Radicalism vs. Liberalism: C. Wright Mills' Critique of John Dewey's Ideas

7/29/2019 Radicalism vs. Liberalism: C. Wright Mills' Critique of John Dewey's Ideas

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American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc.

Radicalism vs. Liberalism: C. Wright Mills' Critique of John Dewey's IdeasAuthor(s): J. L. Simich and Rick TilmanReviewed work(s):Source: American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Oct., 1978), pp. 413-430Published by: American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3486029 .

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Radicalismvs. Liberalism:C.WrightMills'Critiqueof John Dewey'sIdeas

By J. L. SIMICHand RICKTILMAN*ABSTRACT. C. Wright Mills' critique of some aspects of the thoughtof John Dewey is analyzed. What Mills studied was what he referredto as 1) Dewey's "biologization" and "methodization" of value phe-nomena; 2) his approach to the solutions of socio-economic problemsand 3) his insensitivity to the structural origins of interest and power.Mills held generally that Dewey was unable to free himself fromliberal-reformist assumptions and programs and consequently couldnot construct a consistently radical critique of the dominant socio-economic institutions. Careful analysis of Dewey's writings, however,suggests a picture substantially different from the one Mills painted.It is shown that, in several areas, Mills' critique of Dewey was over-stated and that Dewey was indeed committed to a program of funda-mental social change considerably more radical than the prescriptionsof contemporary liberalism. Finally, analysis of both Mills' andDewey's political biographies suggests a common desire for an egali-tarian and participatory society based upon some form of socialism.Their common interests and values are more striking than theirdifferences.

IINTRODUCTIONTHE SOCIALAND POLITICAL HOUGHT f John Dewey has been underserious attack for many years. C. Wright Mills was not his firstadversary (1). Dewey's early pragmatic and later instrumentalistdoctrine has been criticized in diverse intellectual and political circles.A partial survey of writers critically concernedwith Dewey's politicalthought in ways related to Mills' critique includes: 1) Marxists andother radicals who believe instrumentalism s an ideological rationaliza-tion of the capitalist order. They contend that Dewey had an inade-quate conception of class structure, little appreciation of the role ofthe working class, an unviable commitment to incremental rather thanradical change and an unwillingness to confront squarely the problemof corporate power in capitalist societies (2). 2) Those such asReinhold Niebuhr, the Protestant theologian and social critic, think

* The authors thank Marc Tool, Paul Goldstene and Sheldon Kravitz fortheir valuable critiques of an earlier draft. They also thank Janet Lawson, VickiNewby, Lynne Tilman and Catherine Bair for typing assistance. Mrs. YaraslavaMills kindly consented to the use of the Mills Collection which is housed at theUniversity of Texas, Austin.AmericanJournal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 37, No. 4 (October, 1978).0002-9246/78/1000-0413$00.75/0e 1978 AmericanJournal of Economics and Sociology, Inc.

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414 American ournalof Economicsand Sociologystructural reform can only be achieved by overcoming group egoismand self-interest through overriding religious commitment. Niebuhrbelieves that Dewey ignores this harsh reality because of his oppositionto institutional religion and unwillingness to face the difficulties ofattaining change in a hostile environment (3). 3) Disillusioned prag-matists like Randolph Bourne (4) emphasize propensity of instru-mentalism to degenerate into a philosophy of political expediency inwhich ends are subordinated to means, and vision to technique. 4)Recent critics, such as Alfonso Damico, argue that Dewey avoidsserious reflection about values, especially political values, because, byfocusing on the issue of the place of standards in choosing, he becomespreoccupied with the process of choice at the expense of criteria ofchoice (5). Pragmatism thus shuts off serious normative discourse bysubstituting "method" and "science" for philosophy, and "problem"for "value." 5) Harold Stearns claims (6) that Dewey never askedthe question of ultimate values or purposes, an assertion of obviouspolitical significance if social or political reconstruction is sought.6) Morton White contends (7) that Dewey's liberalism supplies uswith no particular or specific political position that can be acted on,only a plea for intelligence. 7) A. J. Somjee argues that Dewey'sinability to grasp the basic difference between the manipulative opera-tions of a civil or mechanical engineer on the one hand, and political"engineers" on the other, makes his approach to the problems ofpolitical manipulation unrealistic and naive (8).C. Wright Mills was a sympathetic yet critical interpreterof Deweywhose views partially parallel the above appraisals. Although hemounted his challenge from the political Left, he distinguished him-self from other radical critics of pragmatism by the exceptional depthand penetration of his analysis. Consequently, the intellectual meritof his critique warrants consideration of his views aside from hisreputation as a radical political sociologist and social critic.Mills received much of his early training in philosophy as a prag-matist under disciples of George Herbert Mead and John Dewey (9).The focus of Mills' early work was the sociology of knowledge, par-ticularly the sociology of philosophy (10). Although he concentratedon the social background of the major pragmatists and their readingaudience, he also analyzed epistemological, methodological, ethical andpolitical aspects of pragmatism. By so doing, Mills revealed a com-mitment to this mode of thought, although his critique of it was basedon his own unique brand of eclectic radicalism (11).



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Radicalismvs. Liberalism 415Thepoint is often madethatpragmatism,ncludingDeweyan nstru-mentalism, s an importantcomponentof American iberalism. At

present liberalism s in a period of acute intellectualand politicalcrisis. It is uncertainof its own doctrinalorientation, nableto for-mulatea convincing ritiqueof the structural lawsof American nsti-tutions, and unwilling o focus on goals or programs apableof cap-turing the public'ssupport. Since instrumentalisms alleged to bea componentof liberaldoctrine,Mills' analysis of Dewey may beuseful in understandinghe vicissitudesof contemporaryiberalism.Ourfocuswillbe on thepoliticalaspectsof his evaluation f Dewey.We will concentrate n Mills' critiqueof Dewey's 1) "biologization"and "'methodization"f valuephenomena nd consequentack of em-phasison the impactof the culturalapparatus n value formation ndpublic policy; 2) incrementalist pproachto the solution of socio-politicalproblems,and 3) attitude toward the structuralorigins ofconflictsof interestandpower. Also, the similaritiesn politicalbiog-raphywhichnarrow he gap between he two will be notedand Mills'critiqueof Dewey's politicalaudienceevaluated.

TI'BIOLOGIZATJON,' 'METHODIZATION,' AND THE CULTURAL

APPARATUSMILLSBELIEVED hat Dewey's explanation of human behavior wasoverly biologicalbecausehis sequenceof adjustmentwas a simplistic,mechanical ne of organism-environment-adaptation.ills contendedthat urbanized xistencewas virtuallyindependent f biologicalfac-tors, for explanation f action is cultural, not biological. In Dewey,on the other hand, physical characteristicswere set against mentalcharacteristics hile nadequate ttentionwas givento cultural actors.Mills arguedthat Dewey'spsychologythus failed to take adequateaccountof the fact that in the evolutionof culturalconductfromorganicbehavior here is genuinenoveltyand irreduciblequalitativedifferentiation.Thus,behavioralpatternsare culturally osteredandcannotbe reduced o biology and physiology. As Mills put it, "thebiologicaltheoryof actionconstructed long adjustmentines is notadequate o our presentdata and knowledge" 12).Mills elaborated n his disagreement ith Dewey (andMarx)whenhe wrote n his essay,"TheCulturalApparatus,"hatthe consciousnessf men doesnot determine heir materialexistence;nor does their materialexistencedetermine heir consciousness.Be-



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416 American Journal of Economics and Sociologytween consciousness and existence stand meanings and designs andcommunicationswhich other men have passed-first, in human speechitself, and later, by the management of symbols. These received andmanipulated interpretations decisively influence such consciousness asmen have of their existence. . . . In the cultural apparatusart, science,and learning, entertainment,malarkey, and information are producedand distributed. . . . Taken as a whole the cultural apparatus is thelens of mankind through which men see; the medium by which theyinterpret and reportwhat they see. It is the semi-organizedsource oftheir very identities and of their aspirations (13).

The political significance of this becomes evident in Mills' claimthat the power elite is able to manipulate the cultural apparatus to itsown advantage in establishing what Gramscicalled "ideologicalhegem-ony." Thus, Dewey was alleged to be guilty both of using a mecha-nistic adjustmentmodel to explain human behavior, and of inadequaterecognition of the class bias and power disparities which are inherentin the cultural environment of Americancapitalism.Further, Mills argues, Dewey was wrong in believing that themethod of science is necessarily self-corrective. Dewey paid inade-quate attention to the sociology of knowledgeperspective which showshow "scientific" methodology and the epistemological positions onwhich it is based depend upon the distribution of social power. Forwhat is "scientific"is often an ideological rationale for what is usefulto elites who perceive science as a device for consolidatingor expand-ing their sociopolitical position. Consequently, models which aredominant in the scientific community, including the procedures oflaboratory science upon which Dewey relied too heavily, may reflectlittle more than the existing power structure. This is especially truewhen these procedures,adapted from the "hard sciences," become themethodological core of inquiry in the social sciences. Dewey's workon social and political issues performs a "masking"or ideological func-tion which vitiates its potential as an agent of social change. Millsput it this way:It should be clear that . .. the angle of sight of these conceptions arenot conducive, indeed prohibit the discernment or the reconstructionof power-issues and structural antagonisms (14).Thus not only did Dewey's philosophy serve as an ideological maskfor the existing distribution of power, but it was an actual source ofsocial problems.

According to Mills, Dewey's value theory made him prone to over-look power inequalities, ideological differences,and conflicts of interest.



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Radicalismvs. Liberalism 417Moreover Mills felt that Dewey's biological model of action containeda deficiency which was connected with his evasion of the valueproblem:The biological model of action, "adaptation,"by its formality enablesone to avoid value-decisions.... By its usage value-decisionsas value-decisions are assimilated into the biological and hidden by formality(15).Mills read Dewey as believing that value phenomena have their im-mediate source in biological modes of behavior. This embedding ofvalue in a biological matrix is a central cause of Dewey's failure toconfront the necessity of value choice.Related to this is Mills' contention that, although for Dewey growthis a moral end, Dewey fails to establish criteria for differentiatingbe-tween good growth and bad growth. But Mills ignores the fact thatgrowth for Dewey is not an aimless, random activity but a processwhich enables more growth to occur. When growth does occur it willnot hinder or block subsequent growth. Thus growth itself becomesthe criterion Dewey uses for distinguishing between "good" growthand "bad" growth. As Axtelle and Burnett put it in his defense:Growth is not neutral or amoral development. It is life guided withan eye to the enrichment of present and future development. ..One can "grow"-in a non-Deweyan sense-as a criminal; but it isdoubtful if it can be said with assurancethat in any culture criminalityis a customary and opportune route to a life which is long, full, free,and vivid. It is true that some criminals reach an old age, relativelyuntouched by social demands, and die rich. For all the seemingglamour of their life of luxury, the secrecy required to exploit othersleads to stultification (16).

Mills also objected to Dewey's tendency to "methodize,"by whichhe meant that Dewey utilized methodological solutions to problemsthat were not, at bottom, methodological. Dewey was guilty of. . . the assimilation of problemsof political power and of moral goodsto a statement of thinking,of method to a model of action and thoughtimputed to "science". ... But the model is generalizedby Dewey intoeducation and into the discussion of politics . . . "scientific method"becomes "the method of intelligence" and this method is equated with"liberal democracy" (17).Thus, where Dewey perceives problems as emanating from a failureto use the "method of intelligence," these are viewed by Mills asdifficulties resulting frompower, wealth, and status disparities originat-ing in institutions, and from value conflicts rooted in the class struc-



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418 American Journal of Economics and Sociologyture. Such problems cannot be solved by resorting to methodologicalmanipulation or substitution, nor can they be dealt with through theshibboleths of scientific experimentalism. Instead, Dewey should havesquarely confronted the structural problem of power in modern capi-talism. But he would not do so because "the professionalizing ormethodizing of value and of value questions already assumes for itshappy operation a kind of community that nowhere exists" (18).Unfortunately Mills gives insufficientemphasis to Dewey's recogni-tion that there are many situations which arise in hostile environmentswhere the method of intelligence can be expected to accomplish little.As Dewey once put it:If intelligent method is lacking, prejudice, the pressure of immediatecircumstances,self-interest and class interest, traditional custom or in-stitutions of accidental historic origin are not lacking, and they tendto take the place of intelligence (19).However, Mills is correct in asserting that Dewey is unnecessarilyvague about the kinds of environments n which the method of intelli-gence will not succeed because of structural obstacles.

IIIMILLS ON DEWEY'SINCREMENTALISMSINCE PRAGMATISTSare usually assumed to be incrementalistsit is notsurprisingto find Mills putting Dewey in this category (20). Dewey'sincrementalism as methodology, policy prescription and political phi-losophy was suspect because it failed to consider total social structures.Focusing on Dewey's concept of adaptation, Mills writes that thebiological model strengthens the drive toward the specificity of prob-lems and this specificity implements . . . a politicsof reformof thesituation. Adaptation is one step at a time; it faces one situation ata time (21).Although Mills is not explicit in defining incrementalism what heapparently means are programs that deal with parts or aspects of aproblem instead of the whole problem. Consequently such programsdeal mostly with secondary issues rather than fundamentals. Theaspects of the problem that are dealt with are usually those for whicha "product"solution is possible. The solutions which are chosen aresuch that they will constitute the least amount of disturbanceto thesocial fabric. Incrementalist reform efforts were associated with theNew Deal at the time Mills wrote his critique, and later with theFair Deal and the New Frontier-GreatSociety programs. It is this



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Radicalism vs. Liberalism 419kind of piecemeal reconstruction that he faults. As John Carbonaraput it:Mills is committed in a partially Deweyan sense to a continual socialreconstruction, simply because our knowledge of the social order keepschanging and increasing. He differs from Dewey, and other liberalsin that he does not advocate a "piecemeal"reconstruction. This in hisview is doomed to failure, because partial reconstructions never reallytake into account the entire social order. What is requiredis a broadreconstruction along many, if not all, fronts simultaneously (22).

An analysis of Dewey's proposals for socio-economic reconstructionduring the depression provide a different picture than the Mills' view.For Dewey advocated a different role for government than it hadtraditionally played. No longer was it to be the "night-watchman"State of classical liberalism. Instead, it must undertake an obliga-tion to satisfy basic economic needs. Thus Dewey supported govern-ment ownershipof basic industries and natural resources. To achievesuch socialization he advocated heavy taxation on upper incomegroups. This revenue could then be used to compensate owners ofindustries which were nationalized, and also redistribute wealththrough subsidizing social welfare programs (23).

Although it is difficult to square Dewey's views on sociopoliticalchange in the 1930s with the Mills' interpretation, it must be remem-bered that Dewey's radicalism was inconsistent since he vacillatedbetween advocacy of Welfare State capitalism and genuine socialism.Nevertheless, several years before the New Deal began, he had writtenthatWe are in for some kind of socialism, call it by whatever name weplease, and no matter what it will be called when it is realized. Eco-nomic determinism is now a fact, not a theory. But there is a differ-ence and a choice between a blind, chaotic and unplanneddeterminism,issuing from business conducted for pecuniary profit, and the deter-mination of a socially planned and ordered development. It is thedifferenceand the choice between socialism that is public and one thatis capitalistic (24).

Should it be thought that Dewey's commitment to large-scale struc-tural reform is exaggerated, let us look at a summary of his positionon the New Deal during the 1930s. Admittedly this is the periodwhen Dewey moved furthest to the Left. However, based on Mills'citations, it was the period of Dewey's work with which Mills was mostfamiliar, and most likely the one about which Mills generalized. As



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420 American Journal of Economics and SociologyEdwardBordeau ut it:Dewey could not accept Roosevelt'scompromisewith capitalism orhe saw clearlythat the New Deal permittedpowerandruleto remainessentiallyn the same hands as thosethat brought he country o itspresent tate-dominated as those hands are by the profitmotive....While the New Deal was not, to Dewey'smind, radicalenoughintermsof his socialism,t was nonetheless reatlyunder the influenceof his instrumentalismnd pragmatismven if this pragmatismwasmoread hoc andheadless han his own. Deweygenuinelyapplaudedwhathe, Roosevelt,had accomplished, ut the New Deal was merelyan attemptto savecapitalism nd "onlya newsystemwhichdestroysthe profit systemcan banish poverty and bringthe Americanpeoplethe economic iberationwhich modern cienceand technologys pre-pared to bestow upon them. . ." (25).It is evident that Mills underestimatedDewey's commitment oradicalreformduringthe 1930s, although n Mills' defense,Dewey'sadvocacyof radicalchange throughouthis careerwas inconsistent.Dewey'ssometime ommitmento radicalismwas more evident n the1930s thanit had beenearlieror became ater. Consequently,Mills'emphasison the liberal,as opposed o the radical mplications f in-strumentalism,s moreaccuratewhen aimedat Dewey'spoliticalanal-ysis beforeandafter the depression. Mills oncewroteof C. E. Ayresthat hispointaboutDeweywas:too reminiscent,oo localized: t represents phase of thought. . .and could not hold of the entirecareerand periodsthroughwhichDeweyhasmoved(26).This was an aptsummary f Mills'ownworkonDewey.

IVPOWER, CONFLICT AND POLITICS

MILLSARGUEDhat Dewey's socio-political deas were incorrectbe-causethey assumeda harmonyof interestand a balanceof powerbe-tween interest groups that did not exist in the United States. Acentral heme s that "he is all too ready to root conflict n a 'logicalnature' which man is up against; he is too reluctantto admit thefactsof conflictwithinthe culturesof men"(27). Mills enlarged hisassertion nto the claimthat becauseof its assumption f a harmonyof interests,Dewey'smodelof action "serves o minimizehe cleavageof powerdivisionswithin society, or put differently,t serves as apervasivemode of posingthe problemwhich locates all problemsbe-tweenman and nature nsteadof betweenmenandmen"(28).



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Radicalismvs. Liberalism 421Mills believed Dewey tried unsuccessfully to deal with the prob-

lems of power and force within a technological frameworkby reducingthese concepts from political to technical ideas. Power was energy,violence was waste, and organized force was synonymous with effi-ciency. Thus Dewey avoided a concrete recognition and analysis ofthe problem of political power and depoliticized the vocabulary ofsocial struggle.Although Dewey's model postulated conflict between man andnature, this does not mean that there were not concurrent conflictsoccurringat different levels of analysis, say between men and men orbetween institutions or classes. Mills disregardedthis in arguing thatDewey's position had two pernicious effects. One is that the socialsciences, partly under Dewey's influence, are permeated with the be-lief that fundamental social and political problems result from theinability adequately to manipulate and control nature. On the con-trary, Mills was convinced that these difficulties cannot be resolvedbecause of the disparities of power, wealth and status which gave theupper hand to the dominant class. The other effect is the widely-held belief that the solution to the problem is more and better educa-tion and incrementalreform,prescriptionsabout which Mills remainedskeptical throughouthis career.Clearly there are fundamental differences in the way that Deweyand Mills perceived the role of science and technology. In Liberalismand SocialActionDewey wrote that:the rise of scientific method and of technology based upon it is thegenuinely active force in producing the vast complex of changes theworld is now undergoing, not the class struggle whose spirit andmethodare opposedto science (29).Dewey's interpretation of the role of science and technology was in-correct for Mills because it was based on untenable assumptions of anatural harmony of interest. Technology was not an instrument bywhich the whole society adjusted to new conditions. On the contrary,the prime function of technology and science was to serve the interestsof big business.Technological power is then socially neutral and those who wouldcelebrate it must face the question: Power for what? Dewey hascelebrated "man's" growth of power through science and technology;he has not clearly answered the question involved in that celebration.To do so would have committed him to face squarely the political andlegal problem of the present distribution of power as it exists withinthis social order. And this Dewey has never done. . . . Just how this



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422 American Journal of Economics and Sociologytechnology is to be taken from those pecuniary individuals who nowmonopolize it, we are not told (30).Again Mills has overstated the case. As has been shown, Dewey'sideas, at least during the 1930s, about how to deal with corporatepower and its misuse of technology were similar to those of otherradicals.Mills also charged Dewey with showing insufficient commitment topart and program. He was too "mugwumpish," that is, too inde-pendent and individualistic. Thus, his conception of political actionwas never firmly tied to any political organization,platform, or class.Dewey's "social class perspective," to use Mills' phrase, was ill definedand ambiguous and lacked a sharp political focus.There was so much spurious hope and optimism in Deweyan pragma-tism. But it is spurious . . . because of lack of tough political analysis(31).These, of course, are the structural criticisms of Dewey shared byother radicals (32). Such criticisms have weight, but they overstatethe case that can be made as the following summary of Dewey'spolitical values and activity demonstrates.

VPOLITICALBIOGRAPHYAND AUDIENCE

DEWEY'S VOTING RECORDindicates that he was an independent. Atthe national level most of his votes were cast for socialist or progres-sive third-party candidates, although occasionally he supported aDemocrat for the Presidency when there seemed to be no suitablealternative. He voted for Grover Cleveland, a Democrat, in 1884.In 1912 he supported Socialist Eugene V. Debs for President. In1916 he voted for Democrat Woodrow Wilson, and Charles EvansHughes, a progressive Republication, for governor of New York. In1924 he backed Robert M. LaFollette, the progressive reformer, forthe Presidency. Then in 1932, 1936, and 1940 he supportedNormanThomas. The only other indication of his later voting records revealsthat he voted for Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1944 (33). ClearlyDewey had long realized the importance of third-party pressure inoffering the public real alternatives. What he wanted was a partyto formulate and propagandize progressive programs. His willing-ness to support the Democratic Party emerged only when third-partyagitation seemed fruitless.It is interesting to note that both Mills and Dewey voted for Nor-



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Radicalism vs. Liberalism 423man Thomas, the Socialist Party candidate, for president in 1940 (34).Perhaps Mills and Dewey were not as far apart as Mills thought whenhe wrote parts of Sociology and Pragmatism the same year. In spiteof Mills' strictures on the inadequacy of Dewey's conception of theoryand practice and the linkage between the two, he came to the sameconclusion about to whom he should give his political support. Millswas somewhat further Left in the political and ideological spectrumthan either Dewey or Norman Thomas. Nevertheless, when forced tochoose, he chose Thomas, whose views he preferred to those of theStalinists, Trotskyites and other radical splinter groups. Perhaps themain difference between Mills and Dewey in the arena of electoralpolitics was that Dewey was willing to support non-socialist "progres-sive" or "liberal" parties and candidates, while Mills abstained fromsuch support on the grounds that these movements were not sufficiently"radical."In Sociology and Pragmatism Mills evaluates the nature of the"publics" whom Dewey addressed (35). These publics include stu-dents, educators, professional philosophers, and those actively con-cerned with social and political problems. Mills locates Dewey'spolitical anchorageand his reading publics in those business and pro-fessional groups from a rural or small town backgroundto whom the"formality, intellectuality, and tentativeness" of Dewey's thought cor-responds and appeals. He indicates that Dewey's audience found hiscommitments to incrementalreform, avoidance of violence, and "mug-wumpism" convincing. Mills asks rhetorically, "Could the politicalcharacter of Dewey's concept of action be imputed to the fact thatnone of the groups to which he is oriented have aspirations to rule?"(36) It was evident to Mills that Dewey's theory of action and hispolitical and social philosophy were well tailored to the views of hisaudience. His criticism in this regard is an attempt to explain thedeficiencies of liberal analysis and support of liberal politics ratherthan an accusation of opportunismagainst Dewey.liberalism recognizes new irrational spheres; for instance, class strug-gles and power fights. But it is intellectualistic in so far as it attemptsto solely through thought, discussion and organization to master as ifthey were already rationalized, the power and other irrational relation-ships that dominate here . . . From all these factors mentioned comesan explanation for why there is no power problem in pragmatism.For it is precisely individuals who coming from varied strata havearrived at modus operandiamong themselves that conceive of all prob-lems being solved by intelligence and discussion (37).



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424 American Journal of Economics and SociologyIt is interesting to note that Mills, himself, soon abandoned anybelief in the revolutionary and socialist potential of the American

working class as an archaic element of the "labor metaphysic." Hebegan to direct his political analysis to many of the same groups thathe had criticized Dewey for having in his reading audience. For itwas evident that, if structural changes were to be brought about, in-tellectuals would have to play a prominent role. Thus, despite hisearly skepticism about the political orientation of Dewey's publics,Mills arrived at similar conclusionsabout the social origins and occu-pational affiliation of the likely catalysts of political change, althoughhe communicatedwith these groups in more radical phraseology.VI

CONCLUSIONHow CONVINCING is Mills' critique of Dewey? The answer to thisquestion is a value-laden one lying as much in the realm of politicalphilosophy as in scholarly method. The art of textual exegesis asutilized by the historian of ideas, and the insights of the politicalbiographer are relevant, but no more so than the scholars' ideologicalreaction to Mills' and Dewey's political commitments and value-ori-entations.Mills understood his analysis of Dewey to be a dialogue betweenradical and liberal, with all the implications this has for political andintellectual confrontation between opposing camps. However, Millsdistorts Dewey's views primarily by exaggeratingsome of the tenden-cies prevalent in his earlier works. He also underestimates Dewey'scommitment to, and involvement with, parties and organizations com-mitted to fundamental structural change, including several with astrong political focus (38). But, in fact, he and Dewey are closerin political and intellectual orientation than he is willing to admit.Both share a desire for an egalitarian and participatory society whichhas much in common with the ideals of guild socialism. As politicalactivists they each spent much of their careers outside the frameworkof the two party system as activist Leftist independents, althoughMills was less a joiner than Dewey. Their common interests andvalues are more striking than their differences (39).Given the principled commitment of Dewey to active theoreticaland practical support of large-scale structural change, why has "prag-matism" come to denote little more than opportunismand expediencyand to be associated with policies which are often alleged to be un-



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Radicalism vs. Liberalism 425principled? Lewis Feuer's "principlesof wings" provides insight intothe ideological evolution of pragmatism from a doctrinal change ori-entation of the political Left to a moderate-conservativeperspective ofthe Centerand Right.The principle of wings, as we have seen, affirmsthat every philosophicunit-idea in the course of its career makes the passages through thewhole spectrum of ideological affiliations. A philosophical doctrinewhich begins at the Left will move Rightward, and if at the Right, itwill diffuse toward the Left. In the course of its life-history, everyphilosophic standpoint and unit-idea will therefore be associated withcontrary political standpoints (40).

In accord with Feuer's principles of wings, pragmatism, a liberalperspective once noted for its moral commitment, opposition to dog-matism, and autonomy from the prevailing power system has assumedan apologetic intellectual and political role. The question is whetheror not contemporary liberalism's ill-defined ethical standards ideo-logical closure, and affiliationwith the powers-that-be owes these traitsto Dewey to the degree implied by Mills? Or have they been derivedfromsome other source?One recent critic of American liberalism, Bruce Miroff, does notperceive any direct intellectual links between the "pragmaticliberals"and Dewey. Miroff does not attribute their policy errors directly todeficiencies in instrumentalism. Indeed, though his book, PragmaticIllusions, is a critique of the "pragmatic liberal" political style andbelief system, no mention is even made of Dewey. What Miroff de-scribes may be little more than a limited conversion of the residues ofthe Americanpragmatic tradition into an ideological rationalization of

the modus operandi of New Frontier and Great Society.We have shown that the "liberalism"of Dewey was at times quiteradical in its programs and implications and, therefore, different insubstance and spirit from the dominant ideology of interest-group, orpragmatic liberalism. However, it is also evident that Dewey's politi-cal thought had some of the deficiencies which are intrinsic to Ameri-can liberalism. In this regard Mills' critique of Dewey serves as avaluableantidote and corrective.Because Mills was sometimeswide of the mark in attacking Dewey'sliberalism, it does not follow that his evaluation is irrelevant to theanalysis of Americanliberalism. His interpretationof Dewey is valu-able not because it is an adequate view of him as a political thinker,but because it is a compelling critique of present-day liberal doctrine



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426 American Journal of Economics and Sociologyand practice. The flaws Mills attributed to Dewey are much moreprevalent among the contemporary proponents and practitioners ofinterest group liberalism. Specifically, they include a strong tendencyto reduce problems of issues to problems of method, and to take asproblems of method problems that are not at bottom methodologicalin nature, but rooted in the class structure and power matrix ofAmericancapitalism.Evident, too, is a refusal to consider the possibility that "lack ofawareness of objective self-interest," as Mills put it, is fostered by acultural apparatus dominated by powerful elements which benefit fromfostering the folklore of political and intellectual pluralism. Con-temporary liberalism often sanctions an evasion of the problems ofcorporate power and upper class wealth in a way that Dewey neverdid during the 1930s. As an academic stance of which Mills wascritical, it endorses morally dubious efforts to separate humanisticvalues from social science inquiry in ways contrary to instrumentalistdoctrine. As a political posture it often ignores the failures of thewelfare and regulatory mechanismand promises more of the same onan incrementalbasis.In short, the same tendencies Mills thought he saw in Dewey are,instead, part of liberal thought and practice. A serious reappraisalofDewey's thought and Mills' critique, which is itself rooted in prag-matism, are essential to an understandingof contemporaryliberalismand its role in the Americanexperience.Universityof Nevada,Las VegasLas Vegas,Nev. 89154andCaliforniaStateCollege,SanBernardinoSanBernardino,Calif.92407

1. Unfortunately, the Dewey-Mills correspondence sheds no light on theirpolitical differences. Instead, their letters deal primarily with the question ofwhich philosophers were pragmatists. See Mills to Dewey, October 29, 1941 andDewey to Mills, November 3, 1941, Box 4B364, C. Wright Mills Collection,Barker Texas History Center Archives, University of Texas, Austin.2. Marxist-Leninist interpretations to this effect are found in Howard Selsam,Socialism and Ethics (New York: International Publishers, 1943) and HarryWells, Pragmatism: Philosophy of Imperialism (Freeport: Books for LibrariesPress, 1971). Other radical interpretations include George Novack, Marxism andPragmatism (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1975), V. J. McGill, "PragmatismReconsidered: An Aspect of John Dewey's Philosophy, Science and Society, 3(Summer, 1939), pp. 289-322, and Ernest Sutherland Bates, "John Dewey, Amer-ica's Philosophic Engineer," Modern Monthly, 7 (August, 1933), pp. 387-96, 404.3. Niebuhr argues that the development of scientific experimental proceduresfor the purposeful control of social changes is impossible in a community wherethere are "dominant social classes who are trying to maintain their special privi-leges in society." These pragmatic moralists fail to realize the "stubborn re-



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Radicalism vs. Liberalism 427sistanceof group egoism to all moral and inclusive social objectives." Niebuhrconcludes that "man's collective behavior will never 'be conqueredby reason,unless reason uses tools, and is itself driven by forces that are not rational."These "forces,of course, are those of religiousfaith in a supernaturalorder towhose purposesthe realm of nature is subordinate."See Moral Man and Im-moral Society (New York: Charles Scribner'sSons, 1960), pp. xl-xxxv. Alsosee Joan Huber Rytina and CharlesP. Loomis,"MarxistDialectic and Pragma-tism: Power as Knowledge,"AmericanSociologicalReview, 35 (,April,1970),pp.316.4. See Randolph Bourne, War and the Intellectuals,edited with an intro-duction by Carl Resek (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), especially theessays entitled "A War Diary" and "Twilightof Idols." For a similar analysissee Lewis Mumford in Pragmatismand AmericanCulture, Gail Kennedy, ed.(Boston: D. C. Heath,1950),pp.36-49, 54-57.5. Alfonso J. Damico, "Analysisand Advocacy: Pragmatismand the Studyof Politics,"Polity, 7 (Winter,1974), p. 205.6. Harold Stearns, Liberalism n America (New York: Boni and Liveright,Inc., 1919), pp. 180-84. Stearnsalso says that: "The plain truth is that methodand techniqueare subsidiary o ends and value in any rationalphilosophyeitherof politics or life, and that the pragmatists were so busy studying method thatthey had small time left for studying the purposesto which that method wasto be applied."Loc. cit.)7. Morton White, The Revolt Against Formalism (Boston: Beacon Press,1957),pp. 195,200-202.8. A. J. Somjee, The Political Theory of John Dewey (New York: ColumbiaUniv.Press,1968), p. 174.9. Mills took his M.A. in philosophyat the Universityof Texas in 1939. Histhesis,Reflection,Behavior and Culture,(unpublishedmaster'sthesis,Departmentof Philosophy,Univ. of Texas,1939) focuseson aspectsof the thoughtof Deweyand GeorgeHerbertMead,especiallyDewey.ClarenceAyres, a leading exponent of Deweyan instrumentalismn economicanalysis, had a great impact on Mills. In addition,Mills's graduatecommitteeincluded George Gentry and David Miller, both students of Mead during theirgraduatetrainingat Chicago. A good analysis of Mills' intellectualperspectiveas a student,which emphasizes he influenceof pragmatism,s found in a letterof recommendation rittenby Ayres to ProfessorCharnerPerry of the Universityof Chicago,March 2, 1939. Box 3F291, ClarenceE. Ayres Collection,BarkerTexas History Center Archives,University of Texas, Austin.10. See Sociology and Pragmatism(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1964).This was Mills' doctoral dissertationoriginallyentitled A SociologicalAccountof Pragmatism. Also see Irving Louis Horowitz, ed., Power, Politics and People(New York: OxfordUniv. Press, 1969), especially the essays entitled "Language,Logic and Culture,""Situated Actions and Vocabulariesof Motive,""Methodo-logical Consequencesof the Sociology of Knowledge,"and "The ProfessionalIdeologyof SocialPathologists."Three short unpublishedmanuscripts hat deal with Dewey in an incisiveandoriginal way, partly from a sociology of knowledgeperspective,are found inBoxes 4B 361, 359, 360 of the Mills Collection. They are entitled "Inceptionsand Outcomes of Reflection," "Sum up of J. D." and "The OrientationofDewey'sQuestfor Certainty."11. Mills' eclecticismconsistedof a fusion of pragmatism,nstitutionaleco-nomics, and symbolic interactionism,hree closely relatedschools of thought ofAmericanorigin, with various strands of Europeansocial thought.12. Mills,Reflection,Behaviorand Culture,p. 45.13. Mills,Power,Politics,andPeople,pp. 405-407.14. Mills,SociologyandPragmatism, . 434.15. Ibid.,p. 380.16. Axtelle and Burnett, "Dewey on Educationand Schooling," n Guide tothe Works of John Dewey, Jo Ann Boydston, ed. (Carbondale:S.I.U. Press,



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428 American Journal of Economics and Sociology1970), p. 263. Mills contendsthat the reason for Dewey's refusal to establishspecificgrowth criteria lies in his unwillingness o place growth (educational)issues upon the "moral,political plane where decisions between adults must bemade." Further, ". . . education as growth is calculated to avoid just suchquestions." See Sociologyand Pragmatism,pp. 457-58.17. Ibid., pp. 418-19. But for a rebuttal of Mills' arguments,see Dewey'sA CommonFaith (New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press, 1934) pp. 77-78,and his Authorityand the Individual,edit. Harvard TercentenaryPublications(Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniv. Press,1937),p. 187.18. SociologyandPragmatism, . 410.19. Dewey, The QuestFor Certainty(New York: G. P. Putnam'sSons, 1960),p. 265. In this respect another Dewey comment is illuminating:"The thesisthat the operationof cooperativentelligenceas displayed n science is a workingmodel of the union of freedomand authoritydoes not slight the fact that themethodhas operatedup to the present n a limited and relativelytechnicalarea.On the contrary, it emphasizedthat fact. If the method of intelligencehadbeen employed in any large field in the comprehensiveand basic area of therelationsof human beings to one another in social life and institutions,therewould be no presentneed for our argument. The contrastbetween the restrictedscope of its use and the possible range of its applicationof human relations-political, economic, and moral-is outstandingand depressing. It is this verycontrast that defines the great problem that still has to be solved." Dewey,"Authorityand Social Change," n Authorityand the Individual, p. 187.20. In an early publicationMills characterizediberal ameliorism(incremen-talism) in this manner: "The 'informational'characterof social pathology islinked with a failure to considertotal social structures. Collectingand dealingin a fragmentaryway with scatteredproblemsand facts of milieux, these books(on social pathology) are not focused on larger stratificationsor upon struc-tured wholes." Mills, "The Professional deology of Social Pathologists,"Power,PoliticsandPeople,pp. 526-27.21. Mills,SociologyandPragmatism, . 382.22. This is the interpretationof Mills' conceptionof incrementalism tilizedby John Carbonaran his CriticalEmpiricism n C. Wright Mills (unpublisheddoctoral dissertation,Department of Philosophy, S.U.N.Y., Buffalo, 1967), pp.23, 90-91.23. Consult the followingsources: Dewey, "America'sPublic OwnershipPro-gram,"People'sLobby Bulletin, 3 (March, 1934), p. 1; Taxation as a Step toSocialization,"bid., 4 (March, 1935), pp. 1-2; "The ImperativeNeed for aNew Radical Party," CommonSense, 2 (1933), reprinted in Challengeto theNew Deal, Alfred M. Binghamand Selden Rodman, eds. (New York: FalconPress, 1934), pp. 269-73; "No Half Way House for America,"People'sLobbyBulletin,November, 1934, p. 1; "You Must Act to Get CongressTo Act," ibid.,May, 1932,p. 1; "VotersMust DemandCongressTax WealthInsteadof Want,"ibid., June, 1932, p. 1. "President'sPolicies Help Property Owners Chiefly,"ibid., June, 1934, pp. 1-2; Dewey, "The Drive AgainstHunger,"New Republic,29 (March,1933),p. 190.24. Dewey, IndividualismOld and New (New York: CapricornBooks, 1962),pp. 119-20. Again, note the ambiguityand vagueness of the first sentence inthe quotation.25. Edward J. Bordeau,"John Dewey's Ideas About the Great Depression,"Journal of the History of Ideas, 32 (January-March,1971), pp. 78-79, 83-84.26. Mills, Sociology and Pragmatism,p. 324. James H. Tufts pointed to aweakness in Mills' and other interpretationsof Dewey when he wrote that:"One general remark,growing out of my long friendshipand discussionswithDewey is this. Many criticismsof his supposedviews have been based on pas-sages in his writings taken as though they representedhis whole thought onthe topic. That has not infrequentlyresultedin distorted or one-sidedconcep-tions. It is not his habit to guard very meticulouslyall his statements. Whenhe wishes to make a point he often does not take pains to note all possible



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Radicalism vs. Liberalism 429qualifications r exceptions. He drivesat the central dea. And then, perhapsatanother time and in another connectionbrings out other aspects." James H.Tufts to Mills, December6, 1941, Box 4B364, C. Wright Mills Collection.27. Mills,Reflection,Behaviorand Culture,p. 54.28. Mills,SociologyandPragmatism, . 382.29. Dewey, Liberalismand Social Action (New York: G. P. Putnam'sSons,1934), p. 74.30. Mills, SociologyandPragmatism, p. 416-17.31. Undated manuscriptentitled "Pragmatismas Politics and as Religion,"Box 4B360,C. WrightMillsCollection.32. It is interesting o note that these criticismsof Dewey are similarto thoselater made of Mills himselfby his Marxistcritics. See Paul Sweezy and HerbertAptheker n G. WilliamDomhoffand Hoyt B. Ballard, eds., C. WrightMills andThe Power Elite (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), pp. 115-64. Also see Aptheker's,The World of C. Wright Mills (New York: Marzani and Munsell, 1960). Millselaborateson this theme: "The characterwhich Dewey gives action may be, inpart, explainedby tacit awareness,or a desire to avoid the consequences ore-told in the truism that when thought gets hitched to political action, it tendsstrongly to become rigid, to ignore factual matters which would embarrass t bychanges. Such a situation also goes into the explanationof why Dewey has beenrather liberally mugwumpish n politics and why "action"is not linked witha sizableorganization,a movement, a party with a chanceat power. The con-cept of action in Dewey obviouslydoes not cover the kinds of action occurringwithin and between struggling,organizedpolitical parties. . . . Politically,prag-matism is less expediencythan it is a kind of perennialmugwump confrontedwith rationalizedsocial structures." Mills, Sociology and Pragmatism,p. 394.34. Dewey's view of the 1940 campaign is expressedin The Nation, 151(September,28, 1940). Mills wrote to his parents that "I am this Novembervoting for Norman Thomas. I know he will not win but that does not meanthe vote is lost. You both vote for him too. His is the only anti-war partyin the running." Undated letter, Box 4B349, 2.325, C. Wright Mills Collection.In spite of his regard for the Socialist Party and many of the measures t sup-ported, Dewey never became a committed socialist who adhered to socialistdogma. His pragmaticattitude toward social problemsprecludeda commitmentto socialism or for that matter any other "ism." He once wrote that "Thepersonwho holds the doctrineof 'individualism' r 'collectivism'has his programdetermined or him in advance. It is not with him a matterof finding out theparticularthing which needs to be done and the best way, under the circum-stances, of doing it. It is an affiairof applying a hard and fast doctrine whichfollows logically from his preconception of the nature of ultimate causes."Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Denver: Alan Swallow, 1965), p. 202.35. Mills uses the idea of communitypoliticallyin the concept of the "pub-lic" which is identical with Dewey's use of it in The Public and Its Problems.Mills wrote that "Publics ive in milieux but they can transcend hem-individu-ally by intellectualeffort; socially by public action. By reflectionand debateand by organizedaction, a communityof publics comes to feel itself and comesin fact to be active at points of structuralrelevance." Mills, The Power Elite(New York:OxfordUniv.Press,1956), p. 321.36. Mills, Sociology and Pragmatism,p. 393. Also see pp. 343, 351-53, andJoseph Scimecca, The Sociological Theory of C. Wright Mills (Port Washing-ton, N.Y.: KennikatPress, 1977), p. 61. But also see Gary Bullert,John Deweyin Politics (unpublisheddoctoral dissertation,Department of Political Science,ClaremontGraduateSchool,1975), p. 300. Perhaps Mills was betraying his ownuncertainty about which parties and programson the left to support when heoverstated the case against Dewey in this way: "Dewey has not taken partystands. He has stood for many 'programs'and attitudes and very specific issueslike the trials of Negro sharecroppers.Sidney Hook, who surely should know,has written '. . . none of the conventional label of left-wing politics can beaffixed to him. This is what we should expect about anyone faithful to the



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430 American ournalof Economicsand Sociologyspirit of the experimentalphilosophy.' We can see Dewey fumblingfor wordswhat are politically neutral: 'There is no word which adequatelyexpresseswhatis taking place.' 'Socialism'has too specific political and economic associationsto be appropriate. 'Collectivism' s more neutral, but it, too, is a partywordratherthan a descriptive erm." Mills, Sociologyand Pragmatism,p. 405.37. Mills, "SumUp of J. D.," pp. 1-3, Box 4B359,C. WrightMills Collection.38. Dewey was instrumental n organizingand/or leading the following: TheProgressive Education Association, League for IndustrialDemocracy, AmericanFederation of Teachers., The People's Lobby, American Civil LibertiesUnion,AmericanAssociation of University Professors,and the League for IndependentPolitical Action. Since Mills was aware of these affiliations,he is probablycriticizingDewey for vacillating between supportof liberaland radicalorganiza-tions insteadof consistently dheringo a radical ine.39. An interestingcomparisonof Mills and Dewey is found in a letter writtenby the AmericanMarxist GeorgeNovack to Leon Trotsky'swidow. "He [Mills]has shown by his criticism of U. S. militarismand, above all, by his stance indefense of the Cuban Revolution that he is one of the most courageous andhonest of all academic figures in this country today. He belongs to the sameuniversity faculty as did John Dewey, and they are of the same intellectualandmoral stature, as well as of the same general trend of thought. Moreover, heis today defending the right of Trotsky's views to be presented to the publicwithout prejudice or discriminationno less vigorously than did John Dewey inthe hearings on the Moscow Trials. I believe that you can credit the com-parison based upon my intimate acquaintancewith the work and characterofboth these eminent scholars." Novack to Natalia Trotsky, September30, 1961,Box 4B396, C. WrightMills Collection.40. Lewis Feuer, Ideology and the Ideologists (New York: Harper, 1974),pp. 56-57.

41. Bruce Miroff, Pragmatic Illusions: The PresidentialPolitics of John F.Kennedy (New York: David McKay Company, 1976).

U.S.-SovietExchangesTHE DEVELOPMENTof trade between the United States and the SovietUnion is an important stabilizing factor in the relationship betweenthe two countries. But the economic area is only one of the coop-erative activities that have grown in recent years. There are morecultural and academic exchanges now, more performing arts groups,more scientific exchanges and more exhibits-most notably our Bi-centennial Exhibition in the Soviet Union in 1976 and the SovietSixtieth Anniversary Exhibit which Minister Patolichev opened in1977. Mutually beneficial cooperation agreements have been signedand are in operation in a number of areas and disciplines, such ashousing, health, agriculture,the environment. I have been told of theremarkable healing effects which these cooperative agreements havehad on old antagonisms. [Froman address.]

PHILIP C. HABIB

Radicalism vs. Liberalism: C. Wright Mills' Critique of John Dewey's Ideas

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