Quasi-War Between Japan and the U.S.S.R., 1937-1939

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Trustees of Princeton University

Quasi-War Between Japan and The U.S.S.R., 1937-1939Author(s): Clark W. TinchSource: World Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Jan., 1951), pp. 174-199Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2008951 .

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QUASI-WAR BETWEEN JAPAN ANDTHE U.S.S.R., 1937-1939By CLARK W. TINCHT HE scaleand intensityofthefightinginKoreahavebeensuch as Americanshave, before 1950, associatedonlywith full-fledgedwar. How such a conflictcould fail to de-velop intoWorld War III theyonly dimlyunderstand.Theyhad assumedthat in the twentiethcenturywar, or at leastwarsinvolvinggreat powers,had to be total.

To theextentthatthisassumptionis incorporatedin the ex-pectationsof the rulingeliteofeitheroftwoor more contend-ing powers,it is likely to be true; to the extentthat war ismadean endinitself,isconceptuallydivorcedfromthe politi-cal endsit in fact seeks to achieve, the organizedviolenceofwarringgreatpowersmustbe not only totallyorganized, buttotallyapplied,whiletheconsequencesgo hang.The weaponsand techniquesof the lastwar whenhandled non-politicallyproduced,therefore,asmighthavebeenanticipated,conditionssingularlyunpropitiousto therealization ofwhatwere pro-fessedtohave been theaimsforwhichthewar was fought.In his recent,widely quotedarticle in theReader's Digest,policy-plannerGeorgeF. KennanoftheStateDepartmentat-tacked theidea thatwar with Russia is inevitable and por-trayedtheroad topeace as a twilightregionpockedwithun-certaintyand edgedwithdanger.'While subjectto criticismorskepticismin itsparticulars,Mr. Kennan'sargumentreflectshis realizationoftwoimportanttruths:War is theextensionofpoliticsbyothermeans;and warneed not be total.For the moment,with its sobering prospects,it is almostenoughthattheAmericanpublicbe persuadedonlythatthereisnologicinherentinthingsthatmakesunavoidablethephysi-cal obliterationof the opponent,and hence increases thechancesof one's own obliteration.The questionof whetherand under what circumstancestotal war is desirable may

1 "Is War with Russia Inevitable?" Reader's Digest, LVI, No. 335 (March 1950), 1-9.


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JAPAN AND THE U.S.S.R., 1937-1939 175be dealtwithonlywhen the premiseofchoicelessnesshas beenshattered.Leaving thequestionof desirabilityto others,con-sequently,Mr. Kennan rummaged throughmodern historyforevidence thateven a violentconflictof interests-whethernationalor ideological or both-does notmean thattheremustinevitablyfollow a twentieth-centurysaturnaliaof extermina-tion.What he came up with was a brief (and insufficient)re-minderof a storyas absorbingas it is pertinentto the con-temporarysceneand itsgreatunresolvedproblems-the storyof the undeclared "pocketwar" between Soviet Russia andImperial Japan.The natureandbackgroundoftheirmilitarystrugglealong the far-flungborders of Manchuria are pre-sentedand analyzed in this article for the meaningful,ifharsh,light cast upon the distraughtworld of today in whichSovietRussia bulksso large.

THE FORGOTTEN WARIn Septemberof 1931 the Japanese invaded Manchuria.The Soviet government,aware thatthe invasion would be-comea lastingoccupation,set aboutacceptingthefactas phil-osophicallyas possible.Almost alone amongthegreat powers,theU.S.S.R. voiced no formal denunciationof theJapanesetransgression,but maintaineda discreetdiplomatic silencewhichwhollyfrustratedtheeffortsoftheLyttonCommission,representingthe League of Nations, to ascertain the Sovietattitude.At thispivotal juncture,whenjointactionbythein-terestedpowersmighthave seta precedentwithprofoundconsequencesforthe futurepeace of theworld,the Soviet leadersrejectedbothin practiceand in word theconceptof collec-tivesecurityin internationalrelations.(Ironically,thesesameleaders were subsequentlyto be hailed in the League andelsewhereas theforemostdefendersofthisconcept.)The So-

viet press,with a differentmissionto perform,emptiedthevialsofitsvitriolalmostimpartiallyonJapanandtheWesternpowers,whichweredenouncedas collaboratorsand instigatorsin the alleged Japaneseschemeto invade the Soviet Far EastfromManchuria.22 For a work typical of the Soviet reaction,see C. Tul'skii and M. Fedorov, Man-


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176 WORLD POLITICSFortunatelyforthesafetyofbothSiberia and the MaritimeProvince,thenervouspolemicsof the Sovietpresswere backedup with militarypreparations.The emergentindustrialecon-

omyof Russia was setthetaskofconvertingtheFar Easternre-gions into a veritablefort.3This policy reflectedthe govern-ment'srealization that "the situationwith which the SovietUnion is faced in the Far East requires that it strengthenits defenses,protectitsborderfromoutsideattack,in particu-lar throughthe strengtheningof the military garrison ontheFar EasternbordersoftheU.S.S.R."4The deteriorationinJapanese-SovietrelationsfollowingtheManchurian invasion advertiseditselfmost spectacularlyinthemountingnumberand violence of armedborderclashes.These provided both partieswith ample material for mutualrecriminationand vituperation.Usually termed"incidents,"theyrangedfromthe seriousto theabsurd.On one occasion alarge Japaneseborderinspectionparty,inexplicablyequippedwithmachinegunsinsteadof surveyinginstruments,crossed

intoSoviet territoryandwas promptlywipedout.On another,theJapaneseprotestedratherplaintivelythat a Soviet steam-boat had stolena largenumberoffishinghooksfromthedang-ling polesoftheirJapaneseowners.Citingsimilarconflicts-real and imagined, sanguinary and ludicrous-Japanesespokesmencould declarein 1938 that2,400 separateincidentshad occurred.5The armed clashesinvariablymovedtheJap-anesetodeplorethe"ambiguousdemarcation"ofthe frontierschzhuriia: platsdarm dlia napadeniia na S.S.S.R. (Manchuria: Base for Attack onthe U.S.S.R.), Moscow, 1934. A much more comprehensivestudyon this period and itsbackground is V. Avarin, Imperializm v Manchzhurii (Imperialism in Manchuria),2 vols., Moscow, 1934. A brief retrospectiveview may be found in V. Masslenikov,"The War Front and the Peace Front in the Far East," Tikhii Okean (Pacific Ocean),March-April 1938.

3 For a review of the electrifyingeffectof the Japanese invasion upon the SovietFar East, see G. Voiminskii, "Japanese Military Aggression in the Far East," inOkupatsiia Manchzhurii i bor'ba kitaiskogonaroda (The Occupation of Manchuriaand theStruggle of the Chinese People), ed. by Voiminskii,Moscow, 1937.

4 From an editorial in Izvestiya, March 4, 1932.5 For the most comprehensive coverage of these incidents through the battle ofChangkufeng (Khasan), see Noburu Hidaka, (ed.), Manchoukuo-Soviet Border Is-sues, 1938; also, "An Outline of the Soviet-Manchoukuo Border Controversy,"Con-temporaryManchuria, July1937.


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JAPAN AND THE U.S.S.R., 1937-1939 177and the Russiansto suggest,notwithoutsarcasm,thattheJap-anese could avoid suchdifficultiesby returningto Japan.6However, the present-daysamuraiof Japan had designedaNew OrderinAsia thatincludedno plans forwithdrawalfromManchuria. As 1936 drew to a close it had become clear thatJapaneseexpansionismrestlesslysoughtnew outlets.The mil-itary rode the saddle of governmentat home and honed itsspursforadventureinChina. TensionwithSoviet Russia grewapace. On November25 Japan joined Germanyin the Anti-CominternPact; on December9 Soviet Russia retaliatedbyrefusingto ratifya new eight-yearfisheriestreaty,vital toJapan'stauteconomy.Mostobserversexpectedtroublebetweenthetwo nations,butno one anticipatedwhatwas to follow.In early Julyof 1937openwarfareflaredalong theAmurRiver, the great streamwhich formsmost of the northernborder of Manchuria. The dispute centeredabout severalstrategicislandsof questionableownershipjust south of theimportantSoviet rivercityand defensebastion, Blagovesh-chensk.A pretextsufficedto precipitatean engagementinwhichtroops,artillery,andrivergunboatsofbothnationspar-ticipated.Once again chargesandcounterchargestravelledbe-tweenMoscow andTokyo.The publishedSoviet andJapaneseversionsof the affairare of little aid in determiningwhatactuallyhappenedorwhy.'The mostsatisfactoryexplanation

6 A relatively completeaccount of border incidents and their causes as viewed bythe Soviet press is provided by Harriet L. Moore, Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931-1945,Princeton,Princeton University Press, 1945.7 See the editorial "Provocations of Japan in China and on the Far Eastern Bordersof the Soviet Union," Mirovoe Khoziaistvo i Mirovaia Politika (World Economics andWorld Politics), August 1937, p. 138. The editorial states that "afterthe Soviet Unionon July 4 offeredpeacefullyto settle the dispute and recommendedthat evacuation oftroopsof both countriesfromthe islands be carried out, the Japanese renewed theirattacks." Hidaka (op. cit., pp. 88-94), on the otherhand, records the above agreementas having occurred on July 2, and mentions neither the withdrawal of Japanesetroops nor the subsequent attacks. The Japan-Manchoukuo Year Book (Tokyo, 1937,p. 687) confuses the matteryet furtherby stating that Litvinov informedJapaneseAmbassador Shigemitsuof his agreementto withdraw Soviet troops; that he did notdo so precipitatedthegunboat incident.Finally, according to the Year Book report,theJapanese secured a withdrawal agreement and withdrew their troops, leaving un-solved the problem of possession of the islands. Ambassador Joseph E. Davies inMission to Moscow (New York, Simon& Schuster,1941, pp. 164-66) gives yet anotherunverified story in which, among other things, Japanese-Manchurian cutters, notSoviet,were sunk.Davies became so alarmed over what he believed to be the danger-ous tensionthathe paid an unofficialvisit to Shigemitsuin the hopes of averting war.The Ambassador plainly was in unfamiliar surroundings.The world press, in gen-


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178 WORLD POLITICSis thatofferedinformallyto AmbassadorJosephE. Davies inMoscow by a "high Japanese official,"who stated that theAmurfightinghad beentouchedofftotestSovietresolutionandpreparedness.The Japanese commanders,it appeared, werebothsurprisedand impressed.8While theirdiplomatsin Moscow were in the midstof theAmur cease-firingnegotiations,the Japanese began their as-saultonChina.The ensuingstruggle,moreprolongedand diffi-cult than foreseenin Tokyo, largely precluded a unilateralJapanesewar onRussia.A year later,as Soviet Foreign Min-isterLitvinovconfidedto AmbassadorDavies, such a war hadbecomevirtuallyimpossible.9This was not,it shouldbe noted,the attitudeexpressedby the Soviet press,which continuedto anticipatealmostmomentarilya Japaneseattackon Russiabecauseof"reversals"in China.The elite of the Japanese military,the Kwantung Army,meanwhilewas rusticatingin Manchuria as thewar in Chinapickedup momentum.It could noteven join inthesportof ex-terminatingManchuria's numerous "bandits" (resistanceforces,disgruntledpeasantry,and plain criminals),in whomboththe ChineseNationalistgovernmentand theRussiansdis-played a morethan paternalinterest;"Othere was a separateand formidableinternalsecurityestablishmentto deal withthisproblem.Apparentlyto heightenits fightingespritandrelieve thetedium,theKwantungArmy began to enlargeonits policyofneedlingtheRussians.It was notlongbeforetheJapanesewenttoofar.In thesummerof 1938 casual clashes inthevicinityof strategicPoset Bay at Changkufenggot outof hand and developed intounmistakable,mechanizedwar-fare.11If ithad notbeenfor certainpeculiar arrangementstoeral, displayed no less naivete. Perhaps due to its obfuscationby propaganda, the inci-dent was completelymisinterpretedas a threat to peace, a matter for internationalconcern,etc. The above accountshave been reviewed at such length simplyto illus-trate the difficultyof gettingat the facts when in totalitarianhands facts are weapons.

8 Davies, op. cit.,p. 166.9 Ibid., p. 299.10 For a descriptionof guerrilla activities,see N. Glebov, "The Japanese Aggressorsand the Manchurian Rear," Miro'voe Khoziaistvo i Mirovaia Politika, July-August1938.11 It is still not clear whether the Changkufengbattle was set offpurposefullybythe Kwantung Army or whether it simply grew out of increasinglysevere fighting.


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JAPAN AND THE U.S.S.R., 1937-1939 179be describedbelow,thenearbyvital portof Vladivostokmighthave beenendangered.As describedbythe Soviet Commander,GregoriStern,thebattle began July 29 and continueduntil August 11. TwoSoviet rifledivisionsfinallyparticipated,opposed by a nu-mericallygreaterforceof Japanesewhowere supported,how-ever,by a considerablysmallerand less effectiveair and tankforce. Catching the Soviet borderguardsunaware,Sternre-ports,theJapanesemanagedto drive the Russiansfromthevolcanic heightsof Zaozernaia and Bezymiannaia,whichdominatedthearea.The strugglethenseesawedinconclusivelywhilebothsidesrushedup men and equipment.By August6enoughSovietreinforcementshad arrivedto permita counter-attacktobe setforthefollowingday.An especiallyinterestingconsiderationwas toenterintothisplanforcounterattack.Theenemyoccupied the commandingheightsin a position,asSternsaid, "tocounteveryoneof ourguns,everytank,almosteveryman"; yet,althoughother approacheswere tacticallypossible,the attackwould havetobe carriedstraighton totheheights throughJapanese barricades and a witheringfire.Flanking operationswere out of the question,it seems-butnot formilitaryreasons.Stern'sexplanationof this is worthquoting:"Therewasnochancewhatsoeverofhidingthelocaleand directionofour attack.The fightingwas restrictedto thedistrictofLake Khasan,the volcanoesZaozernaia and Bezy-miannaia,and theheightsbelongingtothoseplaces only."12

Since Sterncommentedon this "restricted"aspect of thefightingwithouteven casual elaboration,it can onlybe in-ferredthatthese unusual arrangementsappeared so naturaleitherto Stern,theeditorsof Pravda, or the reading publicthatno qualificationsor explanationsseemed necessary.Itmustalsobe concludedthatsuchrestrictionswerepossibleonlythroughat least a tacit agreementbetweenthe Soviet andJapanese high commands.Nothing could illustratemoregraphicallythecalculatingnatureof thispocketwar thanthesedispassionatearrangements.They could be paid foronly inRussianblood.Inasmuch as the Russians were not prepared for the engagement and the Japaneselost it, the clashes, from any standpoint,"got out of hand."12 Gregori M. Stern,"The Sixthof August," Pravda, Aug. 6, 1939. Author's italics.


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180 WORLD POLITICSBefore the counterattackwas launched,Soviet artilleryde-livered a surprisinglybriefbombardmentof the enemyposi-tions.Since theRussianArmytraditionallyhas reliedstronglyon itsartilleryand used it withgreat skill and energy,Sternattemptedtoexplainwhythe counterattackhad notbeen pre-ceded by the usual heavy artilleryassault. Observingthatthe "prolongedpreparations"of the ImperialistWar (i.e.,WorldWar I) causedan enormouswasteof valuable artilleryshellson a narrowfront,Sternpointedout the contrast:TheRed Armywould attackafternomorethan a two-hourbom-

bardment.His reasoningseemedtobe thatwithoutcapitalistmunitions-makerstourgeprodigality,Soviettroopswould befreefromunnecessaryandexorbitantartillerypreparations!This remarkablestatementcan perhapsbe relatedto anotherthatSternmade elsewhere.An attackwas imperativethe mo-mentreinforcementsarrivedon August5, he explained,be-cause "thepeople and governmentdemandedthattheaggres-sorsbe immediatelyevicted."If governmentpressuredid infactcoincidewithan admittedlyforeshortenedartillerybom-bardment,a decidedlyunpleasantpicturecan be painted:Al-thoughthemilitarysituationcould have permitteda fairlyindefinitedelayin offensiveoperations,theRed Armyattacked,despitea shortagein artilleryshells, simplybecause of pol-itical considerations-attacked,it should be remembered,along theline of greatestJapaneseresistance!If thisrecon-structionof eventsis valid,thentheRed Armyagain deservesa hero'sname.Actually,theremayhave been an additionalthreehoursofbombardment,althoughplans originallycalledonlyfor a total of two. Rain preventedthe air cover fromgettingoffonscheduleand theattackwas thereforepostponed.Stern unfortunatelydid not indicate whether the artillerybombardmentwas thereforeprolongedor also postponed.Iftherewas a shortageof shells,as would seem the case, thebombardmentwas unquestionablydelayed and hence lastedbuttwohours.In spiteof theseunfortuitouscircumstances,accordingtoGeneralStern,the Sovietforcespushedthe invadersfromtheheights.SubsequentJapanesecounter-thrusts,thoughdesper-ate and powerful,were beaten off. This proved to be the


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JAPAN AND THE U.S.S.R., 1937-1939 181hingeoftheentirebattle.Sternfeltthatvictoryresultedfromthe high morale of the troops,the professionalcompetenceand loyaltyof theofficers,the excellenceofRed Armyequip-ment,theactivesupportof theneighboringcivilian popula-tion,butaboveall fromthefactthat"in theholocaustof battlethesoldiers,commanders,and politicalworkersfeltnearthemthepresenceof comradeStalin.""3Stern'sreport,whichwas writtenon the 1939 anniversaryof thebattle,filled a notablehiatusin Soviet releaseson theKhasan affair.On August 15, 1938, shortlyafterfightingstopped,an editorialin the partyjournalBol'shevik had re-viewedtheboundarydisputeand the battle,but failedto men-tionthe"Great Attackof the Sixth.""4Instead,theeditorialinsistedthateach timethe JapanesecrossedintoSovietterri-torytheywere summarilyrepulsed.Moreover,Izvestiyacar-ried no bannerheadline about the victoryof August 6 butmerelyannouncedonAugust9 that"The GreatSovietPeopleUnanimouslySupporttheFirmPolicy oftheSovietGovern-ment."Anotherinterestingaspect of the publicityaccorded theKhasanfightingwas theheavystressplaced throughoutuponthesignificantroleplayedby"bolshevikagitation"and "pol-iticalwork,"uponthejoywithwhich thesoldiersrushedintobattlewithcriesof"For Stalin! For Party!For Motherland!"It is pertinentto recall the internaldifficultieswithwhichtheArmy,theparty,and Stalinwere confrontedat the time.Itcould suggestthe possibilitythatthe difficultiesat Khasanserveda nationalunifyingfunctionof no smallvalue.All cavil aside,however,theSovietAutonomousFar EasternArmy,in spiteof thepurgeswhich had decimatedit and theobstacleserectedbyitspoliticallyconsciousleadership,didwina convincingvictoryat Lake Khasan. The Japanese com-mandertacitlyadmitteddefeat-and doubtlessexaggerated-whenhepraisedhisarmyfor"standingup againstattackssup-portedby200 tanksand 100 aeroplanes."15EmperorHirohitotoldtheArmyChiefofStaffof hisgratificationthattheArmy,

13 Ibid. All the facts and interpretationsattributedto Stern are drawn from thissame articlein Pravda.14 "The Soviet Repulse of the Japanese War Instigators,"Bol'shevik,Aug. 15, 1938.15 Hidaka, op. cit.,p. 215.


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182 WORLD POLITICS"under a difficultsituationand despitetheirsmall strength,acted withprudenceand patience, fulfillingtheirduties."16The newde factosituation,theresultof Sovietarmedstrength,producedon August11a new agreementto ceasefire.The severefightingat Khasan and the defeatadministeredbytheSovietsdidnot,however,diminishforlong theJapaneseappetiteformilitaryexperimentationand opportunism.Spo-radic gunplaycontinuedto troublethe Manchurianfrontiers.The basicdifferencesinnationalpoliciesremainedunresolvedand theboundlessdeterminationof both armiesremainedun-corrupted.Moreover, the elite Kwantung Army had lostprestigein themire of Changkufeng.Its leaders would notbe long in seekingrevenge.No Russian witha normalmemoryof eventsand a slightunderstandingof theJapanesecouldhave beensurprised,there-fore,whenalarmingreportsbeganto circulatethroughouther-meticRussia in thespringof 1939. Soviet troops,it was ru-mored,had goneintoactionalong the OuterMongolian bor-der; a diplomaticcrisis in Japanese relationswas developingalong with theborderwar; greatair battleswere occurringdaily; thousandsofmen,hundredsof tanksand cannonwereturningthe Mongolian Steppeintoa vastbattlefield.Had thewar come at last?While warhad comeagain,thewar had not,as eventsweretomakeplain.The Sovietpeople did not receivethisfirstdi-rectreportonrenewedborderwarfarewiththeJapaneseuntilmorethana monthafterithadbrokenout.On June27 Tass re-viewed a two-hourengagementoverOuterMongolia betweensixtyJapaneseand fiftySoviet-Mongolianaircraft.Twenty-fiveof the enemyand threefriendlyplaneswere reportedde-stroyed.The nextday Tass reportedeightJapanesepursuitplanes and thirtybombersin actionover theborder; losses:seven Japanese, six Soviet-Mongolian. On June 29 Tassclaimed twoenemyplanesdownedbyantiaircraftfire.Thenthenewscurtaindroppedagain forovertwoweeks,and theymusthaveseemedominouslyquietweekstotheaverageSovietcitizen.On July 14 Izvestiya at last broke the silence to review

16 Ibid., p. 220.


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JAPAN AND THE U.S.S.R., 1937-1939 183thesituation.Matter-of-factlyit announcedthatin heavyfight-ing near the river Khalka (where northwesternManchuriaborders on Outer Mongolia), during July 6-12, over 2,000Japanese-Manchuriantroopshad been killed, another3,500wounded,and254takenprisoner.Large storesofenemyequip-ment-including cannon,armoredcars, and machine guns-had been captured.The hostileforceswere described,but theSoviet-Mongolianwere not; nor were the Soviet-Mongolianbattle casualties mentioned.Air engagementssince May 28,Izvestiya continued,had cost the enemy199 planes as againsta lossof52 Soviet-Mongolian.There was in this reporta statementreleased by the Sovietcommand:"In theopinionoftheSoviet-Mongoliancommand,theJapanese infantrydoes notfightbadly, althoughit couldfightmuchbettersincebothJapanesedivisions,the23rd aswellas the7th,are ratedthe bestones." It is difficulttofindan ac-curateequivalentofthisobservationin itscontext.But itmaynot be too far wrongto suggestthatit is as though,followingtheJapanese attackon Pearl Harbor, therehad appeared inall American newspapersonly a box wire dispatch reportingthelossesoftheattackingforcesandincludingthebriefmilitarycommentthat Japanese bombing proved fairly accurate,al-thoughitcould have been better.To theAmericanpublicsuchan approach would, of course,have been incomprehensible,had it been possible.A nationwhich rose in wrathover thesinkingof the Maine and demandedvengeancefortheLusi-tania could notnormallybe expectedto understandhow theSoviet Governmentcould treatwhat was in effecta small waras thoughit were tournamentchess. But the Soviet govern-ment,withits business-likesenseofprofitand loss,could anddid.Its reasonswereexcellent.There were at hand other,moredesperateissues,on which thedestiniesof the Soviet Unionclearlyturned.On April 17,1939theRussianAmbassadorinBerlin, Merekalov,had visitedBaron vonWeizsacker,StateSecretaryin theGermanForeign Office,to suggestthepossi-bilityof improvedSoviet-Germanrelations.On May 3, Lit-vinov,commonlyidentifiedwitha policyfavoringtheWesterndemocraciesat the expenseof Nazi Germany,was abruptly


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184 WORLD POLITICSreplacedas ForeignCommissarbyMolotov.The newForeignCommissarmetwithSchulenburg,the GermanAmbassadorinMoscow, on May 20 andJune 28, and discusseddelicatelytheprospectsof easingSoviet-Germantensions.The Kremlin,inshort,was maneuveringwith infinitetact,patience,and nolittleskill to removetheGermanthreatbyjoining it. A warwith Hitler's ally, Japan,at thistime-that is, a formal,pro-claimed war could onlybringruinto Sovietplans. If, on theotherhand, thenegotiationswith Germanycould be nursedinto bloom, thenthe Japanesequestionwould take care of it-self. To gain a basic understandingwith Germanywould beto staggerand perhapsimmobilizeJapan'sdesignson Russia.The Sovietpress,as ever sensitiveto high affairsof state,unobtrusivelydroppedthe entirematterof invasionand con-flictin theFar East whilethreevitalweekspassed.OnAugust6Pravda casuallymentionedthatcontinuingand severeJapaneseattackshadbeenconsistentlyrepulsedandthataircombatcon-tinued.In thatsameissuewascelebratedthe"GreatVictoryofAugust 6" at Lake Khasan a year before. Red Armymenwho had shared in the victorydescribed theirexperiences;partyworkersexalted the role of the political commissars;poetssangofRed Armyvaloragainstthehatedfoe.ButofthedisturbingfactthatthissamevalorousRed Armystoodlockedin combatwith the samehated foe therewas slightmention-a communique,terseand colorless.Then for anotherthreeweekssilenceshroudedthe battleatNomonhan.Negotiationswiththe Germanswere movingtotheirworld-shakingclimax. On August 23, 1939Molotov andRibbentrop,theReich ForeignMinister,signedthe notoriousTreatyofNon-AggressionwithitsSecretProtocol.Four dayslaterPravda permitteda briefglance at developmentson theMongolian border.Thirty-oneJapanese aircrafthad beendowned sinceAugust6. SevenSoviet-Mongolianaircrafthadfailedto return.Anotherprolongedsilenceby the Soviet pressslipped be-tweenthe world and Nomonhan. Finally, on September1,the daythattheGermanArmyinvadedPoland, Izvestiyaun-emotionallybroughtits readersup to date.On August 17 theJapanesehad launchedan offensivewhich had momentarily


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JAPAN AND THE U.S.S.R., 1937-1939 185threatenedto breakthrough;rallying,the Soviet-Mongolianforceshad stemmed,thenstalledtheonslaught.On thetwen-tieththeRussianshurleda full-scalecounterattackagainsttheentireenemylineto theeastof theriverKhalkha. PinningtheJapanese between two convergingwings, the Red Armycrushedthemon the nightof August 28. The Soviet-Mon-golianforcesthenduginalongtheborderofOuterMongolia.17Marshal Zhukov, later to gain internationalfame,receivedthecovetedaward"Hero of the SovietUnion" forcommand-ing thisbrilliantoffensive.

Back in Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov andJapaneseAmbassadorShigemoriTogo, bothofwhomhadbeencloselyfollowingthe courseof the battle,negotiateda newcease-firingagreementon September15. Fightingwas to endthe followingday, troopswere to remainalong the frontierline theyheld,and prisonerswereto be exchangedat once."8Hostilitieswere consequentlybroughttoan endon September16,the day beforeSoviettroopsin the West invadedcrumb-lingPoland.Japaneseaccountsof thisstruggleat Nomonhan inwhichmenand machineswere sucked intogrindingwarfarefromMay 4 untilSeptember16-differedradicallyfromtheSovietversionon almosteverycount.One thing,however,could notbe obscured:Japan had suffereda stunningdefeat.JapaneseForeignOfficespokesmen,admitting18,000casualtiesfromthefighting,termedit "a disastrous,bitterbattle."19Soviet-

17 Mirovoe Khoziaistvo i Mirovaia Politika, Sept. 1939, pp. 247 f. The reportsonNomonhan,like those on otherborder clashes, are open to question. If the Japanesewere "beaten back" and "ejected fromSoviet soil" almost before they set foot uponit (as the Soviet press invariably insisted), how then was it possible to mounta prolonged and successful counterattackof the kind just described without at thesame time crossing over into enemyterritory(which act the Soviet press invariablydenied) ?18 Ibid.19New York Times, Sept. 4, 1939. Three books in Japanese are available at the

Library of Congress, each describing a differentphase of the engagement. For thenon-user of Japanese, the works are neverthelessvaluable for their collections ofphotographs,battle orders,maps, etc. The most comprehensiveof these is KwantungArmy Headquarters, Nomonhan Bidauroku (A Record of the Nomonhan Incident),1941. Valuable for its reporton tank warfare is Sakae Kusaba, Noro Kochi (HillNoro), Tokyo, 1941. For a personal narrative, see Eiji Tanaka, Nomonhan Senki:Tokon (Nomonhan Battle Report: The Spirit of Battle), Tokyo, 1941. The foregoingdocumentswere reviewed and highlightedforthe authorby Dr. Ardath Burks.


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186 WORLD POLITICSMongolianlossescannotbe enumerated,sincethe Sovietpressreferredonly to aircraftlosses and publishedno figuresonpersonnelcasualties.RegardlessofSovietlosses,however,andtheyunquestionablywere high, a small-scalewar had beenfoughtinwhichtheJapanesehad receivedthemostpunishingmilitarydefeatof theirmodern history.But an even moreparalyzingshockhad runthroughthe structureof Japanesepower: Hitler and Stalinhad becomevirtualpartners,a warwas on in Europe,andJapanstoodisolatedin theOrient.

BEHIND THE FIGHTING FRONTSThe borderwarfarejust describedboth reflectedand in-fluencedthe course of other developmentsin Soviet andJapaneseforeignand domesticpolicy.Unfortunatelyit is atpresentimpossibleto determinewithfinalitytheevolutionofeitherthewarfareor thenon-militaryaspectsof thestruggle.The SovietUnionandJapan,eachin itsowntotalitariantradi-tion,filteredthepertinentfactsthroughthe livingmembraneof political opportunism.Foreign correspondentsand diplo-matsofthe othergreatpowersofnecessitygatheredtheirin-formationonlyin Moscow and Tokyo,where it was subjectto the samebasic laws of double thinkas the mosteruditeofjournals.Nevertheless,althoughconsiderableobfuscationre-mains,a numberof importantthingsseem fairlyclear aboutwhatwentonbehindthefightingfrontsand a fairlyaccuratereconstructionispossible.The disputedissuesandtheinteract-ingforcesmayforconveniencebe categorizedinto fourmainproblems:thoseofborders,fisheriesand concessions,strategy,andpolitics.The casualnatureof TsaristRussia'srelationswithManchuChinahadproduceda numberofverycasual treaties,inwhichthebordersofManchuriareceivedequallycasual treatment."As a result,if no one knewpreciselywherethe borderswere,at leastno one cared. But whenthe meticulousJapanese-as

20 For excerpts from these treaties where they relate to the border questionand a discussionof themas theyaffectedtheJapanese position,see "An Outline of theManchoukuo-Soviet Border Controversy," Contemporary Manchuria, July 1937. Alarge map is included to show the disputed borders; also, a table of border-markers,theirhistoryand condition.


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JAPAN AND THE U.S.S.R., 1937-1939 187theyso conscientiouslyput it-assumed China's internationalobligationsin Manchuria,thesituationchangeddrastically."Japan based itsborderclaims on theSino-Russiantreatiesun-til and includingtheTreatyofPeking in 1860. The Russiansretortedthatthesetreatieshad beensupplementedby thelaterand secretTreatyof Hunchun in 1866. Professingto knownothingof such a secrettreaty,theJapaneserefusedto be af-fectedbyit. (As a matteroffact,noneof thesetreaties,pub-lishedor secret,could providemorethan an informedguessas to theactuallocationoftheborders).22Sincethe Russiansappearedcontentwiththisstateofaffairsand theJapanesedid not,the onus of aggressionmust be as-signedtheJapaneseforattemptingpersistentlyto revise thebordersunilaterally.The Soviets cannotescape blame,how-ever,because of their unwarrantedsatisfactionwithwhollyquestionableboundaries.23On the otherhand, they may atleastbe creditedwiththeclear realizationthatJapanesede-mandsreallyhad littleto do with"ambiguousborders."TheJapanesewereinsteadseekingtofindandexploitSoviet weak-nesses.If the Russians were on the defensivein regard to theborderquestion,theymostassuredlywere not in thematterof fisheriesand concessions.Amongthemanycontestedeco-nomicissuessnarlingJapanese-Sovietrelations,none seemedso crucial to Nippon as did thequestionof Japanesefishingrightsin Sovietwaters.24As viewedfromTokyo,thewatersofOkhotskand Kamchatkabelongedhistoricallyto thenaturalJapanesesphereof influence.Further,theJapanesefelt thattheirindustriousnessand skill had beenresponsiblefor what-ever successthe Russians had achieved in exploitingthese

21 Ibid., p. 26.22 For example,see Izvestiya, Aug. 6, 1939,forthe HunchunTreaty Map. This mapwas reproducedby the Soviet press to supportSoviet claims in relation to the battleat Changkufeng (Lake Khasan) the previous year. For the map applied to the

Nomonhan conflict,see Izvestiya, July 14, 1939. This map is a cartographical ques-tionmark.The scale is 1-2,500,000and thereare no co-ordinateswhatsoever.23 The Soviet governmentinsistentlymaintained that the borders had been proper-ly demarcated and made it clear that all attemptsto revise the existingborders wouldcontinueto meet armedresistance.24 For a detailed discussion, see Shintaro Shindo, "Fishing in Soviet Waters,"ContemporaryJapan, Sept. 1938.


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188 WORLD POLITICSwaters-thatJapanhad developedthe techniques,equipment,andbasic know-howwhichmadeRussianoperationsprofitable.They concluded thereforethat theyshould receive a largersharein the industrythan theRussians,towhom the fishingindustrywas notof virtuallife-and-deathimportance.StatingitsconvictionthattheAnti-CominternPact markedthetrue"crisisofcapitalism"soregularlypredicted,the Sovietgovernmentrefusedto renewtheeight-yearfisheriesconven-tion whichexpiredin 1936.Nor did theRussianslook withfavor upon therenewedJapaneseeffortsof 1937 to achieveanotherconvention,particularlysince the Japanese govern-menthad justwelcomed Italy intotheAnti-Cominterncon-stellation.Instead,onlyone-yearextensionswere granteduntil1941 in spiteof therepeatedJapanesecomplaintthatit was"theconsistentpolicyof theSovietgovernmenttoexterminateall Japaneseeconomicrightsand interestsin thesenorthernregions."25The Sovietsmeanwhilewent on accusing Japanesemili-taristsofattemptingto arouseanti-Sovietopinionover the fish-eries question,ofbreakingthefishingagreements,and ofcon-ductingespionagethroughthefishingfleets.26(These claims,likeJapanesecountercharges,undoubtedlypossesseda substan-tial residuumoftruth.)In view of thisattitude,thestatesmenof Japan,whatevertheirwords,were hardlyso lacking in

25 Ibid., p. 246. Shindo, like his government,pretended to believe that the Sovietgovernment had refused to renegotiate the 1928 treaty "for no good reason."Japanese authoritiesat this point had become highly sensitive to legal and verbalniceties.Since Moscow, equally concernedwith formto the exclusion of content,hadrepeatedly insisted that the Cominternand the Soviet Union were connectedby nomore than the gossamer of mutual sympathy,the Japanese blandly maintained thatthe Anti-CominternPact could in no way be construedas an anti-Soviet instrument.They concluded thereforethat Soviet-Japaneserelations should be in no way affectedby the Axis alliance. Both powers appear to have been somewhat entrancedby theresonanceof their own soundingboards.26 The Soviet attitude on fisheriesduring the latter thirties was expressed of-ficiallyin the sharp replyof the Narkomindelto the Japanese request of early 1939.See Pravda, July24, 1939,fortext; also applicable portionsof Iu. Davydov: "EconomicRelations of Japan and the U.S.S.R.," Mirovoe Khoziaistvo i Mirovaia Politika, Sept.1938. Useful in describingSoviet views on the fisheriesdispute in its wider contextisE. Zhukov: "The New Japanese Governmentand the Foreign Policy of Japan," TikhiiOkean, Oct. 1939. Japan's case is available in the statementof the Foreign Officespokesmanconcerningthe fisheriesnegotiations (March 15, 1939) and the statementof the Foreign OfficeInformationBureau concerningfisheriesnegotiations (April 4,1939), in ContemporaryManchuria, May 1939,pp. 436-37.


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JAPAN AND THE U.S.S.R., 1937-1939 189sophisticationas to be surprised that the fisheriescontractofferedby the Soviet Unionwas determined,in thefinalanal-ysis,by the existingover-allpolitical situation.27The questionofmineralconcessionson the Soviet-controllednorthernhalf of the island of Sakhalin proved to be no lesscapable of generatingfriction.Once again the controversycenteredon critical resources: oil and coal, but especiallyupon the former.And like the fisheries,Soviet-Japaneseoiland coal operationswere underpinnedwith mutual distrustand hostileintent,to thedissipationof which theAnti-Com-internPact in no way contributed.Their Japanesepartners-in-enterprise,the Sovietsbluntlyannounced,had practiced"un-paralleleddeceit"in breakingtheconcessionstreaties.Japaneseoperatorswere accusedofwilfullyand maliciouslyviolatingSovietlabor legislationand ingeneralof"takingthe law intotheirown hands."28The Soviet governmentdenied categori-cally thatithad beencoercingJapaneseoperatorsorotherwiseinterferingwiththeirfreedomto extractcoal and oil withinthestipulationsof thetreatyarrangements.29Whateverthefactsofthecase,andtheyaredebatable,thecon-cessions,like thefisheries,had become a matterforpoliticians-not foroil menor coal operators.Productionfromthe con-cessionsvarieddirectlyas thestateofrelationsexistingat anygiventimebetweenthetwogovernments.Once againtheSovietgovernmenthad implicitlyreaffirmedits belief that whilepeace maynotbe indivisible,foreignpolicy,if it is to avoidfrustrationand perhapsdisaster,mustbe. Nor were theJap-anese less alertto thepowerfactorthan theRussians.WhenRusso-Japaneserelationsbecameseverelystrainedduringthebitterdaysat Nomonhanin mid-Julyof 1939,Japanesewar-shipswerereportedassembledin northernwatersto head offa Soviet threatto confiscatetheJapaneseoil concessionson

27 Before theThird Session of the SupremeSoviet,May 31, 1939,Molotov remarkedcharacteristicallythat the new extension (for one year) had "the greatest politicalsignificance."28 See Davydov, loc. cit., pp. 60-62, for a full discussion of the concessions andalleged Japanese anti-Soviet conduct. For the text of the governing treaty of 1925and attached Protocol (B), see Harriet Moore, op. cit., pp. 179-81.29 Izvestiya declared emphaticallythat all fishery,oil, and coal concessionaires andworkerscontinuedto enjoythe fullrightto engage in their business withoutinterferenceso long as theyabided by the Soviet regulations and did not violate the concessionsagreement.Davydov reiteratedthisclaim (op. cit.,p. 61).


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190 WORLD POLITICSSakhalin.30The threatdid not,however,materialize.In additionto theforegoingproblems,therewas thatoftraderelations.Throughoutthe periodfollowingthe resumptionofdiplomaticrelationsin 1925untilthetradepact of 1941,Russo-Japanese commercial exchange coincided with the patternalreadydescribedin connectionwithfisheries,concessions,and,ofcourse,borderdisputes.3"The mostimportantsingletrans-actionoccurredon September21, 1934, when the Sovietgov-ernmentsold out its interestin theChinese EasternRailway,despite the factthat the Chinesegovernmentvigorouslypro-testedthe illegalityof the sale as contradictingthe contractunderwhichthe Sovietshad originallyenteredintojointoper-ationoftherailwaywith theChinese.Ignoring Chinese pro-tests,the Sovietsproceededto complete the transactionat arelativelysmall part of theinvestment'sworth.32Politics wasstilldictatingpolicy,economicorotherwise;the Russianshaddoubtless concluded that joint managementof the ChineseEasternRailwaywithJapanwouldprovidetheJapanesewithendlesspretextsformoreanti-Sovietagitation,whichwouldinturnproducemorediplomaticwranglingandperhapsfight-ing.And in 1934,itwill be recalled,the Soviet Far East wasstill relativelyundefended.Actually, however,relationsbe-tweenthetwopowerscould scarcelyhave deterioratedmorehad therailwaynotbeensold. Far fromremovinga sourceoffriction,the sale led toseriouscontroversyin lateryearswhentheJapaneserefusedto meettheirobligations.Shortlyafterhis appointmentin 1939, ForeignMinister Molotov angrilywarnedtheJapanesethatthe SovietUnion would notpermitthisviolationofitsinterests.33Whenpaymentwas finallymadeinJanuary1940,theefficacyofSovietpower politicswas onceagain manifest.Desperatelyin need of a fisheriesagreement

30Necw York Times, July22, 1939.31 The figureson total trade and trade turnover between Japan and the SovietUnion from1931 throughthe firstquarter of 1938 illustrate mostclearly the inevitablesubordinationof economicconsiderationsto political ones. See Davydov, op. cit., pp. 53-55, for a summaryof trade relations between the two countries.32 124,000,000yen, one-thirdof which was to be paid in cash and the remainderin goods.

33 A. Ziuzin, "The Situation in Manchuria," Mirovoe Khoziaistvo i MirovaiaPolitika, No. 4-5, 1940, p. 171. Ziuzin's article presents perhaps the best and mostcomprehensiveRussian surveyof Manchuria as of early 1940.


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JAPAN AND THE U.S.S.R., 1937-1939 191and bewilderedby the German-Russianrapprochement,theJapanesecouldfindno alternativeto liquidatingthe debt.To sum up, economic relationsin general betweenRussiaand Japan had,fromtheSoviet standpoint,symptomaticratherthancausativesignificanceandcomparativelylittletodo witheconomics. They were linked inextricablywith the Man-churianfighting,thewar in China,andthesituationinEurope.But theydid reveal an attitudetoward foreignpolicywhichwas groundedin an empirical realism as tough as it waspliable.

Interwovenwith thequestionsof bordersand economic re-lationswas stilla third: thatofstrategy.To theSovietUnion,Manchuria posesa directandseriousmilitarythreat.From it,the Soviet Far East and theMaritime Province can be iso-lated or chopped up in a numberofways.Armies can movethroughOuterMongolia to the Trans-Baikal region.OtherscanproceedfromHeiho to fanoutnorthwardfromBlagovesh-chensk. Still others can head northeastwardthrough theSungari Valley to Khabarovsk and thence up along thebroadAmurbasinto itsdelta at NikolaevskoppositeRussianSakhalin.The key portand naval base ofVladivostokis alsovulnerableto attackfromManchuria. In regardto the FarEast as a whole,Manchuria is perhapseven more cruciallyimportant.It providesa military pivot which controlsthestrategicdestiniesof northeasternChina.Historically,themas-terof Manchuria has also held swayover muchof northernChina. It was no accidentthatthedecisivebattlesof thecivilwarbetweentheCommunistsand Nationalistswerefoughtinthenortheasternprovinces-Manchuria.Theseconsiderationswerenotloston theSovietgovernment,which responded by undertakinga rapid strengtheningofborderdefenses,the constructionof a Far Easternmilitaryforce,theimprovementofcommunications(includingdouble-trackingtheTrans-SiberianRailway), and theencouragementof theRussianpeople to endure thehardshipsentailedin theprogram.34The Japanese,similarlyproclaimingthemselves

34 See VictorKravchenko, I Chose Freedom, New York, Scribner,1946, pp. 316-31for a personal account of the developmentof heavy industryin Siberia and the partplayed by the Japanese threat in expeditingthe process. For a general discussion of


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192 WORLD POLITICSmenacedbySovietpreparations,hastenedtocompletemeasuresoftheirown.Theyerecteda formidablewar industryinMan-churia.Theybuiltthousandsof milesofrailwaysandcountlessairfieldshavingonlystrategicvalue.Theystroveto bringundertheircontroltheMongolianracesofnorthwesternManchuria,hopingto drivea subversiveethnicwedge deep into Soviet-controlledOuter Mongolia. Concernedover the securityoftheirsouthwesternand westernflanksin Manchuria,theJap-anese occupied Jehol and Chahar and Inner Mongolia. Inordertoconsolidatetheirpositionin Manchuriaandtoprepareforfutureaggression,theymobilized industryand cultivatedfanaticismin thehomeislands.BothJapanand Russia acted as thoughtheyexpectedwar.ButonlyJapanactedas thoughshe soughtit.35The hard core ofJapanese-Soviethostilitieslay,however,notin disputedborders,commercialcompetition,nor in thestrategicpositionofManchuria alone. It lay insteadinthein-ternationalpolitical and economicanarchywhich in the FarEast as elsewherewas at oncea functionandby-productoftheSoviet Union's searchfor securityand Japan's drive towardempire.In thecontextoftheimmediateinternationalsituation,theJapanesepolicyofaggressionwas mouldedbytherenascenceofNationalistChina,unfetteredbytheparalysisoftheLeagueof Nations, encouragedby the successesof revisionistItalyand Germany,canalized by the decline of Imperial Britainand theisolationismof the United States,excusedbythedis-ruptiveactivitiesof the CommunistInternationaland itsSovietsponsor,and accelerated by the returnto world-wideeconomictribalism.Following the emergenceof the Japanesemenace on itseasternflankand the Germanin theWest,theSovietUnion'sforeignpolicywas markedbyco-operation,real or attempted,the Soviet Far East and its turbulenthistory,see M. Gubel'man, "Our Heroic FarEast," Tikhii Okean, March-April 1938.35According to Ziuzin (loc. cit., p. 171), railroad mileage in Manchoukuo almostdoubled duringtheJapanese occupation.Ziuzin emphasizes that this developmentwasdirected against the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic as well asagainst the areas of partisan resistance.For a complementarystudy,see A. Gal'nerin,"The Military-EconomicPreparation of the Manchurian Base," Mirovoe Khoziaistvoi Mirovaia Politika,September1939.


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JAPANAND THE U.S.S.R.,1937-1939 193with theWesterndemocracies.But eventhentheSovietpressdid notdistinguishbetweenthe totalitarianand thenon-totali-tarian"capitaliststates"in pointingout thedangersof "capi-talistencirclement."The Soviet leadersdedicatedthemselvestotheprimarytaskofsecuringSovietsafetyfromwhatseemedto themthe mountingthreatof aggression.These were alsoyears freightedwith significantinternal developmentsinSoviet Russia-especially industrializationand the purges-whichreacteduponexternalpolicywithpersistenceand force.World eventsand a pervasivesenseof insecuritycombinedtoforceRussia intothemainstreamof worldpolitics.Collectivesecurity,universaldisarmament,and co-operationwith thedemocraticWestwere theunimplementedand oftenhypocri-tical Soviet themesuntilRussia at lastturnedto her "naturalally,"Germany,forthesecuritythat provedillusoryand thefriendshipthatprovedshort-lived.Reflectingupon these years of diplomatic march andcounter-march,it iseasytocondemnthestatesmenoftheWest,whoselack of perspicacityat timesseemedmatched only bytheirineptness;it is equally simple to maintainthatamongthe prospectivevictimsof Hitler the Soviet Union alonegraspedthenecessityforconcertedactionin stiflingthisap-pallingmenace to civilization.But to do so is to overlookorignorethenatureof theSovietstateand itspolicies as inter-pretedbytheWest,tobe blindtothedilemmaofthesmallandrelativelyhelplessstatescaughtinexorablybetweentheupperand nethermillstonesof Soviet and Nazi totalitarianism,todisregardthenumbinguncertaintyand growingalarmwithwhichthe Westernpowersreactedto theconfluenceof Sovietmilitarymightwithideologicaldynamism.Whateveritsintent,whateveritssincerityin seekingcollectiveactionagainstAxisaggression,the Soviet Union remainedone of the principalforcesofdisruptionina worldsadlyin need ofstability.The conclusionof theSoviet-Nazi Pact in late August of1939seemedtomanyobserversa negationof thoseprinciplesforwhichthe Soviet Unionostensiblystood;and thesuccessfulcompletionof thenegotiationswiththeJapanesethreeweekslaterto end the fightingat Nomonhandeepenedthe riddle.Actually,however,thecomplexofconditioninghistoricaland


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194 WORLD POLITICSideologicalforceswhichenabledSovietleaderstoadjusttothenot-so-coldwarwithJapan (and theperilofGermany)madeit virtuallycertainthat theywould adjust to it. Threatenedelsewhere,theSovietgovernmentwas willingto carryon anarmedstrugglewithJapanonpreciselythatscalewhichwouldrepulseinvasionand discourageJapaneseaggression.It exer-cised extremevigilance in preventingthis strugglefromde-velopinganyfurtherthan practicalconsiderationsmightre-quire and theoreticalconsiderationspermit.These considera-tionscoalescedandfoundunifiedexpressionintermsofpoliticsand weremodifiedonly bythenecessityof retainingprestige.Japanesemilitaristsgraspedthesesubtletiesas well as theirramifications.Safe in theknowledgethattheirenemyunder-stoodand practicedthe realitiesofpower,theJapanesecouldcontinueto experimentwithoutfearinga greaterinvolvementthantheywerepreparedtoundertake.The Soviet government,ontheotherhand,couldanddid balancethepowerequationbymanipulatingitseconomicrelationswithJapanaccordingtothedictatesof pureexpediency.To theJapanese,theserelationswereeverybitas vitalas werethe"sacredSovietborders"to theRussians.In assessingthe currentsignificanceof the Manchurianborderwarfarein its broader implications,particularnotemustbe madeofthreethings.First,JapanandtheSovietUnionwere inherent,naturalenemiesin almosteverypolitical,so-cial, economic,and historicrespect.Second,theirgeographicpositions,especiallyin an age when distanceand terrainaredemolishedby flight,presentedeach powerwith essentiallyinsolubleyetinescapableproblemsof strategy.Finally,untilAugust of 1939 theywere nominallyor openly aligned inworld political and militarycoalitionsthatwere destinedtowarfortheworld.Yet inspiteofthesefundamentalandubiquitousantagonisms,the twogovernmentsjointlyachieved a near miracle.Theyhappenedupona modusvivendiwhichtranscendedall motiva-vationssavethoseofpower,all moralitysave thatofMachia-velli. Significantly,thatmodusvivendi,attainedthroughcon-flictandhard-headeddiplomacy,wasneverthelessoneofpeace.Japan and Russia did not go to war. Their citieswere not


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JAPAN AND THE U.S.S.R., 1937-1939 195reducedto rubblenortheirpeoples annihilated.The war inManchuria repaid the relativelysmall investmentsof bloodwiththe incalculabledividendsof peace. With the firingofthelastshellatNomonhanthereensueda scrupulouslycorrectrelationshipapproachingamitybetweenthe Soviet and Jap-anesegovernmentswhichwas tofreeeach to pursueitsthird-powerpolicieswithoutfearorhindrance.This firstSovietcoldwarwas broughtto itssuccessfulterminationwiththesigningofthePact ofNeutralitybetweenJapanandtheSovietUniononApril 13,1941,a pactwhichwas toendureuntiltheobjectiveconditionswhichhad broughtitintobeing-i.e., theequipoiseof powerin theFar East-had beendecisivelyalteredbythecrushingdefeatsadministeredtoJapanbythe armedforcesoftheUnitedStatesandto GermanybytheAllied powers.36

THE LESSONThe foregoinganalysishasnotbeenofferedwiththeimplicitsuggestionthattheUnitedStatesusurpthe prewarprovocativerole ofJapaninitsrelationswithSovietRussia.Thatwouldbeas alien as itwouldbe corruptingtotheAmericanspiritand,in a two-insteadof a multi-powersystem,probablyfatal totheprospectsof anysortof realstabilityintheworld.But thiscasestudyhasmostemphaticallyindicatedtheneedfor a thoroughoverhaul if not reconstructionof the tradi-tionalAmericanassumption,imbeddedfirmlyinconstitutional

historyand practice,thata stateof war or peace effectivelyexistsonlybyvirtueof legislativeaffirmationand is, in eithercase, an exclusive phenomenonof inescapable totality.37AsT. A. Taracouzio hasdemonstratedin an exhaustiveexamina-tionofSoviettheoryonthesubject,theleadersoftheU.S.S.R.,ontheotherhand,adheretotheconvictionthatwar and peacearenotinfact"diametricallyopposedand mutuallyexclusive,"36 For the text of the Treaty, see Iz'vestiya,April 15, 1941, with the appendaged

FrontierDeclaration which guaranteed the "territorial integrityand inviolabilityofManchoukuo,and .. . theMongolian People's Republic."37 As Nathaniel Weyl put it in Treason: The Story of Disloyalty and Betrayal inAmericanHistory (Washington,Public AffairsPress, 1950,p. 474): "The Constitutionwas drafted in a comparativelysimple era when nations, as a rule, either went towar or remained at peace." The institutionalmeans at the disposal of the govern-mentremain,despite themany ad hoc decisions of recentadministrations,ill-designedto cope with the unique demands of quasi-war.


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196 WORLD POLITICSbut are instead"twoequally importantmeans,supplementingeach otherin thecommunists'advancetowardtheirfinalrev-olutionarygoals."38The Soviets,in short,have recognized,asAmericanstoo frequentlyhave not,thevalidityofAristotle'sobservationthatwaris nothingbuta meansofsecuringpeace-thoughthe Soviets have correctlyelaboratedthe dictumtomeana peace whichservesone'spoliticalobjectives.Conversely,of course,the Soviet approach bars as senti-mentaland uselessor worsea warwhichdoesnotfurtherthepurposesof theState.Since survivalis obviouslyessentialtothosepurposesa defensivewar is of coursea sine qua non intheeventof attack.But theurge to offensivewar must waitupon a carefulbalancingof anticipatedadvantageand disad-vantage.This balancingis,withina totalitarianstate,a highlybureaucratizedprocessand thereforedependentin itsaccuracyand wisdomupon the natureof institutionalizedprocedure,bothformaland informal,as well as upontheabilitiesand pre-dispositionsof theindividualswho have to do both with thegatheringof informationand its interpretation.It is difficult,however,toimagineanyimportantgovernmentalapparatusinthe contemporaryworldwhichis incapable of understandingthattheweaponsoftodayvirtuallyassuregraveifnotmortalin-jurynotonlytoa nationsubjectedto eitheran all-outassaultorcounterassaultbut also-and thisis a revolutionarydevelop-mentinworldhistory-tothegovernmentalapparatusitself.This last is so because thedirectionand executionof highlyorganizedwar demandsnolessorganizationandcentralizationonthepartofthewarringgovernment.The resultis a complexpoliticalnerve-centerofhighvulnerability.Hence any policybasedon a rationalcalculus,evengiventhesubjectivizationofthatcalculus,mustexcludethelaunchingof totalwaragainstanantagonistunlessan overwhelmingvictorywithoutchance ofsmashingreprisalis almostcertain.

While it maybe argued successfullythatstates,like men,mayatcrucialor evenprosaicmomentsact withsingularirra-tionality,thereis, as thisstudycontends,substantialevidencethattheSovietgovernment,at leastin regardtowar,doesnot.This is in spiteof thefactthatthereexistwithintheU.S.S.R.38 War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy, New York, Macmillan, 1940,p. 295.


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JAPAN AND THE U.S.S.R., 1937-1939 197fewifanyinternalobstaclestothewagingofan aggressivewar-as exemplified,forinstance,in the Soviet invasionof theBaltic States,Poland, andFinland. It shouldbe equallyclear,fromrecenthistoryas well as fromthe natureof the bodypoliticitself,thattheUnitedStatesis andwill in all likelihoodcontinueto be incapableofinitiatingthekindofcalculatedwardiscussedabove.AssumingthattheAmericanabilitytoretali-ate drasticallyis notsapped by ineptnessor internalfission,therefore,it would seemthattotalwar withtheU.S.S.R. isnotapttobreakoutas a resultof an outrightattackbyeitherpower.How, then,could a full-scaleconflictcome about?It has beenremarkedthata warwill resultwhenonepowerfeels that its capacity to wage war is seriouslythreatened.While subjectto thequalificationsapplicable tomostgeneral-izations,thisadequatelydescribestheconditionsunderwhichtheUnitedStatesand Russia are mostlikelyto resortto war.Hence itis atthisfocusthatattentionmustbe directed.Marked innovationsinweapondevelopmentnecessarilyaf-fect,inproportiontothemilitaryweightoftheinnovation,therelativecapacitiesofnationstowagewar.A significantinnova-tionwill act as a casus belli,or a provocationto prophylacticwar,however,onlysolongas itisassumedthatwar mustbetotaland thattheenemywill infactattempttousehis ownweaponsof totaldestructionfirst,withoutregardto the consequences.A SovietmiscalculationofAmericandeterminationandabilitytoretaliatemassivelyseemshighlyimprobable.Thereforethedevelopmentbythe U.S.S.R. ofanyweaponwhichwould notcompletelyreduce to ashes America's retaliatorycapacitywould appear mostunlikelyto encouragean attackupon theUnitedStates-so long,thatis,as the Politburodid notbelievethatatomicbombsor theirequivalentwere aboutto explodeoverMoscow.There are,ofcourse,a numberoffactors,relativelydifficultto calculate,whichreactdecisivelybutunobtrusivelyupon anation'swar-makingpotentialand consequentlythebalancingof power-an increasedstandardof living,improvedpublichealth,theexploitationof untappedresources,an increaseinindustrialproduction,and so on. These factorscannotbe ig-


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198 WORLD POLITICSnored; theyare not,however,readily assessedas threatssuffi-cientlydirectand grave in themselvestoprovokewar.There is, however,one outletthroughwhich thereseemstocourse the cumulativeexpressionof nationaland ideologicalstrengthand ambition-politico-economicand territorialex-pansion.Here liesthetruepointofconcentration-andof com-bustion.Thus itisthatAmericanforeignpolicyhas come to bedirected to the "containment"of Soviet territorialaggran-dizementand the castrationof movementswhich seek to ex-tendthedomain of Soviet influence.The Korean experiencehas, amongotherthings,demonstratedtheunwisdomofpursu-ing an unlimitedpolicyofcontainmentwithoutthe meanstoimplementthat policy.But this experiencehas also broughtintofocusonceagaintheflexible,opportunisticattitudeoftheSoviet governmenttoward peripheral clashes of interest,nomatterhow severe.It is particularlysignificantthatthe Soviet press, despiteworld tensionsvergingonoverload and despitetheproclama-tionof a nationalemergencyin the UnitedStates,givesno in-dication of fear thatthe presentcrisis will debouch into ageneralwar. Instead,SovietanalystsexpressconcernthattheUnited Statesrefusesto recognizethe practical implicationsofitsKorean defeatand theemergenceof a drasticallyalteredpowersituationinthe Far East.39In otherwords,theRussiansseem to be tellingtheUnited Statesas pointedlyas theydidtheJapanesethat it is essentialto deal with the realityofpower,the ultimaratioofpolitics,whetherone likesitornot,and thatanydiscussionswhich ignoreor obscure thisrealityare butone removefrommetaphysics.However one mayevaluate such an attitude,it can never-theless be dealt with. There is in the Soviet mentalitynoirrational,heroicurgeto Gotterddmmerung,no chiliasticex-pectationthatall historyis about topourthrougha breach inthepresentto transformthe future.When thevital interestsof the Soviet Statedemandedit in thelate 'thirties,the Polit-buro proved eminentlycapable of co-operatingin a back-handed way tolocalize and subsequentlyto resolvediplomati-

39Harrison E. Salisbury,New York Times, International Edition Supplement,Dec.17, 1950, p. 5.


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JAPAN AND THE U.S.S.R., 1937-1939 199cally even violentarmed clashes on Soviet territory.Sovietleadershave subsequentlyprovedequally adept at exacerbat-ing peripheralconflicts,particularlywhen the formalityofnon-interventioncouldbe maintainedandpossiblereprisalde-flectedto thenominalagentof aggression.This fact,it mustbe insisted,representsno dramaticchange in Soviet opera-tional procedures,long-rangeexpectationsor aspirations,butsimplythe existenceof a new power situationfavorable tomore energeticmanipulation.The successof thatmanipulationcan yetprovokethecata-clysmif Americanstatesmendo notsoonrecall that interna-tionalpoliticsis at besta shadyand imperfectbusiness.It is notsusceptibletotheverbatimapplicationofprinciple,nomatterhow loftyor inspiring.One principle in particular,neitherloftynor inspiring,mustat once be laid to restif substantialportionsof mankindarenotto be. It is thegreatand disastrousillusionthatwar and politicslead privatelives of theirown,that to save our mortalsoulswe mustneverbe foundsimul-taneouslyintheembraceofboth,and thatwe mustemptythefullreservoirof ourstrengthand of ourpassionon one to theutterexclusionof the other.We can no longeraffordto act asthoughwhatis expedientis necessarilyimmoraland what isimmoralmust thereforebe expedient,or we may shortlyfindthecivilizedworldplungedintotheagonyand darknessofa newVolkerwanderung.If, on theotherhand,theUnited Statescan recapturetheflexibilitythathas beenso alarminglyabsentfromitspoliciesandtheirimplementation,andiftheAmericangovernmentandpeople can avoid attributingto the Russians a home-grownconvictionthatwar and peace are and shouldbe totalcondi-tionswithnobridgebetween,thenall is notlost.The provoca-tionsmaywell be unending,the beat to quartersincessant.Neverthelesstherecan yet be in our time a peculiar buteffectivepeace whichwill permitthe enflamedpassionsandtraumaticdogmasof thepresentto be replacedgradually,ifwith infinitepatienceand vigilance,by the emergenceof aworld communityin which men can at last get on withthebusinessofliving.The plea is forcommonsense.

Quasi-War Between Japan and the U.S.S.R., 1937-1939

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