Laurence E. Horton

MSc in Risk, Crisis and Disaster Management

Institute for Lifelong Learning

Civil Safety and Security Unit

University of Leicester

Intake September 2012

Dissertation

07 September 2014

PERCEPTIONS OF RISK ASSOCIATED WITHINTERNATIONAL TRAVEL

Are lay decisions related to risk informed by expert conceptions of reality?

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PERCEPTIONS OF RISK ASSOCIATED WITH INTERNATIONAL TRAVELAre lay decisions related to risk informed by expert conceptions of reality?

Laurence Horton

Abstract

This study has been carried out to establish to what degree risk perception and decision-making of lay persons is informed by experts. International travel acted as a proxy from which to further generalise. This study' primary objective was to examine the effectiveness of expert communication of data related to travel risks by establishing how strongly lay estimations of risk correlate with such data. This comparison established how much experts inform public risk perception and acted as a metric to compare against survey data regarding lay attitudes to expert informants. The secondary objectives were to discover to what degree laymen engage with expert advice and if they feel sufficiently informed in their decision-making. Together these objectives allow an insight as to how functional the relationship between laymen and experts is. Cross-referencing this data allowed further insight into whether people make counter-rational decisions related to risk despite being informed by experts. This study will show that despite perceiving travel as riskier than the actuality and generally engaging with experts who would inform such pessimistic rationality, most people do not use expert advice to inform decision-making. Previous studies have approached risk perception of international travel by focusing on the ‘why' and 'what' of the decision making process rather than the degree decision-making may deviate from rational choices that experts advocate. As most risk perception research is highly quantitative and questioned in terms of social validity, this research considers social contexts related to lay perceptions and constructions of risk and how these change when in conflict with expert conceptions of reality. This study' framework may allow for more general insights into the relationship between laymen and experts regarding risks and decision-making.

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Contents

1. Introduction - Modern mans informed and logical decision making process? ….4

2. Literature Review and Conceptual Framework - An informed society with contempt for the informers………………………………………………………11

3. Research Methodology - Seeing science in the subjective decision making Process…………………………………………………………………………...32

4. Results, findings and analysis - An illogical and dysfunctional relationship with the logic of the scientific community…and our own………………………43

5. Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Research - A need to reconnect to quantitative truths and logic to educate and inform better decision making………………………………………………………………….62

Appendices…………………………………………………………………………….70

Appendix 1 - Survey Invitation Email…………………………………………70

Appendix 2 - Informed Consent Form…………………………………………71

Appendix 3 - Online Survey (including raw data)……………………………..72

Appendix 4 - Presentation of Results…………………………………………..80

Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………..110

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1. Introduction

Modern mans informed and logical decision making process?

The purpose of this study is to establish to what degree risk perception and

decision making of lay persons is informed by experts and provide an insight into how

effective current risk communication strategies are in influencing behaviour. As most

risk perception research is highly quantitative and questioned in terms of social validity,

this research considers social contexts related lay perceptions and constructions of risk

and how these change when in conflict with expert conceptions of reality. It is the

responsibility of experts who expect our deference to not only provide the public with

information on day-to-day risks but also to ensure and maintain a healthy

communicative relationship with lay persons. This study will give some indication as to

whether modern society makes people less susceptible to risks due to expertly sourced

knowledge in the public domain, or whether people act autonomously regardless of the

availability of such knowledge. Validating if lay decisions related risk may be

disconnected from expert advice is important as more in depth studies can investigate

why this may be.

At every level in all societies, choices and decisions must be made. As all

actions have consequences, the uncertainty of those consequences is what may be

considered a risk. When choices are made, world-views further influence how

particular risks come to be (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2012, Module 1, Unit 1: 5).

Risks commit people to live in an uncertain world where they cannot control or predict

accurately what may happen. Yet, people cannot leave all things as postmodernists

would have it to fate (Coote: 124). As such lay persons put trust in the experts who can

educate decision making amidst such uncertainty. Only quite recently has science

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earned its place over clergymen or cosmologists as the 'expert' opinions of the public

domain wherein an extraordinary optimism about science and technology has led to

almost universal deference to scientific experts (Durant, 1998: 70-71). Technological

and social advancement has given society the tools to make the world a better place and

also inform rationality, but events over the last fifty years or so have caused friction in

the relationship between lay people and experts. Amongst others; CFCs, nuclear power,

the UK BSE crisis, confusion over the MMR vaccine, uncertainty in the scientific

community about global warming, food and drink safety and military action without

public consensus have caused the public to question their relationships with those with

the power to both inform and make decisions at the international level. As such it can

be suggested that this relationship does not fulfil its fundamental and prescribed role.

Furthermore, lay persons are questioning whether technocratic and expert world-views

should inform decision making at an individual level. Risk affects everyone' lives and is

usually spoken of as a negative. Yet, understanding risk allows us to mitigate it. As

such, the more apparent it is, the more we can avoid it. Although, some risks are easily

identified like driving or smoking, others can become obscured due to conflicting or

complex arguments. Debates about nuclear power, transport and the environment are

just some examples where experts disagree about the effects of risks (Institute of

Lifelong Learning, 2012, Module 1, Unit 1: 5).

Some sociologists claim society is experiencing the 'decline of deference'

wherein lay persons are less inclined to place trust in traditional authority figures like

doctors, teachers, police officers, clergymen, politicians, judges and journalists.

Whether this is good or bad in terms of risk is a point of discourse, punctuated by the

notion of whether authority figures deserve our unquestioned respect. Problems

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materialise as "irrational" behaviour by politicians and bureaucrats, unaccountability

and declining public trust in scientific expertise (Hood and Jones, 1996: xi). Late

modern pluralism is permeating society as now society is "in a situation where no

single view of risk can claim authority or is wholly acceptable" (Turner, 1994: 148) and

it is becoming clear that "there is no expert on risk" (Beck, 1992: 29). Regardless of the

conflicting information from the experts and politicians that society may no longer trust

to keep them informed, people still make decisions. This further intensifies insecurity,

which for Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens embodies the transition from one form of

society to another (Franklin, 1998: 1-2) by moving from the first phase of modernity

through the risk society into the second phase or 'post-modernity'. Anthony Giddens

claims that to be living 'after tradition is essentially to be in a world where life is no

longer lived as fate' (Giddens, 1998: 26). Through experience, people are beginning to

realise they can no longer rely on experts to guide them in the choices they make and

are forced to make decisions in the light of conflicting information. People may simply

not trust politicians and experts because they do not know how to say that they don't

know (Franklin, 1998: 5). People expect politicians to answer questions and protect

them from risk, yet when they cannot, they find themselves resenting them (ibid.: 7).

The increasing reliance upon expert opinion by everyone in modern society is

paralleled by the growing ability of many people, reinforced by modern media, to

deconstruct political reassurance as scientific or technical 'fact' (Grove-White, 1998:

51).

Globalisation' effect on both perceptions and exposure to risk can be seen in the

increasing frequency of overseas travel, notably travel to developing countries which

pose increased health and safety risks to travellers. Risks people may be exposed to

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while abroad include violent crime, political, economic and societal unrest,

governmental stability and conflicts perhaps resulting in war and/or terrorism.

Furthermore risks such as not wearing safety belts in cars, driving in unserviceable

vehicles, taking part in activities in dangerous areas, risk of malaria and poor water

quality pose a considerable risk in developing countries This is by no means an

exhaustive list, but it does illuminate some of the many increased risks posed to people

whilst abroad.

The initial idea for this research began with an interest into why people chose to

live in countries which have poorer public safety records than those of their home

countries. Looking more closely at the topic highlighted the multitude of risks that

people may be exposed to when abroad on a more general level. Discovering how

people developed attitudes to these risks seemed a pragmatic way to investigate both

risk perception and risk communication. In choosing suitable research types, secondary

data and a survey were chosen as the most appropriate methods. These methods

allowed for collection of both quantitative and qualitative data as to improve the

validity of the research. The coupling of these approaches allowed for socially

constructed reality to be represented alongside positivist objectivity and provides a

basis for further research into rationality. Existing research lacks conceptualisation of

the relationship between how objective quantitative studies may inform ideas

concerned with social construction and vice versa. Risk perception, risk communication

and social learning have been identified as the appropriate theories to be explored to

expand the framework concepts to broaden applicability and generalisability. This

research has been carried out with all commonwealth nationals. The key objectives that

were identified to ensure concentrated study were:

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To assess the difference between the lay perception of being exposed to a

significant risk during international travel and the statistical actuality of being

exposed to such risks.

Establish if commonwealth nationals feel sufficiently informed by experts in

their decision-making.

Establish the degree to which expert opinion influences lay decision making

related to risks and gain an insight into what factors may affect this.

This will be a comparative piece of research which will compare official

statistics on injury and death during international travel against data from an online

survey concerned with people's estimations of risk during international travel and

attitudes to public information provided by experts. The expert world-views and advice

which will be used to ascertain to what degree lay persons perception of travel risks

correlates with expertly disseminated statistics will be those of the Foreign and

Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Office of National Statistics (ONS). FCO and

ONS statistics were chosen as the source for comparative data as they are collected and

collated by the UK government and as such have a high degree of reliability.

Furthermore, this data and advice is both easily accessible to the public and provided to

other organisations to disseminate.

The publications used were ‘Travel Trends 2013' from the ONS which states

that in 2012/13 58.5 million UK residents travelled abroad (ONS, 2014a) and ‘British

Behaviour Abroad 2013' from the FCO which states that the FCO gave assistance to

more than 19,000 Brits in need in 2012/13 (FCO, 2013b). The FCO's Know Before You

Go campaign encourages British nationals to prepare for their foreign travel so they can

avoid preventable problems. It targets several audiences and works with around 600

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travel industry partners to communicate its messages (FCO, 2013b). This qualifies their

advice as sufficiently accessible to lay persons. From participants responses it can be

established if people seek or pay attention to such advice in regards to understanding

and mitigating risks during international travel. Analysis of these results will indicate

how accurate people's perceptions of the risks of international travel are and as such

establish how well public information about risk is communicated by experts. This data

is further compared against attitudinal perspectives from optional free text questions

within the survey to establish the reasoning behind the results. Depending on how well

people are informed, the qualitative data on attitudes may suggest why. Analysing data

on travel to show how much perception of risk and decision making is informed by

experts may show that there is a fundamental difference in world views between lay

persons and experts.

Establishing if lay perceptions of risk are informed by expert conceptions of

reality lays the foundation for asking why this may be the case. If the relationship

between powerful social informants and the general public can be proven to not only be

dysfunctional but increasingly so, claims of an increasingly globalised society which is

incapable of effectively utilising its means in a postmodern fashion shall be evidenced.

As such for all society' modernising and connectivity we are indeed susceptible to more

risks than ever before as we don't get the information we need and don't listen when we

do. Furthermore, our globalised world may be amplifying a less risk averse,

adventurous and autonomous post-modernist psychology. This research shows that the

rationality of the general public is not only increasingly disproving functionalist and

Marxist claims about society but also disregarding any individual logic that may be

influenced by technocratic or expert advice. As such, people may be disregarding both

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subjectively created logic through the lens of society and personal interpretation as well

as objectively informed logic from experts and scientists.

This study will show that although lay persons seek and trust advice form

experts they rarely utilise it. Although this may suggest that experts are ineffective in

their roles as social advisors, the findings of this study suggest it is quite likely the

choice to remain autonomous in their decision making that precludes lay persons from

making rational and informed choices. Until a risk communication model which

encourages reflexivity on behalf of both experts and lay persons evolves, the human

decision making process is still likely to remain irrational and result in adverse events.

How and to what scale information may be lost due to a dysfunctional relationship

between experts and lay people is of great relevance to society at large. Furthermore,

evaluating how much expert advice influences decision making or discovering if people

feel that they feel communicated to effectively, may illuminate how reflexive lay and

expert attitudes to risk may be. As an examination of human nature and the rationality

behind decisions related to risk, this research can act as a proxy for a more general

understanding of human decision making in multiple contexts.

To understand and draw from previous research a full literature review will

follow. This paper will go on to illustrate the methods used to collect the research data

alongside its challenges and restrictions. An analysis of this study's findings will then

assess both the degree to which risk perception and decision making of lay persons is

informed by experts and how much rationality influences this. This analysis will

support both the conclusions and suggestions for further research.

2. Literature review and conceptual framework

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An informed society with contempt for the informers

This literature review will provide a comprehensive overview of the research

and theory that contributed to developing the research methodology of this study and

the conceptual framework for the analysis of its results. The appropriate theories

identified to be explored as to expand the framework concepts and to broaden

applicability and generalisability of this study are risk perception, risk communication

and social learning as well as political and social theoretical concepts related to the

nature of risk. These are all critical in establishing to what degree risk perception and

decision making of lay persons is informed by experts as this relationship, like risk, is a

multidimensional social construct. How and to what scale information may be is lost

due to a dysfunctional relationship between experts and lay people is of great relevance

to society at large as a functional form of this relationship would not only help people

effectively mitigate risk, it may also help reconcile differences between lay persons and

experts. Furthermore, evaluating how much expert advice influences decision making

or discovering if people feel that they are communicated to effectively, may illuminate

how reflexive lay and expert attitudes to risk may be.

Risk perception

Risk perception involves people's beliefs, attitudes, judgements and feelings, as

well as the wider social or cultural values that people adopt towards hazards and their

benefits (Pidgeon et al., 1992: 89). It is multidimensional and personalistic, with

particular risks or hazards meaning different things to different people and in different

contexts (Warner, 1992: 7). Until recently, most risk research has been very quantitative

and carried out in a scientific and objective fashion. This research may be considered as

reliable as others may replicate the results yet its social validity is increasingly

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questioned (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 2, Unit 2: 3). Amongst others,

Slovic (1987) criticises how much quantified research illustrates the reality of decision-

makers using limited information and where judgements are often influenced by ‘trust'

or ‘intuition'. More recent social psychological approaches consider the social and

cultural contexts in which lay people perceive risk, and how they may change when in

conflict with expert conceptions of reality. Regardless of their methodological

differences, they can be generally placed into groups of risk perception, cognitive,

decision-making, psychometric and the more recent ‘mental models' approach (Institute

of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 2, Unit 2: 3).

Psychological theorists believe risk is a real and objective entity, and as such

can be quantitatively analysed. Traditionally, psychologists have attempted to

comprehend risks by selecting a variable for an experiment or through collecting and

analysing data using social surveys. This research paradigm is known as risk perception

and often compares ‘perceived risks' against a calibrated `actual risk' within a particular

population sample (ibid.: 4). Earlier work in risk perception used mostly quantitative

approaches. However, more recently, qualitative approaches have been employed as the

significant use of quantitative approaches was questioned as the definition and

measurement of risk was considered problematic (ibid., Module 2, Unit 1: 5). Early

psychological empirical studies of risk perception, in particular those pioneered by the

Decision Research Group led by Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischoff and Sarah Liechtenstein

(1980) have been extensively replicated and extended (Pidgeon et al, 1992: 90).

The classic method to test perception of risk was providing a sample group of

subjects with a situation involving decision-making. Under controlled conditions,

subjects would choose from a selection of options which would then be recorded and

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analysed. From this work, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky established (Institute

of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 2, Unit 2: 4-5) that, under certain predefined

conditions, there is a statistical likelihood that people will display certain preferences

which will often display logic very much unrelated to rational decision-making

(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).

Breakwell (2007) claims there is a large amount of psychological research on

decision making about risk, specifically when choices are made about probabilities with

incomplete information (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2012, Module 5, Unit 1: 8).

'Heuristic principles' often bias such decisions. The availability heuristic occurs when

‘‘people assume that the probability is greater if they can easily remember an instance

of the event '' (Breakwell, 2007: 80). This causes people to remember dramatic, unusual

or recent events more than frequent and normalised events regardless of their nature.

Some believe this phenomena causes the irrational degree to which we try to protect

ourselves against low frequency risks. The extent of human irrationality towards risk

shows how society wishes to control that which it cannot predict.

Another type of research associated with risk perception is psychometrics.

Psychometric studies collect and measure psychological variables related to a

phenomenon from individuals in a sample population. Such tests involve analysis of

data to show how a sample perceives certain risks. This approach also attempts to

consider qualitative characteristics of hazards. Early psychometric studies measured the

degree to which people perceived how certain risks relate to fatalities. These studies

stemmed from increasing social and political pressures to investigate public perceptions

of risks as to better inform and re-educate the public (Institute of Lifelong Learning,

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2011, Module 2, Unit 2: 30-31) if they disagree with expert conceptions of reality

(ibid.: 2-3).

One significant study involved educated non-experts making judgements about

fatality rates from several known hazards. The responses were compared against the

actual death rates (ibid.: 6). The study discovered subjects tended to overestimate death

rates for low frequency hazards while underestimating death rates for high frequency

hazards (Lichtenstein et al., 1978). This was significant as it enabled theorists to

measure irrationality towards significant risk issues (Institute of Lifelong Learning,

2011, Module 2, Unit 2: 6). Fischoff argues that such work demonstrates the degree of

rationality or confusion in relation to risk (Fischoff, 1990). However, risk perception

has been shown to be far more complex than this study alone suggested. Starr (1969)

discovered a difference between the way voluntary and involuntary risks of which

people are more fearful are perceived. He argued individual perception of a risk may be

affected by the degree that risk was considered to be self-imposed, in contrast to risks

imposed by uncontrollable outside forces. Involuntary risks were for Starr defined as

(Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 2, Unit 2: 6) "imposed by the society in

which the individual lives" (Starr, 1969: 165).

Otway and von Winfeldt (1982) and Slovic et al. (1980) have attempted to

understand what Slovic has described as the ‘personality' of hazards (Slovic, 1992).

Otway and von Winfeldt argued, based on survey research, that there are several

‘negative hazard attributes' which may influence people's risk perception (Institute of

Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 2, Unit 2: 31-32). These have been summarised by

Pidgeon et al. (1992) as:

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1. Involuntary exposure to risk.

2. Lack of personal control over outcomes.

3. Uncertainty about probabilities or consequences of exposure.

4. Lack of personal experience with the risk (fear of the unknown).

5. Difficulty in imagining risk exposure.

6. Effects of exposure delayed in time.

7. Genetic effects of exposure (threatens future generations).

8. Infrequent but catastrophic accidents (‘kill size').

9. Benefits not highly visible.

10. Benefits go to others (inequity).

11. Accidents caused by human failure rather than natural causes (Royal Society, 1992:

101).

This study' significance is due to how it highlights the complexity of social

features which may affect risk perception. As such, the measurement of risk must be

sensitive to understanding how risks are perceived. This also suggests that what may

seem as an irrational view may actually be a logical construction of a perceived reality

(Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 2, Unit 2: 7). These studies highlighted

the complexity of influences upon lay perceptions of risk. Furthermore, that risk

perception could be measured and the results replicated was important because different

studies could be compared to produce general conclusions about public perceptions of

risk (ibid.: 8). However, respondents were restricted to giving views only on the

hazards mentioned causing relationships between other risks to remain unknown.

Nonetheless, this criticism could be addressed by good questionnaire design, the use of

pilot surveys and the addition of further axes of questioning (ibid.).

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Psychometric approaches to risk perception have been increasingly criticised by

‘risk communication' theorists, who question the social context within which

communication takes place between ‘lay' and ‘expert' groups. They believe this affects

the way people develop their perceptions of risk. The bias towards empirical methods

within psychology also exists as some researchers wish to produce work which can be

evaluated in a purely scientific fashion (ibid.: 11-12). Furthermore, although

psychometric approaches are well grounded in an empirical sense they offer a limited

theoretical framework (Pidgeon et al., 1992: 124-125). Social scientists do not limit

themselves to purely quantitative analysis as 'there are serious difficulties in attempting

to view risk as a one-dimensional concept ... when...a particular risk or hazard means

different things to different people in different contexts' (Warner, 1992: 7). Social

science' wish to consider qualitative dimensions of risk led some theorists to adopt a

mental models approach (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 2, Unit 2: 8).

The mental models approach may be viewed as being based on both the

psychometric and decision-making traditions, as well as theories of risk communication

(Bostrom et al., 1991). Criticisms of the psychometric approach were addressed to an

extent by the mental models approach which aims to improve effectiveness of risk

communication strategies by assisting people to make informed choices about risks.

Initially, a group of experts would be selected to establish what they thought about a

certain hazard through semi-structured and open-ended interviews. Prompted by

photographs, the experts would be interviewed about a certain hazard. This would be

used to highlight the known risks from the hazard and the expert's conceptions of how

they viewed said hazard (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 2, Unit 2: 9).

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Lay perceptions of the risk would be analysed in the same way and mapped on to the

expert conceptions to identify any gaps and misconceptions in the lay people's beliefs.

Lay people would then be shown the expert influence diagrams and photographs to

prompt them to discover whether their beliefs about the hazard are incomplete or

misinformed (ibid.). Bostrom et al. (1991) argue this is useful to illustrate personal

psychological portrayals of certain risks for analysis. Bostrom argued this technique

could be useful in improving lay people's conceptions, by concentrating risk

communication work on risks where lay perceptions most need informing (Institute of

Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 2, Unit 2: 10). There are several criticisms of this

approach including whether the interview techniques are sensitive enough to establish a

complete picture of how subjects view certain hazards. Furthermore, paying informants

to assist in a ‘study of a risk' is likely to suggest to subjects that they are being

questioned about a dangerous phenomenon (ibid.). More recent approaches to risk

perception such as cultural theory have been subjected to fewer empirical studies than

the approaches discussed above, but may offer broader and more valuable theoretical

insights into risk perception (Pidgeon et al., 1992: 124-125).

Most would agree that the physical consequences of hazards, such as deaths,

injuries and environmental harm, are objective facts (Pidgeon et al., 1992: 90).

However, within the behavioural sciences there are disagreements. Some psychologists

argue lay persons don’t view risks as a result of scientific rationality, but rather as a

socially construct which inherently involves a degree of subjectivity. Nonetheless,

psychological views have been criticised by anthropologists as failing to take account

of the cultural dimensions of risk perception (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2011,

Module 2, Unit 4: 8-10). Mary Douglas claims ‘the profession of psychologists which

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has grown up to study risk perception takes the culturally innocent approach by treating

political dissension as intellectual disagreement' (Douglas, 1990: 9). The Royal Society

Study Group further support this view as '...one of the major challenges to orthodox

psychological approaches to risk perception over the past ten years has come from the

grid-group 'cultural theory' proposed by the anthropologist Mary Douglas and her

colleagues' (Royal Society, 1992: 112).

Although people try to make logical choices, rationality is limited by belief and

experience. As such cultural and psychological factors may affect perception of risk.

Research has shown people typically base risk perception on experiences and beliefs

unrelated to any mathematical model or scientifically reasoned understanding of the

situation (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2012, Module 1, Unit 5: 5). As such, Douglas

and Wildavsky (1982) believe different societies and individuals interpret and measure

risks and hazards in different ways. Such social and individual perspectives suggest that

risk perception is not objective but subjective (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2012,

Module 1, Unit 5: 5). Other authors support this view in claiming: "it is unrealistic to

presume that the fundamental processes of risk assessment are objective" (Reid, 1992:

151). Also that: "[a]ll judgements about hazards or risks are value-laden" (Shrader-

Frechette, 1991: 220). Paul Slovic (1992: 119) states that: "[t]here is no such thing as

‘real risk' or ‘objective risk'". As such it is suggested that both risk and risk perception

can be seen as being subjective in nature (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2012, Module

1, Unit 5: 6).

Risk communication

Governments and private industry are increasingly required to inform people

about the environmental, technological and health hazards to which they may be

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exposed (Pidgeon et al., 1992: 118). Risk communication can be defined as the

techniques used by experts to inform lay people about such risks and influence

behaviour related to how people perceive risks and rationalise decision making

(Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 2, Unit 3: 3). Risk communication

theorists are concerned with the dialogue, or lack thereof, between expert and lay

persons (Irwin, 1989; Wynne, 1989). Risk communication research emerged from high

profile public policy problems which resulted from social conflicts over risks (Krimsky

and Plough, 1988). Much of the early work in risk communication had the objective of

resolving such conflicts (Borodzicz et al., 1993).

Risk perception research illustrates the plethora of ‘socially constructed' world-

views that contribute to such disputes. As risk communicators and lay persons may

ineffectively communicate with each other, both channels of communication may

become lost and as such make risk communication redundant. Consequently, it is

considered that in accommodating appropriate forms of communication between the

parties to such disputes, better mutual understanding may lead to conflict resolution.

However, achieving this effectively with persons who may have different perspectives

on the problem sets a more challenging task (Pidgeon et al., 1992: 119).

Current risk management practices assume science best explains and manages

the multiplying risks of the modern world - many ironically generated by science itself.

As such, it can be asked whether science is quite as rational and objective as its

advocates suggest since it is a human construction (Institute of Lifelong Learning,

2011, Module 2, Unit 3: 3). Furthermore, expert approaches, it is argued are based upon

a misconception of 'science' as within the scientific community subjective factors

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(social, cultural and psychological) either do not, or minimally, influence the decision-

making process (ibid., Unit 1: 6-7).

The deficit model of risk communication assumes the public are passive and

ignorant. Yet, the public already holds opinions on a range of matters, and is far from

lacking in knowledge. However, such knowledge is unstructured and not subject to

‘methodical scepticism', fallibilism or peer review (ibid., Unit 3: 20). Risk

communication theorists claim lay people's perceptions of risk are influenced by

subjective factors not considered by science and are characterised as being constructed

within irrational and non-objective models of reality (Institute of Lifelong Learning,

2011, Module 2, Unit 1: 6). Some claim this is because experts count lost lives while

the public focuses on several other aspects, more specifically fairness and

controllability (Irwin, 1989; Wynne, 1989). Nevertheless, such knowledge can help tell

risk communicators how the public understands the world and help improve risk

communication.

One-way models of risk communication are highly criticised as by assuming an

altruistic communicator it devalues the perspectives and knowledge of the people at

risk, while ignoring the political aspects to many of the risk conflicts in society

(Pidgeon et al., 1992: 120). There are many publics within any society, each with

possibly different worldviews and frameworks for approaching risk problems. This

highlights the complexities of risk communication (ibid.: 121). Much of the currently

available advice on communicating risk information lacks direct empirical validation

either in terms of its effectiveness to meet goals or in its capacity to avoid unintended

consequences. The latter appears important as health and economic damage may result

from poor risk communication, and sets a significant future research agenda for risk

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communication researchers (ibid.: 122). Furthermore, miscommunication may be

causing confusion which in turn is rationalizing dangerous decision making.

Trust in regard to risk communication was first raised by Brian Wynne (1980,

1982) who argued that due to technological risks some of the differences between

expert and lay perceptions might be due to different perceptions of the relation between

risk outcomes and the trustworthiness of risk-management institutions (Pidgeon et al.,

1992: 123). As Lee (1986) points out, persuasive communication studies indicate the

reputation of communicators is relies highly upon the trust placed in them. As Wynne

(1992: 278) explains ‘the heart of risk perceptions and risk conflicts [is] not the issue of

technical risk magnitudes, but rather trust in institutions [...] trust [is an] essential

dimension of social life and institutional viability'. If we do not trust the source, we do

not trust the message (Pidgeon et al., 1992: 122). Laird (1989) illustrates that lack of

trust in risk management institutions may result from a more general loss of faith by the

public in institutions and an unwillingness to assign responsibility for important

decisions to institutions (Pidgeon et al., 1992: 123). In talking about trust in both

scientific and technological progress, Anthony Giddens differentiates between trust in

the time of ‘simple modernity', and trust in our present ‘reflexive modernity' (Giddens

in Lash et al., 1996: 44-83). According to Giddens in ‘simple modernity', trust was

willingly given to the modernist institutions of science and technology. However in

today's ‘reflexive modernity', trust is a matter of ‘deliberative choice' (Institute of

Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 6, Unit 9: 3).

The relationship between the British public and the UK' nuclear industry

provides a valuable test of Giddens' and Ulrich Beck' theories of ‘reflexive modernity'.

It is broadly considered that opposition to the nuclear industry originated in the

21

environmental movements of the 1970s. Nonetheless, Wynne believes the lack of

dissent before this decade should not be interpreted as acceptance of and support for the

industry (ibid.). Rather, it was feelings of helplessness and powerlessness when faced

with a pro-nuclear British political establishment that may have persuaded people that

there was little point in protesting (ibid.). Furthermore, according to Beck (1992: 37),

the ‘boomerang effect' of scientific and technological development, where supposedly

life-enriching innovations fail to improve the human condition, undermines the

legitimacy of institutions which promote scientific and technological development

(Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 6, Unit 9: 4). Flawed science may be

causing disinterest and disbelief in experts and in turn the social forces that promote

them within society. As such the decision making process of lay persons may not rely

upon expert opinion, suggesting expert constructions of reality conflict with those of

laymen.

Brian Wynne (1996) studied sheep farmers in Cumbria, England, who were

subjected to administrative restrictions due to radioactive contamination, allegedly

caused by the nuclear accident at Chernobyl in 1986. The sheep farmers suffered

economical losses, and it emerged the source of radioactivity was in fact the Sellafield

nuclear reprocessing complex; thus, the experts responsible for the restrictions were

mistaken. This case illustrates how scientific interpretation controlled and intimidated

the farmers and furthermore how privileged scientific knowledge neglects and de-

legitimises specialist lay knowledge in presupposing ignorance or irrationality. It also

indicates the social basis of scientific knowledge and its public credibility (Institute of

Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 2, Unit 4: 18-22). Furthermore, the different world

views which are now recognised as underpinning different perceptions of risk means

22

presumptions and principles about risk are based upon very different conceptual

foundations (Krimsky and Golding, 1992; Wynne, 1996). When formal scientific

discourse is the only explanation the public is sufficiently pragmatic to listen to and

follow advice. However, as Wynne explains, we should not misinterpret such pragmatic

quiescence as a firm belief in science and scientists as dependence doesn't necessarily

require agreement (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 6, Unit 9: 5). In terms

of the relationship between lay persons and experts, Wynne' work has further

implications in how the experts undermined the farmers' history and identity. Whereas

in ‘late-modernity', people often define themselves through consumption patterns, in

traditional societies, people often define themselves in terms of their work.

Undermining this association risks destroying a person's identity (ibid., Module 2, Unit

3: 18). Identity is fundamental to a pluralistic post modern world. As such, the notion

that expert advice may neuter pluralism may affect how people engage with it.

Wynne' work critiques the distinction drawn between expert and lay decision

makers in much of the psychological and sociological work on risk. Wynne argues that

expert or scientific conceptions of science and truths are wrong as they are based upon

purely objective factors, and ignores social, cultural and psychological factors which

are very much subjective (ibid., Unit 1: 6). This suggests experts disregard subjectivity

in the decision making process and furthermore social truths, and as such believe the

general publics' perceptions are built upon irrational and subjective models of reality

(Bennett, 2012: 10). The relationship between expert and lay conceptions of risk is

complicated further by the theory of late modernity which suggests that an increasingly

sceptical or ‘reflexive' (Beck, 1992; 2009) society is challenging the traditional

structures of authority (scientists, politicians, doctors, engineers, legal officials) and

23

their explanations for patterns and truths in the world around us (Bennett, 2012: 1). A

paradox lies at the centre of late modernity, as the more science and objective,

quantitative logic develops, the more it is questioned (ibid.). This infers that individuals

may be purposefully making decisions which counter positivist and scientific rationale,

as the more science affects our lives the less we accept its authority (Beck, 2009).

Consequently, decisions made by lay people to disregard what scientists or ‘experts'

would regard as quantified fact may result in increased exposure to risk and adverse

events. Ulrich Beck claims the solution to this problem is for science to engage with

society's increasing reflexivity (Beck, 1992).

Lay person' difficulty in understanding information communicated by experts is

compounded by public questioning of political and expert assertions which some

experts attribute to irrational folk world views based on a mistrust of expertise and

progress (Wynne, 1992). Nonetheless, governments may be complicit in

misrepresenting risks through poor communication of the relative scale of risks to

achieve political and economic gains. This notion suggests that mistrust in experts may

not be as unintuitive as is likely assumed. The one-way nature of this relationship is

evidence that poor risk communication by expert may be disguising poor lay decision

making. Another aspect of the debate is that experts must consider that "numerical

information is capable of seriously misleading those who use it" (Funtowicz and

Ravetz, 1990: 10). This may cause problems for people who have difficulties

understanding expressions of probability related to evaluation of hazards. This is further

complicated by the abstract language that such information is often presented with

(Covello, 1991; Covello et al., 1986; Slovic and Fischoff, 1983). Furthermore, experts

themselves can also make mistakes when dealing with probability estimates.

24

Gigerenzer (2002) reports research showing that senior doctors made such mistakes

when interpreting the results of diagnostic tests to advise patients on their chances of

having an illness and a successful treatment. He argues that confusions arise where data

is presented as percentages and probabilities (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2012,

Module 1, Unit 5: 11). People find it difficult to either comprehend or believe

probability. This apparent irrationality of popular risk perception suggests people have a

problem of cognition or trust in official and / or scientific data sources (ibid., Module 2,

Unit 1: 4). Toft and Reynolds highlight that society should not ignore the fact that

‘where people decide that a particular activity is safe, they continue to engage in it

regardless of expert advice or the evidence' (Toft and Reynolds, 2005: 3).

Wynne's concept of social learning states that, informed decision-making on

technological and/or scientific questions requires both transparency and candidness in

all intellectual and ideological transactions between parties (Wynne, 1992 in Institute of

Lifelong Learning, Module 4, Unit 1: 11-12). Social learning advocates reflexivity to

allow experts to accommodate society' irrational reactions to risks. As if subjective

rationalities are not recognised by experts it is unlikely they will aggregate to form a

mutually beneficial discourse, further perpetuating the unbalanced narrative on risk and

continuing to undermine both lay and expert opinion.

World-views and conceptions of reality

World-views are the ways people interpret the world. The influence between

individual and collective world-views is significant in examining the influences of

culture and power upon risk perception. A specific world-view prescribes a complex

and dynamic set of beliefs, values, assumptions, opinions, attitudes and motivations

25

which form our (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2012, Module 1, Unit 3: 10) perceptual

biases about the world. Shared world-views are important for integration and stability

in society yet, different world-views may be so irreconcilable that clashes and conflicts

occur.

The functionalist world-view is objective and consistent with beliefs that the

structures of society, politics, business and organisations have predetermined functions

necessary to maintain social order. Furthermore, some functionalists believe society

exists to support and serve capitalist interests. Interpretative world-views cross a desire

for order with assumptions that aspects of society, politics, business and organisations

are not pre-determined but socially constructed. Interpretivist also admit that multiple

interests, rationalities and even realities are recognised as legitimate. For example, non-

expert perceptions of risk, which may be marginalised or considered insignificant in a

functionalist world-view, would be highly relevant from an interpretative perspective

(Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 1, Unit 3: 11). The debates about the

way functionalist and interpretative world-views and modernist and postmodernist

perspectives are compared are closely linked (Carter and Jackson, 1991; Waring, 1993).

The new ‘Realpolitik' in social analysis, which Beck advocates, stresses continuity

between world-view types and seeks to accommodate different perspectives (Waring,

1993, 1996 in Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 1, Unit 3: 12).

Every day people make many decisions related to risk believing they are

appropriate. Nonetheless, powerful socio-psychological processes can affect both

individuals and groups. If unrecognised and poorly managed, these influences can

increase the likelihood of inappropriate decisions being made (Toft and Reynolds,

2005: 9). The problem to be addressed in this research is whether, as Ulrich Beck

26

suggests, that in the Risk Society, humans are in touch with and aware of the risks in

the modern world.

Risk society and late modernity suggest the world is changing at an increasing

rate. Furthermore, Beck (1992) claims risks will become more prevalent due to

globalisation, industrialization and modernisation which increase exposure to risk. Beck

highlights how the perceptions of risks are inclined to being ‘magnified, dramatized or

minimized' by key ideological institutions, primarily the media and states (Beck, 1992,

cited in Waddington and McSeveny 2011: 45). Furthermore, late modern societies are

reflexive societies wherein the centres of power and things that once made us feel

secure like science, technology, medicine , the state, judiciary, the law and

bureaucracy; unsettle us and as such are challenged (Bennett: 12-13). Although greatly

aided by hyper-connectivity, globalisation and information technology humans have

begun to question the validity of scientific expertise.

New types of incalculability are emerging through what Giddens and Beck call

manufactured uncertainty. Here the production of risks from scientific and political

efforts to control or minimize them (Beck, 1998: 12) are turning society into a

laboratory where nobody is in charge (ibid: 9). The new discoveries and technologies of

science create unprecedented risks at an ever increasing rate. Furthermore, these new

risks are a product of a community of experts being given the green light by politicians.

In the case of risk conflicts, politicians can no longer rely on scientific experts as there

are always competing and conflicting viewpoints from a many individuals and groups

who define risks very differently. Nonetheless, producing conflicting knowledge on risk

is the purpose of scientific investigation. Secondly, experts can only supply more or less

27

uncertain factual information about probabilities, but never answer the question: which

risk is acceptable and which is not. Thirdly, if politicians just implement scientific

advice, they become caught in the mistakes, modes and uncertainties of scientific

knowledge (ibid.: 13-14).

Postmodernism

A dictionary definition of ‘modernism' is ‘to subordinate tradition to harmony

with modern thought' (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1982), whereas ‘postmodernism, is

‘a style of thought that rejects the dogma and practices of any from of modernism'

(Collins Concise English Dictionary, 1992). Lash (1990: 261-3) believes this society, is

characterised by struggle for change and individual groups attempting to achieve

autonomy. It defines a complex society where all processes are not as monolithic and

deferential to the established knowledge and power structures but more pluralistic in

their construction and execution (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2012, Module 5, Unit

5: 7). In a truly postmodern society, although potential disharmony must be allowed for,

different conceptions of reality must be reconciled as to minimise conflict (ibid.: 15).

Although many believe we exist in a ‘post-modern' society (Beck, 1992; Giddens,

1991), others argue that failure to effectively manage risks shows our inability to

become modern let alone post modern (Latour, 1991). Bruno Latour counters Beck in

claiming postmodernism is still elusive, and suggests we are currently unable to control

risk to a degree that can be called post-modern.

Postmodern cultures are claimed to be less deferential towards all types of

experts as they are considered part of the problem rather than the solution (Durant,

1998: 72). The relationship between politicians, policy makers and lay people has

28

always been tumultuous and volatile and one may hypothesise that the way technocrats,

experts at large and the scientific community are regarded by lay people may be

increasingly less deferential. The notion that we may be becoming a postmodernist

society where expert opinions of the scientific community are increasingly rejected by

society is further supported by the increasing criticism of the relationship between

science and capitalism which produces no universal good (McNeill and Chapman,

2005: 185) as "the knowledge is spreading that the sources of wealth are ‘polluted' by

growing ‘hazardous side effects" (Beck, 1992: 20). Together, Beck, Latour and

Giddens, in different ways, attempt to explain that we do not live in a postmodern

society without control. Nonetheless, if as Beck suggests, society is postmodern and we

are more in control of risks, we shall simultaneously be less deferential towards the

power structures of old. This suggests lay persons are inherently able to mitigate risk as

they no longer require advice to inform decisions on risk and assumes we have become

exceptionally logical individuals who can determine what is best for ourselves without

having to consult experts. It seems illogical to assume such a notion, as to forego

scientific truth in the name of postmodern autonomy can only serve to perpetuate

misinformed decision making and the institutionalization of irrationality within the lay

populous.

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, science replaced religion as the

major source of knowledge in western societies as (McNeill and Chapman, 2005: 172)

‘empirical, rational science usurped...the tradition of religion' (Woodward and Watt,

2000). Furthermore, "Up until the Scientific Revolution ... we apparently had no need

for a concept like ‘accident'. Religion and superstition supplied adequate explanatory

29

models...No longer do we see accidents as meaningless, uncontrollable events...

accidents are evidence that a particular risk was not managed well enough" (Dekker ,

2012). Although scientific accuracy is now commonplace and facts and figures

dominate the structure of society, have experts and scientists been deified only to be

dethroned by a post modernist apathy to technocracy and expert opinion due to an

increasing unease or disappointment with both experts and the establishment .

Marxism claims that politics, hierarchy, economics and the vested interests

therein may control and cause conflict with the general public. Positivists too suggest

that people are controlled by social forces (McNeill and Chapman, 2005: 15). As such

these social forces and the positivist scientific community see ‘society' as more

important than the ‘individual'. In the classic Marxist sense, society may not wish to be

controlled and as such may develop both disregard and contempt for social forces. Not

entirely unlike Marxism, functionalism is concerned with how individuals need to be

socialized into a set of values which shapes society and creates social order. In a

postmodern sense, there may be some conflict with acceptance of such truths at the

individual level (ibid.). Both expert and lay persons constitute society, but since experts

have the ability in a functionalist sense to shape society, the question is raised,

especially in an increasingly postmodernist society, as to whether people accept this

authority.

Berger and Luckman (1984) argue reality is socially constructed and ‘inter-

subjective' as it exists in the shared social consciousness as a construction of shared

meanings and interpretation. As such man is a conscious, active, purposeful social

30

being rather than being controlled by external influences (McNeill and Chapman, 2005:

21). This perspective suggests all risks are to an extent subjective in nature, as

suggested by Pidgeon et al (1992), and hence for human beings perception is all. As

this research is concerned with risk perception, social construction is of great

importance in determining an accurate interpretation of human rationality.

3. Research Methodology

31

Seeing science in the subjective decision making process

This research has taken a primarily positivist approach through comparative

analysis of quantitative data sets to assess results and reach a conclusion. Nonetheless,

it also includes phenomenological approaches as to increase the validity of the research

through triangulation of data sources to allow methodological pluralism. The coupling

of these two approaches allow for the subjectivity of social constructed reality to be

represented alongside positivist objectivity. As the research is concerned with risk

perception, social construction is of great importance in determining an accurate

interpretation of human rationality. Social construction is a theory that believes peoples

actions are results of the interpretation of social reality, but are also limited by structural

factors beyond their control (McNeill and Chapman, 2005: 5). From a non positivistic

outlook, reality is socially constructed and as such, in so far as human rationality is

concerned a deeper truth can be uncovered through phenomenological approaches

rather than just positivism. Acknowledging this in developing the methodology has

allowed for a clear line to be drawn between that which the question aims to confirm

and the indisputable nature of human rationality and decision making being a subjective

process. As the research was conducted upon people who have already made choices

despite processing the rationality of those risks, they have controlled the external

factors and can be considered examples of pure social construction. Although this

research is using the hypothetico deductive model to extrapolate its findings and is

primarily descriptive and analytical in nature, it will be explanatory in some respects.

There are many approaches to data collection in both ‘quantitative and

qualitative' (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 3, Unit 5: 9) research.

Anthony Giddens encourages multiple methods, as quantitative methods are seen as

32

suited to exploring the influence of the social structure whilst qualitative methods are

aimed to uncover how people interpret social structure (McNeill and Chapman, 2005:

6). Furthermore, interpretivist sociologists argue secondary data alone reduces the

probability of uncovering the real meanings of actions or behaviours of social actors'

(McNeil and Chapman, 2005: 58). For this project both qualitative and quantitative

data have been used to enhance research validity through triangulation. Triangulation

refers to the use of multiple methods to cross-check and verify the reliability of a

particular research tool and the validity of the data collected. (McNeill and Chapman,

2005: 23). Quantitative secondary Data from the UK ONS and FCO will be contrasted

against both quantitative and qualitative primary data from online surveys.

The ONS statistics present the actuality of risk exposure whilst travelling. The

closed questions from the survey provide the comparative data to be compared against

the ONS statistics and highlight how people's perception of risk differs from the

statistical evidence. The ONS data is compared against participant's perceptions to

establish if there is any correlation. Open text boxes in the survey have provided

opinions to compare the subjectivity of participants and assess general qualitative

attitudes towards both risk and the bearing of expert opinion upon the decision making

of lay persons. In establishing the degree and nature of both the perceived and

quantifiable risks of international travel it is possible to show how informed people are.

To achieve the broader objective of determining how much of a difference there

is between statistical estimations of exposure to risk and human perception of risk

during international travel, the study has undertaken two pieces of research, one

quantitative and one qualitative. They are as follows:

33

Quantitative > What is the number of serious incidents occurring to UK citizens

travelling or living abroad and what does that statistically represent when compared

to the overall number of UK citizens travelling or living overseas. This data will

then be compared against data collected from an online survey concerned with

perceptions of risk during international travel. The key data for comparison will be

the extent to which the participants feel they may be exposed to significant risk

while travelling abroad.

Qualitative > The perceptions and opinions of UK citizens regarding the risk of

travelling abroad to establish a descriptive insight (to what degree do we perceive

the risks associated with international travel?) with further open questions leading

maybe to an explanatory insight (why do we do it?).

The chosen methods relate well to the research problem. As human perception

of risk is a very subjective social construction, the balance between phenomenological

and positivist approaches to both generating and triangulating results of the research

will increase the validity of the findings. The research has followed the principle of

falsification by looking for evidence to prove the hypothesis is wrong rather than right

(Popper, 1934). This helped to reduce 'confirmation bias' which may have sought

information to confirm a hypothesis. To compile information specific to UK nationals

and gain a representative sample, specific data is required so an analysis may be made

and conclusions drawn. As this information has not been compiled before, this research

may provide a basis on which others can develop further.

Secondary Data

34

To establish the number of incidents injury or death occurring overseas,

secondary data from the ONS and the FCO was reviewed and collated. ONS statistics

are collected and collated by the UK government and as such have a high degree of

reliability. Furthermore, they are available to the public and are easily accessible. As

this research is attempting to compare lay perceptions against those of experts, the ONS

statistics are an excellent basis for comparison as they represent expert advice which

may be communicated to the British public both at home and abroad. Official statistics

are seen to have positivist characteristics as they are considered to have been collected

in a reliable and objective fashion, and as such are seen to deal in 'fact'. (McNeill and

Chapman, 2005: 137). Some consider official statistics to be social constructions which

are not simply facts but the end process of a series of relationships between social

actors who are engaged in a constant process of interpretation and negotiation (McNeill

and Chapman, 2005: 138). As such the content of official statistics are often defined by

civil servants and the priorities of politicians (McNeill and Chapman, 2005: 141).

McDonald (2001) argues documents are 'socially produced' by organisations or

individuals for reasons other than sociological research. 'Social production' refers to the

view that although documents are often presented as objective statements of social fact,

they actually reflect the values and norms of the society or social group in which they

are produced. As such secondary data can give tremendous insight into the organisation

of societies and cultures at particular points in time (McNeill and Chapman, 2005:

147). One of the benefits of secondary data is that is generally unobtrusive as it rarely

directly intrudes in peoples lives (McNeill and Chapman, 2005: 169). Nonetheless,

statistics are snapshots and it is important to be sceptical and consider other factors.

This approach will serve to establish a deeper truth from secondary data by looking at

where it comes from and for what purposes it has been generated.

35

All data sets have been individually reviewed to compare the total number of

incidents with the assessed demographic to check statistical validity. This has been

done to find unidentified trends or anomalies, and get a deeper understanding from the

secondary data by looking at where the statistics come from. Having established that

the data was comparable the data was compiled into one complete data set. These

provide another source of data for later analysis. The FCO report ‘British Behaviour

Abroad 2013' (FCO, 2013a) was used to establish the total number of cases reported

and catalogued by the FCO which could be considered a significant risk whilst the

‘Commentary: UK Residents visits abroad' (ONS, 2013a) section from the ONS report

‘Travel Trends 2013' (ONS, 2013b) was used to establish the total number of visits

abroad made by UK nationals. Travel Trends is an annual ONS publication which

presents some of the key trends in overseas travel and tourism drawn from the

International Passenger Survey (IPS). The IPS is a continuous survey carried out by the

Office for National Statistics (ONS), whose results are used by a number of

government departments and organisations. The results are based on face-to-face

interviews with a random sample of passengers. Approximately 95 per cent of

passengers entering and leaving the UK have a chance of being sampled on the survey.

The estimates contained in 'Travel trends' are based on approximately 300,000

interviews a year, which represents approximately 0.2 per cent of travellers. They are

subject to sampling errors that result because not every traveller to or from the UK is

interviewed on the survey. Robustness of estimates ranges from a 95% confidence

interval of +/- 1.1 per cent of the estimate for total visits abroad by UK residents (ONS,

2014b).

36

Primary Research

Primary research was conducted through a self completion online survey which

can be found complete with the raw data in Appendix 5 of this study. Surveys are a

significant research method as they tend to gain a large amount data and information

and response rates tend to be high. They are also high on reliability, as findings are

easily replicated. Surveys also involve minimal interaction with the researcher and

therefore there is seen to be less opportunity for subjective bias. The quantifiable nature

of questionnaires is seen as attractive because statistical data can be comparatively

analysed and correlated (McNeill and Chapman, 2005: 44). Positivist sociologists

advocate social surveys as they are carried out under controlled conditions and are

organised by logical and systematic designs. The survey style of research imposes a

structure on that which is being researched, rather than allowing the structure to emerge

from the data as it is collected (McNeill and Chapman, 2005: 22). Furthermore, having

both fixed choice and less structured questions can lead to more accurate results as

respondents can seek to clarify answers by adding further depth (McNeill and

Chapman, 2005: 37). Including text boxes for open opinions to be expressed allows

participants to describe their perceptions about the risk associated with travel within

their answers. This ensures that the same questions are asked, but allows for some

different responses. Including these text boxes was critical to the choice of method as

having a questionnaire with only closed questions would limit expansion of opinions

which may clarify answers (ibid.).

The survey was carried out in the Summer of 2014. Initially Shanghai was

chosen as the city within which to perform the research as the author resides there,

making access to a chosen sample and collection of data simpler. Furthermore, there is

broad range of UK companies and organisations that operate there. Upon further

37

investigation and consideration, as to enhance the validity of the survey the sample was

broadened to include UK nationals who did not only reside in Shanghai. as it would be

more representative. The objective of choosing the sample was to enable a practical

means for the data to be collected whilst ensuring the selected sample provided an

unbiased and balanced representation of the population. As such surveys were

forwarded alongside an invitation email (Appendix 1) to individuals known to the

author, but also to random participants to ensure the data collected is unbiased and

represents a broad enough sample to inform a comprehensive analysis. 50 survey

invitation emails were dispatched with the hope of achieving a 40% to 50 % response

rate of 20 to 25 completed surveys. The survey was designed on and accessed online by

participants through Bristol Online Surveys (BOS). Having completed the literature

review and identified the main aims and concepts necessary to ensure a strong piece of

research both in its content and structure, the concepts were operationalised into

questions. Converting the hypothesis and concepts into question form became simple

once the indicators for questions were identified.

The wording of the questions, especially the closed questions, was clear,

precise and unambiguous. Furthermore emotion, jargon and vague terms were all

avoided (McNeill and Chapman, 2005: 38) whilst designing the survey. The survey was

designed to be completed in less than 10 minutes and structured in a logical fashion. As

values, attitudes and opinion of researchers should not influence a respondents answers

(McNeill and Chapman, 2005: 62) the phrasing and sequence of the questions was very

neutral and any values or attitudes were not imparted during their design. As such the

respondents were not ‘led' to answer any questions in a particular way. At all stages

38

during the research the personal opinions and biases of the researcher were prevented

from being introduced into the survey.

The survey begins with simple and welcoming introductory questions to

encourage participants to continue as it has been shown correctly ordering questions

increases response rates (Moser and Kalton, 1971: 346). Most questions will be

'perception' and ‘attitude' questions and were designed to review existing attitudes and

previous behaviours rather than anticipated future attitudes or behaviours as

‘individuals are generally not good at predicting future behaviours' (Moser and Kalton,

1971: 326). Nonetheless, some questions did ask about possible future decisions and

actions to gauge whether attitudes remained consistent in a chronological sense.

This survey contained mostly closed questions as they are easier to process;

enhance comparability and may clarify the meaning of a question for the respondent.

Furthermore, they decrease bias and increase accuracy of any data collected. The

purpose of these questions is to have a quantifiable data set concerned with how people

perceive risk and interpret expert opinions which can then be compared against the

secondary data. To collect adequately comparable data, the survey mostly used the

Likert scale (Likert, 1932: 140) for ordering the closed questions. However,

disadvantages of closed questions include spontaneity in respondents' answers,

therefore loss in richness of data (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2011, Module 3, Unit

6: 28). As closed questions can be irritating for respondents, every five closed questions

were followed by an open ‘comment' question to partition the survey. They questions

allowed for a more interpretivist approach, to contrast against the positivist

methodology used for closed question and secondary data analysis and further increase

39

validity. The open questions allowed participants to elaborate on the content of the

survey and their experience. The purpose of the comments is to provide deeper

understanding of participant's attitudes to the risks of travel and allow the student some

insight into why they travel despite the innate risks. The comments in the survey

generated more qualitative answers which were analysed using the Glasser and Strauss

(1957) ‘Coding Paradigm'. As the data was collected to be compared against existing

data, it was 'coded down'. Primary coding was open to identify key analytical

categories, followed by axial and selective coding stages which became part of the

analysis not simply to allow for categorisation but to identify key themes in the data.

Before the survey was launched a brief pilot test took place to ensure whether

the questions were suitable for a broad sample. This has increased validity and

reliability. Furthermore, this testing established how the questions needed to be changed

so they were easy to understand. The content and the language of the questions were

reassessed and slightly revised due to the feedback. Having verified the survey and

interview schedule through pilot tests, few other resources other than time were needed

to proceed. The project followed a strict timetable. Having completed the literature

review to frame the research and ensure clear aims and objectives, the design of the

research tools commenced. This was followed by the compilation of secondary data

sources to generate one set of data for comparison in the analytical stage. Next, having

established an adequate sample selection for the survey and interviews, the collection of

primary data began during which the second and third sets of data would be compiled

for analysis. After the coding stages, the computer analysis was undertaken in order for

final analysis to take place, allowing for the conclusions to be drawn. In seeing that all

40

aspects of quality control and all the above stages were met, the feasibility and quality

of the planning of this project was ensured.

The open ‘comment' sections of the survey generated large amounts of data

which required significant time to organise and analyse. This process commenced upon

the closing of the survey through identifying themes, similarities, differences and

problems within the comments. Comparative analysis of this data helped to establish if

participants have discussed similar issues, themes and opinions. Once analysed through

Microsoft Access, the data was cross-referenced in order to develop a means for

presentation using tables, chart and graphs. Once coded, the survey data was cross-

referenced and analysed using the Bristol Online Surveys analysis tools. Following this,

having compiled the qualitative data each statement was individually analysed by the

author to help codify, review and develop theory.

Problems

There were not many problems whilst implementing the research. Gaining

access to participants was not hindered by ‘gatekeepers' (Institute of Lifelong Learning,

2011 Module 3, Unit 2: 17) as social and professional networks were utilised in place of

organisational networks. One limitation of the research was the significant amount of

research needed in the subject and the constraint of time which denied deeper study and

increased accuracy of results, perhaps through the use of focus groups. Nonetheless, the

survey has provided a rich source of both quantitative and qualitative data.

Ethical Issues

41

Ethics or moral principles must guide research (McNeill and Chapman, 2005:

12) as researchers have responsibilities and obligations to uphold the rights and safety

of participants. Ensuring the trust of participants was paramount to ensure truth and

detail. As such all participants completed informed consent form, to confirm they knew

the purpose of the research. This form can be found in Appendix 2 of this study. No

information was kept from any participant and all participants knew the survey was part

of a research program. In recognition of the Data Protection Act 1998, the details

concerning the ownership, storage, confidentiality and anonymity of the data were

explained to the participants. All information collected in the survey and during

interviews will remain confidential, as will the identities of all interviewees.

42

4. Results, analysis and findings

An illogical and dysfunctional relationship with the logic of thescientific community…and our own.

The tables and graphs shown in Appendix 4 represent the data gathered from the

online survey and are related to the aims outlined in the introduction. Although all the

data gathered from the survey is presented here, during the analysis phase it was

considered that some of the questions could not add a significant degree of inference to

the study. The findings from the data sets considered relevant and significant will be

analysed and further cross-referenced as to build upon each one in succession and

emphasise their relationship in achieving the aims of the study. This approach has

assisted in both creating separation between the different sections of the survey whilst

highlighting the interrelated nature of the study' aims articulated in the introduction.

The primary aim was to compare how strongly lay persons estimations of risks related

to travel abroad correlates with UK government data related to travel risks. The

findings from this comparison are then cross-referenced against survey data regarding

lay attitudes to expert social informants as to establish to what degree lay persons

engage with expert opinion and if they feel sufficiently informed in their decision-

making. This approach facilitates an analysis which will establish how functional the

relationship between lay persons and experts is. The necessary data to achieve such

aims was gathered successfully. There were a total of 25 completed surveys. This

represented a return rate of exactly 50% of the 50 emails dispatched. This was as

expected. A slightly higher response rate would have been desirable as to increase both

representativeness and validity but the 25 responses matched the goal set out in the

proposal for this study. The survey was completed by a wide cross-sectional

43

demographic including a broad age range and a variety of social economic

backgrounds. This is evidence that the methodology employed a strategy which allows

for broader generalisations due to broad representativeness of the UK public amongst

the respondents.

The survey was structured so that during analysis once inferences were made

from the first set of questions related to risk perception, the following questions

included for more comparative purposes could allow for clear and linear analysis. In

this sense the perception questions are followed by questions related to cognition and

rationality which in turn are followed by questions related to experts and risk

communication. This was intended as to facilitate a logical and structured analytical

framework. This structure has allowed for a gradual layering of both analysis and

theory through which the aims of the study can be achieved in a structured and

comprehensive fashion.

44

The survey began with questions which although essential to both establish the

demographic base of the respondents and to ease respondents comfortably into the

survey, they have little to no applicability in serving to achieve the aims of this study.

The first key question which related to the aims of this study was question 5, which

asked whether people felt they were always adequately insured for travel. Table and

figure 4 show that 64 % of respondents answered ‘yes' to this question and 36%

answered ‘no'. These responses indicate that almost two-thirds of people like to feel

prepared for travel risks. When considering these responses in regard to more general

risks, it can be inferred that people like to feel prepared for risks in general. That lay

people choose to have adequate travel insurance whilst abroad may be indicative of

general attitudes to risks and an underlying desire of most people to feel safe. This is a

rational way to behave. When considering risks, most people will take steps to avoid

risk. Furthermore, such behaviour is consistent with social norms in regard to personal

safety. The responses to the optional text based question related to question 5, suggest

that people are aware of the need to be prepared for the risks that travelling abroad

necessitates. Answers included an admission to feeling uneasy about having travelled

without insurance in the past and having good medical insurance which covered the

individual without a separate travel insurance policy. The qualitative answers to this

question all suggested that people value travel insurance. This is qualitative evidence

of a general predisposition by lay persons of the awareness of risks. This data shows

that individual decision making related to avoiding and mitigating risk exhibits a

logical perception of risk.

Table and figure 5 show the responses to Question 7 which asks to what extent

people try to avoid risks. Figure 6 gives a better impression of the distribution of

45

responses and shows that responses sharply drop off in the less risk averse area of the

chart. This highlights that people believe that they are generally quite risk averse.

Furthermore, the responses to question 14, shown in figure 12 which asks whether

people think they make good decisions, show that people overwhelmingly trust

themselves to make good decisions most of the time. These results suggest that most

lay persons believe they are both rational and risk averse. Furthermore, these responses

show people have trust in informing themselves to reach informed and balanced

conclusions on possible risks. The data and analysis on the questions discussed above

shows that lay persons are aware of the risks that travelling abroad presents and that on

the whole they perceive themselves to be rational and risk averse. These observations

show us that lay persons can take steps to mitigate risks as they are aware of where the

risks may be and how to protect against or mitigate their effects. This is evidence of

Ulrich Becks Risk Society in action as lay persons are taking responsibility for the risks

which surround them in a postmodern fashion through both awareness and action to

mitigate personal risk. This responsibility is representative of a society that is rational in

its choices.

The responses to questions 8 and 9 which asked people how safe they feel on a

day to day basis or whilst on holiday are shown in figures 7 and 8 respectively. The

responses to these two questions show that people feel marginally safer on a day to day

basis than they do when travelling abroad. These responses are evidence of logic and

rationality at work. Lay persons perception of the risks which exist abroad compared to

those of their home are marginally heightened. The factors which contribute to this can

be many. One factor may be the exposure to the unknown and what they perceive as

low frequency risks. Although as suggested by the name, ‘low frequency' risks happen

46

infrequently, many people do engage in activities which are associated with them whilst

travelling. Air travel, visiting new places, exposure to poverty and tropical diseases are

to name but a few of the types of risk people are exposed to when travelling abroad.

Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) believe that the ‘availability heuristic' contributes to

this irrational response to such risks as it is the low frequency, high impact nature of

certain types of risks associated with travel which cause an irrational predisposition to

feel anxious about travelling. The low frequency nature of these risks compounded by

the relatively short amount of time most people spend whilst on holiday makes such

opinions irrational as the risks we are exposed to on a day to day basis are far more

likely to cause people harm than those that may be encountered whilst travelling

abroad.

Question 10 asked people to express as a percentage, how likely they thought it

would be that they may be exposed to a significant risk whilst travelling abroad. The

primary purpose of the responses to this question was to establish people's perceived

likelihood of being exposed to significant risks whilst abroad. This question generates a

statistic similar to those used in risk perception research through comparing ‘perceived

risks' against a calibrated `actual risk' related to a certain population sample. The results

from this comparison will also act as a metric that establishes the degree to which the

perceptions of lay persons deviate from the statistical actuality. Asking the participants

to express how likely they thought it was that they would be exposed to a significant

risk while travelling abroad as a percentage was the best way to get an accurate

representation of their perception of the risk as it could be easily compared against

statistics generated from the FCO and ONS data. For the purpose of this study, the

mean average was chosen over the median and mode. The median and mode averages

in this case would represent an unbalanced central tendency which would not have been

47

representative of the broad range of responses to this question. Had the responses been

distributed closer to one another perhaps they may have been utilised to generate the

comparative average for this data. The percentage that was generated as the mean

average from all the respondents answers was that they believed it was a 34.8

(34.78260869565217) percent chance that they would be exposed to significant risk

while abroad. This roughly equates to a one in three chance. The raw data for this

comparative statistic can be found in figure 9. To compile a percentage which

represented the actuality of significant travel related risks for comparison, data on

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) assistance for serious types of cases and

Office of National Statistics (ONS) data for the total number of visits made abroad by

UK residents was used. The statistics for the number of serious incidents reported to the

FCO were acquired from the British Behaviour Abroad Report 2013 and the ONS data

on the number of visits abroad made by UK residents was taken from the Travel Trends

report 2013. From these statistics the incidents which qualified for inclusion as they

represented a significant risk within the usable statistics were total deaths,

hospitalisation, rape, sexual assault and total assistance. The categories of arrests and

detentions were not included as arrest tends to be due to personal premeditated

misbehaviour rather than risks unintentionally encountered. The category of passport

lost/stolen was also not included as if the loss or theft of a passport had resulted an

individual coming to personal harm the incident would have been recorded as such.

This comparative question is essential for comparing the responses to certain other

questions as it acts as a metric against which to compare people's perception of the

likelihood of travel risks against the actuality of such risks. To generate a percentage to

be used as a comparative statistic, the total number of overseas visits by UK nationals

in the year 2012/13 (58.5 million) was divided into 100 then multiplied by the total

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number of incidents considered to be a significant risk in the year 2012/13 (13,809).

The figure which emerged from this calculation was a 0.0236 (0.023605) percent

chance of being exposed to a significant risk. This result represented a less than one in

four-thousand chance of exposure to a significant risk whilst travelling abroad.

This clearly shows that lay perceptions of the likelihood of being exposed to a

significant risk represent a very high estimation against the actuality. This is evidence

of both an inflated and over-exaggerated perception of risk. Although the statistics and

its related advice tell people the risks are reasonably low, the public perception of them

is statistically very high in comparison. This comparison is evidence that although we

live in a hyper connected globalised world, important public information is not being

communicated effectively to lay people by experts. This shows us that we cannot be

living in the postmodernist world Ulrich Beck believes is emerging as despite the

means at the disposal of both experts and lay persons, risks is not being effectively

controlled. Bruno Latours perspective that it is that we cannot control these risks which

keeps us from becoming a postmodern society is supported by these figures.

Questions 11 and 12 which ask whether people have ever experienced any

anxiety related to their destination prior to or whilst travelling abroad. Figures 10 and

11 show that people are 20% more likely to be anxious prior to a trip. This increased

level of anxiety is likely related to the knowledge of irrational decision making which

causes people to maybe ask themselves ‘have I made the right choice ?' or ‘will I be

safe?'. The open text section of the question concerned with anxiety prior to a trip

shows the reasons for this anxiety are related to fear of flying, fear of the unknown,

feeling uninformed about destinations, driving in another country, social unrest,

49

inability to communicate effectively in an emergency and airport security. The

qualitative answers given in the question related to anxiety felt whilst abroad showed

reasons for such anxiety is related to unfamiliarity with transport networks, unavoidable

risks whilst being in certain situations, lack of security, stolen belongings and unsafe

districts and regions. The availability heuristic is affects how individuals perceive risk

as well as mitigating it through choice. As Breakwell claims, this irrational fear of low

frequency risks as opposed to normalised risks is evidence of individuals emphasising

the likelihood of experiencing a high impact, low frequency event. This notion may

apply to familiar or low consequence risks due to disconnection from scientific advice.

This is counter to the fear which some believe is institutionalised within society and

causes the irrational degree to which we try to protect ourselves against low frequency

risks.

These qualitative responses constitute the risks which may significantly impact

upon an individual's perception of risk within a given scenario as well as suggesting the

forces which may inform such perspectives. Communication, information and

infrastructure feature heavily in the qualitative reasons as to why people feel anxious

about travelling abroad. There are many factors which influence our perceptions of

risks which in turn affect decision making. One of the most significant is how

information and statistics collected by governments and bodies responsible for public

information is presented to the general public. This shows that how information is

absorbed and utilised by its target audience can significantly affect people's lives.

Influences on risk perception and decision making

The next section of analysis will begin to show what contributes to building our

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perceptions of risk of travelling abroad and informs our decision making, such as our

own experience and knowledge, friends and expert opinion. When compared against

the responses to the questions related to trust in advice given by friends and

acquaintances (table 14 and figures 15/16) and government advice and statistics (table

16 and figure 17), the responses to question 15 which asks to what degree peoples

experience and knowledge of international travel influences where they decide to visit

shows that peoples own knowledge is far more important than consulting the advice of

experts or friends. The responses to question 18 which asked if people trust advice

given by friends and acquaintances in relation to planned travel show more often than

not people trust advice and information given by friends and acquaintances as opposed

to government or expert advice. Although the data shows that peoples own knowledge

and experience supersedes the advice of both friends and experts, the data related to

whether people trust expert advice (Figure 19) shows 80 percent of people do trust such

information and indicates that people do place value on the advice of experts.

Despite this level of trust in experts, the data suggests that people prefer to trust

their instinct to volunteer to accept risks rather than being told of statistical likelihoods

and accepting other peoples conceptions of reality, especially those of experts. This

finding highlights the postmodernist claim that lay persons and groups are becoming

less deferential to experts. This study does not have the aim of establishing whether

society is postmodern or not but this finding supports Becks claim that individuals and

groups seek autonomy in developing their own perceptions of risk which to a large

degree are less affected by expert conceptions of reality.

That lay persons prefer to make decisions based on their own personally

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constructed perceptions of risk supports the work of Slovic et al. (1980) and Otway and

Van Winfeldt (1982) into the personality of hazards which established several

‘negative hazard attributes' which influence peoples perception of risk. Amongst others

these included involuntary exposure to risk, lack of personal control over outcomes,

uncertainty about consequences and lack of personal experience with particular risks.

The data has shown that for rational reasons or not, these factors do also impact upon

how lay people allow themselves to be informed on risk. People would rather

subscribe to their own perceptions of risk which are informed by their own experience

over those of others as they feel they may have more control over the outcomes.

Figure 17 shows the responses to Question 20 which asks if people use the

internet for mostly information or communication. Although 72% of respondents

answered that they use the internet for both communication and information equally,

24% of the remainder use the internet mostly for information. This indicates that a

majority use the internet as a means to gather information. This is evidence of peoples

desire to be informed in their decision making. Nonetheless, this does not correlate with

the data which shows that people over-amplify risks and perceive their likelihood as

being far more likely than the actuality. People wish to be informed, but either do not

engage with the correct sources of information or simply do not digest that which they

have actively sought to inform both their perception of risk and decision making. This

paradox suggests many problems within the relationship between lay persons and

experts.

Question 17 which provided respondents with an opportunity to give qualitative

answers concerned with what factors affect where people decide to travel

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overwhelmingly shows that when choosing a destination to visit the interest in that

places culture as well as sightseeing and cost figure very dominantly in making these

decisions. Nonetheless, those who do mention safety and security place a great degree

of emphasis upon it. These responses also stipulate the importance of transport and

communication infrastructure in deciding where to visit. These responses highlight that

those individuals with more risk averse attitudes do have a more rational conception of

the types and degree of risk inherent in travelling abroad. This concern and specificity

in regard to risk indicates such persons may have a more engaged and rational

relationship with experts and the advice they provide.

Opinions on Government and expert advice

That people use the internet primarily for information correlates with the

question which asks whether people actively seek expert and/or government advice in

relation to planned travel (question 21). The responses to this question shows people

overwhelmingly ‘may' seek advice from experts. This establishes that people wish to be

informed and are generally seeking information from experts. This finding is important

in assessing the degree of functionality within the relationship between experts and lay

persons as people clearly want expert advice. This finding can be compared against the

following set of questions and their responses which illuminate to what degree this

information is trusted and how often and to what degree it factors into the decision

making of lay persons.

The results to Question 22 which relates to trust in expert and/or government

advice related to planned travel are shown in figure 19 which shows 80 % of people

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trust government advice. The responses to this question do not support Brian Wynne's

assumption that there is an inherent lack of mistrust in experts by lay persons.

Nonetheless, figure 20 which shows the distribution of the answers to question 23

concerned with how much the opinions of experts inform people's decision making

highlights that although people trust these sources of information and the opinions of

experts they may not use them to inform their decision making to such a high degree.

This result allows for the suggestion that the nature of the relationship between lay

persons and experts may be becoming inherently and increasingly dysfunctional in that

it is not so much a matter of trust in experts, rather a choice to be less deferential to

experts and be more autonomous in their decision making. This is evidence that people

value their own world views over expert conceptions of reality and that perceptions of

risk are quite likely informed by the perspectives that individuals or groups have on risk

rather than positivist conceptions of reality that functionalism assumes gives order to

society. This is further emphasised by question 24 which asks whether people think

those responsible for informing the public on risk communicate this information

effectively. Figure 22 shows that there is not an overwhelmingly positive or negative

answer to this question. This suggests people are undecided on whether social

informants fulfil their role as effective communicators of risk and are perhaps impartial

as to whether they perform effectively as people are more inclined to act in an

autonomous fashion which relies more upon personal experience or their own

constructions of reality

Question 25 asked whether people feel experts and government bodies fulfil

their roles in informing the public about day to day risks. Figure 23 shows the

responses suggest people believe experts and social informants do not fulfil their roles

54

as completely as they might be able to. The opinion that experts and government

bodies may not be effectively informing the public on day to day risks allows for risk

communication to be discussed. We have established above that people generally trust

expert informants which should allow for effective risk communication and a reciprocal

relationship between lay persons and experts in regard to effective social learning.

However as the responses to question 24 point out a higher proportion of people believe

this information could be communicated more effectively. The lay belief that public

information is being delivered poorly or even being mis-communicated can lead to a

perspective which rationalises dangerous decisions.

Question 26 gave respondents the option to make qualitative statements about

the issues raised in questions 20 to 25. They have provided an insight into lay opinions

regarding expert advice and risk communication. One respondent expressed an

attitudinal opinion which helps draw together all the aims of this study. The response

was ‘I believe they (experts) do provide good information, however I believe you will

only get the information if you look for it. Which is something I have never done'.

Although only expressed as a belief, this perspective seems somewhat contradictory in

that how can a person have a opinion upon something with which you have never

engaged. It has already been established through other data that most people do seek

expert advice yet believe the information could be better disseminated. However this

respondent, although not having sought expert advice believes they provide good

information. This response further supports the notion that persons who may be

autonomous in their approach to making decisions on risk may have irrational attitude

towards expert advice which could result in dangerous and uninformed decision

making.

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Another response to this question gives the opinion that public information that

experts provide acts as tool with which social forces can protect themselves. The

response was ‘I feel the general public are given enough information to cover the

government's backs should something arise. We are given a certain amount of

information to safeguard ourselves but this info is given just as much to protect us as to

protect those who give it'. Although, his is clearly a quite cynical standpoint on expert

advice it highlights that lay persons are aware that expert and government advice can be

a tool used by social forces. Awareness or at least suspicion of such behaviour can

impact upon the level of trust that exists between lay persons and experts. This

comment suggests lay people's attitudes to social informants and their conceptions of

reality can be influenced by the perception that the role of experts in society can be self

serving. Furthermore, this suggests that information provided to the public may even be

disseminated with the intention of aiding those with vested interest. Such a notion

seriously impacts the level of trust in the relationship between lay persons and experts.

Furthermore, it greatly affects the degree to which the relationship can affect both

social learning and effective reflexivity for both parties. An interesting inference that

can be made here is that although advocates of postmodernism claim individuals and

groups are becoming less deferential to the institutions of old, it is not that lay persons

may have a negative perception of experts convey but the increasingly acceptable

nature of this attitude which is causing the relationship between lay persons and experts

to become more dysfunctional. Brian Wynne's notion that places responsibility in the

hands of the scientific community whose arrogance towards laymen may be causing

ineffective social learning and communication of information cannot be considered

monolithic. The public also have a responsibility to at least attempt and validate the role

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experts play in society to ensure a healthy dialogue with reasoned and logical sources

of information on risk.

Another respondent gives an interesting opinion upon how individual perception

of risk is formed by group influence upon conceptions of reality. The respondent asserts

‘I think there are a lot of life skills which should be taught at school that should cover

everyday health and safety and other risk. I learnt some things from my parents and a

lot from friends/the internet. If you don't have a support network you could easily miss

out on important knowledge that could put yourself and others at risk'. The respondent

begins by stating that schools ‘should' be teaching ‘life skills' in relation to risks. This

suggest a belief that what they perceive to be the current practice in regard to informing

individuals on how to avoid and mitigate risks in schools is insufficient. The respondent

goes on to say that their personal experience of learning how to avoid risks has been

informed by close social groups and that this is ‘important' in developing a rational

approach to risks. This perspective again highlights the finding from above in which it

is shown that irrelevant of the degree to which lay persons seek expert advice or the

level of trust they place in it, a majority of people default to trusting their own world

views, conceptions of reality and their own perceptions of risk which are socially

constructed through close family and peer groups. This response suggests some people

believe social construction is more important that functionalist social knowledge. One

respondent stated that the ‘risk perception and risk aversion of different people varies.

Therefore, government agencies have to err on the side of caution in their travel advice

and guidance'. This perspective suggests that some people believe government statistics

and advice may be more pessimistic in their message as to safeguard citizens.

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The responses to question 27 which asked how much does travel advice made

available by national governments influence your choice of travel destination showed

that almost two thirds of people (64%) believe that travel advice made available by

national governments does not really influence their choice of travel destination.

Figures 26 highlights this quite clearly. This may be evidence of disregard for expert

advice or simply be a product of peoples choice to discover things for themselves,

nonetheless it is evidence of a disengagement with the expert community who although

positivist in their attitude to social construction only wish to inform the public. That lay

persons may be less willing to engage with and utilise such information for such

reasons is evidence of a public which is very selective regarding its choice of

informants. This raises the question of perception again, not just the perception of risk

but the perception of trust in experts. Lay persons disenfranchisement with social

institutions, even those that wish to inform them on potential risks, may be causing the

relationship to become so dysfunctional that it may be forcing a reliance on their

individual or group conceptions of reality which in turn is creating an acceptable degree

of irrationality. Such irrationality towards risks is totally at odds with Becks claim that

society is becoming increasingly more in touch with the nature of risk. This again is

evidence of a society that is unable to become postmodern, not because of positivistic

arrogance towards laymen but because the dysfunctional nature of the relationship

between themselves and experts may be becoming institutionalised with social groups.

The answers to questions 28 and 29 which asked whether people have made use

of travel advice made available by national governments in the past and how likely is it

that they will use such advice on their next holiday suggest that although people have

used expert advice in the past, a reduced percentage of people would continue to do so.

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This is interesting, as in a chronological sense people are less inclined to engage with

this information in a consistent fashion. If risk perception is indeed a product of belief

and experience, such a decision by lay people shows that as their conceptions of reality

develop they begin to submit less to those of experts.

The responses to Question 30 which asks whether people have opinions about

how the government of a person's home country distributes public information related

to travel risks are shown in figure 30 and suggest people are more inclined (70%) to be

impartial to information issued by experts. This finding has a moderate correlation with

the responses concerned with whether people will utilise information gathered from

sources of public information (figures 29 and 28). This observation highlights that

people are broadly disconnected from utilising the knowledge which is made available

to them by social informants. Again this is further evidence of a society unable to

become postmodern as this relationship is fundamental to the control of the risks of

both the society and technologies we have established in the 21st century.

The qualitative data from attitudes and opinions gathered in the optional open

section of Question 30 further illuminate on the reasons for this impartiality as these

responses come from the 30% of people with an opinion upon how information is

disseminated. One respondent highlighted how information on risk could be

disseminated on social media. This is evidence of how people may think that expert

advice could be better disseminated given the means available in our globalised world.

This allows some of Becks arguments regarding how globalisation and networks act as

enablers to society to be critiqued. Beck argues that we can achieve a postmodern

quality in our relationship with risk yet the opinion that social media is not used

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effectively enough to disseminate social information proves Latour correct in his

assertion that generally speaking experts do not engage well enough with the modern

technologies we have at their disposal to convince lay persons that it is used effectively.

Another respondent believes ‘the FCO does the job well'. This is explicitly

supportive of expert advice and the role the UK government has in providing

information on risk. Nonetheless, when compared to the data both on trusting experts

(figure 19) and the degree to which lay persons making is informed by experts (figure

20 ) we have seen that there is no correlation between the two. This is indicative of the

irrational nature of the way we catalogue and implement the information we gather on

risk. We know its right and want to trust it, nonetheless it does not factor into our final

decision making. Furthermore, the opinion that expert advice ‘is too specific in regards

to informing general behaviour' helps to illuminate how some people see public

information on risk being disseminated in broad strokes rather than being user specific.

One respondents belief that information is ‘not often that clear or put into regular

persons terminology - and most people have to go find that information rather than

having it clearly pushed to them' highlights again that lay people believe public

information could be disseminated more effectively. Furthermore, it highlights Covello

and Slovic' assertion that some lay persons may find some information is abstract and

presented in language which is difficult to comprehend. This point again emphasises

how ones own beliefs and experiences can outweigh expert advice in that lay people are

familiar with it and don't have to attempt to understand complex information. Another

interesting perspective a respondent voiced was that experts ‘should carry on doing it

(informing the public), but know that few people follow the advice. My perception is

that the government is too cautious when telling people not to go places'. The notion

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that expert opinion and the statistical evidence on which it is built is more cautious than

that of the public is disproved by the comparison between actual and perceived risk of

travel. Although people are aware that they are not very inclined to follow advice there

is the belief that government advice will be more pessimistic in its perception of risk

than the publics. This is evidence of irrational decision making, as although people are

aware that information is available and viable, lay person's social constructions of risk

both devalue it and assume it is more pessimistic than their own perceptions.

This unawareness and perhaps even disregard for the help of expert or

politically affiliated organisations and their advice may render some people

exceptionally susceptible to risk and irrational decision making. The disconnection with

experts and information or an independent reliance on ones resourcefulness may

overwhelm the pragmatic and rational decision making process. This attitude can cause

a situation or problem to worsen and put an individual at further risk. This is evidence

of a counter intuitive logic which dismisses quantitative information and our own

internal logic which should help us remain safe.

In summarising the results and findings discussed above, this research study has

found that lay persons from the UK significantly over-estimate the likelihood of being

exposed to a significant risk while travelling abroad. Furthermore, it has established

that although the majority of lay persons seek and trust both expert and government

advice, they are very unlikely to actually use that information to inform either their

perception of risk or decision making. That lay person's over-estimate the likelihood of

being exposed to a significant risk is real-life evidence that their perception of risks are

not significantly informed by experts. Lay persons perceptions of risk are more likely to

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be informed by their own beliefs and experiences, and to a lesser extent, advice from

friends and acquaintances. The voluntary nature of decisions based on personal belief

and experience reduces possible exposure to unknown factors and low frequency, high

impact risks of which most people are very fearful. As such it is the notion of

subscribing to someone else's construction of reality and perception of risk that causes

people to make the irrational decision not to allow expert advice to play a role in

individual perceptions of risk and decision making. This is evidence of a dysfunctional

relationship between lay persons and experts, but not in the sense that peoples drive for

autonomy is causing people to be less deferential to experts. This dysfunction is a result

an irrational predisposition to not subscribe or volunteer to someone else's conception

of reality or perception of risk regardless of the degree to which it is based on logic and

statistical evidence.

5. Conclusions

A need to reconnect to quantitative truths and logic to educateand inform better decision making

This study has been carried out to establish to what degree the risk perception

and decision making of lay persons is informed by experts. International travel acted as

a proxy from which to further generalise. This study' primary objective was to examine

the effectiveness of expert communication of data related to travel risks by establishing

how strongly lay estimations of risk correlate with such data. This comparison

established how much experts inform public risk perception and acted as a metric to

compare against survey data regarding lay attitudes to expert informants. The

secondary objectives were to discover to what degree laymen engage with expert

advice and if they feel sufficiently informed in their decision-making. Together these

objectives have given an indication of how functional the relationship between laymen

62

and experts is. Cross-referencing this data allowed further insight into whether people

make counter-rational decisions related to risk despite being informed by experts. How

and to what scale information may be is lost due to a dysfunctional relationship

between experts and lay people is of great relevance to society at large as a functional

form of this relationship would not only help people effectively avoid and mitigate risk

it may help reconcile differences between lay persons and experts. Furthermore,

evaluating how much expert advice influences decision making or discovering if people

feel that they feel communicated to effectively may illuminate how reflexive lay and

expert attitudes to risk may be.

Discovering how people develop attitudes to travel risks seemed a pragmatic

way to investigate both risk perception and risk communication. In choosing suitable

research types, secondary data and a survey were chosen as the most appropriate

methods. These methods allowed for collection of both quantitative and qualitative data

as to improve the validity of the research as social constructed reality could be

represented alongside positivist objectivity. This approach has yielded both a

manageable and relevant set of results which have allowed for the analytical framework

to be implemented in a clear and balanced fashion.

This study has found most lay persons have a good awareness of risk, feel they

make rational decisions to avoid and mitigate risk and trust how they inform themselves

on risk. This supports Ulrich Beck's assumption that society is taking a postmodern

responsibility for risks through rational awareness and action to mitigate personal risk

from decision-making. Nonetheless, having established that lay persons significantly

over-estimate the likelihood of being exposed to significant risks whilst abroad when

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compared against the actuality showed lay persons have an over-exaggerated perception

of risk. This suggests people have an irrationally over-pessimistic view of the

likelihood of risk Furthermore, this finding highlights that although we live in a hyper-

connected globalised world, important public information is either not being

communicated effectively to lay people by experts or the relationship between lay

persons and experts exhibits' dysfunctional qualities. This implies we are not living in

the postmodernist world Ulrich Beck supposes, as risk is not effectively controlled and

as such supports Bruno Latour's perspective that society cannot be considered truly

postmodern. The same data also established that humans are not wholly rational as

people focus upon and over-amplify low frequency and unknown risks. This supports

Kahnemann and Tversky's assumption that many aspects of decision making are

irrational but also suggests that perception may be irrational too. This is further

evidenced in how feelings of anxiety are related to events and activities which have not

occurred yet but are considered statistically very safe.

Although people seek advice and information given by friends and

acquaintances more than that from governments or experts, lay peoples trust in their

own knowledge and experience is far more important than either. This is evidence that

people trust their instinct in volunteering to accept risks rather than being told of

statistical likelihoods and accepting other people's conceptions of reality, especially

those of experts. This supports the postmodernist claim that lay persons and groups are

less deferential to experts and are increasingly seeking autonomy to develop their own

perceptions of risk and highlights the very subjective nature of risk. The data gathered

by this research study has shown that for rational reasons or not, people would rather

64

subscribe to their own perceptions of risk which are informed by their own experience

rather than those of others as to have more control over the outcomes.

Interestingly, despite these findings this study has also established that lay

persons want to be informed in their decision making through seeking advice from

experts. This finding is important in assessing the degree of functionality within the

relationship between experts and lay persons as people clearly want expert advice.

Nonetheless, this study has also shown that people over-amplify risks and perceive their

likelihood as far more likely than the public information conveys. This leads to the

conclusion that although people wish to be informed, they are either not engaging with

the correct sources of information or simply do not digest and utilise information which

they have actively sought. This paradox suggests many problems within the relationship

between lay persons and experts.

That 80 % of people trust government advice shows people do place value on,

and trust the advice of experts. This finding does not support Brian Wynne's assumption

that there is an inherent lack of mistrust in experts by lay persons. Nonetheless,

although people trust these sources of information and the opinions of experts they may

not use them to inform their decision making to such a high degree. This suggests that

the relationship between lay persons and experts may be becoming inherently and

increasingly dysfunctional as it is not so much a matter of trust in experts, rather a

choice to be less deferential to them and be more autonomous in their decision making.

This is evidence that people value their own world-views over expert conceptions of

reality. Lay perceptions of risk are likely informed by the perspectives that individuals

or groups have on risk rather than the positivist conceptions of reality that

functionalism assumes gives order to society. This is further emphasised by an

65

impartiality as to whether people believe public information is effectively disseminated,

as people are more likely to act in an autonomous fashion which relies more upon

personal experience and their own constructions of reality. Various qualitative

statements emerged from the study which suggested that irrelevant of the degree to

which lay persons seek expert advice or the level of trust they place in it, a majority of

people default to trusting their own conceptions of reality and perceptions of risk which

are socially constructed through family and peer groups.

Another significant finding was that people believe experts and government

bodies may not be effectively informing the public on day to day risks and suggests

experts and social informants do not fulfil their roles as completely as may be expected.

It has been established above that people generally have trust in social informants

which should allow for effective risk communication and a reciprocal relationship

between lay persons and experts in regard to effective social learning. However, a

higher proportion of people believe this information could be communicated more

effectively. The lay belief that public information is being delivered poorly or even

being mis-communicated can lead to mistrust and disenfranchisement which

rationalises decision making based on individual constructions of reality which are not

informed by expert advice. This clearly illustrates the purpose of this study in that

allowing the public to disconnect from scientific and rational sources of public

information, lay persons decision making on risk becomes highly autonomous. This can

incubate irrational attitudes towards expert advice which could result in harmful

decision making. Furthermore, it greatly affects the degree to which the relationship can

affect both social learning and effective reflexivity for both parties.

66

Almost two-thirds of the respondents believed travel advice made available by

national governments do not really influence their choice of travel destination. This

may be evidence of disregard for expert advice or simply be a product of people's

choice to discover things for themselves; nonetheless it is evidence of disengagement

with the expert community. That lay persons may be less willing to engage with and

utilise such information for such reasons is evidence of a public which is very selective

regarding its choice of informants. This raises the question of perception again, not just

the perception of risk but the perception of trust in experts. Lay peoples

disenfranchisement with social institutions, even those that wish to inform them on

potential risks, may be causing the relationship to become so dysfunctional that it may

be forcing a reliance on their individual or group conceptions of reality which creates

an acceptable degree of irrationality. Such irrationality towards risks conflicts with

Becks claim that society is becoming increasingly more in touch with risk. This again is

evidence of a society that is unable to become postmodern, not because of positivistic

arrogance towards laymen but because the dysfunctional nature of the relationship may

be becoming institutionalised within social groups. 70% of people have no opinion on

how their home country distributes information on travel risks issued by experts. This

impartiality further highlights that people are broadly disconnected from utilising

information made available to them by social informants. Again this is further evidence

of a society unable to become postmodern as this relationship is fundamental to control

societal and technological risks in the modern world. This unawareness and perhaps

even disregard for the help of expert or politically affiliated organisations and their

advice may render some people exceptionally susceptible to risk and irrational decision

making. The disconnection with experts or an independent reliance on ones

resourcefulness may overwhelm pragmatic and rational decision making. This is

67

evidence of a counter intuitive logic which dismisses quantitative information and our

own internal logic which should help us remain safe.

The theoretical cross-analysis of this studies findings show that there is an

interest in the information and advice that experts provide, nonetheless, it is the degree

to which lay persons utilise this information which is of most interest in assessing the

relationship between experts and lay persons. The study has shown that although lay

persons seek and acquire public information, they would rather rely on the advice of

those closest to them, or to a higher extent their own perception of what the risks may

be. An individual's conception of reality is the most important point of reference for

decision making. Regardless of how irrational that conception of reality is, it

determines how people manage risk. This study has shown the irrational way that lay

persons choose to inform decision making is further perpetuating a dysfunctional

relationship with expert conceptions of reality.

This perception of how we should inform ourselves about risks may result from

a profound shift in the way lay persons engage with experts or more simply may be

attributed to a latent belief amongst lay persons that the scientific and expert

community fails to perform its fundamental role. It has been shown that lay persons

present a significant degree of irrationality in regards to allowing expert opinion inform

their decision making. This is evidenced in how, to a large degree, although people seek

and trust such sources of information people do not allow it to inform their decision

making. Beck, Latour and Wynne speak of reflexivity on behalf of social informants as

to ensure better integration between themselves and lay persons, but the general public's

role in this relationship cannot be underestimated. This study has shown there is a great

68

degree of trust on behalf of lay persons in social informants but it's the willingness of

lay people to implement and act upon that collective social knowledge which may

contribute to an improved, more integrated and balanced dialogue on risk in the 21 st

century.

Further research to develop upon the findings and conclusions of this study

could focus on several things. Firstly, this study has not had the time or resources to

establish why there may be a dysfunctional relationship between lay persons and social

informants. Having established that there is a significant discrepancy between the

actuality and lay people's perception a given risk, a deeper more qualitative

investigation may reveal the reasons why lay perceptions of risk deviate so greatly from

the information that experts attempt to communicate to the public. Furthermore, an

investigation seeking to clarify why lay persons seldom act upon information that they

both seek and trust and prefer to rely on their own conceptions of reality would quite

possibly explain how this dysfunctional relationship may be reconciled. These studies

have the potential to contribute towards the development of policy and strategy for re-

forging effective two-way communication and a creating renewed sense of pluralistic

decision making between experts and lay persons.

69

6. Appendixes

Appendix 1

Survey invitation email

Dear sir/madam,

I am currently undertaking research for a dissertation project to complete my MSc in Risk, Crisis and Disaster Management.

As part of the research I am conducting into Risk Perception, I would like to find out your views about the risks associated with International Travel. The research is concerned with establishing whether the decision making of the general public is informed by expert opinion and dissemination of public information. It is hoped that in conducting this research it may be established whether people subscribe to scientifically informed opinions on risks in the 21st

century. Any views expressed would be given in confidence, and any quotes used would be anonymised and used solely to help conduct, publish and disseminate the research.

70

If you are interested in participating you will find an informed consent form attached which MUST be completed.

Below you will find the URL link to the survey page at Bristol Online Surveys.

https://www.survey.bris.ac.uk/leicester/travel_risks/

If you have any questions about the survey or any other aspect of my studies or research please feel free to contact me using this email address: leh32@student.le.ac.uk

Thank you for your time.

Yours sincerely,

Laurence Horton.

Appendix 2

Informed consent form

University of LeicesterInstitute of Lifelong Learning

Informed Consent Form

Dear sir / madam,

As part of the research I am conducting into Risk Perception I would like to find out your views about the risks associated with International Travel.

The research is concerned with establishing whether the decision making of lay people is informed by expert opinion and dissemination of public information. It is hoped that through conducting this research that a conclusion can be made as to whether lay people subscribe to scientifically informed opinions on risks in the 21st century.

The research involves the completion of an online questionnaire. Any views expressed would be given in confidence, and any quotes used would be anonymised and used solely to help conduct, publish and disseminate the research.

It is important to note that you can withdraw from the research at any time.

71

If you are willing to take part in this research, would you please sign below.

If you would like to ask any questions concerning this process, please feel free to contact me:Email: hortonl.lh@gmail.comMob: +86 15121086794

Yours sincerely,

Laurence Horton.

Participant declaration:

I agree to participate in this research on the basis outlined.

Signature: Date:

Print name of interviewee:

Appendix 3- Online Survey (including raw data)

Survey overviewNumber of respondents: 25Expected number of respondents: 50Response rate: 50.0%Launch date: 16 May 2014Close date: 11 Jul 2014

2. Do you enjoy travelling abroad?

Yes: 96.0% 24

No: 4.0% 1

3. Have you travelled to a destination other than your home country or the country where you live in the last 12 months?

Yes: 84.0% 21

No: 16.0% 4

4. Do you currently have any travel planned to a destination other than your home country or the country in which you live?

Yes: 60.0% 15

No: 40.0% 10

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5. Are you always adequately insured for travel?

Yes: 64.0% 16

No: 36.0% 9

6. If you would like to comment in more detail about any of the questions or issues raised on this page please do so below:Excellent medical insurance. No other travel insurance as it's not possible being a Brit living in China.I am understanding adequate insurance as only when required depending on the destinations policies on healthcare for British tourists.I forgot to buy travel insurance last time I went on a weekend break in Europe In the past I've often travelled without insurance but wouldn't again in the future.

7. To what extent do you try to avoid risk?

Very much: 20.0% 5

Quite a lot: 28.0% 7

To a reasonable extent: 40.0% 10

Not really: 12.0% 3

Not at all: 0.0% 0

8. How safe do you feel on a day to day basis?

Very safe: 48.0% 12

Safe: 48.0% 12

Unsafe: 4.0% 1

Very unsafe: 0.0% 0

9. How safe do you feel whilst travelling abroad?

Very safe: 12.0% 3

Safe: 76.0% 19

Unsafe: 12.0% 3

Very unsafe: 0.0% 0

10. As a percentage, how likely do you think it is that you could be exposed to a significant risk whilst travelling abroad?11%152020%252525%330%30%30%355%505050%50%60%

73

65%7070%70%HighPossible

11. Have you ever experienced any anxiety related to your destination prior to travelling abroad?

Yes: 68.0% 17

No: 32.0% 8

11.a. If you have answered 'Yes' to the above question, please explain in more detail below:Fear of flyingFear of the unknown (but in a good way) > fear of the unknown > low frequency risks/I get notoriously anxious while travelling abroad. This relates to irrational fears I have while flying. Despite knowing the risks and calculated improbability of anything happening, I do feel at ill ease with flying!I was travelling with several thousands of pounds in a money belt for an extremely long journey to a country I was migrating to.India - concerns about travelling solo without knowing much about the culture.Only about missing flights!Plane flightSome concerns when driving to Mexico from US, just due to previous stories and risk factor in that country with crime.travelling to Egypt last year just as the riots/protests took hold.Very mildly while Thailand was under military control and uncertainty loomed over the control of the country.When travelling in countries where I cannot understand, speak or read the language, misunderstandings and problems might arise due to an inability to communicate.When travelling to the middle east I was concerned about security at airportsWorry about not knowing where I'm going once I arrive, trouble communicating, the hotel being terrible etcYes. I often feel overwhelmed about going somewhere unfamiliar before a long haul flight but it usually calms down a day or two after I get there

12. Have you ever experienced a heightened sense of anxiety whilst travelling abroad?

Yes: 48.0% 12

No: 52.0% 13

12.a. If you have answered 'Yes' to the above question, please explain in more detail below:

Again, this relates back to when I'm in the airplane. Nearly every flight I have been on, I have experienced some level of unpleasant feeling or worry. One landed, I am generally fine.

It takes me a very long time to get comfortable with new subway/travel networks so I always feel completely lost and confused when travelling in cities abroadMilitary checkpointsSituations which I knew were unsafe but was unable to remove myself from for financial or practical reasons i.e. Staying in dodgy areas, sleeper trains with frequent robberies, taxi drivers who didn't seem trustworthy etc.Some places (countries, cities, areas) are reputed to lack security, be it due to criminality, civil disorder or corruption, so one tends to be somewhat less at ease.Stolen belongings.Travelling to and in IndiaUsually when I have found myself in neighbourhoods or areas which would not be deemed safe for a tourist.

74

13. If you would like to comment in more detail about any of the questions or issues raised on this page please do so below:We have lived and worked in more than a dozen countries on three continents and have travelled to many more.

14. Do you think you make good decisions?

All the time: 4.0% 1

Most of the time: 84.0% 21

Sometimes: 8.0% 2

Rarely: 4.0% 1

Never: 0.0% 0

15. Does your experience and knowledge of international travel influence where you decide to visit?

Very much: 40.0% 10

Quite a lot: 36.0% 9

To a reasonable extent: 12.0% 3

Not much: 8.0% 2

Not at all: 4.0% 1

16. Does your experience and knowledge of international travel affect your day to day decision making?

Yes: 28.0% 7

No: 40.0% 10

Sometimes: 32.0% 8

17. What factors affect where you decide to travel?Climate, the culture and what the people are likeCost of travel there, costs in-country, culture, food, weather, travel time (i.e. is it a good use of holiday from work), whether I can combine the trip with visiting friends/family en route or nearby.cost, internal affairs, securitycost, relaxation, places of interestcurrent economy, political situation and bars.depends on if im travelling to pursue adventure, exploration or just relaxing.exchange rates, political climatesFriends, sightseeing, different cultures, places I haven't visited before.geographical interests, culture, and activitiesHistory, regional complexity, reasonable travel costsInterest in a place, its accessibility, stability (security / political situation), costMoney. Friends. What I am travelling for. Experiencing new hobbies such as surfing.New culture and flavoursObviously I like to make myself aware of some of the risks one may come into contact with while abroad but I would like to think I'd still go somewhere given the chance. The risk would have to outweigh the potential benefits of seeing somewhere beautiful which I would like to think would never deter me enough to avoid going.Personal safety Reliable transport Good communicationsPlaces of interest Cost WeatherPrice of flights, food and things to see.Recently it's been where I've been invited to visit friends who are living abroadRecommendations, interested in the country's cultureRisk of illness, e.g food poisoning, diseases etcsafetySafety, cost, distance, hassle of experiencing local life once at destination and likelihood or

75

trip being relaxing/funWeather, cost, whether I have been there before or not, availability of flightWHat the FCO say about a country. Do I know it or know people living there.When travelling alone, my safety is most important and ability to communicate home. The more typical factors: culture, food, things to see and do, weather, > risk averse

18. Do you trust advice given by friends and acquaintances in relation to planned travel?

All the time: 20.0% 5

Most of the time: 48.0% 12

sometimes: 28.0% 7

Rarely: 4.0% 1

Never: 0.0% 0

19. If you would like to comment in more detail about any of the questions or issues raised on this page please do so below:I might be interested in visiting a place, but the current political situation might militate against it, for example Yemen or the Uighur Autonomous Region in China.Recommendations from friends and family are highly valued if it's info I wouldn't be able to get from a guidebook etc.

20. Do you use the internet mostly for information or communication?

Information: 24.0% 6

Communication: 4.0% 1

Both equally: 72.0% 18

21. Do you actively seek expert and/or government advice in relation to planned travel?

All the time: 16.0% 4

Most of the time: 12.0% 3

Sometimes: 36.0% 9

Rarely: 16.0% 4

Never: 20.0% 5

22. Do you trust expert and/or government advice in relation to planned travel?

Yes: 80.0% 20

No: 20.0% 5

23. How much do the opinions of experts inform your decision making?Very much: 16.0% 4

Quite a lot: 12.0% 3

To a reasonable extent: 40.0% 10

Not much: 28.0% 7

Not at all: 4.0% 1

24. Do you think those responsible for informing the public on risk communicate this information effectively?

All the time: 0.0% 0

Most of the time: 28.0% 7

Sometimes: 44.0% 11

76

Rarely: 28.0% 7

Not at all: 0.0% 0

25. Do you feel experts and government bodies fulfil their roles in informing the public about day to day risks?

Very much so: 8.0% 2

Most of the time: 16.0% 4

To a reasonable extent: 44.0% 11

Not really: 32.0% 8

Not at all: 0.0% 0

26. If you would like to comment in more detail about any of the questions or issues raised on this page please do so below:I believe they do provide good information, however I believe you will only get the information if you look for it. Which is something I have never done. > contradictory, complacent and irrational (how can you know what you have never sought), believes information is not disseminated to an adequate levelI feel the general public are given enough information to cover the governments backs should something arise. We are given a certain amount of information to safeguard ourselves but this info is given just as much to protect us as to protect those who give it. > aware that govt. advice can be a tool used by social forces

I might read the government website on a country but many don't recommend travel to place I visit. It seems to say this for too many countries that are fine so long as you are careful.

Re: 25 I think there are a lot of life skills which should be taught at school that should cover everyday health and safety and other risk. I learnt some things from my parents and a lot from friends/the internet. If you don't have a support network you could easily miss out on important knowledge that could out yourself and others at risk. > believes social construction is more important that functionalist social knowledgeRisk perception and risk aversion of different people varies. Therefore, government agencies have to err on the side of caution in their travel advice and guidance. >believes govt stats and advice may be more pessimistic in their message as to safeguard citizens

27. How much does travel advice made available by national governments influence your choice of travel destination?

Very much: 8.0% 2

Quite a lot: 28.0% 7

Not much: 48.0% 12

Not at all: 16.0% 4

28. Have you made use of travel advice made available by national governments in the past?

Yes: 64.0% 16

No: 36.0% 9

29. How likely is it that you will use travel advice made available by national governments on your next holiday?

Very likely: 0.0% 0

Quite likely: 20.0% 5

Reasonably likely: 32.0% 8

Unlikely: 36.0% 9

Very unlikely: 12.0% 3

77

30. Do you have any opinions about how the government of your home country distributes public information related to travel risks?

Yes: 30.4% 7

No: 69.6% 16

30.a. If, so, what are these opinions?Advertise the risks on social media > thinks expert advice could be better disseminated given the means available in our globalised worldI think the FCO does the job well > supportive of expert adviceit is too specific in regards to informing general behaviour > as isNot often that clear or put into regular persons terminology - and most people have to go find that information rather than having it clearly pushed to themThe Swiss government runs a reasonably clear and informative website which I have occasionally consulted and found helpful > supportive of expert adviceThey should carry on doing it, but know that few people follow the advice. My perception is that the govt is too cautious when telling people not to go places > aware that people are not very inclined to follow advice: believes govt. advice will be more pessimistic in risk perception than the public > this wrong/ compare to metric

31. If you would like to comment in more detail about any of the questions or issues raised on this page please do so below:Not sure if this section refers just to travel advice regarding risks (ie. health risks and what vaccinations to get, any threat of civil unrest etc) or general sightseeing advice too, so just want to clarify I'd only use a national government site for health & risk advice rather than general tourism/sightseeing info

78

Appendix 4- Tables and charts

Table 1: Percentage of sample population who enjoy travelling abroad

Do you enjoy travelling abroad?

Frequency Percent Cumulative percent

YesNo

Total

24125

964

100

96100

79

96%

4%

Yes

No

Figure 1: Percentage of persons who enjoy travelling

Table 2: Percentage of sample population who have traveled to a destination other than their home country or the country where they live in the last 12 months?

Have you travelled to a destination other than your home country or the country where you live in the last 12 months?

Frequency Percent Cumulative percent

YesNo

Total

21425

8416100

84100

80

84%

16%

Yes

No

Figure 2: Percentage of sample population who have travelled to a destination other than their home country or the country where they live in the last 12 months?

Table 3: Percentage of sample population who currently have travel planned to a destination other than their home country or the country in which they live?

Do you currently have any travel planned to a destination other than your home country or the country in which you live?

Frequency Percent Cumulative percent

YesNo

Total

151025

6040100

60100

81

60%

40%Yes

No

Figure 3: Percentage of sample population who currently have travel planned to a destination other than their home country or the country in which they live?

Table 4: Percentage of sample population who believe they are always adequately insured for travel

Are you always adequately insured for travel?

Frequency Percent Cumulative percent

YesNo

Total

16925

6436100

64100

82

64%

36%

Yes

No

Figure 4: Percentage of sample population who believe they are always adequately insured for travel

Table 5: Degree to which sample population believe they try to avoid risk

To what extent do you try to avoid risk?

Frequency Percent Cumulative percent

Very muchQuite a lot

To a reasonable extentNot reallyNot at all

Total

57103025

202840120

100

204888100100

83

20%

28%40%

12% 0%

Very much

Quite a lot

To areasonableextent

Not really

Not at all

Figure 5: Degree to which sample population believe they try to avoid risk

Figure 6: Degree to which sample population believe they try to avoid risk

84

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Very m

uch

Quite

a lot

To a

reaso

nable

exten

t

Not rea

lly

Not at a

ll

Table 6: The degree of safety the sample population feel on a day to day basis

85

How safe do you feel on a day to day basis?

Frequency Percent Cumulative percent

Very safeSafe

UnsafeVery unsafe

Total

12121025

484840

100

4896100100

48%48%

4% 0%

Very safe

Safe

Unsafe

Very unsafe

Figure 7: The degree of safety the sample population feel on a day to day basis

Table 7: Degree of safety the sample population feel while travelling abroad

86

How safe do you feel while travelling abroad?

Frequency Percent Cumulative percent

Very safeSafe

UnsafeVery unsafe

Total

3193025

1276120

100

1288100100

Figure 8: Degree of safety the sample population feel while travelling abroad

87

12%

76%

12% 0%

Very safe

Safe

Unsafe

Very unsafe

Figure 9: The sample populations perceived likelihood of being exposed to a significant risk whilst travelling abroad expressed as a percentage (raw data)

11%152020%252525%330%30%30%355%505050%50%60%65%7070%70%HighPossible

Table 9: Percentage of sample population who have experienced anxiety related to travel destination prior to travelling

Have you ever experienced any anxiety related to your destination prior to travelling abroad?

Frequency Percent Cumulative percent

YesNo

Total

17825

6832100

68100

88

68%

32%

Yes

No

Figure 10: Percentage of sample population who have experienced anxiety related to travel destination prior to travelling

Table 10: Percentage of sample population who have experienced a heightened sense of anxiety whilst travelling abroad

Have you ever experienced a heightened sense of anxiety whilst travelling abroad?

Frequency Percent Cumulative percent

YesNo

Total

121325

4852100

48100

89

48%52%

Yes

No

Figure 11: Percentage of sample population who have experienced a heightened sense of anxiety whilst travelling abroad

Table 11: Percentage of sample population who believe they make good decisions

Do you think you make good decisions?

Frequency Percent Cumulative percent

All the timeMost of the time

SometimesRarelyNever

121210

484840

48896100100

90

Total 25 100

4%

84%

8%

4% 0% All the time

Most of thetime

Sometimes

Rarely

never

Figure 12: Percentage of sample population who believe they make good decisions

Table 12: Degree to which experience and knowledge of international travel influences where the sample population decide to visit

Does your experience and knowledge of international travel influence where you decide to visit?

Frequency Percent Cumulative percent

91

Very muchQuite a lot

To a reasonable extentNot muchNot at all

Total

10932125

40361284

100

40768896100

40%

36%

12%

8% 4%

Very much

Quite a lot

To areasonableextent

Not much

Not at all

Figure 13: Degree to which experience and knowledge of international travel influences where the sample population decide to visit

Table 13: Percentage of sample population whose experience and knowledge of international travel affects their day to day decision making

Does your experience and knowledge of international travel affect your day to day decision making?

Frequency Percent Cumulative percent

YesNo

Sometimes

7108

284032

2868100

92

Total 25 100

28%

40%

32%Yes

No

Sometimes

Figure 14: Percentage of sample population whose experience and knowledge of international travel affects their day to day decision making

Table 14: Degree to which the sample population trust advice given by friends and acquaintances in relation to planned travel

Do you trust advice given by friends and acquaintances in relation to planned travel?

Frequency Percent Cumulative percent

All the timeMost of the time

SometimesRarely

51271

2048284

206896100

93

NeverTotal

025

0100

100

20%

48%

28%

4%

0% All the time

Most of thetime

Sometimes

Rarely

Never

Figure 15: Degree to which the sample population trust advice given by friends and acquaintances in relation to planned travel

Figure 16: Degree to which the sample population trust advice given by friends and acquaintances in relation to planned travel

94

5

12

7

100

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

All the

time

Mos

t of t

he ti

me

Somet

imes

Rarely

Never

Table 15: Percentage of sample population who use the internet mostly for either information or communication

Do you use the internet mostly for information or communication?

95

Frequency Percent Cumulative percent

InformationCommunication

Both equallyTotal

611825

24472100

2428100

24%

4%

72%

Information

Communication

Both equally

Figure 17: Percentage of sample population who use the internet mostly for either information or communication

Table 16: Degree to which sample population actively seek expert and or government advice in relation to planned travel

Do you actively seek expert and/or government advice in relation to planned travel?

96

Frequency Percent Cumulative percent

All the timeMost of the time

SometimesRarelyNeverTotal

4394525

1612361620100

16286480100

16%

12%

36%

16%

20%

All the time

Most of thetime

Sometimes

Rarely

Never

Figure 18: Degree to which sample population actively seek expert and or government advice in relation to planned travel

Table 17: Percentage of sample population who trust expert and/or government advice in relation to planned travel

Do you trust expert and/or government advice in relation to planned travel?

Frequency Percent Cumulative percent

Yes 20 80 80

97

NoTotal

525

20100

100

80%

20%

Yes

No

Figure 19: Percentage of sample population who trust expert and/or government advice in relation to planned travel

Table 18: Degree to which the sample population' decision making is informed by experts

How much do the opinions of experts inform your decision making?

Frequency Percent Cumulative percent

98

Very muchQuite a lot

To reasonable extentNot muchNot at all

Total

43107125

161240284

100

16286896100

16%

12%

40%

28%

4%

Very Much

Quite a lot

To areasonableextent

Not much

Not at all

Figure 20: Degree to which the sample population' decision making is informed by experts

Figure 21: Degree to which the sample population' decision making is informed by experts

99

43

10

7

10

2

4

6

8

10

12

Very M

uch

Quite

a lot

To a

reaso

nable

exten

t

Not muc

h

Not at a

ll

Table 19: Degree to which the sample population believe those responsible for informing the public on risk communicate this information effectively

Do you think those responsible for informing the public on risk communicate this information effectively?

100

Frequency Percent Cumulative percent

All the timeMost of the time

Sometimes Rarely

Not at allTotal

07117025

02844280

100

02872100100

0%

28%

44%

28%

0%

All the time

Most of the time

Sometimes

Rarely

Not at all

Figure 22: Degree to which the sample population believe those responsible for informing the public on risk communicate this information effectively

Table 20: Degree to which the sample population feels expert and government bodies fulfil their roles in informing the public about day to day risks

Do you feel experts and government bodies fulfil their roles in informing the public about day to day risks?

Frequency Percent Cumulative percent

101

Very much soMost of the time

To a reasonable extentNot reallyNot at all

Total

24118025

81644320

100

82468100100

8%

16%

44%

32%

0%

Very much so

Most of thetime

To areasonableextent

Not really

Not at all

Figure 23: Degree to which the sample population feels expert and government bodies fulfil their roles in informing the public about day to day risks

Figure 24: Degree to which the sample population feels expert and government bodies fulfil their roles in informing the public about day to day risks

102

2

4

11

8

00

2

4

6

8

10

12

Very m

uch

so

Mos

t of t

he ti

me

To a

reaso

nable

exten

t

Not rea

lly

Not at a

ll

Table 21: Degree to which the sample population' choices of travel destination is influenced by travel advice made available by national governments

103

How much does travel advice made available by national governments influence your choice of travel destination?

Frequency Percent Cumulative percent

Very muchQuite a lotNot muchNot at all

Total

2712425

8284816100

83684100

8%

28%

48%

16%

Very much

Quite a lot

Not much

Not at all

Figure 25: Degree to which the sample population' choices of travel destination is influenced by travel advice made available by national governments

Figure 26: Degree to which the sample population' choices of travel destination is influenced by travel advice made available by national governments

104

2

7

12

4

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Very much Quite a lot Not much Not at all

Table 22: Percentage of sample population who have made use of travel advice made available by national governments in the past

105

Have you made use of travel advice made available by national governments in the past?

Frequency Percent Cumulative percent

YesNo

Total

16925

6436100

64100

64%

36%

Yes

No

Figure 27: Percentage of sample population who have made use of travel advice made available by national governments in the past

Table 23: Degree to which sample population will use advice made available by national governments on their next holiday

106

How likely is it that you will use travel advice made available by national governments on your next holiday?

Frequency Percent Cumulative percent

Very likelyQuite likely

Reasonably likelyUnlikely

Very unlikelyTotal

0589325

020323612100

0205288100

0%20%

32%

36%

12%Very likely

Quite likely

Reasonablylikely

Unlikely

Very unlikely

Figure 28: Degree to which sample population will use advice made available by national governments on their next holiday

Figure 29: Degree to which sample population will use advice made available by national governments on their next holiday

107

0

5

89

3

0123456789

10

Very l

ikely

Quite

likely

Reasona

bly lik

ely

Unlikely

Very u

nlike

ly

Table 24: Percentage of sample population who have an opinion about how the government of their home country distributes public information related to travel

risks

Do you have any opinions about how the government of your home country distributes public information related to travel risks?

108

Frequency Percent Cumulative percent

YesNo

Total

71623

2872100

28100

30%

70%

Yes

No

Figure 30: Percentage of sample population who have an opinion about how the government of their home country distributes public information related to travel

risks

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