Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

download Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

of 26

Transcript of Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

  • 8/12/2019 Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

    1/26

    CANDIDATESELECTIONMETHODS

    An AnalyticalFramework

    Gideon Rahatand Reuven Y. Hazan

    AB STRACT

    The framework presented in thisarticle supplies tools fordelineatingcandidateselection methods, defineswhat ismeantbytheirdemocra-tization and offersan analyticalframework forcross-nationalcompari-son. The first section of thisarticleraises the problems of classifyingcandidateselection methodsand suggestssolutionsforthem. Each ofthe next four sections offers a dimension for the classification ofcandidate selection methods: candidacy; party selectorates; decentral-ization;and voting/appointmentsystems. Thesixth section definestheprocess of democratizing candidate selection, and demonstrates its

    implementation in thethreelargestpoliticalpartiesin Israelpriorto the1996 elections, via the dimensions of the analytical framework. Thesubsequent section assesses the repercussions of this democratizingphenomenon in generaland providesempiricalevidencedrawn fromtheIsraeliexperiencein the1990s. Thearticleconcludesbyexaminingtheabilityofpoliticalpartiesto comprehend and to overcometheconse-quencesofdemocratizingcandidateselection.

    KEYWORDScandidateselection democratization Israel partyorganization

    primaries

    Developingtoolsforthestudyofcandidateselection methodsisimportantin two respects. First, when westudypartypolitics, appropriatetoolsenableusto drawamap ofamajorelementin thepartysinternalpowerstructure.Second, ifweclaimthatthebehaviorofpartiesisaffected bythenatureofthe electoral system, then the behavior of individual politicians must beaffected bythenatureoftheselection method. Thismeansthatwithoutana-

    lytical

    t

    ools such ast

    hose supplied by elect

    or

    al systems

    r

    esear

    cher

    s (for

    example, Rae, 1967;Taageperaand Shugart, 1989), welack an importantfactorforanalyzingpartypolitics. In lightofthepersonification ofpoliticsand changesin partyorganization thatlead to increased autonomyforthe

    PAR T Y P O L IT IC S VO L 7 . N o . 3 pp. 297322

    Copyright 2001 SAGEPublications London Thousand Oaks NewDelhi

    1354-0688(200105)7:3;297322;016987

  • 8/12/2019 Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

    2/26

    individualpoliticiansatthetop (Katzand Mair, 1995;Katz, in thisissue),thisgap needsto befilled through furtherresearch.

    On theonehand, candidateselection methodsarelessstablemechanismsthan stateinstitutionalmechanisms(such aselectoralsystems), and arerela-tivelymo

    r

    epr

    onet

    o change.A

    ssuch,t

    heyshould beseen asr

    eflectingpa

    rtypolitics. On theotherhand, thesechangesarenotfrequentenough to justify

    an inclusivetreatmentofthemasonlyamirror. Thus, candidateselectionmethodsshould betreated asinstitutionalmechanismsthatboth reflectthenatureofthepartiesand affect partypolitics.

    Untilnow, onlyafewstudiesofcandidateselection methodshaveofferedtools for comparativeanalysis (Gallagher, 1988a, 1988c; Ranney, 1981).Theframework presented in thisarticlesetsoutto achievetwo goals:first,to supplytoolsfordelineatingcandidateselection methodsand fordefiningwhatismeantbytheirdemocratization;second, to offeran analyticalframe-work thatwill enablea cross-national comparison of candidate selectionmethods.

    Candidate selection methods are only oneaspect in the more compre-hensiveanalysisofcandidaterecruitment. AsNorris(1997)pointsout inherstudyof legislativerecruitment, abroad rangeofselection actorsandprocessesoutside thepartyarenashould beaddressed when oneanswersquestions regarding who becomes a candidate, and how and why thishappens. Thisstudyisnotaboutcandidaterecruitmentin general, butratheraboutaparticularand importantaspectofitinside thepartyarena. Whilethebroadercontextofselection iscertainlyimportant, partiesarecriticaltotheprocess. Thus, thisarticleoffersan institutionalanchorforthestudyofcandidateselection methods. Asan analogy, electoralsystemsarealso butoneaspect in themorecomprehensivestudyofelectoralpolitics, yettheystillsupplyuswith usefultoolsfortheiranalysis.1

    Theunitofanalysisisthesingleparty, in aparticularcountry, ataspecifictime. Onlyin caseswhereseveralpartiesin aparticularcountryusesimilarcandidate selection methods (usually due to legal requirements), whereasinglepartyusesasimilarcandidateselection method morethan once, or

    when both similaritiesoccur, willwemakegeneralizationsabouttheselec-tion systematthefirststageoftheanalysis.

    Thefirstsection ofthisarticleraisestheproblemsofclassifyingcandidateselection methodsproblemsthatstemfromhavingto dealwith anumberofcomplex featuresand offerssolutionsforthem. Thenextfoursectionsofferfourdimensions, orcontinua, fortheclassification ofcandidateselec-tion methods, and elaborate how these dimensions correspond to thephenomenon of democratizing candidate selection. The analytical frame-work is, therefore, builtaround fourmajorquestions:

    1 Who can beselected?Arethereanyrestrictionson presentingcandidacyin agiven party?Ifso, howstrictare these limitations?Howmuch dotheyaffectthesizeand natureofthepotentialcandidatepool?

    PART Y P O L IT IC S 7 ( 3 )

    298

  • 8/12/2019 Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

    3/26

    2 Who selectscandidates?Arethereanyrestrictionson participatingin agiven partyscandidateselection process?Ifso, what istheir impactonthesizeand natureoftheselectorate?

    3 Wherearethecandidatesselected?Arecandidatesselected byanational

    or

    asub-nationalselec

    t

    or

    ate?

    Ifcandida

    tesa

    r

    eselected byasub-na

    tionalselectorate, is itaregionalora localone?Doesthepartyallocatepos-

    itionsforfunctionalrepresentation, i.e., arecandidatesselected formallyasrepresentativesofsocialgroupsorsectors?

    4 Howarecandidatesnominated?Iscandidacydetermined byavotingpro-cedureorarecandidatessimplyappointed?

    Thesixth partofthisarticledefinestheprocessofdemocratizingcandi-date selection, and demonstrates its implementation in the three largestpoliticalpartiesin Israelpriorto the1996 elections, viathedimensionsoftheanalyticalframework. Thesubsequentsection assessestherepercussionsofthisdemocratizingphenomenon in general, and providesempiricalevi-dencedrawn fromtheIsraeliexperiencein the1990s. Thearticleconcludesbyexaminingtheabilityofpoliticalpartiesto comprehend and overcometheconsequencesofdemocratizingcandidateselection.

    ProblemsofClassification and theirSolutions

    The concept of safe positions on the candidate list, or safe seats whendealingwith majoritarian systems, isused quitefreelyin theresearch litera-ture. Sincewealso usethisconcept, wedefineitaccordingto thefollowingparameters. Although thesizeofthepartyslegislativerepresentation isnotknown in advance intra-partyselection ismadebeforethegeneralelec-tionspartiesand politicianstend to relateto theirpartysactual represen-tation as the one that distinguishes safe list positions from unsafepositions. As for new parties that did not compete previously, and thuscannotrelate to anyexisting size, weare forced to estimateaccording to

    theirprojectedsize, through theuseofopinion polls.2Thetoolsoffered in thefollowingsectionscan beeasilyused when ana-

    lyzing a simple, one stage, uniform candidate selection method. Such asimplemethod isonein which allpotentialcandidatesfacesimilarrestric-tions, and theselection ofallcandidatesismadebythesameselectorate, atthesamelevel, usingthesamenomination method.

    Empirically, however, we face complex candidate selection methods methodsin which, simultaneously, differentrequirementsaresetforcandi-dacyfordifferentpositionson thelist;selection ismadebydifferentselec-

    torates; these selectorates use different nomination systems; and somecandidatesareselected atdifferenttypesof locations, defined territoriallyand/orfunctionally.

    Wedistinguish between two kindsofsuch complexities. Firstisthemixed

    RAHAT & HAZ AN : CAN D IDAT E SE L E C T IO N M E T H O D S

    299

  • 8/12/2019 Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

    4/26

    candidate selection system. This isamethod in which different potentialcandidatesfacedifferentrestrictions;ordifferentcandidatesareselected bydifferentselectorates, in differentlocations, oraccordingto differentnomi-nation systems.

    Second is

    t

    hemult

    i-st

    agecandidateselec

    tion me

    t

    hod. Thisisamet

    hod inwhich thesame candidateshaveto facemorethan oneselectorateduringtheselection process. Theseselectoratesmaybedefined differentlyin terri-torialand functionalterms, and mayalso usedifferentnomination systems.In thiskind ofprocess, screeninghappensthrough thecandidateselectionprocess, and notonlybycandidacyrequirements.3

    In cases of both mixed and multi-stage candidate selection methods,classification becomesmorecomplex. Asourgoalhereisto offeracross-partyand cross-nationalanalyticalframework, wemusttryto offerawayto integrateone-stage, uniformcandidateselection methodsand differentcomplex cases, such asmixed and multi-stagemethods, into thesameframe-work.

    Thedifficultywith mixed candidateselection methodscan beaddressedin two steps. First, thereshould beaseparateanalysisofeach selectorateitslocation and itsnomination system. Second, toward thegoalofsummingupthesystem, therelativeimpactofeach procedureshould beweighted bycalculatingtheratio ofsafepositionsthatarefilled bytheparticularselec-torates.

    The complexity ofa multi-stage candidate selection method should be

    approached in aslightlydifferenttwo-step method. First, thereshould beaseparateanalysisofeach stage:definingtheselectorate;itslocation;and itsnomination system. Second, therelativeimportanceofeach stageshould beestimated. If certain stagesare found to be merely formalities, then theyshould beremoved fromconsideration. When morethan onestagehasarealimpacton thecomposition ofthecandidatelistin termsofthesafepositions then these stages should be weighted to produce results thatwill enable us to locate the system along the continuum suggested. Thefollowing sections will offer examples of the operationalization of such

    solutions.

    Candidacy

    Thefirstdimension addressesthequestion ofcandidacy:Who can presenthisorhercandidacyin thecandidateselection processofasinglepartyataparticularpointin time?Therestrictionsapplied to potentialcandidateswillbeclassified in acontinuumaccordingto thelevelofinclusivenessor

    exclusiveness(Figure1).4

    Atoneend, theinclusivepole, everyvotercan stand aspartycandidate.Some states in the USA are close to this pole. This phenomenon can beattributed to thefactthatstate laws, ratherthan partyrules, regulatethe

    PART Y P O L IT IC S 7 ( 3 )

    300

  • 8/12/2019 Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

    5/26

    candidateselection process. Attheexclusivepoleweencounteraseriesofrestrictive conditions. An example is Oblers (1974: 180) account of therequirements thatapplied to potential candidates in theBelgian SocialistParty. Accordingto theserestrictions, apotentialcandidatemust:

    (1)havebeen amemberatleastfiveyearspriorto theprimary;(2)havemade annual minimum purchases from the Socialist co-op; (3) havebeen a regular subscriber to the partys newspaper; (4) have sent hischildren to stateratherthan Catholicschools;and (5)havehiswifeandchildren enrolled in theappropriatewomensand youth organizations.

    TheSelectorate

    Theselectorateisthebodythatselectsthecandidates. Itcan becomposedofoneperson, orseveralormanypeople, up to theentireelectorateofagiven nation. Theselectoratesareclassified in acontinuum(Figure2)also

    accordingto theirinclusivenessorexclusivenesslevels. Atoneextreme, theselectorateisthemostinclusivetheelectoratethathastherightto voteinthegeneralelections. On theotherextreme, theselectorateorrathertheselectoristhemostexclusive, anomination entityofoneleader.

    Between thesetwo extremes, theselectoratesareclassified accordingtotheiramountofinclusiveness. Each ofthecategories, orzones, thatappearsin Figure2 containssub-categoriesthatarelocated alongeach zone, whichtogetherproducetheoverallcontinuum. Forexample, American primariesare located in the electorate zone. Methods such as the nonpartisan

    primaryand theblanketprimary, in which everyregistered votercan voteforcandidatesfromboth parties, would belocated neartheinclusiveend ofthe electorate zone (Ranney, 1981). American closed primaries, whichdemand votersregistration according to theirpartyaffiliation before thedayoftheprimaries, arelocated toward theexclusiveend oftheelectoratezone. Theexactlocation ofAmerican primarieswillthereforebedependent

    RAHAT & HAZ AN : CAN D IDAT E SE L E C T IO N M E T H O D S

    301

    Figure1. Candidacy

    Figure2. Partyselectorates

  • 8/12/2019 Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

    6/26

    on therestrictionsthataredefined bythedifferentstatelaws(seeKolodnyand Katz, 1992:909;Ranney, 1981).

    Still, theelectoratezonewillnotbeoccupied onlybyAmerican cases.Accordingto Kristjnsson (1998), from1971 on severalpartiesin Iceland

    adopted open p

    r

    imar

    ies. Thesewer

    eusuallyconducted in someof

    t

    heelec-toral districts, and every citizen in these districts could participate. Anadditionalcase, located toward theexclusiveend oftheelectoratezone, isthatoftheSpanish Catalan party, which opened itscandidateselection toregistered sympathizers non-memberswho can registeraspartysup-porterswithoutpayinganymembership fee(Hopkin, in thisissue).

    European closed primaries(Newman and Cranshaw, 1973), asopposedto American closed primaries, usually mean party primaries (Gallagher,1988c:23940), in which theselectorsarepartymembersthesecond zoneoftheselectoratecontinuum. In thispartymemberszone, wefind differ-entmethodsofpartyprimaries. Such methodswereadopted to selectboththepartyleaderand thepartycandidatesin themajorIsraelipartiesin the1990s(Hazan, 1997), and wereused in Iceland in someparties(Kristjns-son, 1998).

    Theselectoratesin thepartymemberszonecan bedistinguished accord-ing to the restrictions on party membership, the additional requirementsthatareplaced on memberswith aconditionalrightto takepartin thepartyselectorate, and thelevelofaccessibilityoftheselectorto theselection pro-cedure. Forexample, onerule thatcould restrictmembership, orjust theright to participate in candidate selection, is the payment ofmembershipdues. Members participation mayalso be restricted by the request foraminimal party membership period prior to candidate selection, proof ofpartyactivity, etc. Accessibilitymayalso bean importantfactorin distin-guishingbetween such methods. Levelsofaccessibilityand inclusivenessarehigher if a party adopts such methods as postal ballots, tele-voting orspreadingpollingstationsalloverthecountry. Alessaccessibleand inclu-sivemethod isan open partyconvention. Whileallmemberscan attend suchameeting, itrequiresmoreefforton theirpart.

    In theselected partyagencyzonewefind variouspartyagenciesthatmaybedistinguished bydifferentparameters. Insideeach party, therelativesizeofeach agencyisasign ofitsinclusiveness:conventionsareusuallylargerthan central committees, which in turn are usually larger than executivebodies such as bureaus. The terminology used in each country is rarelyequivalent, and hence onemust be cautiouswhen inferring the extent ofinclusivenessbased solelyon whataparticularpartycallsaspecificagency.In addition, themoreinclusivepartyagenciescontain delegatesselected bypartymembers, whilethemoreexclusiveonesincluderepresentativeswho

    wereselected bysuch delegates.Themoreinclusiveselectoratesin thenon-selected partyagencieszoneare, forexample, specialselection committeeswhosecomposition isratifieden bloc byaselected partyagency. Themoreexclusiveselectoratesin this

    PART Y P O L IT IC S 7 ( 3 )

    302

  • 8/12/2019 Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

    7/26

    zonearerepresented byagatheringofpartyfounders, in newparties, oraninformalgatheringoffaction leadersin olderones. Israelsultra-orthodoxreligiouspartiesserveasan exampleofaveryexclusiveselectorate. In oneparty, DegelHaTorah, oneRabbiwasauthorized to decidethecomposition

    oft

    hepart

    ylist

    .I

    n anot

    her

    part

    y,A

    gudat

    Yisr

    ael,t

    helist

    wasfor

    med byt

    heCouncilofSagesabodyofRabbiswho are the spiritual leadersof thepartyfactions.

    TheBelgian parties, fromthe1960suntilthe1980s, serveasan exampleofamixed system, onethatusesdifferentselectoratesforselectingcandi-dates of the same party. Inside the large parties, some candidates wereselected bypartymemberswhileotherswereappointed bylocaland centralpartyagencies(DeWinter, 1988;Obler, 1974). Locatingsuch caseson thecontinuumrequiresoneto weigh theimpactofeach selectorate. Ifhalfofthecandidateswereselected bypartyagenciesand halfbypartymembers,then when summingup forcomparativeneedsonecan locatetheselec-toratein-between thesezones.

    Multi-stage candidate selection processes include, by definition, differentselectorates. In the British parties, small executive party agencies filtercandidates and/or have the ability to veto their nomination. Most of theinfluence is held by selected party agencies or party members who decidewho will be the party candidate (Denver, 1988). While it may be the casethat those who are screened have no chance of being selected in the firstplace, and while the veto is activated only on rare occasions, one must stillconsider the impact ofthis agency. Populistcandidates that might have hada chance among party members may be screened or checked, and selec-torates may be sensitive enough to refrain from selecting someone whomay be vetoed by the executive agency. Thus, a party such as the BritishLiberal Democrats in which members select candidates, but party agen-cies screen them would be located on the exclusive end of the partymembers zone.Figure 3 integrates our first two dimensions, presenting the party candi-

    date selection method according to the level of inclusiveness or exclusive-

    ness of both candidacy and the selectorate. This combination becomesrelevant when analyzing the democratization of candidate selection pro-cesses. A highlevel of inclusiveness in one dimension combined with a highlevel of exclusiveness in the other would mean that the party leadershipand/or the party apparatus retain control over the process. For example,the Belgian Socialist Party used inclusive selectorates in many districts party members but retained control over the composition of its candi-date list through very restricted candidacy (De Winter, 1988). The ItalianCommunist Party included non-members as candidates, but this was done

    under the supervision ofanexclusive andcentralizedselectorate (Wertman,1988).

    RAHAT & HAZ AN : CAN D IDAT E SE L E C T IO N M E T H O D S

    303

  • 8/12/2019 Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

    8/26

    Decentralized CandidateSelection Methods

    Partyselection methodsmaybeseen asdecentralized in two senses, paral-lelto theconceptsLijphart(1984)proposed when hedealtwith thedivisionofpowerin federaland unitarydemocraticregimes. Decentralization may

    beterritorial, i.e., when partylocalselectoratesnominatepartycandidatessuch asalocalleader, partybranch committee, allpartymembersorvotersin an electoraldistrict. Decentralization oftheselection method mayalso becorporate, i.e., onethatensuresfunctionalrepresentation forrepresentativesofsuch groupsastradeunions, women, minorities, etc.

    Whiledecentralization based on territorialmechanisms, in orderto ensureregionaland localrepresentation, isfairlystraightforward, morecomplexmechanismsarerequired forensuringfunctionalrepresentation viadecen-tralization. Therearetwo mechanismsto ensurefunctionalrepresentation.

    Thefirstisthesectarian orsocialgroup district, wherethecandidatesandtheselectorsaremembersofthesamesectororsocialgroup. Thesecond isthereserved placemechanism, which guaranteesaminimalposition on thelist(orminimalnumberofsafeseatsin thecaseofsingle-memberdistricts)

    PART Y P O L IT IC S 7 ( 3 )

    304

    Figure3. Candidacyand partyselectoratesin candidateselection* Each statesposition mayvarybased on differentstateregulations.BSPBelgian SocialistParty1960sIsrael1 two main parties1996

    Israel2 ultra-religiousparties1990s

  • 8/12/2019 Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

    9/26

    foracandidateorcandidatesbelongingto adistinctsectororsocialgroup.Asopposed to thedistrictcompetitors, thosecandidateswho areeligibleforreserved placescompetefortheirplaceon thelistagainstallofthecandi-dates, and areselected bythesameselectorate. Thereserved representation

    mechanismisimplemented onlyif

    t

    hecandidatesdo no

    t

    att

    aint

    her

    eser

    vedposition, orahigherone. Thefirstmechanismdecentralizesboth candidacyand the selectorate, while the second one implies the decentralization ofcandidacyalone.

    When candidatesareselected exclusivelybyanationalpartyselectorate,with no procedure that allows for territorial and/or functional represen-tation beitanon-selected leader, anationalparty-agencyoran electoratethatselectsallcandidatesfromthewholenation then wehaveamethodthatislocated in thecentralized pole(Figure4).At the decentralized pole, candidates are selected exclusively by party

    localselectoratesand/orintra-partysocialgroupsand/orsectarian groups.In manyEuropean cases, theselectorateatthedistrictlevelplaysthecrucialrole in candidateselection. TheNorwegian caseseemsto fallcloseto theterritorialdecentralization pole. Notonlycan nationalpartyagenciesnotveto candidacythatisdetermined atthedistrictlevel, itisalso thecasethatterritorialrepresentation is taken into account inside each district (Valen,1988).

    Onceagain, wehaveto determineand weigh theimpactofdifferentselec-toratesatdifferent levels in thecaseofamulti-stageselection method. Acase in point is thatof the Italian parties in the1980s, in which central,provincial and local level selectorates took part in candidate selection.Accordingto Wertman (1988), theprovincial-levelpartyagenciesplayed themain role in candidateselection, vis--vis thecenterand thedistrict levelselectorates. ThustheItalian partiesofthe1980sarein themiddleareaof

    RAHAT & HAZ AN : CAN D IDAT E SE L E C T IO N M E T H O D S

    305

    Figure4. Centralization and decentralization ofcandidateselection

  • 8/12/2019 Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

    10/26

    theterritorialcontinuum. Still, thereweredifferencesbetween theparties,which placed theItalian Communists, forexample, closerto thecentralizedpolethan theirSocialistcounterparts.

    Belgium supplies us with examples of both of the functional represen-t

    ation mechanismswhich we

    r

    eused at

    t

    hedistr

    ict

    level.I

    nt

    heB

    elgian Chr

    is-tian SocialPartyin 1961, thereserved placemechanismwasused when itwasdecided thatin someoftheBrusselsdistricts, Flemish and Francophonecandidateswould geteveryotherseaton theparty list. In 1965, separateintra-partysub-districtswereactually established when FrancophoneandFlemish Partymembersin thesedistrictsselected, separately, Francophoneand Flemish candidatesforparliament(Obler, 1974).

    VotingSystemsand AppointmentSystems

    When theselection process includesaprocedure in which votesdeterminewhethersomeonewillbeplaced asthepartyscandidatein thegeneralelec-tions, and hisorherposition on thelist, wearedealingwith avotingsystem.Itshould benoted thatavotingproceduremaybeused byan appointmentbodyoftwo peopleormore. However, thiswould notbeconsidered avotingsystemunlesstwo conditionsaremet:First, each candidatemustbedeter-mined exclusivelybyvotes, and not, forexample, byan agreed-upon listoran allocation thatisratified byunanimousormajorityvote;second, votingresults must be presented officially to justify and legitimize the candidacy.When candidacy isdetermined withoutusingsuch avotingprocedure, wereferto thisasan appointmentsystem. In apureappointmentsystem, candi-datesareappointed with no need forapprovalbyanypartyagency, orotherorgan, exceptthenominatingorgan itself. In apurevotingsystem, allcandi-datesareselected through avotingprocedure, and no otherselectoratecanchangethecomposition ofthelist. Thisdistinction iscrucialwhen dealingwith thelevelofcontrolapartyholdsoverthecomposition ofitscandidatelist(Figure5).

    When thelistisappointed, itscomposition can becontrolled. Thelistcanexpressthebalancethatthepartyorgansthink isappropriatein responseto both inter-party (electoral image, personal popularity) and intra-party(loyalty, factional, social and sectarian representativeness) pressures anddemands. On theotherhand, when thelistisselected, thepartyorgansdonotcontrol itscomposition, which is instead determined accordingto theaggregation ofindividualvotes. Partiesthatusevotingsystemsalso tend touserepresentation correction mechanisms, such asfunctionaland territorialdistrictsorreserved seats, and multi-round and PRvotingsystems, to ensure

    abalanced list.Therearealso casesthatcan belocated in-between theseextremes. Theseappearin thecontinuumasappointment-votingsystems. Such istheen blocratification vote thatwas used in Belgium. In many constituencies, party

    PART Y P O L IT IC S 7 ( 3 )

    306

  • 8/12/2019 Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

    11/26

    memberswereasked eitherto voteforamodellistalistofcandidatesdetermined byalocalpartyagencyorto expresstheirpreferencesregard-ingthecandidates. Onlyifmorethan 50 percentofpartymembersdid notratify themodel listwere theother votes counted, and thus theydid nothavemuch weight (Obler, 1974). In Norway, themix wasmoreopen tochangein theratification process. Liststhatwererecommended byanom-inatingcommitteewerethen ratified byamajorityofaselected partyagency,position byposition (Valen, 1988).In multi-stage selection methods, it is possible that both appointment

    systemsand votingsystemswillbeused atdifferentstages. In theBritishLiberalParty, ashortlistwasappointed duringtheinitialstageofthecandi-dateselection process, butthefinaldecision concerningthoseon theshort-listwasdetermined bypartymembersvotes. Therearealso systemsthatmix both nomination systems:somecandidatesareappointed, whileothersareselected. In Belgium, someofthecandidatelistsofthethreelargeparties

    were determined by member vote, others by member ratification of aregionalagencylist, and afewotherswereappointed byanationalagency(DeWinter, 1988;Obler, 1974).Itisusuallythecasein smalland moreexclusiveselectoratesthatcandi-

    datesareappointed, whilelargerselectoratesvotein orderto choosetheircandidates. Still, these are two (almost) mutually exclusive categories. Avoting system can, theoretically, be used in a selectorate of two or morepeople, and appointments can take place in bodies that include severaldozensofpeople.

    Votingsystemscan befurtherdistinguished on thebasisoftwo elements(Table1). Thefirstistheposition allocation formula, i.e., proportionalrep-resentation (PR), semi-PR, semi-majoritarian and majoritarian systems. Thedistinction between these four kinds of voting systems is based on theirpotential level of proportionality. Proportional voting systems in thiscontext will usually be personalized. For example, the three largest Irishpartiesin the1980s, exceptforFiannaFil, used apersonalized PRsystemto determinethecomposition oftheircandidateliststhesingletransfer-able vote (STV) system thatwasalso used in the generalelections. Semi-

    proportionalsystemsarethosein which thenumberofvoteseach selectorhasissmaller than thenumberofsafeseatsbeingcontested. Thisistheintra-partyversion ofalimited voteelectoralsystem. Semi-majoritarian systemsaredefined assystemswherethenumberofvotesthateach selectorreceives

    RAHAT & HAZ AN : CAN D IDAT E SE L E C T IO N M E T H O D S

    307

    Figure5. Candidatenomination and partyrepresentationalcontrol

  • 8/12/2019 Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

    12/26

    ishigher than thenumberofsafeseatscontested. Whilesuch asystem ismajoritarian asamajorityblock can beorganized and can takeoverallthesafepositionsitissemiin thesensethatincentivesfororganizingapluralityormajorityblock voteareweaker.5 In amajoritarian system, thenumberof votesand safe seats isequal. In many cases, every position is

    contested separately, making the systemalmostparallel to single-memberdistrictelections.

    Thesecond parameterdistinguishesbetween one-round ormulti-roundselection methods. In theformer, allsafepositionsareselected atonetime,whereasin thelatterthesafepositionsarefilled gradually. Theimportanceofthisdifferenceliesin theopportunitiesto controland/orbalancethecom-position oftheliststhatagradualselection processgivestheparties.

    Thereisaconnection between thevotingsystemused in thefinalstageofthe candidate selection process and the national electoral system. Where

    national elections are conducted in single-member districts, the votingsystemused in thecandidateselection processmustbemajoritarian in orderto produceasinglecandidate. Forexample, theexhaustiveballotwasusedby theBritish Conservativeand Labour parties in the final stage of their

    PART Y P O L IT IC S 7 ( 3 )

    308

    Table1. Appointmentsystemsand votingsystems

    Category Sub-category Examples*

    AppointmentSystems Pure Israeli ultra-orthodox parties Shas,A

    gudat

    Yisr

    ael, DegelHaTor

    ah(19921999)With en bloc ratification Belgian BSP(partialusageofthe

    ModelList1960s1980s)

    Appointment-Voting With ratification and Norway(1960s1980s)Systems correction possibilities

    VotingSystems One-round Majoritarian British Labourand Conservatives,LDP (1980s); Israeli Likud(1996)

    Multi-round Majoritarian Irish FiannaFil(1980s);Israeli

    Likud (1992),S

    hinui** (1992),and Mapam** (1992)One-round Semi-majoritarian Belgian SocialistParty (partial usage

    1980s);IsraeliMeretz(1996)Multi-round Semi-majoritarianOne-round Semi-PR IsraeliLabour(1992, 1996, 1999),

    Likud (1999), and Meretz(1999)Multi-round Semi-PR IsraeliRatz** (1992)One-round PR Irish FineGael, Labour, and

    ProgressiveDemocrats(1980s)Multi-round PR

    * Data fromBelgium, Obler (1974)and DeWinter (1988);Norway, Valen (1988);Britain,Denver(1988);Ireland, Gallagher(1988b).

    ** Threepartiesthattogethercomposed theMeretzlistestablished in 1992.

  • 8/12/2019 Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

    13/26

    selection process,6 whiletheLiberalsused themajoritarian method ofthealternativevote(Denver, 1988). On theotherhand, when generalelectionstakeplacein multi-memberdistricts, thevotingsystemneed notbemajori-tarian. Forexample, in Ireland, theexhaustiveballotwasused byFianna

    Filin or

    der

    to deter

    mineitscandidatelist, position byposition, whilethenextthreelargestpartiesused aone-round STVmethod.There is also a connection between the selectorate size and the use of

    eitherone-round orgradualselection. In smallerselectorates, itispossibleto adopteithermethod. However, when theselectorateislargerespeciallyin thosecaseswhereitincludesallpartymembersortheentireelectoratelogisticsmaketheuseofoneround almostamust.

    DemocratizingCandidateSelection Methods

    Many parties now afford their ordinary members a greater voice incandidateselection than wasoncethecase.

    (Mair, 1994:15)

    Democratization ofthecandidateselection processisexpressed bywiden-ing participation in the process, i.e. when the selectorate that isadoptedfollowingareformofthecandidateselection method ismoreinclusivethanthepreviousone. Such areformmightimmediatelyaffectthenatureofthenomination system, sincetheuseofaselectoratethatislargerthan afewdozen usuallyrequiresadoptingavotingprocedure.Adoptingmoreinclusivecandidacyrequirements, and eitherterritorialor

    functionaldecentralization, maybe labeled democratization. However, aslongastheselectorateremainsasexclusiveasitwas, thesereformscannotbeseen asatruedemocratization ofthecandidateselection process, fortworeasons. First, despite more inclusive candidacy requirements, the samelimited selectoratestillhasfullcontroloverthefinalresults. Second, decen-tralization mightmean onlythatcontrolofcandidateselection haspassedfromthenationaloligarchyto a localoligarchy.7 Only ifdecentralization

    encompassesamore inclusiveselectoratecan itbeconsidered ademocra-tizing process. In other words, decentralization can limit, maintain orexpand theextentofintra-partydemocracy.

    Thecandidateselection methodsadopted bycertain partiesin Israel, priorto the1996 parliamentaryelections, presentan excellentcasefortheclassifi-cation ofcandidateselection methodsbased on thedimensionselaboratedin theanalyticalframework above. Moreover, theIsraelicasecan also beused in orderto assessthecausesofdemocratizingcandidateselection, theextentofthisdemocratization and itsconsequences.

    TheIsraelipartysystemisextremelymulti-partyin nature, and exhibitsawide varietyofselection methods (Bar, 1996;Hazan, 1997;RahatandSher-Hadar, 1999b). Thishigh variancestemsfromthreeconditions. First,although aPartiesLawwasadopted in Israelin 1992, itdoesnotreferto

    RAHAT & HAZ AN : CAN D IDAT E SE L E C T IO N M E T H O D S

    309

  • 8/12/2019 Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

    14/26

    thewaycandidatesshould beselected. Therefore, in preparingtheirlistsofcandidates, partiesarenotlegallybound to adoptanyspecifickind ofcandi-dateselection method. Second, theelectoralsystemisafixed listsystemwitha single national constituency. Thus, when designing their selection

    met

    hods, part

    iesar

    enot

    aspr

    essur

    edt

    or

    espondt

    ot

    heelect

    or

    atesin

    ter

    estsasarepartiesin open listand personalelectoralsystems(Bogdanor, 1985;

    Careyand Shugart, 1997). Third, Israelisocietyisveryheterogeneous, andmanysocio-politicalcleavagesarereflected in thepartysystem, resultinginmanypartiesthatrepresentdifferentpoliticalsub-cultures.

    Thissection focuseson thedemocratization ofcandidateselection in threeIsraeli parties (or lists) prior to the 1996 elections: Labour, Likud andMeretz. Thesewerethethree largestoutgoingpartiesofthe12th Knesset(19926), Israels parliament. Three of the dimensions, or continua, pre-sented thusfarwillbeelaborated foreach party.8

    Although candidateselection processeshaveundergonedemocratizationin Israelsincethe1970satimewhen nomination byaclosed innercircleofpartyleaderswastherulethepaceofthisdevelopmenthasbeen differ-entfromonepartyto thenext(Brichta, 1977;Doron and Goldberg, 1990;Goldberg, 1980, 1994;Goldbergand Hoffman, 1983;Hazan, 1997). Itisin thearenaoftheselectoratethattheexistence, orlack thereof, ofademoc-ratizingtrend isofacutesignificance. TheIsraelipartiescoveralmosttheentirespectrumofpossibleselectorates. Atoneend, neartheexclusivepoleofthecontinuum, wefind theultra-orthodox religiousparties. Thepowerto nominatethesepartiescandidatesliesin thehandsofasingleRabbi, ora council of Rabbis, whose authority is based on their role as religiousleaders. Closeto theotherend wefind thethreelargestpartiespriorto the1996 elections, all of which significantly expanded their selectoratesandadopted partyprimaries.In 1992, the selection process of the Meretz alliance (three dovish

    parties:Ratz, Mapamand Shinui)wasconducted solelybythecentralcom-mitteesofthethreeconstituentparties. In 1996, however, Meretzexpandeditscandidateselection process, and began to conduct itin two rounds. In

    the first round, the constituent parties three central committees (whichnumbered severalhundred peopleeach) filtered thecandidates, i.e. eachproduced ashort listofapproved candidatesfromamongthosewho pre-sented theircandidacy. In thesecond round, allMeretzmembersranked thecandidatesfromthethreeapproved partylistsand produced thefinallistofcandidatesitwasthisround thatdetermined whetheracandidatewouldbeplaced in asafeorunsafeposition. In thissecond round, each memberwasgiven morevotesthan thenumberofsafeseats. Thus, themoreimport-ant round of the multi-stage method used by Meretz employed a semi-

    majoritarian votingsystem. Meretzwas, therefore, placed between thepartymembersand theselected partyagencyareasoftheselectoratecontinuum(seeFigure2), butwaslocated closerto theformerbecausethemoreinclu-siveselectoratehad themoredecisiverole.

    PART Y P O L IT IC S 7 ( 3 )

    310

  • 8/12/2019 Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

    15/26

    Israels two major parties, Labour and Likud, are found even closer tothe inclusive end of the selectorate continuum. Labour had alreadyadopted a more inclusive candidate selection method in 1992 in 1988 ithad still allowed its central committee to choose the list of candidates

    which it

    maint

    ained in 1996. Part

    ially in r

    esponse t

    o Labour

    s vict

    or

    y inthe 1992elections,Likud also democratized its candidate selection methodand no longer allowed its central committee to produce the party list. In1996, both parties held single-round party primaries in which all dues-paying members were given the sole right to determine both the composi-tion and the rank of the partiescandidate list. These two parties were thuslocated in the party members area of the continuum, and used a purevoting system.

    However, thevotingsystemused byLabourto selectitsnationallistwasbased on asemi-proportionalallocation formula, whilethatofLikud wasmajoritarian.9 Labourgaveeach of itsmembers11 to 15 votes, forwhatwereexpected to beapproximatelytwentysafeseats. Sincethepartywasexpected to win moreseatsthan themaximumnumberofcandidatesanymember could vote for, this was a limited vote and was thus semi-proportional. Likud, on theotherhand, gaveeach member19 to 20 votes,forwhatwerealso expected to beabouttwentysafeseats. Thiswasindeedamajoritarian winner-take-allsystem.

    SinceIsraelselectoralsystemhasonlyonenationalconstituency, itisdiffi-cult to speak of territorialdecentralization, but it isnot impossible. BothLabourand Likud circumvented thenationalelectoralsystembydecentral-izingtheircandidateselection processesthrough theestablishmentofgeo-graphicaldistricts(Hazan, 1999). Forexample, themajorurban centersofJerusalem, TelAvivand Haifawereeach aterritorialdistrictin both parties,with secured positionson thepartylistsforwhoeverwasselected in them.Onlypartycandidatesand memberswho wereresidentsin thegeographi-caldistrictwereallowed to run and vote.In addition, both Labourand Likud adopted functionaldistrictsaspart

    of theircandidateselection methods, characterized bygeographicallydis-

    persed socialgroup ororganizationalaffiliation. Labourhad two sectariandistrictsforitsnon-Jewish members(Arabsand Druze), and two organiz-ational districts for those living in cooperative or collective settlements(moshavimand kibbutzim);Likud had asingleorganizationaldistrictforthoseresiding in regionalcouncilsoragriculturalsettlements. In both thegeographicaland thefunctionaldistricts, itwastheselectorateatthedis-trictlevelthatplayed theonlypartin thecandidateselection process.Allthreepartylistsalso reservedpositionson theirlistsforrepresenta-

    tivesfromaparticularsocialsectororasub-group. Meretz, forexample,

    used such functional decentralization to guarantee the representation ofwomen and minorities(i.e. Arabs). Atleastthreeofthefirstthirteen candi-dateson thelisthad to bewomen, and atleastoneofthefirstten had to bean Arab. Labourreserved positionson itsfinallistsofcandidatesforwomen

    RAHAT & HAZ AN : CAN D IDAT E SE L E C T IO N M E T H O D S

    311

  • 8/12/2019 Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

    16/26

    and immigrants. Likud reserved positionsforwomen, foran immigrant, anon-Jew and a young candidate. These reserved positions were imple-mented only if the candidates could not reach them on their own. Forexample, ifno femalecandidatewon ahigh enough position in theparty

    pr

    imar

    y,t

    he corr

    ection mechanism would

    t

    hen be implemented and

    t

    hehighestplaced femalecandidatewould bepromotedto thehigherreservedposition on thelist.

    Together, the geographical and functional districts, along with thereserved positions, madeup overone-halfofthesafeseatsin theLabourlistforthe1996 elections, and overone-third ofthosein theLikud list. Theparties thought that by democratizing their candidate selection methods,theywould notbeableto maintain representativelists, so theydesigned cor-rectivemechanismsin orderto circumscribethedecision madebytheirnowmoreinclusiveselectorates.In thedecentralization of the candidate selection processbased on dis-

    tricts, both candidacyand theselectorateweredecentralized. Thatis, candi-datesand selectorsweremembersofthesamedecentralized geographical,social or organizational group, and thus formed particular constituencieswithin theparty. In thedecentralization based on reserved positions, on theother hand, the candidates were the representatives of the social group,whiletheselectoratewastheentirepartymembership. In otherwords, theterritorial and functional district candidates had to compete within theirown constituencies, whilethereserved position candidatescompeted withthe national candidates for the votes of the entire party selectorate.However, despitethemoreorlessextensiveelementsofdecentralization intheseaspectsofthecandidateselection process, neithernecessarilyexhibitsatrueprocessofdemocratization, asdefined here.

    TheConsequencesofDemocratizingCandidateSelection

    In anumberofparliamentarydemocracies, partiesarenowin theprocess

    ofdemocratizingtheircandidateselection methods. Theimportantquestionthatarisesfromthisnewphenomenon is:Arepartiesstillableto exertanimportantimpacton thecandidateselection process?Ifpartylistsareassem-bled notbythepartyorgans, but, forexample, byamoreinclusiveselec-torate, such asthepartymembers, theresultcould betheexpungingofoneofthemore important functionsofparties in parliamentarydemocracies.When thepartyleadersand organization can becircumvented bythepoli-ticians, itweakens thepartyand hampers itsability to aggregatepoliciesand to presentacohesiveideologicalimage. Theabilityofprospectivepoli-

    ticiansto appealdirectlyto thepartymembership thuschangesthebasesofboth legitimacy and responsibility of the (s)elected party representatives.Theresultcould beadrasticweakeningofpartisan disciplineand cohesive-ness, leadingto adeclinein theabilityofthepartiesto function asastable

    PART Y P O L IT IC S 7 ( 3 )

    312

  • 8/12/2019 Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

    17/26

    basisforthepoliticalprocessand to operateeffectivelyin theparliamentaryarena.FormerMinisterZeevBegin (1996:208), who won oneofthetop pos-

    itionsin theLikud Partyprimaryin 1996, argued that

    Thepartyorgans. . . areessentialforthecreation ofapoliticalplatform,socialoreconomic, and for itspromotion and implementation bythepartysMKs[MembersofKnesset]. Partydiscipline, which isso easilyridiculed, isanecessarycondition fortheproperfunctioningofademo-craticregime. Arandomcollection ofMKs, who panderto theirvoters,each usingmorelowlytactics, isadangerousobstacle.

    However, ifthepartiesmaintain, orreassert, controlovercertain phasesinthecandidateselection process, thephenomenon ofdemocratization neednotlead to alossofcontrolforthepartyorganization, norto adeclineinitsfunctionalcapacities. Forexample, ifthepartycan filtertheprospectivecandidatespriorto allowingthemoreinclusiveselectorateto rank them, orifitsagenciesproducethefinallistafterthemoreinclusiveselectoratehasvoted fortheprospectivecandidates, thepartycan stillremain themasterofitsinternalfate.

    Thedemocratization ofcandidateselection, ifunchecked, can presentadangerto thestabilityofboth politicalpartiesand governingcoalitionsand, as a consequence, to the stability of parliamentary democracy ingeneral. Thisphenomenon presentsaparadox:Politicalparties, which arethe functional bodies that operate in the democratic arena, should not

    becometoo internallydemocraticthemselves. Thatis, whilepartiesmusttryto avoid anyconstraintson democracyin theinter-partyelectoralarenabarringthosepresented bythresholds, allocation formulasand restrictionson the inclusion of particular extremist parties they must at the sametime implementconstraintson democracyin theintra-partyelectoralarenain orderto maintain controloftheircandidatesand legislators.

    Candidateswho arechosen byan inclusiveselectorateowetheirloyaltyto theirvotersin thecandidateselection process, and notonlyto theirparty.Such candidatesareno longerassured ofafuturein politicsbybeingloyal

    teamplayers; instead theymuststand outand berecognized notbytheparty leaders but by their inclusive selectorate. Democratizing candidateselection producesdualsourcesoflegitimacy forcandidatespartylegiti-macyand popularlegitimacy. Theimmediateresultsare:(1)ashorteningofthepoliticaltime-framebased on aconstantfixation with elections;(2)abehavioraldependenceon an amorphousgroup known onlyasthevoters(i.e. theselectorate);(3)atendencyto actin amannerthatlargelydisregardsthegroup(s)with which thecandidateisassociated (i.e. theparty, coalition,opposition, etc.); (4) a drastic increase of the rather basic political trend

    toward individualistand populist politics; (5)a significant growth in theinfluence of the mass media on politics in general, and on the candidateselection processin particular;and (6)aneed to enhancefinancialresourcesin orderto reach awidevoterbase.

    RAHAT & HAZ AN : CAN D IDAT E SE L E C T IO N M E T H O D S

    313

  • 8/12/2019 Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

    18/26

    FormerLabourMinisterUziBaram(1996:215), who won thetop pos-ition in hispartysprimariesin 1996, aptlydescribed thenewsituation intheIsraeliparties:

    With the change of the intra-party selection method, the political

    parentswerealso instantlyreplaced. Instead ofthe1,200 PartyCentermembers, and a number of leadersmanaging theapparatus, theMKsuddenly adopted 150,000 new parents. They chose him for theposition ofMK, and untilhisre-selection fouryearslater, heisrespons-ibleonlyto them.

    Transferringthefunctionalresponsibilityofchoosingpartycandidatesto amoreinclusiveselectoratecould expand theinfluencenotonlyoftheindi-vidual support base of the candidates butalso of well-organized groups,thus producing lists that include both independent and special interestcandidates.In short, thenarrowpersonaland specialinterestsofacandidateselected

    byamoreinclusiveselectoratecould overcomethemoregeneralpartyinter-estsand theeven widervoter intereststhatpoliticiansmust take intoaccount. A legislature with parties that have openly democratized theircandidate selection methods could splinter the legislativeprocess becauseeach legislatorwillattempt to satisfy numerous, divergentand even con-flicting interestswithoutpartydisciplinecircumscribingsuch adevelop-ment.

    The disaggregation of parties, both institutionally and at the parlia-

    mentary level, finds clear evidence in Israel. After the democratization ofcandidateselection, onecould witnessthebreakdown ofthedisciplined andhighlyinstitutionalized parties, which in thepastwerecapableofmandat-ingtheirlegislativerepresentativesto behaveasacohesivegroup dedicatedto thepursuitofpartypoliciesand goals. Onedirectconsequencewasthewhittling away of executive dominance in the sense of effective govern-mental control of the parliamentaryagenda. For example, in the first 12Knessets (194992), prior to the dramatic democratization of candidateselection, privatemembersbillsconstituted 15 percentofthebillspassed

    per Knesset. But in the13th Knesset (19926), after Labourhad alreadyinstituted primariesand otherpartieshad decided to adoptthismethod ofcandidateselection aswell, therewasadramaticincrease, both absolutelyand relatively, in privatemembersbills:54 percentofthebillspassed werenow private members bills and only 46 percent were government bills.

    PART Y P O L IT IC S 7 ( 3 )

    314

    Figure6. Candidateselectoratesand partycohesion

  • 8/12/2019 Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

    19/26

    Moreover, oftheprivatemembersbillspassed, 33 percentweresponsoredsolelybyMKsfromopposition (non-coalition)parties, 42 percentbyMKsfromgovernment(coalition)parties, and 24 percentweresponsored jointlybyboth governmentand opposition MKs.I

    nt

    he14t

    h Knesset

    (19969), 51 per

    cent

    oft

    hebillspassed wer

    epr

    ivatemembersbillsand 49 percentweregovernmentbills. However, therewasa

    60 percentincreasein theproportion ofopposition privatemembersbillspassed. In all, 31 percentofsuccessfulprivatemembersbillswere spon-sored by government MKs, 14 percent werejointly sponsored, and 55percentweresponsored solelybyopposition MKs, which indicatesthatthechallenge to executive dominance increased perceptibly during thatperiod.10

    To the party organization and the individual legislator levels must beadded themass level. Empiricalexamples in thecontextof the1996 pri-mariesshowhowthismethod ofcandidateselection had anegativeimpacton thequalityofpartymembership, and helped advancetheinternaldemiseoftheparties. Forexample, candidatesrunningin theprimariesofonepartyattempted to recruitasmanypartymembers(and hencepotentialvoters)aspossibleeven fromotherpartiestherebypushingthepursuitofquantityoverqualityto an extreme. Moreover, someofthosewho joined apartyinorderto supportaparticularcandidatein theprimariesand therebyinflu-enced thepartyslistfortheKnessetneverintended to voteforthatpartyin the subsequent Knesset elections. Partisan identification, beyond the

    momentaryand theinstrumental, seemed to matterlittlein theprimaries.Indeed, both major parties had constituencieswhere the number of theirdues-payingmemberswashigherthan thenumberofvotestheyreceived inthe national elections only two months later (Rahat and Sher-Hadar,1999a).

    The rather apparent instrumental relationship between party membersand thepartyorganization isfurtherillustrated bythefactthatthenumberofpartymembersincreased dramaticallyduringtheprimaryyearand thensharply dropped off afterwards, thereby showing that membership had

    becomemerelythewaybywhich onecould votein theprimaries, and nolongerapermanentlink between thevoterand theparty. Thisincreaseandimmediate decrease in party membership is similar to the more generalphenomenon ofpartymobilization in therun-up to elections. However, inothercountries, therapid growth in partymembership priorto electionshaslittleto no effecton themakeup ofthepartylist. Itisratheramobilizationofforcesto supporttheelection campaign. In Israel, thepartymemberswerethosewho wereresponsibleforproducingthemajorpartylistspriorto theelection of the 14th Knesset, but they were not necessarily those who

    activelyparticipated in thepartiescampaigns. Theramificationsofcom-biningpartymobilization and partyprimariesare, therefore, both differentand moresignificantthan themoregeneralphenomenon ofpartymobiliz-ation alone.

    RAHAT & HAZ AN : CAN D IDAT E SE L E C T IO N M E T H O D S

    315

  • 8/12/2019 Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

    20/26

    Moreover, asurveyshowed thatofthosepartymemberswho participatedin theprimaries, approximatelyone-third failed to acknowledgethattheywerepartymembers.11 Themeaning, notjustthequality, ofpartymember-ship seemsto have lostmuch of itsrelevance in theeraofprimaries. The

    decliningqualityofpa

    rtymembe

    r

    ship can also beseen int

    hephenomenonofdoubleregistration, which averaged 10 percentin Labourand Likud.12

    Alloftheaboveindicatehowtheintroduction ofprimariesin general, andtheparticularmethod adopted bythepartiesin Israel, served onlyto damagethe party organizations, destroy the power of the party leadership anddegradethestatusofpartymembership.

    Democratizing candidate selection can also lead to additional, andrelated, consequences:(1)increasingthepowerofincumbents, thusreduc-ing competitiveness; (2) decreasing the representativeness of the selectedlists, which can onlybeensured bycorrectivemechanisms;and (3)exacer-bating intra-party conflict, based on the type of voting system adopted(Rahatand Sher-Hadar, 1999a;Hazan and Rahat, 2000).

    Conclusion:RecedingfromthePrecipice

    The preliminary implications of this study are that the phenomenon ofdemocratizingcandidateselection hashad significantconsequencesallthemoreso when onetakesinto accountthatpoliticalpartiesin atleasteightcountrieshaveexhibited thisphenomenon in thepost-warperiod (Austria,Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland and NewZealand).Moreover, morepartieshavemadetheircandidateselection processesmoreinclusivein thepasttwo decadesthan in theprecedingtwo (Scarrowetal.,2000). Thequestionsthatsuch implicationsbeckon are:Can partiesopposethis trend? Is democratizing candidate selection reversible? Can partiesregain controlofboth theircandidatesand theirlegislativerepresentatives?As demonstrated below, the lessons and experience from the Israeli caseprovidea positive reply. Moreover, although true democratization of the

    candidate selection process is largely an issue of the inclusiveness of theselectorate, thisclosingdiscussion oftheIsraelicaseshowshowtheotherdimensionscan support, orundermine, theconsequencesofexpandingthepartyselectorate.An exampleofapartyreversingtheprocessofdemocratizingcandidate

    selection isMeretz, which, afterholdingpartyprimariesin 1996, declinedto do so priorto the1999 elections. Thefinaldecision on thecandidates,and theirplacementon thepartylist, wasstripped fromthepartymembersand placed in thehandsof theparty convention, a selected partyagency

    which numbered approximately3000 people. Moreover, thepartyscentralcommitteefiltered thecandidates.AnotherexampleisLikud, whereBenjamin Netanyahu, thesittingprime

    ministerand partyleader, decided to takecontrolofhispartyand, in 1997,

    PART Y P O L IT IC S 7 ( 3 )

    316

  • 8/12/2019 Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

    21/26

    forced adecision to rescind primariesas thechosen method ofcandidateselection, revertingcontrolback to thecentralcommittee.13 Thisdecisionencountered substantialopposition, butwaspassed and implemented. Theimmediateimplication wasachangein thebehavioroftheLikud legislators

    and minister

    s, who becamemor

    edisciplined and lessindependent

    (Rahat

    ,forthcoming). Thegeographicaldecentralization wasalso undermined in1999 itwasthepartyscentralcommitteeasawhole, ratherthan thepartymembersin thedistricts, who nowchosethedistrictrepresentatives.14

    In lightoftheLikudsdecision, Laboursleader, Ehud Barak, attemptedto do thesamepriorto the1999 elections, butfailed probablybecauseofhisratherweak position astherelativelynewand electorallyuntested leaderofan opposition party. However, hedid succeed in obtainingtherighttoinsertoutsidecandidatesinto thepartyslistwhich hedid and thegeo-graphicaldistrictsweresubsequentlyrelegated to lowerpositionsin thelist,leavingmanyoftheirchosen candidatesoutofoffice.15

    Thus, while the 1996 elections showed an overall trend toward thedemocratization of candidate selection methods in Israel and, in thisrespect, demonstrated the culmination of this trend the 1999 electionsexhibited asignificantreversal. Afterhavingexperimented with thedemoc-ratization of candidate selection, the parties now had to face its conse-quences: temporary membership, vote contractors, representationproblems, incumbent advantage, financial dependence, partisan disorder,ideological incoherence, government instability, etc. In short, therewasasignificantlossofpartycontrol. Asaresult, allthreepartiesseriouslycur-tailed theirselectorate, broughtdecentralization underthepartyscontrolorseverelylimited it, increased theappointmentofcandidates, orsomecombi-nation oftheabove.16 In otherwords, theselectoratesbecamemoreexclus-ive, decentralization becamecontrolled, and appointmentsbecamepartoftheprocess.

    DoestheIsraelicaseshowthatthefutureofcandidateselection methodsliesin itspast?Notnecessarily, butitdoesshowthatthereisawayoutofthepredicamentofdemocratization ifthecandidateselection method is

    notalegalrequirement, butratherapartisan decision. Moreover, Israelisnotaprototypicalcasestudy. TheAustralian Labourand Liberalpartiesbegan shiftingawayfrompartyprimariesasearlyasthe1950s;fromthe1970s onward, several Belgian parties phased out or abolished use ofmembership ballotingaspartofthecandidateselection process;in the1980sand 1990s, most Dutch parties (except D66) eliminated the option ofballoting local party members; and the Austrian VP and SP ceased to useparty primaries as a candidate selection method in the two most recentelections, afterchangingtheirstatutesto recognizethismethod and imple-

    mentingitin the1994 elections. In sum, thepartiesabilityto undemocra-tize their candidate selection methods and reassert both party disciplineand cohesion could betheharbingerofareversalin theoveralldemiseofparties.

    RAHAT & HAZ AN : CAN D IDAT E SE L E C T IO N M E T H O D S

    317

  • 8/12/2019 Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

    22/26

    Notes

    1 For example, one couldargue that Duvergers (1959) lawsare not valid inall cases,e.g.in Canada, although a plurality electoral systemis used, there is no resultingtwo-party system. This, however, does not mean that the electoral incentives forthe creation of a two-party system are lacking in Canada, but rather that otherfactors such as anincreasing divergence in the provinces political orientations work against the creation ofa two-party system at the national level. This is alsothe case withcandidate selection methods. Sometimesthe actors play according tothe incentives that the system provides for them, and at other times they are alsoinfluenced by otherfactors. Forexample,candidacy in the political parties oftheUnited States is relatively inclusive whencompared to parties in othercountries,yet money politics may blockcandidacy more so thanelsewhere. This means thatmoney, and not the party, influences candidacy in the United States to a largerextent. Thesecasesdo notnegatethepotentialbenefitofgeneratingaframeworkthatdelineates the systemic incentives ofdifferentcandidate selection methods.

    2 While the partys actual representation might include both the safe and themarginalseats/positions, an analysisofintra-partyselection methodsshowsthatpartiestend to rely largelyon theiractualrepresentation when designingtheirselection methods. Thiswill, therefore, beafixed criterion. In thecaseofanewpartys projected size, opinion pollsmake the criterion ofprojected sizemorefluid, especiallyin regard to themarginalseats/positions.

    3 In an analysis of candidate selection for the European parliament in Ireland,Sweden and The Netherlands, based on the formal rules set by the parties,Blomgren(1999) identified notless thanfive stages in these processes. Blomgrenoffers a procedure schemecomposed ofthree stages: nomination, selection anddecision. In between thesestages, he also included two intermediate organizationalbodies. His approach helps us understand the complexity of candidate selectionmethods and map it at the beginning of an analysis. However, beyond thismapping, we addressthis complexity in order to allow for analytical comparison.

    4 Forasimilarattemptto establish acontinuumofinclusivenessin partydecision-making, seeScarrowetal. (2000).

    5 When thenumberofvotesisequalto thelistsize(ratio =1), amajoritybloccantakeoverallofthesafelistpositions. When theratio islowerorlimited, inelectoralstudiesterminologyeven in thecaseofblocvoting, morethen oneblocmaywin safeseats. When theratio ishigherthan one, ablocequalto thesizeofthelegislativelistcan beformed. Such abloccan tryto manipulatetheresultsbyaskingvotersto voteforitand spread therestoftheirvotesamongmany different candidates, thereby wasting the surplus votes. However, toorganizesuch avoteundercompetitiveconditionsrequiresveryhigh levelsofmutualpoliticaltrustand excellentcoordination conditionsthatarerareandeven theattemptmaycreatean effectivecounter-reaction byotherblocs.

    6 Theexhaustiveballotisaselection method accordingto which aseriesofballotstakesplace, with thebottomcandidatebeingeliminated aftereach round, untilacandidatewinsan absolutemajorityofthevote.

    7 Forexample, iftheselectorateisdecentralized fromanationalpartyconferenceofseveralthousand participantsto adozen localcommitteeseach consistingofafewhundred activistsand leaders, theoverallselectoratehasnotbecomemoreinclusive, and mayhaveactuallybecomemoreexclusive.

    PART Y P O L IT IC S 7 ( 3 )

    318

  • 8/12/2019 Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

    23/26

    8 Restrictionson candidacyforthepartylistareirrelevantin theIsraelicontextbecausethereareproceduresbywhich theserestrictions, ifpresent, wereeitherrelaxed to thepointofirrelevanceorignored altogether. Hence, thisdimension,whileitislikelyto berelevantin certain countriessuch astheUK(LeDuc, thisissue)doesnotpresentanyanalyticallycomparativevaluein theIsraelicase.

    9 Both partiesalso selected candidates in districts, both regionaland functional.In Labour, each membervoted fortwo candidatesin his/herdistrict. Each districtwasallocated two positionson thepartylist, butformostofthemonlyonewasconsidered safe. This means that the voting system in the districts was semi-majoritarian. Likud, on theotherhand, gaveeach memberasinglevotein thedistricts, whileallotting each district only one safe seat on theparty list. Thevotingsystemherewasthusmajoritarian.

    10 Weareindebted to PeterMedding(2000)forthesecalculations. Onemusttakeinto accountthatasofthe14th Knesset, thePrimeMinisterwasseparatelyanddirectlyelected (Hazan, 1996).

    11 Surveyconducted byAsherArian and MichalShamir, IsraelDemocracyInstitute,May1996.

    12 Partieswereobliged to submittheirmembership liststo thePartyRegistrar, whosubsequentlycross-referenced themand discovered thehigh rateofdoubleregis-tration, despite the fact that this is forbidden by the Parties Law. The PartyRegistrarsresponsewasto ask allthosewho had doubleregistration to choosewhich party they preferred, or to have their membership removed from bothparties.

    13 This move was initiated by Netanyahus proponents in the partys centralcommittee, amovewhich heboth supported and encouraged.

    14 The actual definition of a district representative was expanded, so that anycandidate(exceptaminister)chosen forthepartylistautomaticallyrepresentedhisorherresidentialdistrict. Thisfurtherdegraded themeaning, and power, ofthegeographicaldistricts.

    15 In 1996, thegeographicaldistrictswerepositioned on thepartylistbased on aformulathattook into accountthekind ofdistrict, thenumberofpartymembersand the number of party voters in the district. In 1999, the decisions werearbitraryand severalofthepositionswereallocated accordingto theloyaltyoftheexpected winnersin each district. Here, too, theindependenceand powerofthedistrictrepresentativewasdamaged.

    16 Theactualvotingsystemused byeach party in itscandidateselection processdoesnotshowacleartrend, largelydueto thefactthatthisvariableisinfluencedmorebywhattranspireswithin theparties, ratherthan byeventsthattook placebetween partiesatthesystemiclevel.

    References

    Bar, Aliza (1996)Primaries and OtherMethodsofCandidateSelection. Tel-Aviv:IsraelDemocracyInstitute[in Hebrew].

    Baram, Uzi (1996) Changes in the PoliticalSystem, in Gideon Doron (ed.)TheElectoralRevolution, pp. 21518. Tel-Aviv:HaKibbutzHaMeuchad [in Hebrew].

    Begin, ZeevB. (1996)PrimariesThePriceforDemocracy, in Gideon Doron (ed.)

    RAHAT & HAZ AN : CAN D IDAT E SE L E C T IO N M E T H O D S

    319

  • 8/12/2019 Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

    24/26

    The Electoral Revolution, pp. 20713. Tel-Aviv: HaKibbutz HaMeuchad [inHebrew].

    Blomgren, Magnus (1999) Candidate Selection to the European Parliament: AComparativeStudyofIreland, theNetherlandsand Sweden. Paperpresented atthe European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions of Workshops,UniversityofMannheim, Germany.

    Bogdanor, Vernon (1985)Introduction, in Vernon Bogdanor(ed.)Representativesof thePeople?Parliamentarians and Constituents in Western Democracies, pp.112. Aldershot:Ashgate.

    Brichta, Avraham(1977)Democracyand Elections:On ChangingtheElectoralandNomination Systemsin Israel. Tel-Aviv:AmOved [in Hebrew].

    Carey, John M. and MatthewS. Shugart(1997)Incentivesto CultivateaPersonalVote:ARank OrderingofElectoralFormulas, ElectoralStudies14:41740.

    Denver, David (1988)Britain:Centralized Partieswith Decentralized Selection, inMichaelGallagherand MichaelMarsh (eds)CandidateSelection in Comparative

    Perspective:TheSecretGarden ofPolitics, pp. 4771. London:Sage.DeWinter, Lieven (1988)Belgium:DemocracyorOligarchy?in MichaelGallagher

    and MichaelMarsh (eds)CandidateSelection in ComparativePerspective:TheSecretGarden ofPolitics, pp. 2046. London:Sage.

    Doron, Gideon and GioraGoldberg(1990) No BigDeal:Democratization oftheNominatingProcess, in AsherArian and MichalShamir(eds)TheElections inIsrael1988, pp. 15571. Boulder, CO:Westview.

    Duverger, Maurice(1959)PoliticalParties:TheirOrganization and Activityin theModern State. NewYork:John Wiley&Sons.

    Gallagher, Michael(1988a)Introduction, in MichaelGallagherand MichaelMarsh

    (eds) Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden ofPolitics, pp. 119. London:Sage.

    Gallagher, Michael(1988b)Ireland:TheIncreasingRoleoftheCentre, in MichaelGallagherand MichaelMarsh (eds)CandidateSelection in ComparativePerspec-tive:TheSecretGarden ofPolitics, pp. 11944. London:Sage.

    Gallagher, Michael(1988c)Conclusion, in MichaelGallagherand MichaelMarsh(eds) Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden ofPolitics, pp. 23683. London:Sage.

    Goldberg, Giora(1980)Democracyand Representation in IsraeliPoliticalParties,in AsherArian (ed.)Electionsin Israel1977, pp. 10117. Jerusalem:Academic

    Press.Goldberg, Giora (1994) The Israeli Voter, 1992. Jerusalem: Magnes Press [in

    Hebrew].Goldberg, Gioraand Steven Hoffman (1983)Nominationsin Israel:ThePoliticsofInstitutionalization, in AsherArian and MichalShamir (eds) The Elections inIsrael1981, pp. 6187. Tel-Aviv:Ramot.

    Hazan, Reuven Y. (1996)PresidentialParliamentarism:DirectPopularElection ofthePrimeMinister, IsraelsNewElectoraland PoliticalSystem, ElectoralStudies15:2137.

    Hazan, Reuven Y. (1997)The1996 Intra-PartyElectionsin Israel:AdoptingParty

    Primaries, ElectoralStudies16:95102.Hazan, Reuven Y. (1999) Constituency Interests without Constituencies: The

    GeographicalImpactofCandidateSelection on PartyOrganization and LegislativeBehaviorin the 14th Israeli Knesset, 199699, PoliticalGeography18: 791811.

    PART Y P O L IT IC S 7 ( 3 )

    320

  • 8/12/2019 Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

    25/26

    Hazan, Reuven Y. and Gideon Rahat(2000)Representation, ElectoralReformandDemocracy:Theoreticaland EmpiricalLessonsfromthe1996 Electionsin Israel,ComparativePoliticalStudies33:131036.

    Katz, Richard S. and PeterMair (1995) ChangingModelsofPartyOrganizationand PartyDemocracy:TheEmergenceoftheCartelParty, PartyPolitics1:528.

    Kolodny, Robin and Richard S. Katz(1992)TheUnited States, in Richard S. Katzand Peter Mair (eds) Party Organization: A Data Handbook, pp. 871930.London:Sage.

    Kristjnsson, Svanur(1998)ElectoralPoliticsand Governance:Transformation ofthePartySystemin Iceland 19701996, in PaulPenningsand Jan-Erik Lane(eds)ComparingPartySystemChange, pp. 167182. London:Routledge.

    Lijphart, Arend (1984) Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and ConsensusGovernmentin Twenty-oneCountries. NewHaven, CT:YaleUniversityPress.

    Mair, Peter(1994)PartyOrganizations:FromCivilSocietyto theState, in RichardKatzand PeterMair(eds)HowPartiesOrganize:Changeand Adaptation in PartyOrganizationsin Western Democracies, pp. 122. Thousand Oaks, CA:Sage.

    Medding, Peter Y. (2000) From Government by Party to Government DespiteParty, in Reuven Y. Hazan and Moshe Maor (eds) Parties, Elections andCleavages: Israel in Comparative and Theoretical Perspective, pp. 172208.London:Frank Cass.

    Newman, Roland and Shaelley Cranshaw (1973) Towards a Closed PrimaryElection in Britain, PoliticalQuarterly44:44752.

    Norris, Pippa, ed. (1997)Passagesto Power:LegislativeRecruitmentin AdvancedDemocracies. Cambridge, UK:CambridgeUniversityPress.

    Obler, Jeffrey (1974) Intraparty Democracy and the Selection of Parliamentary

    Candidates:TheBelgian Case, British JournalofPoliticalScience4:16385.Rae, Douglas W. (1967) ThePoliticalConsequences ofElectoralLaws. London:

    YaleUniversityPress.Rahat, Gideon (forthcoming)Developmentsin CandidateSelection Methodson a

    StormySeaofChanges:AHopelessAttemptatAdaptation?in AsherArian andMichalShamir (eds)Elections in Israel1999. Albany:State UniversityofNewYork Press.

    Rahat, Gideon and NetaSher-Hadar(1999a)The1996 PartyPrimariesand theirPolitical Consequences, in AsherArian and Michal Shamir (eds) Elections inIsrael1996, pp. 24168. Albany:StateUniversityofNewYork Press.

    Rahat, Gideon and NetaSher-Hadar(1999b)IntrapartySelection ofCandidatesforthe Knesset List and for Prime-Ministerial Candidacy 19951997. Jerusalem:IsraelDemocracyInstitute[in Hebrew].

    Ranney, Austin (1981)CandidateSelection, in David Butler, Howard R. Pennimanand Austin Ranney(eds)DemocracyatthePolls, pp. 75106. Washington, DC:American EnterpriseInstitute.

    Scarrow, Susan, PaulWebb and David Farrell (2000) FromSocial Integration toElectoral Contestation: The Changing Distribution of Power within PoliticalParties, in RussellDalton and Martin Wattenberg(eds)PartieswithoutPartisans:Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies, pp. 12953. Oxford:

    Oxford UniversityPress.Taagepera, Rein and MatthewS. Shugart(1989)Seatsand Votes. NewHaven:Yale

    UniversityPress.Valen, Henry (1988) Norway: Decentralization and Group Representation, in

    RAHAT & HAZ AN : CAN D IDAT E SE L E C T IO N M E T H O D S

    321

  • 8/12/2019 Rahat Hazan Candidate Selection Methods

    26/26

    MichaelGallagherand MichaelMarsh (eds)CandidateSelection in ComparativePerspective:TheSecretGarden ofPolitics, pp. 21035. London:Sage.

    Wertman, DouglasA. (1988)Italy:LocalInvolvement, CentralControl, in MichaelGallagherand MichaelMarsh (eds)CandidateSelection in ComparativePerspec-tive:TheSecretGarden ofPolitics, pp. 14568. London:Sage.

    GIDEON RAHAT recently received his PhD from the Department of PoliticalScienceat theHebrewUniversityofJerusalemand aresearch fellowat the IsraelDemocracy Institute. His research interests include candidate selection methods,electoralsystemsand thepoliticsofelectoralreform. Hehasrecentlyco-authoredarticles in ElectoralStudies and ComparativePoliticalStudies, published chaptersin severalbookson electionsand electoralreformand istheco-authorofIntra-PartySelection ofCandidates fortheKnessetListand forPrime-MinisterialCandidacy

    19951997(1999).ADDRESS:DepartmentofPoliticalScience, HebrewUniversity, 91905 Jerusalem,Israel[email:[email protected]]

    REUVEN Y. HAZAN is a Lecturer in theDepartment of PoliticalScienceat theHebrew University of Jerusalem. His research interests include parties and partysystems, electoralsystemsand legislativestudies. HispublicationsincludearticlesinComparative Political Studies, Electoral Studies, Journal of Legislative Studies,JournalofTheoreticalPolitics, LegislativeStudiesQuarterly, PartyPolitics, PoliticalGeog

    r

    aphy and var

    iousot

    her

    jour

    nals. He ist

    heaut

    hor

    ofCentrePa

    rties:Pola

    r

    -ization and Competition in European ParliamentaryDemocracies (2000), and co-editorofParties, Electionsand Cleavages:Israel in Comparative and TheoreticalPerspective(2000).ADDRESS:DepartmentofPoliticalScience, HebrewUniversity, 91905 Jerusalem,Israel[email:[email protected]]

    Papersubmitted 19 December1999;accepted forpublication 12 July2000.

    PART Y P O L IT IC S 7 ( 3 )

    322