Razi Knowledge of Particulars

Fakhr al-Dn al-Rz on God's Knowledge of the ParticularsAuthor(s): Binyamin AbrahamovSource: Oriens, Vol. 33 (1992), pp. 133-155Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1580602Accessed: 05/04/2010 00:48

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FAKHR AL-DIN AL-RAZI ON GOD'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE PARTICULARS

by

Binyamin Abrahamov Tel Aviv

Introduction

Orthodox Islam teaches that God knows every existent in the temporal world, be it an event or an entity, and that this knowledge applies to past, present and future times. This idea is well attested in the Qur'an,1 according to which God even knows thoughts.2 Thus, nothing escapes His knowledge. As in other theological issues, the Muslim theologians did not content themselves with Qur'an verses and tried to prove God's knowledge, especially His knowledge of the particulars in a logical way. Logical proofs were needed, since the philosophers denied God's knowledge of the particulars on the ground that, e.g., His essential unity and simplicity contradict a knowledge which supposedly divides His essence.

The theologians learned God's knowledge of the particulars through several arguments. They inferred it from the notion that God creates everything through His free will; God must know the objects He willed.3 They also gathered this knowledge from the perfection observed in things; only whoever knows the particulars can create such perfect, well designed and purposeful things.4 According to al-Ghazali, God's will and His knowledge of this will entail His being living, and every living being is conscious of things other than its own self, hence God knows Himself and other things.5 Al-Hilli and al-Iji deduced God's knowledge of the particulars from His power.6

sira 34, v. 2: "He knows what penetrates into the earth, and what comes forth from it, what comes down from heaven, and what goes up to it; He is the All-compassionate, the All-forgiving." Trans. A.J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted, Oxford 1983. Cf. suira 35, v. 11, sura 6, v. 59, sOra 4, v. 166.

2 sura 50, v. 16. Leaman, p. 108. 3 Bello, p. 111. MatQlib, vol. III, p. 117. 4 Matalib, vol. III, p. 164. Mawaqif, vol. VIII, p. 65. Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Tasi, al-

IqtiSdftlm yata Cllaqu bi l-ictiqad, Beirut 1986, p. 54f. Schmidtke, p. 231. 5 Bello, p. 117. 6 Mawdqif, vol. VIII, p. 66, 1. 1 from the end - p. 67. Schmidtke, ibid.

Binyamin Abrahamov

The philosophers, on the other hand, had different views. They were divided, as reported by al-Amidi, on this issue, into three groups: a. Those who absolutely denied God of knowledge, whether it is knowledge of Himself or of other things. b. Those who affirmed only God's knowledge of Himself. c. Those who affirmed God's knowledge of things other than Himself, but limited this knowledge to the universals.7 In al-Ghazali the first group are the Neoplatonic philosophers who held that the world necessarily emanates from God. This emanation implies depriving God of the attributes of will and knowledge, and hence of life. And whoever is not living cannot know himself. However, the Neoplatonic philosophers themselves thought that God knows Himself.8 The second view is that of the Aristotelians.9 Most of the Muslim philosophers belonged to the third group. They argued that in order to know the particulars one must have senses10 and imagination which are inadmissible with regard to God."l Furthermore, on account of God's unity of essence, they assumed that God's knowledge is one12 and immutable. Now, knowledge of particulars involves knowledge of changes in the particulars, and if one knows changes one's knowledge changes,13 for knowledge follows its objects. Or to put it in other words, that which is eternal, namely God, cannot be subject to change.14 Moreover, the multiplicity of the objects of knowledge causes the multiplicity of knowledge, and this is impossible where God is con- cerned.15 These considerations led the philosophers to the denial of God's

7 Al-Amidi, p. 76. 8 Bello, p. 111. 9 Metaphysics, XI, 9, 1074a. 10 Al-Ghazali, Tahafut, vol. I, p. 276 (457). Marmura, p. 301. 1 Leaman, pp. 108f., 112f.

12 Marmura, p. 301. 13 Al-Shahrastani, p. 222. The most famous example of the change in knowledge is the eclipse

of the sun. "We shall explain this through an example, namely that the sun, for example, suffers an eclipse, after not having been eclipsed, and afterwards recovers its light. There are therefore in an eclipse three moments: the moment when there was not yet an eclipse but the eclipse was ex- pected in the future, the time when the eclipse was actually there-its being-and thirdly, the moment the eclipse had ceased but had been. Now we have in regard to these three conditions a threefold knowledge: we know first that there is not yet an eclipse, but that there will be one; secondly that it is now there; and thirdly, that it has been present but is no longer present. This threefold knowledge is numerically distinguishable and differentiated, and its sequence implies a change in the knowing essence, for if this knowing essence thought after the cessation of the eclipse that the eclipse was present as before, this would be ignorance, not kowledge, and if it thought during its presence that it was absent, this again would be ignorance, and the one knowledge cannot take the place of the other." Al-Ghazali, Tahafut, vol. I, p. 275 (455f.)

14 The notion of God's immutability can be traced back at least to Plato. See e.g., Republic, II, 379-382. Against those who adhere to God's immutable knowledge, al-Ghazali argues that whoever accepts changes in the eternal world must accept changes in the eternal God. Al-Ghazali, Tahafut, vol. I, p. 281 (464). 15 Marmura, p. 301.

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knowledge of the particulars and to the conclusion that since the knowledge of genera and species does not imply change nor plurality in God's knowledge, God knows the universals.16 Ibn Sina, however, went farther and developed a theory according to which God knows the particulars in a universal way.17 Ibn Rushd had a different solution to the problem. He differentiated between man's originated knowledge and God's eternal knowledge. The former is caused by the existence of beings, while the latter is the cause of beings.18 In setting forth this notion, Ibn Rushd seems to stress the difference between these two kinds of knowledge, but to dodge the question: a. He does not explain the difference between God's knowledge before the things are created and after their creation; b. In his system eternal knowledge may imply an eternal object of knowledge which cannot be explained in a world of origination and de- struction.19

From the point of view of religion, the theory of the philosophers is irreli- gious, for according to it, God cannot know whether a man obeys or disobeys Him, or whether a man becomes a heretic or a true believer. That is because God can know only the obedience or the disobedience, the belief or the unbelief in general, not as a particular behaviour of a certain man.20

Fakhr al-Din al-Razi's (d. 1209)21 chapter on God's knowledge of the particulars is presented here in an annotated translation. I have preferred to choose this chapter in Matflib rather than the chapter in Mabahith to introduce to the reader al-Razi's view on this question, because the former deals more fully with the Kalam arguments of our issue than the latter. However, parallels between the two works will be pointed out in the notes.

I would now like to give a short description of this chapter, its framework and arguments.22 The structure of the chapter can be introduced through the following outlines: 1. The philosophers' stand that God knows neither the changeable things nor the corporeal ones and their first argument to prove this stand; 2. The Mutakallimun's answer to the philosophers' argument: a. The arguments of those who hold that God's first knowledge remains as it was; and

16 Ibid. 17 This theory was thoroughly explained by Marmura. 18 Ibn Rushd, Damima, p. 74. Bello, p. 118. Cf. Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, III,

ch. 21. 19 Cf. Marmura, p. 302f. 20 Al-Ghazali, Tahafut, vol. I, pp. 277 (457), 222f. (376). 21 G.C. Anawati, EI2, vol. II, pp. 751-55. S.H. Nasr, "Fakhr al-Din al-Rzi", in A History of

Muslim Philosophy, ed. M.M. Sharif, Wiesbaden 1963, pp. 642-656. 22 For the purpose of creating continuity in the description of the chapter, I do not bring the

arguments in the order of their appearance in the chapter; for example, al-Razi's arguments against the notion of the duration of God's knowledge comes immediately after this notion, whereas in the text it comes later.

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b. The arguments of those who hold that God's knowledge changes; 3. Al- R&zi's rejoinder to 2a; 4. The reaction of some later Mutakallimun to 2b; 5. The philosophers' second argument; 6. The philosophers' third argument; 7. Al-Razi's own arguments which prove God's knowledge of the particulars.

According to al-Razi, the philosophers, whose hidden spokesman here is Ibn Sina, state that God does not know the particulars because of their changeability nor does he know the corporeal things. To prove their view they bring forward as an example a simple event, namely Zayd's changing his position from sitting to standing. The continuation of God's knowledge of Zayd's sitting when he is standing means God's ignorance of Zayd's standing, which is inconceivable. On the other hand, the discontinuation of this knowledge implies change in God's knowledge, which is also inconceivable with regard to God.

Some Mutakallimun accept the possibility of the continuation of God's knowledge of the particulars, on the following grounds: a. Just as plurality of the objects of knowledge does not cause plurality of knowledge23, so the change of the objects of knowledge does not cause change in knowledge. God knows everything through one knowledge. Al-Razi absolutely rejects this notion, for according to him, knowledge does multiply due to the multiplicity of the objects of knowledge, whether knowledge is perceived as a form which corresponds to its objects or as a special relationship between the knower and the object of knowledge. Al-Razi's second objection to the theory of the continuation of knowledge consists in a defect occurring in the analogy which compares multiplicity of objects to multiplicity of changes: the analogy has no common principle.

The view of the duration of knowledge is also based on the argument that knowledge is a quality through which the objects of knowledge are disclosed. Knowledge resembles a mirror in which forms are seen. Just as the forms change and the mirror does not, so objects of knowledge change and knowledge itself does not.24 Admitting that knowledge is a disclosure, al-Razi, however, says that this disclosure means a special relationship between the knower and the object of knowledge. The disclosure is a cause of this knowledge. Thus, when the cause disappears the effect too disappears.25

23 The premise which lies behind this argument is that one piece of knowledge can perceive many objects.

24 See note 43 below. 25 In a chapter dealing with the real meaning of knowledge and perception (Matalib, vol. III,

pp. 103ff.), al-Razi brings forward four possibilities of defining knowledge: a. Knowledge indicates only a special relationship between the knower and the object of knowledge. This view of knowledge is preferred by al-Rzl. b. The notion of most of the philosophers that knowledge is a real quality, which means that knowledge is the occurrence of the form of the object of knowledge in the knower. This idea is totally rejected by al-Razi.

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The third argument, or rather assertion, which advocates the continuation of knowledge, assumes that the knowledge of a future event continues until the event occurs. This is easily refuted by al-Razi on the ground that objects of knowledge are accidents which come into being successively. Hence, the knowledge which follows its object cannot endure; one cannot know through one piece of knowledge what will occur in the next moment. Moreover, the contention that knowledge continues ignores the element of time, which is an integral part of the knowledge of every occurrence in the corporeal world.

The last argument, which is put forth in defense of the duration of knowledge, considers knowledge a real quality of the knower's essence. The quality's connection to the object of knowledge is a relationship between the knowledge and its object.26 The change of the object of knowledge causes a change of relationship between the knowledge and its objects, but the essence of knowledge does not change. The relationship is thus external; it does not in- fluence the essence of knowledge.27 Pointing at the previous arguments, in which he demonstrates that knowledge does change, al-Razi does not refute this argument directly.

Four arguments are adduced in support of the view, shared by Jahm ibn Safwan, Hisham ibn al-Hakam and Abu al-Husayn al-Ba$rl, that following the change of the objects of knowledge, knowledge changes: a. There is a knowledge that something will happen tomorrow. If a man does not know that tomorrow will come, he will not know the occurrence of this event. Events are connected with time, hence ignorance of time prevents one from knowing the occurrence of an event. This proves that the knowledge that an event will occur is not the same as the knowledge of its occurrence when it occurs.

b. Essences do not change. Since knowledge is an essence, it does not change. The knowledge that a thing will exist is an essence opposite to the knowledge of the thing's present existence. c. The knowledge that a thing is existent now is conditioned on its actual existence, whereas the knowledge of its future existence is not conditioned on its actual existence. Thus these two pieces of knowledge are different from each

c. The view of most of the Mutakallimun to the effect that knowledge is a real quality existing in the knower's essence and having a special relationship to the object of knowledge. This real quality is not a form identical with the essence of the object of knowledge. d. Knowledge is a real and specific quality which pertains to negation. Two groups are subsumed under this definition: 1. A group of early Mutakallimun, who said that knowledge means absence (or negation) of ignorance. 2. Philosophers who adhere to the view that the meaning of the intellect (= that which perceives things) is something which is deprived of matter.

26 See the preceding note. 27 Cf. al-Ghazali, Tahafut, vol. II, p. 153.

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other; furthermore, they are contraries, because they cannot coexist. d. This argument is based on the definition of knowledge as a form which accords with its object. Now, since objects of knowledge are contraries, those things which accord with them must be contraries. This is a slightly different formulation of the previous argument.

The later Mutakallimun do not accept the view that God's knowledge changes. First they say that the coming of a knowledge into being entails its having someone who brings it into being who in turn must know the act he does. Thus the bringing of a knowledge into being is dependent upon another knowledge. Such an endless chain of pieces of knowledge is inconceivable. Al- Razi points out that this argument is based on the premise that the knowledge is brought into being by a person who has ability and choice. However, if knowledge is perceived as obliged by the knower's essence on the condition that the object of knowledge exists the case is different.

The second argument refutes the notion of the change of knowledge through examining the substrate of its taking place. This argument scans three possibilities of the place in which knowledge occurs, namely, in God's essence, in another essence and in no substrate. All three possibilities are cancelled; hence it is proved that knowledge does not come into being.

The third argument is also based on a triparitite division of which the Mutakallimun were fond. God's essence is sufficient either for the causation of knowledge (knowledge being perceived here as a quality to which reason points), or for its nullification28, or neither for one nor for the other. The first two possibilities mean continuation of knowledge and its privation respective- ly. In both cases change is prevented. The third possibility, according to which God's essence is sufficient neither for causation nor for rejection, implies that the causation or rejection of this quality is dependent upon something other than this essence. And that which is dependent on another thing is possible by virtue of itself, whereas God's essence is necessary by virtue of itself.

The fourth argument shows a contradiction in God's knowledge of the world in case His previous knowledge of the non-existence of the world continues after the creation of the world, which entails a knowledge of its existence. This contradiction enjoins the author to examine another possibility, that is, the disappearance of the previous knowledge, which is assumed to be either eternal or temporal. Both possibilities are inconceivable. The two famous proponents of the change in God's knowledge, Jahm ibn Safwan and Hisham ibn

28 Al-Razi uses here two words daf and salb, but salb seems to me the more appropriate, because dafC (rejection) refers to something which exists and will exist-which is not the case- whereas salb (nullification or negation) means to prevent something from being existent-which is the contrary of causation.

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al-Hakam, rejoin by distinguishing between two kinds of knowledge: a. knowledge of the essences of things; and b. knowledge of the actual things. The first knowledge is eternal, while the second is temporal.

To recapitulate the course of our description until now, al-Razi begins his discussion with setting forth the philosophers' first argument, which proves that God cannot know the changeable and corporeal things. He adds to this the arguments of those Mutakallimun who advocate the continuation of God's knowledge, the arguments of those who advocate change in God's knowledge and the contra-arguments to these two kind of arguments. Now al-Razi comes to deal with the philosophers' second and third arguments.

The second argument is based on a sketch of a square winged by two other squares. In the first phase the philosophers prove that the distinction between the two squares occurs in the mental existence. In the second phase it is demonstrated that the two squares have two substrates, not one. These two substrates differ from each other in state and place. Since the two squares have bodily qualities (state and place), their perceiver must be a body29, and God is not a body so that he can have the squares inhere in Him. This proof, al-Razi responds, is based on the notion, which was already refuted,30 that the perception of a thing is conditioned on the presence of the object of knowledge in the knower's mind.

The third argument of the philosophers can be summarized as follows: a. Knowledge is the effect of the existence of its object; b. God's essence is based on His knowledge; c. Consequently, God's essence is based on the object of knowledge, which means that His essence needs a possible thing for its existence, and hence God's essence is possible; d. Thus, the Necessary Existent by virtue of Himself must be a possible existent by virtue of itself, which is absurd. The present argument denies God's knowledge of the particulars. However, God knows the essence of things, for this knowledge takes place whether the things exist or not; it is not dependent upon their actual existence. This argument incurs al-Razi's rejoinder. He deduces from the philosophers' argument that God cannot produce an effect on another thing, for this production needs another thing. Thus, the conclusion implied is that just as this notion is inconceivable so too is the notion that God cannot know the particulars.

The last part of the chapter consists of arguments adduced by al-Razi in the name of those who adhere to the view that God knows the particulars. Al-Razi has already proved God's knowledge of His acts through the perfection observed in them. Now, perfection is seen only in the particulars, therefore God knows them. Second, he shows that the element of individualization is either

29 In order for a thing to be a body it needs a state and a place. 30 See note 25 above, the second notion.

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an integral part of the essence of a thing, or a possible essence (mahiyya mum- kina). Since God, according to the philosophers, knows the essences, he must know the particulars. Al-Razi also uses the philosophers' idea that the knowledge of the cause entails the knowledge of its effect in order to show that God's knowledge of His essence implies His knowledge of the individual things which are the effect of His knowledge.

The premise of the third argument is that knowledge of things is a quality of praise and perfection. God is the greatest among all existents, therefore he is necessarily more entitled to be qualified by qualities of perfection.

In the last argument al-Razi has recourse to man's deeds, which, in his opinion, show man's predisposition (fitra), whose evidence is more appropriate than the divisions of the Mutakallimun to be accepted as true. That people beseech God for mercy in time of distress even if they deny His knowledge of the particulars serves as proof for His knowledge of the particulars. The use of such an argument in the context of philosophical arguments seems odd even though we may regard the predisposition as a necessary knowledge. However, it is not the first time that an argument like this occurs in Kalam texts. In a chapter which treats "God's sitting Himself upon the Throne", al-AshCari, after interpreting some Qur'an verses in favor of the idea that God is on the Throne, brings as proof of God's existence in the heaven the fact that when praying all Muslims raise their hands towards the heaven.31

The contents of the arguments put forth in defense of God's knowledge of the particulars deviate from the topics dealt with in the Mutakallimun's arguments which al-Razi introduces in this chapter. Due to al-Razi's criticism of the arguments which try to prove either the changeability of God's knowledge or its continuation, he seems to regard them as inconclusive.32 Notwithstanding, most of al-Razi's own arguments do not seem definitive; they can easily be refuted. The notion that a perfect act entails knowledge of the particulars can be rejected on the ground that in nature we observe perfect acts of animals to which we cannot ascribe knowledge.33 Referring to the third argument one

31 Al-AshCari, al-Ibana 'an usal al-diyana, Dar al-Tiba'a al-Muniriyya, Cairo n.d., p. 32. Cf. Ibn Taymiyya, Bayan talbTs al-Jahmiyya fi ta'sis bidacihim al-kaldmiyya, ed. Muhammad ibn CAbd al-Rahman ibn Qasim, n.p., 1396H., p. 446f. Al-AshCari also uses man's feeling in distinguishing between appropriated movement (harakat iktisab) and involuntary movement (harakat iq(tirar). Man necessarily knows the difference between these two kinds of movement through his consciousness; he knows that he cannot prevent involuntary movements (shaking from palsy or shivering from fever) from occurring, while the opposite is true with appropriated movements (go- ing and coming, approaching and withdrawing). B. Abrahamov, "A Re-examination of al- Ashcari's Theory of Kasb according to Kitab al-lumac", JRAS (1989), p. 211.

32 The only exception is the third argument which refutes the notion of change in God's knowledge. Al-Razi considers this argument excellent.

33 Matalib, vol. III, pp. 109ff.

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can ask: Does God's quality of praise necessitate knowledge of the particulars if it contradicts another quality of praise which is assigned to God, namely, in- corporeality? In the second argument, al-Razi tries to prove that individualization forms a part of the essence or that it is the essence itself. Here al-Razi ignores the definition of an essence and the conditions of individualization, namely, accidents, which cannot be a part of the essence or the essence itself. In sum, these three proofs which advocate the notion that God knows the particulars appear questionable. This may explain why al-Rizi prefers at the end of the chapter to bring forth an argument rooted in man's predisposition and not in his speculative ability. This argument cannot be refuted on speculative grounds.

A Discussion of God's Knowledge of the Particulars (Matalib, vol. III) (p. 151) There are some people who, on the authority of the philosophers,

relate the following statement: God does not know the particulars (juz'iyyat). This statement needs consideration. That is because God's peculiar essence (dhatuhu al-makhsusa) is a fixed essence (dhat muCayyana)34 and He knows this fixed essence.35 The particular has no meaning but this36, so that God can know it. Furthermore, God's essence is the cause of the First Intellect.37 What clearly arises from their method is that they admit that God knows the First Intellect inasmuch as it is the First Intellect.38 Moreover, it is right to say that they deny His knowledge of the changeable things (mutaghayyirat) inasmuch as they are changeable and His knowledge of the corporeal things according to their specific and fixed measures.

They (the philosophers) adduced some arguments to prove their method: a. They said: Let us assume God's knowledge that Zayd is sitting in this

place, then if Zayd rises from this place His knowledge of Zayd's sitting, if it remains [as it is], will be ignorance, which is inconceivable (muhal) concerning God, and if it does not remain it will be a change, and a change regarding

34 I.e. it does not change. 35 Cf. Nihayat, p. 215, 1. 8. Introduction p. 134. 36 Al-Razi ascribes to the philosophers the notion that God's essence is a particular; hence God

knows it and not other particulars. In his Mabdhith (vol. II, p. 475f.) al-Razi divides the particulars into four classes: a. particulars which neither change nor are composed of form and matter, e.g. God and the intellects; b. particulars which do not change but which are composed of form and matter such as the celestial spheres; c. particulars which change but which are not composed of form and matter, e.g., the accidents which come into being, forms in the sublunary world and the rational human souls; d. particulars which change and which are composed of form and matter, such as the bodies which are generated and corrupted. Marmura, p. 305.

37 Very probably this refers to the theory of Ibn Sina according to which God's act of self- knowledge necessitates the First Intellect. Marmura, p. 305. Netton, p. 163. Bello, p. 121. 38 Cf. Mabahith, vol. II, p. 476, 11. 5-6.

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God is inconceivable. This is the wording38a on which the philosophers depend.39

Know that the Mutakallimun were divided into two parties concerning this doubtful opinion (shubha).40 Some of them said: (p. 152) The first knowledge remains.41 Some others adhered to [the notion of] change, and said: The first knowledge does not remain. As for the first party, they said: The knowledge that a thing will come into being (sa-yahduthu) is the same knowledge of its coming into being (hudath) when it comes into being, for the knowledge remains and the change takes place in the thing known (maclim).

They adduced some arguments to prove the soundness of their opinion: a. God knows through one knowledge all the known things. Since the mul-

tiplicity of the objects of knowledge does not result in the multiplicity of knowledge, it is necessary that the change of the objects of knowledge will not result in the change of knowledge.42

b. Knowledge is a quality (sifa) through which the objects of knowledge are revealed as they are. For this meaning we shall cite a parable: If we assume a mirror fixed on a wall, the form of everyone who passes in front of the mirror is revealed in it. When people pass in front of this mirror, forms have not ceased to be revealed, but the mirror does not change. The change, however, occurs in the people who pass in front of it.43 If you know this, we shall say: Knowledge is a quality ready for the perception of what is present in front of it. This quality remains in its state, and the change occurs in the. objects of knowledge.

c. If we assume that a person thought that Zayd would enter the house tomorrow and if we assume this thought [to remain] until he entered the city, then [through] the fixation of this thought, he thinks the entrance of Zayd to the city now; thus it is proved, through what we have mentioned, that the knowledge that a thing will exist is the same as the knowledge of its existence when it exists.44

38a The text has harf (lit. letter). 39 Cf. Mabfhith, vol. II, p. 476. 40 For the translation of this term see van Ess, ifi, index. The Mutakallimun used to indicate

by this term the arguments of their adversaries. Peters, pp. 75, 364, renders this term "sophism". 41 According to al-Shahrastani this is the Muctazila's stand. Nihayat, p. 221. Al-Iji adds that

most of the Ash'arites agree with it. Mawaqif, vol. VIII, p. 75, 11. 4-9. Cf. Nihayat, pp. 218, 219, 1. 19. Al-Iji explains that this view is taken from the philosophers who hold that God's knowledge does not take place in time and has no connection to time. Mawaqif, ibid., p. 75,1. 10 - p. 76,1. 15.

42 Cf. MabQhith, vol. II, p. 477, 11. 6-7. 43 The comparison between God's knowledge and a mirror through which things are revealed

seems unconvincing, for a mirror does not retain the form which passed in front of it, whereas God's knowledge does not lose the object of knowledge.

44 Cf. Nihayat, p. 219, 11. 12-18. Mawaqif, ibid., p. 75,1. 5. The basis of this argument is the premise that God's knowledge is not connected with time. Ibid., 11. 10-11. Al-Ghazali, Tahafut, p. 278 (459). Note 41 above.

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d. Knowledge is a real quality existing in the knower's essence, and the connection (taealluq) of knowledge to its object means a (p. 153) relationship (nis- ba) between the knowledge and its object. If the object of knowledge changes, the relationship of this knowledge to its object will change but the essence of the knowledge will not. Do you not understand that if a person (a) sits in his own place and another person (b) comes and sits beside (a), (a) is on (b)'s right side; then, if (b) rises and moves from this side to the other side, (a) is on his left side after sitting on his right side. Here a change in this relationship (between the knowledge and its object) occurs while clear [perception of] sense and reason proves that no change took place in the knowledge altogether, and that it remains as it was.44a

This is the sum of the arguments held by whomever says that the first knowledge remains as it was.

As for those who say that it is necessary for knowledge to change with the change of its object, they adduce some arguments to prove the soundness of their opinion:

a. If we assume that a man thought that Zayd would enter the city tomorrow, then we suppose that this man was seated in a dark house without distinguishing between night and day and that his thought remained as it had been until dawn came [and] Zayd entered the city, but this sitting person did not know that dawn had come. The thought that Zayd would enter the city tomorrow would not cause this man to know that Zayd was entering the city now. [Now], if the knowledge that a thing will exist were identical to the knowledge of the existence of the thing when it exists, this last knowledge would occur in the same form as the former,45 and since it does not,46 we know that the knowledge that a thing will exist is not identical to the knowledge of the existence of the thing when it exists. Indeed, if he has a piece of knowledge that Zayd will enter the city tomorrow then he has a second piece of knowledge that tomorrow had come; from these two pieces of knowledge a third piece of knowledge will derive to the effect that Zayd is entering the city now. This (the third) is a new piece of knowledge which derives from the two preceding ones and it does not infringe on the first piece of knowledge.47

(p. 154) b. The second argument with regard to the explanation that the

44a Bello, p. 119 at the bottom. Al-Ghazali, Tahafut, p. 277f. (458). Ibn Rushd, .)amima, p. 74. The counter-argument of the philosophers is that the relationship between the knowledge and its object enters the knower's essence. Al-Ghazali, Tahafut, p. 278 (459). (This scheme describes the root of the argument: bl [a] b2).

45 I.e. it would be the same knowledge. 46 Since the knowledge of what will happen is not identical to the knowledge of what really

happened. Cf. Ibn Rushd, JpamTma, p. 73. 47 Cf. Nihayat, p. 217, 1. 18 - p. 218, 1. 2. Mawaqif, vol. VIII, p. 74. The example given at

the head of the paragraph is brought forward by al-Iji as Abu al-Husayn al-Basri's saying. Ibid., p. 77, 11. 7-8.

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knowledge that a thing will exist is not identical to the knowledge of its existence when it exists is this: It is intuitively (fi badihat al-caql)48 clear that the essences of things (haqa'iq al-ashy7')49 do not change; blackness does not change into whiteness and knowledge does not change into its opposite. If you know this, we shall say: The knowledge that a thing will exist is an essence50 opposite to the essence [of the knowledge] that the thing exists now. The proof of this is that it is impossible for one of them to replace another, for if one thought that a thing had existed before its existence it would be ignorance [on his part], and if one thought, when the thing exists, that the thing had not existed and would exist it would [also] be ignorance [on his part]. Thus it is proved that the essence of each of these two pieces of knowledge is opposite to the essence of the other. If this is proved, we shall say: We have explained that the essences (al-mahiyyat wa'l-haqa'iq) are unchangeable. As a result, it is necessarily impossible that one of the two pieces of knowledge should be- come identical to the other, and thus it is proved that the knowledge that a thing will exist cannot be the same as the knowledge of its existence when it exists.

c. The third argument is to say that it is intuitively clear that a thing which is conditioned by a condition (mashrat bi-shart) differs from a thing which is not conditioned by this condition. Moreover, a thing which exists now differs from a thing which does not exist now but will exist after that. If you know this, we shall say: The knowledge that a thing will exist is not conditioned by the existence of the thing now, but its condition [if it exists] opposes this knowledge. As for the knowledge that the thing exists now, it is conditioned by the existence of this thing now. Therefore, one necessarily judges that each of the two pieces of knowledge differs from one another. Furthermore, the knowledge that a thing will exist occurs now and will not remain when the thing does exist. And the knowledge that a thing does not exist does not occur now and will exist when the thing does [not] exist. These two pieces of knowledge are like two opposing contraries (al-mutanafiyayni al-mutaddadayni); hence the statement that one of them is the same as the other (p. 155) is like the statement that each of two contraries is the same as the other. This is an absurdity which reason does not accept.

d. Knowledge is a form which accords with its object. Now, it is necessarily known that the essence of our statement "it will happen" (sa-yahduthu) opposes the essence of our statement "it is now happening" (hadith, hasil). Since

48 Al-Jurjani, K. al-tacrifat, p. 44, 11. 16-20. 49 Ibid., p. 95, 11. 1-4. 50 The two terms which occur here, mahiyya and haqiqa, indicate that through which a thing

is what it is (ma bihi al-shay' huwa huwa). Each of the two terms refers to a different aspect. Haqiqa refers to that through which a thing is what it is considering its actuality, and mahiyya refers to it without considering its actuality. Ibid., pp. 95, 205.

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these two essences oppose each other, the forms which accord with them necessarily oppose each other, because that which accords with the opposing thing must be opposing. And if one form of the two opposes the other it is impossible to state that one of them is the same as the other. These are clear nearly intuitive arguments considering the explanation that it is impossible for the knowledge that a thing will exist to be identical to the knowledge of its existence when it exists.

Now we come to answer the arguments to which they adhered for the purpose of elucidation of their opinion.51

The answer to the first argument, which states that since knowledge does not multiply on account of the multiplicity of its objects, it does not necessarily change on account of the change of its objects, is based on two arguments:

a. We do not admit that knowledge does not multiply with the multiplicity of its objects. The proof of this [runs as follows]: Knowledge is either a form which accords with its object or a specific relationship between the knower and the object of knowledge.52 The first [possibility] necessitates the multiplicity of the pieces of knowledge when the objects of knowledge multiply, since things which accord with different essences must be different. The second [possibility] necessitates the same [conclusion], for we have explained that a relationship [of one thing] to "a" (lit. to a thing ila 'I-shay') is different form [its] relationship to "b" (lit. to another). The proof of this is that it is admissible to conceive that one of these two relationships overlooks the existence of the other.53

b. let us suppose that we admit that knowledge does not necessarily multiply when its objects multiply; why then did you say that it must not change when its objects change? For this is an analogy without a common principle.54 The forcible proof which we have mentioned demonstrates that knowledge necessarily changes with the change of its objects.

The answer to the second wrong argument, which states that knowledge is a peculiar quality (p. 156) through which the essences of knowledge are revealed,55 is to say that we have mentioned in the book of knowledge (kitab al- cilm) that there is no meaning to knowledge except for this revelation and

51 See p. 152, 1. 5ff. of the Arabic text, p. 136 of the translation. 52 Cf. Mab.hith, vol. I, p. 331. Note 25 of the introduction. 53 I.e. the two relationships are different from each other and therefore there are two pieces of

knowledge which sometimes have no connection with each other. 54 Qiyas min ghayr jdmi means an analogy without a common principle which corresponds to

major term in syllogism. Horten, p. 145. For major term see Maimonides, Maqola fti indat al- mantiq, ed. and trans. into French by M. Ventura, Paris 1935, ch. 6. Al-Razi means to say that there is no common principle between change in pieces of knowledge and their multiplicity so that one can draw an analogy. 55 See p. 152, 1. 8ff. of the Arabic text, p. 136 of the introduction.

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except for this peculiar exposition.56 As for the affirmation of a quality be- yond this peculiar relationship and apart from this peculiar ascription, we have mentioned in Kitdb al-Cilm that there is no proof which demonstrates its affirmation. If this is affirmed, we shall say: Since it is proved that this peculiar relationship (i.e. the relationship between the knowledge and its object) changed, this adjudicates that the knowledge had changed. Then we say: We admit that the knowledge is something different from this peculiar relationship, but we ask (lit. say) whether this peculiar knowledge (lit. thing) necessitates a peculiar relationship to the peculiar object of knowledge or not? If it necessitates (this relationship), then it is not knowledge, for knowledge means revelation (inkishdf, tajallT), and there is no doubt that revelation is a state of relationship between the knowledge and its object. If we assume a quality which is not this very revelation and which does not necessitate this revelation, it will not be knowledge. However, if we say that this peculiar quality necessitates this peculiar relationship and this peculiar ascription, then when this peculiar relationship disappears the result (ldzima)57 of this knowledge disappears. The disappearance of the result proves the disappearance of its cause (malzum). Here we must also definitely state that this knowledge disappears.

The answer to the third wrong argument58, which states that if we suppose that the thought that Zayd will enter the city tomorrow continues until he enters then the knowledge (that he will enter) is the same as the knowledge of the occurrence of this entrance, is as follows: Most of the Mutakallimun say: The continuation of the object of knowledge is impossible (al-baqdl Cald al- maclum mumtanic), since it is59 an accident which takes place successively.60 If this continuation is impossible how do they know that if this impossible thing occurred the case would be such and such. Who is the one who informs them that the matter is as they say? Then (p. 157) we say: We have already explained that if this thought continued but the thinker did not know that the day had come, then he would not know, on account of this thought that someone was now entering the city. Therefore it is proved that the form which they have mentioned is the best proof of the soundness of our statement.

The answer to the fourth wrong argument,61 which states that knowledge is a quality which has a peculiar relationship [to its object] and that what changes

56 Al-Razi may refer here to the chapter on 'ilm in Mablhith, vol. I, p. 319. Cf. note 25 of the introduction.

57 Ldzima seems to be an equivalent to lazim which means a result, a consequence. Van Ess, Iji, index.

58 See p. 152, 1. 15ff. of the Arabic text, p. 137 of the translation. 59 The text has bal innahu. 60 Hence there are pieces of knowledge which follow the objects of knowledge. 61 See p. 152, the last line of the Arabic text, p. 137 of the translation.

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is the relationship, not the quality, is the previous discussion, which exposes the problems involved in this view. And God knows best.

The second party of the Mutakallimun adhered to the notion that change occurs in the knowledge, and said: When the object of knowledge disappears, the knowledge of it disappears, and another knowledge comes into being. The explanation of this statement is as follows: This peculiar essence (al-dhat al- makh!f4a)62 necessitates the knowledge of the object on the condition that this object takes place; if this object takes place according to this aspect, then a necessary condition occurs and the knowledge of this thing necessarily occurs in this peculiar essence. If this object disappears, the necessary condition disappears and a condition of another knowledge occurs. Thus the first knowledge certainly disappears and another knowledge occurs. This is the opinion of Abu al-Husayn al-Basri63, who is counted among the Muctazilite scholars, and of Jahm ibn Safwan64 and Hisham ibn al-Hakam65, who are counted among the ancient scholars.

As for the later Mutakallimun, they proved the unsoundness of this view through several arguments:

a. Since this knowledge comes into being after its nonexistence, it must have something which brings it into existence and makes it, and the bringer into existence and the maker of this knowledge must know it, because we have explained that the coming of a perfect action out of the maker is conditioned by the latter's being a knower. Hence, the bringing of this knowledge into existence is conditioned on the occurrence of another knowledge preceding the former. And the statement with regard to that previous knowledge is like the statement concerning this knowledge. This necessitates an endless chain (tasalsul) [of pieces of knowledge], which is absurd.

[However], one has a right to say: This argument is weak, for you arrange your statement so that knowledge (p. 158) comes into being only because the choosing free maker (al-facil al-mukhtar) brings this knowledge into existence through ability and choice. We do not adhere to this opinion, but we say that

62 I.e. man. 63 One of the masters of 'Abd al-Jabbar (d. 1025). Ibn al-Murta

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this peculiar essence necessitates the knowledge of the thing on the condition that this object [of knowledge] takes place according to this aspect.66 If the thing takes place according to the special aspect, the necessary condition occurs, and the peculiar essence necessitates this peculiar knowledge, and if this object disappears, then the necessary condition disappears and this knowledge [also] disappears. According to this assumption this argument is false and refuted.

b. If this knowledge came into being [there would be three possibilities]: it would come into being either in God's essence (fi dhat allah), or in another essence, or not in a substrate (mahall). The tripartite division is false; hence the opinion concerning the coming of the knowledge into being is [also] false. We say that it is impossible that the knowledge should come into being in God's essence only because this forces God's essence to be a substrate of things which come into being, and this is false. We say that the two remaining possibilities (lit. parts) are [also] false only on account of the [notion] that the knowledge of such and such a thing by a [certain] essence is a quality of this essence,67 and the occurrence of the quality of essence not in this essence68 is inconceivable.

However, one has a right to say: Why it is not conceivable to say that these pieces of knowledge comes into being in God's essence? [Concerning] his saying: "This forces God's essence to be a substrate of things which come into being", we say: If you mean by his being a substrate of things which come into being the coming into being of these pieces of knowledge in His essence, this means forcing the conclusion to be a proof (lit. forcing the thing on itself ilzam IPl-shay" cala nafsihi),69 and this is false.

c. [There exist three possibilities concerning] every quality which reason points at: God's essence is sufficient for its causation (istilzrm), or is sufficient for its rejection, or is sufficient neither for its causation nor for its rejection. If the first [possibility] exists, the continuation (dawarm) of this quality is necessary due to the continuation of this essence. This prevents change in God's essence. If the second [possibility] exists, the continuation of the negation of this quality is necessary due to the continuation of this essence. And this also

66 This aspect means that the peculiar essence necessitates the knowledge as is mentioned above.

67 It is not a quality of God. For the whole argument cf. Nihayat, p. 216, 11. 1-4. 68 I.e. neither in another substrate and nor in any substrate. 69 The opponent of the view that God's knowledge changes (= comes into being) says that it

is impossible that such a knowledge should come into being in God's essence, because in this case God's essence should be a substrate of things which come into being. However, if God's being a substrate of things which come into being is identical to the coming of these pieces of knowledge into being in His essence, there is no proof here, for the arguer uses the conclusion desired as proof which means that he forces (alzama) the conclusion to be a proof.

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prevents a change in [God's essence]. If the third [possibility] exists, whereby this essence is sufficient neither for the affirmation of this quality nor for its negation, then it follows that the affirmation of this quality as well as its negation are based on a thing different from this essence. (p. 159) But it is known that this essence has not ceased to affirm this quality and to negate it. And if it is proved that the affirmation (of this quality) and its negation are based on a thing different (from this essence),70 and everything which is based on a different thing is possible by virtue of itself (mumkin bi-dhatihi). It follows that that which is necessary by virtue of itself (wajib bi-dhatihi)7oa is possible by virtue of itself. This is a wrong and false [statement]. Here ends the discussion concerning the explanation of this argument. And it is excellent.

d. Let us suppose that God has known from eternity that the world is now nonexistent (macdtim ft 'l-hal)71, then he brought it into existence and knew that it is now existent, did the first knowledge disappear or not and was the second cancelled? [If the first knowledge did not disappear] there is knowledge that the world is both nonexistent and existent now, and this necessitates ignorance and combination of two contradictory opinions-which is inconceivable. As for the first possibility, namely, the disappearance of the first knowledge, we say: This knowledge is said to have been eternal or temporal. The first possibility is false, for the Mutakallimun agree that it is impossible that what is proved as eternal should be nonexistent, and there are also many proofs which speaks in favor of this [notion]. Concerning the second possibility, namely, that this knowledge is temporal, we ask whether this knowledge is preceded by another knowledge or not? If it is preceded by another knowledge the reference to this preceding knowledge is as the reference to this knowledge, and this causes each temporal knowledge to be preceded by another temporal knowledge. This necessitates the notion of temporals which have no beginning (hawadith la awwala laha). According to the Mutakallimun this view is false. If we say that these pieces of knowledge end in temporal knowledge which is not preceded by another knowledge, this will attribute ignorance to God, which is inconceivable.72

Jahm ibn Safwan and Hisham ibn al-Hakam responded to this contention,

70 Cf. Mab.hith, vol. II, p. 478. What follows is a parenthetical sentence of the text which is omitted in one of the manuscripts and which is not needed for understanding the passage. It appears after note 70: "While that which is based on a thing which is in turn based on a thing is based on a different thing, it follows that this peculiar quality is based on a different thing."

70a I.e. God. 71 Lit. at once, immediately. 72 That is because God has not always known that the world is not existent in a certain

moment. For the notion of tasalsul see Nihoyat, p. 220.

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saying: The knowledge which occurs in eternity is knowledge of essences (mahiyyat, haqadiq)73 and of conceptions (tasawwurat).74 Then when God has not ceased to bring things into existence, judgements (tavdiqat) have taken place. Tasdiq means the judgement that a certain thing exists and that a certain thing does not exist.75 According to this assumption the difficulty disappears.

Know that we have mentioned in the beginning of this argument their saying76 that if God knew that (p. 160) Zayd was sitting in that place and when Zayd stood up, if this knowledge still remained, it would have been ignorance (on the part of God), and if it did not remain it would have been change. Then we have mentioned the methods of the people with regard to each of these two parts.

Here ends the discussion on this argument. And God knows best. The second argument of the philosophers in this chapter: If we supposed a

square winged by two equal squares according to this sketch:

and if we assumed God's knowledge of it (the square), there would be no doubt that each of these two squares, which are placed on these two sides, is distin- guished from the other. This is known. If this is proved we shall say: The distinction of each of these two squares from the other is conditioned on their being existent, for the occurrence of distinction and difference regarding shape, measure and form with their being absolutely nonexistent is inconceivable. Thus one must assert that this distinction does not occur unless these [two squares] are existent. Now, we say: This existence is either external or intellectual. The first possibility is false, for we can imagine a form like this with right imagination in case of its actual nonexistence. Moreover, the knowledge [of these two squares] is temporal, since the whole form is temporal, and its bringer into existence (muhdith) is God. Whoever does not know it cannot bring it into existence. Hence it is proved that the knowledge of forms and shapes like these precedes their existence and it is also proved that this distinc-

73 See note 50 above. 74 Ta,awwur means the consideration of a thing inasmuch as it is without referring to its exis-

tence or nonexistence. Al-Razi, Muhagal, p. 16. Al-Amidi, al-Mubin, p. 69. 75 Cf. Ibid. 76 P. 141f. above.

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tion occurs in the intellectual existence. (p. 161) We say: The substrate of these two squares, which are placed in the two sides, is either one thing or two different things according to space (hayyiz) and state (wa

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the knowledge refers to its existence and that it does not exist only because the knowledge refers to its nonexistence. That is since (p. 162) the knowledge of a thing is a form which fits this thing in itself.80 The fact that this form fits it (the object) depends on the essential actuality of the thing (tahaqquqihifinafsi- hi). It is impossible to say that its essential actuality depends on the fitness of this form to it (to the object).

If we prove this principle we shall say: If it were necessary to qualify God's essence through these pieces of knowledge (culum), while we have already proved that the occurrence of these pieces of knowledge is based on the occurrence of these objects of knowledge themselves according to these peculiar aspects, then His peculiar essence would need the occurrence of these pieces of knowledge. You know that that which is based (God's essence) on a thing (God's knowledge) which is based on a thing (the object of knowledge) must be based on the latter thing. Hence it follows necessarily that the actuality (tahaqquq) of God's essence is based on the actuality of these possible things (mumkinat) and that that which needs the existence of the possible things is more entitled to being possible (awla bi'l-imkan). Consequently, that which is a Necessary Existent by virtue of Himself must be a possible existent by virtue of Himself, which is inconceivable.81

This is contrary to His knowledge of the essences (al-mahiyyat wa'l- haqa)iq).82 For this knowledge occurs no matter whether these essences occur or not. In such a case His peculiar essence is sufficient for the establishment of these pieces of knowledge in Him, and His essence must not be based on the occurrence of something else. As for the knowledge that Zayd is sitting in this place, for it is impossible for such knowledge to occur but when Zayd is sitting in this place, God's peculiar essence is not sufficient for the occurrence of these pieces of knowledge. Moreover, one must consider the occurrence of these objects of knowledge according to these peculiar aspects [without God's knowledge]. If God's essence is not sufficient for the occurrence of these pieces of knowledge, then the difficulty mentioned above is not necessary.83

(p. 163) One has a right to say: This statement prevents Him from producing an effect on another thing (mu'aththir fi 'l-ghayr), for the production of an effect on another thing is a peculiar relationship between Him and another thing, which is not established but through another thing. If He produced an

80 Note 25 above. 81 Cf. Mabahith, vol. II, p. 478. 82 Cf. note 50 above. 83 If we say that God's knowledge does not perceive the particulars, then His essence is not

dependent on them (see the last paragraph). The word "not" must be placed here, otherwise the sentence does not make sense.

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effect on another thing, He would necessarily need another thing.83a It is possible to point out the difference between both of them (i.e. the producer of an effect and another thing). And God knows best. Here ends the account of the view of those who denied the knowledge of the particulars.

As for those who adhered to the view that God knows the particulars, they adduced some proofs of this view:

a. They said: We have proved that God makes perfect actions, and we have explained that whoever makes such actions must know them, therefore God necessarily knows the actions He makes.84 It is also known that perfection is seen only in the particulars (al-ashkhas al-juz'iyya) which were brought into existence. Hence it is demonstrated that what proves His being knowing itself proves His being knowing of the particulars.85

b. The individual and particular thing (al-shay' al-shakhv! al-juz'l) has an essence and [an element of] individualization and distinction.86 This element is either an integral part (cayn) of this essence or something added to it. If this element is an cayn, the knowledge of the essence is the knowledge of the cayn. This [element of] individualization, from the point of view of its being this integral part, will be known, even if the individualization of this individual is different from this essence, since this individualization is also an essence of the possible essences.87

The philosophers admitted that the knowledge of the cause (cilla) necessitates the knowledge of the effect (maclul). (p. 164) Thus God's knowledge of His peculiar essence necessitates His knowledge of the things through which this individualization and this distinction (tacayyun) take place. Therefore He necessarily knows this individualization inasmuch as it is individualization. Thus it is proved that their view that the knowledge of the cause necessitates the knowledge of the effect obliges them to admit that God knows the individual things inasmuch as they are these individual and distinct things.88

c. The third argument concerning His being knowing of the distinct particulars is: The knowledge of things is a quality of praise and perfection and the ignorance of them is a quality of imperfection. Now, since God is the most perfect and the most sublime of all the existents, He is necessarily more entitled to be qualified by qualities of perfection and sublimity than to be qualified by qualities of imperfection.89

83a The philosophers would answer that God really does not produce an effect on anything. 84 Cf. Mabdhith, vol. II, p. 479f. 85 Cf. Muhassal, p. 165f. Mawdqif, p. 69f. 86 I.e. it has something which particularizes it and distinguishes it from others. 87 God knows the essences. Now, if individualization is an essence God knows it and hence the

particulars. 88 Cf. Mabahith, vol. II, p. 484. 89 Cf. ibid., p. 485.

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d. We observe that if the people of this world, the righteous and the wicked (zindiq), the Muslim and the unbeliever (mulhid), are afflicted by suffering, they beseech God for mercy and ask Him to save them from this suffering even if they are the most extreme deniers of His being knowing of the particulars. If this happens to someone he will necessarily set about praying, beseeching mercy from God and submitting to Him. This proves that the basic disposition (al-fitra al-asliyya)90 attests that the Lord of the world (ilah al-calam) has power over the things (lit. objects of His power) and knows the secret and the hidden things. It is known that the testimony of the fitra is more acceptable than these hidden disjunctions (taqsimat khafiyya) and obscure proofs, which are to be sought;91 therefore one must definitely assert that the Lord of the world knows the particulars and is capable of supplying [man's] needs. I think that Ibrahim said to his father: "O my father, why do you worship that which neither hears nor sees, nor benefits you in anything?"92 only because his father belonged to the religion of the philosophers and denied God's power and knowledge of the particulars.93 Certainly Ibrahim said to his father these words [on account of his father's religion]. This is my opinion on this subject. And God knows best.

Abbreviations

al-Amidi, al-Mubin

Bello

van Ess, iji al-Ghazali, Tahafut

Horten

Ibn Rushd, DamTma

al-Jurjani, K. al-taCrifat Leaman

Mabd.hith

Sayf al-Din al-Amidi, al-Mubin fSharh macant alfaz al-hukama' wa l-mutakallimTn, Cairo 1983. I.A. Bello, The Medieval Islamic Controversy Between Philosophy and Orthodoxy, Leiden 1989. J. van Ess, Die Erkenntnislehre des CAcludaddin al-AcT, Wiesbaden 1966. S. van den Bergh, The Incoherence of the Incoherence, London 1954. This work includes the translation of both al-Ghazali's Ta- hafut al-falasifa and Ibn Rushd' s Tahafut al-tahafut. The page num- bers of the Arabic text as edited by M. Bouyges (in Bibliotheca Arabi- ca Scholasticorum, vol. III, Beirut 1930) are given in parentheses. M. Horten, Die Spekulative und Positive Theologie des Islam, Hil- desheim 1967 (rep. of the Bonn ed. 1912). Ibn Rushd, Damimat al-Cilm al-ilahi, tr. by G.F. Hourani in Aver- roes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy, London 1961. CAli al-Jurjani, Kitab al-tacrifat, ed. G. Flugel, Leipzig 1847. 0. Leaman, An Introduction to Medieval Islamic Philosophy, Cam- bridge 1985. Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, al-Mabahith al-mashriqiyyafi cilm al-ilahiyyat wa l-tabiciyyat, Haydarabad 1343 H.

90 Or primordial nature. 91 That is because fitra is a necessary knowledge. 92 Siura 19, v. 42. 93 For this argument see introduction p. 140.

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Fakhr al-Din al-Razi on God's knowledge of the particulars 155

Marmura M.E. Marmura, "Some Aspects of Avicenna's Theory of God's Knowledge of Particulars", JAOS 82 (1962), pp. 299-312.

Ma!tlib Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, al-Ma#flib al-'dliya min al-Cilm al-ilahi, ed. Ahmad Hijazi al-Saqa, Beirut 1987.

Mawaqif CAdud al-Din al-Iji, KitOb al-mawaqif, Cairo 1907. Muha.sal Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, Muhassal afkar al-mutaqaddimin wa'l-

muta'akhkhirTn min al-culamaP wa'l-hukamdl wa'l-mutakallimTn, ed. Taha cAbd al-Ra'fif SaCd, Cairo n.d.

Netton I.R. Netton, Allah Transcendent, Studies in the Structure and Semio- tics of Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Cosmology, London and New York 1989.

Nihayat al-Shahrastani, Nihayat al-aqdam fi Cilm al-kalam, ed. A. Guil- laume, Oxford 1934.

Peters J.R.T.M. Peters, God's Created Speech, A study in the speculative theology of the Mu'tazili Qadfl al-QulaQt Aba l-Hasan CAbd al- Jabbar ibn Ahmad al-Hamadani, Leiden 1976.

Schmidtke S. Schmidtke, The Theology of al-CAllama al-HillY (d. 726/1325), un- published Ph.D thesis, St. John's College, Oxford 1990.

Article Contentsp.[133]p.134p.135p.136p.137p.138p.139p.140p.141p.142p.143p.144p.145p.146p.147p.148p.149p.150p.151p.152p.153p.154p.155

Issue Table of ContentsOriens, Vol. 33 (1992), pp. I-VI+1-470Front Matter [pp.I-VI]Der "Urknall" eine Idee des Ab Bakr ar-Rz [pp.1-21]Ab Sulaymn ad-Drn [pp.22-85]Die sufik nach Ammr al-Bidls [pp.86-93]Lehrer: Schler: Enkel: Amad b. Idrs, Muammad Umn al-Mran, Isml al-Wal [pp.94-132]Fakhr al-Dn al-Rz on God's Knowledge of the Particulars [pp.133-155]Izzaddn al-usain's Autograph seiner ilat at-Takmila: Traditionarier-Biographien des 7./13. Jahrhunderts [pp.156-180]Zur Problematik des arabischen Nomen speciei [pp.181-214]Some Quick Rules Ut Pictura Poesis: The Rules for Simile in "Mift Al-Ulm" [pp.215-229]Zopyros bei den Arabern: Streiflichter auf ein Motiv Herodots in der arabischen Literatur [pp.230-267]The City of Tarsus and the Arab-Byzantine Frontiers in Early and Middle Abbsid Times [pp.268-286]Albanian Literature in the Moslem Tradition: Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century Albanian Writing in Arabic Script [pp.287-306]Die Ta'i Si tu: Fassung des "Kodex der 13 Gesetze" (al lce bcu gsum): Ein Beitrag zur tibetischen Rechtsgeschichte im 14. Jahrhundert [pp.307-347]Conditions, Ways and Means of Healing in the Perspective of the Chinese Taoist [pp.348-362]Die Gedichte des Chi Yn (1724-1805) als Quelle fr die Landeskunde in Ostturkestan im 18. Jahrhundert [pp.363-436]Neues zur Familie al-Qn: Ein Beitrag zur Genealogie einer gyptischen rzte- und Gelehrtenfamilie [pp.437-444]Kitablar ve Mecmualar/Review of Books and Periodicalsuntitled [pp.445-446]untitled [pp.446-448]untitled [pp.448-456]untitled [p.456]untitled [pp.456-458]untitled [pp.458-459]untitled [p.459]

Wilhelm Eilers: Leben und Werk [pp.460-469]Back Matter

Razi Knowledge of Particulars

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