Qaddafi Reserach Paper

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Militza Balcheva PSCI 6630 Final Research Paper MUAMMAR QADDAFI: A STABILITY FIGURE FOR LIBYA Libya has always been a state of interest to the international community with its oil industry. Its reputation however has not gone untainted. While under the rule of Muammar Qaddafi Libya was seen under a gray light, with Qaddafi’s dictatorship and involvement in terrorism, the international community kept a close eye on the state and even held it responsible for terrorist attacks against the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Yet even though Libya was seen as a rogue state while under Qaddafi rule, it was a stable state. Qaddafi may have been an imperfect leader, but he provided stability to the state and region by suppressing the rise of rebel and militia groups and maintaining control over his territory. While his rule

Transcript of Qaddafi Reserach Paper

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Militza BalchevaPSCI 6630Final Research Paper

MUAMMAR QADDAFI: A STABILITY FIGURE FOR LIBYA

Libya has always been a state of interest to the international community with

its oil industry. Its reputation however has not gone untainted. While under the rule

of Muammar Qaddafi Libya was seen under a gray light, with Qaddafi’s dictatorship

and involvement in terrorism, the international community kept a close eye on the

state and even held it responsible for terrorist attacks against the United States, the

United Kingdom, and France. Yet even though Libya was seen as a rogue state while

under Qaddafi rule, it was a stable state. Qaddafi may have been an imperfect leader,

but he provided stability to the state and region by suppressing the rise of rebel and

militia groups and maintaining control over his territory. While his rule did not

always benefit the Libyan people, it was not until the beginning of 2011 that his

control began to falter. Enough time had passed and the anger and frustration of the

people began to rise. Alongside the people’s demands for quality of life

improvements, international economic sanctions and NATO backed support for a

rebellion finally pushed Qaddafi out of his position and in turn leading Libya to state

of disorder. This paper seeks to prove that even though Qaddafi was a dictator and

did not care for his people, he was an important figure for the stability of the region.

Without his rule, Libya has fallen into to the hands of militia and rebel groups,

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increasing in violence, rising in acts of terrorism, and pulling Libya into an overall

state of instability and without governmental authority and power.

THE CIVIL WAR

Muammar Qaddafi reigned in Libya for nearly forty-two years. The end of his

time in power came about with the rise of the civil war in Libya, backed by the

power of NATO. The Libyan people had a many reasons that led them to revolt,

among which lay the “…feeling of unrelenting assault on human dignity and of a

denial of basic rights….”1 The official start of the revolution was on 15 February,

2011 in Benghazi, it was a quiet peaceful protest, but the civilians were immediately

repressed by police. Still, the spark had lit the fire and within days the movement

had spread throughout eastern Libya and already reports of defection of army units

and senior military officials began to emerge.2 The Qaddafi regime had already

begun to fracture, with the first cracks appearing with General Abdul Fatah Younis,

who joined the rebelling a week after its inception, and would later lead the

rebellion’s military operations. One reason for the quick abandonment of Qaddafi’s

elite is that Qaddafi had never held the military in high esteem and had “…excluded

the armed forces from his inner circle of power.”3 It was these military and

governmental defections who formed the core of the Free Libyan Army that fought

1 “The Arab Awakening.” Strategic Survey 111, no. 1 (2011): 13. Accessed November 2, 2014. http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tssu20, 5.2 Ibid., 9.3 Yahia H Zoubir, and Erzsebet N Rozsa. “The End of the Libyan Dictatorship: The Uncertain Transition.” Third World Quarterly 33, no. 7 (2012): 1272.

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Qaddafi’s forces alongside rebel groups.4 With his own governmental party already

breaking away, Qaddafi would have become hard pressed to maintain control over

his people, and it would have been extremely difficult to suppress the now imminent

revolution.

In order to try to quell the rising rebellion, Qaddafi called upon his sons to

bring together a force outside of the military. That force was created from a

combination of special brigades led by his sons and the hiring of mercenaries.5 The

mercenaries were called in from various countries of Africa and Qaddafi offered

them high payments. Qaddafi’s intention was to have the mercenaries join his

loyalist forces in the eastern part of the country to suppress the rebellion, but by

doing his, Qaddafi alienated larges sections of his military, which was already

unsure of its loyalty to the regime.6

In August 2011, rebel groups made significant progress by moving towards

Tripoli. By August 22, rebel forces had overrun Green Square and renamed it

Martyrs Square. The following day, Qaddafi’s compound was seized and he went

into a hiding. Less than a month later, Qaddafi was found, beating, and finally killed

by rebel forces. Three days later, the National Transitional Council (NTC), which had

been recognized as the legitimate government of Libya, had declared the country

officially liberated.7 The next step for the newly liberated state, was to set up a new

4 “The Arab Awakening.” Strategic Survey 111, no. 1 (2011): 13. Accessed November 2, 2014. http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tssu20, 10.5 Yahia H Zoubir, and Erzsebet N Rozsa. “The End of the Libyan Dictatorship: The Uncertain Transition.” Third World Quarterly 33, no. 7 (2012): 1272.6 Yahia H Zoubir, and Erzsebet N Rozsa. “The End of the Libyan Dictatorship: The Uncertain Transition.” Third World Quarterly 33, no. 7 (2012): 1272.7 This paragraph has been cited from “Middle East/Gulf,” Strategic Survey 112, no. 1 (2012): 212. Accessed November 4, 2014. http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tssu20.

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government while appeasing all groups and tribes which had been under

oppression until this point.

The provisional government announced that eighty seats would be set aside

for the political parties which had been banned during the Qaddafi rule.8 Still, as a

newly formed government there were struggles to cater to each formerly oppressed

group and to prevent another dictatorship. For example, the “head of the Tripoli

Council, Abdel Hakim Belhadj was…an al-Qaeda operative, as well as the head of the

head of the Libyan Islamic Group for Combat (LIGC), which also has links to AQIM.”9

This group had fought against the Qaddafi regime in the 1990s, but had been

defeated. This group had already viewed Qaddafi as an enemy and therefore when

chance came for them to have a say in the establishment of the new government,

they would look to act for their benefit. The same ideas could be applied to other

formerly oppressed Jihadist groups, and their call for representation in the new NTC

government.

The civil war not only instigated the break of Qaddafi’s own party, it also

provided Libyan jihadists, who up until this point had been controlled by Qaddafi

and had suffered many losses at his hands, an opportunity for join the fight against

him.10 During Qaddafi’s reign, he was able to suppress many tribes and he

maintained control over extremists groups. Naturally this created animosity against

8 “Middle East/Gulf,” Strategic Survey 112, no. 1 (2012): 212. Accessed November 4, 2014. http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tssu20.9 Yahia H Zoubir, and Erzsebet N Rozsa. “The End of the Libyan Dictatorship: The Uncertain Transition.” Third World Quarterly 33, no. 7 (2012): 1276.10 “The Arab Awakening.” Strategic Survey 111, no. 1 (2011): 13. Accessed November 2, 2014. http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tssu20, 13.

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Qaddafi and when the fighting broke out, many of those tribes sided with the

rebels.11 In order to try to reestablish control, Qaddafi, along with this sons and

relatives, attempted to regroup and counter. The counter included loyalist forces,

conventional army units, African mercenaries, and elite, and under Qaddafi’s

relatives’ command, they were able to push back the rebels and advance towards

Benghazi.12 Despite hard efforts to regain control and stability, Qaddafi and his

forces ultimately lost, and the end came about with the death of Qaddafi.

TERRORISM

Before the murder of Qaddafi in 2011 that spurred the new leaf for Libya,

Qaddafi spent many years working in the terrorism field. During the 1980s, Libya

was viewed as the world’s strongest supporter of terrorism, and was seen as a

serious threat to the United States.13 Terrorism originating in Libya also proved to

be a threat to the international community as well. In 1988 Pam Am flight 103 was

stuck over the Lockerbie, Scotland, killing its passengers. The investigation

conducted by the United States and the United Kingdom led to two Libyan

suspects.14 Both nations increased their demands of Libya to accept full

responsibility and provide compensation. But they were not alone in going after

Libya during those early years of Qaddafi’s rule. In 1989, French UTA Flight 772 was

downed over Chad and once again France accused Libya of being responsible for the

11 Ibid., 28.12 Ibid., 28.13 Jonathan B. Schwartz, “Dealing with a ‘Rogue State’: The Libya Precedent.” The American Journal of International Law 101, no. 3 (July 2007): 553. 14 Ibid., 555.

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attack, but did not seek the same amount of compensation.15 (see fig. 1.1 for

complication of Libyan sponsored attacks). Nevertheless, in either case, Libya was

the state investigations led to as responsible for the terrorist attacks on civilian

flights. Along with a Security Council resolutions beginning in 1992, demands were

placed on Libya to renounce and disassociate itself from terrorism, but failed to

meet demands, and the result was a significant increase of attention from the

international community.16 Because Qaddafi’s Libya came under so much scrutiny

from the international community, he began to pull back the acts of terrorism from

open view, but did not fully renounce his association with it.

It was during the 1980s that United State had placed highly effective

economic sanctions on the Libyan government and Qaddafi had begun to feel their

effects. Yet despite economic hardship from sanctions, Qaddafi’s response was to

increase the lethality of his terrorist attacks, especially after U.S. airstrikes

increased.17 As pressure from the international community and the United States

mounted, Qaddafi began to shift his stance on terrorism. After further economic

sanctions were imposed on Tripoli in 1992, Qaddafi was quick to renounce his ties

with terrorism.18 Part of the reason behind the change of stance on terrorism is

because Qaddafi was already losing support from the people after suffering under

15 Jonathan B. Schwartz, “Dealing with a ‘Rogue State’: The Libya Precedent.” The American Journal of International Law 101, no. 3 (July 2007): 556.16 Ibid., 557. 17 Stephen D. Collins. “Dissuading State Support of Terrorism: Strikes or Sanctions? (An Analysis of Dissuasion Measures Employed Against Libya.” Studies In Conflict & Terrorism 27, no. 1 (2004): 2. Military & Government Collection, EBSCOhost. Accessed November 4, 2014.18 Stephen D. Collins. “Dissuading State Support of Terrorism: Strikes or Sanctions? (An Analysis of Dissuasion Measures Employed Against Libya.” Studies In Conflict & Terrorism 27, no. 1 (2004): 2. Military & Government Collection, EBSCOhost. Accessed November 4, 2014.

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economic sanctions. In order to retain the survival of his regime, Qaddafi chose to

sever ties with terrorism. When Osama Bin Laden set the stage for the attacks on the

U.S. on September 11, 2001, Qaddafi was one of the first to condemn the attacks and

felt that the United States was justified in its invasion and retaliation of

Afghanistan.19 Qaddafi mainly sought to maintain his power in Libya, but he also

viewed al-Qaeda as a threat to his regime, and therefore, the invasion by the United

States into Afghanistan to seek out and hold Osama bin Laden responsible, would

mean an elimination of a threat for Qaddafi.

19 Kurt A. Didier., “Commentary: Diplomacy and Libya: Balancing Foreign Policy With Private Party Litigate.” Diplomacy & Statecraft 22, no. 2 (2011): 343. Military & Government Collection. Accessed November 4, 2014.

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(Figure 1.1 Source: Stephen D. Collins. “Dissuading State Support of Terrorism: Strikes or Sanctions? (An Analysis of Dissuasion Measures Employed Against Libya.” Studies In Conflict & Terrorism 27, no. 1 (2004): 2. Military & Government Collection, EBSCOhost. Accessed November 4, 2014.)

The post-Qaddafi Libya has shown an ambivalent stance on terrorism. The

state continues to fight alongside the international community against terrorism,

but with little success. There is a lack of a centralized government and a lack of “…

coherent national security bureaucracy to develop a comprehensive

counterterrorism plan and functional and capable national security forces to

implement it.”20 Without a centralized government to provide control and stability,

extremist groups are able to affiliate themselves with other extremist groups and

are thus able to engage in acts of terrorism. Despite ICC jurisdiction over these

crimes because of their war crimes, including terrorism, there have been no trials or

prosecutions and the groups are left unchecked. In addition, post-Qaddafi Libya has

become a very good breeding ground for terrorism. Some of the reasons include:

“a central government with weak institutions and only tenuous control over its expansive territory, the ubiquity of uncontrolled weapons and ammunition, porous and inaccessible borders, heavily armed militias and tribes with varying loyalties and agendas, high unemployment among young males along with slow-moving economic improvement…, political paralysis due to infighting and distrust among Libya’s political actors, and the absence of a functioning police force or national army.”21

The apparent lack of a centralized government is one of the main themes resonating

throughout Libya. Distrust among political parties makes for complicated

agreements to form a coherent government and with every tribe and militia group 20 “Chapter 2. Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview.” Bureau of Counterterrorism. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224823.htm.21 Ibid. US Department of State.

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asking for a seat in the government, rival areas are pushed to cooperate, which is a

daunting task with a history of distrust.

Of the large number of militia groups that have risen out of the post-Qaddafi

ashes of Libya, some of the terrorist groups, in order to maintain their territorial

hold, have begun to provide services to their constituencies, such as Ansar al-Shari’a

(AAS) Benghazi and AAS Darnah, and meanwhile they recruit members.22 Of those

groups, the ones who are affiliated with other extremist groups such as ISIS, have

set up a network for communication and covered routes to other regions, such as

Syria and Iraq. Regardless of extremist affiliations and physical location of terrorist

groups, their attacks have a broad spectrum. In 2013 terrorist attacks by violent

extremist groups have been directed towards the United States, Western nations,

and Libyan government facilities and interests.23 Notably, these attacks only focus

on a small portion of the all terrorist attacks in Libya, and many incidents of

bombings and assassinations have not been counted – at least those committed, in

part, by AAS Darnah and AAS Benghazi. For many of these attacks, no responsibility

has been claimed by the terrorist groups dotting the state, but the main goal of these

attacks, “…appear[s] to be undermining the fragile democratic transition and

spreading fear.”24 The current weak state of the government is on thin ice and

anything to break it apart would mean chaos spreading throughout Libya, and in

this case it would not be because the people are calling for change to improve their

lives. Terrorist organizations trying to undermine the unstable government

22 Ibid. US Department of State. 23 “Chapter 2. Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview.” Bureau of Counterterrorism. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224823.htm.24 Ibid. US Department of State.

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currently in place do not appear to have a plan to establish a strong government, but

seem to attack for the sake of breaking the already fractured system.

Some examples of terrorist attacks targeting the Libyan government as well

as Western nations include: January 12 – attacking the vehicle of Italian consul

General in Benghazi. July 23 – improvised mortar hit a high-rise which houses the

Prime Minister, Western businessmen, the Qatari Embassy, and Tripoli Towers,

which house the British, Canadian, and Maltese Embassies. August 17 - attacking

the Egyptian Consulate General. October 11 – attacks on the joint honorary

consulates of Finland and Sweden. November 27 – attack on the shrine of Murad

Agha in the area of Tajoura.25 These are but a few examples of the vast number of

terrorist attacks in Libya. Shaking ties with Western nations would mean little to no

support from the Western community leaving Libya in the hands of terrorists and

their strong affiliations with extremist groups and rogue states.

Libya continues, however, to try to counter terrorism within its borders.

Sections of the penal code provides for crimes or offenses prejudicial to state

security and for felonies to the state, including terrorism. Libya has also ratified the

Organization of African Unity’s Convention on the Prevention and Combating of

Terrorism, which requires states to criminalize terrorist acts. In 2013, the GNC even

adopted two laws as part of a security plan to disband all non-state militia groups,

but implementation has been a challenge for Libya, and the state still does not have

a comprehensive counterterrorism law.26 Because of the already weakened

25 “Chapter 2. Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview.” Bureau of Counterterrorism. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224823.htm.26 This section has been cited from “Chapter 2. Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview.” Bureau of Counterterrorism.

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government, the enforcement of these laws proves extremely difficult. Terrorist

organizations would be hard pressed to succumb to any amount of authoritarian

enforcement of these laws, and in addition, the attacks on prosecutors and judges

has halted the prosecution and trials of terrorist members. The law enforcement

personnel and agencies currently placed in charge of deterring and responding to

terrorist incidents do not have the adequate training to do so. Particular areas

affected by this lack of training are the collection and management of evidence, lack

of coordination, and increased fear of retribution.27 If militia and rebel groups can

prevent any prosecution of their members by eliminating those in charge of the

prosecutions, then those groups can maintain their power and control over their

established areas. Furthermore by eliminating and striking fear in authoritarian

figures only solidifies the strength of the militia and rebel groups and undermines

the little power and control the current government and law enforcement system

has.

INCREASING VIOLENCE POST-QADDAFI

After the fall of the Qaddafi regime, overall violence has continued to rise

(see fig. 1.2). Despite the fact that the ICC retains jurisdiction in Libya, no

prosecutions have come out of the court and thus there is no incentive for conflicts

to abate. Human Rights Watch has retained presence in Libya and has repeatedly

made statements regarding overall violence. Human Rights Watch has asked for

http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224823.htm.27 “Chapter 2. Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview.” Bureau of Counterterrorism. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224823.htm.

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accountability for the abuses in Libya to help bring about the beginning of a durable

solution.28 With the lack of control over small groups, those that have been able to

arm themselves have attacked civilians and their property, and have even escalated

to committing war crimes. Human Rights Watch has documented various violations

of international law since 2011, among which lay torture, forced displacement, and

unlawful killings.29 It is up to the state’s government to deal with such rebel groups

and bring about security, however, since the overthrow of Qaddafi, not one of the

implemented governments has been able to bring about stability and control over

the armed groups. Furthermore, it is this “inaction domestically in the face of

mounting crimes has contributed to a culture of impunity and has helped set the

stage for the militia lawless in Libya today,” according to Human Rights Watch.30

However lack of prosecutions from the Libyan government as well as the ICC have

kept the doors open for continuous human rights violations.

28 “UN Security Council: Address Libya Crimes.” HRW. November 11, 2014. http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/11/un-security-council-address-libya-crimes.

29 “UN Security Council: Address Libya Crimes.” HRW. November 11, 2014. http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/11/un-security-council-address-libya-crimes. 30 Ibid. HRW.

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(Figure 1.2 Source: Global Terrorism Database. University of Maryland. Last modified August 2014. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=libya&sa.x=0&sa.y=0.)

Overall, due to the lack of centralized and powerful government, the militias

were able to finally rise from underneath Qaddafi’s thumb. They were able to exert

much more power as independent entities and relished in the weaker decentralized

government.31 The lack of authority to suppress tribal and militia groups allowed for

the spread of these groups throughout the state and their rising power over

territorial areas. The localized power groups grew in power and control over the

citizens and areas, establishing smaller versions of potential terrorist organizations.

One of the areas affected by armed militia is the eastern city of Derna. The

armed militia in this area “…are terrorizing residents through summary executions,

public floggings, and other violent abuse.”32 Because there is no law enforcement

31 “Middle East/Gulf,” Strategic Survey 112, no. 1 (2012): 212. Accessed November 4, 2014. http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tssu20, 18. 32 “Libya: Extremists Terrorizing Derna Residents.” HRW. November 27, 2014. http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/27/libya-extremists-terrorizing-derna-residents.

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agency to contain them, the armed groups are left to roam free and unchecked.

Further lack of figurehead to establish control, as Qaddafi did during his rule, allows

for rebellious groups to create mayhem and push the Libya into a state of disorder.

In addition, some of the armed militia groups have affiliated themselves with the

Islamic State (ISIS) group.33 Part of the reason behind the overthrow of Qaddafi in

2011, was directly related to his role in terrorism and international sanctions were

imposed on Libya because of those actions. Therefore, current association with a

major terrorism organization leaves an open door to condemn Libya and solidify its

status of a nation void of control over its population.

One of the extremist groups in collaboration with ISIS is the Islamic Youth

Shura Council. Human Rights Watch has documented their role in beheadings of

Derna residents and “…dozens of seemingly politically motivated assassinations of

public officials, judges and members of security forces….”34 Through the elimination

of law-enforcing personnel, extremist groups are able to retain their control over

various territories of the state, and maintain the status quo of instability and lack of

control. The ending result and impact extremist groups have had on Libya, and

specifically the city of Derna is to force its residents to flee. Human Rights Watch has

spoken with several residents of Derna and a clear picture has emerged regarding

the major conflicts in the post-Qaddafi Libya. According to a Derna activist who fled

the city described Derna as “’fully under the control of fundamentalists’ who have

imposed an extremist ideology, and enforced a strict interpretation of Shari’a law

33 Ibid. HRW.34 “Libya: Extremists Terrorizing Derna Residents.” HRW. November 27, 2014. http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/27/libya-extremists-terrorizing-derna-residents.

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with public executions and floggings.”35 While Qaddafi himself was directly involved

in the harsher treatment of the Libyan population, he was able to maintain control

over extremist groups. Post-Qaddafi interim governments have been unsuccessful in

establishing the same amount of control over these groups.

Another issue that has arisen since the fall of the Qaddafi regime is the

formation of new militia groups. The establishment of new groups, some of which

are affiliated with extremist international groups such as ISIS, has become

prominent because there is a lack of control by authorities to suppress the

formation, and have been unsuccessful in eliminating any pre-existing groups.

Furthermore, during the capture of the Qaddafi’s convoy, the Tigris Brigade, one of

the militia groups that participated in the civil war, captured a group of men from

the convoy, and executed them within twenty-four hours along with Qaddafi. Cell

phone footage capture some of the faces of both the detainees and some of those

responsible for their deaths, however, no investigations or actions were taken to

ensure accountability for those responsible.36

Part of the reason for the lack of prosecutions and the freeze over the

prosecution of war crimes, is the militia groups themselves. Militia groups threaten

and attack judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and witness causing a paralysis of the

justice system in many parts of the country.37 If there is no stable prosecuting entity,

35 Ibid. HRW.36 Fred Abrahams. “Dispatches: Two Years after Gaddafi, Lawless in Libya.” HumanRights Watch, October 20, 2013 http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/20/dispatches-two-years-after-gaddafi-lawless-libya. 37 Hanan Salah. “Global Insider: Justice System on the Brink of Collapse in Libya’s Security Vacuum.” Human Rights Watch. March 20, 2014. http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/20/global-insider-justice-system-brink-collapse-libya-s-security-vacuum.

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then there is no incentive or reason to keep militia groups at bay. Chaos essentially

breeds more chaos. The ending result is a security vacuum that leads to work

stoppage by the courts and prosecutors for months.38 Lack of authorities and a

current weak government have failed to regain control over the militant groups.

Even with the alliance of the Libyan air force with the elected government, and after

conducting air strikes against militia targets in Derna and Benghazi, the militias

have mounted return attacks, including suicide attacks, have only led to additional

war crimes and further loss of control.39 The escalation of attacks has increased

awareness of the situation in Libya, but no international intervention has emerged.

Among violence within the Libyan borders, violence is also found in the

migrant detention centers where refugees fleeing, generally to Italy, are held

awaiting next steps. Reports have been made regarding beatings of boys and men,

and strip searches for women and girls, on the lighter side, and reports of harsh

abuse and torture on the opposite end of the spectrum.40 Despite reports on the

abuse, little has been done to curtail the violence and meanwhile and influx of

detainees increase. In the early months of 2014, of the 42,000 people who

disembarked in Italy, just under 27,000 came from Libya.41 Many of these had

escaped violence in their country, only to fall back into the violent hands of the

detention centers. Limited aid has been provided by the European Union and Italian

support to Libya’s coastguard to intercept and rescue migrants and asylum seekers

38 Ibid., Hanan.39 “Libya: Extremists Terrorizing Derna Residents.” HRW. November 27, 2014. http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/27/libya-extremists-terrorizing-derna-residents.40 “Libya: Whipped, Beaten, and Hung from Trees.” June 22, 2014. http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/22/libya-whipped-beaten-and-hung-trees. 41 Ibid., HRW.

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as they head towards Italy. However, Human Rights Watch insists that this aid

should be suspended until all abuse in the centers, where the fleeing detainees have

been held, has been eliminated.42 However, whether Libya will be able to regain

control over these detention centers is uncertain, as the weak government and law

enforcement system do not have the power to implement a reorganization of all

detention centers.

The violence encompassing Libya has also spilled outside of its borders. The

civil war brought out a large number of weapons stolen from the Qaddafi regime

and were dispersed among the rebels. Many of the weapons also ended up in the

hands of militia groups outside of the Libyan border. Some weaponry from the

Libyan stockpiles had been stolen by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and

then they flowed into Sahara-Sahel, adding to the instability of the area.43 Currently,

the weak border control also allows for a laundry list of illegal trades of weapons

into Maghreb, Sahel, and further out.44 Of the militia extremist groups within Libya,

many supplied arms, some of which had been taken from the Qaddafi regime,

throughout the region and to fighters in Syria.45 The increasing instability created by

the disbursement of weapons and fueled by the fall of the Qaddafi regime, inflated

the AQIM to increase its influence inside and outside of Libya. The AQIM had found a

safe haven in northern Mali, and with a sophisticated arsenal, armed entire Tuareg

42 Ibid. HRW.43 Yahia H Zoubir, and Erzsebet N Rozsa. “The End of the Libyan Dictatorship: The Uncertain Transition.” Third World Quarterly 33, no. 7 (2012): 1275.44 “Chapter 2. Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview.” Bureau of Counterterrorism. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224823.htm.45 Ibid., US Department of State.

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detachments and headed to their home in Azward, located in northern Mali.46 The

influx of armed rebels in Mali significantly altered the already unstable state. Mali,

however, was not the only state affected by the rebellion in Libya.

The spill of weapons from the fall of the Qaddafi regime reached as far as

Somalia. Somali pirates had acquired some of the weapons from the Qaddafi

stockpiles.47 The black market received the flow of weapons and they immediately

became available for all rebels and insurgents from various parts of unstable

economies and states. The arming of militias and rebels in instable states only fuels

the fracturing of the governments and increases the odds of a full-scale rebellion.

The surrounding region, including Mali, Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso, felt the

impacts of the fall of the Qaddafi regime. Libya, under Qaddafi rule, employed many

expatriate workers, and when Qaddafi fell, the return of these workers to their

home states added to the suffering economies already weakened by famine.48 While

Qaddafi may have treated his people harshly, he did provide stability for state of

Libya and the surrounding region.

CONCLUSION

Libya is no longer a stable nation and while it was not ideal under Qaddafi

rule, it still retained a degree of peace and stability. The removal of its leader has left

it in chaos. The same idea can be seen in the state of Colombia. This state is

46 Yahia H Zoubir, and Erzsebet N Rozsa. “The End of the Libyan Dictatorship: The Uncertain Transition.” Third World Quarterly 33, no. 7 (2012): 1275.47 Ibid., 1275.48 Yahia H Zoubir, and Erzsebet N Rozsa. “The End of the Libyan Dictatorship: The Uncertain Transition.” Third World Quarterly 33, no. 7 (2012): 1275.

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otherwise prosperous but only two-thirds of its territory is actually controlled,

indicating a failure.49 There are three private armies which show their power and

control over large portions of the state and government has lost control to zones to

insurgent groups and drug traffickers.50 Alongside Colombia lies Zimbabwe. This

state has also fallen weak and the government has no real authority. With a laundry

list of problems already pushing the failure of the state, corruption runs rampant.

Presidential elections have been altered, the government’s legitimacy has vanished,

and elite are collecting al profits.51 According to Robert I. Rotberg, there are three

indicators that a state is heading towards failure, and they are: economic, political,

and deaths in combat.52 Libya has exhibited all three.

Undoubtedly post-Qaddafi Libya has fallen in a state of disorder and the

removal of the former dictator has created a power vacuum that cannot be

reestablished. Formerly suppressed rebel groups have been given freedom to rise

and establish territorial rule. Newly formed militia groups and tribes have also

staked their own claim in various parts throughout Libya. Old grievances have not

been diminished and grudges still remain in different tribes and jihadist groups

which had suffered losses and oppression while Qaddafi ruled Libya. Today, the

government still struggles to establish itself with little success. Each party in the

political bureaucratic system seeks representation and a vast majority of rebel and

militia groups also want to have a say in the new government system. Distrust

49Robert I. Rotbert, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators.” Failed States, Civil Wars, and Nation-Building. Contemporary World Politics Part 4, 454.50 Ibid.,4.51 Ibid., 5.52 Ibid., 7.

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however is a major player in the failing establishment of a government. In addition,

power is an equal party. Rebel and militia groups have grown accustomed to

retaining the power they have held since the fall of Qaddafi and the establishment of

a new government would mean loss of that power.

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