diaspora Africans with those on the

continent. Msimang wrote:

38 H. Selby Msimang to Max Yergan, 30 July 1936, transcript in Ma-My, Box 206–4, Max Yergan Papers,Moorland Spingarn Research Center, Washington, DC, Howard University.

39 Xuma to Yergan, 11 July 1936, transcript in Xuma, A.B., Box 206–4, MSRC. Also, Yergan to Xuma, 24 July1936, transcript in Xuma, A.B., Box 206–4, Max Yergan Papers, MSRC. Yergan to Xuma, 27 July 1936,transcript in Xuma, A.B., Box 206–4, Max Yergan Papers, MSRC.

40 Ibid.41 Anthony found this quote in Yergan to Slack, 6 March 1936, File ‘South Africa’, Box 67, YMCA Archives; see,

also, Anthony, ‘Max Yergan in South Africa’, p. 46.

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I am confident that you are equal to the task and that you will be propelled in your efforts by thegrand idea that the emancipation of Africa from imperial domination has, by this appointment,been committed into your hands. May your efforts be the means of hastening the consummationof our economic and political liberation which can be realized by Africans showing a unitedfront.42

Four things are evident from this series of correspondence. First, Western-educated South

African elites, many of whom had studied in the United States, initiated from within South

Africa the international campaign for their liberation alongside members of the African

diaspora. Second, Yergan’s respect as a statesman found him an audience among certain

African elites in South Africa who may not have shared his Marxist sentiments, for example,

Xuma and Jabavu, but who clearly understood that their future national freedom was tied to

the liberation of the continent of Africa and more broadly to the overthrow of Western

imperialism. From the very outset the transnational struggle for South Africa’s liberation was

hindered by the fact that there was no consensus concerning how these wider attainments

supporting local liberation were to be carried out. Third, the Western-educated African

leadership in South Africa considered Yergan their representative in the United States and

beyond, and finally, Yergan believed himself to be a torchbearer of African liberation

generally, and South African liberation specifically.

As early as August of that year, word reached Yergan that the South African government

was creating a council of ‘native’ leaders that would represent the concerns of Africans to the

Minister of Native Affairs and that the AAC was planning to cooperate. Henceforth, Cape

Africans could elect four whites to represent them while Africans from the other provinces

could vote to place four white senators in office to speak on their behalf. A Native

Representative Council (NRC) served in an advisory capacity to the white elected officials

representing the Africans. Aghast, Yergan wrote to D.D.T Jabavu, President of the AAC, to

express his concern. ‘I am disturbed by a document which someone said to me last night had

been sent out by Johannesburg’, he wrote. ‘This document according to my informer, calls for

cooperation with Government in the formation of a Council, the election of senators and the

members from the Cape’. Yergan warned Jabavu that he must steer the AAC clear of any

form of cooperation with the authorities. He rightly believed that the government was

attempting to undermine the influence of the Convention by creating a Council that it

controlled.43 Yergan pleaded:

If what I have been told is true, I believe it will be disastrous for the Convention. It seems to methat our consistent line must of necessity be one of opposition. We must in season and out ofseason declare our disbelief in the desire or ability of Government to do anything for the people.We must make it increasingly clear that the Convention represents the people and, under thecircumstances, is the only body that can represent the people.44

Fearing that his straightforward statement might distress the elder statesman Jabavu,

Yergan added that he did not ‘imply a boycott’. But it was important, Yergan wrote, that

the leaders of the Convention make it unquestionably clear that their interest in the

Council was not an expression of the belief that through it, ‘the Senate or the House any

good can’ come to the Africans. To the contrary, Yergan averred, ‘we must at once declare

that these bodies are the tools of the forces that will further oppress [Africans]’.

Nevertheless, Jabavu did become a member of the NRC.45 Although eventually Jabavu

42 H. Selby Msimang to Max Yergan, 30 July 1936, transcript in Ma-My, Box 206–4, Max Yergan Papers, MSRC.Italics in quotation introduced by the author.

43 Max Yergan to D.D.T. Jabavu, 7 August 1936, transcript in Ja-Jo, Box 206–3, Max Yergan Papers, MSRC.44 Ibid.45 Ibid.

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and a few other prominent Africans served on it, most Africans viewed it as a political

sham and so too did Yergan.46

Formation of the International Committee on African Affairs

After fifteen years serving as a missionary for the YMCA in South Africa Yergan returned to

the United States with a mandate to support South African liberation. Jim Crow segregation

was entrenched in the southern states and a more refined, but no less pernicious, racial

discrimination was mundane in the north as well. As former wartime allies, relations between

the United States government and the government of South Africa were strong. Yergan had

already had in mind an idea for an organisation that would lend support to Africa before he

left for the United States. He had previously made pan-African contact with groups and

individuals in West and East Africa who were challenging Western imperialism and

colonialism. Shortly after his arrival back in the United States, Jabavu sent Yergan a list with

the names of pan-Africanist organisations and individuals who had written him to enquire

about the AAC. It included a list of names, most notable George Padmore and student aid

groups like the Universal Ethiopian Students’ Association and the African Student Aid

Association.47

Plans for the ICAA began in early 1936 while Yergan was in London. At that time,

Eslanda Robeson, undoubtedly motivated by her own experiences in South Africa, gave

Yergan £300 to begin organising the committee. Yergan sent a financial solicitation and a

proposal to Mrs. John F. Moors, the wife of a leading philanthropist in Boston.48 As he

explained, the committee was to serve at least three important purposes: first, it was to be a

vehicle for educating the public on current events in Africa. Research on Africa would allow

the organisation to act on a consultative basis to governments who had an interest in Africa.

Governmental support, if it could be won, would increase the influence of the ICAA

exponentially. So, Yergan was also concerned that ‘the results of such research must be of a

non-propaganda nature . . . and of course based on fact’. He suggested a bi-monthly

publication for disseminating the information they collected and compiled.49

The second purpose of the committee would be to train ‘carefully selected’ Africans to

assume positions of leadership. This training was to emphasise economics and sociology, and

46 He wrote a report concerning legislation that militated against Africans that can be found in the Moorland Papers.See, Max Yergan to Jesse Moorland, 26 January 1926, transcript in YMCA – Max Yergan – Corr. 1926, Box126–65, Jesse Moorland Papers, MSRC. Political conditions and Hertzog’s political agenda can be found in,Fredrickson, Black Liberation, pp. 140–42.

47 Among other names the list included James L. Brown of New York, a member of the Universal EthiopianStudents’ Association, and Dr Harry T. Maponyane of Chicago, and formerly from Butterworth, South Africawho was President of the African Student Aid Association. Jabavu to Yergan, 27 October 1936, transcript in Ja-Jo, Box 206–3, Max Yergan Papers, MSRC. The Universal Ethiopian Student Association (UESA) wasestablished in 1927 to assist students with college and university education and to study ‘the history of the humanrace’. John Henrik Clarke was one of its members. Information on the UESA can be found online in,correspondence, ‘Letter from the Universal Ethiopian Students Association to W.E.B. Du Bois’, 4 October 1934,W.E.B. Du Bois Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts AmherstLibraries, MS 312 [online] http://oubliette.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b072-i242, accessed on 26September 2011.

48 John F. Moors founded the investment firm of Moors & Cabot, Inc. in Boston in 1890. Brief historical sketch onthe company can be found on the corporate website, [online] http://www.moorscabot.com/about/history.html,accessed 26 September 2011. The Council on African Affairs is in dire need of a complete history. Yergan’sefforts to raise funds can be found in H. Lynch, Black American Radicals and the Liberation of Africa, pp. 19.

49 Eslanda Robeson to Council Members, 16 April 1948, transcript in Council on African Affairs correspondence,Box 38, Paul Robeson Papers, Moorland Spingarn Research Center, Howard University, Washington, DC. MaxYergan to Mrs. John F. Moors, 23 January 1937, transcript in Ma-My, Box 206–4, Max Yergan Papers, MSRC.

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it was to be given preferably in Africa. Anticipating the changes that were ahead, Yergan felt

that, ‘there must be in various parts of Africa a number of men who will be in a position to

cooperate with those in Europe who wish to give effect to a more liberal, humane, and peace

making policy’. If the training could not be done in Africa then Africans should be brought to

the United States for training.50

Collaboration with ‘various African bodies in the promotion of the Cooperative

movement’ was the third purpose. Again, Yergan firmly believed that the challenge to

colonialism and imperialism had to be by the masses of people living under the undue burden

of colonialism. This formula portends later stages of the anti-apartheid movement when

TransAfrica, the African Liberation Support Committee, and the Southern Africa Support

Project were able to mobilise the grassroots in the United States.51

A quick critique of the purposes of the organisation reveals that Yergan had not

completely lost confidence in Western governments and institutions. Thinking that they

would assist in overthrowing racial segregation and discrimination in South Africa appears

naıve, but it must be remembered that Yergan was ensconced in the traditions of the African

American middle class whose faith in the myth of America’s highest ideals were almost

unshakable.52

To lend credibility to his effort, Yergan also listed the names of key individuals whom he

felt would appeal to Mrs Moors and who might play a role in the permanent organisation.

They included Louise Pearce of the Rockefeller Foundation, Charles Johnson, a professor of

sociology at Fisk University; Paul Robeson; Dr Channing Tobias, a Senior Secretary in the

Coloured Work Department of the YMCA; Dr William Jay Schieffelin, an industrialist and

philanthropist; and the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr.53

Yergan estimated that his initial budget would total $7,250, most of which was allotted for

salaries and stenographic services. He hoped to raise that money by appealing to foundations,

university student organisations, certain churches, and local YMCAs, in addition to gifts and

monies he could earn from public speaking engagements. Although he was taking personal

responsibility for raising the money, he was relying on Moors to be his financial reference and

one of his main financial backers along with the Robesons. He specifically wanted a reference

fromMoors to seek financial support from theWorld Peace Foundation, which she apparently

gave.54

At its inception, the black members of the ICAA other than Yergan included: Paul and

Eslanda Robeson, Ralph Bunche, Channing Tobias, Mordecai Johnson; F.E. DeFrantz of

the YMCA; and Hubert T. Delany, a lawyer and the Tax Commissioner of New York City.

Rene Maran, a French West Indian novelist, represented the committee in France. The

white members included Mary Van Kleeck, a sociologist, and Director of Industrial

Research for the Russell Sage Foundation; Raymond Leslie Buell, an Africanist political

scientist at Harvard University and member of the Foreign Policy Association; Norman

McKenzie, a law professor at Toronto University; Leonard Barnes, a professor at

Liverpool University who was a socialist author who wrote on colonialism; and Mrs

50 Ibid.51 Ibid. Also see, Eschen, Race Against Empire, p. 18.52 Yergan to Moors, 23 January 1937, transcript in Ma-My, Box 206–4, Max Yergan Papers, MSRC. The

organising committee was composed of Mrs. Moors, Raymond L. Buell, Hubert T. Delany, Ralph Bunche, MaryVan Kleeck, and Mordecai Johnson.

53 However, when the ICAA was actually formed it did not include Pearce, Johnson or Niebuhr; Schieffelin becamea member later. Ibid.

54 Yergan to Moors, 23 January 1937, transcript in Ma-My, Box 206–4, Max Yergan Papers, MSRC. Moorsremained a financial backer of the CAA through its early years.

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Moors. The initial officers were Van Kleeck – chairwoman, Delany – treasurer, and

Yergan – director.55

The Committee came into existence on 28 January 1937. Its purpose as stated in the

organisation’s constitution was simply ‘to study the conditions of life and work in Africa; and

to promote the welfare of the African people’.56 In May, the Robesons gave $1,500 to the

ICAA. Yergan cheerfully acknowledged their largesse:

Before I left London I tried to say to you how deeply appreciative I am of what you have done andhow moved I am by its really limitless significance. Your gift not only makes possible anindispensable quality of financial strength in the early stages of the life of the Committee, but ithas given me a measure of encouragement and sense of support and cooperation which I am sureyou recognize to be of very great importance at this particular period.57

In spite of a great deal of thought and planning, the early years of the ICAA were not very

auspicious. In part, this was because Yergan had difficulty raising the funds to carry out its

programme as he envisaged it and because he was spending considerable time working with

other organisations. He was, however, successful in using his contacts and the ICAA to

establish a transnational network of activists supporting the anti-colonial movement. In

addition to the ties that he retained with South African leaders such as Xuma, Matthews, and

Jabavu, he also built bridges to pan-Africanists in London, such as Jomo Kenyatta, George

Padmore, and Ras Makonnen. Kenyatta was a student leader in London from Kenya, and

would eventually become his nation’s first president. He and Yergan had discussions that

contributed to facilitating the education of African students in the United States. Padmore was

also a prominent diaspora figure. He was born in Trinidad, and in the 1920s, championed

communism, and the rights of black workers, but he severed his ties with the Communist

Party in 1934 over their retreat from contesting colonialism. Makonnen is not as well known

as Kenyatta or Padmore, but he was also part of the pan-African movement to which they

belonged. He was a close associate of Kwame Nkrumah. In September 1937, the ICAA had

its first public function. Fittingly, Xuma and Jabavu were visiting the United States from

South Africa and both gave speeches. In 1938, as part of his continuing effort to educate the

public, Yergan published a pamphlet entitled Gold and Poverty in South Africa that brought

to light how black labour produced vast amounts of wealth for whites but was entirely

exploitative to the Africans.58

Yergan’s other engagements caused tension between himself and the other officers of the

Committee. He had been appointed a ‘lecturer in Negro History’ at City College in 1937, and

in addition, he had helped organise the National Negro Congress (NNC) in 1936. He was

vice-president of the NNC until 1940 when A. Philip Randolph resigned as president because

55 Lynch, Black American Radicals and the Liberation of Africa, p. 19. Lynch does not name all of the originalmembers. Eslanda Robeson counted herself as a member because she gave the initial £300 to establish the ICAA.See, Eslanda Robeson to Council Members, 16 April 1948, Council on African Affairs correspondence, Box 38,Paul Robeson Papers, MSRC. Legal documents indicate when the Council formally came into existence. See,Council on African Affairs, Inc., Plaintiff against Max Yergan, Defendant, Supreme Court of the State of NewYork, transcript in Council on African Affairs, Inc. vs. Max Yergan, n.d., Box 206–1, Max Yergan Papers,MSRC.

56 Constitution, manuscript in Council on African Affairs – Constitution, Box 131–30, E. Franklin Frazier Papers,MSRC.

57 Max Yergan to Paul Robeson, 25 May 1937, transcript in Yergan, Max, Box 5, Paul Robeson Papers, MSRC.Lynch also concurs that the Robesons’ largely financed the Council at its beginning. See, Lynch, Black AmericanRadicals and the Liberation of Africa, p. 18.

58 In November of that same year, Yergan also presented those findings before the Association for the Study ofNegro Life and History at their annual meeting. Eschen, Race Against Empire, p. 18. Biographical informationcan be found on Ras Makonnen in R.T. Makonnen and K. King (eds), Pan-Africanism from Within (New York,Oxford University Press, 1973). Discussion of Yergan’s work from 1937–38 can be found in Lynch, BlackAmerican Radicals and the Liberation of Africa, p. 20.

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of its overtly close association with the Communist Party. Yergan then assumed the

presidency of the NCC. In 1941, he became part owner of People’s Voice, a radical

newspaper published in Harlem, New York.59

In 1941, the ICAA was re-organised as the Council on African Affairs (CAA) with Paul

Robeson as the chairman. From that point forward the agenda of the organisation changed to

be more explicitly political and more militant. The CAA did not completely drop its

educational component. However, to move the anti-colonial agenda forward it was necessary

that new tactics be implemented. Thereafter, in addition to political education, the CAA

specifically sought to lobby the United States government for both civil rights at home and

human rights abroad while providing material support to the anti-colonial struggle.60 To

remedy the defenceless condition of the African people, Yergan suggested that ‘we [the

CAA] could stress the resolution passed at our Council meeting calling for the arming of the

African people and extensive utilization of African resources’.61

Many African-American leaders were attracted to the CAA because of its dual focus on

domestic and transnational politics. In the early 1940s Mary McLeod Bethune and William

Alphaeus Hunton, both educators, joined the CAA. Bethune had started an educational

institute in Florida that grew into a college that bears her name – Bethune Cookman College.

She had significant influence in the black community and beyond because of her close

relationship with First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt. Hunton was another professor from Howard

University. In August 1943, he became the Education Director and assumed the

responsibilities for setting the agenda of the Council which, owing to his communist

affiliations, became more radical and less compromising.62

In the early 1940s, the Council’s membership experienced some turnover. It remained

small, but was made up almost entirely of wealthy whites and African-American elites.

Several of the original members left the group and several new members joined. Along with

Bunche, Mordecai Johnson, Raymond Leslie Buell, and Mary Van Kleeck left the Council,

probably because of its closer ties to communists. New members to the Council included

Hunton, Charlotta Bass, publisher of the California Eagle; William Y. Bell, Professor of

Theology at Gammon Theological College in Atlanta; Earl B. Dickerson, president of the

National Bar Association (NBA); and E. Franklin Frazier, a prominent sociologist at Howard

University, joined the Council.63

Also in 1943, through the assistance of Mrs. Edith Fields, the Council’s treasurer, the

Council was given a $12,000 gift from individuals Yergan referred to as ‘old friends of the

Council in New England’. That year the Council moved to a spacious office in a three-story

brownstone at 23 West 26th Street in New York City. Mrs. Fields was the wife of the wealthy

59 Yergan discusses the National Negro Congress in Max Yergan, Address Given by Max Yergan, President of theNational Negro Congress at the Meeting of the New York Council, May 13, 1940, manuscript in National NegroCongress presentation, May 13, 1940, Box 206–6, Max Yergan Papers, MSRC. Also see, L.S. Wittner, ‘TheNational Negro Congress: A Reassessment’, American Quarterly, 22, 4 (Winter, 1970), p. 884 and Lynch, BlackAmerican Radicals and the Liberation of Africa, p. 20. Ralph Bunche felt that the ICAA was not serving itspurpose. He therefore resigned.

60 William Cochran’s contribution to the Council can be found in William Cochran to Yergan, November 7, 1942,Cochran, William, Box 206–3, Max Yergan Papers, MSRC. Cochran’s biographical information can be found inObituary Record of Graduates of the Undergraduate Schools Deceased During the Year Ending July 1, 1951,Bulletin of Yale University, Number 110 (New Haven, Yale University, 1952), pp. 110. Cochran was the ownerand chairman of Sherwood Forest Company (1910–1950). His parents were affluent, and his family wasinterested in YMCA work. This may have been how he became connected to Yergan.

61 Ibid.62 Lynch, Black American Radicals and the Liberation of Africa, p. 20.63 Ibid., p. 21. In February 1942, Robeson and Yergan extended an invitation to W.E.B. DuBois for membership on

the Council but he did not join at that time. Robeson and Yergan to DuBois, February 7, 1947, W.E.B. DuBoisPapers, Microfilm Reel 59, Washington, DC: Library of Congress.

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philanthropist Frederick Vanderbilt Fields. She took over the position of treasurer from John

Hammond, another wealthy white philanthropist. Dr. William Jay Schieffelin joined Fields

on the executive board of the Council. Schieffelin was a grandson of John Jay and married the

granddaughter of William H. Vanderbilt.64

In 1944, the Council began publishing periodicals that dealt with the colonial question.

New Africa was a monthly newsletter that gave the Council’s position on pertinent

developments unfolding in Africa. Hunton edited the monthly, and it carried profiles of

African countries and African leaders. It was particularly useful as a means of gathering

information on events in South Africa, which appeared frequently in the periodical.

According to Hollis Lynch, in the early 1940s, New Africa was ‘the single most important

source of information and enlightened opinion on Africa’.65 As a consequence of the Second

World War, new opportunities and challenges shaped the work of the Council in the coming

years.

As the war approached its decisive apogee, the major question confronting the allies was

how to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the war and to avoid future global conflict. As a

result, the leaders of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States met at Yalta in the

Crimea to discuss these matters. Along with various territorial agreements, they decided that

an international organisation was needed to re-build Europe and to secure peace in the future,

which in the nuclear age was now an imperative. The United Nations conference was held in

San Francisco in April 1945. It was called in the spirit of the Atlantic Charter, which 26 allied

powers signed in 1942. Fifty nations attended the conference. The United Nations Charter

provided for a General Assembly to which every member nation would belong and that would

serve as a forum to mediate international concerns. The United States, the Soviet Union,

Great Britain, France, and China comprised the permanent members of the Security Council,

which also included six other nations elected for two-year terms. The charge of the Security

Council was to use diplomatic, economic or military sanctions against nations that all

permanent members agreed threatened international security. Yergan and Robeson welcomed

the establishment of the United Nations and viewed it as a vehicle for securing freedom for

Africans in South Africa and elsewhere around the world scratching to survive under different

forms of economic and social oppression. This was important because as the United States

government approached the end of the war, the question of domestic race relations was still

emerging from behind the growing threat of communism, and it was not yet concerned about

the internal racial dynamics of its wartime allies, including South Africa.66

With the war’s conclusion looming and the world powers having discussions at the

highest levels of government about international security and re-building Europe, the CAA

took the offensive. Particularly vexing to the leaders of the Council was the fact that Smuts,

who had presided over the first General Assembly, was responsible for inserting the phrase

‘fundamental human rights’ into the Charter at the same time that the South African

government was denying those rights to Africans and other persons of colour. Robeson sent a

Council authored resolution to President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of State

Edward R. Stettinus concerning the programmatic framework and political direction of the

64 Yergan to Cochran, December 11, 1944, Cochran, William, Box 206–3, Max Yergan Papers, MSRC. TheCouncil shared the office with the Council for Pan American Democracy, the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, theAmerican Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born, and the American Labour Party. Biographicalinformation on William Jay Schieffelin can be found in ‘Some Brilliant Weddings: Ms. Shepard Becomes Ms.William Jay Schieffelin’, New York Times, 6 February 1891.

65 Discussion of New Africa can be found in Lynch, Black American Radicals and the Liberation of Africa, p. 24.The name of the periodical was changed to Spotlight on Africa in 1951.

66 The Yalta Conference was held in February 1945. United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British PrimeMinister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin were the principal leaders involved.

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nascent United Nations Organisation.67 The resolution reflected their belief in universal

human rights and stated in part that, ‘We recognize today the interdependence and the

necessary mutual aid among all nations and peoples, and we know that there can be no lasting

prosperity for the peoples of this country [United States] as along as many millions in

Africa . . . are compelled . . . to live in hunger, disease and ignorance’. It was necessary

therefore that the United States use its international influence to ensure the ‘rapid

industrialization, modernization, and the advancement of social standards’ in Africa and

other developing regions. Robeson then reminded Roosevelt and Stettinius of the

contributions that Africans made during the war and intimated that they would expect to

be rewarded for their sacrifices. Robeson wrote, ‘The colonial and subject peoples of Africa

have contributed greatly toward the achievement of a United Nations’ victory over our

common fascist enemies, and are justified in their expectation that they . . .will benefit by

their sacrifices in this war of liberation’.68 Predictably, on the colonial issue the United States

remained in bed with its wartime European allies, Britain and France. Communist expansion

from the vantage point of the United States government was a far graver threat to its national

security and sovereignty. Nevertheless, the Council on African Affairs remained at the

forefront of the anti-colonial movement in the United States and the main organisation

emphasising the struggle for South Africa’s liberation.

In 1945, drought struck SouthAfrica, causing an increase in the cost Africans paid for food.

A famine ensued and the CAA mobilised a relief effort. On 7 January 1946 the Council held a

rally that 5,000 people attended at Abyssinian Baptist Church in Harlem.69 They called

meetings in 40 cities across the United States to discuss the situation in South Africa and to

collectmoney and canned goods. In addition, they placed advertisements in African-American

newspapers, and Robeson personally wrote an article in support of collecting money and

sending food to South Africa. Robeson wrote, ‘The Negro people of South Africa are

undergoing the extremest hardship. In the rural areas they walk many miles and stand in long

queues to get ameager ration of cornwhich is below the starvation limit of 1,500 calories’. [sic]

Robeson understood the connection between colonial oppression and poverty. He observed:

We Americans . . . have the responsibility of providing something more than food for the peopleof Africa – the whole of Africa with its 150 million colonial subjects. We must see that theirdemands for freedom are heard and answered by America and the United Nations. For withouteconomic and political freedom, there cannot be any abiding relief from poverty and hunger.70

The CAA collected and shipped fifteen tons of canned goods to the areas stricken by famine

in South Africa, and they had raised $14,000 additionally for relief purposes.71

On 6 June 1946, the anniversary of D-Day, the CAA held the ‘Big 3 Unity for Colonial

Freedom’ rally in front of a large audience at Madison Square Garden in New York City.

Robeson addressed an audience comprised of the Big 3 – labour unionists, progressives, and

communists – all constituents of the CAA. Robeson began his speech with a pan-Africanist

declaration that linked Jim Crow to European colonialism. He said, ‘The Negro – and I mean

67 The United States government’s primary interest was not in race politics. See for example, T. Borstelmann,Apartheid’s Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War (Oxford, OxfordUniversity Press, 1993), p. 41.

68 Paul Robeson was a key figure during the anti-colonial and early South African liberation movement. His papersare at MSRC. Also see, Phillip Foner who published many of his speeches and writings. P. Robeson, ‘Africa andPost-War Security Plans’, in P. S. Foner (ed.), Paul Robeson Speaks: Writings, Speeches, and Interviews, 1918–1974 (New York, Carol Publishing Company, 1978), pp. 158–59.

69 Yergan discusses initiating the strike in Yergan to Cochran, January 16, 1946, Cochran, William, Box 206–3,Max Yergan Papers, MSRC.

70 P. Robeson, ‘Food and Freedom for Africa’, in Foner (ed.), Paul Robeson Speaks, pp. 167–68.71 Max Yergan to William F. Cochran, 19 November 1946, transcript in Cochran, William, Box 206–3, Max

Yergan Papers, MSRC.

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American Negroes as well as West Indians and Africans – has a direct and first-hand

understanding, which most other people lack, of what imperialist exploitation and oppression

is’. For them, Robeson continued, ‘It is no far-off theoretical problem’. Robeson urged

African Americans to support the struggle against European imperialism because he

understood that their civil rights were linked to the freedom of Africans on the continent and

elsewhere in the African diaspora. ‘Big Business’ was the real culprit because it advanced

imperialism and was therefore not concerned with securing freedom for colonial subjects.72

This was evident in August when 74,000 African mineworkers on the Witwatersrand

went on strike to protest for better wages, family housing, paid leave, and better food. At the

time of the strike African mineworkers were receiving 50 cents per day. The South African

government responded by brutally compelling the African miners to return to their jobs. In

the process a dozen Africans died and over 1,200 were injured. The leaders of the strike were

summarily arrested, and in what would become an oft-used ploy, the South African

government labelled the strike a ‘communist plot’, nullifying any consideration for the

legitimate concerns of the miners.73

In September, the CAA made a public appeal for support of the African mineworkers in

response to the crisis. In November a delegation of South Africans was visiting the United

States. It included Senator H.M. Basner, a liberal white member of parliament and

representative of Africans in the Transvaal; H.A. Naidoo, an important leader of the South

African Indian Congress; and Alfred Xuma, who had been elected President-General of the

African National Congress in 1940. On 8 November, the South African delegation addressed

two hundred leaders of progressive organisations and several members of various United

Nations delegations in the Council’s office on the racial situation in South Africa including

the mineworkers strike. Later in the month a second meeting was held for the delegation at the

Abyssinian Baptist Church. A large audience listened as speakers expressed solidarity with

the South African mineworkers. On 21 November, the Council organised a picket line in front

of the South African consulate in New York. Two hundred representatives of labour, civic,

and church groups participated in the demonstration.74 Portending the tactics of the Free

South Africa Movement by almost 40 years, the Council hoped to keep the famine relief

effort and African mineworkers strike in the media in order to curry public support in the

United States for the Council’s work as well as educate the public about the grave situation

facing Africans and other blacks in South Africa.75

After the First World War, Article XXII of the covenant of the League of Nations allowed

for South Africa to take over administration of South West Africa from Germany. After the

Second World War, South Africa continued to retain virtual control of South West Africa

under the United Nations Charter. For anti-colonial activists the case of South West Africa

represented an opportunity to test the collective will and authority of the United Nations as an

instrument for combating colonialism. South Africa had extended its racial policies into

72 A letter introducing the rally can be found in Paul Robeson to Friend, May 4, 1946, Robeson, Paul, General,1945–53, Box A511, Group II, NAACP Records, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. His speech has beenpublished in, P. Robeson, ‘Anti-Imperialists Must Defend Africa’, in Foner (ed.), Paul Robeson Speaks,pp. 168–70.

73 Foner suggests that after the strike the government imposed fines of $60 or two months imprisonment with hardlabour on 34 of the accused agitators.

74 Robeson’s quote can be found in P. Robeson, ‘South African Gold Mine Strike’, in Foner (ed.), Paul RobesonSpeaks, p. 172. Also see, Lynch, Black American Radicals and the Liberation of Africa, p. 32–33.

75 Ibid., p. 33. Several pamphlets giving information about the working conditions in South Africa, the strike, andpoverty among the Africans were also published: Eight Million People Demand Freedom! What About it GeneralSmuts; Seeing Is Believing – Here is the Truth About the Color Bar, Land Hunger, Poverty and Degradation, thePass System, Racial Oppression in South Africa; and Stop South Africa’s Crimes: No Annexation of South WestAfrica.

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South West Africa, increasing the urgency for a response. For these reasons the status of

South West Africa was a critical issue for the Council.76

Article 76, paragraph b, of the United Nations Charter appeared to suggest that as the

trustee of South West Africa, South Africa would have fundamental responsibilities to the

people of that nation. Robeson and the Council were making the case that by extending its

racial policies to South West Africa, South Africa would be contravening part of Article 76.

The paragraph in question states that the trusteeship system should:

promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of thetrust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence asmay be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and freelyexpressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of eachtrusteeship agreement.77

The ambiguity of ‘as may be appropriate to the particular circumstance’ in the second half of

the article somewhat undermines the strong language for ‘self-government’ and

‘independence’ in the first half, but this was still an important declaration. The Charter,

however, went further, providing as a basic objective:

to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of theUnited Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the later in the administration ofjustice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to theprovisions of Article 80.78

The South African government was hopeful of adding South West Africa as a fifth province.

To justify this incorporation, the people of the trust territory had to agree to the inclusion.

This became a fault line that the Council sought to exploit in the interest of the Africans living

in South West Africa. The government of South Africa had alleged that ‘the people’ desired

the annexation of South West Africa. Of course, ‘the people’ referred only to the whites

sympathetic to their perspective on race living in South West Africa. Owing to South Africa’s

racial policies, which they had extended to South West Africa, the wish of the African

peoples was not considered. A battle ensued over the meaning and application of Article 76 to

the case of SouthWest Africa and specifically whether the Africans living there could petition

the United Nations. This determination would be made with the assistance of the United

Nations Trusteeship Council. Rayford Logan, a member of the Council and of the faculty in

the Department of History at Howard University, had argued at the organising meeting of the

UN for strong language empowering the Trusteeship Council ‘to accept petitions’, but the

American delegation had rejected his suggestion.79

Responding as acting Chief of the Division of Dependent Affairs at the State Department,

Ralph Bunche complicated matters for the United States government with regard to the

Trusteeship Council. He observed that:

There is recognition of the right of the inhabitants of trust territories or other interested parties topresent oral as well as written petitions, which may be received and discussed in open meeting.80

Thus, the possibility existed for petitions to be heard concerning South West Africa. Yergan

was confident that if the CAA could force South Africa to relinquish its hold on that region,

76 R. Logan, ‘The Operation of the Mandate System in Africa’, The Journal of Negro History, 13, 4 (October 1928),p. 430.

77 R. Logan, ‘The System of International Trusteeship’, The Journal of Negro Education, 15, 3 (Summer 1946),pp. 285–99; ‘The Problem of Education in Dependent Territories’ (Summer 1946), p. 286.

78 Ibid., p. 287.79 Ibid., p. 289.80 Ibid., p. 295.

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that would at least have symbolic significance. He wrote that a victory at the UN ‘will have

established a great precedent and contributed to one of the most forward looking steps in the

interest of colonial people’. As it had with the famine relief effort, the CAA published

advertisements supporting the position against annexation and requesting the United States

delegation to the UN General Assembly to also fall in line.

Rather than supporting South West Africa, the United States delegation took a middle of

the road approach by ‘the adoption of a resolution which makes possible approval of the

proposal at a later date’.81 Robeson sent a letter to the United States delegation to the United

Nations General Assembly expressing the disappointment of the CAA with the United States’

position on several important issues. He called attention to the fact that the United States

could do a lot more to advance international peace and security if it would follow the lead of

India and the Soviet Union, both of which were demanding freedom for subject peoples. In

the end, the United States government did not respond favourably to the efforts of the CAA,

but its effort was a partial victory for colonial subjects because it had made their demands a

public and international issue. The Council’s efforts were not going without notice.82

The Council’s work was winning praise and supporters across the country and

internationally. Kwame Nkrumah, then Secretary-General of the West African National

Secretariat, wrote to Yergan to express the allegiance of the Secretariat for the work of the

Council. Nkrumah wrote that the Secretariat ‘fully supports you and Mr. Robeson in the

magnificent effort of the unceasing struggle of Africans and peoples of African descent for

their human rights, dignity, respect and self-determination’. Yet, as Nkrumah was

congratulating Yergan and Robeson, the climate of global politics was already undergoing

changes that would challenge the Council’s effectiveness.83

Conclusion

History has not fully rewarded the important role that Yergan, Robeson, Hunton, and the

Council on African Affairs played in the struggle for South Africa’s liberation. Western

societies largely remunerate the victors, and the Council was not triumphant in its efforts with

regard to South Africa, but they were successful in placing the South Africa situation firmly

on the landscape of transnational protest politics in the United States. Yergan’s later turn to

political conservatism legitimated the position of the Cold Warriors, many of whom used the

fight against communist expansion as a pretext for standing between Africans and their

freedom, which further obscured the important role of the CAA had played during this early

period.

Yergan returned to the United States with a charge from African leaders in South Africa

to, in effect, inaugurate what became the anti-apartheid movement in the United States. His

decision was of course tied to the larger anti-colonial effort. It is pointless to separate the

South African question from the anti-colonial question during this period because as a matter

of policy Yergan, Robeson, Hunton, and the other members of the CAA approached the

question of South Africa’s liberation as a part of the anti-colonial struggle. Yergan is singled

out because he lived in South Africa for 14 years. He authored the Council’s initial

programme, selected its primary members, and solicited funds to underwrite it. He did much

of this alongside Paul Robeson, whose contribution to the anti-colonial struggle and South

81 Yergan to Cochran, 19 November 1946, transcript in Cochran, William, Box 206–3, Max Yergan Papers, MSRC.82 P. Robeson to United States Delegation to UN General Assembly, December 6, 1946, in ‘The United Nations

Position on South Africa’, Foner (ed.), Paul Robeson Speaks, pp. 181–82.83 Kwame Nkrumah to Max Yergan, 4 November 1946, Na-No, Box 206–4, Max Yergan Papers, MSRC.

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Africa’s liberation struggle is still under-appreciated by scholars, but especially the wider

public.

By the early 1940s, the Council drew transnational support across the left and thereby

united communists, progressives, liberals, and labour unionist under its banner of anti-

colonialism. Labour was also in support of the CAA and so were many anti-war groups.

Yergan’s association with communists such as Earl Browder and his belief in their principles

injected militancy into the anti-colonial movement, and his concern for the circumstance of

Africans in South Africa placed them firmly on the agenda of a cross-section of liberal groups

in the United States for the first time.

Yergan’s relationship with Alfred Xuma and other South Africans highlights the

important role he played in connecting Africans in the diaspora with those on the continent.

He was in many ways the prototypical transnational figure. Through his relationships with

black leaders in South Africa, such as Xuma, Jabavu, and Naidoo, and his prominent role as a

leader of the Council on Africa Affairs, Yergan was able to build a platform in the United

States for critiquing the racial situation in South Africa and for building a base of

transnational support for black South Africans.

Yergan was undoubtedly a complex figure, and the years to come would reveal him to be

even more enigmatic, but he also was a man who saw the world through the lens of his

personal experience. For many years Yergan applied moral suasion to the South Africa

situation, but ultimately the intractability of the racial oppression in South Africa undermined

his confidence in the ability of Christianity to effectively transform the racial situation of

black South Africans. His acceptance of communism foreshadowed the volatile nature of his

political ethos, which was wrought out of the transformative times in which he lived. Yergan

was very much a part of those times.

CHARLES DENTON JOHNSON

Department of History, Howard University, 2441 Sixth Street, NW, Room 309, Douglas Hall,

Washington, DC 20059, USA. E-mail: charjohnson@howard.edu

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