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Transcript of Q & ôòôó Z& )! UZ
THE IBC DIGESTVOLUME V
MARCH 2021
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The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code Digest:
March 2021
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 has been one among the most dynamic legislative
enactments in India that has been amended from time to time to meet the ever-changing needs in
the field of insolvency laws. Each legislature gets its shape over increased litigation that helps
conclusively decide matters and acts as a tool for interpretation of the provisions of the statute.
The provisions of the IBC have been tested time and again before the judicial and quasi-judicial
authorities ranging from the Hon’ble National Company Law Tribunal to the Apex Court namely
the Supreme Court of India. The judgments passed by the National Company Law Tribunal
(NCLT), National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), the High Court and the Supreme
Court of India have helped the Insolvency Professionals and every professional practicing in the
field of Insolvency Laws, interpret the Code read with the relevant Regulations, in its true letter
and spirit.
‘The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code Digest’, is an initiative by Corpvin Curious, the Knowledge
and Research Cell of Corpvin Consulting LLP to summarize all the landmark judicial
pronouncements passed each month in the field of Insolvency and interpret the amendments that
are introduced in the Code or the Regulations made thereunder, if any, to assist professionals in
understanding the implications of such pronouncements and/or amendments in a summarized way.
Corpvin Curious is the brainchild of CS Jasveen Bindra and the team of Corpvin Curious is led by
her.
About the Author: CS Jasveen Bindra is a member of the Institute of Company Secretaries of
India as a Practicing Professional. She is a designated partner at Corpvin Consulting LLP. She has
an enriching experience in the field of Insolvency Laws, relating to; inter alia, the Initiation of
Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) by a Financial Creditor, Initiation of CIRP by an
Operational Creditor, Process specific compliances during CIRP, Handholding of Insolvency
Professionals to ensure the smooth execution of CIRP and Liquidation Processes.
Happy Reading!
Disclaimer: Nothing contained in this document shall be construed as a legal opinion or view of
Corpvin Consulting LLP whatsoever and the content is to be used strictly for educational purpose
only.
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Table of Contents
Supreme Court Judgments .............................................................. 6
1. Kridhan Infrastructure Private Limited v. Venkatesan Sankaranarayan &
Ors……………………………………………………………..…………6
Upheld the Liquidation order against the Corporate Debtor due to delayed
implementation of the approved Resolution Plan and also held that time is a crucial
facet of the scheme under the IBC.
2. A. Navinchandra Steels Private Limited v. SREI Equipment Finance
Limited & Ors…..………………………………………………………..6
A petition either under Section 7 or Section 9 of the IBC is an independent proceeding
which is unaffected by winding up proceedings that may be filed qua the same company.
3. P. Mohanraj & Ors. v. M/s. Shah Brothers Ispat Private Limited ............ 7
Whether the institution or continuation of a proceeding under Section 138/141 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can be said to be covered by the moratorium under
Section 14 of the IBC?
4. Gujrat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. Mr. Amit Gupta & Ors. ................. 8
Whether the Hon’ble NCLT and NCLAT can exercise jurisdiction under the IBC over
dispute arising from contracts such as the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA)?
5. Kalpraj Dharamshi & Anr. v. Kotak Investment Advisors Ltd. & Anr…..
................................................................................................................ 9
Whether the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 or the principles laid
down therein would be applicable to proceeding under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code, 2016?
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6. Alok Kaushik v. Mrs Bhuvaneshwari Ramanathan and Others ..............11
The issue in the present appeal relates to the costs, charges, expenses and professional
fees payable to a registered valuer appointed after the initiation of the CIRP under the
IBC, in a situation where the CIRP is eventually set aside by the Adjudicating Authority
or, as the case may be, Appellate Authority.
7. Arun Kumar Jagatramka v. Jindal Steel and Power Ltd. & Anr. ............12
It was held that a person who is ineligible under Section 29A of the IBC to submit a
resolution plan, is also barred from proposing a scheme of compromise and
arrangement under Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013.
8. Sesh Nath Singh & Anr. v. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank
Ltd and Anr..... ………………………………………………………….13
Whether prior proceedings under the SARFAESI Act qualify for the exclusion of time
under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963?
9. Jaypee Kensington Boulevard Apartments Welfare Association & Ors. v.
NBCC (India) Ltd. & Ors. .....................................................................15
It was held that in the Adjudicatory process concerning a resolution plan under the
Code, there is no scope for interference with the commercial aspects of the decision of
the Committee of Creditors (CoC).
10. Indus Biotech Private Limited v. Kotak India Venture (Offshore) Fund &
Ors………………………………………………………………………15
Decision upon the priority of consideration of an application under Section 8 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 vis-à-vis an application under Section 7 of the
IBC by the Hon’ble NCLT.
11. Laxmi Pat Surana v. Union Bank of India & Anr. ..................................17
Whether an action under Section 7 of the IBC can be initiated by a financial creditor
against a corporate person (being a corporate debtor) concerning guarantee offered
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by it in respect of a loan account of the principal borrower (not being a Corporate
Debtor)?
National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Judgments
1. India Resurgence ARC Private Limited v. Amit Metaliks Limited and
Ors. ........................................................................................................19
It was held that the discretion of the CoC to take into account the value of security
interest of a Secured Creditor in approving of a Resolution Plan, is a guideline and not
imperative in terms.
2. Mr. Gulabchand Jain v. Mr. Ramchandra D. Choudhary ........................20
CoC is empowered to take a decision in regard to the liquidation of the Corporate
Debtor even after an application has been filed by the Resolution Professional placing
the Resolution Plan approved by the CoC before the Adjudicating Authority for
approval.
3. Vijay Sitaram Dandnaik v. Punjab National Bank and Anr. ...................20
The provisions of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall be applicable only if the
debt is acknowledged within three years i.e. before the expiry of the Limitation Period.
4. Committee of Creditors of EMCO Limited v. Mary Mody and Anr. ......21
Whether the Adjudicating Authority can direct the CoC to raise interim finance even if
the CoC has voted against the proposition?
5. Ram Ratan Kanoongo v. Veda Kumar Nimbagal and Anr. ....................21
It was held that a claim from third parties relating to any contract entered into by the
Corporate Debtor shall be deemed to have been extinguished upon approval of this
Resolution Plan, without any liability whatsoever on the Corporate Debtor.
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6. Mr. Ravi Shankar Deverakonda v. Committee of Creditors of Meenakshi
Energy Limited ......................................................................................19
The exercise of the power of extending the time limit by the ‘Adjudicating Authority’
in negation of the statutory provision under Section 12 of the Code may be desirable in
an exceptional/extraordinary circumstances
7. Indian Overseas Bank v. RAM Infrastructure Ltd., and Anr. .................22
Whether after imposition of moratorium any transaction done with respect to the assets
of the Corporate Debtor is deemed to be valid or not?
8. Radico Khaitan Ltd. v. BT & FC Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. ...............................23
Parameters for consolidation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Processes
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Supreme Court Judgments
1. Kridhan Infrastructure Private Limited v. Venkatesan Sankaranarayan & Ors.
Date of Pronouncement: 01.03.2021
Order Passed by: The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
Coram: Hon’ble Justice Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Hon’ble Justice M R Shah
In the impugned matter, the appellant submitted a Resolution Plan for the Corporate Debtor
under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016. The Resolution Plan was approved by the
CoC on 8 March 2019 with a majority of 89.92%. The Resolution Plan was approved by the
National Company Law Tribunal on 15 May 2019. The appellant accordingly deposited an
amount of Rs 5 Crores in an Escrow Account of the Corporate Debtor. However, the appellant
did not fulfil its further obligations, including equity infusion, under the Resolution Plan
despite numerous opportunities over a period of six months.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while passing an order in the matter, inter alia, held that time is
a crucial facet of the scheme under the IBC. To allow such proceedings to lapse into an
indefinite delay will plainly defeat the object of the statute. A good faith effort to resolve a
corporate insolvency is a preferred course. However, a resolution applicant must be fair in its
dealings as well. The appellant has, unreasonably, failed to abide by its obligations as
warranted under the Resolution Plan, hence the order of the Hon’ble NCLAT liquidating the
Corporate Debtor was upheld by the Hon’ble Apex Court.
Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/554ba9e24acf8eb0bd2e02c4df162436.pdf
2. A. Navinchandra Steels Private Limited v. SREI Equipment Finance Limited & Ors.
Date of Pronouncement: 01.03.2021
Order Passed by: The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
Coram: Hon’ble Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman, Hon’ble Justice B.R. Gavai
In the Instant matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India while deciding the matter, reiterated
that, given the object of the IBC as delineated in paragraphs 25 to 28 of Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd.
v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC, it is clear that the IBC is a special statute dealing with revival
of companies that are in the red, winding up only being resorted to in case all attempts of
revival fail. Vis-à-vis the Companies Act, which is a general statute, deals with companies,
including companies that are in the red, the IBC is not only a special statute which must prevail
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in the event of conflict, but also has a non-obstante clause contained in Section 238, which
makes it even clearer that in case of conflict, the provisions of the IBC will prevail.
A petition either under Section 7 or Section 9 of the IBC is an independent proceeding which
is unaffected by winding up proceedings that may be filed qua the same company. Given the
object sought to be achieved by the IBC, it is clear that only where a company in winding up
is near corporate death, that no transfer of the winding up proceeding would then take place to
the NCLT to be tried as a proceeding under the IBC. Short of an irresistible conclusion that
corporate death is inevitable, every effort should be made to resuscitate the corporate debtor in
the larger public interest, which includes not only the workmen of the Corporate Debtor, but
also its creditors and the goods it produces in the larger interest of the economy of the country.
Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/6a65edb0cc17d66c677814115b1477f5.pdf
3. P. Mohanraj & Ors. v. M/s. Shah Brothers Ispat Private Limited
Date of Pronouncement: 01.03.2021
Order Passed by: The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
Coram: Hon’ble Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman, Hon’ble Justice Navin Sinha, and Hon’ble
Justice K.M. Joseph
Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881
In the Instant matter, the issue that fell for determination in this appeal before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India was whether the institution or continuation of a proceeding under
Section 138/141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can be said to be covered by the
moratorium provision, namely, Section 14 of the IBC.
While deciding the matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court deliberated on several cardinal points
of law, inter alia, the Interpretation of Section 14 of the IBC, Application of the Noscitur a
sociis and ejusdem generis rules of interpretation to the Section 14(1)(a) of the IBC, the Object
of Section 14 of the Code, Section 14 vis-à-vis other moratorium sections in the IBC, The
Nature of Proceedings under Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act etc.
Some key takeaways from the Judgment are as follows:
Given the tests laid down for distinction between Criminal and Civil Proceedings, it is
clear that a Section 138 proceeding can be said to be a “civil sheep” in a “criminal
wolf’s” clothing, as it is the interest of the victim that is sought to be protected, the
larger interest of the State being subsumed in the victim alone moving a court in cheque
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bouncing cases, as has been seen upon the analysis of Chapter XVII of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881.
Regard being had to the object sought to be achieved by the IBC in imposing this
moratorium under Section 14 of the Code, a quasi-criminal proceeding which would
result in the assets of the Corporate Debtor being depleted would directly impact the
corporate insolvency resolution process in the same manner as the institution,
continuation, or execution of a decree in such suit in a civil court for the amount of debt
or other liability.
Hence, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it is clear that a quasi-criminal proceeding that is
contained in Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 would, given the object
and context of Section 14 of the IBC, amount to a “proceeding” within the meaning of Section
14(1)(a), the moratorium therefore attaching to such proceeding.
Further, for the period of moratorium, since no Section 138/141 proceeding can continue or be
initiated against the corporate debtor because of a statutory bar, such proceedings can be
initiated or continued against the persons mentioned in Section 141(1) and (2) of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, namely, the persons who, at the time when the offence was
committed, were in charge of, and was responsible to, the company (corporate debtor) for the
conduct of the business of the company and any director, manager, secretary or other officer
of the Company. This being the case, it is clear that the moratorium provision contained in
Section 14 of the IBC would apply only to the corporate debtor, the natural persons mentioned
in Section 141 continuing to be statutorily liable under Chapter XVII of the Negotiable
Instruments Act.
Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/4fd82b27266f68ac4065537fc1474029.pdf
4. Gujrat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. Mr. Amit Gupta & Ors.
Date of Pronouncement: 08.03.2021
Order Passed by: The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
Coram: Hon’ble Justice Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud and Hon’ble Justice M.R. Shah
Section 60 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
In the Instant matter, the questions that fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court
of India were, whether the Hon’ble NCLT and NCLAT can exercise jurisdiction under the IBC
over dispute arising from contracts such as the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) and whether
the appellant’s right to terminate the PPA in terms of 9.2.1(e) of the Agreement (on grounds
of initiation of CIRP) is regulated by the IBC.
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While deciding the matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, inter alia, held that considering the
text of Section 60(5)(c) and the interpretation of similar provisions in other insolvency related
statutes, NCLT has jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes, which arise solely from or which relate
to the insolvency of the Corporate Debtor. However, in doing so, we issue a note of caution to
the NCLT and NCLAT to ensure that they do not usurp the legitimate jurisdiction of other
courts, tribunals and fora when the dispute is one which does not arise solely from or relate to
the insolvency of the Corporate Debtor. The nexus with the insolvency of the Corporate Debtor
must exist. For the adjudication of disputes that arise dehors the insolvency of the Corporate
Debtor, the RP must approach the relevant competent authority. For instance, if the dispute in
the present matter related to the non-supply of electricity, the RP would not have been entitled
to invoke the jurisdiction of the NCLT under the IBC.
Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/79e3093d3be5f907a06411924f0a6b62.pdf
Summary of Judgment:
https://www.ibbi.gov.in/uploads/legalframwork/6a638b7d5cb6127680a4e0aeb470a3c5.pdf
5. Kalpraj Dharamshi & Anr. v. Kotak Investment Advisors Ltd. & Anr.
Date of Pronouncement: 10.03.2021
Order Passed by: The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
Coram: Hon’ble Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, Hon’ble Justice B.R. Gavai and Hon’ble Justice
Krishna Murari
Section 61 and Section 238A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and Section 14 of
the Limitation Act, 1963
In the Instant matter, the crucial question that fell for consideration before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India was, inter alia, whether the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 or the principles laid down therein would be applicable to proceeding under the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
For the convenience of our readers, the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963
set forth as follows:
‘14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction. —
(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has
been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first
instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the
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proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which,
from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the
applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court
of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be
excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of
jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
(3) XXXX ’
In this matter, the Respondent herein namely, Kotak Investment Advisors Limited (hereinafter
referred to as ‘KAIL) contented that the procedure followed by NCLT (for approving the
Resolution Plan under Section 30 and 31 of the IBC) was in breach of the principles of natural
justice, hence KAIL filed a Writ Petition before the Bombay High Court challenging the orders
passed by the Hon’ble NCLT. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition filed by KIAL on
the ground that KIAL had an alternate and efficacious remedy of filing an appeal before
NCLAT. KIAL, thereafter filed appeals before the NCLAT, however the same was beyond the
limitation period of thirty days from the date of the order of the Hon’ble NCLT as prescribed
under Section 61 of the Code.
Hence, in the present matter, it was to be adjudged by this Hon’ble Supreme Court, if the time
period during which KIAL was prosecuting the Writ Petition before the Hon’ble High Court
would be excluded for the purpose of calculating the Limitation Period in accordance with
Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
While deciding the matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, inter alia, held that the provisions of
Section 14 of the Limitation Act are meant for grant of relief, where a person has committed
some mistake. Referring to the Judgment in the matter of Consolidated Engineering Enterprises
(supra), it was reiterated that while considering the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation
Act, proper approach will have to be adopted and the provisions will have to be adopted and
the provisions will have to be interpreted, so as to advance the cause of justice, rather than
abort the proceedings. The Section is intended to provide a relief against the bar of limitation
in cases of mistaken remedy or selection of a wrong forum.
It was further observed that the legislature has enacted Section 14 to exempt a certain period
covered by a bona fide litigious activity. In accordance with Section 14, the time taken
diligently pursuing a remedy, in a wrong court, should be excluded.
Though strictly, the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would not be
applicable to the proceedings before the quasi-judicial Tribunal, however, the principles
underlying the same would be applicable i.e., the proper approach will have to be of advancing
the cause of justice, rather than to abort the proceedings.
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Referring, to the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Central Inland Water
Transport Corporation Limited and another v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and another, it was also
reiterated in the Judgment that the Courts will not enforce and will, when called upon to do so,
strike down an unfair and unreasonable contract or an unfair and unreasonable clause in a
contract entered into between parties who are not equal in bargaining power. It has also been
held, that this principle will apply where a man has no choice, or no meaningful choice, but to
give his assent to a contract or sign on the dotted line in a prescribed or standard form or to
accept a set of rules as part of the contract, however unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable
a clause in that contract or form or rules may be.
Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/09d6ec71f2fdefd0e1011ae0c57e3e38.pdf
6. Alok Kaushik v. Mrs Bhuvaneshwari Ramanathan and Others
Date of Pronouncement: 15.03.2021
Order Passed by: The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
Coram: Hon’ble Justice Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud and Hon’ble Justice M.R. Shah
Section 60(5)(c) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
The present appeal was filed by Alok Kaushik, in the capacity of being a registered valuer of
the Plant and Machinery of Kavveri Telecom Infrastructure Limited (hereinafter referred to as
the Corporate Debtor). The issue in the present appeal relates to the costs, charges, expenses
and professional fees payable to a registered valuer appointed after the initiation of the CIRP
under the IBC, in a situation where the CIRP is eventually set aside by the Adjudicating
Authority or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that, the Appellant is justified in contending that there must
be a forum within the ambit and purview of the IBC which has the jurisdiction to make a
determination on a claim of the present nature, which has been instituted by a valuer who was
appointed in pursuance of the initiation of the CIRP by the RP.
In this matter, the NCLT had held that it was rendered functus officio in relation to the
appellant’s claim to which the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it would be an incorrect
reading of the jurisdiction of the NCLT as an Adjudicating Authority under the IBC. In a recent
judgment in Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited vs Amit Gupta and Others, this Court clarified
the jurisdiction of the NCLT/NCLAT under Section 60(5)(c) of the IBC specifically stating
that considering the text of Section 60(5)(c) and the interpretation of similar provisions in
other insolvency related statutes, NCLT has jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes, which arise
solely from or which relate to the insolvency of the Corporate Debtor.
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Though the CIRP was set aside later, the claim of the appellant as registered valuer related to
the period when he was discharging his functions as a registered valuer appointed as an incident
of the CIRP. The NCLT would have been justified in exercising its jurisdiction under Section
60(5)(c) of the IBC and, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court accordingly ordered and directed that in a situation such as the
present case, the Adjudicating Authority is sufficiently empowered under Section 60(5)(c) of
the IBC to make a determination of the amount which is payable to an expert valuer as an
intrinsic part of the CIRP costs.
The availability of a grievance redressal mechanism under the IBC against an insolvency
professional does not divest the NCLT of its jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) of the IBC to
consider the amount payable to the appellant.
Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/02de2a8a337a49cec272b055e0884335.pdf
7. Arun Kumar Jagatramka v. Jindal Steel and Power Ltd. & Anr.
Date of Pronouncement: 15.03.2021
Order Passed by: The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
Coram: Hon’ble Justice Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud and Hon’ble Justice M.R. Shah
Section 29A and 35(1)(f) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and Section 230 of the
Companies Act, 2013
In the Instant Matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a person who is ineligible under
Section 29A of the Insolvency Bankruptcy Code, 2016 to submit a resolution plan, is also
barred from proposing a scheme of compromise and arrangement under Section 230 of the
Companies Act, 2013.
The background of the case was that, Mr. Arun Kumar Jagatramka, assailed the order dated 24
October 2019 of the NCLAT, inter alia, on the ground that Section 230 of the Act of 2013 does
not place any embargo on any person for the purpose of submitting a scheme. According to
the appellant, in the absence of a disqualification, the NCLAT could not have read the
ineligibility under Section 29A of the IBC into Section 230 of the Act of 2013.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court while deciding the matter held that, the stages of submitting a
resolution plan, selling assets of a company in liquidation and selling the company as a going
concern during liquidation, all indicate that the promoter or those in the management of the
company must not be allowed a back-door entry in the company and are hence, ineligible to
participate during these stages.
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Another submission by the Counsels representing the Appellant was that on the withdrawal of
the application under Sections 7, 9 and 10, as the case may be, the company goes back to the
same promoter in spite of such a promoter being ineligible under Section 29A for submitting
a resolution plan. As such, it was urged that there is no reason or justification then to preclude
a promoter from presenting a scheme of compromise or arrangement under Section 230. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court responded to this submission by stating that, there is a fundamental
fallacy in the submission. An application for withdrawal under Section 12-A is not intended to
be a culmination of the resolution process. This, as the statutory scheme would indicate, is at
the inception of the process.
Hence, the Hon’ble Apex Court based on its detailed deliberations, held that the prohibition
placed by the Parliament in Section 29A and Section 35(1)(f) of the IBC must also attach itself
to a scheme of compromise or arrangement under Section 230 of the Act of 2013, when the
company is undergoing liquidation under the auspices of the IBC.
Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/8b20adae7a37b302f30a02b3aa64ae91.pdf
8. Sesh Nath Singh & Anr. v. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Ltd and Anr.
Date of Pronouncement: 22.03.2021
Order Passed by: The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
Coram: Hon’ble Justice Indira Banerjee and Hon’ble Justice Hemant Gupta
Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and Section 5 and 14 of the Limitation
Act, 1963
In the Instant matter, the Appellant herein, in an appeal before the NCLAT, contended that the
account of the Corporate Debtor had been declared NPA on 31st March, 2013 whereas the
application under Section 7 of IBC had been filed on 27th August, 2018, after almost five years
and five months from the date of accrual of the cause of action, and was therefore barred by
limitation.
The issues involved in this appeal were: -
(i) Whether delay beyond three years in filing an application under Section 7 of IBC
can be condoned, in the absence of an application for condonation of delay made
by the applicant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963?
The Hon’ble Supreme Court while deciding the matter held that, the condition precedent for
condonation of the delay in filing an application or appeal, is the existence of sufficient cause.
Whether the explanation furnished for the delay would constitute ‘sufficient cause’ or not
would dependent upon facts of each case. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the
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rule and refusal an exception, when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be
imputed to the defaulting party.
Further, it was also held that, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not speak of any
application. The Section enables the Court to admit an application or appeal if the applicant or
the appellant, as the case may be, satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making
the application and/or preferring the appeal, within the time prescribed. Although, it is the
general practice to make a formal application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in
order to enable the Court or Tribunal to weigh the sufficiency of the cause for the inability of
the appellant/applicant to approach the Court/Tribunal within the time prescribed by limitation,
there is no bar to exercise by the Court/Tribunal of its discretion to condone delay, in the
absence of a formal application. A plain reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act makes it
amply clear that, it is not mandatory to file an application in writing before relief can be granted
under the said section.
(ii) Whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to applications under
Section 7 of the IBC? Can prior proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 be
considered for the purpose of exclusion under Section 14 of the Limitation Act,
1963?
The Hon’ble Supreme Court while holding that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 applies to application under the IBC stated as mentioned hereinafter. ‘The language
and tenor of Section 238A is significant. The Section reads that the provisions of the Limitation
Act, 1963 shall, as far as may be, apply to proceedings or appeals inter alia before the
NCLT/NCLAT.’ Section 14 (2) of the Limitation Act provides that in computing the period of
limitation for any application, the time during which the petitioner had been prosecuting, with
due diligence, another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance, or of appeal or
revision, against the same party, for the same relief, shall be excluded, where such proceeding
is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like
nature, is unable to entertain it. The conditions for exclusion are that the earlier proceedings
should have been for the same relief, the proceedings should have been prosecuted diligently
and in good faith and the proceedings should have been prosecuted in a forum which, from
defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, was unable to entertain it.
Another question put forth was whether prior proceedings under the SARFAESI Act do not
qualify for the exclusion of time under Section 14, inasmuch as they are not civil proceedings
in a Court, referring to the judgment of the Hon’ble NCLAT in the matter of Ishrat Ali v.
Cosmos Cooperative Bank Limited and Anr. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while deciding this
question held that, if, in the context of proceedings under Section 7 or 9 of the IBC, Section 14
were to be interpreted with rigid and pedantic adherence to its literal meaning, pronounced
that, if it were to be held that only civil proceedings in Court would enjoy exclusion, the result
would be that an applicant would not even be entitled to exclusion of the period of time spent
in bona fide invoking and diligently pursuing an earlier application under the same provision
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of IBC, for the same relief, before an Adjudicating Authority, lacking territorial jurisdiction.
This could not possibly have been the legislative intent.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court put forth its considered view that, keeping in mind the scope and
ambit of proceedings under the IBC before the NCLT/NCLAT, the expression ‘Court’ in
Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be deemed to be any forum for a civil
proceeding including any Tribunal or any forum under the SARFAESI Act.
Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/29e594ee74eee313c8b6c8532146c5cb.pdf
9. Jaypee Kensington Boulevard Apartments Welfare Association & Ors. v. NBCC (India)
Ltd. &Ors.
Date of Pronouncement: 24.03.2021
Order Passed by: The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
Coram: Hon’ble Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, Hon’ble Justice Dinesh Maheshwari and Hon’ble
Justice Sanjiv Khanna
Section 30 and Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
The present matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in the Adjudicatory process
concerning a resolution plan under the Code, there is no scope for interference with the
commercial aspects of the decision of the Committee of Creditors (CoC), and that there is no
scope for substituting any commercial term of the Resolution Plan approved by the CoC. It
was also noted that, only if the NCLT or the NCLAT, as the case may be, within their limited
jurisdiction, found any shortcoming in the resolution plan vis-à-vis the specified parameters,
would the resolution plan be sent back to the CoC, for re-submission after satisfying the
parameters delineated by Code, and exposited by the Court. The Supreme Court also noted that
for a proper and meaningful implementation of the approved resolution plan, the payment to
dissenting financial creditors as envisaged by the second part of Section 30(2)(b) of the Code
could only be payment in terms of money, as the dissenting financial creditor cannot be forced
to remain attached to the corporate debtor by way of provisions in the nature of equities or
securities.
Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/0fb1262c0473ece0b614ecc9d46fbb12.pdf
10. Indus Biotech Private Limited v. Kotak India Venture (Offshore) Fund & Ors.
Date of Pronouncement: 26.03.2021
Order Passed by: The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
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Coram: Hon’ble Justice S.A. Bobde, Hon’ble Justice A.S. Bopanna and Hon’ble Justice V.
Ramasubramanian
Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and Section 8 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996
In the instant matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court decided that, when an application under
Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is made while an application under
Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as ‘IBC’) is
pending before the Hon’ble NCLT for admission, the Hon’ble NCLT should first decide
whether, the application under Section 7 of the IBC is to be admitted.
For the convenience of our readers, Section 8 (1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
reads as follows:
8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement.— (1) A
judicial authority, before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an
arbitration agreement shall, if a party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming
through or under him, so applies not later than the date of submitting his first statement on the
substance of the dispute, then, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of the Supreme
Court or any Court, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that prima facie no valid
arbitration agreement exists.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court set forth that, if the Application under Section 7 of the IBC is
concluded by deciding that there is default and the debt is payable, due to which the
Adjudicating Authority proceeds to pass the order as contemplated under sub-section 5(a) of
the Section 7 of the IBC to admit the application, the proceedings would get itself transformed
into a proceedings in rem having erga omnes effect due to which the question of arbitrability
of the so called inter-se dispute sought to be put forth, vide the application under Section 8 of
the Act of 1996, would not arise. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also reiterated its decision in
Vidya Drolia and others v. Durga Trading Corporation that exhaustively concluded that a
dispute will be non-arbitrable when a proceeding is in rem.
On the other hand, on such consideration of Section 7 application under the IBC made by the
Adjudicating Authority if the satisfaction recorded is that there is no default committed by the
Company, the Petition would stand rejected as provided under sub-section 5(b) to Section 7 of
the IBC, it would also leave the field open for the parties to secure appointment of the Arbitral
Tribunal in an appropriate proceedings as contemplated in law and the need for the NCLT to
pass any orders on such application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 would not arise.
Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/165267b7826a9da22930afb04059e787.pdf
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11. Laxmi Pat Surana v. Union Bank of India & Anr.
Date of Pronouncement: 26.03.2021
Order Passed by: The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
Coram: Hon’ble Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, Hon’ble Justice B.R. Gavai and Hon’ble Justice
Krishna Murari
Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and Section 18 of the Limitation Act,
1963
In the instant matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court decided two central issues, as follows:
(i) Whether an action under Section 7 of the IBC can be initiated by the financial
creditor against a corporate person (being a corporate debtor) concerning
guarantee offered by it in respect of a loan account of the principal borrower, who
had committed default and is not a ‘corporate person’ within the meaning of the
Code?
The Hon’ble Supreme Court while deciding upon this question held that, Section 7 is
an enabling provision which permits the Financial Creditor to initiate CIRP against a
Corporate Debtor. The Corporate Debtor can be the Principal Borrower and it can also
be a corporate person assuming the status of corporate debtor having offered guarantee,
if and when the Principal Borrower/Debtor (be it a corporate person or otherwise)
commits default in payment of its debt. The obligation of the Guarantor is coextensive
and coterminous with that of the Principal Borrower to defray the debt, as predicated
in Section 128 of the Contract Act.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified that in case of consequence of default committed
by the Principal Borrower, the status of the Guarantor metamorphoses into a debtor or
a Corporate Debtor if it happens to be a Corporate Person within the meaning of Section
3(8) of the Code. The principal borrower may or may not be a Corporate Person, but if
a Corporate Person extends guarantee for the loan transaction concerning a principal
borrower not being a corporate person, it would still be covered within the meaning of
expression ‘Corporate Debtor’ under Section 3(8) of the Code. Further, the expression
‘Debt’ in Section 3(11) of the Code is wide enough to include liability of a Corporate
Person on account of guarantee given by it in relation to a loan account of any person
including not being a corporate person in the event of default committed by the latter.
Hence, upon default committed by the principal borrower (whether or not a Corporate
Person), the liability of the Company (Corporate person), being the Guarantor, instantly
triggers the right of the financial creditor to proceed against the Corporate Person.
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(ii) Whether an application under Section 7 of the Code filed after three years from
the date of declaration of the loan account as NPA, being the date of default, is
barred by limitation?
The Hon’ble Supreme Court while deliberating on this question held that, ordinarily,
upon declaration of the loan account/debt as NPA that date can be reckoned as the date
of default to enable the Financial Creditor to initiate action under Section 7 of the Code.
However, Section 7 of the Code comes into play when the Corporate Debtor commits
a ‘default’ and this Section consciously uses the expression ‘default -not the date of
notifying the loan account of the Corporate Person as NPA.
Thus, when the Principal Borrower and/or the Corporate Guarantor admit and
acknowledge their liability after declaration of NPA but before the expiration of three
years therefrom including the fresh period of limitation due to successive
acknowledgments, it is not possible to extricate them from the renewed limitation
accruing due to the effect of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Such
acknowledgement, however, must be before the expiration of the prescribed period of
limitation including the fresh period of limitation due to acknowledgment of debt from
time to time. Further, the fact that acknowledgment was only by the principal borrower
and not the guarantor, would not absolve the guarantor of its liability flowing from the
letter of guarantee.
Hence, the liability of the Corporate Guarantor also triggers when the Principal
Borrower (irrespective of being a Corporate Person or otherwise) acknowledges its
liability in writing within the expiration of prescribed period of limitation (as may be
applicable in accordance with the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963), to pay such
outstanding dues.
Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/4ed4a21540b05893704433eca2efade9.pdf
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National Company Law Appellate Tribunal
Judgments
1. India Resurgence ARC Private Limited v. Amit Metaliks Limited and Ors.
Date of Pronouncement: 02.03.2021
Incidence of Appeal: Appeal against orders passed by Hon’ble National Company Law
Tribunal, Kolkata Bench, Kolkata dated 20th October 2020 and as amended on 21st October
2020.
Coram: Justice Bansi Lal Bhat (Acting Chairperson), Dr. Ashok Kumar Mishra (Member
Technical)
Appeal on the grounds of Section 30 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
In the instant matter, it was contended on behalf of Appellant that while approving the
Resolution Plan the value and quality of security interest of the Appellant was not considered
by the Successful Resolution Applicant and the Committee of Creditors.
The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal held that, on a plain reading of the provision of Section 30(4)
of the Code it is manifestly clear that the considerations regarding feasibility and viability of
the Resolution Plan, distribution proposed with reference to the order of priority amongst
creditors as per statutory distribution mechanism including priority and value of security
interest of Secured Creditor are matters which fall within the exclusive domain of Committee
of Creditors for consideration. These considerations must be present to the mind of the
Committee of Creditors while taking a decision in regard to approval of a Resolution Plan with
vote share of requisite majority.
As regards amendment introduced in Section 30(4), be it seen that the amendment that it,
introduced vide Section 6 (b) of Amending Act of 2019 vests discretion in the Committee of
Creditors to take into account the value of security interest of a Secured Creditor in approving
of a Resolution Plan. It’s a guideline and not imperative in terms, which may be taken into
account by the Committee of Creditors in arriving at a decision as regards approval or rejection
of a Resolution Plan, such decision being essentially a business decision based on commercial
wisdom of the Committee of Creditors.
It abundantly clear that the considerations including priority in scheme of distribution and the
value of security are matters falling within the realm of Committee of Creditors. Such
considerations, being relevant only for purposes for arriving at a business decision in exercise
of commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors, cannot be the subject of judicial review
in appeal within the parameters of Section 61(3) of I&B Code. Such consideration of the value
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of security interest in favour of a Secured Creditor is only aimed at arming the Committee of
Creditors with more teeth so as to take an informed decision in regard to viability and feasibility
of a Resolution Plan, fairness of distribution amongst similarly situated creditors being the
bottomline. However, such business decision taken in exercise of commercial wisdom of
Committee of creditors would not warrant judicial intervention unless creditors belonging to a
class being similarly situated are not given a fair and equitable treatment.
Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/c97a95e3f1b0f96f059a3c5724cfbd26.pdf
2. Mr. Gulabchand Jain v. Mr. Ramchandra D. Choudhary
Date of Pronouncement: 02.03.2021
Incidence of Appeal: Order passed by the Hon’ble National Company Law Tribunal,
Ahmedabad Bench dated 31st December, 2020
Coram: Justice Bansi Lal Bhat (Acting Chairperson), Dr. Ashok Kumar Mishra (Member
Technical)
Appeal against order passed under Section 33 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
In the case in hand, the Hon’ble National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, reiterated that the
CoC is empowered to take a decision in regard to liquidation of the Corporate Debtor even
after an application has been filed by the Resolution Professional placing the Resolution Plan
approved by the CoC before the Adjudicating Authority for approval. This implies that even
after approval of the Resolution Plan by the COC and laying it before the Adjudicating
Authority, the CoC can change its mind and pass a Resolution liquidating the Corporate Debtor
subject to only exception that such course cannot be adopted after its confirmation i.e., after
approval of the Resolution Plan by the Adjudicating Authority.
Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/a42f637d2f464008d6a8cf947efd5f6f.pdf
3. Vijay Sitaram Dandnaik v. Punjab National Bank and Anr.
Date of Pronouncement: 02.03.2021
Incidence of Appeal: Order passed by the Hon’ble National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai
Bench dated 06th November, 2019
Coram: Justice Anant Bijay Singh (Member Judicial), Ms. Shreesha Merla (Member
Technical)
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Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and Section 18 of the Limitation Act,
1963
In this case, the Appellate Tribunal reiterated the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
‘Jaipur Metals and Electricals Employees Organization’ (Supra) and in ‘Forec India
Limited’ V/s. ‘Edelwiss Assets Reconstruction Company Limited’ wherein it was decided that
the Application under Section 7 was maintainable irrespective of the pendency of the Petition
before the Hon’ble High Court.
Further, deciding upon the point of the Financial debt being barred by limitation and the
validity of acknowledgement of debt under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the Hon’ble
Appellate Tribunal held that that there is nothing on record to suggest that the Appellant has
acknowledged the debt ‘within three years’ and has agreed to pay the debt. As the scope and
objective of the Code was not to give a fresh lease of life to time barred debts, the Appellate
Tribunal was of the considered opinion that the ratio of ‘Babulal Vardharji Gurjar’ (Supra) is
squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case.
Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/63aea4be94109d1491a812c6de137474.pdf
4. Committee of Creditors of EMCO Limited v. Mary Mody and Anr.
Date of Pronouncement: 02.03.2021
Incidence of Appeal: Order passed by the Hon’ble National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai
Bench dated 15th January 2020
Coram: Justice Anant Bijay Singh (Member Judicial) and Ms. Shreesha Merla (Member
Technical)
Section 5(15) and Section 28 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
In this case, the Hon’ble National Company Law Appellate Tribunal relying upon the decision
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘K. Sashidhar’ V/s ‘Indian Overseas Bank’ (2019) 12 SCC
150 held that, where the Committee of Creditors (CoC) has by a majority vote rejected to raise
any interim finance then the Adjudicating Authority cannot direct the CoC to do the same.
Link: https://nclat.nic.in/Useradmin/upload/21467681396017dfea03b6a.pdf
5. Ram Ratan Kanoongo v. Veda Kumar Nimbagal and Anr.
Date of Pronouncement: 17.03.2021
Incidence of Appeal: Order dated 4th August, 2020 passed by the Hon’ble National Company
Law Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench, Hyderabad
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Coram: Justice A.I.S. Cheema (Member Judicial) and Justice V.P. Singh (Member Technical)
Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
In the instant matter, the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal held that any claims and debts and other
dues of the Corporate Debtor in relation to any person for the period prior to the Completion
Date, that are not expressly provided for in the Resolution Plan, including any claim from third
parties relating to any contract entered into by the Corporate Debtor shall be deemed to have
been extinguished upon approval of the Resolution Plan, without any liability whatsoever on
the Corporate Debtor. The Hon’ble NCLAT also held that any claim for the CIRP period could
have been raised before approval of a Resolution Plan. After the Resolution Plan's approval
and implementation, no direction can be issued to the erstwhile Resolution Professional on
account of any belated and settled claim. Successful Resolution Applicant cannot be burdened
with the claim/dues of the Corporate Debtor.
Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/778212840a6e3425a797f44d93cd5311.pdf
6. Mr. Ravi Shankar Deverakonda v. Committee of Creditors of Meenakshi Energy
Limited
Date of Pronouncement: 24.03.2021
Incidence of Appeal: Order dated 8th January 2021 passed by the Hon’ble National Company
Law Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench
Coram: Justice Venugopal M (Member Judicial) and Justice V.P. Singh (Member Technical)
Section 12 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
In the Instant Case, the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal held that undoubtedly, an extension of time
for extension of time for ‘CIRP’ is a ‘critical arena’. However, the exercise of the power of
extending the time limit by the ‘Adjudicating Authority’ in negation of the statutory provision
of the Code may be desirable in an exceptional/extraordinary circumstance of a given case.
Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/4f6c0e9d352f1e0e3b23216ab6fcac0f.pdf
7. Indian Overseas Bank v. RAM Infrastructure Ltd., and Anr.
Date of Pronouncement: 26.03.2021
Incidence of Appeal: Order dated 15th July 2020 passed by the Hon’ble National Company
Law Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench
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Coram: Justice Jarat Kumar Jain (Member Judicial) and Mr. Kanthi Narahari (Member
Technical)
Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and Section 13(2) and Section 13(4)
of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities
Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act, 2002)
In the Instant Case, the Appellant herein being the Financial Creditor of RCM Infrastructure
Limited (the Corporate Debtor) sold the two Secured assets mortgaged with it and the sale was
confirmed by e-auction on 13.12.2018 in favour of the successful bidders in the public auction
and the successful bidders deposited 25% of the bid amount in respect of the same. While so,
the Corporate Debtor herein filed an Application under Section 10 of the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (in short IBC) before the Hon’ble Adjudicating Authority and the
Hon’ble Adjudicating Authority admitted the Application on 03.01.2019 and Corporate
Insolvency Resolution Process (in short CIRP) commenced declaring a moratorium under
Section 14(1) of IBC. Further, the Appellant accepted balance payment of 75% of the bid
amount on 08.03.2019 from the successful bidders.
Hence, upon auction of the property of the Corporate Debtor, the Appellant Bank received only
25% of the bid amount on 13.12.2018. Remaining 75% of the bid amount was only received
by the Appellant on 03.03.2019 i.e., after commencement of moratorium in terms of Sect ion
14 of IBC.
The matter for consideration before the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal was whether after
imposition of moratorium any transaction done with respect to the assets of the
Corporate Debtor is deemed to be valid or not?
The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal while deciding the matter, held that mere receiving of 25% of
the sale proceeds does not conclude the sale unless the full amount is paid prior to imposition
of moratorium. The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal was also not inclined to accept the submission
of the learned Counsel for the Appellant that 25% of the sale proceeds were received thereby
the sale was confirmed prior to imposition of moratorium. It was finally decided in the matter
that, when the moratorium was imposed by the learned Adjudicating Authority, receipt of the
balance sale consideration is illegal and the learned Adjudicating Authority rightly set aside
the sale transaction.
Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/8bbf86d680dc29641ac757b40ef1d3c5.pdf
8. Radico Khaitan Ltd. v. BT & FC Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.
Date of Pronouncement: 26.03.2021
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Incidence of Appeal: Order dated 2nd September 2020 passed by the Hon’ble National
Company Law Tribunal, Bengaluru Bench
Coram: Justice Jarat Kumar Jain (Member Judicial) and Justice Kanthi Narahari (Member
Technical)
Consolidation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process
In the Instant Case, the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal reiterated the decision of the Ld.
Adjudicating Authority Mumbai Bench in the case of SBI Vs Videocon Industries Ltd. (Supra)
which set forth the parameters to be considered while ordering the consolidation of CIRP.
The eight parameters enlisted by the Ld. Adjudicating Authority in the aforementioned matter
were the existence of Common Control; Common Directors; Common Assets; Common
Liabilities; Inter-Dependence; Pooling of Resources; Intricate links between the Companies;
Common Financial Creditors.
The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal held that, if all the eight parameters are fully met and satisfied
the consolidation of CIRP shall be the most viable for the purpose of convenience of the
stakeholders of the connected Corporate Debtors.
Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/e5484483c5dd17c55923e41b5c198d0d.pdf
About the Author:
CS Jasveen Bindra is a member of the Institute of Company Secretaries of India as a Practicing
Professional. She secured an All-India Rank 9 in her CS Executive Examination and has
cleared all the CS examinations in the first attempt.
She is a designated partner at Corpvin Consulting LLP. She has an enriching experience in
the field of Insolvency Laws, relating to; inter alia, the Initiation of Corporate Insolvency
Resolution Process (CIRP) by a Financial Creditor, Initiation of CIRP by an Operational
Creditor, Process specific compliances during CIRP, Handholding of Insolvency
Professionals to ensure the smooth execution of CIRP and Liquidation Processes. To get in
touch with her contact at 8983352620 or drop an email at [email protected]
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Disclaimer
This write up is a knowledge resource of Corpvin Consulting LLP and is prepared by ensuring
the accuracy, completeness and reliability of the information available to us. The author will
not be responsible for any action taken on the basis of this document for any reasons
whatsoever.
Any form of plagiarism will be considered as an offence and in the case of any excerpt
required due reference has to be given.
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