Response

r2^Liberalism and Democracy

Cant Have One Without the Other

Marc F. Plattner

Less than a quarter-century ago, demo-cracy appeared to be confmed, with a fewexceptions, to North America and WestemEurope. These nations had advanced in-dustrial economies, sizable middleclasses, and high literacy rates—factorsthat many political scientists regarded asprerequisites for successfial democracy.They were home not only to free andcompetitive multiparty elections but alsoto the rule of law and the protection ofindividual liberties. In short, they werewhat had come to be called"liberal democracies."

In the rest ofthe world, by contrast,most countries were neither liberal nordemocratic. They were ruled by a varietyof dictatorships—military, single-party,revolutionary, Marxist-Leninist—thatrejected free, multiparty elections (in prac-tice, if not always in principle). By theearly 1990s, however, this situation had

changed dramatically, as an astonishingnumber of autocratic regimes around theworld fell from power. They were generallysucceeded by regimes that at least aspired tobe democratic, giving rise to the phenome-non that Samuel P. Huntington termedthe "third wave" of democratization.Today, well over a hundred countries, inevery continent in the world, can plausiblyclaim to have freely elected governments.

Outside of Africa, few of these aspiringnew democracies have sufFered outrightreversions to authoritarianism. But many,even among those that hold unambigu-ously free and fair elections, fall short ofproviding the protection of individualliberties and adherence to the rule of lawcommonly found in the long-establisheddemocracies. As Larry Diamond has putit, many ofthe new regimes are "electoraldemocracies" but not "liberal democracies."Citing Diamonds distinction, Huntington

MARC F PLATTNER is Co-Editor oi the Journal of Democracy^ and Co-Director ofthe International Forum for Democratic Studies.

Marc F. Plattner

has argued that the introduction of elec- mechanism by which the people exercisetions in non-Western societies may often their rule. Today it is further presumedlead to victory by antiliberal forces. And that democracy imphes virtually universalFareed Zakaria has contended that the adult suffrage and eligibility to run forpromotion of elections around the world office. Elections, then, are regarded ashas been responsible for "the rise of illiberal embodying the popular or majoritariandemocracy"—that is, of freely elected gov- aspect of contemporary liberal democracy,ernments that fail to safeguard basic liber- The word "liberal" in the phrase liberalties. "Constitutional liberalism," Zakaria democracy refers not to the matter ofargues, "is theoretically different and his- who rules but to the matter of how thattorically distinct from democracy rule is exercised. Above all, it implies thatToday the two strands of liberal demo- government is limited in its powers andcracy, interwoven in the Western poUtical its modes of acting. It is hmited first byfabric, are coming apart in the rest of the the rule of law, and especiaUy by a funda-world. Democracy is flourishing; consti- mental law or constitution, but ultimatelytutional liberalism is not." Drawing upon it is limited by the rights ofthe individual,this distinction, Zakaria recommends that The idea of natural or inalienable rights,Western policymakers not only increase which today are most commonly calledtheir efforts to foster constitutional liberal- "human rights," originated with liberalism,ism but diminish their support for elec- The primacy of individual rights meanstions, and suggests that "liberal autocra- that the protection ofthe private sphere,cies" are preferable to illiberal democracies, along with the plurality and diversity of

ends that people seek in their pursuit ofDECONSTRUCTING DEMOCRACY happiness, is a key element of a liberalThe basic distinction made by all these political order.authors is both valid and important. Lib- The fact that democracy and liberalismeral democracy—which is what most are not inseparably linked is proven by thepeople mean today when they speak of historical existence both of nonliberaldemocracy—is indeed an interweaving democracies and of liberal nondemocracies.of two different elements, one democratic The democracies ofthe ancient world,in a stricter sense and the other liberal. As although their citizens were incomparablyits etymological derivation suggests, the more involved in governing themselvesmost basic meaning ofthe word "democ- than we are today, did not provide freedomracy" is the rule ofthe people. As the of speech or religion, protection of pri-rule ofthe many, it is distinguished from vate property, or constitutional govern-monarchy (the rule of one person), aristo- ment. On the other side, the birthplacecracy (the rule ofthe best), and oligarchy of liberalism, modern England, retained(the rule ofthe few). In the modern a highly restricted franchise well into theworld, where the sheer size of states has nineteenth century. As Zakaria pointsrendered impossible the direct democracy out, England offers the classic exampleonce practiced by some ancient republics, of democratization by a gradual extensionthe election of legislative representatives of suffrage well after the essential institu-and other public officials is the chief tions of constitutional liberalism were

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already in place. In our own time, Zakaria the authority ofthe government; this willoffers Hong Kong under British colonial shall be expressed in periodic and genuinerule as an example of a flourishing of lib- elections which shall be by universal anderalism in the absence of democracy. equal suffrage and shall be held by secret

vote or by equivalent free voting proce-ALL MEN ARE CREATED EQUAL dures." One may regard this as a formalAlthough "unpacking" the component or even merely defmitional link betweenelements of modern hberal democracy is liberalism and electoral democracy, but ita crucial first step toward comprehending points to a more profound kinship,its character, overstating the disjunction For the pohtical doctrine at the sourcebetween hberalism and democracy can of liberalism also contains a deeply egali-easily lead to new misunderstanding. tarian and majoritarian dimension. ThisWhile many new electoral democracies is the doctrine that all legitimate pohticalfall short of liberalism, on the whole, power is derived from the consent ofcountries that hold free elections are over- individuals, who are by nature not onlywhelmingly more liberal than those that free but equal. In the opening pages ofdo not, and countries that protect civil lib- his Second Treatise of Government^ Johnerties are overwhelmingly more likely to Locke states that men are naturally in "ahold free elections than those that do not. state of perfect freedom," which is "a stateThis is not simply an accident. It is the also of equality, wherein all the powerresult of powerful intrinsic links between and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no oneelectoral democracy and a Hberal order. having more than another: there being

Some of these links are immediately ap- nothing more evident, than that Creaturesparent. Starting from the democratic side, ofthe same species and rank promiscu-elections would seem to require the guaran- ously born to all the same advantages oftee of certain civil liberties—the freedoms Nature, and the use ofthe same faculties,of speech, association, and assembly—if should be equal one amongst anotherthey are to be genuinely free and fair. Thus without Subordination or Subjection."even minimalist definitions of democracy The essential point is that no man has aoffered by political scientists usually include natural claim to rule over another, and itsa stipulation that such liberties must be clear corollary is that the rule of man overmaintained at least to the extent necessary man can be justified only on the basis ofto make possible open electoral competi- a mutual agreement or "compact."tion. If we begin instead with the human Now it is true that neither Locke norrights mandated by the liberal tradition, his immediate successors concluded fromthese are generally held today to include this that democracy was the only legitimatesome kind of right to electoral participa- form of government. For while they heldtion. Thus Article 21 ofthe U.N. Univer- that the consent of all is essential to thesal Declaration of Human Rights states: original compact that forms a political"Everyone has the right to take part in the community, they also contended that thegovernment of his country, directly or political community is free to decidethrough freely chosen representatives . . . where it chooses to bestow legislativeThe will ofthe people shall be the basis of power—^whether it is in a democracy, an

FOREIGN AFFAIRS-March/April 1998

Marc F. Plattner

oligarchy, a monarchy, or a mix, as it wasamong the King, Lords, and Commonsin England. Liberalism did not originallyinsist on democracy as a form ot govern-ment, but it unequivocally insisted uponthe ultimate sovereignty ofthe people.Thus Locke argues that if the legislature isdissolved or violates its trust, the power toinstitute a new one reverts to the majorityofthe people.

In order to grasp the distinctive char-acter of liberal egalitarianism, it is neces-sary to appreciate how different modernliberal democracy is from the premodern(and truly illiberal) democracy ofthe an-cient city. Reliance on elected representa-tion in the legislature, the key politicalinstitution of modern liberal democracy,was understood by its proponents as a de-cisive departure from ancient democracy.The authors of The Federalist frequentlycontrast two very different kinds of "pop-ular government." They write in favor ofa "republic" ("a government in which thescheme of representation takes place"),which they argue need not be subject tothe infirmities of "a pure democracy" ("asociety consisting of a small number ofcitizens who assemble and administer thegovernment in person," Federalist xo). Inpure or direct democracies, they contend,"there is nothing to check the inducementsto sacrifice the weaker party or an obnox-ious individual," and therefore they "haveever been found incompatible with per-sonal security or the rights of property."Later, in Federalist 63, acknowledgingthat the principle of representation wasnot unknown to the ancients, Madisonstates: "The true distinction between[ancient democracies] and the Americangovernments lies in the total exclusion ofthe people in their collective capacity, from

any share in the latter, and not in the totalexclusion ofthe representatives of the peoplefrom the administration oix\it former"(italics in original). In short, modern lib-eral democracy from the outset was in-clined to minimize the direct politicalrole ofthe people. In this sense, Zakariais on soHd ground in stressing the anti-majoritarian aspects of hberalism.

In part, of course, the substitution ofrepresentative government for directdemocracy was justified by the largersize of modem states, which made it im-practical for the whole people to assemble.But this very fact had led thinkers UkeMontesquieu and Rousseau to concludethat democratic or repubUcan govern-ment was possible only in a small state,and Rousseau to assert that "the momentthat a people gives itself representatives,it is no longer free." There was, however,another ground used to justify represen-tative government. In Madison's words,it "would refine and enlarge the publicviews by passing tbem through the mediumof a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdommay best discern the true interest of theircountry and whose patriotism and love ofjustice will be least likely to sacrifice it totemporary or partial considerations." Inother words, elected representatives areexpected to be superior to the averagecitizen. In the ancient democracies, bycontrast, most public officials were chosenby lot. In The Politics, Aristotle character-izes lot as the democratic mode of choos-ing officials, and election as the oligarchicmode. Montesquieu reiterates this judg-ment, adding, "The suffrage by lot is amethod of electing that offends no one,but animates each citizen with the pleasinghope of serving his country." Whereelections are used instead, those chosen _

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tend to be richer, better educated, and monarchical political system. But as themore talented than most of their fellow principle that all men are created equalcitizens. In this light, representative or gained currency, and as the educationalelectoral democracy, besides largely elim- and economic situation ofthe commoninating the people from direct participa- people continued to improve, it was onlytion in self-government, also seems to to be expected that some of them wouldconstitute an aristocratic deviation from begin to demand the vote. And once theypolitical equality. began to do so, how could it any longer

be claimed that they consented to a poht-BY AND FOR THE PEOPLE ical order in which they had no say?Yet there is another sense in which modern Popular sovereignty without popularliberal, representative democracy is much government may be coherent in theorymore egalitarian than was ancient democ- and even sustainable in practice for aracy. In the latter, the citizens entitled to time. Over the long run, however, popularparticipate in public affairs invariably rep- sovereignty can hardly fail to lead toresented a relatively small percentage of popular government,the overall population. Not only were Thus it is not surprising that through-large numbers of slaves and resident aliens out the Western world, liberal, constitu-excluded, but women had no role in polit- tional regimes became more and moreical affairs. Preliberal democracy, the direct democratic during the nineteenth anddemocracy ofthe ancient city, was not twentieth centuries. The share of legislativebased on any concept ofthe fundamental, power wielded by monarchs or unelectednatural equality of all human beings. It is bodies receded until it had virtually dis-true, of course, that modern representative appeared. At the same time, suffrage wasgovernment for a long time excluded the gradually broadened. Property qualifica-poor and all women from political partic- tions and exclusions on the basis of raceipation, and in the United States even or sex were eliminated, to the pointcoexisted with slavery. But it is no less where "universal and equal suffrage" wastrue that these kinds of exclusions were endorsed by the world community inalways in tension with the underlying 1948 as a human right,principle of liberalism—namely, that all The moral grounds for extendinghuman beings are by nature free and suffrage are succinctly stated by Johnequal. The historical development of Stuart Mill in his Considerations onthis principle inevitably transformed Representative Government, published inliberalism into liberal democracy. 1861. "It is a personal injustice," Mill argues.

It is one thing to claim that the majority "to withhold from anyone, unless for theof people in a traditional and hierarchical prevention of greater evils, the ordinarysociety have somehow given their tacit privilege of having his voice reckoned inconsent to a political arrangement in which the disposal of affairs in which he has thethey are excluded from having any voice. same interest as other people . . . NoPopular sentiment in seventeenth-century arrangement ofthe suffrage, therefore,England, if there had been a way of meas- can be permanently satisfactory inuring it, might well have approved of a which any person or class is peremptorily

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Marc F Plattner

excluded, in which the electoral privilegeis not open to all persons of full age whodesire to obtain it." On these groundsMill also argues for the extension ofthefranchise to women. Yet this does notprevent him from arguing against grantingthe vote to illiterates and to recipients ofparish relief (i.e., welfare); he also proposesthat multiple votes be allotted to the edu-cated and professional classes. Today, suchdepartures from universality and equalityin the allocation ofthe franchise seemshockingly "elitist." No arguments for "theprevention of greater evils" are reckonedas sufficiently powerful to overbalancethe injustice of denying any citizen anequal vote.

MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK

There is another respect in which Mill'sRepresentative Government 1% repugnantto contemporary sensibilities—namely,its justification of colonialism. For Mill,representative government "is the idealtype of a perfect government," but it isnot applicable under all social conditions.In particular, it is ill suited to "barbarous"or "backward" peoples, who are likelyto need some form of monarchical or(preferably) external rule to bringthem toward the state of civilizationin which they might become fit forrepresentative government.

In part. Mill's argument in favor ofcolonialism is grounded in a dubiousdoctrine of historical progress (or of"modernization," as we would say today).Yet there is another basis for Mill's con-tention that representative government isnot applicable under all conditions that isnot easily dismissed. As he puts it, "rep-resentative, like any other government,must be unsuitable in any case in which it

cannot permanently subsist." If people donot value representative government, ifthey are unwilling to defend it, if they areunable to do what it requires, then theywill not be able to maintain it. Thus itwould be vain to expect that it wouldserve them well.

The concern with making democracyable to maintain itself, with training andspurring the people to do what is neededto make democracy work, is certainlynot outdated. It is at the heart of mostprograms of "democracy assistance" nowbeing provided to new democracies byWestern governments, international andregional organizations, and nongovern-mental organizations alike. It is at the rootofthe central concern today of politicalscientists who study new democracies—the problem of consolidation, or how tobring a democratic regime to the pointwhere its breakdown becomes extremelyunlikely. And it explains the widespreadattention to issues of citizenship and civilsociety today, not only in new democraciesbut in long-established ones as well.These concerns reflect the irreduciblefact that making self-government work isnot easy. A democratic government canbe given to any people, but not everypeople can maintain it. But what is to bedone in the case of a people that is not,at least for the time being, capable ofmaking democracy work? Mill's answerto this question was colonial rule. Whatis ours? That is the question implicitlyraised by Zakaria's article.

The difficulty in answering it pointsto an acute tension within the moderndemocratic tradition between the liberaldoctrine of just or legitimate governmentand the practical requirements of populargovernment. (In The Social Contract,

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Rousseau says that "all legitimate govern- monarchical governments preceded demo-ment is republican." But later in the same cratization. It has often been remarkedwork he says that "freedom is not a fruit that the sequence of first liberal constitu-of every climate, and it is not therefore tionalism, then gradual democratization,within the capacity of every people.") can have advantages in accustoming peopleThe principle that all men are born free to the requirements of self-government,and equal, and that no one has a right to But is this a pracdcal strategy today?rule them without their consent, has now During the nineteenth and earlyswept the world. As I have argued above, twentieth centuries, democratizationthis has inevitably come to be understood proceeded in a context in which moreas meaning that they cannot be ruled traditional principles of social hierarchywithout their clearly expressed consent, in still had a considerable hold over thethe form of an election. Yet the experience popular imagination. The idea of equalityofpast ages and of many lands suggests had not been fully accepted as the pre-that this principle cannot be effectively eminent principle of political legitimacy,put into practice everywhere and immedi- Monarchy and aristocracy still prevailedately The failure in the 1960s of so many in most of Europe, so that even a limitedofthe democracies bequeathed by the legislative role for an assembly electeddeparting colonial powers once again with a restricted suffrage could seemdemonstrated the fact that under certain like progress toward popular govern-conditions democracy is unlikely to endure, ment. Today the situation is dramaticallyBut if democratic government is required different. There are only a few countries—everywhere in principle, what course can principally Islamic monarchies—in whicha good liberal democrat follow where it anything like traditional rule still holdsappears unable to work in practice? This sway. In these cases, perhaps the nine-conundrum largely accounts for the alter- tee nth-century European model can tonating cycles of euphoria and despair some extent be emulated. Elsewhere,about the prospects for the spread of existing autocracies—or the regimes thatliberal democracy. aspiring democracies have replaced—are

How does Zakaria suggest that this generally ideological rather than tradi-dilemma be resolved? He contends, first, tional regimes and espouse some kind ofthat constitutionalism, the rule of law, egalitarian doctrine of their own. In aand the protection of individual liberty post-communist or formerly one-partyare more essential than representative socialist regime, what principle could begovernment. Accordingly, he recommends accepted as a basis for restricting suffrage?that, rather than encouraging the intro- And what legitimate mechanism otherduction of elections in many developing than election could be used for decidingcountries. Western policy should favor who will rule?the establishment of "Hberal autocracy." The only example in the contemporaryAs noted above, the prime example of world of liberal autocracy that Zakarialiberal autocracy that he presents is nine- explicitly cites is British-ruled Hong Kong,tee nth-century Europe, where the intro- Yet he certainly does not seem preparedduction of constitutional liberalism by to recommend a revival of colonialism.

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Marc F Plattner

Earlier in this decade, there was a flurryof discussion ofthe problem of "failedstates"—former client states ofthe super-powers during the Cold War that threat-ened to collapse once the support of theirpatron had been withdrawn. Amid thetalk of a new world order, there seemedto be some inclination to have the "inter-national community" intervene in suchcases, in effect reviving something likecolonial rule under the aegis ofthe UnitedNations. Whatever the merits or thefeasibility of this idea, the fiasco oftheU.S. attempt at poUtical (as opposed tohumanitarian) intervention in Somalia,along with the proliferation of states thatmight have been candidates for suchcostly international reconstruction opera-tions, quickly made it clear that the politi-cal will for this kind of policy was lacking.

The practical model that Zakariaseems to have in mind is the economicallysuccessful (at least until recently) autoc-racies of East Asia. Yet it would surely bequestionable to assert that these autocraciesare genuinely constitutional or liberal, afact that Zakaria himself seems to recog-nize by characterizing Indonesia, Singa-pore, and Malaysia not as "liberal" butonly as "liberalizing" autocracies. It wouldbe implausible indeed to claim that thesestates more reliably protect individualrights or have more independent andimpartial judiciaries than the LatinAmerican democracies that Zakariadescribes as "illiberal." Even the Singa-poreans themselves, while claiming topractice democracy, acknowledge thattheir regime, to quote Singapore's U.N.Ambassador, Bilahari Kausikan, "hasnever pretended or aspired to be liberal."Thus, despite Zakaria's talk of constitu-tionahsm and individual rights, he seems

to wind up taking the much more familiarview that authoritarian capitalist develop-ment is the most reliable road to eventualliberal democracy.

The economic achievements of theseEast Asian autocracies have certainlybeen impressive, but so have been theeconomic achievements of East Asiandemocracies, beginning with Japan. Thisis not the place to enter into the complexand hotly contested argument about towhat extent, if at all, authoritarian rulehas been responsible for Asian economicdevelopment. What is clear, however, isthat in the rest ofthe world the overallrecord of autocracies in promoting eco-nomic development, let alone the growthof constitutional liberalism, has been poor.As Mill noted, the same shortcomingsthat make a people poorly prepared forrepresentative government are also Ukelyto be found in its unelected rulers. Wiseand benevolent despots are the exception,not the rule.

A LOOK rNSIDE THE BALLOT BOX

It was only to be expected that, as countriesaround the world replaced their autocraticregimes with freely elected ones, theywould encounter serious difficulties inmaking democracy work. Self-governmentis indeed difficult, and holding electionsis merely one step in a long and arduousprocess that, in the best case, will culmi-nate in a consoUdated Uberal democracyElectorates can make bad choices as wellas good or (most often) mediocre ones.Demagogues can use electoral campaignsto appeal to voters' worst instincts, in-cluding ethnic or religious intolerance(although the number of new democraciesin which candidates have succeeded onthe basis of such appeals is far fewer than

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might have been expected). But in any tionally supervised elections as a method ofcase, how often can elections themselves conflict resolution for countries embroiledbe plausibly cited as the cause of problems in civil strife has been surprisingly positive,that would not have been just as likely This relatively recent innovation, firstto persist or arise under a nonelected attempted in Nicaragua in 1990, combinesgovernment? African voters, for example, peacemaking with democracy-building,may often cast their ballots along ethnic but is driven primarily by the former goal,or tribal Unes, but in how many African Thus elections are often held under extra-countries have dictatorial governments ordinarily difficult circumstances and atachieved real ethnic accommodation, rather times that would not have been chosen ifthan merely the domination of some democracy-building were the only goal,groyps by others? Most new democracies Nonetheless, such elections have not onlyare undoubtedly confronting severe chal- brought a number of bloody civil wars to alenges, but almost none of these would be halt, but in countries like Mozambiqueovercome by abolishing elections. and El Salvador have had positive political

It is also true that, beyond peacefliUy results as well. Even if such countries todaygetting rid of a bad and unpopular gov- are merely iUiberal democracies, they areernment (which is no smaU accompUsh- manifestly much better off than if theyment), elections by themselves do not were still racked by civil war. Afghanistan,solve most other poUtical problems. For a country that did not undergo an electoralthis and other reasons, prudence counsels process and faces continuing civil waragainst hastily pushing elections on a fairly and the rule of an extremist and intolerantstable, decent, and moderate nondemocra- Islamist government, does not present atic regime, especiaUy in a country where very attractive alternative model,the strongest opposition forces are not In more typical cases of democraticthemselves weU disposed toward liberal transition, where an authoritarian govern-democracy. This, however, is a lesson that ment either is overthrown or negotiatesmost Western governments, inherently an agreement with domestic oppositioninchned toward diplomatic caution, forces on the creation of a new regime,hardly need to be taught. In fact, their the timing of "founding elections" can beadherence to such a poUcy is a frequent a matter of critical importance for thecomplaint of those who accuse Western success of an emerging democracy. Ingovernments of being too friendly with such cases there is room for reasonablenondemocratic governments, especiaUy disagreement about how soon to holdin the Arab world. elections. Amid the devastated political

There are arguably cases where elections landscape of the post-Mobutu Congo,have made things worse, as in Angola in for example, even those committed to try-1992, where Jonas Savimbi's refusal to ing to move the country in a democraticaccept his defeat in a U.N.-supervised direction are divided about both the practi-election led to a violent escalation of that cability and the desirabiUty of conductingcountry's civil war. Yet despite some serious early elections. At the same time, it issetbacks, most recently in Cambodia, the difficult to see how dispensing with elec-overaU record of attempts to use interna- tions would lead the Kabila government to

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Marc F Plattner

move toward "constitutional Uberalism," orhow such unaccountable rule would bepreferable to "ilUberal democracy."

IF AT FIRST YOU DON'T SUCCEED

In such unfavorable situations, of course,electoral democracies may simply be unableto endure. The history of democratizationis replete with faUed attempts. That is whythe pattern discerned by Huntington isalso characterized by "reverse waves," peri-ods when democratic breakdowns far out-number democratic transitions. But theoveraU trend, nonetheless, is for more andmore countries to become and remain de-mocratic. Moreover, the historical recordshows that countries that have had anearlier experience with democracy thatfailed are more Ukely to succeed in a sub-sequent attempt than countries with noprevious democratic experience. So evenif democracy breaks down, it can leave alegacy of hope for the future.

Now that a growing number of coun-tries lacking the standard sodal and eco-nomic "prerequisites" for democracy havegained the privilege of electing their ownleaders, it is not surprising that these newregimes often have serious deficiencieswith respect to accountahiUty, the rule oflaw, and the protection of individual Ub-erties. There is every reason for Westernnations to do aU they can to assist thesecountries in improving their electoraldemocracies and turning them into lib-eral democracies. It is precisely the ilUberaldemocracies that Zakaria maligns that areUkely to be the most receptive audience forthe promotion of constitutional UberaUsmthat he recommends. For the road to con-stitutional UberaUsm in today's world runsnot through unaccountable autocraciesbut through freely elected governments. 4S'

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