Raaf-malaya Convoys January 1942

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CHAPTER 1 6MALAYA CONVOYS : JANUARY 194 2

MARTIAL law had been proclaimed when, on New Year ' s Eve ,Singapore was subjected to another night raid . But the exotic citycould still cast its spell and in the night clubs and hotels people brieflyforgot, or pretended to forget, that the Japanese were so desperately close .Their number, understandably, included men of the fighting Services fre eto snatch a few hours of relaxation from combat or the other tasksof war. Sirens sounded their warning through the music of dance bands .A band leader would break off to make the announcement : "An enemyair raid is approaching ." But the music and the dancing would continuewith scarcely a break, even when the sound of anti-aircraft gunfire coul dbe heard, followed by the muffled rumble of bursting bombs in the dis-tance . A few would leave quietly ; the others would dance on. "Champagne. . . expensive food . . . immaculate uniforms and bare white shoulders,"an Australian flight lieutenant wrote later, adding, "Tonight the Japs ar ea back number . . . . Tomorrow? . . . We'll think about that, tomorrow . "That "tomorrow"New Year's Day 1942brought the first seriousair attack on Tengah airfield . Considerable damage was done by th ebombing, but one of the most serious results of such raids was the dis-appearance of the native labourers . That set a problem not only in main-taining the airfield ' s facilities but in repairing the damage done . And thenatives were not only being frightened away ; they were being enticedaway by cunning enemy radio propaganda that invited them to move t oa designated safety areathe Japanese would see to it that no bombs fellthere and would tell them the precise time of the next raid .For the better air defence of the island, Fighter Control Headquarterswas expanded and redesignated No . 224 (Fighter) Group, with GroupCaptain Rice' in command. An effort was made, too, to cope with nigh traids by reorganising No. 27 (Night Fighter) Squadron which now hadfive serviceable Blenheim I aircraft . But the effort was entirely unsuccess-fu l ; a reflection not on the squadron but solely on the incapacity of theiroutmoded aircraft.A report that reached Air Headquarters on New Year's Eve from areconnaissance pilot told of an enemy force in small steamers and towe dbarges moving down the Perak coast . With the first reinforcement convoynow approaching Singapore Air Vice-Marshal Pulford dared not divertaircraft in any strength from the task of protecting it, a task that demandedshepherding operations by fighters, and reconnaissance sorties by 6 Hud-sons, 4 Glenn Martins and 2 Catalinas daily for three, days, while al lother available combat aircraft remained at the alert ready to strik e

1 Gp Capt E. B. Rice, RAF. (1914-19 : 4th Dismounted Rifles, SAF; Lt Royal Dublin Fusiliers ;RFC and RAF .) Comd 223 Gp HQ 1941, 224 Gp HQ 1942. Regular air force offr; b. Clare-mont, Cape of Good Hope, Sth Africa, 5 Jul 1892. Died while a prisoner of war 5 Sep 1943.


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should enemy air or naval forces, or both, attack the convoy . On NewYear ' s Day the enemy force on the west coast reached the mouth of thePerak River. One tug, with four barges in tow and all vessels laden withtroops, grounded on a sandbank in the river's moutha perfect target .The defending troops sent an urgent call for naval and air striking forces .There was no naval force within reach that was capable of effectiveattack and the aircraft that were sent arrived too late to strike . The tidehad risen and the "target" had refloated and disappeared somewher eunder the dense jungle overhanging the river .As the first reinforcement convoy came nearer, the two AustralianHudson squadrons undertook the brunt of the reconnaissance sorties whil ethe combined Australian fighter unit, No . 21/453 Squadron, which by thistime had received 16 replacement aircraft, shared in providing the fighte rpatrols, sending out aircraft, in relays, 6 at a time . Happily this task ofwatching over 7 merchant ships, with their escort of 5 warships, wa sperformed without enemy interference . The convoy berthed safely o n3rd January . 2Further progress by enemy forces down the west coast was accom-panied by a strong attack on the main British positions in the Kampararea, but it was the flanking coastal movement that told; a further Britishwithdrawal was forced, this time to the Slim River area where new posi-tions were taken up on 4th January . Japanese air units were now in Ipoh ,and this enabled them to reduce the range of their sorties and increasethe number. An understanding of the strain placed on the troops of the11th Indian Division and the communications of the III Indian Corp sby almost incessant enemy air attack while they had no direct air suppor tof their own must temper any criticism of their lack of spirit . On theother hand the over-worked air units whose resources were so limitedwere in no way to blame. "They did their willing best, " General Perciva lwrote later, "and it was no fault of theirs that it was a poor best ." 3The task confronting Air Headquarters was indeed perplexing when Ai rVice-Marshal Maltby arrived on 4th January to fill the post of Chief ofStaff to the new Commander-in-Chief, General Pownall . 4By this time headquarters of both Malaya Command and III Corp swere calling urgently for air action against the Japanese forces landingon the west coast and outflanking the British positions . Air Headquarterstherefore ordered daily offensive reconnaissance sweeps by from four t osix Glenn Martins or Blenheims. At first these were unescorted operationsbut the loss of four aircraft in one day from enemy fighter attacks force dthe Command to provide escort from its own very precious fighter strength .Four Shark aircraft, one of the two flights of No. 4 Anti-Aircraft Coopera-tion Unit based at Tengah, had been moved to Batu Pahat on the wes ta - This convoy brought the 45th Indian Brigade and a pioneer battalionall untried and onlypartially-trained troops .Percival, The War in Malaya, p. 199

* Maltby remained to assist the AOCFar East Command when Pownall became Chief ofStaff to Wavell . He was attached to AHQ Singapore on 12th January for that purpose .


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2-5JanEFFECTS OF AIR ATTACKS325coast on 2nd January to bring them within range for such reconnaissanceoperations . On 2nd, 3rd and 4th January Blenheim crews attacked an ddamaged enemy barges off Port Swettenham. No definite sinkings wer ereported .At this stage General Percival ordered General Heath s of III Corpsto do his utmost to delay the enemy's advance by flank and rear attacks .It was of the utmost importance, he said, that the airfields at KualaLumpur and Port Swettenham should be denied to the Japanese unti lat least 13th January (when another convoy should be in port) . On 2ndand 3rd January enemy attempts to land at Kuala Selangor were repelled ,but on the 4th other enemy troops were encountered moving south alon gthe coast track about eight miles to the north . In the Slim River secto rthe British and Indian troops prepared new positions, working mainly a tnight because by day Japanese aircraft were almost continually bombingand machine-gunning the jungle flanking the road and the railway, eve nwhen they could not see a target . Though they inflicted few casualties ,these attacks seriously demoralised the troops . The commander of oneIndian battalion, Colonel Deakin,0 reported that his unit, which hadwithdrawn 176 miles in three weeks with only three days' rest, and a ta cost of 250 casualties, most of whom had been killed, had lost 5 0per cent of its fighting efficiency. His men now " seemed to want to donothing but sit in slit trenches". They complained that they could no tsleep because of the enemy air attacks, and the deadly silence on th eground, emphasised by the blanketing effect of the jungle, was getting o ntheir nerves. This silence was broken only by the roar of enemy aircraf tengines overhead .

On the day of the arrival of the first convoy two Australian Buffal opilots, Flying Officer Wallace? and Sergeant Harrison, 8 flew to KualaLumpur with orders to make a tactical reconnaissance to the south o fIpoh. They found a force of Japanese troops with motor transport movin gsouth and, attacking with low-level gunfire, they caused substantial casual-ties and damage. Just as Wallace and Harrison were circling to land atKuala Lumpur for refuelling "the whole runway seemed to erupt" a sseveral sticks of bombs burst on it . The Buffaloes were caught in th eturbulence caused by the explosions and, when their aircraft had levelle dout again, the pilots saw a formation of 27 enemy bombers sweeping west -ward at 20,000 feet . Since the runway at Kuala Lumpur was now unser-viceable, they flew back to Sembawang, landing there after dark with thei rfuel tanks practically empty .Kuala Lumpur was now untenable even as an advanced base, and th emaintenance party from No. 21/453 Squadron, which had remained ther e

6 Lt-Gen Sir Lewis Heath, KBE, CB, CIE, DSO, MC. GOC5 Indian Div 1939-41 ; comd II IIndian Corps 1941-42. Regular soldier; b. Poona, India, 23 Nov 1885. Died 10 Jan 1954 .c Brig C. C. Deakin, DSO, OBE. GSO1 1 Aust Div 1937-40; comd 5/2 Punjab Bn 1941. Regularsoldier; b. Cruck Meole, Shropshire, Eng, 16 July 1896 .Sqn Ldr R. H. Wallace, 586. 21, 21/453, 5 and 30 Sqns. Regular air force offr; of Larg sBay, SA; b. Largs Bay, 12 Jan 1918. Killed in aircraft accident 29 Oct 1944.

e F-Lt G. T. Harrison, 407578. 21, 21/453, 23, 84 and 450 Sqns. Shoe designer; of KensingtonGardens, SA; b. Glenelg, SA, 10 Dec 1917 .


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when all the aircraft had moved to Singapore Island, was ordered towithdraw, undertaking demolition work at Port Swettenham on their wayback ; they reached Sembawang on 6th January . Before dawn on the sameday two other Buffalo pilots, Flight Lieutenant Kirkman and Flyin gOfficer Sheppard, left Sembawang to investigate a report of further enemybarge movements along the Bernam River . After searching for some timethey sighted nine barges laden with Japanese troops . It was one of thosetoo rare occasions when the enemy could be paid back in like measure .Kirkman and Sheppard climbed to 2,000 feet, rolled their aircraft over ,and dived to blast the troops in the barges with their gunfire . Theyrepeated these tactics until they had spent most of their ammunition .Later, in the mess at Sembawang, Kirkman answered the questions o ffellow pilots with the terse comment, "We saw a lot of Japs in thewaterdead ones . "

But such operations were too few to relieve the 11th Division whichwas being sorely pressed despite all the efforts of the commanders todevelop a tactical situation in which the enemy could be held . Aftermore confused fighting in which the Japanese advance was temporarilystayed the enemy's numbers, fitness for such combat, armament and tac-tical advantages told again. On 7th January their main column, consistingof tanks with infantry support, smashed through the 11th Division's for -ward positions ; then the tanks drove deeply into the British defence areaand continued for 19 miles, sweeping aside all attempts at opposition andreaching a point three miles south of Slim River Bridge, a key positionin the British defences. The battle of Slim River was a spectacular succes sfor the Japanese and a disaster for the British forces; the loss of centralMalaya was now certain .

Meanwhile, the 9th Indian Division, with the 8th Indian Brigade in th eKuala Lipis-Jerantut area and the 22nd Indian Brigade at Kuantan, hadbeen given a task comparable in purpose with that of the 11th Divisionat Kuala Lumpur : denial of Kuantan airfield to the enemy, and for th esame reasons. These forces might have been effectively used for an opera-tion against the left flank of the main Japanese force by moving alon gthe Jerantut-Raub-Kuala Kubu road but for the over-riding importanc eof the need to defend the airfield . Something of what Percival has termedthe "poor best" of the air force was contributed in an attempt to destroyenemy aircraft on the ground in the Kuantan area on 2nd January . TheGong Kedah airfield had been occupied by the Japanese on New Year 'sEve, bringing Kuantan more nearly within their grasp . It was an expressionof the weakness of Air Command's striking power that the attack on thi sairfield should have to be limited to the two remaining Catalinas o fNo. 205 Squadron R.A .F ., reinforced on 7th January by three more .The Catalinas were so vulnerable to enemy fighter attacks that they ha dbeen withdrawn from daylight reconnaissance and were being used instea dfor long-range night attacks; they were the only aircraft available wit hsufficient range for attacks on such targets as Singora (on which they


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23Dec-8IanJAPANESE SHIPS HIT327made two strikes) and Gong Kedah. An indication of the importanceplaced on the attack on Gong Kedah lay in Pulford's expressed intentio nof accompanying one of the crews making the strike . That the Air OfficerCommanding should find it necessary to contemplate this was in itself areflection of the great strain that was imposed upon him. It happenedthat at the last moment he was prevented from doing so. Two experiencedofficers of No. 8 Squadron, Flight Lieutenants Bell and Widmer, wereselected to fly in the Catalinas as navigators. The strike was made bu tthere is no record of any particular success attending it ; nor could soweak a striking force have gained much success .

The 56th Japanese Regiment which had captured Kota Bharu ha dmade contact with patrols of the 22nd Indian Brigade on 23rd Decem-ber and by New Year 's Eve was investing the Kuantan airfield . On 3rdJanuary, the 22nd Brigade, having lost about one-third of its strengthin combat, began to withdraw towards Raub .An incidental operation at this time was an attack on 8th Januar yby nine Glenn Martins and four Hudsons on an enemy ship anchoredin the South China Sea. It was suspected that the vessel was being usedas a navigation base for Japanese aircraft flying from Indo-China t oMalaya. Direct hits were observed by the attacking crews . Next day nineGlenn Martins bombed enemy ships unloading at Kuantan with "som esuccess" . Two days after the 22nd Indian Brigade had withdrawn, th eenemy achieved what G.H.Q . had been so anxious to preventthe occupa-tion of Kuantan airfield. Even before the actual occupation Air Head-quarters had ordered all the available strength of No. 21/453 Squadronto prepare for an attack. On 8th January 8 Buffaloes flew to Kluang .After landing in the dusk the aircraft of both Flight Lieutenant Kinnin-mont and Flying Officer Vanderfield ran into unmarked bomb craters andwere damaged. Surprise was essential to the attack which, therefore, hadbeen planned for dawn. There was a final briefing by torchlight nextmorning and all serviceable Buffaloes were airborne before daylight . Asdawn came and the aircraft were circling to pick up formation, therewas a cry over the radio-telephone of "Bandit!" and an enemy reconnais-sance aircraft swept over at high speed . One Buffalo pilot fired a vainburst of gunfire at it as it disappeared . There was no sign of any otherenemy aircraft and the Buffaloes set course for Kuantan only to be recalle dby the ground controller because the target had been shut off by torren-tial rain. The attack was therefore abandoned and the pilots flew dis-consolately back to Sembawang .It was now symptomatic of the whole campaign that the army 's initialproblem of meeting the enemy's advance from tactically unsound position sso that it might preserve the Malayan airfields for the use of the Allied ai runits had radically changed. Instead it was fighting from equally unsoundtactical positions to deny the enemy each of these airfields in turn for a slong as possible. The safety of approaching convoys and of Singapor eIsland itself also demanded the maximum effort from the Allied air units .


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This, in turn, denied air support to the army in its urgent task; and, ifthe army failed to hold the airfields, the enemy would be able to moun tair attacks in such strength that they might be able both to smash th econvoys before they had discharged their urgently needed cargoes an dto make the airfields on Singapore Island untenable to the Allied ai runits. G.H.Q. were thus forced to gamble on whether the reinforcementscould be brought in safely, in sufficient numbers and in time .This situation and its implied need to hold the Japanese north o fJohore until reinforcements permitted an effective offensive were im-mediately apparent to General Wavell when, on the day of the Slim Riverdisaster, he reached Singapore . The day after his arrival in Malaya hevisited the headquarters of both the 11th and 9th Indian Divisions . Heat once appreciated that the most urgent need of III Corps was rest .He therefore ordered that the 8th Australian Division (except the 22n dBrigade Group which was to stay in the Mersing area) should move t onorth-west Johore to meet the main enemy drive on the Segamat-Moun tOphir-Muar line. These Australian troops, commanded by Major-GeneralBennett,9 would be supplemented by four battalions then comprising th e9th Indian Division, which in turn would be brought to strength byaddition of the freshest troops of III Corps and of the 45th Indian Brigade .Wavell also surveyed the defence of Singapore . He noted that nodefences against invasion from the north had been constructed or planned ,an omission which he ordered to be corrected at once . His battle plan wasthat General Bennett's force, to be known as Westforce, would form th emain line of resistance in the Segamat-Muar sector . The III Corps wit hthe 22nd Brigade Group A.I.F . (Eastforce) would defend southern Johor eon the Endau-Kluang-Batu Pahat line. The 11th Indian Division was tobe rested and reorganised in Johore.

While these plans were being made the 11th Division was still inthe front line though General Heath had withdrawn it farther south .The division was ordered to hold Kuala Lumpur until midnight of 10th -11th January and then fall back about 30 miles to the Seremban area .On 10th January the hard-worked Blenheim crews were called o nto destroy 13 trains laden with British stores that had been stranded o nthe Malacca branch line because of the congestion and dislocation o ftraffic on the main railway . They achieved partial success in this, and i na comparable operation two days later they bombed several oil tank s

that had been left intact at Port .Swettenham .The decision to withdraw from Kuala Lumpur, capital of the Federate dMalay States, carried a heavy responsibility that was emphasised by th eobvious distress of the Asian population to whom the long column o fretreating troops under a sky dense with the smoke from blazing build-ings and oil stores was nerve-breaking . It began their own disorganise dretreat to Singapore by road and raila retreat that broke their con- Lt-Gen H Gordon Bennett, CB, CMG, DSO, VD, NX70343 . (1st AIF : Comd 6 Bn 1915-16 ,3 Inf Bde 1916-19 .) GOC8 Div 1940-42, III Aust Corps 1942-44. Public accountant andcompany director; of Sydney ; b Balwyn, Vic, 16 Apr 1887 .


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10-12 IanFRUSTRATED FIGHTERS32 9fidence in British rule and was to cause serious civil problems in tha talready congested city .Continuing his tactics of land-and-sea movement, the enemy was press-ing down the west coast of the peninsula . A water-borne force lande dnear Port Swettenham on 10th January without opposition, occupied th etown, and then pushed inland in the hope of cutting off the 11th Division ' sretreat. They missed this opportunity by only a few hours . On 12t hJanuary the commander of the 5th Japanese Division set up his head-quarters in Kuala Lumpur and thus closed the first phase of XXV Army'splan for the conquest of Malaya . Although petrol and oil stores atKuala Lumpur and Port Swettenham had been run to waste or burned,and demolition had been carried out at Kuala Lumpur airfield, the enemygained much valuable war material .In the success of the Japanese advance there was, of course, emphasi son his success in severing the III Corps' communications. Percival hassince written that the best way to maintain communications was to suppl ythe forward troops by air. In fact Far East Command had no aircraf tsuitable for such operations and very few containers for supply dropping .The result was that forward troops had to have with them the reserve sthey needed to maintain them in the field for seven days, a very heavypenalty in terms of mobility and a contrast to the situation of the com-paratively unburdened enemy .Further tactical reconnaissance operations over Port Swettenham ,Kuala Lumpur and Ipoh occupied No . 21/453 Squadron on 10th an d11th January . On the 12th there was another demonstration of thefrustration these pilots were called on to endure . Eight Buffaloes tookoff from Sembawang to help defend Singapore against enemy air forma-tions that numbered more than 100 aircraft . After a harassed controlleron the ground had directed them successively to three different sector son their gridded maps, the Buffalo pilots picked out one formation o f27 bombers which was clearing the target area after the attack . Withthrottles wide open the Buffaloes gave chase . When the enemy pilot ssaw that they were being overtaken, they too opened their throttles and ,their aircraft the lighter for having released their bomb-load, they wentinto a shallow dive and gained speed. From that moment the Buffaloe swere left behind . "Bombers outpacing fighters, " one Australian pilotsaid afterwards with disgust, " You've got toell laugh!" The enemyhaving divided into three formations, had bombed Seletar, Tengah an dthe docks in Keppel Harbour, and then flown away without interception ,leaving fires burning in each target area . The Buffaloes landed again, theirpilots to return to the "alert room" to await further orders and hold "pos tmortem" examinations on yet another futile attempt to meet and matc hthe enemy .

The "alert hut" (Kinninmont wrote later) was a large room at one end of ou rdouble-storied brick station headquarters building . Fifty yards across the road wa sthe edge of the aerodrome, and down to the left were four huge iron hangars .


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Straight out from the alert hut our fighters were lined up ready to go . OtherBuffaloes w ere dispersed in built-up earthen pe ns around the e dge of the field an dback in the rubber . Hangars and workshops and all vital sections were roughl yinside this headquarters are a . Thus the pilots spent m ost of their time in the centr eof the choicest target on the station; which fact left them quite unconcerned .It was in this attack on Singapore targets that No . 488 (Fighter )Squadron, R. N . Z .A.F ., formed under the Empire Air Training Scheme ,had its first air combat as a unit .' Based on Tengah, which had beenheavily bombed three days before when the unit's offices and equipment ,oil and ammunition stores were practically demolished, the squadron

put 8 Buffaloes into the air . Soon they were in action against 27 enemyfighters, which had, as was customary, the advantage of greater altitude .Within minutes 2 Buffaloes had been shot down but both pilots para-chuted to safety . Three other pilots were wounded and 5 Buffaloe sdamaged. On Singapore Island the Buffalo pilots on the ground neededat least 30 minutes' warning of an enemy raid if they were to take offand reach an altitude of upwards of 20,000 feet at which the Japanes eformations usually flew. But with the successive evacuation of ObserverCorps posts as the enemy advanced down the peninsula and the in-adequacy of the radar cover, warnings of 30 minutes were almost un-known. When the Buffalo pilots did succeed in joining the enemy i ncombat they were outnumbered in any ratio between 6 and 15 to one .Of Singapore's anti-aircraft defences, only the 3 .7-inch guns, of whichthere were but 40 on the island, could reach the enemy aircraft flyin gat altitudes of 20,000 feet and more.Through "black weather fronts" and heavy rain storms the Hudsonand Glenn Martin crews were maintaining arduous reconnaissance sortie sfrom Sembawang, sorties now becoming increasingly hazardous becaus eof the enemy's acquisition of closer bases for their fighters . It was becom-ing commonplace now for these aircraft to return riddled with bulle tholes caused by the fire from intercepting Zeros . As an example therewas the experience of Flying Officer Gibbes2 who had joined No . 1Squadron at Kota Bharu on the very eve of the invasion . Gibbes broughthis Hudson back badly holed by enemy gunfire from each of four suc-cessive sorties and each time it was patched up and made airworthyagain by the ground staff.

The Australian Buffalo pilots made another and their last attempt t ostrike at the Japanese on the ground at Kuantan on the afternoon o f12th January . Again a wall of bad weather made approach to the targe tarea impossible. The tactics employed on these offensive sweeps wer e' No. 488 was formed in New Zealand in September 1941 at the request of the British Govern-ment, earlier in the year, for a fully-manned fighter squadron to share in the defence o fSingapore. The squadron reached Singapore in October and was converted to and equippedwith aircraft left by No. 67 Squadron RAF when that squadron was transferred to Burma .No . 488 Squadron had achieved partial operational proficiency by December, and by January1942 was performing routine patrols and taking part in major engagements .9 Sqn Ldr P. J. Gibbes, MVO, DFC AFC 262097 . 6 Sqn, 1 Commn Flight, 1 and 7 Sqns;Test pilot duties, Laverton, 1943; Trans Pacific Ferry Service 1943-45. Commercial pilot;of Darling Point, NSW; b. Roseville, NSW, 4 Apr 1915 .


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Ian 1942CONVOY REACHES SINGAPORE33 1those used successfully by the R.A.F . in the Middle East . The squadronflew as a formation but each pair of aircraft would weave forward i nwide curves, a manoeuvre which permitted a much greater area of searchthan was possible in direct flight . On this occasion two weaving Buffaloescollided. One of the pilots, Harrison, succeeded in crash-landing his air -craft in the jungle . Setting out for the coast he trudged determinedlyfor two days. On the second night he found himself in a mangrove swamp .The only place he could find in which to sleep was a hut at the end o fa long Malayan fish-trap . During the night the tide rose and he wasforced to climb on to the roof where he clung while three crocodilescruised round him in the moonlight . Next day he stayed until the croco-diles, seemingly tired of waiting, disappeared and then he struggled tothe coast near Mersing where he was found by an A.I.F . patrol andbrought back to safety. The other pilot, Wallace, managed to keep hisdamaged aircraft flying until he was over the sea near Tengora . By thistime he was losing height so he "ditched" his Buffalo in the sea and ,though injured and bleeding freely, succeeded in swimming 200 yardsto the shore. For two days he struggled through the jungle and then buil ta raft and floated down a river until he, too, was found by an A .I.F .patrol. Though only two miles from the A.I .F. base at Jemaluang, th eparty took five days to make their way through jungle with the injure dairman, who was then flown to Singapore by one of that little group o fgallant airmen, the Malayan Volunteer Air Force .

At dawn on 13th January No. 21/453 Squadron, with 14 Buffaloes ,was ready for the big eventthe arrival of the convoy carrying the 5 1Hurricane fighters. As the convoy approached the island, one half steam-ing towards Keppel Harbour and the other half towards the naval base ,enemy air formations numbering about 100 aircraft were reported to beapproaching. It was at this critical moment that the weather, which seeme dto have favoured the enemy so consistently since the Malayan campaig nbegan, turned against them. Closing in rapidly a heavy cloud formatio ncompletely screened the convoy from the Japanese bombers and screenedthe attackers from the circling Buffaloes. For the next 24 hours weather ,as "bad" as Singapore had known for a long time, gave the convoy com-plete freedom from air attack not only in berthing but in disembarkin gits troops and unloading its cargo.Reinforcements included in this convoy were a brigade of the 18thBritish Division ; the 51 Hurricane fighters, in crates, accompanied b y24 Hurricane pilots from Nos. 17, 135 and 136 (Fighter) Squadron sR.A .F. ; and a nucleus ground staff of No. 232 (Fighter) SquadronR.A .F., the new Hurricane squadron for Far East Command. Some indica-tion has been given of the tension that existed as the convoy approached ;its safe arrival produced a sense of exultation among those who knewwhat it had brought. Understandably they felt that this, at last, migh tbe the turning point ; here was the means to sweep the Japanese from the


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skies and stem their advance on the Malayan mainland . Thus stimulatedthey went to work with all speed to prepare the Hurricanes for battle .A reconnaissance by two Buffalo pilots, Flight Lieutenant Sproule andSergeant Parsons,3 brought news of enemy air activity at Kuantan3 0Zeros on the ground and a number airborne . Low cloud gave the Buffalopilots good cover and they returned without combat . All enemy activityon the east coast was now watched with growing concern for Intelligencereports increasingly suggested that a major Japanese landing in th eEndau area, to the north of Mersing, could be expected in the disturb-ingly near future . Initially General Bennett had been in communicatio nwith Group Captain McCauley on the question of air support . He ha ssince recorded that the liaison between his command and the R .A.A.F .was "excellent" and that he had received a copy of McCauley's tentativeproposals for air cooperation with the A .I .F . in the event of an attack.These had been submitted to Pulford for approval . The decision byWavell that the 8th Division should move to meet the main enemy driv ecancelled any such plans. But now, it seemed, a Japanese attempt to lan da large force on the east coast and to strike south from there wa simminent .

a Sgt H W . Parsons, 407802. 21 and 21/453 Sqns, Storeman; of Port Adelaide; b. Adelaide ,5 Jun 1918. Killed in action 19 Jan 1942,

Raaf-malaya Convoys January 1942

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