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This paper is part of the proceedings of the 2nd

Annual

conference on Qualitative Research for Policy

Making, 26 & 27 May 2011, Belfast

Qualitative evidence of municipal service delivery protests:

implications for South Africa

Zacheus Matebesi

Department of Sociology/Centre for Development Support

UNIVERSITY OF THE FREE STATE

P.O. Box 339

Bloemfontein, 9300

SOUTH AFRICA

matebsz@ufs.ac.za

Tel: +2751 4012590

Fax: +2751 4013518

MAY 2011

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CONTENTS

ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………………………..3

1. Introduction.......................................................................................................................3

2. Overview of Local Government in South Africa...............................................................5

3. Demarcation and participation: some conceptual issues....................................................6

3.1 Partocipatory governance...................................................................................................7

3.2 Cross-boundary municipality.............................................................................................7

3.3 Demarcation process..........................................................................................................8

4. Methodology......................................................................................................................8

5. Reasons fo protests..........................................................................................................10

5.1 Structural reasons for the protests....................................................................................10

5.2 Systemic reasons..............................................................................................................11

5.2.1 Poor governance.........................................................................................................11

5.2.2 Individual political struggles......................................................................................12

5.2.3 Complaint management and communication.............................................................13

5.3 Provincial cross-boundary municipal issues - Gauteng case study..................................14

6. Impacts of the protests......................................................................................................17

6.1 Damage to public infrastructure.......................................................................................17

6.2 Economic impact..............................................................................................................17

6.3 Impacts on the education system......................................................................................18

7. Lessons and recommendations.........................................................................................18

REFERENCES.........................................................................................................................19

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Abstract

Social protests in South Africa were to a large degree responsible for making the former

black townships ungovernable. In 2004, a decade since the advent of the new political

dispensation, South Africa witnessed unrest of significant proportions at local government

level. This occurred despite the emphasis on good municipal governance by the national

government. The lack of capacity to deliver on mandates, together with factors such as

individual political struggles, poor communication and ineffective client interface, are key

contributors to the surge in violent protests.

This study was conducted in four cities from three different provinces in South Africa. The

main aim of the study was to identify the reasons for the violent protests and policy

implications. Methodologically, this entailed 100 in-depth interviews with community

leaders, councillors and municipal and provincial government officials. More than 300

community members (both protestors and non-protestors) were interviewed by of focus

groups discussions. This qualitative study is useful to policy makers and planners at all

spheres of government, including security services because it not only identified the reasons

for the protests, but also identified early warning signals and various lessons on how to

prevent or manage these events in future.

1. Introduction

During the apartheid-era in South Africa, social protests against the political system used to

be widespread (Atkinson, 2007). These protests, together with the popular mobilisation for

democracy, were led by the banned African National Congress (ANC) and its ally the

Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU); the South African National Civics

Organisation (SANCO), and the United Democratic Movement (UDF) (Narsiah and Maharaj,

1994).

Despite the transition to a democratic political system 17 years ago, social protests has been

recurrent in South Africa. For those familiar with the popular protests in apartheid “it might

appear as if the rolling mass action of the end-of-apartheid period had simply continued into

the dawn of a democratic government in South Africa (Atkinson, 2007). Data presented in

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Figure 1 below provide some indication of the scale of the protest movement. There has been

no less than 285 service delivery protests between 2004 and October 2010. The years, 2005,

2007, 2009 and 2010 were particularly worrisome for the South African government because

the most number of protests occurred during these times (Municipal IQ, 2009; SABC News

Research, 2011).

10

35

2

3227

83

96

0

20

40

60

80

100

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Figure 1: Number of service delivery protests (January 2004

to October 2010)

Source: Municipal IQ, 2009; SABC News Research, 2011.

A myriad of factors triggering some of the protests identified in studies include lack of

capacity to deliver services at local government level, poverty and unemployment, individual

political struggles and the erosion of public confidence in government leadership (Ballard,

Habib & Valodia, 2006; Desai, 2002, Mandlingozi, 2007, Marais et al., 2008). The

multiplicity of factors at the root of the current protests can best be placed into three broad

categories: systemic (such as maladministration, fraud, nepotism and corruption in housing

lists); structural (such as healthcare, unemployment, and land issues); and governance (such

as weak leadership and the erosion of public confidence in leadership)” (Parliament of RSA,

2009).

Participatory governance, as Friedman (2006: 1) rightfully states, ‘has been a canon of

governance thinking in the new democracy [in South Africa], for it has strong roots in the

fight against apartheid’. In fact, a number of commentators (Edigheji 2004; Friedman 2006;

Papadikis 2005; Thompson 2007) also concurred that participatory governance and

accountability arrangements in South Africa are generally regarded as world-class examples

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of good practice. Scholarly contributions have emphasised the importance not only of the

existence of public participation in governance, but also of the extent and meaningfulness of

participation (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) 2007: 6;

Friedman 2006: 3; Marais et al., 2008). Despite such noble sentiments, examples of

genuinely effective participation by all relevant stakeholders are still the exception rather than

the rule (United Nations 2008: 1.2).

Broadly, Butler’s (2008) assessment of the ANC government’s performance since the first

democratic election in 1994 illustrates how the South African government has struggled to

strike a balance between political and economic development. He further that the South

African government’s failure in meeting the basic services needs of the poor, especially in

terms of housing, education, electricity and water, limits attempts at achieving sufficient

economic redress and, thus contributes to the violent social protests one can contend. This

paper first provides an overview of local government in South Africa. This is followed by a

synoptic description of the methodologically followed.

2. Overview of Local Government in South Africa

The Constitution of South Africa (1996) establishes local governemnt as a distinctive sphere

of government, which is interdependent, and inter-realated with national and provincial

spheres of government. Local government is reagrded as the sphere of government ‘closest to

the people.’During the aprtheid years, there were four (4) administrations, 10 Bantustans and

more than 800 racially-segregated local authorities. The National and Provincial Government

came into effect in 1994 after the adoption of the Transitional Constitution of South Africa.

The new Local Government was inaugarated much later on 5 December 2000, with the

almagamation of the 800 racially-segregated municipalities were amalgamated and

reconstituted to 284 (SABC Research News, 2011).

According to the White Paper on Local Government 1998, the core Constitutional ideals and

mandate entrusted to local government (Section 152) are:

• to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities;

• to ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner;

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• to peomote social and economic development;

• to promote a safe and healthy environment; and

• to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the

matters of local government.

The transformation of local government has probably been the largest undertaking within the

entire democratic governance transformation process since 1994. Enormous progress has

been made but much still needs to be achieved before all 283 municipalities are fully

functional, effective, efficient, responsive and sustainable. A number of “stubborn” service

delivery and governance problems have been identified in municipalities over a number of

years and remain consistently at the forefront of government’s developmental challenges.

These priority areas according to COGTA (2009) include:

• Huge service delivery and backlog challenges, e.g. housing, water and

• sanitation;

• Poor communication and accountability relationships with communities;

• Problems with the political administrative interface;

• Corruption and fraud;

• Poor financial management, e.g. negative audit opinions;

• Number of (violent) service delivery protests;

• Weak civil society formations;

• Intra - and inter-political party issues negatively affecting governance and delivery;

and

• Insufficient municipal capacity due to lack of scarce skills.

3. Demarcation and participation: some conceptual issues

This section of the paper clarifies several concepts used in this article. First, the concept of

‘participatory governance’ is defined, followed by a description of the concept of ‘cross-

boundary municipality’. A brief description of the role of the demarcation process is also

provided.

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3.1 Participatory governance

Participatory governance, as employed in this article, is defined as a set of structural and

procedural requirements to realise public participation in the operation of provincial and local

governments. It also refers to a regulatory framework in which the task of running public

affairs is not only entrusted to both government and public administration, but further

involves cooperation between state institutions and civil society groups (Friedman 2006). The

term goes beyond the public management ‘to a more fundamental question of how the

processes of democracy (citizen involvement, decision-making, procedures and

administrative function) can be adapted to help countries resolve the complex public issues

with which they are challenged’ (Lovan, Murray and Schaffer 2004: xv).

Participatory governance is expected to empower people (Osmani 2008: 36), but it is only

through the use of effective tools that it can yield benefits in terms of efficiency, equity and

responsiveness of policies by giving a sense of ownership to the citizens, by allocating

resources according to citizens’ priorities, needs and preferences, and by utilising their skills

and knowledge (Yemek 2007).

3.2 Cross-boundary municipality

Boundaries have very important political, financial and social effects, because they determine

what each municipality is responsible for, and where. The Constitution and the Local

Government Municipal Structures Act, 117 of 1998, of the Republic of South Africa made

provision for an Act of Parliament to authorise the establishment of a cross-boundary

municipality. The Municipal Demarcation Board, after initial research, noted that there are a

number of areas in South Africa where large tracts of land, including a number of different

communities and settlements, straddle provincial boundaries.

A cross-boundary municipality refers to a situation where parts of a local municipality are

located within the borders of two different provinces. For example, in the case of Merafong,

the smaller part in the south was located in North West Province and the larger part in the

east was located in Gauteng Province. This in effect meant that the governance of these

municipalities was a shared political and fiscal responsibility of two different provinces.

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Since the establishment of cross-boundary municipalities, numerous problems have been

experienced with the administration of these areas.

One of the main challenges experienced with the administration of these areas was the day-

to-day management of the cross-boundary municipalities (Naidoo 2007). This geo-political

arrangement meant that a matter such a local government project in one municipality, for

example, had to be subjected to a tedious, labour-intensive and bureaucratic process of

consultation between the local government concerned and principals of the local government

departments at provincial sphere. According to the GCIS (2006), this process greatly affected

and ultimately constrained the execution of the provincial department of local government’s

mandate in terms of the cross-boundary municipalities. This affected communities negatively,

as government was not able to effectively deliver services.

3.3 Demarcation process

The participation of communities and stakeholders in the demarcation process is important, to

ensure that the Demarcation Board considers all the different views people have about

boundaries. The demarcation process is governed by three different pieces of legislation

which all relate to each other. These are the Constitution, the Municipal Demarcation Act and

the Municipal Structures Act (1998).

According to the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG 2008),

communities can be involved in the demarcation process in three ways:

• Members of communities may respond to invitations by the Board to submit written

representations on how boundaries in their area should be drawn;

• If the Demarcation Board decides to hold a public meeting to discuss boundaries,

members of the public can air their views;

• Any member of a community can object to the demarcation of a municipal boundary

or the delimitation of a ward. The Board must take account of the objection and

respond to the person. It is the responsibility of municipalities to ensure that all

community members participate, particularly people who are illiterate or who cannot

transport themselves to a public meeting.

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4. Methodology

The overall study design was descriptive and explanatory, but also directed towards

recommending interventions at both policy and practice levels. The main aim of the study

was to identify the reasons for the violent protests and policy implications. Methodologically,

this paper is based on three interlinked approaches:

• First, an extensive media and literature scan was conducted. Although most of the

media reports were relatively superficial as they focused on the narrative of the unrest

without any real background analysis, they proved to be pivotal in piecing together

the chronology of events, as they unfolded in the case studies. In respect of scholarly

papers concerning the social protests, very little is available, except for the growing

number of papers on post-apartheid social movements in South Africa.

• The second methodological dimension of the study involved in-depth interviews

conducted with community leaders; councillors; ex-councillors; protest leaders;

business people; officials (both provincial and local); and the police. About 100 in-

depth interviews were conducted.

• The third methodological tool was a series of focus group meetings held with

community members. Two of these meetings were conducted with the leaders of the

protests. Three focus group meetings were also held with ordinary citizens who had

not participated in the protests. Focus groups generally consisted of from ten to 16

participants. In all, approximately 300 people participated in the focus group

discussions.

In addition to the main methodological approaches, three further activities should be

mentioned. The research process started off with workshops in the case study areas. The aim

of the workshops was to inform the relevant role players about the research and afford them

the opportunity to influence the main methodological approaches. After the completion of the

empirical study, feedback workshops were also conducted. On this occasion the findings of

the research were shared with those present. Finally, comments and suggestions received

from these reviewers were incorporated, where appropriate, into the final report.

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All four of these case studies were conducted between 2007 and early 2010 and was funded

by the Conflict and Governance Facility (CAGE). In Khutsong1 the conflict is about the

demarcation of the boundary between the North-West Province and Gauteng. Nevertheless,

the Khutsong study is particularly instructive where it comes to deriving lessons concerning

the appropriate handling of local conflicts.

5. Reasons for the protests

This section aims to assess the reasons for the protests. In general, the protests were regarded

as having been sparked off by deficient service-delivery. However, in this section I shall try

to analyse the reasons behind poor service delivery. Notably, not all the reasons pertained in

all four of the case study sites. It was, however, various configurations of these factors that

contributed to the protests. The sections begin with a discussion of the reasons for the unrest

in the four localities. This is followed by an analysis of the impacts of the unrest and, finally,

the lessons to be derived from the case studies are discussed.

5.1 Structural reasons for the protests

There is a body of literature that suggests that structural reasons are the fundamental source

of social protests. Six of these structural reasons are highlighted below.

First, socio-economic conditions such as poverty, unemployment and poor living conditions

contributed to the violent protests.

Second, the lack of economies of scale in small towns in respect of infrastructure investment

should be acknowledged as a contributing reason. The capital expenditure, along with the

1 Khutsong, which ironically means place of peace, has been engulfed in violent protests since the government passed this

controversial cross-boundary municipality legislation. This black town formed part of the Merafong Local Municipality in

Gauteng Province until it was incorporated into the North West Province (Bernstein and Johnston 2007: 144). The agenda

of the cross-boundary municipalities – of which there were 16 in five of South Africa’s provinces – has been the focus of

the Municipal Demarcation Board for the past few years. Since the establishment of these municipalities, numerous

problems have been experienced in respect of administering them. Several attempts at resolving the identified issues have

largely failed. In an attempt to ensure that in future these 16 municipalities would individually be located in one province

only, whereby, ultimately, a more effectively integrated provision of services could be achieved, the Constitution Twelfth

Amendment Bill was adopted in 2005.

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pressure on basic infrastructure that results from the need for maintenance in small towns, is

fairly high in relation to the number of people serviced by the municipalities in the four areas.

A third contributing factor linked to the foregoing reason is rural–urban migration. Large-

scale urbanisation of former farm workers has placed tremendous pressure on the provision

of basic service. For instance one senior municipal official remarked: “The deterioration of

street, electricity and sewerage networks was compounded by an influx of people who had

been evicted from farms.”

A fourth factor cited by leaders from the coloured communities, is the legacy of apartheid,

which divided many neighbourhoods into racial camps and which, to a large extent, still

prevails today.

The fifth reason relates to the amalgamation of municipalities that has exerted huge

institutional pressure on local municipalities and inhibited them from efficiently performing

their normal service delivery and maintenance duties. In the case of the Nelson Mandela Bay

Metro, three towns/cities constitute the newly amalgamated Metro. It has taken several years

to resolve and synchronise the administrative system, created from the separate

administrations. More than eight years ago, small-town research has already indicated that the

amalgamation of municipalities has had a negative impact on local economic development in

those towns not designated as the headquarters of these municipalities (Atkinson 2002).

Finally, considering the fact that young people were at the forefront of the protests in the

former black townships, these protests probably, to some degree, had a bearing on issues of

youth development. One respondent at a focus-group meeting remarked, ‘If the municipality

can become serious about youth development, I will not take to [the] streets again. I once

asked the then mayor to get us someone [to] act as a mentor for young aspiring entrepreneurs.

Most young people struggle to write business proposals …’

5.2 Systemic reasons

Although the structural causes already discussed cannot be ignored, a number of systemic

reasons for the municipal protests should also be considered

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5.2.1 Poor governance

“Governance” refers to the ability of institutions to take decisions. In the cases under review, poor

governance contributed markedly to the protests. For example, the fact that the Phumelela

Council (in the Free State Province) did not meet for long periods of time resulted in a complete

lack of basic decision making and direction. This left the Municipal Manager and the municipal

officials rudderless and had the effect of hampering service delivery which contributed to the

conflict and protest. In the case of the Nelson Mandela Metro, it took years for its draft Integrated

Development Plan (IDP)2 to be accepted.

5.2.2 Individual political struggles

In most of the case studies there was evidence of political in-fighting. In the two case studies

in the Free State Province some of these struggles were between local factions, whereas

others seemed to emanate more from provincial level. In the Gauteng and Eastern Cape

municipalities there was evidence of deep ideological divisions within the tri-party alliance3.

The protest in Free State case studies is an example of how protesters, pursuing an agenda

that involved getting rid of a certain councillor, managed to force the issue via recourse to

violence.7 There was no compelling evidence for any of the allegations made against the

councillor in question. Despite their inability to prove their case, the protesters were able to

capitalize on the rupture in communication lines between the councillor and the community,

and this helped ensure that via their protest actions the councillor was finally compelled to

resign. The fact that many of these upheavals occurred within the twelve months prior to the

local government elections furnishes further evidence of political jockeying for position.

The nature of leadership in post-apartheid South African towns remains complex and

obscure, and it will require a great deal more qualitative research for the dynamics of this to

2 In terms of Chapter V of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (No 32 of 2000), local

government bodies are required to formulate and implement Integrated Development Plans (“IDPs”) for their

respective areas of jurisdiction. These IDPs are meant to deal with all developmental and planning related

issues for a period of five years. The main objective in formulating IDPs is: “To guide implementation

oriented planning which is strategic and consultative and is integrated requiring holistic thinking across the

conventional sectoral boundaries”. Specifically the IDP is to guide decisions in respect of the Municipal

budget, improve spatial management, promote local economic development and at the same time ensure

effective institutional transformation in a consultative, systematic and with strategic interventions

(Government Gazette no 21776, 2000). 3 This refers to the alliance between the ruling African National Congress, South African Communist Party and

the labor federation, the Congress of South African Trade Unions.

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be fully understood. Firstly, the party political structures within affected communities have

had to develop a mode of response to this leadership style, and to the growing level of public

grievances that it has precipitated. But there seem to be no formal mechanisms to deal with

such cases within most of the political parties. Secondly, this type of leader has unwittingly

created an ethos of counter-leadership within communities. As public frustration with poor

service delivery mounts, and people attempt to find responsive communication channels to

vent their grievances, the attitude of delinquent councillors often becomes increasingly

offensive.

5.2.3 Complaint management and communication

Atkinson (2006 and 2007) has outlined the inability of municipal government to be

appropriately responsive to the needs of municipal residents. The lack of a complaint

management system and the inability to create open communication channels (and thus, the

inability to listen) were probably the main factors that triggered the protests. Numerous

interviewees mentioned that their complaints had neither been listened to nor been addressed

adequately. One of the focus groups summarised the situation: ‘After four years of

complaints and frustration, residents may believe that the only effective way to achieve [a

solution] is through violence and confrontation … but listen, this is not born out of a desire to

be violent. Instead, it is born out of [the] belief that nothing will significantly change

exclusively through non-violence and appeasement …’ The complaints voiced by residents

during the focus groups can be categorised in terms of three overall issues: politicians/

officials who do not wish to listen to complaints; the arrogance of many politicians/officials;

and the inability to communicate effectively.

The following statements by interviewees reflect the perceived inability of officials to listen

to reasonable demands of ordinary people:

Maybe they [officials and councillors] did not worry because they were still getting

paid. They subscribed to the notion that their actions are not to be questioned. In this

age of democracy and civilisation, it is a surprise that officials expect us … to accept

their behaviour without question.

The community has complained many times to the councillor, but he was so

arrogant he could not even listen to them. He was arrogant and he abused his

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powers; as a councillor he had to go because he was the one standing between

service delivery and the community.

We complained to our ward Councillor, but he was never helpful. It was decided

that no one should vote for the councillor during the forthcoming elections. This

particular councillor acted like a prima donna. He never listened to the people.

One of the main factors that, perhaps, could have stopped the unrests, was the

removal of one corrupt councillor. We were challenged to provide proof of the

corrupt practices of this councillor, which we did. We knew that no one can just

be dismissed, but our leaders decided to protect this man. The community felt that the

ANC was protecting corrupt officials at their expense.

5.3 Provincial cross-boundary municipal issues – Gauteng case study

This section highlights the confusing demarcation process by means of a literature review and

empirical findings. In terms of the latter findings about public involvement in the case study,

it offers a comprehensive presentation of the reasons for the violent protests in the Gauteng

case study (Botes et al. 2007; Marais et al. 2008). This case study illustrates how how

participatory governance could go wrong (from a social engineering perspective), but equally

importantly, how it could thrive for civil society. While participatory governance is regarded

as a tenet of governance thinking in the new democratic South Africa, the Merafong City

Local Municipality demarcation process is a classic example of the weakness of participatory

governance efforts. In this regard, the following two arguments hold: first, it is argued that

the sequence of events, decisions and communications intended to give effect to the

incorporation of Merafong City Local Municipality into the North West province were both

confusing and haphazardly executed (see Table 1 below). Second, it is argued that public

involvement was not effective and that, to some extent, served largely to grant legitimacy to a

predetermined policy agenda.

Table 1: Trail of governance activities/decisions about Merafong

Date Activity/Decision Preference for

province

The year 2000 Merafong City Local Municipality was established

within the West Rand District Municipality

19 August 2005 Government Gazette No. 27937 North West

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29 August 2005 Government Gazette No. 27962 North West

18-20 November

2005

Written memoranda directed to the Gauteng

Provincial Legislature, as well as to the NCOP and

other governmental role-players

Gauteng

21 November 2005 Municipal Demarcation Board (Government Gazette

28236)

North West

25 November 2005 Joint Public Hearing (Gauteng and North West

Provincial Legislatures)

Gauteng

29 November 2005 Local Government Portfolio Committee, Gauteng

Legislature

Gauteng

14 December 2005 National Council of Provinces North West

19 March 2009 National Council of Provinces Gauteng

The following were comments of some stakeholders supporting the unrest:

It was never decided to riot, but we got the message from our leaders that we cannot

allow a government we voted for to take us for granted. Immediately after the

announcement in Pretoria, we rushed into the streets and hurled stones, in fact

anything that we could lay our hands on, at the police. The police reacted by firing

rubber bullets at us. It was then that we decided to target the houses of councillors. I

did not care what will happen to me, but I was prepared to sacrifice my life for a good

cause, to die for my parents who are now suffering at the hands of a so-called

democratic governmen

Some other important reasons for the conflict are the following:

• History of settlement-uncertainty in Khutsong due to dolomitic condition of the

land

Due to the geological make-up of the residential land in Khutsong (i.e. predominantly

dolomite formation) the Merafong City Local Municipal councilors and officials

communicated since 2000 to the residents of Khutsong that many of them in the larger part of

Khutsong should be re-located due to the possible dangers of house slumping and house

subsiding.

Before the unrest one of the major challenges was the unstable land. This is a

dolomite area. 90% of the land in Khutsong has scientifically been declared unfit

for human settlement due to the dolomitic condition of the land. We often

encounter sinkholes which lead to pipe bursts. From time to time we have to re-

route water pipes. This affects the municipality’s budget. We embarked on a

process to declare Khutsong a disaster area and a Presidential project.

95

According to community members and leaders of the protests, the dolomite issue is just a

ploy from the mining companies not to invest in Khutsong. Questions were also raised about

why only townships are often regarded as dolomitic. The confusion among residents about

the dolomitic condition of the area seems to be exacerbated by the activities of the

municipality and individual councillors which contradict what they state in public:

I agree that the mayor did inform the community about the unstable condition of the

land in Khutsong. But while they preach about the dolomitic nature of the land, one

local councillor extended his house. Is that not sending out the wrong signals that

we are taken for granted? A road construction project was also awarded to a

Welkom company. The owner of the company is regarded as a ‘Mandela from the

Free State.’ Why are these infrastructural projects allowed to continue when our

officials know that they ultimately want to resettle the community? The roads here

resemble swimming pools…i

This dolomite thing is nothing, but modernised slavery. The mines do not want to

contribute anything to the development of Khutsong. The municipality want to

relocate people to a place which was also regarded as being dolomitic. How do you

understand? If this is true, why are they taking so long to come up with a solution?ii

• History of cross border arrangements

From the beginning of the cross border arrangement, administratively it places a huge burden

on the Local Municipality of Merafong City to report to two provinces. From 2002 problems

of communicating and reporting lines started to resurface but this was handled through trial

and error. Different stakeholders indicated that the issue of demarcation is a long standing

one.

• Unilateral decisions regarding cross-border arrangements without proper

communication and buy-in on the ground/Political decisions taken at national

level without considering local opinions and conditions sufficiently

If one follows the paper trail of notices in the Government Gazettes there are quite clearly

some conflicting decisions and communiques that caused confusion at grass roots level.

Community stakeholders also indicated that the national government was not sensitive to

their specific request and that the reasons for this decision were not communicated

satisfactory:

It was never decided to riot, but as we got the message from our leaders that we will

finally become part of North West Province, we told ourselves not to allow a

96

government we voted for, in the first place, to take us for granted. Immediately after

the announcement, we rushed to the streets and hurled stones at or anything else we

could lay our hands on, at the police. The police reacted by firing rubber bullets at us.

It was then that we decided to target the houses of councillors.

I did not care what will happen to me, but I was prepared to sacrifice my life for a

good cause, to die for my parents who are now suffering at the hands of a so-called

democratic government.

One of the major flaws in respect of the demarcation seems to be the manner in which the

community was informed about the decision:

Residents were not consulted. The few that were allegedly consulted cannot be

equated with the rest of the community. The mayor was always diplomatic in his

interaction and dealings with the community. He approached the Faith-based Forum

which consists of the pastors of all major denominations in Khutsong about the

issue. We later realised that the ploy was for us to spread the news during our

sermons that Merafong will remain as part of GP. Some pastors began to label the

mayor as a sell-out and refused to interact with him.iii

We were sold out by our mayor, the most unpopular mayor in South Africa. He,

together with all the councillors knew that Merafong would ultimately be

incorporated into North West, but they decided to keep quiet about it. The majority

of us here [in Khutsong] were ANC members, but our party betrayed us. Minister

Mufamadi and the provincial government delayed to inform us. Information leaked

to us that the ANC was pushing for our incorporation into North West. In fact, this

demarcation monster has been there for a long time, why the community was not

consulted earlier still baffle our minds. The first time they made contact with the

community was merely to inform us, and not to consultiv

.

6. Impacts of protests

Although the protests were not wholly negative, there were a number of destructive impacts.

6.1 Damage to public infrastructure

The impacts of the unrest were experienced, first and foremost, in terms of the destruction of

public and private infrastructure. The burning (or attempt to do so) of vehicles, libraries and

councillor housing, was a widespread feature of the protests. By the end of 2009, the

Khutsong upheavals had cost an estimated of USD 10 million. Damage to private property

alone was estimated at USD 2.5 million.

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6.2 Economic impacts

The economic impact of the protests varied from place to place. In most cases the economic

impact on businesses in the predominantly black townships was more severe than in the

traditionally white areas. The main reason for this was that many of these areas were barricaded

and nobody was allowed in. Towards the end of 2008 Eskom (the electricity supplier in South

Africa) was providing power to 126 Small, Micro and Medium Enterprises (SMMEs) in

Khutsong. By June 2009, they were providing electricity to only 35 of these enterprises. Larger

enterprises were also affected in that workers were not allowed to leave the townships. In the Free

State, a small town (Hennenman) estimated a daily loss to the economy of USD 35,678.25as a

result of the protests there. A further impact was that many of the protests degenerated into the

looting of ‘foreign-owned’ shops.

6.3 Impacts on the education system

One of the short-term impacts was that schools were disrupted as many pupils were in the forefront of

the protests. The matric pass rate for Port Elizabeth (the Eastern Cape case study) decreased by 8%

from 75.8% to 67.8% during the year of the protest. Although it is not clear to what extent this can be

ascribed to the conflicts in Port Elizabeth. At the same time however, the pass rate for the province as

a whole increased from 53.5% to 59.3% during the same period, thereby suggesting that at least one

of the factors responsible for the decrease in performance in Port Elizabeth could be the protests.

Education in all the case study sites was seriously disrupted by the protests. In Khutsong,

schooling was disrupted sporadically for almost three years.

7. Lessons learned and recommendations

This article has attempted to assess the municipal, service-related unrest experienced in South

Africa, and, more specifically, in the Free State, Gauteng and Eastern Cape provinces. This

section briefly reflects on the lessons learned.

Firstly, was sometimes speculated that the presence of the media, and most especially

television cameras, had the effect of artificially fuelling the protests. It seems as if playing up

for the camera is an expression of the desire to ‘become someone’. The media should

arguably be more sensitive to their potential role in fanning the flames of these protests.

Although the sensationalising nature of media coverage is a difficult area on which to make

98

pronouncements, there is a great need for proper investigative journalism which can uncover

the causes of the protests, and fairly convey all the protagonists’ points of view.

Secondly, is the point that political or legal coercion does not minimise conflict. Two of the

case studies showed that political coercion and legislative directions do not contribute to

conflict resolution. In the case of Khutsong, the conflict was not alleviated by the

redemarcation being confirmed by parliament. Attempts in Phomolong to dampen the conflict

by demanding legally sound evidence of the allegations against the councillor, proved

fruitless. Although no such evidence could be produced this did nothing to quell the unrest.

Thirdly, the government needs to rethink development approaches in small towns. Two of the

case studies were derived from small towns and it needs to be more fully realized that many

policies, some of them essentially good policies, nonetheless have negative impacts on small

town environments. Small towns might also find it increasingly difficult to attract qualified

municipal staff. The fact that the National Spatial Development Perspective (NSDP)

designates some of these areas as being without much economic potential may also tend to

reinforce a perception of regional inferiority, or purposive neglect, entertained by

government.

Finally in terms of the Khutsong case study, an in-depth socio-political analysis of cross-boundary

disputes may prevent the often violent outbursts that accompany such disputes. Again, there is a

need for more multicase-oriented studies, in that the current literature on provincial boundary

disputes has a single-case orientation. According to Mavungu (2007), a single-case study limits the

understanding of the structural and systemic factors that cause and shape such clashes.

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i Interview with leader of the protests,

ii Interview with involved resident, iii Interview with community leader. iv

Interview with protest leader