1IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JAIPUR BENCH, JAIPURD.B.Civil Writ PetitionNo.7414/2006 (Public Interest Litigation)Nikhil SoniV/sUnion of India&ors.Date of Order::- 10.8.2015PRESENTHONBLE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.SUNIL AMBWANIHONBLE MR.JUSTICE VEERENDR SINGH SIRADHANAMr.Madhav Mitra with )Mr.Nishant Sharma )Mr.Veerendra Singh )-for the petitioner.Mr.Abhishek Naithany )Mr.P.C.Bhandari with )Mr.Rakesh Chandel )Mr.Abhinav Bhandari )Mr.Dinesh Pareek )Mr.S.K.Gupta,Addl.Advocate General)Mr.J.K.Singh,Sr.Counsel assisted by )-for the respondents.Mr.Anuroop Singhi)Mr.Saurabh Jain )Mr.Ajeet Bhandari )Mr.Sunil Nath )Mr.Uday Sharma )Mr.Vimal Choudhary )ORDER(Reportable) BY THE COURT (Per Hon'ble Sunil Ambwani, Chief Justice)1. In this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitutionof Indiainpublicinterest, thepetitioner, apractisinglawyer atJaipur Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, has prayed for directions totheUnionof IndiathroughSecretary, Department of Home, NewDelhi-respondent no.1 and the State of Rajasthan through Secretary,2Department of Home, Secretariat, Rajasthan, Jaipur-respondent no.2,totreatSANTHARAorSALLEKHANAasillegal andpunishableunder the lawof the land and that the instances given in thepleadings,beinvestigatedandsubjectedtosuitableprosecutionofwhich, the abetment be also treated as criminal act.2. The Santhara, which means a fast unto death, is a practiceprevalent in Shvetambara group of Jain community. According to thepetitioner, it is a religious fast unto death on the pretext that whenall purpose of life have been served, or when the body is unable toserve any purpose of life, the Santhara will obtain Moksha(salvation). A person, after taking vow of Santhara stops eating andeven drinking water and waits for death to arrive. It is submitted thatthe Santhara is religious thought, which has no place under the lawoftheland.TheConstitutionofIndiaguaranteesrighttolife,andprotectsthelifeofanindividual.Therighttofreedomofreligionunder Article-25 in Part-III-FundamentalRights,issubjecttopublicorder, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part,whichincludes Article21. All persons areentitledtofreedomofconscienceandtherightfreelytoprofess, practiceandpropagatereligion. Apractice, however, ancient it may beto a particularreligion, cannot be allowed to violate the right to life of anindividual.3. It is submitted that a voluntary fast unto death is an act of self-destruction, which amounts to suicide, which is a criminal offenceand is punishableunder section 309 IPC with simple imprisonment for3a term which may extend to one year or with fine or with both. Theabetmentofsuicideisalsopunishableundersection306IPCwithimprisonmentofthetermwhichmayextendtotenyearsandalsoliable to fine. Suicide means an intentional killing of oneself. Everyact of self-destruction by a human being subject to discretion is, incommon language described by the word suicide provided it is anintentional act of a party knowing the probable consequence of whathe is about to do. Suicide is never to be presumed.Intention is theessential legal ingredient under section 309 IPC.4. It is submitted that Shvetambara group of Jain religion believesthat the Santhara is a means to attain moksha. A person adopting theSanthara is helped by the entire community in designing itceremoniously.Peoplevisitthepersonforhis/herdarshanandtowitness the occasion with reverence. The house of such personbecomes a place of pilgrimage. The entire act is considered to be anact of courage and rational thinking on the pretext that soul neverdies. They glorify the act and its eventuality. The petitioner has givenseveral examples of the Santhara to show that it is not an age old andforgotten practice and that it is being practiced even now regularly.Some of the instances of Santhara have been given in paragraph 4 ofthe writ petition as follows:-(i) SohanKumariji administeredthevowofSANTHARA,on7th Oct.1993. Her fast lasted for 20 days.(ii) Premji Hirji Gala in Nov.1994. Fasted uptil 212 days.(iii) Jethalal Zaveri fast lasted for 42 days in 1997.4(iv) Nirmalananda (illustration taken from the Deccan HeraldJan.10, 1997) the fast lasted for three weeks.(v) Haraklalji Bhairulalji Mehta in Oct.2000 Ahmedabad. Fastlasted for 23 days. He hails from Mahendra Garh near Bhilwara,Rajasthan.(vi) Sadhvi Nerbhay Vani. Fasted for 20 days, 24th May 2003 atJain Temple Gohana Town and Muni Matiryaji Maharaj, Fastedfor35daysbelongingtoTerapanthDharamSanghatUdasarnear Bikaner, Rajasthan.5. An additional affidavit was filed bringing on record the adoptionof the Santhara by late Vimla Jain, who was given the status of Sadhviand her fast unto death was widely publicized by her family memberswith her photographsin the obituary columns for having adopted theSanthara. The decorated photograph of her dead body was alsopublishedinthenewspaper. Thenewspaper report publicizedthereligious meetings and glorified the act of late Vimla Devi raising thestatusof thefamilyinthecommunity. Thoughit wasanoffenceunder section 309 IPC for which the entire family and the communityabetted, no action was taken by the police as the Administration inRajasthan acceptsthe act as a part of religious practice.6. Noticesofthepetitionwereissuedon22.9.2006alsocallingupon the Superintendent of Police (East), Jaipur to do the needful ifthepetitionerapproacheshimwithacomplaint.Onthenextdatefixed on 21.12.2006, a large number of individuals soughtintervention, to which an objection was taken by the petitioner that5they are not true representatives of the Jain community. The Courtobserved that if all the sundry are formally impleaded as respondentsand allowed to file their respective replies, it would make theexercise difficult and cumbersome and thus, allowed intervention bybodies/associations and they were added as respondents andindividual intervenors to be heard.7. On2.5.2007, theCourt permittedShri ManSinghMehtatointervene in the matter as an individual as others were also allowedto intervene.8. The matter has, thereafter, been on voyage on the cause listfrom 6.8.2008 for seven years until it was heard on 23.4.2015. Thecauseof thepetitionfor thelast nineyearshasbeenasubjectmatter of curiosity by the general public, and a lot of concern of theJaincommunity. The matter was argued and defended with passion.Thepetitionerisadvocatingmodernthoughtandthinking,andhasrelied heavily upon the Constitution of India to be the governing lawof the land. The respondents on the other hand are represented byShri Mr.P.C.Bhandari withMr.RakeshChandel, Mr.AbhinavBhandariand Mr.Dinesh Pareek as lawyers andmembers of the Jain communityandMr.S.K.Gupta, Addl.Advocate General representing the State ofRajasthan. Mr.J.K.Singhi, Sr.Counsel, Mr.Anuroop Singhi, Mr.SaurabhJain, Mr.Ajeet Bhandari, Mr.Sunil Nath and Mr.Uday Sharmaparticipated in the hearingwith curiosity and concern.9. Theresponseof theStatetotheprayers madeinthewritpetition is mixed with respect and reverence for the religion, and6protection of ancient and rich culture of Jain community, which haseconomic dominance in the State of Rajasthan. Out of the confusionand protectionist attitude arises a curious plea by the State that theright of individualpractising Santhara or Sallekhana is protected as areligious practice under the Constitution.It is stated in the reply thatthe petitioner is seeking relief to declare the Santhara or Sallekhanaas illegal, which is areligious practice or religious feeling followed bytheSocietyofJainsincetimesimmemorial.Thebasisofthewritpetition is that under section 309 IPC, such practice amounts to anoffence, however, the petitioner has failed to substantiate as to howthis public interest litigation is maintainable for declaring thereligiousactivitypunishableundercriminal law. Hehasfailedtoplace on record any sort of evidence or particular instance, whichfalls withintheambit of Section309 IPCandthus, thepetitiondeservestobedismissedasbaseless.Itisfurtherstatedthatthedelayed investigation of such instances is meaningless and for whichthe writ petition is not maintainable at all. The petitioner has placedon record some clippings of the newspaper, but in absence ofmatters falling within the ambit of Section 309 IPC and as nocomplaint has been filed in the Police Station, the investigation is notpermissible in law. It isstated that the petitioner has not carried outany research and has also failed to go through the Article 25 of theConstitution of India, which gives right to freedom of religion. Thepetitioner has not placed on record any such facts or material, whichmay demonstrate glorifying of Sati, which is an offence under the7law and in no religion glorifying of Sati Pratha is religious activity orreligious faith or amounts to belief in God.10. TheStateGovernment has reliedonastudycarriedout byJustice T.K.Tukol, former Vice-Chancellor, Bangalore University, whohas written a book published from Ahmedabad, namely, Sallekhanaisnotsuicideinwhichalotofresearchworkandinstanceshavebeen given and which provides the procedure, stage, situation for theperson, who wants to adopt or follow the religious path known asSallekhana.It is submitted on behalf of the State that it is not inpublic interest to entertain such petition. In paragraph 5 of the reply,affirmedbyShri OmPrakashSharma, Addl.S.P.(East), Jaipur, itisstated that the petitioner has not placed on record any example inwhich the practice of Santhara amounts to offence under section 309IPC, whereas commonly and religiously it is known as religious activityor faith in Jain religion like other religions. He has failed to submiton record that the practice of Santhara/Sallekhana is practised underforce or compulsion and does not amount to religious activity,whereas it is sufficient tostateat this stage that this religiouspractice or activity or faith is nowhere defined as illegal or criminalact andassuch, thesameisneither punishablenor subjectedtoinvestigation unless any specific complaint is received by the policeauthorities.Thewritpetitioniswithoutanyresearchworkinthefieldand thus, liable to be dismissed at the threshold.11. A reply has been filed by ShriVimal Chand Daga, Secretary ofStanakvasi Jain Shravak Sangh, Jaipurimpleaded as respondent no.3.8It is stated in the reply that the petitioner is a busy body and thus isnot entitled to maintain the writ petition in public interest on thelawdeveloped by Hon'ble Supreme Court. He is a meddlesomeinterloper, at whoseinstancetheissuemaynot beraisednor isjusticiable. The issue is justiciable when it can be resolved throughjudicial process. Thepresent litigationisneither bonafidenor forpublic good. It is a cloakfor attaining private ends by a member oftheHinduSocietyagainstareligiousminoritycommunityknownasJain,whichisasectionofthecitizens.InAppeal No.9575/2003decided on 21.8.2006, the Supreme Court held that Jain religion isundisputedly not a part of Hindu religion. The pronouncement of lawdoesnotappeartobeacceptabletosomeofthemembersoftheHinducommunityandthus, thepetitioner bedirectedtodepositsecurity of Rs.one lac as payment of cost in case the writ petition isdismissed.12. ThereplydefendsthepracticeofSanthara/Sallekhanaasanexercise ofself purification and apopularreligious practice throughout the history of Jainism. It is known as voluntary vowwithmeditation till the person lives by abstaining from food, water andevery kind of nourishment to the body when one is approaching theend of life.It is stated thatSallekhana is not giving up life, but it isverymuchtakingthedeathinitsownstride.Jainismbelievesinrebirth and so the consequences of our Karmas are dependent uponown good and bad thoughts, words and deeds. In order to appreciatethereplygivendefendingSanthara/Sallekhana, whichaccordingto9the answering respondent no.3 is saved by Articles 25, 26 and 29 ofthe Constitution of India, it will be necessary to reproduce thecontents from paragraphs 2 to 8 of the reply as follows:-2. That the contents of para (2) of the writ petition are notadmitted. The allegations are false and not well founded. Theanswering respondents respectfully submit that petitioner iscompletely ignorant of the Vrat of Santhara orSallekhana. It is absolutely wrong to say that Jain communityis divided intotwo groups. Digambaras and Shwetambarasare not two groups of Jain community. Santhara or Sallenkna isprevalent in the entire Jain community. Santhara is notadoptedinorder toobtainMoksha. It is not admittedthatSanthara is a voluntary suicide. Sallekhna is the key to attainsalvation in the least possible number of birth and death cyclesahead by consciously toiling to purge the soul from karmas.According to Jainism, every individual soul, by its nature,is pure and perfect, with infirm perception,knowledge powerand bliss. But from eternity, it is associated with Karmic matterand has therefore become subject to birth and rebirth innumerous forms of existence. The supreme object of religion isto show the way for liberation of the soul from the bondage ofKarma.ThetruepathofliberationliesintheattainmentofRightFaith,RightKnowledgeandRightconductincompleteunion and harmony.The basic concept underlying the vow is that man who isthe master of his own destiny should face death in such a wayas to prevent influx of new Karmas even at the last moment ofhis life and at the same time liberate the soul from bondage ofKarmas that may be clinching to it then.SantharaAccording to Jain scriptures, Santhara means to weakenthestrengthof bodyandpassionfor puttinganendtothe10bodily existence without consciously coveting death by fasting.It is undertaken when one is faced with an unavoidable naturalcalamity, severe drought, old age or an incurable disease. Priortotheadoptionof thevow, oneis requiredtogiveupallfeelings of love, hatred, companionship and worldlyattachments with a pure all humanity at the same timeforgiving themsincerely. It is also desired that one mayundertake the great vow of Santhara after discussing itthroughly and frankly with one's guru (religious preceptor).ItisinterestingtofindthatinJainReligionthereisatraditionof atypical systematicfasting, whichis knownasSallekhna. It is absolutely misconstrued as a step to end life orfast unto death. It is a Code of Right Conduct and selfdiscipline practiced with a healthy desire for elevation of lifeand self realization akin to shifting to one's own house from arental house (the body). It leads to the inward path of Nirvritifrom Pravriti by complete detachment form the sensorysystem. Santhara is an exercise for self-purification. ThisreligiousactknownasSallekhna-Santharahasremainedverypopular through out the history of Jainism. It is mostly knownfor a voluntary vow meditation till the person lives: (Santhara)by abstaining from food, water and every kind of nourishmentto the body when one is approaching the end of life. Sallekhnais not giving up life but it is very much taking the death in itsown stride.Jainismbelievesinrebirthandsotheconsequencesofour Karmas are dependent upon our own good and badthoughts, words and deeds. Every living being is responsible forits own activities the consequences of which work outautomatically. One cannot escape from one's Karmas except byexperiencing their consequences, goodor bad. TheKarmasbear fruit and are therefore responsible for our Karmic bodies.Depending on the nature of the individual's Karma, the next life11may be human or otherwise.In Ratna-Karanda Sravakacara for Sallekhna it is statedas under:-The holy men say that sallekhna is giving up the body(by fasting) when there is an unavoidable calamity,severe draught, old age or incurable disease, in order toobserve the discipline of religion.It is emphatically denied that Santhra is a voluntarysuicide.Sallekhna(Santhara)isarbitrarilyequatedwiththeoffence of suicide or Sati or euthanasia in the PIL. The mainpsychological and physical features of suicide are: (1) thevictim is under an emotional stress; (2) He or she isoverpowered with a feeling of disgrace, fear, disgust or hatredat the time when suicide is resorted to; (3) The main intentionofcommittingsuicideistoescapefromtheconsequencesofcertain acts or events; disgrace, agony, punishment, socialstigma or tyranny of treatmentetc. (4) The kind is far awayfrom religious or spiritual considerations (5) The meansemployed to bring about the death are weapons of offence ordeath; (6) The death is sudden inmost cases unless the victim isrescuedearlier; (7) Theact is committedinsecrecy(8) itcauses misery or bereavement to the kith and kin.The basic concept underlying the vow of Santhara is thatamanwhoisthemaster of hisowndestinyshouldresolvehimself to follow the best method of leaving the body. A Jainresolving to undergo Santhara knows it well that he has eaten alot of food to sustain his body during his life. Now, when thebodydoes not cooperatetohelpinlivingmeaningfullyanymore, the person should resolve for Santhara. During Santhraonemustnotwishtoliveonordesiresensualpleasuresbutequally he must not seek for death to come swiftly.3. That the contents of para (3) of the writ petition are notadmitted. Theallegations madeagainst theJaincommunity12arewildandderogatorymakingthepetitioner liablefor anoffence of defamation. It appears that the petitioner iscompletely ignorant about the Vrata of Santhara or Darshan orSallekhna as already explained above. It is denied thatSantharaorSallekhnaviolatestheprovisionsofIndianPenalCode or the Constitution of India. It is further submitted thatthe petitioner has taken the liberty ofmaking wild allegationsagainsttheentireJainCommunitybuthasfailedtoimpleadtheJaincommunityinthewritpetitionaslaiddownintheCode of Civil Procedure. It is thus submitted that theallegations made in para (3) should be eschewed fromconsideration in the absence of Jain community as party to thePIL and the petition may kindly be dismissed with heavy costsas it is a case of nonjoinder of necessary party.4. That the contents of para (4) may be true. From para (4)it appears that the petitioner has taken the information fromthe Internet. But he speaks lie as in his affidavit whilesupporting the writ petition he says that the contents of para(4) are true and correct to the best of his personal knowledge.In this para it is submitted that the petitioner has givensome of the instances of Santhara which is pinnacle of glory oflife and death from 1993 to 2003. It is prevalent in the Jaincommunity for more than 2000 years or say since timeimmemorial by the followers of the worlds oldest Jain religion.Justice T.K.Tukol, former Vice-Chancellor, Bangalore Universityin his book Sallekhna is not suicide has given completehistory. In Chapter 3 under title Sallekhna in practice, he hasgiven various instances of Sallekhna prevalent in the country inJaincommunity. It reflects cultureof Jaincommunity andproves that Sallekhna was prevalent in the Jain community as acustomor practiceor ritual andhas beenrecognizedas acultureofthecommunityasartofliving.Jainsaretheonlycommunitywhocelebrates birthanddeathboth. It maybe13mentioned that culture is a collective name for the material,social-religious and artistic achievements of human growthincludingtraditions, customsandbehavioural patternsall ofwhich are unified by a common place and values. Since India isa secular state the State is not to associate with religion and isnot to interfere with it. The way in which the writ petition hasbeen filed amounts to making mockery of Jain religiouspractice and the right of Jain to manage their own affairs inthe matter of religion as guaranteed by Article 25, 26(b) and 29of the Constitution.It is an admitted case of the petitioner that the practiceof Santhara is being followed as part of customary and religiouspractice. It is thus clear that Santhara is religious practice orritual andassuchcanbeperformedasperreligioustenets,usages and custom. Before appreciating upon the propriety ofSanthara practice one has to understand the metaphysicalethical and social concepts of Jainism which are different fromother religion. Jain metaphysics divides the Universe intoeternally co-existing but independent, categories, One Jiva-thesoul-second Ajiva-the non-soul. The body is the non-soul. Soulis the central theme in Jaina system. The ultimate goal of ahuman life in Jainism is the realization of the soul viz- AtmaDarshan after its emancipation from the entanglement of non-soul of the body.5. Thatthecontentsofpara(5) ofthewritpetitionareemphatically denied.6. That the contents of para (6) of the writ petition appearsto have been not interpreted properly. Under Section 309 IPCpunishment has beenprovidedfor attempt tosuicide. Inachanging society, notions of what is objectionable have alwaysbeen changing. Prevention or punishment of particular conductis dependent upon the scope and the purpose of the criminallaw that is in force for the time being. A crime predominantly14is dependent upon the policy of the State. It may be mentionedthat some time back Law Commission in its report hasrecommended for abolition of Section 309 IPC. A Division Benchof theHon'bleSupremeCourthadheldSection309IPCasviolative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Though thesaid judgment of the Division Bench stands over ruled but theConstitution Bench has recognized that the right to lifeincluding the right to live with human dignity would mean theexistenceofsucharightuptotheendofnatural lifewhichmeans right to a dignified life up to the point of deathincludingadignifiedprocedureofdeath.Inother wordsthismayincludetherightofdyingmantoalsodiewithdignitywhen his life is ebbing out. 7. That the contents of para (7) of the writ petition are notadmitted. It appears that the learned petitioner has notcorrectly appreciated the judgment of the Constitutional BenchoftheHon'bleSupremeCourtinSmt.GyanKaurVs.StateofPunjab (JT 1996(3) SC 339). The Supreme Court in Gyan Kaurhas declared the law as under:-Aquestionmayarise,inthecontextofadyingman,who is, terminally ill or in a persistent vegetative statethat he may be permitted to terminate it by a prematureextinction of his life in those circumstances. Thiscategory of cases may fall within the ambit of the 'rightto die' with dignity as a part of right to live with dignity,when death due to termination of natural life is certainand imminent and the process of natural death hascommenced. These are not cases of extinguishing life butonly of accelerating conclusion of the process of naturaldeath which has already commenced. The debate even insuchcases topermit physician-assistedterminationoflife is inconclusive. It is sufficient to reiterate that the15argument to support the view of permitting terminationoflifeinsuchcasestoreducetheperiodofsufferingduring the process of certain natural death is notavailabletointerpretArticle21toincludethereintheright to curtail the natural span of life.Every man as per Hindu religion lives to accomplish fourobjectives of life(1) Dharma (2) Artha (3) Karma and(4)Moksha. Whentheearthlyobjectives arecomplete, religionwould require a person not to clinch to the body. Thus a manhas moral right to terminate his life, because death is simplychanging the old body into a new one.Ourmythologyisfull ofincidentswhenourGodshaveterminated their life. Lord Ramtook Jalsamadi in riverSaryu. Lord Mahavir and Lord Budha achieved death by seekingit. In recent days Shri Vinoba Bhave met his end by undertakingfast. So was the case of Swami Ram Krishna Param Hans. Ma-Anandmai.ThefolkdeityofRajasthan'RAMDEOJIhastakenliving samadhi. India Saints every year willingly relinquishthebody which is called 'Samadhi Maran'. Instances are there whereJain munis have terminated their lives by going on fast that is,byadoptingthepracticeof Santhara. Shri RaichandBhai,religious guru of Mahatma Gandhi took Samadhimaran at theage of 33 years.Santhara may fall within the category of cases which mayfall within the group of right to die with dignity as a part of lifewith dignity when death is certain and imminent and theprocess of natural death has commenced. There is longtradition of Santhara in Sharamanic culture which is anexpressionof fearless towards death. It is rising aboveallbodily pains and sufferings. It is a process of painlessness andbecoming a Stith Progya.8. That the contents of para (8) of the writ petition have no16relevancy withthecaseinhand. It is a case of differentcircumstances. There are lots of cases where Anglo-BritishCourts have permitted the withdrawal of the life supports.Somecases cameupfor hearingbeforetheSupremeCourt of New Jersy, where a question was raised as to whethera person can direct the physician to terminate his life supportviz respirator. G-tube (Gastrostomy tube) etc., or whether hehas anabsoluteright tocontrol thecourseof his medicaltreatment. In Re Quinlan 70 N.J.10 and in Re-Conroy, 486 A, 2nd1209 the patient was in a vegetative state. In the former casehe was unconscious and in the latter case he was though awakeandconscious but his mental andphysical functioning waspermanently impaired. In the both the case the Courtpermittedthewithdrawal ofthelifesupports.InRe-Quinlanthe life support was withdrawn with the consent of thepatient'sfamily.InMcKayVs.Bergstedfonapetitionbeingfiled in the Court for removal of life support the Courtpermitted disconnection of his respirator. The Supreme Courtof Nevada affirmed the Court'sdecision in appeal. The Courtheld that desire of the patient for withdrawal of his respiratordidnotamounttosuicide.SimilarapproachmaybeseeninBouvia Vs Superior Court (225 Cal.Reporter 297) (CT App 1986)and Barting Vs. Superior Court(209 Cal Reporter 220 (CT App1984). The House of Lords has ruled in Airedale NHS Trust Vs.Bland, 1993 All ER 821 (859) that euthanasia is permissible inlaw.InarecentcasewhichitoccurredinMarch,2005theCourt allowed the removal of the feeding tube. It was a case ofTerrie Schiavo. Terri Schiavo is nowdead. She remainedunconscious for more than 15 years on account of some tragedyrendering braindeath. Shewas kept onfeeding tube. Herhusband applied to the Court for removal of the feeding tube.Her parents opposed to it. The Court allowed the removal of17feeding tube. The matter went up to an Appellate Court. TheCourt alsodeclinedtointerfere. TheFederal Appeals Courthowever agreed to consider an emergency motion requesting anewhearingontherequest of her parentsonthequestionwhether to reconnect their severely brain damaged daughter'sfeeding tube. In requesting the new hearing, a plea was raisedthat aFederal JudgeinTempashouldhaveconsideredtheentireStateCourt recordandnot whether previous FloridaCourt''s ruling met legal standards under Statelaw. It alsostatedthat AllandaFederaAppellateCourtdidnotconsiderwhether therewas enoughclear andconvincingevidencethat Terri Schiavowouldhavechosentodieinher currentcondition. However, before hearing was done Terri died. Onceher feeding tube was removed at the behest of her husband nocoursewas left but for Terri todiealingeringdeath. Thequestion is whether she was allowed to die with dignity. Againa debate has come up as to whether right to life includes righttoapeacefulandwillingdeath. The question requires to bedecided as to who decides the right to die.9. Thatthecontentsofpara(9) ofthewritpetitionaremisplaced. No analogy can be demonstrated between SantharaandoffenceunderSati PreventionLaws. InSati PreventionLaw it is the glorification which has been made an offence. Theact of Sati has been held to be immoral. 10. That the contents of para (10) of the writ petition arenot admitted. Underthelawof thecountrynobodycanbeforced to eat or drink against his/her will. The case of hungerstrikeisquitedifferent. Inthecaseof hungerstrikeif thedemandis madethepersonconcernedwouldautomaticallywithdraws the fast. As suchthe case of Santhara is quitedifferent. Further, as already submitted above, the practice ofSanthara has become part of the culture of Jain community. Itis a part of religious practice for the persons who voluntarily18takes vow of Santhara. It is not suicide as contemplated underthe provisions of the India Penal Code. The true idea ofSanthara is only this that when death does appear at last oneshould know how to die, that is, one should die like a Monk andnot like a beast bellowing and panting and making vain effortsto avoid the unavoidable. The Jain Sallekhna leaves ample timefor further reconsideration of the situation as the processwhich is primarily intended to elevate the will is extended overa period of days and is not brought to an end at once.Itwouldbelegallywrongandmorallyinsupportabletocategorize death by Sallekhna as a suicide which is sudden self-destruction due to emotional and neurasthenic upsetment.Suicide causes harm to the person committing it as also to thesociety whose concern it is to ensure the safety of its member.Umasvami has definedhimsa(violence) as 'severance ofvitalities out of passion' (pramatta-yogat pramavyaparopanaimhimsa). A person actuated by passion is pramatta. The activityof such a person ispramatta-yoga. Amrtacandra Suri hasexpressed similar views; He who injures the real nature of Jivacommitshimsa. Any injury whatsoever to the material orconscious vitalities caused through passionate activity of mind,body or speech is undoubtedly himsa. Himsa is sure to result, ifone acts carelessly under the influence of passions. Evenwhere there is injury to the vitalities, there is no himsa if themanis not movedbyanykindof passionandis carefullyfollowing Right Conduct. Thus, it is only when a person putsan end to his own life due to his passionate activity that thereis suicide.It has already been explained that in the observance of thevow of Sallkhana, there is complete absence of passion and theconduct is directed to liberate the soul from the bondage ofkarma. When such individual advances himself spiritually by hisausterities and meditation, his life elevates the community of19devoteesandotheronlookersbypurifyingthemindofeveryindividual and by creating anawareness in him or her of theinherent potentialities of the self. The conquest of all passionsandfull detachmentfromworldlydesiresandpossessivenessvisible in the conduct of the ascetic or the householder evokeourreverenceforhim. Hisquietandjoyful deathmakesusconscious of what is good for the individual and the communityat large. His path of absolute renunciation and his marchtowards self-realization enables and enlightens the society atlarge. Such death is not suicide and cannot be categorized assuch either according to law or morals. The Saints and sages ofIndia are known for defiance of death. When they realize thefutilityoftheirperishablebodyorwhentheyachievedtheirgoal for seeking the love of life, they voluntarily invoke death.Theyhaverisenabovelifeanddeath.Inthebrahamicitiscalled living samadhi. To treat it as suicide, amounts toignorance of the Indian culture.The constitutions of democratic countries guaranteefreedomto practice, propagate and preserve one's ownreligion. This right is subject tointerests of publicorder,moralityandhealth. Everycitizenhas right toprofess andpractice his religion freely. It is one of the cardinal principlesof Jaina religion that the noblest or the most spiritual way ofmeeting death is to resort to the vow of Sallekhna when, dueto circumstances already mentioned, a person is unable to liveup to his religion and maintain the purity of his mind and heart.Even if the Indian Penal Code does not refer to this freedom ofreligion enshrined in Article 25 of the Constitution theConstitution overrides the lawin the Penal Code or otheridentical provisions in any other law. The implications of theconstitutional guaranteearethatactssanctionedbyreligionand termed in accordance with the prescribed rites would notbe punishable under any law of the land. Any law which curtails20thefreedomguaranteedbytheConstitutioncannothavethesanctity of law and as the same would be unenforceable by anyauthority or in any court of law.The practice of Sallekhna does not interfere with publicorder, health or morality. Sallekhna is pinnacle of glory of lifeand death. It is not an immolation but promotion of soul. It isin no way a tragedy. Jainism speaks of death very boldly and ina fearless tone toimpress that death should be well welcomedwithcelebrations.Sallekhanais aretreat topeaceintruesense, to be yourself entirely free from all distractions for purecontemplation and introspection.The right of individuals practice Sanllekhana or Santharais protected by right of privacy. The practice of Santhara hasbeen recognized by Privy Council in the year 1863 to beprevalent from time immemorial. The right of privacy has beenrecognized in the case of alleged suicide by AcharyaVinobabhaveinawell knownjudgment.InthecaseofMuniBadri Prasad who practiced Santhara, the Hon'ble SupremeCourt in 1987 did not even consider the case fit for admission,where it was equated to suicide.Article 26 lays down that every religious denomination oranysectionthereof shall havetheright tomanageits ownaffairs in the matter of religion.It is submitted that practice of Sanllekhana is impossiblefor each and everybody to adopt the vow of Sallekhna becauseitrequiresthedevoteetopossessanunshakeableconvictionthat thesoul andthe body are separate, that the body is theresult of accumulated karmas and that liberation from karmasis possible only by an austere life of supreme conduct foundedon right faith and knowledge.The right is also protected under Article 29 of theConstitution of India. It cannot be denied that Jains have theirown culture and therefore any section of the citizens residing21in the territory of India having culture of its own has the rightto conserve the same. The Jain community is a religiousminority community andalso it is a cultural minority andtherefore it is the mandate of the constitution that the Stateshall not impose upon it any other culture which may be localor otherwise. The state has no authority to force feed a Sadhakwho has taken the vow of sanllekhna.In the PIL Sallekhna that is Santhara in completeignorance is equated with the offence of suicide, sati customand euthanasia. It is outlandish notional and ultra-vires. By nostretchofimaginationSantharacanbetermedorconfusedwith any one of the aforesaid offences at all, strictly prohibitedin Jainism itself. The difference between Santhara and suicidehas been vividly explained in many articles by the Scholars. Theanswering respondent shall be submitting the same at the timeof making submissions.By fasting is meant voluntaryabstinence from all food. Itis the oldest method of cure in disease even animals resort to itinstinctively.11. That the contents of para (11) are not admitted and inreply to the allegations made therein the answering respondentwould like to reiterate what has been submitted in theforegoing paragraphs. It is again reiterated that Santhara is notsuicide.12. That the contents of para (12) of the writ petition areneither relevant nor correct. If necessary, the answeringrespondents reiterate what has been submitted above.PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS1. The petitioner has no locus-standi to file this writpetition as Public Interest Litigation. The petitioner is neither ascholar in Jainism nor he has studied the practice ofSanllekhana or Santhara. In this regard he appears to be a busybody or meddlesome anteloper.222. That in the petition hypothetical question has beenraised without any material particulars. The petition thus is notmaintainable. The petitioner has neither made the ladies whohadtakenSantharaas parties tothepetitionnor theJaincommunity. It is by way of additional affidavit that their nameshavebeendisclosed. It is settledlawthat noamount ofevidence can be looked into for which there are no pleadings.3. That the writ petition suffers from the defect ofmultifariousness. Neither the necessary parties have beenimpleadednorthepetitiondisclose the cause of action. Theanswering respondents fails to understand as to why Union ofIndia or the State of Rajasthan has been impleaded as a partyto this writ petition. However, one thing is certain that theyhave been impleaded as party because the petitioner wasaware of the fact that without impleading themno writpetition is maintainable against Jain community such asStanavwasi Jain Sangh and Shreemal Sabha. It is notmaintainable otherwise as the writ petition is not maintainableagainst private persons who have no public duty to discharge.4. That Stanakvasi Jain Shravak Sangh and Shreemal Sanbhaarenot legal persons. They are private persons. They aremerely representative institutions of private persons. No writpetition is maintainable against them.5. That the writ petition is addressed to Jain community assuch the Jain community should have been impleaded as party.Thewritpetitionthereforeisliabletobedismissedonthiscount in the absence of the necessary party.6. That the writ petition is not maintainable as prima-facieit violates principles of natural justice as the entire Jaincommunity has been condemned without being heard.7. That the practice of Santhara is saved by Articles 25, 26and 29 of the Constitution of India as already discussed above.8. That as the State is unable to guarantee an individual life23and freedom of expression implies freedom of silence, the rightto die voluntarily is a right of privacy and self termination oflife should not come between an individual and his/herconscience. One has the subtle discriminative power to discernthe matter from the eternal. It caused annoyance to the entireJain community when Smt.Vimla Devi, Kamla Devi and Keladeviwerethreatenedwithpoliceactionandlegal implicationsinthis land of Rishis, Munis and Thrithankaras, when it is the onlycommunity practicing righteousness and believes in AhimsaIt is, therefore, prayedthat thewrit petitionof thepetitioner may kindly be dismissed with special costs.13. The petitioner has described the practice of Santhara asabhorrent to modern thinking. He submits that no religion howsoeverhistorical, pure or revered, can permit or allow a person to commitdeath by choice. The fast until death is nothing but a self-destructionin whatever form and belief it may be, and that fundamental right tofreedom of religion cannot protect a criminal act as it is subject topublic order, morality and health. The guarantee given by theConstitution under Article 25 is that every person in India shall havethefreedomofconscienceandshall havetherighttoprofess,practiceandpropagatereligion,subjecttorestrictionsimposedbytheStateonthegrounds(i)publicorder,moralityandhealth;(ii)other provisions of the Constitution; (iii) regulation of non-religiousactivityassociatedwithreligious practice; (iv) social welfareandreform; (v) throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a publiccharactertoall classesofHindus.Nopracticeorbeliefortenet,which isabhorrent to public order, morality and health and violates24other provisions of the Part-III, namely, Article 21, can protect thereligious practice. 14. It is submitted that the freedom of conscience isnot necessaryto be connected with any particular religion or any faith in God. Italso implies the right of a person not to be converted into anotherman's religion or to bring to any religion at all. A knowledge or senseof right or wrong, moral judgment that opposes theviolationofpreviously recognized ethical principles and that leads to feelings ofguilt if one violates such a principle. The freedom of conscience asdefined in Webster's New World Dictionary has been encircled withthe public order, morality and health and the right to life and therights of other persons guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution ofIndia.15. It is submitted that religious practices, which are violative ofpublic order, morality andhealthandinwhichpublic order willinclude violation of the provisions of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) havebeen rejected to be protected under Article 25 by the Supreme Courtin various pronouncements. In Jagadishwaranand Avadhuta Acharya,V/sPoliceCommissioner,Calcutta(AIR1984SC51),theSupremeCourt upheld the power of the police to prohibit deleteriouspractices, suchas thesacrificeof humanbeings inthenameofreligion, or to direct the exhumation or removal of graves or interredcorpses for the purpose of detection of crime or for preventing breachof the peace between fighting communities or to prohibitperformanceof the'tandava' dancebytheAnandamargis inthe25publicstreets or places. Referencewas madeonthedecisioninGulam Abbas V/s State of UP (AIR 1983 SC 1268).16. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Courtin Church of God (Full Gospel) in India V/s K.K.R.Majestic ColonyWelfare Association ((2000) 7 SCC 282), in which the Supreme Courtobservedthat inacivilizedsocietyinthenameof thereligion,activitieswhichdisturboldorinfirmpersons,studentsorchildrenhavingtheir sleepintheearlyhours or duringdaytimeor otherpersons carrying on other activities cannot be permitted. 17. Reliance has also been placed on the decisions in N.AdithayanV/sTravancoreDevaswomBoard((2002)8SCC106)andJaved&ors. V/s State of Haryana & ors.((2003) 8 SCC 369) in which it wasobserved that the right of the State to impose such restrictions as aredesired or found necessary on the grounds of public order, health andmorality is inbuilt in Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India.The religious practice which forms an essential and integral part ofreligious is protected. A practice may be a religious practice but notan essential and integral part of the religion.18. It is submitted that religion is a social system in the name ofGod laying down the code of conduct for the people in society. It is awayof lifeinIndiaandanunendingdiscoveryintotheunknownworld. People living in society in which they are born or by choicehavetofollowsomesort of religion. Itisasocial institutionandsociety accepts religion in a form which it can easily practice. Faith inreligioninfluences thetemperament andattitudeof thethinker.26Religionincludesworship, faithandextendseventorituals. Jainreligion has been found to be a distinct social systemwith itsindividuality andpurpose. It cannot, however, claima practiceancient it may be, as an essential part or belief or tenet, which isviolativeof thepublicorderandmoralityacceptedbytheStateunder the provisions of law including in section 309 IPC. The right tohis/her death cannot be treated as part of the tenet of the religion,as religion which takes life cannot be allowed to advocate that thetaking of life in however purified form is a way of life, which is alsoan essential tenet of religion.19. Thepetitioner appearinginpersonhastriedtodemonstratethat adoption of Santhara, an act with criminal content,has becomea means of climbing social ladder. Any person adopting Santhara isnot allowed to go back on his vow, and the entire family andcommunity forces him/her to complete the process in which he has togo through inhuman and intolerant conditions. He/she is some timestied to the chair or bedand is not allowed to eat and drink, even ifhe/she wants to come out of the vow or suffers from pain on theground of criticism. A person adopting Santhara is surrounded by thegroups singing Bhajan and Kirtan and he/she is made to looseconscience and drawn by religious fanaticism, to accept the processof death. It is nothing but killing a person, who may or may not haveinthereligiousbeliefvowedtoadoptSantharaasameanstoendhis/her life. It is submitted that this notorious, abhorrentand tribalpracticeinthereligionmustbestoppedatallcostsandtheState27Government should not be allowed to protect the practice in order toprotect Jain religion, which has the economic dominance in the Stateof Rajasthan. When the State of Rajasthan can stop Sati and thoseabetting Sati are treated as offenders, in which case, theinvestigations are carried out and punishment is awarded, theSanthara is no different and it is also a process to commit suicide inthenameofreligionasinthecaseofSati.Thereisabsolutelynoneed to protect the practice of Santhara by the State. 20. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents havepassionatelydefended the Santhara as an inseparable tenets of Jainreligion. They have tried to connect it with the way of life and sourceto attain moksha, which is the ultimate purpose of Jain religion.ShriP.C.Bhandari has explained to us in great detail as to howtheSanthara is practiced reciting the Mantras and narrating the stages ofattaining the Santhara with reverence.He submits that it is a highestorder in Jain religion. He has explained to us the manner in which thevow of Santhara is taken and has recited theslokas in a loud voice intheCourt, totheamusement of thegeneral publicsittingintheCourt. It is submitted by him that Article 25 has no application to anessentialreligious practice and has relied upon the decision inGianKaur V/s State of Punjab (JT 1996(3) SC 339), in which the SupremeCourt has protected the right to die by a person, who is terminally illor inpersistent vegetativestatetoterminatehis lifeandthoughsetting aside the declaration of lawinP.Rathinam/NagbhushamPatnaik V/s Union of India (JT 1994(3) SC 394), raising a doubt in the28case of terminally ill or for a person in persistent vegetative state tobe permitted physician assisted termination and keeping theargument open, whichwastriedtobeaddressedbytheSupremeCourtin ArunaRamchandraShanbaugV/sUnionofIndia&ors.((2011) 4 SCC 454).21 In this writ petition filed in public interest, we are concernedwith the short question as to whether the practice ofSanthara/Sallekhanapractisedby theShvetambaras groupof Jainreligionisanessential tenetoftheJainreligionprotectedbytheright to religion under Article 25 of the Constitution of India.22. Shri Madhav Mitra, learned counsel appearing for the petitionersubmits that the Jain community is divided into two groups ofDigambaraandShvetambara. TheSanthara, areligious fast untodeath, isprevalent in Shvetambara, whereas a similar kind of fastcalled Sallekhana in the Digambara.The Santhara is a kind of self-emulation, wherein the person adopting it starts fast to achieve thegoal of death in which he stopped consuming food, water andmedicines. It is nothing but suicide under the garb of religious beliefs.No individual has a right to take his own life. The Supreme Court inGian Kaur Vs. State of Punjab (supra) held that Section 309 IPC isvalid and not violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Therighttolifedoesnotincludetherighttodie.Therighttohumandignity does not include the right to terminate natural life and it hasover-ruled the previous judgment of its own Court in P.Rathinam V/sUnion of India (supra).2923. It is submitted that in Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug V/s Unionof India & ors. (supra), the Supreme Court held that botheuthanasiaand assisted suicide are not lawful in India. The right to life does notinclude the right to die and that euthanasia could be lawfulonly bylegislation. Both the abetment of suicide under Article 306 IPC andattempt to commit suicide in Section 309 IPC are criminal offence.Section309IPCisconstitutionallyvalid.ItwasheldinGianKaur'scase (supra) that the debate topermit physician-assisted terminationoflifeisinconclusive. Theeuthanasiaisoftwotypes; activeandpassive. The active euthanasia entails the use of lethal substances orforces to kill a person. The passive euthanasia entails withholding ofmedical treatment for continuance of life, withholding of antibioticswherewithoutgivingitapatientislikelytodie,orremovingtheheartlung machine, from a patient in coma.Both the methods areillegal without legislature, provided certain conditions and safeguardsaremaintained. Generally, theeuthanasiamaybevoluntaryandnon-voluntary. The voluntary euthanasia is where the consent is takenfromthepatient, whereas non-voluntaryeuthanasiais wheretheconsent is unavailable, when the patient is in coma, or is otherwiseunabletogiveconsent.Involuntarypassiveeuthanasiaaperson,who is capable of deciding for himself decides that he would prefer todie which may be for various reasons including unbearable pain orthat he does not have the money for his treatment. He consciouslyandoutofhisfree-will refusedtotakelifesavingmedicines.TheSupreme Court held that in India, if a person consciously and30voluntarily refuses to take life saving treatment, it is not a crime,but whether not taking food consciously and voluntarily with the aimof ending one's life is a crime under section 309 IPC is a question,which need not be decided in the case. After considering the questionofnon-voluntarypassiveeuthanasia, theSupremeCourtlaiddowncertainguidelines for theprocedurefor permittingdeath, undercertain conditions. The Supreme Court laid down a proceduredetailing the conditions for suchactiontill the Act is enacted by theParliament. The procedure provides for a decision to be taken by thepatients todiscontinuelifesupport or thespouseor other closerelatives and in their absence by a person next or by the doctorsattending the patient. The decision must be bonafide and thereafter,approval must besought fromtheHighCourt byfilingapetitionunder Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The High Court in suchcase acts as parens patriae.The matter should be decided by atleasttwo Judges. TheBench will constitute a Committee of three reputeddoctors after consulting such medical authorities/medicalpractitioners, preferably comprising of a Neurologist, Psychiatrist andPhysician. The report of the Committee is to be made available tothe patients and his close relatives to obtain their views andthereafter, the High Court should give its decisionassigning reasons,keeping in view the best interest of the patient. 24. ItissubmittedthatalthoughinArunaRamchandraShanbaugV/s Union of India (supra),the Supreme Court left the question as towhether not taking food consciously and voluntarily with the aim to31end one's life is a crime,the substance of the judgments in Gian Kaur(supra) and Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug (supra) is that no person hasa right to take his own life consciously, as the right to life does notinclude the right to end the life voluntarily.25. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that even the actcommitted with the consent of the individual to end his/her life ispunishable under the Indian Penal Code. The offence of murder undersection 300 IPC prohibits exception,which goes to show that such anact may not amount to murder, but would be termed as culpablehomicide. Section 92 precisely relates to medical practitionerswhereintheact doneingoodfaithfor thebenefit of aperson,without consent has also been made a criminal act punishable underthe law of the land. 26. It is submitted that the religious belief of the Jain community isnotprotectedunderArticle25oftheConstitutionofIndia,asthefreedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagationof religion is subject to public order, morality and health and to theother provisions of this Part, which includes Article 21 guaranteeingrighttolifeandwhichcannotbetakenawayeithervoluntarilyorinvoluntarily. The underlying principle is that if a person cannot givelife, he has no right to take life ashimself or of others.27. It is submittedthat the'Santhara' or 'Sallekhana' is not areligious practice adopted regularly. It is adopted occasionally bythe individual and instigated by others to achieve the salvation. Noreligion propagating salvation permits taking the life of any32individual, which includes the persons taken their own life. The'Santhara' is also not protected under Article 25 or 29 of theConstitutionof India, inasmuchas, it innomanner protects thefreedomof religion or the interest of minorities. The personsprofessing Jain religion though in religious minority, do not have anyspecial status nor does the interest of minority permits taking life andgives a constitutional right.28. The Advocates belonging to the Jaincommunity have filedbulky written arguments to support the Santhara as a religiouspractice, quoted from scriptures and preaching of Jain religion, whichis not by way of taking one's life for attaining any status or relief frompain. They state thatadopting Santhara is notsuicide. It is a deathwith equanimity in pursuitof immortality.It is a victory over deathor rather the fear of death. Persons taking vow of Santhara face itbravely and boldly whenever death becomes to them. They arespiritual aspirants, who retain their equanimityin the face of deathand their death does not remain fearful but becomes peaceful. Suchpeaceful death is called Samadhimarana. It is practiced by thoseinveterate spiritual aspirants, who are in eternal pursuit toimmortality. Jainism is known for many a unique spiritual practiceand accomplishment since its propounding by the first Lord ProphetRsabhadeva, centuries agoat the beginning of time cycle. Theantiquity of Jain religion and Santhara is unquestionably proven byits mentionintheancient scriptures. It is equally modernandrational in itsphilosophy and approach. It is modern in the sense that33spiritual aspirants, inthepursuit of immortality, undertakethispractice. It is rational in the sense that the very purpose of humanexistence in its spiritual evolution to perfection and to overcome allimpedimentsthathinder itsprogresstowardsthisnoblegoal. Thefear of death is one such hindrance and in that sense, the Santharaovercomes this hindrance and paves the way for spirit's attainment ofperfection. It not only enables the spiritual aspirant to overcome thefearofdeathbutalsohighlightstheindomitablehumanspiritthatwould not stop short of achieving its goal whatever may be in the say.Reference has been made to the book of Dr.Colonel D.S.Baya, whichcovers almost all aspects of this spiritual practicebytheJainasacross the sectarian divisions and across the world. The book justifiesthe Santhara as religious practice, which is essential to the religion ofJain. Quoting fromthe Jain scriptures and using a researchmethodology including literary, field research and research finding, itwas concluded in the book thatembracing voluntary peaceful deathby fasting unto death after a preparatory penance is the ultimateformofpenancethatculminatesinafearlessdeathinastateofequanimity of mind.It isa noble form of death, which does not useany violent means to die in a fit of the moment and it is perfectlynon-violent as it causes noinjury totheself or theother. TheSanthara is perfectly peaceful, calm and quiet and is distinct from thevoluntary death practiced by the followers of the other faiths in thatitusesnoviolentmeanstodieandthatthereisnodesiretodieassociated with it. It is simply a noble way to voluntarily discard and34worn out and diseased body that does not remain spirituallyproductiveanylonger.ThepracticehasbeenatraditionwiththeJain ever since the dawn of civilization and it has been practiced bythe Jain ascetics and lay followers since the time of BhagwanRsabhadeva to the present age. The Jain scriptures, rock inscriptionsandmediareportamplybearevidencetothefacts.Itcannotbecompared with suicide, Sati or any other form of honour deaths and itattracts no provisions of law against it.Justice T.K.Tukol opined thatomissiontotakefoodisnot anoffenceunder section309of theIndianPenal Codewhichdeals withsuicideandthat it is not anoffence because it does not injure others. It was finally concluded inthe book thatit is a noblest way todie in the pursuit of immortality.29. In the written arguments filed by Shri Vimal Choudhary,Advocate, Shri Sunil Nath, Advocate appearing for respondent no.3,Shri Anuroop Singhi, Advocate settled by Shri J.K.Singhi, SeniorAdvocate,Shri VivekDangi/VijayChoudhary,AdvocatessettledbyShri Virendra Dangi, Senior Advocate, Shri Ajit Maloo, Advocatesettled by Shri N.K.Maloo, Senior Advocate, Shri HemantSogani/Himanshu Sogani, Advocates appearing for the applicant-Veerendra Kumar Jain and Shri Ajit Bhandari, Advocate appearing forthe respondent no.4, reliance has been placed on various books andarticlesandreferenceshavebeenmadetothereligiousscripturesincluding the opinions of Shri Swami Samantbhadra Acharya,Shrimadacharya Pujyapad, Shri Acharaya Uma Swami and Shri DhyanSagar Ji Maharaj and articles of Justice T.K.Tukol and Justice35N.K.Jain. Reliance has also been placed on various studies carried outby the scholars including the scholars of Jain Vishva BharathiUniversity, in support of the argument that the Santhara orSallekhana is not by way of suicide, but for attaining the moksha andit is accepted form of death in the Jain religion for salvation.30. References have also been made to the Acharanga Sutra(pages421,432,438,439and444)andpreaching of Jain MunijiMaharaj.References have also been made to Sutra 122 RatnakarandaSravakacara, ShreeBhagwati SutrafromDeathwithEquanimity(Para 0.2.06), Jnata Dharma Kathanga Sutra, Rai Paseniya Sutra,Acharanga Sutra, Sthnang Sutra, Acharanga Sutra (page 252 to 255)and Acharanga Sutra (pages 262 to 267).31. In all the written arguments, reliance has been placed on thejudgmentsoftheSupremeCourtinGianKaur(supra)andArunaRamchandraShanbaug(supra), inwhichthedebateof voluntarydeath by a peaceful method was left inconclusive.32. Inwrittenarguments providingdetails of references tothereligious scriptures and the opinions of monks as well as the researcharticles, it is sought to be advocated that the Santhara or Sallekhanaisnotsuicide,whichispunishableundersection309oftheIndianPenal Code. It is accepted form of voluntary death taken step by stepto achieve moksha, with full wisdom and insight. It is not a violentmethodof deathandis permissibleintheJainreligion. All thecounsels appearing for therespondents intheir oral andwrittenarguments have tried to impress the Court to dismiss the writ36petition, as the old-aged practice of Santhara or Sallekhana isprotected by Article 25 of the Constitution of India.33. In Onkar Singh etc. etc. V/s State of Rajasthan ( RLR1987 (II)957), a Division Bench of this Court in a celebrated progressivejudgment considered the challenge to the Rajasthan Sati (Prevention)Ordinance, 1987, on the ground of violation of Articles 25, 26, 174,213 and 51A of the Constitution of India. After referring to the RigVedaMantras, AtharvaVedaandvariousscriptures, inwhichthepractice of Sati was alleged to have been accepted; referring to thepractice of Sati allegedly religious practice referred to in the VishnuPuranaShastraprevalent invarious sects of Punjab, OrissaandBengal; referring to the studies by Professor Kane and Cromwell inthe book Raja Ram Mohan Rai his era and ethics; referring to thejudgments in Ramdaya V/s Emperors (AIR 1914 All.249), Emperor V/sVidyasagar (AIR 1928 Pat.497) & Kindarsingh V/s Emperor (AIR 1933All 160), in whichthe abetment of Sati was held to be an offence andsentences were inflicted, the Division Bench observed that in all theages, the Rajas, Maharajas, Jagirdars and Emperors have made effortsto stop, ban and punish those persons, who abetand propagate theglorification of Sati.It was declared an offence in the year 1987 andcannotbesaidtobeprotectedbytheConstitutionofIndiainanyway. ThechallengetotheOrdinancewas dismissedexcept forClause 19 of the Ordinance, which was held to be ultra viresbeingviolative of Articles 13,14, 21, 25 and 51-A(e) of the Constitution ofIndia, providing for the continuance of ceremonies in the temples in37connection with the Sati constructed prior to the commencement ofthe Act. The landmark judgment is a piece of great legal work, whichreaffirmedtheruleoflawintheStateofRajasthan,inwhichthesections of people glorified the practice of Sati as a religious practiceprotected by Article 25 of the Constitution of India.34. In SardarSyedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb V/s State of Bombay(AIR 1962 SC 853), a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court heldthatArticles 25 and 26embody the principles of religious tolerationthat has been the characteristic feature of the Indian civilization fromthestart of history.They serve to emphasize the secular nature ofthe Indian Democracy, which the founding fathers considered, shouldbetheverybasisoftheConstitution.Inparas40,44and57,theSupreme Court held as follows:-Where an excommunication is itself based on religious groundssuchas lapsefromtheorthodoxreligious creedor doctrine(similar to what is considered heresy, apostasy or schism undertheCanonLaw)orbreachofsomepracticeconsideredasanessential part of the religion by the DawoodiBohras in general,excommunication cannot but be held to be for the purpose ofmaintaining the strength of the religion. It necessarily followsthat the exercise of this power of excommunication on religiousgrounds forms part of the management by thecommunity,throughits religious headof its ownaffairs inmatters ofreligionguaranteedunder Article26(b). TheimpugnedActmakes even such excommunication invalid and takes away thepower of the Dai as the head of the community toexcommunication even on religious grounds. It, therefore,clearly interferes with the right of the Dawoodi Bohracommunity under cl.(b) of Art.26 of the Constitution.....38The right under Art.26(b) is subject to cl.(2) of Art.25 oftheConstitution.TheimpugnedAct,howeverdoesnotcomewithin the saving provisions embodied in cl.(2) of Art.25. Quiteclearly, the impugned Act cannot be regarded as a lawregulating or restricting any economic, financial political orothersecularactivity.Themerefactthatcertaincivil rightswhich might be lost by members of the Dawoodi Bohracommunity as a result of excommunication even though madeon religious grounds and that the Act prevents such loss, doesnot offer sufficient basis for a conclusion that it is a lawproviding for social welfare and reform within Art.25(2). Asthe Act invalidates excommunication on any groundwhatsoever, including religious grounds, it must be held to bein clear violation of the right of the Dawoodi Borha communityunder Art.26(b) of the Constitution.AstherightguaranteedbyArt.25(1)isnotconfinedtofreedom of conscience in the sense of the right to hold a beliefandtopropagatethat belief, but includes theright tothepracticeof religion, theconsequences of thatpracticemustalsobear thesamecomplexionandbethesubject of likeguarantee. It is not as if the impugned enactment saves onlythe civilconsequences of an excommunication not interferingwiththeother consequences of anexcommunicationfallingwithin, the definition. On the other hand, it would be correctto say that the Act is concerned with excommunication whichmight havereligious significancebut whichalsooperatetodeprive persons of their civil rights.35. InGianKaurV/sStateofPunjab(supra),theSupremeCourtdisagreeing withthe reasons giveninP.Rathinam's case (supra)observed in paras 21 to 25 as follows:-3921. From the above extract, it is clear that in substance thereason for that view is, that if a person has a right to live, healso has a right not to live. The decisions relied on for takingthatviewrelatetootherfundamental rightswhichdeal withdifferent situations and different kind of rights. In those casesthe fundamental right is of a positive kind, for example,freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom ofmovement, freedom of business etc. which were held to includethenegativeaspectoftherebeingnocompulsiontoexercisethat right by doing the guaranteed positive act. Those decisionsmerely held that the right to do an act includes also the rightnot to do an act in that manner. It does not flow from thosedecisions that if the right is for protection from any intrusionthereof by others or in other words the right has the negativeaspect of not being deprived by others of its continued exercisee.g. theright tolifeor personal liberty, thentheconversepositive act also flows therefromto permit expressly itsdiscontinuanceor extinctionbytheholder of suchright. Inthose decisions it is the negative aspect of the right that wasinvoked for which no positive or overt act was required to bedone by implication. This difference in the nature of rights hasto be borne in mind when making the comparison for theapplication of this principle. 22. When a man commits suicide he has to undertake certainpositiveovert acts andthegenesis of thoseacts cannot betraced to, or be included within the protection of the 'right tolife' under Article 21. The significant aspect of 'sanctity of life' isalso not to be overlooked. Article 21 is a provision guaranteeingprotectionof lifeandpersonal libertyandbynostretchofimaginationcanextinctionof life' bereadtobeincludedinprotection of life'. Whatever may be the philosophy ofpermitting a person to extinguish his life by committing suicide,40we find it difficult to construe Article 21 to include within it theright todie' as apart of thefundamental right guaranteedtherein. 'Right tolife' is anatural right embodiedin Article21 but suicide is an unnatural termination or extinction of lifeand, therefore, incompatible and inconsistent with the conceptofrighttolife'.Withrespectandinall humility,wefindnosimilarity in the nature of the other rights, such as the right tofreedom of speech'etc. to provide a comparable basis to holdthat the'right tolife' alsoincludes the'right todie'. Withrespect, the comparison is inapposite, for the reason indicatedin the context of Article 21.The decisions relating to otherfundamental rights wherein the absence of compulsion toexercise a right was held to be included within the exercise ofthatright,arenotavailabletosupporttheviewtakeninP.Rathinam qua Article 21. 23. To give meaning and content to the word 'life'in Article21, it has been construed as life with human dignity. Any aspectof life which makes it dignified may be read into it but not thatwhichextinguishesitandis,therefore, inconsistentwiththecontinued existence of life resulting in effacing the right itself.The right to die', if any, is inherently inconsistent with the rightto life' as is death' with life'. 24. Protagonism of euthanasia on the view that existence inpersistent vegetative state (PVS) is not a benefit to the patientof a terminal illness being unrelated to the principle of 'sanctityof life'or the right to live with dignity'is of no assistance todetermine the scope of Article 21 for deciding whether theguarantee of right to life' therein includes the right to die'. Theright to life' including the right to live with human dignity wouldmean the existence of such a right upto the end of natural life.This also includes the right to a dignified life upto the point of41death including a dignified procedure of death. In other words,this mayincludetheright of adyingmantoalsodiewithdignity when his life is ebbingout. But the 'right to die'withdignity at the end of life is not to be confused or equated withthe right to die'an unnatural death curtailing the natural spanof life. 25. A question may arise, in the context of a dying man, whois, terminally ill or in a persistent vegetative state that he maybe permitted to terminate it by a premature extinction of hislifeinthosecircumstances. This categoryof cases mayfallwithin the ambit of the 'right to die'with dignity as a part ofrighttolivewithdignity, whendeathduetoterminationofnatural life is certain and imminent and the process of naturaldeath has commenced. These are not cases of extinguishing lifebutonlyofacceleratingconclusionoftheprocessofnaturaldeath which has already commenced. The debate even in suchcases to permit physician assisted termination of life isinconclusive. It is sufficient to reiterate that the argument tosupport the view of permitting termination of life in such casesto reduce the period of suffering during the process of certainnatural death is not available to interpret Article 21 to includetherein the right to curtail the natural span of life. 36. InGianKaur'scase(supra),theSupremeCourtrepelledthechallenge based on Article 14 of the Constitution to the right to lifeunder Article21andreaffirmedretainingtheSection309intheIndian Penal Code. The Supreme Court held that abetment of attempttocommitsuicideisoutsidethepurviewof Section306andit ispunishable only under section 309 read with section 107 IPC. Theassistedsuicideandassistedattempt tocommitsuicidearemade42punishablefor cogent reasons intheinterest of society. Suchaprovision is considered desirable to also prevent the danger inherentintheabsenceof suchapenal provision.Theabettor is vieweddifferently, inasmuch as he abets the extinguishment of life ofanother persons and punishment of abetment is considered necessaryto prevent abuse of the absence of such a penal provision.It alsoheld thatassisted suicides outside the category of physician assistedsuicide or euthanasiahave no rational basis to claim exclusion of thefundamental principles of sanctity of life. The argument that right todie isincluded in Article 21 of the Constitution and is protected as areligious practicehas no substance and is not acceptable.37. InJavedandors.V/sStateofHaryana&ors.(supra),theSupreme Court rejected the argument that Article 21, which has tobe read alongwith the Directives Principles and Fundamental rights,includes the right to procreate as many children asone pleases.Thefreedomunder Article25issubject topublicorder, moralityandhealth. The protection under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution iswith respect to religious practice, which forms an essential part ofthereligion.Apracticemaybereligiousbutnotanessentialandintegral part of practice of that religion. The latter is not protectedby Article 25. A statutory provision casting disqualification oncontestingfor, or holding, anelectiveofficeis not violativeofArticle 25 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court relied onM.IsmailFaruqui (Dr.) V/s Union of India((1994) 6 SCC 360) and thejudgments in Sarla Mudgal V/s Union of India ((1995) 3 SCC 635),43Mohd.AhmedKhanV/sBhahBanoBegum((1985)2SCC556)andMohd.Hanif Qureshi V/s State of Bihar (AIR 1958 SC 731).38. In State of Gujarat V/s Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat &ors.((2005) 8 SCC 534), a Constitution Bench considering theBombay Animal Preservation (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1994restrictingthe bulls and bullocks below the age of 16 years could notbe slaughtered, repelled the challenge on the ground thatslaughteringofcowsonBakrI'sisneitheressentialnornecessarilyrequiredas apart of thereligious ceremony. Anoptional religiouspracticeis not coveredbyArticle25(1). Onthecontrary, it iscommon knowledge that the cow and its progeny i.e. bull, bullocksand calves are worshiped by Hindus on specified days during Diwaliand other festivals. 39. In order to save the practice ofSanthara or Sallekhana in theJain religion from the vice of criminal offence under section 309 IPC,which provides the punishment for suicide and Section 306 IPC, whichprovides punishment for abetment of suicide, theargument thatSanthara or Sallekhana is an essential religious practice of the Jainreligion, has not been established. We do not find that in any of thescriptures, preachings, articles or the practices followed by the Jainascetics, the Santhara or Sallekhana has been treated as an essentialreligious practice, nor is necessarily requiredfor thepursuit ofimmortality or moksha. There is no such preaching in the religiousscriptures of theJain religion or in the texts writtenbythe reveredJain Munis that the Santhara or Sallekhana is the only method,44without whichthemokshaisnot attainable. Thereisnomaterialwhatsoever to show that this practice was accepted by most of theascetics or persons following the Jain religion in attaining the nirvanaor moksha. It is not an essential part of the philosophy and approachof the Jain religion, nor has been practiced frequently to give up thebody for salvation of soul. It is one thing to say thatthe Santhara orSallekhana is not suicide as it is a voluntary act of giving up of one'sbody for salvation and is not violent in any manner, butit is anotherthingtosaythat it is permissiblereligious practiceprotectedbyArticles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India.40. The Constitution being governing law and fountain headof thelaws in India, guarantees certain freedoms as fundamental rights andalso provides for constitutional rights and duties and statutory rightsunder the laws made under it.It does not permit nor include underArticle 21the right to take one's own life, nor can include the rightto take life as an essential religious practice under Article 25 of theConstitution.41. Article25oftheConstitution of India guarantees freedom ofconscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religionunder the heading Right to Freedom of Religion,subject to publicorder, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part,which includes Article 21. No religious practice, whether essential ornon-essential orvoluntarycanpermittakingone'sownlifetobeincludedunder Article25. Theright guaranteedfor freedomofconscienceandtherighttofreelyprofess,practiceandpropagate45cannot include the right to take one's life, on the ground that righttolifeincludestherighttoendthelife. Eveninextraordinarycircumstances, the voluntary act of taking one's life cannot bepermittedastherighttopracticeandprofessthereligionunderArticle 25 of the Constitution of India.42. The respondents have failed to establish that the Santhara or'Sallekhana' is an essential religious practice, without which thefollowing of the Jain religion is not permissible. There is no evidenceor material to showthat the Santhara or Sallekhana has beenpracticed by the persons professing Jain religion even prior to or afterthepromulgationoftheConstitutionofIndiatoprotectsuchrightunder Article25of theConstitutionof India. Theover-ridingandgoverning principles of public order, morality and health, conditionsthe right to freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess,practice and propagate religion.The right under Article 25 issubjectto theother provisions of this Part, which includes Article 21. We areunabletoacceptthesubmissionthatthepracticeof 'Santhara' or'Sallekhana' asareligiouspracticeisanessential partof theJainreligion, to be saved by Article 25 orArticle26 or Article 29 of theConstitution of India.43. The writ petition is allowed with directions to the Stateauthoritiestostopthepracticeof 'Santhara' or'Sallekhana' andtotreat it as suicide punishable under section 309 of the Indian PenalCodeanditsabetmentbypersonsundersection306oftheIndianPenal Code. The State shall stop and abolish the practice of46'Santhara' and 'Sallekhana' in the Jain religion in any form. Anycomplaint made in this regard shall be registered as a criminal caseand investigated by the police, in the light of the recognition of lawintheConstitutionofIndiaandinaccordancewithSection309orSection 306 IPC, in accordance with law. 44. Beforeparting withthematter, wethanklearnedcounselsappearing for the parties for their valuable assistance given to Courtin deciding the matter.(VEERENDR SINGH SIRADHANA),J.(SUNIL AMBWANI),CJ.ParmarCertificate:All corrections made in the judgment/order have been incorporated in thejudgment/order being emailed.Parmar, PS