Quarterly of CENTER FOR EURO-ATLANTIC STUDIES • August-September LJKM ... · ceaserbia...

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Quarterly of CENTER FOR EURO-ATLANTIC STUDIES • August-September 2013. • ISSN 2217-9925

Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies – CEASDr. Dragoslava Popovića 15, 11000 Belgrade, SerbiaTel/fax: +381 11 323 9579; [email protected], www.ceas-serbia.org

Jelena Milić, CEAS Director

Why a publiC debate on serbia’s nato MeMbership is needed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pg.02

Sanja Mešanović, M.Sc.

hoW to a More efeCtive defenseand seCurity seCtor in the eu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .pg.06

Tamara Kaliterna, CEAS Associate

betWeen resolutionsand intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .pg.10

Jelena Milić, CEAS Director and Tamara Kaliterna, CEAS Associate

dialogue on the responsibility to proteCt doCtrine at the un general asseMbly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .pg.13

Haki Abazi, Program Director for the Western Balkans at the Rockefeller Brothers Fund

syrians are in urgent need of our help -- bashar al assad Must go . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .pg.17

Yavor Siderov

the bulgarian politiCal landsCape is MuCh Changed afterthe birth of genuine Civil soCiety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pg.20

Irina Rizmal, CEAS Researcher

Keeping up With the private seCurity seCtor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pg.24

Research

Mapping of open governMent partnership in south east europe: the Case of serbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pg.30

Why A PUBLIC DEBATE ON SERBIA’S

NATO mEmBERShIP IS NEEDED

Jelena Milić, CEAS Director

„Critics of the current Government will not bring Serbia down.“

Aleksandar Vučić

the show „Teška Reč“, TV Pink, 29.9.2013.

The New century - August-September 20132

l’État, c’est moi – the principle based onwhich ever more openly the progressive partyleader, the first deputy prime Minister of serbiaand the Coordinator of all security services,aleksandar vučić, is attempting to reign overserbia, is not complementary with the notion ofa modern, stable, democratic country in the21st century, with a clear separation of powers,rule of law and respect for human rights.

thirteen years since the start of its politicaland economic transition, serbia is still on theverge of slipping into a “captured state” modelof politico-economic relations. theauthoritarian trend based on which vučić isimposing himself, and based on which he wasimposed upon us, additionally slows down theprocess of consolidation. Meanwhile,transitional justice mechanisms failed toprovide the desired results, for which serbia isnot the only one to blame. the Westerninternational community has previously givenup on their essence, refusing to convey toserbia, loudly and clearly, the reasons for whichit was bombed, if the protection of civilians andthe prevention of excessive use of force werethe actual reason, and bring these

circumstances more clearly in relation withKosovo’s independence. by doing so, in acountry with a difficult legacy of committed warcrimes, the West, consciously or not,contributed to stopping the process ofpersonnel vetting in the security system - whichthe mechanisms of transitional justicelegitimately enable - much sooner than it wassupposed to.

this is why it is dangerous to have someonewith such a large baggage of bad politicalstances and decisions, like vučić, states in twotv shows – o.K. i have sinned, i realize that, ihave changed – and self-lustrates himself in thisway, while society and the Westerninternational community approve. such arinsed-out vučić then imposes himself as themost influential man in the country and society,although based on state of affairs in the securitysystem in general as well as the fact that a newsecurity-information agency (bia) director hasnot yet been named, such a portrayal of him isquite questionable. the trend is in the point atwhich recently vučić quite openly equatedcriticism of his government with bringing downthe state, supported by the obvious silence of

The New century - August-September 2013 3

the Western community.

hence the open question of how muchleeway there will remain for the possibility ofcorrecting the consequences of these trends byJanuary 2014 when the formal start of accessionnegotiations with the eu is expected, if the stateof serbia continues disintegrating like this, butalso whether the process itself iscomprehensive enough for this. disintegration,of course, is not caused by the action of us,critics of the current regime, as vučić presentsit, but comes due to the inability or lack of willof the state to secure constitutionallyguaranteed rights for all of its citizens andmaintain its monopoly over the organized useof force.

how else to explain the fact that the state isincapable of securing even the walk within thepride Week, announced a year earlier, the routeof which – around the block consisting of mainlypublic administration buildings - is already agreat enough compromise of the organizers inorder to make it easier for the state to respondto as many security risks as possible. neither thethesis that the state was defeated by externalelements – hooligans and violent right-wingers;nor that it did not succumb to the pressure ofthese so-called hooligans by prohibiting thewalk, holds water. the walk was prohibitedeither due to the consciousness of the „nationalsecurity council in its wider composition“,whatever that means, that there is no singlechain of command in the security system whichdevelopments during the walk would show; orbecause the state leadership does not actuallywant to lead serbia towards the eu, but daresnot to publicly say so. hence it uses instead itsmercenaries to threaten violence. and thenthey use this threat as an excuse for prohibitingthe walk and promotion of conservatism whichoften goes further, entering the field of hatespeech. both scenarios are equally bad forserbian citizens, as they intensify the processesof putinization which increasingly distance itfrom democratic consolidation andeuropeanization.

organization of the pride Week, amanifestation which makes belgrade part of theworld, the Western, humane and more inclusive

than the rest of the planet, also contributes,each and every time to our ability to review notonly the relationship of the state and the publictowards the protection of human rights andfreedoms, but also the state of affairs in thesecurity system. it should not be forgotten thatthe news that there is about two thousandpersons on secret illegal payroll lists of theMinistry of interior, published only a weekbefore the pride Week, passed completelywithout any kind of denial from the police or thegovernment.

the existence of these formations confirmsthat even thirteen years since the octoberchanges, the state of serbia has not given up theservices of the main pillars of Milošević’scriminal regime. these are the „individuals“ and„self-organized“ paramilitary groups whocarried out false ethnic incidents in bosnia andCroatia in the nineties, followed by the ninetieswars whose flames they ignited, andimplemented their arbitrary terror and crimesordered by the government which regular unitsshould not commit, although they terriblyslipped into it. these are the same„spontaneous disappointed citizens“ who burnembassies precisely of those countries whowere among the first to support Kosovo’sdeclaration of independence, the same„spontaneously organized homophobes“ withradios and knowledge of movement of Ministryof interior official units who attacked peacefulcitizens and state property during the walkwithin the 2010 pride, the same „campers whothe russians send humanitarian aid“ whoimposed order at the barricades in Jarinje andbrnjak in 2011. the state of serbia has clearlynot given these up, and what remains to bedetermined is only whether this is because theirrelationship with parts of the security system isstronger than the alleged desire of stateauthorities to lead serbia into the eu, orbecause the entire process of europeanintegrations is supported by the new born

europeans only because of eu financial supportand the coming into power which enabled theprogressive and socialist party control overmain financial flows, without a genuineintention to move to towards real reformsthrough eu integration. thus the process of


putinization of serbia continues throughrendering system institutions useless, creatingpersonality cults, attempts at establishing partyinstead of democratic control over the securitysystem, political deals brokered with criminalstructures as well as paramilitary actions whichthe state hires for carrying out the dirty work.

there was enough circumstantial evidence ofthe poor state in serbia even from before, butunfortunately not even the „public debate“initiated by two factions within the serbiangovernment, the daily newspapers Kurir andinformer, on the state of the Ministry of interior,and which the prohibition of the walk only laidbare, will contribute to the government, theopposition in serbia, or the Westerninternational community to finally put intofocus the need for a more comprehensiveapproach to assessing the state in the securitysystem, the necessary reform steps , and definethese as a priority. in the best case scenario,instead of a couple of words we will get a coupleof scattered paragraphs dealing with theseissues in the next eu Commission progressreport on serbia, which is expected in thefollowing days. that there is no consideration ofthe security system in serbia is also confirmedby the fact that the increasingly detailedsuggestion containing fourteen measures to atleast improve the field of supervision ofelectronic communications of citizens, whichthe Commissioner for access to information andpersonal data protection, rodoljub Šabić, andthe ombudsman, saša Janković, presentedalready two years ago, apparently neither thegovernment, nor the opposition, nor theWestern international community considered,not to mention thinking about it in detail.instead, there were announcements regardingthe intention of state leadership to alter thearchitecture of the security-intelligence system,without public and expert debate, obviously inorder to facilitate non-transparent removal ofarbitrarily unwanted personnel and theirreplacement with own party soldiers. a newarchitecture could, would have to contribute tobetter governance in the security system toocould be debated even without adopting a newConstitution, but not without strategicdocuments such as the national strategy for

foreign policy which serbia lacks, and withnational security and defense strategies, whichdo not comply with the eu lisbon treaty, or thebrussels agreement.

the intergovernmental meeting, or theinfamous specific date of the start of serbia’snegotiations with the eu will apparently takeplace in January 2014, regardless of theaforementioned, under the condition, of course,that the november local elections in Kosovotake place without any serious incidents.Cancellation of the walk, even despite the harshrhetoric condemnation, will not be overviewedwith all its causes and consequences, but will betreated by the Western internationalcommunity as a populist and two-faced rhetoricof the progressive and socialist party leadershipin light of the increasingly certain parliamentaryelections.

germany and great britain are trying tofurther ensure that relations with officialprishtina stay in focus, this time through thecirculation of a new non-paper, advocating foras many open questions surrounding Kosovo tobe closed as soon as possible. having in mindthat the previous governments justified theirshortcomings of nearly all necessary reformsteps with the notion that it is impossible tocarry these out while we are being robbed ofKosovo, and that the situation internallychanged little under vučić and dačić as thecurrent mantra of – we are fighting for a betterposition of serbs in Kosovo, and you are askingfor democratization – such an approach bygermany and great britain is a neededcondition for serbia’s europeanization, but isinsufficient.

With this much wrangling about „technical“eu criteria for starting negotiations on thechapters for the sake of political incentives onKosovo, and without additional ways to haveother burning issues such as the necessity ofstructural and personnel reform of the securitysystem put in focus, serbia and the eu cannoteven hope for an outcome similar to which theeu agreed to with bulgaria and romania. thesetwo states, despite all their internal weaknessesand russian swoops, have the black sea coastand are nato Member states. earlier start of


serbia-eu negotiations on Chapter 31, foreign,security and defense policy, whose legislation isnot binding in all fields as it is for others policies,would be a useful measure primarily forharmonization and standardization of controlover defense industry exports, but not for otherreforms steps in the security system which mustbe implemented.

this is why, until the Minister of naturalresources, Mining and spatial planning, Milanbačević, decides to dig a channel to the blacksea too, the serbia wanting to enter the eu, andthe eu itself, are left to encourage, as soon aspossible, a debate on the need for serbia’snato membership in serbia. not because thereis an unwritten condition for eu membership asit is often presented, but because the reformsnecessary for nato membership would, finally,also encourage a comprehensive reform of thesecurity system, and the debate wouldcontribute to better understanding of thequality of states and societies of the euro-atlantic world in relation to all otheralternatives, without which there is clearly noeuropeanization or eu integration of serbia. thedebate would also have to contribute to betterunderstanding of events in the nineties,approximation of views in the wider public onthe causes and consequences of armedconflicts, which would lessen the frustrationwhich is at the moment simply being sweptunder the rug. one important element of thepublic debate on serbia’s nato membershipshould also be the challenges of theinternational community – un, otherinternational and supranational organizations –in the prevention of mass crimes. this couldthen also contribute to reviewing currentstrategic documents in light of the brusselsagreement and their harmonization with eupolicies, for a start. this is an important step asthe current set of documents is Kosovo-centricand fails to represent the threats, risks andchallenges which serbia faces in a realistic order.furthermore, the debate would contribute tobetter understanding of the circumstanceswithin the framework of the proclaimedneutrality, primarily its reach and potentialresponses to threats and risks, and the possiblealternatives for short-term and long-term

security and defense cooperation.

a debate on serbia’s nato membershipwould also give a clearer picture of currentpolitical actors, which the suddendemocratization followed by ungroundedpositive reactions of the Western internationalcommunity, blurred completely. Consideringserbia’s nato membership would contribute tobetter understanding of who is genuinelycommitted to eu integration in serbia, and whohopes and, publicly or secretly, works, onfurther putinization of serbia.

the thesis that it would be beneficial forserbia to see the debate on nato membershipstarted as soon as possible seems unfoundedonly at a first glance. in serbia there is a stablecore of voters who want to see serbia in thepolitical West, although a political campaignwhich would publicly point this as a priority, ornato membership, which boils down to thesame thing, was never led. With an objectiveand convincing campaign their number wouldsurely increase. serbian citizens deserve braverpolitical leadership. they best demonstratedthis, not only by remaining calm and not riotingafter the conclusion of the brussels agreement,but by seeing the rating of those realizing theagreement increased. one absurdity ofcontemporary serbia is that, if you add thepercentage of the electorate held by the partieswhose members express pro-nato orientationat receptions within the state and abroad, andremain silent in the serbian public, thedemocratic part and united regions of serbia,with those whose leadership occasionallyspeaks of this topic more openly, such as theleague of social-democrats of vojvodina,alliance of vojvodina hungarians and liberal-democratic party, you arrive at a quite solidnumber which would , if it were any other topicin question, be frantically employed byeveryone.

unfortunately, open advocacy for serbia’smembership in nato is not a point of commonaction in the recently announced agreementbetween ds and ldp. Which is a pity becauseserbia needs a total Makeover, and not a pimpmy ride approach.

6 The New century - August-September 2013

nearly five years ago, at the european Collegein bruges, a debate was organized on therelationship between nato and the eu and thechallenges put before the eu by the increasinglysignificant security challenges. speaking of theCommon security and defense policy, thedebate participants cited an extensive numberof programs in the defense industry field, andduplication of capacities, which reducesinteroperability as the main challenges to thepolicy‘s implementation. the need forintegrating the eu defense industry was seen asan imperative, given the fact that, at thatmoment, there existed 82 different programsfor equipment procurement andmanufacturing. budget appropriations, withinthe exclusive jurisdiction of Member states,were not immense already at that time, and inthe meantime, with the advent of the globalfinancial crisis, they became even less. possiblesolutions were found in a unique procurementsystem, avoidance of capacity duplication andspecialization in the field of research anddevelopment, strengthening the domesticmarket in the defense industry, increasing itscompetitiveness, and, ultimately, amultinational approach to strengtheningdefense capabilities.

this entire debate was even more interestingbecause it ran parallel with the procedure ofadoption of the reform treaty of lisbon, whichintroduced the greatest number of innovationsinto the Common foreign and security policyand Common security and defense policy. inChapter v, related to the Common foreign andsecurity policy, lisbon created the normativefoundations which will enable the europeanunion to develop its own identity in the world,build its own system, and respond to global andregional challenges, strengthening its role in theglobal political scene. furthermore, this Chapterwas amended with two new chapters, out ofwhich the second is especially significantregulating, in the increased number ofmembers, the field of Common security anddefense policy (Miščević, 2011: 13-25).

the amendments increased the importance of the eu defense policy, intensifieddebates on it, opened many issues and definednew challenges stemming, primarily, from thelimitations of the Common foreign and securitypolicy, the incoherent approach of Memberstates to the notion of defense and theunderutilized capacity for action. thedevelopment and success of the, now 28,

hOW TO A mORE EFFECTIvE DEFENSE

AND SECURITy SECTOR IN ThE EU?

M. Sc. Sanja Mešanović

About the author: Sanja Mešanović was an adviser at the Office of

European Integration; Head of the Group for European Integration and

Regional Initiative at the Directorate for International Military

Cooperation, in the Defense Policy Department of the Ministry of

Defense of the Republic of Serbia; and Senior Adviser and Head of the

Group for European Integration of the Deputy Prime Minister Cabinet,

in charge of European integration. Prior to her professional

engagement in public administration she worked in the NGO sector.

She has given numerous lectures on the topic of European integration

at the Center for Democracy, Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence,

Women’s Studies in Novi Sad and courses of the Institute for Gender

Equality in Novi Sad. She is member of the Forum for International

Relations of the European Movement in Serbia.

Member states, when it comes to this newpolicy will be measured in the times aheadthrough efficient responses to these open issuesand challenges. the first opportunity is alreadyat the december summit of heads of states andgovernments which placed the question ofincreasing efficacy and competitiveness of theeuropean defense and security sector, in orderto enable better implementation of theCommon security and defense policyobjectives, as an important topic.

the topic was actualized by a Communicationof the european Commission, published on april24, under the title „towards a More Competitiveand efficient defense and security sector”,which contains an action plan with measuresfor its development (european Commission,2013). it will be the subject of debate amongheads of states and governments, in line withthe december 2012 Council Conclusions. theCommunication is a result of efforts of aWorking group which the europeanCommission formed already in 2011 in order toconsider the possibilities for strengthening thesecurity and defense sector, through themobilization on all resources available in theframework of existing eu policies. during thedrafting process, the Working group consultedall relevant stakeholders within existing euinstitutions and agencies, such as the europeanexternal action service (eeas) and theeuropean defense agency (eda)

there are two reasons for considering thepossibility of increasing efficiency of the securityand defense sector. the first one is political, asan influential europe needs a strong and activeCommon foreign and security policy andCommon security and defense policy,supported by a strong and efficient security anddefense sector.

“the world needs a europe that is capable ofdeploying military missions to help stabilize thesituation in crisis areas. (...) We need toreinforce our Common foreign and securitypolicy and a common approach to defensematters because together we have the power,and the scale to shape the world into a fairer,rules based and human rights’ abiding place”are the words of european Commission

president barroso from september 2012, in aspeech on the state of the union.

and indeed, if the eu wants to be a crediblesecurity factor in the world, it is necessary thatit creates a comprehensive approach usingvarious policies, instruments and resources, butone which is, to a large extent, backed by anintegrated defense industry, capable ofsupporting and developing military capacitiesand autonomous eu action.

the second reason is economic, and itsimperative at a time of economic crisis is evenstronger. steady reduction in defense budgetsand fragmentation of the market in this fieldthreatens to undermine the possibility foreurope to maintain and develop its militarycapacities and industry competitiveness in thefield of defense. another reason for concern isthe fact that each Member state decides onbudget reductions in line with its own priorities,not taking into consideration the commonstrategic objectives of the union. between 2001and 2010 the eu defense budget fell from 251billion euros to 194 billion. the reduction has aneffect on both the industry, but also on thereduction of investment in research anddevelopment. investment in research anddevelopment were reduced by 14% between2005 and 2010 and now amount to 9 billioneuros, while the usa spends nearly seven timesas much.

to make the situation even more serious, thedefense industry plays an unusually importantrole in the european economy and representsthe most important industrial sector with a 9billion euros turnover in 2012. it is also agenerator of innovation and center of hightechnology. the positive effects of itsdevelopment spill over into other fields, such asthe field of electronics or civil aviation, which allcontributes to creating new jobs for highlyeducated personnel. the european defenseindustry today employs 400,000 people and hasan indirect impact on another 960,000 jobs.

in other words, maintaining a good and stableindustrial base, that is, what the eu calls adefense technology industrial base (dtib),represents a necessary precondition withoutwhich the eu cannot ensure the security of its

7The New century - August-September 2013


citizens and protect its values and interests,implement objectives within the framework ofthe Common foreign and security policy andCommon security and defense policy, as well asenable economic prosperity.

the factors which, at this moment, determineand potentially undermine the efficiency andcompetitiveness of the industrial base, are theaforementioned budget reduction and marketfragmentation resulting in capacity, organizationand task duplication. the fact that the entire80% of the existing budget is spent onequipment procurement at the national level,speaks of the need for action at the level of thetwenty-eight. for, if the economic crisis made itimpossible to spend more, it is advisable tospend less. the european union, with its 1,6million soldiers and 194 billion euros whichMember states have together, has the potentialof achieving a strategic role in the internationalscene in line with its principles and values. thecondition, of course, is to overcome the budgetobstacles through active cooperation,coordination, between resource management,specialization, common research projects,common procurement, greater synergy of thecivil and military sector, better standardization,increased interoperability, and greater degreeof market integration.

the recently presented CommissionCommunication maps these problems andprovides concrete suggestions for overcomingthese in order to create a stable base forimplementing the Common security anddefense policy. it should not be forgotten thatwhen it comes to Common security anddefense policy, jurisdiction lays in the hands ofMember states, and that the Commission, usingits limited powers, offered a document whichpresents a hybrid of regulatory and projectproposals and solutions. in order to enhancecooperation in the field of security and defense,and enable survival of an efficient industrialbase, the Commission suggests taking thefollowing actions within its jurisdiction:

further deepen the internal market fordefense and security – through the control ofMember states when it comes to application of

the two directives related to procurement andtransfers in the field of defense (directive2009/43/eC and 2009/81/eC) and reacting toany market distortions; monitoring the coherentimplementation of article 346 of the lisbontreaty, which provides for the possibility ofMember states to classify confidentialinformation related to arms trade for reasons ofnational security; publishing the green paper onthe security industry’s challenges andestablishing a register of transfers within the eu.

strengthening competitiveness of thedefense industry – establishing standardizationfor double-use products, precisely defining ofthe basic raw materials for this type of industry,supporting small and medium enterprises andtheir clusters and using the european socialfund for strengthening human resources.

exploiting civilian military synergies especiallyin the field of research and development

developing capability in the field of Commonsecurity and defense policy – using double-useproducts.

increasing civilian military cooperation in thefield of satellite program and projectdevelopment

developing a european strategy for energyconsumption in the defense sector in order toreduce traditional emergent consumption andpromote the use of alternative energy sources.

strengthening the international dimension ofthis sector through its integration into the eumarket policy.

the proposed measures would certainly savetime and money for Member states. europeancompanies which are part of the defenseindustry, or are indirectly related to it, wouldhave easier access to non-eu markets, and withbetter standardization, easier access toeuropean funds would also be enabled.naturally, there is also the benefit for taxpayerswhose money would be used more efficiently,while through the use of a new energy strategyin the defense field, pollution would be reducedand ecological standards improved.

Resources:European Commission. 2013. CommunicationTowards a More Competitive and Efficient Defenceand Security Sector. COM (2013) 542/final.Fiott Daniel. 2013. More Competitive, MoreEfficient? The 2013 European Commission DefenceCommunication. Security Policy brief No.49.EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations.Available athttp://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/13/sec-gov/SPB49-Fiott.pdf/Miščević Tanja. 2011. Challenges for CommonSecurity and Defence Policy. In Challenges ofEuropean integrations no.11. Službeni glasnik.


according to statements of europeanofficials, the december debate is lookedforward to with great interest. highrepresentative for Common and security policyCatherine ashton stated: “the european unionwants to play the role of an important securityfactor in its immediate environment andglobally, in order to protect its own interests andcontribute to international peace and security.in order achieve this we need capabilities. inorder to possess the capabilities needed weneed a healthy industrial base. this is alsoimportant when we speak of employment,growth and innovation. the european Councilin december 2012 is an important moment atwhich we will discuss the future of security anddefense in europe, and the Commission gave asignificant contribution to the common effort ofMember states, the external action service andthe european defense agency”.

it is difficult to expect that the decembersummit will see Member states unreservedlydeciding to adopt the Commission proposalsand agree on the need for existence of a clearand precise european strategy in the defenseindustry field. finally, it should be mentionedthat this is not the first time that the europeanCommission deals with the notion of europeandefense. she has been doing so since 1996 andthis is its sixth Communication which reiteratesalready existing initiatives but also launchessome new questions such as the problem ofusing raw materials and the emphasized needfor civilian military cooperation when it comesto double-use resources and products (fiott,2013). one thing is, however, clear. that in theworld of an economic crisis, reduced budgetsand increased competition in the world marketmakes it harder for Member states to bear theburden alone. Closer cooperation with theeuropean Commission will be a real need formany. and the possibility of agreement on atleast some of the issues that the Commissionlaunched will take them a step forward in theprocess of deepening cooperation and definingdefense policy.

When it comes to serbia, since september 1,2013, and the entry into force of the saa, itbecame an associate member of the eu. under

the agreement provisions, it is obliged tocoordinate its civil and military actions at theinternational level with the eu to a greaterextent. however, serbia has already, as aCandidate state, participated in activities whichform part of the european security and defensepolicy. since april 2012 she actively participatesin eu crisis management missions andoperations. Currently, members of the serbiaarmed forces are engaged in the naval forcesoperation “eunavfor – atalanta” at all levels,from command to ship protection, and are alsopresent in eutM- somalia, while the procedurefor participation in eutM-Mali is underway.

furthermore, this year serbia completed allpreparatory actions and is ready to, as the firstand only country in the region, sign anadministrative arrangement with the europeandefense agency. When it comes to a pragmaticand multi-national approach to the increase ofdefense capabilities, since its foundation in2004, it had a significant role as the hub foreuropean cooperation in the defense field; aswell as an intergovernmental body, helping theCouncil and Member states to advance eudefense capabilities, as one of its key tasks forthe times that lay ahead. Cooperation with thedefense agency and participation in its projectswill advance interoperability with eu Memberstates, enable strengthening the domesticdefense industry and technologicalmodernization of the armed forces, and betterprepare serbia for the obligations stemmingfrom full membership. serbia’s proactiveapproach in this field of cooperation will notonly be positively assessed by its europeanpartners, but will also bring concrete results andprofit in advancing its industrial and defensepotential, including it into contemporaryeuropean defense policy trends.

http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/13/sec-gov/SPB49-Fiott.pdf/

http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/13/sec-gov/SPB49-Fiott.pdf/


the civil war in syria has been taking place fortwo and a half years now. it started off as a massprotest against the syrian president bashar al-assad, but turned into a bloody civil war with110,000 victims and around 2 million refugeesand displaced persons. Civilians make up for 40to 60 percent of those killed or missing. thearmed conflict began on March 15, 2011, as aseries of demonstrations inspired by the so-called arab spring. the efforts of syrianauthorities to suppress the demonstrations withthe help of the military has, however, led to anescalation of violence, and groups ofdemonstrators armed themselves and, bysummer of 2011, organized the so-called freesyrian army. this is the first official anti-government armed formation. as the warprogressed, opposing groups – includingsoldiers supported by al-Qaeda – will lead totensions among the anti-assad forces.

in february 2012 russia and China blockedthe draft un security Council resolution onsyria. in March 2012 the security Counciladopted the un envoy Kofi annan’s non-bindingpeace plan for syria, but the violence continued.

in June 2012, assad told the governmentthat they are at “real war”. the algeriandiplomat, lakhdar brahimi became the new unand arab league envoy for syrian, followingannan’s resignation.

in november 2012, a number of largeopposition groups, including the syrian nationalCouncil, united in the national Coalition ofsyrian revolutionary and opposition forces(the Coalition). islamic militias from alepporefused to join the Coalition, while the usa

joined great britain, france, turkey and persiangulf states in recognizing the Coalition and the„legitimate representative“ of the syrianpeople. since then, the Coalition changed threeinterim government prime Ministers. some ofthem were favorites of the usa, some of saudiarabia and some of Qatar. in august this year,the usa and great britain requested aninvestigation following reports on the use ofchemical weapons in the conflict with therebels. the syrian government and russia claimotherwise. eu leaders agreed that they will notblock arms exports to the rebels.

on august 31, ten days prior to the chemicalattack in the suburbs of damascus, obamastated that the syrian government is responsiblefor attack on its own citizens: „well over 1,000people were murdered, among which severalhundred were children ... this attack risksmaking a mockery of the global prohibition onthe use of chemical weapons ... the unitedstates should take military action against syrianregime targets.“

a day earlier, us secretary of state, JohnKerry, explained at the state department thatdamascus has, several times during 2013, usedchemical weapons „even though on a smallerscale“, but on „its own citizens ... the unitedstates knows that on august 21, at least 1,429syrians were killed in a chemical weaponsattack, including at least 426 children amongthem. even the first responders — the doctors,nurses and medics who tried to save them —they became victims themselves. We saw themgasping for air, terrified that their own liveswere in danger ... More than 180 states havesigned the Convention on the prohibition of

BETWEEN RESOLUTIONS AND INTERvENTION

Tamara Kaliterna, CEAS Associate

Chemical Weapons, including iran, iraq andlebanon“, he said.

the un report, published in mid-september,implicitly points to the responsibility of thegovernment in damascus for the use ofchemical weapons. following russia’s proposalto place chemical weapons under internationalcontrol, the american president barack obamapostponed an attack on syrian installations forthe production of chemical weapons andagreed to the russian proposal on thedestruction of the weapons until mid-2014. atthe same time, the syrian regime admitted, forthe first time, possession of chemical weaponsand demanded access to the internationalConvention on Chemical Weapons. theorganization for the prohibition of ChemicalWeapons (opCW) in the hague announced thatit will soon develop a program for thedestruction of syrian weapons.

un secretary general, ban Ki Moon,characterized the september 16 use of nerveagent sarin in syria as a war crime which mustnot go unpunished. the beginning of the unstatement says that there exist „clear andconvincing evidence that surface-to-surfacerockets containing sarin were used in theghouta suburb in damascus ... on a relativelylarge scale.“

great britain, france and the usa are pushingfor a „strong and binding“ un resolution on thetransfer of control over syrian chemicalweapons onto the international community.Catherine ashton, eu high Commissioner forCommon foreign and security policy estimatedon september 11 at the european parliament

that in the „role of the security Council is crucialand indispensable“ in solving the syrian crisis.Most eu members oppose the idea of britainand france joining the us military strikes.

russian president vladimir putin stated onseptember 19 that the use of force against syriawould be a blow to the world order, and notsyria. putin assumes that the use of chemicalweapons in syria was a skillful and cleverprovocation. according to him, it is not clearwho used the chemical weapons. „We can’twatch mass killings calmly, but if we try tointerfere on either side, there will be nobalance“, said putin. at the end of september2013, un investigators returned to syria tocheck for new evidence presented by the syrianauthorities and russia.

Development of doctrine on

Responsibility to Protect

despite the efforts of the internationalcommunity since the end of the second WorldWar to protect civilians in armed conflict,prevent genocide, crimes against humanity andwar crimes, genocide took place in bosnia andrwanda.

Many are convinced that it would be best toestablish a special international mechanismtasked to react in crisis situations, especiallywhen great powers cannot agree. it seems thatthis is the doctrine of „responsibility to protect“(rtop or r2p).

rtop, as a set of norms and principles,provides a framework that uses various meansto protect the civilian population. these are, forexample, „warning“ mechanisms: mediation,economic sanctions and all the mechanismscontained in Chapter 7 of the un Charter.

the term „responsibility to protect“ wasformulated in 2003, at a meeting of theinternational Commission on intervention andstate sovereignty, established in 2000.

rtop was included in global crisis throughsecurity Council, un general assembly and unhuman rights Council resolutions over 12times.


u.n. security Council to meet again on syria

http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/slideshow/Secretary_General_Report_of_CW_Investigation.pdf

ban Ki Moon reminded during a recentinformal discussion on rtop at the un, that theprinciples of rtop are the product of atrocitycrimes of the 20th century, such as theholocaust, srebrenica, rwanda, where theinability of states to protect their populationswas clearly demonstrated.

advocates of rtop stress that each action hasto be in line with international law and the unCharter, and that each action under the rtoppatronage has to protect the population, andnot punish the perpetrators.

the general-secretary at the time, Kofiannan, became a promoter of the rtopdoctrine, stressing that the world can protectcivilians in many ways. the last resort in militaryintervention with the „blessing“ of the securityCouncil, and in line with Chapters 6, 7 and 8 ofthe un Charter.

in a recent letter to obama, 25 ngos fromaround the world emphasize that „there is noother solution than political“ for syria.

the human rights Watch (hrW) stated thatmilitary action should be judged according to itseffects in protecting all syrian civilians, but thatduring the military action some civilians willsuffer. hrW believes that protection of civiliansshould be a priority for any militaryintervention.

authors from the World peace foundationbelieve that the maximum penalty for agovernment that kills its citizens would be „aninternational war crimes tribunal conveningoutside of syria“. the international Crisis groupstates that „the debate about possible militarystrikes suppressed what should be the maininternational preoccupation – how to revitalizethe search for a political solution, which isachieved through sustainable cease-fire and agenerally accepted political transition.

analysts heather hurlburt and homahassan* assessed on august 27, that syrianincreasingly reminds of bosnia, with seeminglyinsurmountable divisions in the un. as inbosnia, the use of force has reached top of theWest’s agenda.

various international entities have remindedsyria more than twenty times that it mustprotects its population. all sides, includingrussia and China, which have blocked key unsecurity Council actions agree that there aremass killings in syria and that the governmentis not responding normally. it took years for thisfactor to be acknowledged in the balkans. thereis a broad consensus that what is taking place insyria is a legitimate topic for discussion and aresponse of the international community, whichdid not happen in the first years of war inbosnia.

the authors find that the un machinery wasvery active when it comes to syria. since theconflict began, the security Council adoptedthree, and the general assembly fourresolutions. the harshest in the un, the humanrights Council, adopted ten resolutions and ishighly responsible for presenting the extent ofthe killing in syria to the world. ban Ki Moonused his discretionary rights to shape the wayof understanding and discussing the syrianconflict. he engaged a special representative,observers, investigators on chemical weaponsusage. un investigators used those data onlosses in the conflict on which there is broadconsensus. rtop has not succeeded if thechange of nature of international politics doesnot succeed. however, if success is achieved inpresenting compelling evidence to each unMember – such as the number of civilian deathsin syria (even without explanation of how theydied) and engaging internationalrepresentatives to report on the massacres,then rtop has succeeded. if rwanda, and notbosnia, is the point of comparison, then rtop isthe success of advocates of it, even when we,as the international community, have failed toprevent civilian casualties. this time no one cansay they did not know.

Ceas agrees with these findings.

* Hurlburt is Executive Director of the

National Network for Security and Hassan is a

Peace Researcher.



on 11 september 2013, the united nationsgeneral assembly (unga) in new york held itsfifth annual informal, interactive dialogue onthe responsibility to protect (rtop, r2p). thedialogue was based on the un secretary-general and unga vice president banKi-Moon’s fifth report entitled “state preventionand Capacity” and focused on the first pillar ofthe norm, which articulates that states have theprimary responsibility to protect their ownpopulations from genocide, war crimes, crimesagainst humanity, and ethnic cleansing.

this report by ban Ki-Moon analyses the riskfactors that can lead to the perpetration of massatrocities and puts forward suggestions forstates on ways to strengthen national capacitiesto prevent such crimes.

in his opening remarks un secretary-generalreminded the delegations that the adoption ofthe rtop norm in the 2005 World summitoutcome document remains a “remarkableachievement”. he pointed out that the normitself cannot be blamed for the internationalcommunity’s immobility in preventing theongoing atrocities in certain parts of the world.“the purpose of the rtop doctrine is not to“rush in at the eleventh hour” but to preventsuch crimes from occurring in the first place,and urged states to develop and strengthentheir prevention capacities”, highlighted ban Ki-Moon.

the special adviser to the secretary-generalon the prevention of genocide, adama dieng,moderated an expert panel discussions. thediscussion saw participants such as deputy-secretary-general Mr. Jan eliasson,recently-appointed special adviser on the

responsibility to protect dr. Jennifer Welsh,Cecile Kyenge, Minister of integration of italyand ambassador Maria Cristina perceval,permanent representative of argentina to theun. eliasson recalled that the internationalcommunity understood that early preventiveaction is less costly and more effective thanother measures, but that the problem lies insummoning the necessary political will for theseto be implemented. Minister Kyenge pointedout that atrocity crimes can occur in democraticcountries as well, and that states must thereforeconcentrate on the two greatest risk factors forsuch crimes in democracies: social vulnerabilityand segregation. ambassador perceval invokedthe specter atrocities from the past, includingthe commission of crimes against humanitycommitted in argentina, and highlighted thecritical role of memory in mass atrocityprevention. dr. Welsh stated that the unMember states and civil society must do evenmore on understanding the relationshipbetween human rights protection and atrocityprevention, keeping in mind the distinctionbetween them. she stressed that atrocities canoccur in times of peace as well, and thereforethey can occur even in the absence ofsystematic human rights violations.

the panel of experts was followed by aninformal, interactive dialogue in which sixty-eight governments, one regional associationand two civil society organizations - theinternational Coalition for the responsibility toprotect (iCrtop) and the global Centre for theresponsibility to protect - took part.

sapna Chhatpar Considine, the Coalition’sprogram director stressed that the Coalition

Jelena Milić, CEAS Director and Tamara Kaliterna, CEAS Associate

DIALOgUE ON ThE RESPONSIBILITy TO PROTECT

DOCTRINE AT ThE UN gENERAL ASSEmBLy

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/67/929

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/67/929


firmly believes that the responsibility to protectdoctrine is grounded on the factor ofprevention, and that it welcomes the focus ofthe meeting on the topic of state responsibilityand prevention. she presented the situation insyria: over 100,000 dead; millions seekingrefuge in neighboring states, and countlessmore internally displaced, which demands anurgent international consensus for theprotection of the people of syria. she remindedthat the use of military force is only one toolwithin the international debate on the situationin syria; that many civil society organizationshave appealed for a more robust andcommitted diplomatic effort to achieve apolitical solution to the crisis and that theseorganizations, in the long-term, believe thatensuring accountability for those who havecommitted war crimes and crimes againsthumanity, establishing an inclusive politicalpeace and reconciliation process, andprotecting the human rights of all ethnic groupsare essential to protect against future rtopcrimes; that the secretary-general’s reportstates that the obligations stemming from stateresponsibility and prevention are already rootedin international customary law and that the dutyof states to prevent and halt atrocity crimes isclearly stipulated in several international legalinstruments, including the genocideConvention, the geneva Conventions, and therome statute of the international CriminalCourt. the Coalition’s program directorconcluded that the role of civil society is crucialin assisting states to building inclusive, resilientand transparent societies and encouragedstates to continue to promote a safe anddynamic space for civil society, which includes

ensuring an independent and fair media.

samantha power, permanent representativeof usa to the un stressed the difficultconsequences of the war in syria, especially thehorrific effects of the use of chemical weaponsby the syrian government on august 21, thisyear. the usa representative expressed supportfor the doctrine of responsibility to protect andemphasized the value of a multilateral approachto resolving problems in syria and new similarsituations. power concluded that the importantframework of the 2005 World summit outcomedocument on the doctrine of responsibility toprotect remains more of an aspiration than areality, and that participants are responsible forensuring that this framework becomes a reality.

head of the eu Mission to the un thomasMayr-harting stressed that the eu believes thatthe heart of the responsibility to protectdoctrine is to prevent the planning, preparationor commission of the crime of genocide, warcrimes, crimes against humanity and ethniccleansing. harting warned: „unfortunately, weknow that the failure to implement effectivemeasures of prevention and comprehensiveactions at the national, regional and global levelcould lead to a dramatic deterioration of thesituation and the shrinking of space for anadequate response”. looking at the situation insyria, harting said that the long-term intensesuffering of the syrian citizens is unacceptableand that those responsible for committingcrimes must be held responsible. „the use ofchemical weapons is violation of internationallaw and a crime against humanity. the crimesbeing perpetrated are contrary to all theprinciples and values shared by theinternational community. the internationalcommunity cannot be kept aside from thecynical use of weapons of mass destruction. Wehave to show that such crimes are unacceptableand will not be tolerated, that there will be noimpunity. We need to prevent the re-usechemical weapons in syria, or elsewhere. Weremind of the important role of theinternational Criminal Court (iCC) in theinvestigation and prosecution of such crimes „.

prior to the general assembly debate, theinternational Coalition for the responsibility to

un secretary-general ban Ki-Moon

protect, in a letter to foreign Ministers of unMember states, called upon the Member statesto take part in the dialogue at the generalassembly and encouraged them to highlightspecific steps of the governments towardserecting a society resilient to committingatrocity crimes. the call also contains asuggestion for Member states to considerundertaking actions which seek to uphold theresponsibility to protect by further enhancingstate capacity to prevent atrocity crimes:

• Conduct assessments and analyses ofdomestic capacities and best practices toprevent atrocities, so as to adopt, establish orstrengthen existing mechanisms and statepolicies;

• develop a national plan of action for theprevention of atrocities and theoperationalization of the responsibility toprotect and/or appoint a focal point tasked withintegrating rtop within national policies;

• establish or enhance existing domesticearly-warning mechanisms and ensure that theinformation gathered is analyzed as well asshared with relevant international actors toguarantee swift, preventive action;

• adopt or further strengthen existingpolicies to ensure the full and equalparticipation of women and minoritypopulations in all political, judicial,reconciliation, and peacebuilding activities, aswell as safeguard the protection of equal rightsfor such populations;

• Create processes that cultivate dialoguebetween the state and communities that allowopen communication and mutual trust-building,mechanisms that can support an early

• promote a safe and dynamic space for civilsociety, which includes ensuring anindependent and fair media, as well as continueto form key partnerships between governmentand civil society actors to contribute to theprevention of atrocities.

the Center for euro-atlantic studies frombelgrade (Ceas), the only civil societyorganization from the region of south-easterneurope that is a member of the internationalCoalition for the responsibility to protect,

supported the letter and called upon theserbian Minister of foreign affairs, ivan Mrkić,to have serbia participate in the debate andconsider taking the proposed actions.

serbia did not have a representative in thisimportant debate in the general assemblyalthough vuk Jeremić, serbia’s representative,was still chairman of the un general assemblywhen the debate was held, and serbia wasmore than active in other events in the generalassembly during his presidency. theperformance of the viva vox choir performancesinging the song „March on the drina” will beespecially remembered. drina, by the way, isserbia’s border with another sovereign state,and in the collective memory of many victims,it is this song that heralded the mass rapes ineastern bosnia by serbian forces. Jeremić wasthe organizer of this performance and its activepromoter.

serbia’s experience with militaryinterventions, the reaction of part of theinternational community to systemic violationof human rights of one ethnic group, thepenalty for excessive use of force in the fightagainst insurgents/terrorists/irredentists, orhowever branded, the security Councilresolution 1244 in which these themes areelaborated on more explicitly, the judgment ofthe international Court of Justice in whichserbia is found responsible for failure to preventgenocide, the trend of negation of the genocidein srebrenica stemming even from top serbianofficials, are all very much the reasons for serbiato actively participate in this and similar debatesin the un general assembly.

asked by a reporter of the state radio-television of serbia on his one-year term in theglobal organization, Jeremić concluded that the67th session of the un general assembly, whichhe presided, was „very dynamic andinteresting.”

in his farewell speech to the united nations,on september 16, Jeremić said: „Mostimportant of all is that under serbia’s presidencyof the un the foundations of a newdevelopment policy for the 21st century werelaid, which contain not only an economic, butalso a social and environmental component. he


http://ceas-serbia.org/root/index.php/en/announcements/1510-ceas-support-for-international-coalition-for-responsibility-to-protect-icrtop-letter

pointed out that during his presidency of the ungeneral assembly a „historic internationaltreaty on arms trade, regulating the matter forthe first time in history, has been reached, andthat, after 65 years of waiting, palestinereceived a seat in the un.” the agreement onweapons will come into force only after it isratified by at least 50 countries. the nationalsecurity Council of the White house has beenanalyzing the text of the agreement for months.a desicion on whether to sign it will be reachedsubsequently. some military analysts predictedthat it will take 10 to 15 years for Washingtonto ratify the document. russia did not supportthis agreement. the palestinian representativewill occupy a „non-member-state observer”chair, just like the representative of the vatican.

Jeremić boasted that during his presidency,the serbian president, tomislav nikolić, spokeabout serbian’s stance on the hague tribunal at

the un general assembly. on this occasion, hesaid that in the last decade of the 20th century,serbia „left the un and fell into a vortex of civilwar”. facts, however, show otherwise. at thesuggestion of the security Council, the generalassembly expelled the federal republic ofyugoslavia from the un. a un official, as Jeremićwas at the time of the mentioned speech,would have to be able to distinguish the terms„civil war” and „aggression” against a sovereigncountry. on this, Jeremić, and others in serbia,can best inform themselves through judgmentsof the international Court of Justice and thehague tribunal, the two un bodies.

We suggest that you have a look at theCoalition’s more extensive report on thegeneral assembly debate, as well as theCoalition’s report from the first global civilsociety Conference on rtop.


http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2pcs-topics/4933-icrtop-report-from-first-global-conference-for-civil-society-on-the-responsibility-to-protect

http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2pcs-topics/5004-united-nations-general-assembly-holds-fifth-informal-interactive-dialogue-on-the-responsibility-to-protect

thirteen years ago i became refugee as resultof the war that Milosevic was waging in thebalkans. i had lost many friends and hope forlife. only when nato started to bomb militarytargets i got the hope back that one day peacewill be restored. during that time, i learnedmany words of war terminology, but one thatstayed in my mind was scorched earth,unlimited use of force that exterminates people.only dictators can come up with such strategyand implement it mercilessly, they will neverstop unless they are stopped by force. use ofchemical weapons only confirms that bashar al-assad must go otherwise he will not stop.

few months ago i went to lebanon andturkey and met syrian refugees. the déjà vu ofbeing a refugee haunted me. it reminded meagain that being a refugee is not a term of onlyphysical displacement; it erodes people’s dignityto the point of hating everyone and notunderstanding how is it that the world can justsit and watch while thousands of people arekilled, kids are murdered with chemicalweapons, and millions are forced to becomerefugees?

the syrian conflict, or for that matter anyconflict, is neither simple nor black and white. ialso understand the consequences of takingmilitary action to intervene in a conflict thatthere are so many external factors and partiesare intertwined; every responsible act has itsown consequences and so does not doinganything. to lead and claim leadership also

means to act and make difficult decisionssometimes not even with clear ending.globalization does not only imply absorbing andusing global resources for ones needs. it meanscollective responsibility for maintain andrespecting international conventions and treats,respect for human rights, rule of law andsecurity.

the world must not sit and watch innocentsyrian civilians being killed. it is embarrassing tosee how leaders and public opinion arebecoming immune of videos and pictures fromsyria showing kids dying from use of chemicalweapons and conventional military force,neither should be tolerated. again, i understandthere are interests, russians do not want to losecontrol over seaports and a market for theirweaponry and want to play again in the worldleague of important state actors perhapsclaiming leadership of briC+, the West hasdifferent interests that come from sykes-picotagreement, iranians have their own interest too,turkey is dealing with their interest in the regionand growing fears from the likely creation ofKurdistan in that part of the world. everyone hassome interest and others might take advantageof any situation, but the big question is: shouldthese interests be achieved or maintainedthrough killing innocent people of syria? isn’tthere space for those interests to be negotiatedand emulated in peaceful way? it is clear thatun is not capable of establishing useful path forending the war. both Kofi annan and lakhdarbrahimi tried while over 100 thousand peoplegot killed during these attempts. and we haveseen this in case of rwanda, bosnia andherzegovina and Kosovo, there is no chancethat un security Council will ever agree in acommon position for joined action to stop thewar anywhere in the world. this inability doesnot diminish the role of un. it just proves howmuch reform is needed to make it a useful anddecisive global governance institution. Maybe itwill never be, but can the world afford to wait?does that mean that wars and dictators canemerge every day and have free ride in killing


Haki Abazi, Program Director for the Western Balkans at the Rockefeller Brothers Fund

SyRIANS ARE IN URgENT NEED OF OUR hELP - - BAShAR AL-ASSAD mUST gO

innocent civilians and violate all internationalconventions?

here is the moment of disagreement withworld peace and human rights activists thatoppose military interventions, we cannot standagainst the need for military action when thevery same people we demand human rights forare being gassed and killed or are forced toleave their country. intervening militarily in aforeign country it is the most unpopular andmost undesirable decision to make for anypresident. it is especially for obama, thepresident who has decided to pull us soldiersout from iraq and afghanistan. it is true hereceived the nobel peace prize, but that willlose its meaning if he does not do anything torestore peace in syria, if he turns blind eye tokids and women being killed there.

the question that many ask is: why the us?the answer is simple- Who else? if it was not forClinton administration’s actions in 90s, wewould not be remembering one srebrenicatoday where more than six thousand people gotkilled in one day, but many more. if it was notfor Clinton administration’s actions in ‘90s, wewould not be talking for palestinian refugeesonly but we would be talking about Kosovaralbanians spread all over the world as result ofscorched earth scheme of Milosevic’s regime. itis clear that europeans are in fear of their ownaction and nato is losing ground as the onlysignificant military power in the world due todifficult internal political decision makingmechanisms. let’s not fool ourselves; there isnobody else left except us. i do not think thatrussia, the country that is imprisoning its owncitizens and using everything in their power tosilence any democratic voice, would suddenlystand up and care to fight for syrian lives, evenless when they are directly supporting andarming assad.

it is clear that latest move from russians is tobuy more time and to tactically make it moredifficult for any strikes to be successful in hittingthe right targets. even bad weather can make itmore difficult let alone moving targets orshielding military targets with civilian hostagesto make the intervention look bad.

it is the responsibility of democraticgovernments in the world and those who haveinvested so much in promoting human rights tostand together against aggressions and dictatorsin the world. if not now after more than 100thousand lives lost and almost two millionsrefuges, with war gaining intensity and thegrowing risk for further radicalization and spillover in the region, then when? there is alsohuge potential for this war to become viable

industry; and the intervention in the future willbe even more unavoidable, more risky, andmore expensive. it is time for americans,europeans, the new moderate iran government,and arab countries including egypt to join forcesto stop the war in syria. this cannot be donethrough geneva ii alone. the process of gettingparties to agree to sit around the negotiationtable and reach peace agreement; it has to havethe real power that can punish those who killcivilians and attempt to gain more territory tostrengthen their positions. unfortunatelydictators understand only the language ofmilitary force and power. nobody else wantsthat except dictators that are ready to kill theirown people just to remain in power or to serveto the interests of their sponsors who havelarger geopolitical interest.

Can the mess be avoided after theintervention?

first of all, the intervention cannot be lookedat from the perspective of post intervention.those are and should be treated as twoseparate phases. the intervention should serveto stop the war, full stop. What happens after isthe issue of how, in practice the agreementsreached during negotiations will beimplemented. often these agreements becomeside tracked to dysfunctional internationalmissions often lead by united nations andremoving ownership from the hands of locals.Most of the time this is justified in the name ofstability in the country. in fact, what happens isthat un and other international organizationsrush into the country in the name ofreconstruction and rebuilding the society, andend up trying to extend their role in order tokeep their own organizations going and fundedfor as long as possible.

syria is known for its intellectual, andeducated and secular population. this should be


smoke rises in aleppo - a large rebel basesource: afp

a picture of president bashar al-assad of syriaunder the boot of a member of the free syrianarmy

considered a strong argument for intervention,intervene before this capacity is lost to othercountries or killed. this human capacity shouldbe the basis of new programs for reconstructionand rebuilding syrian society. an interimgovernment for next three years lead by syriansshould be the primary focus of the agreementfor reaching peace. this interim governmentshould be charged with supporting andlegitimizing structures from village councils tomunicipal and national representatives. in threeyears this process should produce a constitutionthat is adopted by the representatives that aredrawn from the direct will and vote of citizensof syria. only after this, should elections bescheduled based on that constitution. havingelections before a constitution is adopted, it willguarantee legitimization and empowerment ofwarlords and people who had profited from warand post war trade and relationships withinternational community representatives. thereis little to no place for citizen voice to be heard.in this scenario no rule of law and no legitimateinstitutions will be created and the economyand trade will fall in hands of criminalstructures. this process will be hard to bereversed and it will disappoint syrians in longrun. the new syrian society should emerge fromthe will of the people and not from an imposedand internationally steered process.international assigned body should only bethere for three years to guarantee and supportthe implementation of peace agreement andcondition international aid.

the international community and its effortsto support syria should be fully coordinated andcontrolled by syrian led institutions and orinterim government. local Civil societyorganizations should be directly supported todemand accountability and transparency from

interim government and support rebuilding thenew syria. there is enough expertise around theworld on how to do this right and not deployneedless consultants and create organizationsthat are donor driven and detached from realityand primary focus of work. un and its agenciesshould not have a role as leading organizations,if at all, they should be coordinated and directedby ministries and their priority agendas withstrong accountability mechanism build withinthe mission. syrians should be able to pick upthe model and the country after which they canconstruct. the syrian agenda should bearticulated by syrian people, grounded in syriancontext and ownership. any other scenarioleads to bosnia, Kosovo, afghanistan, haiti andother failed international post conflictreconstruction missions but the militaryintervention to stop the war and killings cannotbe blamed for failures in post conflictinterventions.


in a Wall Street Journal op-ed francisfukuyama saw protest movements, emergingthroughout the world as ‘the middle classrevolution’, while david rohde in The Atlantic

called them ‘the revolt of the global middleclass’. however, the upswings of civildisobedience in brazil, turkey and bulgaria haveimportant distinguishing features that defy easyclassification. if you add to the mix the occupymovement and especially the so-called arabspring, the differences will drown out thesimilarities to a point where comparisons haveonly heuristic utility – unless one resorts tosweeping generalization.

in any case, making the primetime on thestrength of a domestic civil disobediencemovement is unusual for little bulgaria. her rareand fleeting appearances have had more to dowith nitpicking Cold War-era mysteries - theunsuccessful attempt on pope John paul ii’s life,the successful one on bulgarian dissident writergeorgi Markov’s (aka the poisoned umbrellacase), or with exposing current scandals such asthe maltreatment of orphaned children in stateinstitutions or of dancing bears by their romaowners. lately these have been superseded by

alarmist and increasingly hostile raves about thedanger to Western social security systemspoised by the huddled eastern europeanmasses. the inexorable passage of time drawsus ever closer to 1 January 2014 when allrestrictions by fellow eu members on the freemovement of bulgarian and romanian labormust fall, hence the shrillness of the moreisolationist and xenophobic media voices in theuK, germany, the netherlands and elsewhere.

so when last february bulgarians went out toprotest against exorbitant energy prices andmanaged to topple the government ofstrongman boiko borissov, world media barelytwitched. after all, every now and then bulgariasuffers an uncontrollable seizure, has a changeof mind and government and embarks on a newcourse, only to gradually go off the rails and endup in some new fiscal, economic or political bog.few of these occasions catch global attention.one such moment came to pass in 1996-97, thelast time people went out in force over theproblem of governance. the government of thebulgarian socialist party (bsp) had sospectacularly mismanaged the economy, thebudget and the currency that inflation ran in the

ThE BULgARIAN POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IS mUCh

ChANgED AFTER ThE BIRTh OF A gENUINE CIvIL SOCIETy

Yavor Siderov

About the author: Yavor Siderov studied History and Government

at the Universities of Sydney, Berkeley and Oxford. He trained and

worked at the Bulgarian National Radio and the BBC World

Service. For many years he taught at the American University in

Bulgaria. He is a commentator and analyst with a number of

Bulgarian and overseas media outlets.



hundreds of percent and people’s salaries andsavings evaporated quicker than rain over thesahara desert. but february’s protests peteredout amid accusations and counteraccusations ofparty complicity and nothing presaged whatwas to follow.

What did follow was quite remarkable, evenby local standards. early elections produced absp and Mrf (Movement for rights andfreedoms of the ethnic turks) minoritygovernment supported by the xenophobic andanti-semitic ataKa. this coalition betweensocialists, a purportedly liberal ethnic turkishparty and extreme nationalists was scandalousenough but in a country where the ex-communists of the bsp are traditionally allied totheir former victims (in the dying years ofcommunism the government organized anethnic cleansing campaign against the turks) no-one bats an eyelid – an earlier coalition involvedthe bsp and Mrf together with another formercommunist victim-cum-collaborator, Kingsimeon ii. unprincipled coalitions, immoralalliances and shady backroom deals havegoverned bulgarian political life ever since thepalace coup of 1989 signaled thetransformation of the bulgarian Communistparty’s political power into economic clout. thenovel ingredient to this tried and tested recipewere the nationalists, their credentials boostedby an unexpectedly good electoral result.

the materialization of this absurdity: acoalition between nationalists and socialists(the irony was not lost on many commentatorswho quickly took to calling it national-socialist)propped up by a constitutional aberration – anethnic minority party - came as the finalconfirmation of the complete delegitimation ofbulgarian politics. devoid of principledsubstance, the new government set about doingwhat it needed to do to entrench itself: pay offthe clientele. the very first appointmenthowever stunned public opinion by its sheercynicism. on 14 June delyan peevski, in his earlythirties already possessed of a rich biographyincluding parliamentary experience, a cabinetpost as well as virtual monopoly over theownership and distribution of print media anda significant presence in broadcast and online

media, was selected as the new head of thestate agency for national security (dans, by itsbulgarian acronym). peevski’s mother irenaKrasteva had previously been in charge of thenational lottery. she subsequently acquired themain printing facility in the country in tandemwith tsvetan vasilev, the chairman of CorporateCommercial bank.

peevski and his mother rose through theranks of the bulgarian nouveau riche by givingand receiving favors. at the tender age of 21,and before he had completed his legal studies –a conditio sine qua non - he was put in chargeof board of directors of varna port, bulgaria’slargest. in a similar fashion he was appointed tothe sofia investigative office without havingserved the requisite two years internship. hesubsequently served as deputy minister ofemergencies in the bsp-led triple coalitiongovernment in charge of the state reserve andwas also member of the committee regulatingarms trade. a two-time Member of parliamentwith the Mrf, peevski has no nominal positionin his mother’s media empire but took an activepart in managing it, assuming editorial control.among the least pleasant aspects of peevski’sappointment to the directorship at dans is hisuncanny ability to stay close to centers ofpower: a protégé of King simeon’s ndsv, hebuilt a political career on the back of Mrfconnections and enjoyed the favor of the bsp,spearheading the attack on boiko borissov’sgerb before doing a spectacular backflip andcoming out in his support.

the appointment of peevski proved the lastdrop for many in sofia and the first of whatturned out to be more than one hundred daysof protests took place demanding that he bewithdrawn from the position. the unexpectedfury of public opinion resulted in peevski’sremoval five days later but by then the geniehad been let out of the bottle and people’sanger was redirected at the government itself.prime Minister plamen oresharski foundhimself under siege two weeks into hismandate. no stranger to cross-party tiptoeing,oresharski had been deputy leader of the anti-communist union of democratic forces (udf)and deputy minister of finance in their 1997-


2001 government before running for sofiamayor on their ticket. he subsequently becameminister of finance and prime minister insocialist-led coalitions. in many people’s mindspeevski’s appointment and oresharski’s careerexemplified all that was wrong with bulgaria’spolitical system – cronyism, lack oftransparency, penetration of the highest levelsof government by oligarchic interests, all-prevalent corruption and total lack ofaccountability.

since 14 June two interrelated phenomenahave taken place in bulgaria that sprang out ofthese developments. one, after years ofagonizing soul-searching as to why it was thatother countries were able to mobilize aroundissues of civic importance, bulgaria can nowclaim to possess an indigenous civil society.despite its inherent instability, lack ofhomogeneity and relatively limited scope, thereis a now a core of citizens in this country willingto persist in demanding accountability andtransparency from political elites totally unusedto being held to account. this is a major victoryfor bulgarians whose transition fromcommunism was marred by crippling birthdefects: no indigenous dissident movement tospeak of, an all-too-powerful security apparatus,fractious and ideologically unstable politicalparties, a very imperfect privatization that leftthe majority of the population feeling a distinctsense of injustice, widespread poverty and aperilous demographic situation. two, the worldbegan to sit up and take notice. in a veryencouraging development, bulgaria is nowbeing mentioned in the same breath as braziland turkey as a hotspot of civil unrest – anunimaginable feat of only ten year previous.

a number of important question markssurround the protests. one has to so withscope. on occasion crowds numbered in themany tens of thousands (30 000-60 000according to some estimates), and there isgrowing evidence to suggest that the majorityof people support the demands of theprotesters. yet the protests are most active andvisible in sofia and to a far lesser extent, otherbig cities; there is little sign of the same level ofactivity elsewhere. the reasons may be

demographic (greater concentration of young,active people in larger cities versus an elderly,more conservative population in thecountryside) or political-geographic (both thebsp and Mrf source the majority of theirsupport from the less educated, blue collarstrata) or, more ominously, sociological andcriminal (chains of patronage and dependencyare more likely to flourish in smaller towns andthe countryside where local strongmen act astransmission belts for the interests of nationalpolitical parties and therefore critical thinking isnot merely discouraged but can have adverseeffects on one’s career, livelihood and evenfamily). in all likelihood, all three play a part inwhat has been, so far at least, an urbanphenomenon.

another has to do with political mobilization.it is unclear to what extent the protests willaffect current electoral trends. it may very wellbe that the core electorate of the bsp and to alesser extent those of the Mrf and gerb (boikoborissov’s Citizens for the europeandevelopment of bulgaria) find unity under thethreat of annihilation at the polls. this is a farlikelier outcome for the bsp than for the Mrf,whose support is capsulated and therefore notsubject to the vagaries of political life. gerb onthe other hand has been conspicuously absentfrom the early to mid-phase of the protest; afterall it was their government that fell victim lastfebruary and they are in no way a moretransparent, less corrupt organization than thebsp. While in power, gerb was at the center ofa tangle of dependencies involving some of themajor oligarchic players on the bulgarian scene.borissov’s reappearance on the national stagein the later phase of the protest signaled hisdesire to redeem, rebrand and reestablishhimself through sheer opportunism. it remainsto be seen whether other reformist groups willtake him on as partner or will choose to strikeout on their own, hoping for a fresh start.

in terms of coalition building, there has onlybeen one development of note, and itcorresponds to the gradual shift in the nature ofthe protests from a general anti-corruptionstance involving people of all kinds of politicalaffiliation (and many without one) to one of

nostalgia for the times when the so-calledtraditional right (the udf and its derivatives)were more or less unified and a viable politicalalternative to the bsp. thus the protestsassumed a more anticommunist character thanthey originally started off with and lost someleft-leaning participants (who by no means wentover to the government’s side). the crisis of theright in bulgaria is mirrored by a crisis of the left:it is no more possible to be a right wingconservative/liberal in a country of suchwidespread poverty than it is to be a socialdemocrat where communism has left such afatal mark on ‘progressivist’ ideologies. theupshot is that the remnants of the traditionalright together with a number of other politicalparties that fared badly at the last electionsfound it in them to form a reformist bloc which,despite its extreme heterogeneity has steadilyrisen in popularity according to some polls. itremains to be seen whether the democrats forstrong bulgaria (dsb) of former pM ivan Kostov,now led by one his deputies will manage a goodworking relationship with the bulgaria for theCitizens Movement of this country’s first evereu Commissioner, Meglena Kuneva. thegreens, whose supporters are in two minds

about being part of a right-leaning coalition, anda splinter group from the Mrf, add volatility tothe mix.

be that as it may, nothing can take away fromthe fact that the last one hundred days havebeen one of those rare occurrences whenbulgarians have risen to the occasion, proventheir democratic mettle and dented what has alltoo often seemed like an impenetrable wall ofMafia rule. the omerta of public life is brokenand cannot be fixed; regardless of the outcome(it is unclear as yet whether the government oforesharski will resign in the short term, or willwait until May and call an early election tocoincide with elections for europeanparliament) no future government can affordthe complacency and arrogance of previousones. for too long bulgaria has languished in acrisis of political representation. it is unlikelythat such chronic crisis will be resolved throughmere protests, as a lasting solution requiresrebuilding the entire party system along lines ofprinciple; the first step is, however, oftremendous importance. that first step -establishing trust and restoring self-respect -has finally been taken.


Brief overview of the situation in the

private security sector in Serbia

in the current national security strategy ofserbia, adopted in april 2009, for the first timein history, private security is placed as anintegral part of the national security systemstructure, with the commitment to have thisfield regulated doctrinarilly and normatively.the law on emergency situations anticipateslocal government emergency situationheadquarters to select private securitycompanies to perform the tasks of protectionand rescue in emergency situations. at theinitiative of the industry itself, a series ofnational standards for private security serviceshas been adopted. a Memorandum ofunderstanding between the Ministry of interiorand the serbian Chamber of Commerce hasbeen concluded, representing a starting pointfor improving public-private partnership in theserbian security sector. the association forprivate security at the serbian Chamber ofCommerce has been founded, as well as theCommission for public-private partnership inthe security sector, whose members include

representatives of state institutions and privatesecurity companies, but also non-governmentalorganizations such as Ceas. the serbiangovernment is incrementally introducingmeasures of economic policy aimed ateliminating deviations in the work of publicauthorities and businesses, in order tostrengthen control of operations and avoid thepossibility of inconsistent application of laws onlabor, employment, public procurement and thelike.

given the fact that there is a number of lawsapplicable to this sector the lack of an umbrellalaw does not means that it us automaticallyillegal, but that it is not functionally integratedinto the security system of which it is part.

the private security sector, placed within awider legal framework, would be under greatercontrol of the state, and its work would beprecisely regulated. the current situation,without an umbrella law to regulate the privatesecurity sector, whose existence is gooddemocratic practice in nearly all eu Memberstates, benefits non-market operations,engagement of inadequately trained and/orcompromised staff, poor records of the number


KEEPINg UP WITh ThE PRIvATE SECURITy SECTOR

Irina Rizmal, CEAS Researcher

The working version of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies (CEAS)

report titled „Keeping up with the Private Security Sector“, within the

project „Regulated Private Security Sector – Safer Life of Citizens“,

supported by the Royal Norwegian Embassy and related to the Draft

Law on Private Security, deals with: the current state in the private

security sector in Serbia, comparative examples of good practice, and

comprehensive analysis of the Draft Law on Private Security which the

Serbian Government forwarded to the Parliament for adoption. Analysis

of the mentioned fields has been conducted by a CEAS expert group

consisting of CEAS team members and relevant experts from

international organizations, the academic community and the private

security industry, engaged specifically on this project.

http://ceas-serbia.org/root/prilozi/CEAS-analiza-regulisan-privatni-sektor-bezbednosti-bezbedniji-zivot-gradjana.pdf


of employees in the sector, number ofbusinesses in the sector, and tax evasion. all ofthis contributes to a poor image of the privatesecurity sector in serbia which is, otherwise, alarge and legitimate industry throughout themodern world.

the legal situation in which the position ofprivate security is regulated through generalprovisions on labor, business and responsibilityis insufficient for an effective legal systemprotecting human rights and establishing abalance between legitimate state interests,citizen interests and the interests of privatesecurity companies. it is exactly this kind ofsituation that can contribute to human rightsviolations, endangering the safety of citizensand increasing uncertainty of businessoperations within those entities engaged inprivate security.

although the serbian government isincrementally introducing measures ofeconomic policy aimed at eliminating deviationsin the work of public authorities and businesses,in order to strengthen control of operations andavoid the possibility of inconsistent applicationof laws on labor, employment, publicprocurement and the like, Ceas believes thatadoption of a legal framework which wouldregulate this field is necessary in order to securethe conditions needed for functionallyintegrating the private security sector into theoverall security sector in serbia, additionallyprofessionalize this industry and improve theperception the public has of it now.

thus we are witnessing increasingly oftenreports in the media on numerous abuses ofprivate security companies which includeextortion, racketeering, drug trafficking, physicaland armed conflicts and, unfortunately, murder.the still unresolved murder of fedor frimermanin front of the club „sound“ on July 25, 2013,regarding which, from the non-governmentalsector, only the Center for euro-atlantic studies(Ceas) has voiced concerns, calling upon theMinistry of internal affairs to disclose whetherthe suspects in this murder were hiredindividually or through physical securitycompanies, and to which there is still noresponse, is, unfortunately, an additional

argument on favor of early adoption of theframework law which would, among otherthings, establish records, licensing, guidelinesfor selecting service providers on the one hand,and suppressing the common practice ofchoosing the lowest offered price of services,the negative consequences of which are oftenfelt by both clients of private securitycompanies and citizens, on the other.

according to the serbian Chamber ofCommerce, the number of registeredcompanies operating in the private securitysector in serbia is more than 3 000, althoughthere are no precise data on how many of theseare currently active. according to Ministry ofinterior estimates, the private security sectoremploys between 30 000 and 60 000 personsand is in possession of approximately 50 000pieces of weapons, while the Ministry ofinterior has 53 000 pieces of weapons, and theserbian army has 200 000 pieces of small and580 000 pieces of various large caliber weapons.the strength of the private security market inserbia is estimated at approximately 150 000000 euros.

since 2007 to date, the private security sectorin serbia marks continued growth. there is anevident increase in the rate of growth ofoperating income and earnings of privatesecurity companies, with a parallel decrease inthe number of employees, which is possibleonly by failing to register employees forobligatory social security (illegal work) and/orby concluding contracts on vocational trainingof private security officers who, in reality, oftenwork independently, that is, the qualified officersupposed to „train“ them while on duty actuallydoes not exist.

there is also an evident shift of a largenumber of private security companies into a„grey zone of business“, which, with a largernumber of employees in the private securitysector compared to the police and armedforces, contributes to both losses for the state,in terms of available budget resources, as wellas to the emergence of serious risks, in terms ofemployee human rights violation and adecrease in the level of state and citizen securitythrough a reduced quality of the service

provided.

the percentual growth of income of fiftyprivate security companies in 2012 compared to2011, according to the data presented to theserbian business registers agency, is shown inthe table below:

*Remark: PSC – private security company; PS – physical

security; TS – technical security

some of the most important questionsrelated to private security sector activitiesinclude:

Who can engage in private security? Canpersons convicted of criminal offences,prosecuted ex officio, engage in the privatesecurity business? Can persons convicted of„minor“ criminal offences and prosecuted exofficio, and for which they received less severesentences, engage in the private securitybusiness? Who can be the owner of a privatesecurity company? Who can hold the positionof the responsible person in the legal orentrepreneurial entity for private security? inwhat way are private security services to beconducted? Who trains private security officersand how? What is the state and public oversightlike over private security? do state purchasersof services hire private security providers underthe terms of the law on public procurement,that is, based on the relevant criteria? What isthe control of public procurement in the field ofprivate security like? What is the protection ofpersonal data of persons engaged in privatesecurity as well as the data which these persons

gather from citizens like? What type of weaponscan private security officers use? What are theirstandards of treatment in the occasion of anattack on a person or property which they areprotecting? What is the status of individuals interms of labor rights in the private securitybusiness? (petrović, 2013)

the current situation in serbia, in which thereis no umbrella legislation, and no accompanyingbylaws which would provide answers to theseand other relevant questions, is very dangerous.Ceas believes that the urgent need for findingthe center of gravity of the triangle between theinterests of the private initiative, citizens andthe state by legally regulating the entire privatesecurity sector is therefore obvious.

Employees as Losers

in the case that, through overly liberalregulation, the interests of private securitycompanies prevailed, it would risk decreasedstate oversight over important securityinterests, greater human rights violations andthe possibility for the state to introduce greaterlimitations than actually needed for the privateinitiative by „hindsight“. in the long term, sucha „victory“ would not suit private securitycompanies either, due to greater risks of unfaircompetition (and therefore loss of income), aswell as greater risks for citizen human rightsviolation, and therefore loss of reputation forcompanies engaged in private security.

on the other hand, the current practice notesa decrease in wages and social benefit costs,that is, payment of taxes and contributions foremployees, as an often case in the privatesecurity sector in serbia. this is accompaniedwith the practice of forcing employees to switchto employment contracts for a specific timeand/or part time, as well as the avoidance ofcollective contracts, all in the race to offer thecheapest services in order to be morecompetitive in the market. however, in such asituation, adequate training of employeesbecomes a luxury, while safety mechanismsbecome overheads, resulting in an increasedsecurity threat for everyone, both privatesecurity officers, as well as service users, but


35 FS PSC 2011 g 2012 ggrowth

rate

income 16.097.248.000,00 din. 17.963.801.000,00 din. 1,116

153.834.556,57 € 157.965.186,42 € 1,027

income 2.367.870,79 € 4.935.833,62 € 2,085

employers 22.205 20.438 0,920

15 Ts PSC 2011 g 2012 ggrowth

rate

income 1.573.807.000,00 din. 1.741.067.000,00 din. 1,106

15.040.204,51 € 15.310.121,35 € 1,018

income 1.277.092,89 € 1.406.788,60 € 1,102

employers 151 161 1,066

50 PSC 2011 g 2012 ggrowth

rate

income 17.671.055.000,00 din. 19.704.868.000,00 din. 1,115

168.874.761,09 € 173.275.307,77 € 1,026

income 3.644.963,68 € 6.342.622,22 € 1,740

employers 22.356 20.599 0,921

http://ceas-serbia.org/root/index.php/sr/home-sr/93-preuzeto/1472-zasto-nam-je-potreban-zakon-o-privatnom-obezbedenju

also regular citizens who come in contact withthem.

the atypical character of the sector in alsoreflected in unfair competition – prices offeredin serbia are 1,5 euros per person per hour,while the average in other european countriesis 8,9 euros per person per hour, which is, withthe lack of state control, the basic generator oflow labor costs, humiliating incomes ofemployees and mushrooming of a „grayeconomy“. therefore, due to a lack of acomprehensive law on private security, thefundamental rights of employees arethreatened, while cases of non-payment oftaxes and social benefits by private securitycompanies, breaches of initial contracts relatedto the anticipated number of employees, andcases of undeclared labor, are becomingeveryday reality.

Citizens as Losers

in case citizens interests prevail, in terms ofhuman rights having a far too much limitingeffect over the state and the private initiative, itcan lead to deterrence and ineffective economicand civil order in this field, a reduction of privateinitiative and tax revenues, and therefore anegative effect on society and, in the long term,to the overall state of human rights and securityitself.

however, the analysis of the unusually lowprice, carried out by the association for privatesecurity at the serbian Chamber of Commerce,points to the fact that the price of providingprivate security services in the serbian marketis lowest compared to 34 european states,which as a consequence carries the risk ofbankruptcy of employers in the private securityfield, lack of motivation among private securityofficers, poor quality of service, and thereforeincreased vulnerability of protected facilities, allunder conditions of continuous increases in allforms of criminality rates and proclaimedmeasures of economic policy on introducingorder in the market and preventing „grey areasof business“.

The State as a Loser

in case that, through excessive use of forceand demanding regulations and limitations, thestate interests prevailed over the interests ofcitizens and private security companies, such asituation could lead to undue restrictions ofhuman rights and „suppression“ of the privateinitiative. through such a solution, in the longterm, the state itself would lose tax incomes andstabilization of the important social system ofprivate security, ad encourage a „greyeconomy“.

however, the current situation is quite theopposite, considering the fact that, according toserbian Chamber of Commerce, the number ofregistered companies operating in the privatesecurity sector in serbia is more than 3 000,although there are no precise data on howmany of these are currently active. some datashows that only the first 50 companiesproviding private security services have anannual turnover of 180 million euros. however,having in mind the aforementionedmanipulations of employee contracts, as well asthe avoidance of tax and contributionpayments, this figure presents only a portion ofthe income, which is declared in official financialreports submitted to the serbian businessregisters agency. therefore, only a portion oftotal earnings of private security companies issubject to taxation by the serbian government.as a result of such functioning of a part of theprivate security sector in the „gray zone ofbusiness“, the republic of serbia’s budget losestens of millions of euros annually, according tothe latest estimates.

this state remains unchanged to date, andthe problem becomes even more seriousconsidering the fact that, based on publicprocurement figures, the strength of thedomestic market of the private security sectoris estimated to approximately 6 000 contractswith state institutions and a potential 8 500contracts with private clients. the statetherefore presents a large market share for suchan alarmingly unregulated private securitysector, while at the same time losing budgetresources belonging to it in terms of taxes andbenefits, through the increased involvement ofprivate security services.


The situation in public procurement of

private security sector services

unfair competition in the sector in obtainingcontracts for the provision of securityundermines the reputation of the entire sectorand has implications for employees, employers,but also for clients. the greatest problems inpublic procurement in the field of privatesecurity are deficient training of persons incharge of public procurement, who are notcapable of drafting the technicaldocumentation, unfair competition, inability forpublic procurement procedures to beperformed each year, lack of legislative andmarket rules of the game, as well as lack ofinvestment in quality.

the methodology of selection encompasseschecking the hired security officers, managersof contracted services, contractedinfrastructures and companies offering securityservices, while the decision on awardingcontracts should unconditionally be based onthe principle of the most economicallyadvantageous, and not the lowest offered price.Clients play an important role here because inthe process of ordering services they can clearlystate what level of quality they expect and forwhich price, that is, set the selection criteria. itis in their interest to obtain a high qualityservice, which could be achieved with higherprices and better earnings of employees, whichis, in turn, the most important consideration fora job well done. however, in serbia, theselection methodology based on the lowestoffered price still prevails, which directlyprevents overcoming the abovementionedproblems at the very core, leaving unmotivatedemployees whose rights are often violated,inadequate and poor quality service, andtherefore, lowered security of the client as well.

The role of insurance companies in the

work of the private security sector

insurance companies do not have a specificpolicy on private security services which are onoffer, making it rather easy to meet theirrequirements. Clients are not motivated toinvest more in security, as there is no returns on

such investment through stimulus measures ofinsurance companies, and it is often the casethat banks themselves declare only theminimum amounts of money they transport inorder to lower the price of insurance.

insurance companies could significantlyaffect the quality of services which privatesecurity companies provide for their clients bymaking the premium amount dependent on thelevel of risk for the value for which security isprovided.

insurance companies could also have a muchgreater role in control of private securitycompanies through determining the conditionsunder which private security services areinsured in detail, and then through recognitionof certificates of conformity of these serviceswith the relevant standardized criteria, acquiredin the legal system of accreditation ofcompetence to perform the assessmentcompliance. however, in order for such a systemto be established, it is necessary for insurancecompanies to have professional staff, familiarwith the problems of security management, inorder to be capable to efficiently carry outsecurity assessment and quality assurance forprivate security companies in line with thecurrent market regulations in serbia, which isgaining clearer outlines through the nationalsecurity strategy, standards for private securityservices and ethics of the association for privatesecurity at the serbian Chamber of Commerce.

Conclusion

the serbian government adopted the draftlaw on private security on april 30, 2013. thedraft law regulates mandatory security andprotection of certain objects, activities, andwork of legal entities and persons in the field ofprivate security, the criteria for licensing,operation activities and establishing oversightover their operations. private security, in termsof the draft law, encompasses the provision ofservices, that is, activities including theprotection of persons, property andengagement with physical and technicalsecurity, unless these are under the exclusivejurisdiction of state authorities, as well as jobssuch as the transport of money and other items


of value, maintaining order at public gatherings,sporting events and other places of assembly(monitorial service), performed by legal entitiesand entrepreneurs registered for that purpose,as well as legal entities and entrepreneurs whohave established an internal form oforganization providing for their own needs (self-protective activity).

the group of experts gathered by Ceas toanalyze the draft law on private security agreedthat the existing draft law is in principle good,but that, given the fact that it has alreadyentered parliamentary procedure, certainamendments are necessary in order for it to befurther improved. upon adoption of theimproved draft law, it is also necessary to adoptall the bylaws without which application of thelaw is not possible.

the serbian prime Minister ivica dačićannounced in september this year that thedraft law will be placed on the agenda of theautumn session of the parliament. Ceas hopesthat the report “Keeping up with the privatesecurity sector”, and especially therecommendations for improvement of the draftlaw, formulated by academic experts in thisfield, representatives of private securitycompanies and experts from the association forprivate security at the serbian Chamber ofCommerce, will serve the purpose of helpingMps in contributing to providing a good-qualitylaw and the following bylaws for this importantbranch of industry and for serbian citizens.




the Center for euro-atlantic studies (Ceas) ispart of a coalition of ngos that have launcheda two-year project to encourage governmentsin the Western balkans to become moretransparent, titled “advocacy for opengovernment: Civil society agenda-setting andmonitoring of country action plans” targetinggovernments in albania, bosnia andherzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro,and serbia. the project is being funded by theeuropean union.

open government partnership (ogp) is aninternational initiative promoting multilateralcooperation and seeking strong commitmentsfrom participating government institutions topromote transparency, increase civicparticipation, fight corruption, and harness newtechnologies to make government more open,effective, and accountable.

partners on the project include the policyassociation for an open society (Czechrepublic) as project leader; institute fordemocracy and Mediation (albania), analitikaCenter for social research (bosnia andherzegovina), riinvest institute fordevelopment research (Kosovo), Center forresearch and policy Making, (Macedonia),

Center for democracy and human rights(Montenegro), and the Monitoring Center CeMi(Montenegro).

through a common methodology addressinga common framework for open government amapping of government policy and capacity hasbeen carried addressing the five areas aroundwhich ogp commitments are structured.alongside the mapping study, a public opinionpoll on trust in government has beenconducted in order to provide a full picture ofthe current situation in serbia regarding therelation between the citizens and thegovernment, enabling us to tailor future policybriefs and advocacy plans based on thesefindings.

the project draws on the experience of neweu Members states within the opengovernment framework. What follows areresults of the public opinion poll on trust ingovernment carried out across serbia in april-May 2013. a total of 1074 persons were polledusing face-to-face and telephone interviews inorder to obtain a random representativestratified sample. the full mapping study, alongwith the public opinion poll results is availableat the Ceas website.

mAPPINg OF OPEN gOvERNmENT PARTNERShIP IN

SOUTh EAST EUROPE: ThE CASE OF SERBIA


http://ceas-serbia.org/root/prilozi/Mapping-Open-Government-Partnership-South-East-Europe-Case-of-Serbia.pdf

http://www.opengovpartnership.org/

http://ceas-serbia.org/root/index.php/en/programs/107-open-government



polling sample breakdown


general level of trust in the Serbian government

i have great trust 3%

generally i have trust 33%

generally i do not have trust 48%

i do not have trust at all 16%

polling results

breakdown of results:

general level of trust in the Serbian government


acc

ord

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to t

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po

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s, s

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ian

citi

zen

s h

ave

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ust

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he

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(at

47

%),

wh

ile t

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tize

ns

ex-

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th

eir

lack

of

tru

st in

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l par

ties

(7

5%

).

*rem

ark:

fo

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th

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sim

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qu

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me

qu

esti

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. fo

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egar

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ult

s o

f th

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spo

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s ‘i

hav

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eat

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st’ a

nd

‘gen

eral

ly i

hav

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ust

’. a

det

aile

d b

reak

do

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of

resu

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follo

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for

each

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ph

wh

ere

this

pri

nci

ple

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bee

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sed

.

Tru

st i

n i

nsti

tuti

on

s



Trust in institutionsI have

great trustgenerally I

have trust

generally I

do not have

trust

I do not

have trust

at all

I do not

have an

opinion

president of serbia 6% 30% 30% 28% 6%

government of serbia 6% 30% 37% 23% 4%

parliament of serbia 4% 31% 41% 19% 5%

Judiciary 3% 25% 41% 26% 5%

health system 5% 34% 37% 21% 3%

education system 6% 36% 36% 17% 5%

police 8% 32% 35% 21% 4%

armed forces 11% 36% 28% 19% 6%

security intelligenceagency (bia)

5% 27% 29% 21% 18%

serbian orthodoxChurch

11% 21% 20% 34% 14%

independent institutions

4% 32% 22% 10% 32%

anti-Corruptionagency

4% 21% 31% 18% 26%

political parties 2% 12% 36% 40% 10%

Civil societyorganizations

4% 33% 24% 18% 21%

Media 2% 18% 39% 33% 8%

european union 6% 38% 23% 19% 12%

nato 6% 28% 24% 24% 18%


Am

on

g t

he

min

istr

ies,

th

e h

igh

est

le

ve

l o

f tr

ust

is

en

joy

ed

by

th

e m

inis

try

of

De

fen

se,

wh

ile

th

e m

inis

try

of

Fin

an

ce a

nd

Eco

no

my

sco

red

th

e l

o-

we

st.

Tru

st i

n m

inis

trie

s



Trust in ministries

I have

great

trust

generally I

have trust

generally I

do not

have trust

I do not

have trust

at all

I do not

have an

opinion

Ministry of internalaffairs

5% 30% 37% 19% 9%

Ministry of finance andeconomy

1% 22% 42% 24% 9%

Ministry of foreignaffairs

2% 28% 40% 18% 12%

Ministry of defence 7% 31% 32% 20% 10%

Ministry of regionaldevelopment and localself-government

2% 24% 36% 24% 14%

Ministry of transport 2% 20% 30% 34% 14%

Ministry of Constructionand urban planning

2% 19% 32% 31% 16%

Ministry of agriculture,forestry and WaterManagement

2% 24% 35% 22% 17%

Ministry of Justice andpublic administration

1% 26% 36% 23% 14%

Ministry of education,science and technologicaldevelopment

3% 30% 33% 18% 16%

Ministry of health 2% 29% 33% 20% 16%

Ministry of Culture andMedia

2% 27% 29% 19% 23%

Ministry of energy,development andenvironmental protection

2% 27% 31% 17% 23%

Ministry of naturalresources, Mining andspatial planning

2% 24% 29% 19% 26%

Ministry of employment,and social affairs

2% 23% 30% 22% 23%

Ministry of youth andsport

5% 27% 29% 16% 23%

Ministry of foreign andinternal trade andtelecommunications

2% 24% 29% 17% 28%



how much do you agree with the

following statements?

I

absolutely

agree

I generally

agree

I generally

disagree

I

absolutely

disagree

I do not

have an

opinion

Too much public information about the

work of the government can make our

country more vulnerable

6% 21% 44% 15% 14%

mPs and Councillors have a right

to keep information about their

income and assets private and

confidential

3% 13% 47% 24% 13%

All financial and technical details of the

agreements concluded by the

government, as well as information on

the implementation of these contracts,

should be available to the public

20% 41% 18% 5% 16%

Data on ethnic origin and religious

orientation should be collected for the

purpose of fair employment in public

administration

10% 33% 19% 14% 24%

A civil servant who reveals

confidential information should

be punished

20% 37% 15% 6% 22%

how much do you agree with the following statements?


have you ever submitted an official request for free access to information?

Did you receive a timely reply?

If yes, when was it the last time?


how much do you agree with the following statements?

how much do you agree with

the following statements?

I

absolutely

agree

I generally

agree

I generally

disagree

I

absolutely

disagree

I do not

have an

opinion

An ordinary citizen does not have

enough knowledge to estimate

whether a particular government

decision is good or not

16% 46% 17% 5% 16%

mPs take responsibility for

conducting public affairs22% 47% 10% 2% 19%

Lobbying (impact on the

decision of mPs) is bad for

society

20% 29% 21% 6% 24%

Public hearings, organized at the local

level, have a formal character and

limited impact on the decisions of

local government

10% 31% 14% 4% 41%

Blogs and comments on the

Internet do not reflect the political

public opinion in a proper manner

12% 27% 17% 4% 40%



have you ever taken part in a demonstration or street protest?

When was the last time you took part

in such an event?

If yes, how many times have you taken part in such events?


In y

ou

r o

pin

ion

, w

hic

h i

nsti

tuti

on

s o

r o

rga

niz

ati

on

s h

av

e t

he

gre

ate

st i

mp

act

on

th

e g

ov

ern

me

nt’

s d

eci

sio

ns?


In your opinion, which institutions

or organizations have the greatest

impact on the government’s

decisions?

great

impact

moderate

impact

Low

impactNo impact

I do not

know

parliamentary Committees 11% 17% 42% 13% 17%

individual Mps 11% 29% 35% 11% 14%

opposition parties 5% 15% 41% 24% 15%

state audit institution 3% 14% 32% 28% 23%

ombudsman 2% 10% 33% 28% 27%

Commissioner for information of public importance and personal data protection

3% 11% 32% 29% 25%

Commissioner for the protection ofequality

2% 8% 31% 31% 28%

private tv stations and private pressmedia

15% 33% 28% 11% 13%

trade unions 5% 14% 32% 33% 16%

local self-governments 3% 27% 35% 20% 15%

ngos and citizen associations 5% 16% 36% 23% 20%

the Church 16% 27% 27% 16% 14%

big international companies 29% 38% 15% 5% 13%

domestic entrepreneurs and bankers

34% 34% 13% 5% 14%


as presented, serbian citizens feel that big international companies and domestic entrepreneursand bankers have the greatest impact on the government’s decisions (at 29% and 34%respectively), while the majority of citizens believes that trade unions have the least impact (at33%), followed by independent institutions.


Does your municipality have a website?

If yes, have you ever visited you municipality's website?

If you have, which information have you searched for, and how often?


Project partners

This project is funded by the European union

If you have, which information have

you searched for, and how often?very often Often Occasionally Never

I read programs and events organized in

my city8% 11% 37% 44%

I read decisions of the municipal

government, minutes of meetings of the

local government

4% 3% 26% 67%

I read and download decisions and

resolutions of local self-government2% 3% 23% 72%

I communicate with my committee

member1% 2% 9% 88%

I send remarks and comments to

municipal secretariats and officials1% 5% 20% 74%

I submit documents and forms to local

administration1% 6% 27% 66%


CEAS CALENDAR OF EvENTS SEPTEmBER 2013 – FEBRUARy 2014

23. SEPTEmBER 2013

publiCation of Mapping study on open governMent partnership standards in serbia

Donor: Directorate General for Enlargement, European Commission

25. SEPTEmBER 2013

third round table „ManageMent of insured risKs and Quality

of private seCurity serviCes“

Donor: Royal Norwegian Embassy in Belgrade

30. SEPTEmBER 2013

fourth issue of the Ceas Quarterly the neW Century

Donor: Fund for an Open Society, Serbia

21. OCTOBER 2013

round table „proMoting CoMprehensive seCurity seCtor

reforM“

Donor: National Endowment for Democracy, USA

18. NOvEmBER 2013

round table presenting the fifth issue of the Ceas Quarterly

the neW Century


20. JANUARy 2014

ConferenCe „proMoting CoMprehensive seCurity seCtor

reforM“ and proMotion of the aCtion plan for adopting the

14 Measures

Donor: National Endowment for Democracy, USA

17. FEBRUARy 2014

ConferenCe presenting the siXth issue of the Ceas Quarterly

the neW Century


Quarterly THE NEW CENTTURY is a part ofthe project “Serbia and EU: what do we havein common in the field of security anddefense and how to exploit it to themaximum – public advocacy of continuationof the security sector reform in Serbiathrough extensive use of the resourcesprovided by Serbia`s accession process”,supported by the Fund for an Open Society -Serbia.

CENTER FOR EURO-ATLANTICSTUDIES – CEAS

Dr. Dragoslava Popovića 15,

11000 Beograd, Srbija

Tel/fax: +381 11 323 9579;

[email protected],

www.ceas-serbia.org

The Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies – CEAS is anindependent, atheist, socially oriented left liberal think-tank organisation, founded in 2007 in belgrade. With itshigh quality research work Ceas generates preciseanalysis in the field of foreign, security and defence policyof the republic of serbia. simultaneously, Ceas publiclypromotes innovative, applicable recommendations andcreates practical policy whose aims are

strengthening of the socially oriented, left liberal democracy in serbia1

adopting the principle of precedence of individualover collective rights, without disregard for the rightswhich individuals can only achieve through collectiveactiondevelopment of the of the concept of transitionaljustice and the establishment of mechanisms for itsenforcement in the Western balkans region, exchangeof positive experiences, emphasising the importanceof mechanisms of transitional justice for a successfulsecurity sector reform in post-conflict societies intransition towards democracyacceleration of the processes of serbian euintegration and strengthening of its capacities forconfronting global challenges through collectiveinternational actionstrengthening cooperation with nato and advocacyfor serbian atlantic integrationstrengthening a secular state principle and promotingan atheistic understanding of the worldContributing to the erection and preservation of amore open, safe, prosperous and cooperativeinternational order, founded on the principles ofsmart globalisation and equitable sustainabledevelopment and the international norm of‘responsibility to protect’

Ceas fulfils the mentioned activities through variousprojects assorted in four permanent programmes::

advocacy for serbian euro-atlantic integration;

security sector reform in serbia;

transitional justice;liberalism, globalisation,international relations and human right.

Ceas is an active member of the reKoM coalition whichgathers more than 1,800 civil society organisations,individuals from all the countries stemming from thebreakup of former sfry. among them are also missingpersons’ parental and family societies, veterans, newsreporters, representatives of minority ethnic communities,organisations for the protection of human rights, etc. thereKoM coalition suggests that governments (or states)establish reKoM, an independent, inter-state regionalCommission for the establishment of facts on all thevictims of war crimes and other heavy human rightsviolations undertaken on the territory of the former sfryin the period 1991-2001.

during 2012 Ceas became an associate member of theinternational association of expert non-governmentalorganisations (think-tanks) from europe and Central asia– pasos, which supports the erection and functioning ofan open society, especially in relation to issues of politicaland economic transition, democratisation and humanrights, opening up of the economy and good publicgovernance, sustainable development and internationalcooperation. pasos now has 40 full and 10 associatemembers, amongst which is the prestigious europeanCouncil on foreign relations from london-eCfr, and, untilnow, only the belgrade Centre for security policy -bCbp,from the non-governmental sector in serbia.

during the same year, the Center for euro-atlantic studies

became the first civil society organisation from the regionof south-eastern europe to join the international Coalitionfor the responsibility to protect – iCrtop as a full member.the coalition brings together non-governmentalorganisations from all over the world to collectivelystrengthen normative consensus for the doctrine ofresponsibility to protect (rtop), with the aim of betterunderstanding the norm, pushing for strengthenedcapacities of the international community to prevent andhalt genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimesagainst humanity and mobilise the non-governmentalsector to push for action to save lives in rtop country-specific situations. among the prominent members of theCoalition are organisation such as the human rightsWatch -hrW and the international Crisis group - iCg

* Social liberalism claims that society needs toprotect freedoms and equal opportunities for allcitizens and encourage mutual cooperationbetween government and market institutionsthrough a liberal system. In the process ofevolution, it agrees that some limitations placedupon economic affairs are needed, such as anti-monopoly laws in the fight against economicmonopoly, regulatory bodies or legislationconcerning minimum pay. Soial liberals believethat governments can (or must) cater for thecomfort, health protection and educationthrough revenue gained from taxes, so to enablethe best use of the populations’ talent.Furthermore, liberal-socialism fights againstextreme formsof capitalism and communism. Italso vows for calmer anticlericalism and religiousfreedom..

Editorial board: Jelena milić (Editor in Chief), Tibor moldvai (Editorial Secretary),

Tamara Kaliterna (Proof-reading), Irina Rizmal (Editor), vesna Lukić (Layout)

Quarterly of CENTER FOR EURO-ATLANTIC STUDIES • August-September LJKM ... · ceaserbia...

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