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Radiological Response:Myth vs. Reality

James BarnesCertified Health Physicist

Chairperson, Homeland Security Committee, Health Physics Society

Bobbie WaltonGovernor’s Office of Emergency Services

State of California

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Health Physics SocietyHomeland Security Committee

http://hps.org/hsc/

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Radiation and the First Responder

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Visualizing Radiation

For best viewing, turn brightness and contrast on the monitor to

maximum values

http://faraday.physics.uiowa.edu/modern/7D30.60b.htm

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Average Exposures From Background Radiation

Average Exposure: 0.360 rem/year

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Syndrome Acute Dose (RAD) CharacteristicsSubclinical syndrome

~50 - 200 Subclinical signs (blood changes, nausea, vomiting, weakness, “flu-like symptoms”). May require treatment, but not necessarily hospitilization.

Hematopoietic syndrome

200 – 400 Anemia, hemorrhage, infection, electrolytic imbalance

Gastrointestinal syndrome

600 – 1,000 Lethargy, diarrhea, dehydration, degeneration of bowel epithelium, death in 10-14 days

Agitation, apathy, disorientation, disturbed equilibrium, vomiting, convulsions, prostration, coma, death in 1-2 days.Without medical intervention, exposure to doses between 600 and 2,000 rads may result in death within 3 to 10 days.

Central Nervous syndrome

> 1,000

Radiation Risk – High Dose

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Radiation Risk – Low Dose

2,000 Cancer Fatalities10,000 people

2,004 Cancer Fatalities10,000 people

1 REM

(4 additional fatalities / 10,000 people) / 1 REM0.0004 / rem

In our society, about 20% of the population will die of cancer. In 10,000 people, this means that 2,000 will die from cancer.

If 10,000 people were to be given 1 REM of radiation, statistics suggest that 2,004 will die of cancer.

This suggests that the risk of excess cancer deaths is increased by a factor of about 0.0004 per rem.

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Myth 1

Radiation is so deadly that an attack using radioactive materials

will kill thousands of people.

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The Goiania Experience

(Sept, 1987)

Rozental, J. J. Radiological Accident in Goiana - An Overview.

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The Goiania Experience• A mothballed tele-therapy irradiator was present in an

abandoned hospital building.

• Two men decided to “mine” the metal in the irradiator.

• The unit (containing 1400 curies of Cs-137) was dismantled. The source capsule was ruptured and the cesium was released.

• The “glowing crystals” (due the the extremely high radioactivity of the material) was taken home and shared with family and friends.

• There was widespread contamination of the neighborhood.

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Initial ResponseInitial Response112,000 people (10 % of Goiania’s population) were surveyed at an Olympic Stadium.

– 250 were identified as contaminated

– 50 contaminated people were isolated in a camping area inside the Olympic Stadium for more detailed screening

– 20 people were hospitalized or transferred to special housing with medicaland nursing assistance

– 8 patients transferredto the Navy Hospital inRio de Janeiro

– Residential contamination surveywas initiated

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Early ConsequencesEarly Consequences• Widespread contamination of

downtown Goiania

• 85 residences found to have significant contamination (41 of these were evacuated and a few were completely or partially demolished)

• People cross-contaminated houses 100 miles away

• Hot Spots at 3 scrap metal yards and one house

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Radiation Injuries and UptakesRadiation Injuries and Uptakes• 4 fatalities (2 men, 1 woman and 1 child)

• 28 patients had radiation induced skin injuries(they held/played with the source for extended periods)

• 50 people had internaldeposition (ingestion)

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The Goiania Experience (cont.)• Significant psychological consequences amongst the

population such as fear and depression.

• Discrimination against the victims and key products of local economy

• Psychomatic illnesses related to the accident stress.

• In first 60,000 monitored individuals;

• 5,000 presented symptoms consistent with Acute Radiation Syndrome (i.e, rash, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, weakness, etc.).

• Of these 5,000 persons, NONE were contaminated.

Salter (citing Peterson in Nuclear News; 1988). Helping to Prevent Terror Following A Radiological Incident. HPS Annual Meeting; 2001.

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ConclusionsConclusions• Long and expensive

clean-up effort.

• Profound psychologicalpsychological effects such as fear and depression on large populations

• Isolation and boycott of goods by neighbors

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The Reality:The primary effect of this dispersed radioactivity

was psychological and sociological, not radiological.

The true radiation effects were limited to those in the immediate vicinity of the source remnants:

• They were exposed the longest• They were closest to the source material• They had little protection from the source

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The “Radiation” Terrorist

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(i) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure; and

(ii) appears to be intended --

      (A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;

      (B) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or

      (C) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, kidnapping, or hostage-taking.

The term "terrorism" means an activity that --

Executive Order on Terrorist Financing, 24-September-2001

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The Nuclear Weapon

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What was your reaction to that last slide?

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Myth 2

Nobody can survive the aftermath of a nuclear weapon. There is so much radiation that it will scorch

the earth.

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Blast and Fire create high levels of destruction

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The process (nuclear fission), creates radioactive materials and distributes them over a wide area (“fallout”).

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The RealityTerrorists do not have thermonuclear weapons. They may have small yield nuclear (fission) weapons.

The levels of an atomic weapon’s dispersion are NOT as severe as a hydrogen bomb’s, and CAN be survived.

While such an attack would be devastating, it does not create an inescapable environment in the surrounding areas (i.e., survive the blast, and you have a good chance of escaping).

With proper planning and preparation, people can escape from fallout affected areas without incurring serious exposures.

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Radiological Dispersal Device

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Myth 3

Thousands will die if a “dirty bomb” is exploded in a major city.

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Radioactive Material

High Explosive

The Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)

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Detectable Ground Detectable Ground Contamination Can be Found Contamination Can be Found

Miles DownwindMiles Downwind

≥ 0.2 uCi/m2Can be detected

with thin window G-M meter

≥ 2 uCi/m2Can be detected with dose rate

meter

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Despite Widespread Despite Widespread Contamination, There Are Contamination, There Are

Relatively Small ExposuresRelatively Small Exposures

≥1 REMEPA Shelter Area

Less than 0.1 miles

downwind

0.01 – 0.1 REMout to 2 miles

[Dose similar to a chest x ray or

~30% of natural background]

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Release: 1.3 KCi CS-137 RDDwith 5 lbs HE 4-Day Dose (Internal + External)Evacuation/Relocation PAG

Color

Level

(Rem)

Area

(km2) Description

1 0.026 Consider evacuation. Shelter in place if no evacuation.

0.1 .42

0.01 3.84

Los Angeles Example: EPA PAG Los Angeles Example: EPA PAG Would Recommend Would Recommend

Shelter/Evacuation of a Few Shelter/Evacuation of a Few Residential BlocksResidential Blocks

Release location: Burbank Police Department 34 10' 60"N, 118 18' 31"W

100% Aerosolized release fraction

Normal summertime west-northwest winds, 10-12 mph.

Map size: 6 x 6 km

HYPOTHETICALHYPOTHETICAL

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The Reality

The Dirty Bomb is a weapon of mass disruption, not mass destruction.

It is effective to the degree that it would:– Deny area access– Induce psychological stress in a

population– Create economic disruption

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What Will You Need to Know?

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Know the Basics About Radiation

• Lack of trained personnel is the primary reason for loss of control of radiation / radioactive environments

• Responders FEAR radiation about as much as the public

• Training should be tailored to the mission / scope of the responder (Firefighter vs. EMT vs. Haz Mat’l Team)

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Where do you get this information?

http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is301.asp

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Where do you get this information?

Many local HPS Chapters

will provide training

(general or specific) as a public service (especially to small (poor)

organizations).

http://hps.org/aboutthesociety/organization/chapters.html

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Where do you get this information?

http://hps.org/hsc/documents/

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Know Your Response Mission Precisely

Examples:

• Fire fighters: Set Perimeter; Recover Victims

• Police: Secure Perimeter / Scene Investigation

• FBI: Scene Management

• Red Cross (and others): Mass Shelter and Feeding

• EMTs / Medical: Victim Triage and Medical Services Management

Each Mission Requires a Different Radiation Protection Approach

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Where do you get this information?

http://www.usfa.fema.gov/applications/nfacsd

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Where do you get this information?

http://terrorism.spjc.edu/ceu/blurb.asp?examid=11

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Where do you get this information?

http://hps.org/publicinformation/asktheexperts.cfm

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Obtain and Maintain Instruments• “Simple” works

• Match the Instrument to the Mission

• Dose Rate instrument for scene entry

• Contamination instruments for perimeters

• No one instrument does it all

• Cover a range of levels / doses

• Dose Rates: 0.010 – 50,000 millirem

• Contamination: 100 – 100,000 dpm

• Keep them working and calibrated

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Can I get instruments with no budget?

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/equipment_hder.htm

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Know Your Radiation Exposure Limits for a Terrorist Scene

• What is a “safe” dose level for a member of the public?

• What dose level should a responder not exceed?

• What dose level would make a rescue too dangerous to attempt?

• When would the dose levels apply?

These levels should be formally described. If you’re trying to figure this out AT THE SCENE, it’s TOO

LATE!

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“Emergency” Limits• No dose: Anecdotally reported to be the limit in several

U.S. cities• 100 mrem: Limit listed for first responders in several

emergency response guidance documents (some in draft stage)

• 5,000 mrem: OSHA limit, (first responders to be engaged in occupational exposure in an emergency scenario)

• 10,000 mrem: EPA guidance for property protection• 25,000 mrem: EPA guidance for lifesaving activities• 50,000 mrem: NCRP Report 138• 75,000 mrem: “Old” military limit for lifesaving activities• No upper limit: Draft ICRP Guidance for lifesaving activities

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Know Where to Get Expert Help• Local Radiation Regulatory

Organizations (City, County, State)• Federal Organizations with Radiation

Expertise (NRC, DOE, EPA)• Local Professional Societies (Health

Physics Society Chapters, Medical Physicists, Radiation Oncologists, etc.)

Do it NOW! Don’t wait until the event happens!

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Federal Radiological Monitoring Assessment Center

Operational & logistic management cell focused on radiological consequence management

Nuclear/Radiological Advisory Team

DOE subject matter experts directlysupporting FBI or Dept of State

SearchResponse

TeamSpecialized search for lost or stolen nuclear devices,

weapons or material

Joint Technical Operations Team

Advance technicalcapabilities to neutralizeor move nuclear WMD

devices

Accident Response GroupScientific technical expertise & equipment to

a U.S. nuclear weapon accident/incident

Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/

Training SiteExpert medical assistance forradiation exposure accidents

RadiologicalAssistanceProgramRadiological

measurements & advice to public sector

AerialMeasurements

SystemAirborne radiologicalsensing & surveying

capabilities

NationalAtmospheric Release

Advisory CenterComputer modeling of transport, diffusion &

disposition of radioactive & hazardous material

RAP

ARG

JTOT

Triage

NRATNARAC

AMS SRT

FRMAC

REAC/TS

DOE/NNSA Emergency Response

Assets

Consequence Management

CrisisResponse

TriageGamma Spectroscopy

Home Team

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RAP Team Configuration• Each region has a minimum of 3 teams • RAP teams consist of trained employees from DOE and

DOE contractors/facilities• Each team consists of 9 members; one Team Leader,

one Public Information Officer, one Team Captain, one Senior Scientist, and five Health Physics Survey/Support personnel

• Additional personnel are available, such as industrial hygienists, transportation specialists, logistics support, etc.

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Standard Response Equipment

• Alpha Detection• Beta Detection

• Gamma Detection• Neutron Detection

•Gamma spectroscopy systems (NaI and HPGe)

•Air samplers (high and low volume)

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RAP RegionalContact Numbers

Region 1, Brookhaven Area Office (631) 344-2200

Region 2, Oak Ridge Operations Office (865) 576-1005

Region 3, Savannah River Operations Office (803) 725-3333

Region 4, NNSA Service Ctr. Albuquerque (505) 845-4667

Region 5, Chicago Operations Office (630) 252-4800

Region 6, Idaho Operations Office (208) 526-1515

Region 7, Livermore Site Office (925) 422-8951

Region 8, Richland Operations Office (509) 373-3800

DOE HQ (202) 586-8100

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Any Questions?