Quality Built-In For Sustainable Excellence CQSDI...

Mr. Randolph StoneDirector, MDA/QS

Missile Defense Agency

17 MAR 09

Quality Built-In ForSustainable Excellence

CQSDI 2009

2

Missile Defense Worldwide

3

Kinetic Energy Interceptor

Sensors

Command, Control, Battle Management &

Communications

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

Patriot Advanced Capability-3

Terminal Defense Segment

Terminal Defense Segment

Boost Defense Segment

Boost Defense Segment Midcourse Defense SegmentMidcourse Defense Segment

Integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System

Multiple Kill Vehicle

USSTRATCOMUSSTRATCOM USPACOMUSPACOMUSNORTHCOMUSNORTHCOMNMCCNMCC USEUCOMUSEUCOM USCENTCOMUSCENTCOM

Defense Support Program

Space Tracking and Surveillance System Sea-Based Radars

Airborne Laser

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense

/ Standard Missile-3 Ground-Based

Midcourse Defense

Forward-Based Radar Midcourse X-Band Radar

Early Warning Radar

Sea-Based Terminal

Designated Lead Service: Air ForceNavyArmy TBD

4

What is the driving force for Strategic Defensive Systems?

Quality vs. Schedule/Cost

Failure is not a option!

Failure Is Not An Option!

5

Introduction

� Space and Launch programs and Defense Industry during 80’s & 90’s were driven by schedule and cost.

� Space/Defense programs suffered the effects of acquisition focused on schedule/cost

– High failure rates, low reliability

� 2004 - MDA integrates Quality/Mission Assurance into the Acquisition process

– Acquisition Directives– Award Fee evaluation– Mission Assurance Requirements

6

Schedule/CostDriven Philosophies

BGM-109 TOMAHAWK CRUISE MISSILE

V-22 OSPREY

NASA- Genesis

DC-XA Delta ClipperNOAA -TIROS

Firestone Tires

Brazilian Petrobas Oil platform

IFT-10 INTER-COOLED, RECUPERATED (ICR)GAS TURBINE ENGINE

““ Faster, Better, Faster, Better, CheaperCheaper””

Galaxy 601

Brazil VLS““ Acquisition Reform Acquisition Reform ––

19901990’’ ss””

SLEIPNER NORTH SEA OIL PLATFORM

Commercial Commercial ““ Best Best PracticesPractices””

Ariane IV X-43A

Titan-IV

H-60 Black Hawk

7

BackgroundAcquisition of National Security Space Programs

••Acquisition Environment (Decade of the 1990Acquisition Environment (Decade of the 1990’’ s)s)

••Declining acquisition budgetsDeclining acquisition budgets

••Acquisition ReformAcquisition Reform

••Greater acceptance of riskGreater acceptance of risk

••Changing National Security Changing National Security NeedsNeeds

••Mergers and AcquisitionsMergers and Acquisitions

CostCost was primary driver in managing was primary driver in managing acquisition process; unrealistic budgets acquisition process; unrealistic budgets (Budgeted at 50% probability)(Budgeted at 50% probability)

Many MILMany MIL --STDs canceled; relied on STDs canceled; relied on Commercial Commercial ““ Best PracticesBest Practices”” ; Theory: ; Theory: Reduce stringent Quality, reduce costReduce stringent Quality, reduce cost

Many large industry merger and acquisition Many large industry merger and acquisition took place (i.e. McDonnelltook place (i.e. McDonnell--Douglas/Boeing); Douglas/Boeing); ““ Brain DrainBrain Drain ”” ; causing industry ; causing industry implementation deficienciesimplementation deficiencies

US National Security critically dependent on US National Security critically dependent on Space Systems; GovSpace Systems; Gov’’ t Acquisition process t Acquisition process inadequate for tech. challenging programsinadequate for tech. challenging programs

Space System procurements failed to Space System procurements failed to recognize launch & operational risk; recognize launch & operational risk; technical criticality often ignoredtechnical criticality often ignored

Source:Source:““ Acquisition of National Security Space ProgramsAcquisition of National Security Space Programs”” ,, DSB/AFSAB Task Force Report, 12 Nov 2002DSB/AFSAB Task Force Report, 12 Nov 2002

8

BackgroundSpace and Launch Program Records

• Mission Assurance Effect on Early Space Lift Mission Reliability Pays Off– 96.9% vs 67.0% reliability

* Source: Aerospace Corp. SMC Space Lift and Vehicle Data

(Titan/Atlas/Delta)

Space Lift

0

20

40

60

80

100

80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 9293 94 95 96 97 98 99

YearC

um

ula

tive

Su

cces

s R

ate,

%

Space Vehicles

Conventional Approach

Commercial

DoD

Civilian

FBC-Like SVs:134

Conventional SVs: 324

FBC-Like*

*FBC – Faster, Better, Cheaper

9

BMDS Failures: 1997-2008

•IFT-01 (Jan 1997): Interceptor power supply anomaly

•FT-07 (Mar 1997): Divert and Attitude Control System (DACS) problem; epoxy contamination

•FT-08 (May 1998):Thrust Vector Control Problem

•FT-09 (Mar 1999): Attitude Control System (ACS) #4 degradation

•IFT-04 (Jan 2000): Failure of the cryogenic cooling unit

•IFT-05 (July 2000): KV did not deploy

•FTR-1 (July 2000): Locked-up missile computer due to initialization errors

•BV-2 (Aug 2001): Vehicle roll control Anomaly

•BV-3 (Dec 2001): BV veered off course; ordered self-destruct

•IFT-10 (Dec 2002):KV failed to deploy/separate from booster

•FM-5 (June 2003): Solid Divert & Attitude Control System (SDACS) diverter ball failure

•BV-5 (Jan 2004): Power drop prevented KV separation

•IFT-13C (Dec 2004): Software failure, GBI did not launch

•IFT-14 (Feb 2004): Silo Failure, GBI did not launch

QS Organization formed in late 2002

10

BackgroundAcquisition Reform Vs. Quality/Mission Assurance

Decision Making Pendulum

•Specs & Stds Reform

•Faster, Better, Cheaper

•Less Govt Oversight

•Commercial – “Best Practices”

Acquisition Reform – 1990’s Mission Assurance – 2000’s

Pendulum swings both Contractually and PhilosophicallyPendulum swings both Contractually and Philosophically

•Process Rigor Returns

•Re-Focus on Suppliers

•Increase Govt Insight

•Failure Not an Option

67.0%Reliability

Rate

96.9%Reliability

Rate1980’s

1990’s2000’s

11

MDA ImplementsRigorous Quality Processes and Procedures

• MDA had enough antidotal evidence to realize the Schedule/Cost driven programs and contracts of the 80s-90s didn’t work

• MDA programs and contracts were not immune to the effects of Schedule/Cost focus

• 1997-2004 – 14 failures due to lack of enhanced quality and System Engineering processes

• QS Directorate stood up in late 2002 to infuse Quality/Mission Assurance

Ensure contracts are written with Quality/Mission AssuranceQuality/Mission Assurance

as the focus

12

Postured for Mission Success

• Increased Onsite MDA Presence at major critical suppliers

• Established Quality, Safety and Mission Assurance Provisions

• Focused DCMA Technical Surveillance Activities

• Placed More Boots on Ground

• Strategic Placement of Mandatory Government Inspections (MGIs)

• Implemented MDA Mission Assurance Audits; participate in collaborative audits

• Infused Quality and Mission Assurance into Acquisition Strategy and Award Fee

“Back To Basics –Driving Cultural Changes”“Back To Basics –Driving Cultural Changes”

13

MDA Acquisition Management Directive5010.18

ASP

Acquisition Strategy Panel (ASP)

•Chaired by MDA/DA

•Assist PM in validating and/or refining Acquisition strategies

•Acquisition Strategies are reviewed

•Provide Acquisition Strategy Recommendationsto ASB for approval

•QS member of ASP, ensure MAP and PMAP are on all new contracts

ASB•Chaired by MDA/D

•ASB reviews Acquisition Strategies recommended by the ASP

•ASB ensures harmonization of program efforts across the BMDS and approves strategies developed during the PID and ASP process

•ASB outcome is summarized in a signed letter by the ASB Chairperson

•QS voting member of ASB

Acquisition Strategy Board (ASB)

MDA Director

MDA Assurance MDA Assurance Provisions (MAP)Provisions (MAP)

MDA Parts Materials and MDA Parts Materials and Processes Mission Assurance Plan Processes Mission Assurance Plan

(PMAP)(PMAP)

MDA/D•Releases Director-approved RFP

•After evaluation and review of results from RFP in MDA (incl. QS), and negotiation with Industry, Director approves contract award

14

MDA Award Fee Directive5010.07

Emphasize rewarding results rather than effort or activity

AFRB

Award Fee Review Board (AFRB)

•Recommend criteriaand percentages

•Evaluate contractor performance

•Make Award Fee Recommendationsto Fee Determining Officer (MDA/D for contracts over $100M

•Emphasize areas for next award fee

•QS voting member of AFRB; include Mission Assurance ElementMission Assurance Element

AFAB•Review AFRB recommendations prior to being sent to FDO

•Establish advisory fee rating based on AFRB input

•Emphasize areas for next award fee

•Provide alternate recommended rating when advisory rating varies more than 2% of AFRB recommendation

•QS voting member of AFAB

Award Fee Advisory Board (AFAB)

Fee Determining Official

FDO•Approve award fee plan

•Appoint AFRB members (QS)

•Ensure award fee process is fair

•Determine the amount of fee earned

15

Quality/Mission Assurance Activities

Peer Reviews• Surface correctable problems early• Identify risk• Ensure best practices

CO

NT

RA

CT

System Functional ReviewSoftware Specification Review• Evaluate human interfaces, controls, displays• S/W safety issues & auditsPreliminary Design ReviewCritical Design Review• Subsystem and functional issues• Design Performance• Producibility and risk areasSystem Verification ReviewJoint Services IM Munition WGDesign Certificate ReviewSafety Hazards AssessmentDevelopment Test for Risk Reduction• FMECA, Sneak Analysis

DE

SIG

N &

DE

VE

LO

PM

EN

T

PR

OD

UC

TIO

N

INT

EG

RA

TE

D

TE

ST

&

EV

AL

UA

TIO

N

Test Design Reviews (TDR)• Voting MemberMission Operations ReviewInterface Control WG• Interface integration activities• Ensures integration and compatibility• Resolve technical issuesInteroperability and/or Integration TestBMDS System Safety Working GroupSystem Requirements Review

Continuous Activities• Mission Assurance Reps (MARs) on-site

(Gov. & Industry sites)• Mission Assurance Audits• Award Fee Boards• Independent Readiness Review Teams• Mission Readiness Reviews

Acquisition Strategy Panel• MAP / PMAP on contract• Mission Assurance Criteria• Award Fee Requirements

Mission Assurance Audits• Average six MA audits annuallyPre-shipment ReviewsBMDS Parts & Materials Control Board (PMCB)• Element PMP Control Boards (PMPCB)• Voting MemberTests and Inspections• FOD Prevention, NDT, Acceptance Inspection• Mandatory Gov. Inspections (MGIs)Failure Review BoardMaterial Review BoardSupplier Road Maps

LA

UN

CH

AC

TIV

ITIE

S

Pedigree ReviewFlight Operations ReviewPre-Flight Readiness ReviewLaunch Readiness ReviewMission Readiness Review• Four to six weeks prior to launch• Voting MemberBMDS Safety Officers (BSOs)• Six BSOs at Colorado SpringsMDA Executive Level Flight Test Reviews• Series of four flight test reviews leading to launch

AF AF AF AF

AF

Award Fee Board

Voting Member

Flight Readiness Review• Voting Member

Quality/Mission assurance is contractually implemented throughout the Acquisition Process

16

Quality/Mission Assurance Impact

QS OrganizationFounded in Late 2002

Flight Test Successes

No Interceptor Test Failures in 2006 & 2007

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 20072008

Aegis

NMD/GMD

THAAD

FM-5 6/03FTR-1 7/00

IFT-01 1/97IFT-04 1/00

IFT-05 7/00

IFT-10 12/02 IFT-13c 12/04

IFT-14 2/05

FT-07 3/97

FT-08 5/98

FT-09 3/99

No Interceptor

FailuresBV-2 8/01

BV-3 12/01 BV-5 1/04

22 Flight Test / 10 Failures

(45% failure rate)


(14% failure rate)-Arrow flight tests

are not shown, program is managed

by the Israeli Government

-Patriot flight tests are not shown,

program is managed by U.S. Army


(0% failure rate)

Notes:

JFTM-2 11/08

2009 2010

-Partially Map Compliant

17

Satellite Intercept – Feb 2008

VM361D

18

FTT-09 – 25 JUN 08

VM361D

19

FTG-05 – 5 DEC 08

VM361D

20

Focus On The Details!

21

Focus On Quality/Mission Assurance

• Technical Requirements on Contract

• Supplier Management

• Accountability• Mission

Assurance Audits

• Test As You Fly

• Boots on the Ground

• Stakeholder Initiatives

• Systems Engineering Focus

• Read the Advisories

• Robust Ground Testing

• Heed Lessons Learned

These Tests Were Wake-Up CallsHard Learned Lessons

22

What The GovernmentCan Do…

• Stay “Hands On” !

• Know your program inside and out

• Be a Subject Matter Expert (SME) for your system

• Question Everything

• Inherent Quality shouldn’t be contractual – but part of every award fee

• If it’s not right…STOP THE LINE!

Mission Assurance Should Be At The Core Of Acquisition Programs

Mission Assurance Should Be At The Core Of Mission Assurance Should Be At The Core Of Acquisition ProgramsAcquisition Programs

23

What IndustryIndustry Can Do…

• Maintain healthy and robust Mission Assurance programs

• Know your supply base – manage your suppliers!

• Incentivize your supplier

• Empower your people to stop the line!

• Quality costs less than a failure – and is good for business!

America Is Counting On Its Aerospace And Defense Industry!America Is Counting On Its Aerospace And Defense Industry!America Is Counting On Its Aerospace And Defense Industry!

24

QUESTIONS?

Quality Built-In For Sustainable Excellence CQSDI...

Documents

Transcript of Quality Built-In For Sustainable Excellence CQSDI...