PuttingPoliticsFirst:

TheImpactofPoliticsonAmericanReligiousandSecularOrientations

DavidE.Campbell

UniversityofNotreDame

GeoffreyC.LaymanUniversityofNotreDame

JohnC.Green

UniversityofAkron

NathanaelG.SumaktoyoUniversityofNotreDame

Abstract

NearlyallresearchonthepoliticalimpactofAmericans’religiousandsecularorientationsassumesthatsuchorientationsareexogenoustopolitics.Usingmulti-wavepanelandexperimentaldata,wefindthatreligiousandsecularorientationsareendogenoustopoliticalorientations.Inotherwords,religionandsecularismareaconsequenceaswellasacauseofpolitics.Inshowingthis,wemakethreemajorcontributions.First,weconceptualizeandmeasuresecularorientationsinanewway—notjustastheabsenceofreligion,butasanaffirmativesecularidentityandpositivecommitmenttosecularprinciples.Second,ourpanelandexperimentaldataallowforthemostdefinitivetesttodateofwhetherpoliticalorientationsexertacausaleffectonreligiousandsecularorientations.Third,weisolatetheconditionsunderwhichpoliticsaffectsreligious-secularperspectives,thusidentifyingthemechanismthatunderliespoliticalorientations.WordCount:9070_________________________________________________________________________________________________Thedata,code,andanyadditionalmaterialsrequiredtoreplicateallanalysesinthisarticleareavailableontheAmericanJournalofPoliticalScienceDataversewithintheHarvardDataverseNetwork,athttp://dox.doi.org/doi:10.7910/DVN/YM4LDGThisresearchwassupportedbytheNationalScienceFoundationunderGrantNo.SES-0961700.Anyopinions,findings,andconclusionsorrecommendationsexpressedinthismaterialarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheNationalScienceFoundation.WearegratefulfortheresearchassistanceofPatrickSchoettmerandJeremyCastle.ThanksalsotoChristtheKingLutheranChurchofSouthBend,Indianafortheuseoftheirfacilities,aswellasToddAdkinsandDanHubertforappearingintheexperiment’snewsstories.

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TheincreasingpolarizationofAmericanpoliticshasbeenaccompaniedby

increasingsociodemographicdifferencesbetweenpartisanandideologicalcamps

(Mason2016).Asthelinkbetweensociodemographicorientationsandpoliticshas

grown,scholarshavetheorizedthatcausalityrunsinbothdirections.Peoplenot

onlychoosepoliticalsidesbasedontheirsociodemographicprofiles,butalsomay

basesomesocialpreferences—includingtheirfeelingsaboutnon-politicalsocial

groups(IyengarandWestwood2015),wheretheywanttolive(Bishop2009),and

evenwhotheywanttodateormarry(Iyengar,Sood,andLelkes2012)—ontheir

politicalprofiles.

AttheforefrontofsuchspeculationhavebeenAmericans’religiousand

secularorientations.Partycoalitionshavegrownincreasinglydividedalong

religiouslines,withtheGOPbecomingmorereligiousandtheDemocratsgrowing

moresecularandnon-religious(D’Antonio,Tuch,andBaker2013).Scholars

typicallyhaveassumedthatthisexpandingdividehasresultedfromindividuals

choosingapartisansidebasedontheirreligiousandsecularorientations(e.g.

Layman2001).However,recentworksuggeststhatpeoplealsoabandonreligionor

becomemorereligiouslydevoutbasedontheirpartisanandideologicaltendencies

(Patrikios2008;PutnamandCampbell2010).Infact,aleadingexplanationforthe

recentsurgeinthepercentageofAmericansclaimingnoreligiousaffiliationis

politics:liberalsandDemocratsrejectingorganizedreligionastraditionalist

religionbecomesincreasinglyassociatedwithconservatismandtheRepublican

Party(HoutandFischer2002,2014).

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Here,weprovidethemostthoroughexaminationtodateofthedegreeto

whichsecularandreligiousorientationsareendogenoustopoliticalorientations.In

doingso,wemakethreeadvancesinthestudyofhowpoliticsisrelatedtoreligion

andsecularism.First,weprovideanewwayofconceptualizingandmeasuring

secularism.Werecognizethatsecularismisnotsimplytheabsenceofreligion,but

alsoentails“activesecularism”—anaffirmativesecularidentityandcommitmentto

secularprinciples.Second,mostresearchreliesoncross-sectionaldata,makingit

impossibletoassesscausaldirection.Otherworkhasemployedtwo-wavepanels

thatallowevaluationofcausalclaims,butcannotdistinguish“true”changein

religiousproclivitiesfromchangeduetosurveymeasurementerror.Byemploying

bothanoriginalsurveyexperimentandamulti-wavepanelsurvey,weprovidea

moredefinitivetestofwhethercitizens’politicaltendencieseffectchangeintheir

religiousandseculartendencies.Third,weisolatetheconditionsunderwhich

politicalidentitiesaremostlikelytoaffectreligiousandsecularorientations,thus

providingadirecttestofthecausalmechanismunderpinningthelinksbetween

politicsandbothreligionandsecularism.

Ouranalysisrevealsaclearreciprocalrelationshipbetweenpoliticaland

religious-secularorientationsandshowsthattheimpactofpoliticsisstrongest

whencitizensperceiveaninfusionofreligionintopoliticsgenerally,andthe

RepublicanPartyspecifically.Strikingly,theeffectofpoliticalorientationson

religiousandsecularcharacteristicsisoftenstrongerthanthereverseeffect.This

lendscredencetothe“politicizedreligion”explanationforgrowingsecularism.It

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alsoofferssupportfortheideathatpoliticalidentitiesandattitudesarethemselves

importantsocialidentities,capableofshapingandchangingothersocialidentities.

ReligiousandSecularOrientationsinAmericanPolitics

Overthelastfortyyears,thereligiousdividebetweentheDemocraticand

Republicanpartieshasexpanded.Religiouspeople,especiallytraditionalists,have

becomemoreRepublicanwhiletheDemocraticcoalitionhasgrownlessreligious

andmoresecular(Layman2001;Green2007;Claassen2015)Importantly,the

masspublicrecognizesthispattern.Campbell,Green,andLayman(2011)report

thatAmericansstronglyassociateevangelicalChristianswiththeGOP,tendtosee

“religiouspeople”asmostlyRepublicans,andview“non-religiouspeople”asmainly

Democrats.

Followingtheconventionalassumptionthatcitizens’religiousorientations

aremoredeep-rootedthantheirpoliticalpreferences,virtuallyallworkonthis

developmentassumesthatreligiousandsecularorientationsarethecausal

mover—peoplechooseorchangetheirpoliticalattitudesbasedontheirreligionor

secularism.

However,afewstudiessuggestthereverse—thatpoliticscanaffectreligion.

HoutandFischer(2002)firstproposedthisreversalastheysoughtanexplanation

forthegrowthofthereligiouslynon-affiliatedpopulation(the“Nones”).Notingthat

theriseoftheNonescoincideswiththeburgeoninginfluenceoftraditionalist

ChristiansinconservativeandRepublicanpolitics,theyarguedthattheriseresulted

primarilyfrompoliticalmoderatesandliberalsrejectingreligiousidentityasa

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negativereactiontothemixtureofreligionandconservativepolitics.Thisproposed

malleabilityofreligiousidentificationisconsistentwithresearchshowingthat

manyNonesfluctuatebetweenclaimingandnotclaimingareligiousaffiliation(Lim,

MacGregor,andPutnam2010).Otherworkconfirmsthatreligionisendogenousto

politics(HoutandFischer2014;PutnamandCampbell2010)andshowsthat,

besidesDemocratsandliberalsbecomingmoresecular,Republicansand

conservativesaregrowingmorereligious(Patrikios2008).

Whilethesestudiesdemonstratethatpoliticscanaffectreligious

characteristics,theyhavenotdirectlytestedtheproposedcausalmechanism—that

religion’sinjectionintoAmericanpoliticsanditsassociationwiththeRepublican

Partyhaveledcitizenstobasetheirreligiousandsecularorientationsontheir

politicalorientations.Here,wespecifyandtestatheoreticalexplanationforwhy

politicalidentitiesaffectreligious-secularorientations.Becausepolitical

orientationssuchaspartisanship,ideology,andculturalattitudesserveas

importantsocialidentities,theymayshapenotonlypoliticalpreferences,butalso

socialandreligiousperspectives.Thismayproducecognitivedissonanceamong

Democratsandliberalswithareligiousidentity,leadingthemtobecomeNones.It

alsomayspuran“increasingreturns”processinwhichRepublicansand

conservativesgrowmoredeeplyreligiousandDemocratsandliberalsbecomemore

committedtosecularism.

Becausethegrowthofsecularorientationsisanimportantresultofthis

process,itisimportantthatweaccuratelyconceptualizeandmeasuresecularism.

Socialscientistsgenerallytreatsecularismastheabsenceofreligiosity(Hansen

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2011).1TherecentfocusontheriseoftheNonesisthequintessentialexample,as

Nonesaredefinedaspeoplewithoutareligiousaffiliation.Othermeasuresof

secularismincludedisbeliefinGod,lackofreligiousattendance,andthenon-

salienceofreligion.Becausethisdefinitionencompassesonlytheabsenceofreligion

andnotanactiveembraceofsecularperspectives,wecallit“passivesecularism,”

butwemeasureitastheinverseofatraditionalindexofreligiosity.While

identificationasaNoneisamanifestationofbeingpassivelysecular,asexplained

belowtheliteraturesuggestsadistincttheoreticalexpectationforit.Accordingly,

wetreatbeingaNoneseparatelyfromtheothermeasuresofpassivesecularism.

Wearguethatjustasreligionismulti-dimensional(Kellstedtetal.1996),so

issecularism.Manysecularistsdonotsimplyrejectreligion;theyactivelypromote

secularbeliefs,suchastheefficacyofreasonandscience,andhumanexperienceas

aproperbasisforethicaljudgments.Moreover,tobeactivelyseculardoesnot

precludealsobeingreligiousinsomeway.Thatis,someonecanembraceasecular

perspectivewhilemaintainingareligiousidentityandparticipatinginreligious

activities.2Thisisnotapossibilitywhensecularityisdefinedonlyasnon-religion,

1AnotableexceptionisBeardetal.(2013),whonotethatsecularismismorethan

theabsenceofreligion,althoughtheirarticledoesnotdirectlymeasuresecular

identifyorbelief.

2Inotherwork(Laymanetal.n.d.),wedeveloptheconceptofactivesecularism

morefullyandexamineitsrelationshipwithpassivesecularismandwithpolitical

orientations.Mostpeoplewhoarehighinactivesecularismarealsohighinpassive

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makingitimportanttodistinguishpassivesecularism,ortheabsenceofreligiosity,

fromactivesecularism,ortheaffirmationofsecularidentityandbeliefs.

ATheoryofPoliticizedReligion

Wearguethatnotonlyarevoters’politicaloutlooksshapedbytheir

religious-secularworldview,buttheirreligious-secularorientationsalsoareshaped

bytheirpoliticalperspectives.Moreover,thereligiousimpactofpoliticalidentityis

notlimitedtoidentificationasaNone,butextendstoothercomponentsofpassive

andactivesecularism.

Ourstartingpointisasocialidentityconceptualizationofpolitical

identification.Ifpartisanshipisadeep-rootedsocialidentity—asalongstanding

perspectiveonpartyidentificationcontends(Campbell1960;Green,Palmquist,and

Schickler2002)—thenitmayshapesocialidentitiesandpreferences.Group

membershipencouragesindividualstoconformtogroupnormsandbehavior

patternsandtodifferentiatethemselvesfromopposinggroups.Sincethepublic

viewstheGOPasthepartyofreligionandtheDemocratsasthepartyofthesecular,

partisanshipmayspurRepublicanstogrowevenmorereligiousandDemocratsto

becomelessreligiousandmoreactivelysecular.

Wemightexpectasimilardynamicwithideologyandattitudesoncultural

issues.Whileideologyisthoughtofasanoverarchingjudgmentabouttheproper

roleofgovernment,ConoverandFeldman(1981)findthatideologicalidentificationsecularism,butnearly10percentofactivesecularistshavehighlevelsofreligiosity.

SeetheSupportingInformationformoredetails.

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isbasedmoreonaffecttowardideologicalgroupsandthesocialgroupsassociated

withthem.Culturalattitudes,meanwhile,differfrommostpolicyopinions,which

typicallyareweakandunstable(e.g.Converse1964).Notonlyaretheyclosely

connectedtoreligionandsecularism,butattitudesonculturalissuessuchas

abortionandgayrightsaremoreemotionalandentrenchedthanotherissue

positions(ConverseandMarkus1979).Infact,GorenandChapp(forthcoming)

claimthatviewsonculturalissuesare“strongattitudes,”rivalingparty

identificationandreligionaslong-termpredispositionsandexertingacausal

influenceonbothpartisanshipandreligiosity.ThisisconsistentwithKillianand

Wilcox(2008),whoshowedthatabortionattitudescanleadpeopletochangetheir

partyID,aspro-lifeDemocratsandpro-choiceRepublicansswitchparties.Inshort,

ideologicalidentificationandculturalattitudesalsomayrepresentsocialidentities

capableofaffectingcitizens'religiousandsecularproclivities.

Howshouldpolitically-drivenchangeinreligiousandsecularorientations

occur?First,religion’sassociationwiththeGOPshouldcreatecognitivedissonance

(Festinger1957)amongreligiousDemocratsandliberals.Toresolvethe

dissonance,thesecitizensmightchangeeithertheirpoliticaltiesortheirreligious

identity(Margolisforthcoming).Theconventionalexpectationwouldbepolitical

change,shiftingpeopleinaconservative,Republicandirection.Incontrast,Hout

andFischer(2002)arguethatcognitivedissonancecanberesolvedbychanging

one’sreligiousidentity,or,specifically,abandoningreligiousidentity.

Wefurtherexpectthattheeffectofpoliticalidentitiesonreligiousand

secularorientationsisnotlimitedtoashiftinidentity,butextendstomembersof

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opposingpoliticalcampsgrowingmorepolarizedintheirreligious-secular

proclivities.AstheimageoftheGOPasreligiousandtheDemocraticPartyasnon-

religiousandsecularsharpens,Republicansmayrespondbybecomingevenmore

religiousandDemocratsmaygrowmoreactivelysecular—deepeningthereligious

andsecularimagesofthepartiesandresultinginanincreasingreturnsprocess(e.g.

Pierson2000).More-religiouspeopleshouldbedrawntowardtheRepublican

Partyandmore-secularpeopleshouldbeattractedtotheDemocrats,further

increasingthepressureforRepublicanstobecomemoretraditionallyreligiousand

forDemocratstobemoreactivelysecular.Similarprocessesshouldtakeshapefor

ideologyandculturalattitudes.

Thesedissonanceandincreasingreturnsprocesseshavedevelopedbecause

ofaparticularsetofconditions:anincreasedinjectionofreligionintopoliticsand

especiallyagrowingconnectionbetweenreligiosityandtheGOP.Thus,theimpact

ofpoliticalidentitiesonsecularandreligiousorientationsshouldbestrongestfor

citizenswhoperceivehighlevelsofreligiousinfusioninAmericanpoliticsandseea

closeconnectionbetweenreligioustraditionalistsandtheRepublicanParty.

Thisdiscussionpointstothreehypotheses:

DissonanceHypothesis

TheassociationofreligionwiththeGOPshouldmakeDemocratsandliberals

morelikelytoidentifyasNones.

PolarizationHypothesis

Overtime,politicalidentitiesshouldhaveamutuallyreinforcingrelationship

withpassiveandactivesecularism.More-religiouspeopleshouldgrowmore

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Republicanandconservativewhilemore-secularpeoplebecomemore

Democraticandliberal.Republicansandconservativesshouldgrowmore

religiouswhileDemocratsandliberalsbecomelessreligiousandmore

secular.

PerceptualHypothesis

Bothdissonanceandpolarizationshouldbemorepronouncedamongvoters

whoperceiveanassociationbetweenreligionandpoliticsingeneraland

betweenreligionandtheRepublicanPartyspecifically.

DataandMeasures

Weemploytwooriginaldatasets.Oneisthe2010-2012SecularAmerica

Study(SAS),afour-wavepanelsurveyconductedonlinebyGfK(formerly

KnowledgeNetworks).Weconductedthefirstwaveofthestudyinthefallof2010,

interviewing2,635respondents;3thesecondwaveinthesummerof2011(1,909

3ToconstructthesamplefortheSASsurvey,4,450panelistswererandomlydrawn

fromtheGfKrespondentpanel.Atotalof2,635panelistsrespondedtothe

invitation,yieldingafinalstagecompletionrateof59.2%.Therecruitmentratefor

thisstudy,reportedbyGfK,was16.3%andtheprofileratewas64.3%,fora

cumulativeresponserateof6.2%.Whileregrettablyverylow,thisrateisconsistent

withotherstudiesusingonlinepanels.TheSASpanelincludedageneralpopulation

sample,anoversampleofindividualswithnoreligiousaffiliation,andanover-

sampleofpeopleaged18to29.Alloftheanalysespresentedhereareweightedto

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panelrespondents);thethirdwaveinFebruaryandMarch2012,(1,541

respondents);andthefinalwaveinOctoberandNovember2012(1,412

respondents).4Becauseourcoreindicatorsofactivesecularismdidnotappear

untilthesecondwave,ouranalysisdrawsonwaves2-4.Ourseconddatasetisa

surveyexperimentadministeredbyGfKtoanationallyrepresentativesampleof

1,023subjectsinFebruaryof2012.

OurhypothesesrequiremeasuresofidentificationasaNone,otheraspectsof

passivesecularism(i.e.theinverseofreligiosity),andactivesecularism.We

operationalizeNonesasrespondentswhoidentifytheirreligiousaffiliationas

“nothinginparticular.”5Becausewedefinepassivesecularismastheabsenceof

religion,weemploystandardmeasuresofreligiosity:religiousserviceattendance,

accountfortheoversamples,aswellasanydemographicimbalanceinthegeneral

populationsample.

4Panelattritionbetweenwaves1and4is46percent.Becausethisattritionrateis

relativelyhigh,ourresultsshouldbeviewedwithcaution.However,wearegiven

moreconfidencebecausethedemographicprofileofthesampleremainsvirtually

unchangedacrosspanelwaves.TheSupportingInformationincludestheratesof

panelattritionandrespondents’demographicprofileineachpanelwave.

5Respondentswhorefusedtoanswerthereligiousaffiliationquestionineitherthe

pre-orpost-testwerecodedasmissing.Nonesdonotincluderespondentswho

identifiedasatheistoragnosticbecausetheseareincludedinthesecularidentity

measuredescribedbelow.

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frequencyofprayer,religioussalience,strengthofbeliefinGod,andliteralbeliefin

theBible—allcodedsothathighervaluesreflectlessreligiosity.6

Justasreligiosityincludesreligiousbeliefs,devotion,andidentity,active

secularismencompassessecularbeliefs,secularidentity,andcommitmentto

secularperspectives.Wemeasuresecularbeliefswithabatteryofquestionswe

designedtogaugecommitmenttoasecularworldview.Respondentsindicatedhow

muchtheyagreewithfivestatementsaboutscientificevidenceandhumanreason

astheproperfoundationforexplainingnaturalphenomena,understandinghuman

behavior,anddefiningmoralparameters.Becauseactivesecularismisneitherthe

absenceofreligiositynorantagonismtowardreligion,noneofthestatements

explicitlyreferencereligionsothatsecularismandreligiosityarenotpittedagainst

eachother.

Threeofthestatementsarewordedinadirectionthataffirmssecular

perspectives:

(1) Factualevidencefromthenaturalworldisthesourceoftruebeliefs.

(2) Thegreatworksofphilosophyandsciencearethebestsourceoftruth,wisdom,

andethics.

(3)Tounderstandtheworld,wemustfreeourmindsfromoldtraditionsandbeliefs.

6TheSupportingInformationincludestheexactwordingofallquestionsusedin

thisanalysis.

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Toguardagainstresponseacquiescence,theothertwostatementsarewordedina

non-seculardirection:

(4) Itishardtoliveagoodlifebasedonreasonandfactsalone.

(5) Valuesaremoreimportantthanfactualevidenceinmakingmoraldecisions.

Tocapturesecularism’ssalience,wecreateda“non-religiousguidance”

questionthatparallelsthestandardquestionaboutreligiousguidance.Itaskshow

muchguidancerespondentsreceivefrom“non-religiousbeliefs,suchasderived

fromscienceorphilosophy.”

Totapintosecularidentity,weaskedrespondentstoselectwhich(ifany)

termsfromalistofreligiousandsecularidentitiesdescribethem.Thetermswere

“ecumenical,mainline,charismatic/Pentecostal,humanist,non-traditionalbeliever,

secular,atheist,fundamentalist,bornagain/evangelical,agnostic,”and“spiritual,

butnotreligious.”Exploratoryfactoranalysesofidentificationwiththeselabelsfind

clearevidencethatthesecular,humanist,atheist,andagnosticlabelsformasingle

dimension.7Wemeasuresecularidentityasthenumberofthesesecularlabels

selected,whichrangesfromzerotothree.8

7SeetheSupportingInformationfortheresults.

8Respondentscouldidentifythemselvesasatheistsoragnosticsbothinthe

religiousorsecularlabelsandinthereligiousaffiliationquestion.Oursecular

identitycountvariableincludesrespondentsidentifyingasatheistoragnosticfor

13

Toseeifactivesecularismandpassivesecularismareindeeddistinct

dimensions,weundertakeaconfirmatoryfactoranalysisoftheirindicatorsinwave

2oftheSASpanel(thefirstwaveinwhichoursecularbeliefsitemsappear).We

showtheresultsinTable1.9

[Table1Here]

Wecomparethefittothedataoftwomodels—onewithalltheactiveand

passivesecularismvariablesloadingonasinglefactor,theotherwithouractive

secularismindicatorsloadingononefactorandourindicatorsofpassivesecularism

loadingonasecondfactor.10Bothmodelscorrectformeasurementerrorinthe

observedindicators.Theytreatnon-religiousguidance,secularidentity,andallof

eitherquestion.Asveryfewrespondentschoseallfoursecularlabels(lessthan10

perwave),wecombinedrespondentschoosingeitherthreeorfoursecularlabels.

9TheSupportingInformationincludestheresultsofanexploratoryfactoranalysis

oftheindicatorsofpassiveandactivesecularism,whichparalleltheresultsinTable

1.

10Allofourconfirmatoryfactorandstructuralequationmodelswereestimated

withMplus7.31,usingfullinformationmaximumlikelihoodestimationwithrobust

standarderrors(“MLR”estimationinMplus)andapplyingsamplingweights.This

producesestimatesforallobservationsinthesample,eventhosewithmissing

valuesonthevariablesinthemodel(unlessanobservationismissingonallofthe

observedendogenousvariables).

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theindicatorsofpassivesecularismashavingrandommeasurementerror.11

However,followingGreenandCitrin(1994),whonotethatsurveybatteriesthat

includestatementswordedinoppositedirectionsmayproducenon-random

(correlated)measurementerror,weallowthemeasurementerrorsforeachofthe

secularbeliefindicatorstobecorrelatedwitheachother.12

Althoughallofthefactorloadingsarestatisticallysignificant,13theactive

secularismmeasuresloadfarmorestronglyontheirownfactorinthetwo-factor

modelthantheydointhesingle-factormodel.Thissuggeststhattheirunderlying

orientationisdistinctfrompassivesecularism.

11Theconfirmatoryfactormodelsfollowstandardassumptionsformeasurement

models(Bollen1989).Thecovariancesbetweenthemeasurementerrorsandthe

latentvariablesandbetweenthemeasurementerrorsandthestructural

disturbancetermsaresettozero,andthefactorloadingforoneobservedindicator

ofeachlatentvariableissettoone(worshipattendanceandthe“factualevidence”

statement).

12SeetheSupportingInformationforfurtherdetails.FollowingGreenandCitrin

(1994),weconstrainallofthecorrelationsbetweenmeasurementerrorstobe

equal,estimatingasingleerrorcovarianceparameterforallfiveofoursecularbelief

indicators.

13Throughoutthispaper,a“statisticallysignificant”effectorloadingisonefor

whichatwo-tailedtestofsignificancefallsatp=.05orbelow.

15

Thatisconfirmedbythegoodness-of-fitstatisticsforthetwomodels.The

two-factormodelhasasmallervaluethantheone-factormodelofthechi-square

testofoverallmodelfit,asmallervalueoftherootmeansquareerrorof

approximation(RMSEA),andalargervalueofthecomparativefitindex(CFI).An

appropriatetestofwhetherthedifferenceinfitisstatisticallysignificantisthe

differenceinthechi-squarevaluesforthetwomodels—thisdifferenceis

overwhelminglysignificant(p<.0001).14Inshort,activeandpassivesecularism

representseparatedimensionsofsecularorientations.15

AssessingDissonance:TheCandidateReligionExperiment

Wefirsttestthedissonancehypothesiswithasurveyexperiment,conducted

onlineinFebruary2012.Anationallyrepresentativesamplewasadministereda

pre-testtomeasuretheirreligiousidentityandtheirdegreeofpassiveandactive

secularism.Roughlyoneweeklatertheyreadafictionalnewspaperstoryabouta

14Thechi-squarestatisticsforoverallmodelfitthattheMLRestimatorinMplus

producesarescaledtomakethemrobusttonon-normalityandnon-independence

ofobservations.Thismakesitnecessarytoconductthescaleddifferenceinchi-

squaretestsuggestedbySatorraandBentler(1994),asshowninTable1.

15Forourexperimentalanalysis,weconstructthemeasuresofactiveandpassive

secularismthroughfactoranalyseswiththesurveydatainwhichourexperiment

appeared(seetheSupportingInformation).Forourpanelanalysis,themeasures

arecreatedthroughtheconfirmatoryfactormodelsincludedinourstructural

equationmodels.

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“congressionalraceinanearbystate.”Respondentswererandomlyassignedtoread

aversionofthestorythatvariedtheamountofreligiousrhetoric,endorsements,

andimageryassociatedwiththeDemocraticandRepublicancandidates—ranging

fromnonetomoderatetohighuseofreligion.Withtwocandidatesandthree

possibleconditionseach,therearenineversionsofthestory.16

Whilethecommunity,“Summerville,”andthenewspaper,TheSummerville

Gazette,arefictional,thearticlewasdesignedtolookasrealisticaspossible.Upon

readingthestory,subjectsansweredquestionstoreplicatethepre-test.Thisdesign

enablesacleantestofwhetherexposuretoreligiouspoliticsinthenewsstory

triggersachangeineitheridentityorattitudes.

Thearticlefeaturesanopen-seatcongressionalracebetweenDemocratic

andRepublicancandidateswhoaredemographicallysimilar.Thestoryisnon-

sensational,highlightingthecandidates’backgroundsandpositionsonkeyissues.In

thecontrolcondition,neithercandidatementionsreligion;thetreatmentsadd

religiousreferencestothetextusedinthecontrol.Toreflectthecurrentstateof

religion’sdeploymentinelectoralpolitics,thereligiousreferencesareChristianin

nature.Althoughneithercandidateisidentifiedasbelongingtoaparticularreligious

denomination,thereligiouscueshaveanevangelicalProtestanttinge—consistent

withthereligiousrhetorictypicalincontemporarypolitics.

Eachstorycontainsthreeessentialelementsthatvaryaccordingtothe

treatment’s“dose”ofreligiouspolitics:text,endorsements,andphotos.Table2

displaysthevariationacrosstreatments.

16TheSupportingInformationdisplaysallthetreatments.

17

[Table2Here]

Thearticlesthusprovidemultiplecuesthatoneorbothofthecandidatesare

engagedinreligiouspolitics.Theysimulatereligiousreferencesbycontemporary

politicians,whileholdingconstanteverythingelseaboutthecampaign.Giventhe

frequencyofreligiousreferencesinpolitics,weundoubtedlyarenotexposing

subjectstoreligiouspoliticsforthefirsttime.Rather,thestoriesreflectreligious

cuesthattheyhavelikelyencounteredbefore,bringingthemtothetopofsubjects’

heads.

Ifthedissonancehypothesisiscorrect,thenwhenDemocratsareexposedto

aRepublicancandidatewhoisassociatedwithreligion,theywillbecomemore

likelytoidentifyasNones.LestitseemthatidentificationasaNoneisunlikelyto

changeonthebasisofasinglenewsstory,previousresearchshowsself-

classificationasNonetobeunstable.Overthecourseofpanelsurveys,substantial

percentagesofpeople(aboutone-thirdoveraone-yearpanel,nearlyhalfoverfive

years)switchbackandforthbetweenidentifyingasNoneandclaimingareligious

affiliation(Lim,MacGregor,andPutnam2010;PutnamandCampbell2010).Many

Nonesarethus“liminals”whomayormaynotthinkofthemselvesashavinga

religiousidentitydependingonthecontext.Wedonotexpectthatonenewsstory

onacongressionalcampaignwillmovepeoplefromhighlyreligioustohighly

secular.Rather,inkeepingwithHoutandFischer’sconceptualizationofNonesason

theboundarybetweenreligiousaffiliationandnon-affiliation,itmightnudgesome

liminalsintoself-identificationasaNone.

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Totestthedissonancehypothesis,weregressidentificationasNoneonaset

ofdichotomousvariablesrepresentingeachtreatment(thecontrolconditionisthe

baseline).SincethemodelcontrolsforidentificationasNoneinthepre-test,a

positivecoefficientreflectsatreatment’seffectontheincreaseintheincidenceof

identifyingasaNone.Becauserandomassignmenttothetreatmentswassuccessful,

nocontrolvariablesarenecessary.17Weuselogisticregression,asthedependent

variableisdichotomous.

ThefirstcolumnofTable3containstheresultsforallrespondents.As

expected,exposuretoareligiousDemocraticcandidateproducesnoeffects.

However,weuncovertheexpectedeffectsfortwotreatmentsinwhichthe

Republicanisheavilyassociatedwithreligion.Weseepositiveandstatistically

significantcoefficientsforthetreatmentswithhighreligionfortheRepublicanand

eithernoreligionoronlymoderatereligionfortheDemocrat.Therearenoeffects

fortheRepublican-moderatetreatments,orwhenbothcandidatesareheavily

associatedwithreligion.Thissuggeststhatdissonancemaybetriggeredonlyby

overtreferencestoreligionbyaRepublicanwhennotcounter-balancedbya

similarlystrongdoseofreligionfromtheDemocrat.

[Table3Here]

17WetestedtherandomizationwithTukey’sHonestlySignificantDifferencetests.

Acrossourtreatments,therearenodifferencesineducation,race(white,black,

Hispanic),gender,orpartyidentification.

19

Whilefindinganeffectinthewholesampleisinformative,thedissonance

hypothesiscentersoneffectsforDemocrats.Accordingly,thesecondandthird

columnsofthetabledisplaytheresultsforDemocratsandRepublicans.18

AmongDemocratsthereisalargeandsignificanteffectforexposuretothe

combinationofthehigh-religionRepublicanandtheno-religionDemocrat,anda

similarlysizedeffectforthehigh-religionRepublicanandthemoderate-religion

Democrat,althoughthelatterfailstoachieveconventionalsignificance(p=0.15).

DemocratsappeartoexperiencedissonancewhentheRepublican’sassociationwith

religionisnotoffsetbyreligiousreferencesontheDemocraticside.19Asexpected,

therearenoeffectsamongRepublicans.Whenthelogitcoefficientsareconvertedto

probabilities,wefindthatforthepopulationasawhole,thereisa.057increasein

theprobabilityofidentifyingasNone,whileforDemocratsonlyitisnearlytwiceas

large—ajumpof.106.Inbothcases,the95percentconfidenceintervaldoesnot

crosszero.20

Movementinreligiousself-identificationmerelyfromexposuretoasingle

newspaperstorynotonlysupportsthedissonancehypothesisbutconfirmsthat

18RepublicansandDemocratsincludeindependentswholeantowardonepartyor

theother.

19BecauseofthesmallcellsizesforIndependents(meanof19casespercell),we

onlypresenttheresultsintheSupportingInformation.

20ConfidenceintervalsareestimatedwiththemargincommandinStata.Seethe

SupportingInformationforafiguredisplayingtheexperimentalresults.

20

religiousaffiliationismoremalleablethantypicallyrecognized.Providinga

concentrateddoseofthesortofstimuliexperiencedbyvotersastheyobservethe

politicalprocessapparentlyhastriggeredthedissonancethatleadsDemocratsto

disclaimareligiousaffiliation.21

ReciprocalEffectsofSecularandPoliticalOrientationsintheSASPanel

Dopoliticalorientationsproducechangesinreligious-secularorientations—

orviceversa—inthe“realworld,”outsideofanexperimentalsetting?Toassessthis,

weturntotheSASpanel,firstasasecondtestofthedissonancehypothesis,and

thentotestthepolarizationandperceptualhypotheses.

Weuseasimilarmodeltotestallthreehypotheses.Thepoliticalvariablesin

themodelsarepartyidentification(aseven-pointscalerangingfromstrong

RepublicantostrongDemocrat),ideologicalidentification(aslidingscaleranging

from“extremelyconservative”to“extremelyliberal”),andculturalissueattitudes.

Ourmeasureofculturalattitudescombinesviewsonabortion(afour-pointscale

rangingfrom“neverallow”to“alwaysallow”)andviewsonhowthelawshould

definemarriage(aslidingscalerangingfrom“onlyasaunionbetweenonemanand

onewoman”to“asaunionbetweentwopeopleregardlessoftheirgender”).

21Giventhatthepolarizationhypothesisinvolveschangeinpassiveandactive

secularism,whichshouldbemoredeep-seatedorientationsthanself-identification

asNone,wewouldnotexpecttheexperimentaltreatmenttohaveaneffecton

either.Itdoesnot.SeetheSupportingInformationfordetails.

21

Weevaluatethereciprocalrelationshipbetweenpoliticalorientationsand

secularorientationsbyusingwaves2-4ofourSASpaneltoestimatestructural

equationmodelsofthefollowingform:

(1)SecularOrientationit=α1+λ1SecularOrientationi,t-1+β1PoliticalOrientationi,t-1+ε1,it

(2)PoliticalOrientationit=α2+λ2PoliticalOrientationi,t-1+β2SecularOrientationi,t-1+ε2,it

Thismodeltests“cross-lagged”effectsbetweenaparticularpoliticalorientationand

oneofoursecularorientations,withbothvariablesbeingshapedbytheirownpast

valuesandthepastvalueoftheothervariable.Theλparametersconnectingeach

factorattimettoitsownvalueattimet-1capturetheexpectedindividual-level

stabilityinsecularandpoliticalorientationsovertime.Theparameterβ1linking

politicaltendencyatt-1tosecularorientationattcapturesthepotentialinfluenceof

previouslyheldpoliticalperspectivesoncurrentsecularorientation.Because

equation(1)alreadycontrolsfortheeffectofpreviousseculardisposition,β1

measurestheimpactofpoliticalorientationonchangeinsecularorientationsfrom

t-1tot.Similarly,theparameterβ2inequation(2)capturestheinfluenceofsecular

orientationonchangeinpoliticalperspectives.

Toensurethatanyimpactofpoliticalorientationsandsecularorientations

oneachotherrepresenteffectsonactualchange,wecorrectformeasurementerror

intheobservedindicatorsofpoliticalandsecularorientations.Ourmodelscombine

thestructuralmodelofcross-laggedeffectswithameasurementmodel(i.e.a

confirmatoryfactormodel)inwhichobservedindicatorsarestructuredbyboth

22

latent“true”variables(e.g.activesecularism)andmeasurementerrors.Forthe

measurementmodelstobeidentified,weneedeithermultipleindicatorsofthe

latentvariableorthreeormorewavesofpaneldata(Bollen1989).Foractive

secularism,passivesecularism,andculturalissueattitudes,wehaveboththree

wavesandmultipleobservedindicators.Thethreewavesofdataalsoallowusto

correctformeasurementerrorinpartisanship,ideologicalidentification,and

identificationasNoneevenwithonlyoneobservedindicatorofeachvariable.

Inadditiontothestandardmeasurementmodelconstraints(seefootnote

11),thesesingle-indicatormeasurementmodelsrequireadditionalrestrictionsfor

identification(WileyandWiley1970).Weassumethatthemeasurementerrorsof

theobservedindicatorsareuncorrelatedacrosspanelwavesandthattheeffectsof

latentvariablesonthesingleobservedindicatorareequaltoone.Forthemultiple-

indicatorlatentvariables,weallowthemeasurementerrorstobecorrelatedacross

panelwavesandestimateallfactorloadingsexceptoneperlatentvariable.

Wealsoplaceconstraintsonsomeofthestructuralparameters.Weallow

severalsociodemographiccontrolvariables—education,income,sex,age,race(a

dummyvariableforWhites),region(adummyvariableforresidentsoftheSouth),

andreligiousaffiliation(dummyvariablesformembersofthethreelargestreligious

traditions:evangelicalProtestants,mainlineProtestants,andCatholics)—toaffect

latentsecularandpoliticalorientationsinwaves3and4.22Becausethereisno

22Wecategorizerespondents’religiousaffiliationsintoreligioustraditionsbasedon

themethoddescribedinGreen(2007).Wedonotincludethesereligiousdummies

23

theoreticalreasontoexpectsociodemographiceffectstovaryacrosspanelwaves,

weconstrainthemtobeequalacrossthetwowaves.

Wefurtherconstrainthecross-laggedeffectsbetweenpoliticalorientations

andsecularorientationsandthelaggedeffectsofeachvariableonitselftobeequal

acrosspanelwaves.If,asourmodelassumes,therelationshipbetweenvariablesis

continuousovertime,then,withrelativelyequalspacingbetweenpanelwaves,the

cross-laggedandlaggedeffectsshouldbeequalacrosswaves(Finkel1995).

Table4displaystheestimatesofallthestructuralparametersinour

models.23Notsurprisingly,whenwecorrectformeasurementerror,eachsecular

andpoliticalorientationishighlystableovertime;stabilitycoefficientsallare.86or

greater.

[Table4Here]

Despitethisimpressivestability,laggedpoliticalorientationshave

statisticallysignificanteffectsonchangeinallthreesecularorientations.First,as

confirmationofthedissonancehypothesis,strongeridentificationwiththe

DemocraticPartyandmore-liberalculturalattitudesarebothrelatedtoan

increasedlikelihoodofidentificationasNone.Liberalideologyhasasimilar,though

inthemodelofidentificationasNones.Allsociodemographicvariablesare

measuredinwave2ofthepanel.

23TheSupportingInformationincludesallmodelestimates,includingthe

confirmatoryfactorloadingsandeffectsofsociodemographicvariables,forthe

modelsshowninTables4and5.

24

notquitesignificant,effect.However,identificationasNonehasnoeffectonchange

overtimeinanyofourpoliticaldimensions.Thus,beingaNoneseemstobe

endogenoustopolitics,butnotamoverofpoliticalproclivities.

Next,wefindclearsupportforthepolarizationhypothesis.Democratic

partisanship,liberalideology,andliberalculturalattitudesallspurincreasesover

timeinpassiveandactivesecularism.UnlikeidentificationasaNone,passiveand

activesecularismsometimesreciprocateandspurincreasesinDemocratic

partisanshipandpoliticalliberalism.Passivesecularismcausesincreasesinliberal

ideologyandliberalculturalattitudes.Activesecularismhasaclearlysignificant

effectonculturalattitudesandeffectsonpartisanshipandideologythatapproach

statisticalsignificance.Whataboutthemagnitudeofourcross-laggedeffects?

Becausetheobservedindicatorsofpoliticalandsecularcharacteristicsarecodedto

rangefromzerotoone,theunstandardizedcoefficientsrepresenttheimpactofan

increaseinoneorientationfromitstheoreticalminimumtoitstheoreticalmaximum

onchangeintheotherorientationonthesamezero-to-onescale.Forexample,

movingfromstrongRepublicantostrongDemocratinpartyidentificationproduces

increasesof.02inbothpassivesecularismandactivesecularism.Inmore

substantiveterms,.02representsaboutone-sixthofthedistancebetween

categoriesonazero-to-onescaleofworshipattendance—e.g.,betweenattending

twoorthreetimesamonthversusonlyonceamonth.So,itwouldtakeaboutsix

panelwavesorapproximatelyfourandone-halfyears(giventheroughlynine-

monthaveragegapbetweenourpanelwaves)fortheaveragestrongDemocratto

25

becomeonecategorylesslikelythantheaveragestrongRepublicantoattend

worshipservices.

Takinganotherexample,movingfromthelowestlevelofpassivesecularism

tothehighestlevelisassociatedwithanincreaseof.024inliberalidentification,

whilethesamechangeinactivesecularismisassociatedwithanincreaseof.038in

liberalism.Substantively,thatmeansthatitwouldtakeaboutfourpanelwaves(or

approximatelythreeyears)forthemostpassivelysecularrespondenttomoveone-

tenthoftheideologyscaleinamoreliberaldirectionthantheleastpassivelysecular

respondent.Meanwhile,itwouldtakejustunderthreepanelwaves(orabitmore

thantwoyears)forthemostactivelysecularrespondenttogrowmoreliberalthan

theleastactivelysecularrespondentbyone-tenthoftheideologyscale.

Theseeffectsareadmittedlymodest.However,withcorrectionsfor

measurementerrorandashortperiodbetweeneachpanelwave,wewouldnot

expectthemtobelarge.Overaperiodofyears,thecumulativechangesinpolitical

orientationsbasedonsecularismandinsecularismbasedonpoliticscouldbe

sizeable.24

Asafinalstep,weevaluatetheperceptualhypothesisthatbothdissonance

andpolarizationapplyprimarilytopeoplewhoperceivethatreligionhasinfused

Americanpolitics,particularlytheRepublicanParty.Ourtestemploystwoquestions

thatappearedinwave1oftheSASpanel.Onequestionasked“Ingeneral,how24IntheSupportingInformation,wealsocomparetheestimatedchangeinone

latentvariablewhenwemovetheotherlatentvariableacrosswhatMplusestimates

asitsfullempiricalrange.

26

muchtalkaboutreligionisthereinpoliticstoday?,”withthreeresponseoptions:“a

lot,”“alittle,”and“notalkaboutreligionatall.”Theotheraskedrespondentsto

assessthepartisantiesof“evangelicalChristians,”promptingthemtosaywhether

evangelicalsare“mainlyDemocrats,mainlyRepublicans,oraprettyevenmixof

both.”

Next,weestimatedourmodelsofcross-laggedeffectsbetweenparty

identificationandsecularorientationssimultaneouslyforthethreegroupsdefined

byeachofthesequestions,butallowingthestructuralparameterstovaryacrossthe

groups.25Weexpecttheeffectofpartisanshiponchangeinsecularismtobe

strongestforpeoplewhoseeevangelicalsas“mainlyRepublicans”andwhoperceive

alotoftalkaboutreligioninpolitics.26

25Thefactorloadingsforourlatentvariablesandtheeffectsofdemographic

variablesonthelatentvariablesareheldequalacrossthegroups.Onlythe

stabilitiesofsecularandpoliticalorientationsandthecross-laggedeffectsare

allowedtovaryacrossgroups.SeetheSupportingInformationforthefullsetof

estimates.

26Wefocusonlyonpartyidentificationbecauseitisthecentralvariableinour

hypothesesandtheevangelicalpartisanshipvariablepertainsspecificallytoparty

ties.

27

Table5presentsthestabilitiesandcross-laggedeffectsseparatelyforeach

dimensionofsecularismandforeachcategoryofourtwoconditionalvariables.27

Theresultssupporttheperceptualhypothesis.Theimpactofpartyidentificationon

changeinidentificationasaNone,passivesecularism,oractivesecularismisnever

statisticallysignificantunlessindividualsbelievethatevangelicalChristiansare

“mainlyRepublicans”orperceive“alot”oftalkaboutreligioninpolitics.However,

amongindividualswhoseeevangelicalsasprimarilyRepublicanandperceivealot

ofreligioustalkinthepoliticalenvironment,theeffectsofpartisanshiponsecular

changearenearlyalwaysstatisticallysignificant.28WhenAmericansperceivea

closeconnectionbetweenreligionandpoliticsandrecognizeclosetiesbetween

traditionalistreligionandtheGOP,DemocraticPartyidentificationspursincreases

insecularism.29

27FortheanalysisinwhichthedependentvariableisidentificationasNoneandthe

conditionalvariableisperceivedevangelicalpartisanship,ourlatentvariablemodel

producesanon-positivedefinitematrix.So,weestimatedthemodelwithobserved

partisanshipandobservedidentificationasNone.Allotheranalysesinthetable

involvelatentvariables,accountingformeasurementerror.

28TheonlyexceptioniswhenthedependentvariableisidentificationasNoneand

respondentsperceivealotoftalkaboutreligioninpolitics.

29Toassesswhetherthedifferencesineffectsacrossperceptionsofevangelical

partisanshipandreligioustalkinpoliticsarestatisticallysignificant,wecomputed

Satorra-Bentlerscaledtestsofthedifferenceinchi-squarebetweenthemodelsin

28

[Table5Here]

Conclusion

OuranalysisofreligionandsecularisminAmericanpoliticsoffersempirical,

theoretical,andsubstantiveinnovations.Empirically,wedifferentiatebetweenthe

absenceofreligionandactivesecularismbyintroducinganindexofactive

secularism,ortheaffirmativeembraceofasecularidentityandworldview.We

assessthemeasurementpropertiesofactivesecularisminotherwork(Laymanet

al.n.d.),whereweestimatethatjustunderninepercentofAmericansareactive

secularists(whilenearlyaquarterarepassivesecularists).30Here,wedemonstrate

itsimportanceforcontemporarypolitics.

Theoretically,ourfindingthatpoliticalorientationscanshapereligiousand

secularorientationshasbroaderimplications.InanincreasinglypolarizedAmerica,

politicalidentitiesstructureawiderangeofnon-politicalsocialchoices.

thetableandmodelsthatconstrainthestabilitiesandcross-laggedeffectstobe

equalacrossgroups.Thoughmostofthetestsdonotreachstandardlevelsof

statisticalsignificance,theygenerallysuggestthattheformersetofmodelsfitthe

databetterthanthelatter.Whentheconditionalvariableisperceivedevangelical

partisanship,thevalueofthescaleddifferenceinchi-squareis9.74(p=.28)for

identificationasnone,5.94(p=.65)forpassivesecularism,and12.53(p=.13)for

activesecularism.Whentheconditionalvariableisperceivedlevelofreligioustalk

inpolitics,thevalueis12.95(p=.11)foridentificationasnone,12.20(p=.14)for

passivesecularism,and19.87(p=.01)foractivesecularism.

30Part1oftheSupportingInformationhasmoredetails.

29

Substantively,whilepastresearchinfersthattheintertwiningofreligionand

theGOPhastriggeredreligiousnon-affiliationamongDemocrats,weexplicitlytest

thecausalmechanismleadingtothiseffect.Intheexperimentalandpaneldata,the

closeassociationofreligionandtheRepublicanPartycreatescognitivedissonance

amongDemocrats.ManyDemocratsresolvethedissonancebybecomingNones.

Further,theminglingofreligionandpartisanpoliticsleadstopolarization,as

RepublicansandconservativesgrowincreasinglyreligiousandDemocratsand

liberalsbecomemorepassivelyandactivelysecular.Importantly,theseprocesses

takeshapeonlywhenvotersperceivethemixtureofreligionandpolitics,

particularlyintheGOP—thecausalmechanismproposed,buttodateuntested,in

theliterature.

Itisstrikingthatpoliticalorientationsstructureallthreeformsof

secularism:identificationasaNone,passivesecularismandactivesecularism.The

reciprocalrelationshipbetweensecularism,measuredindifferentways,and

politicalorientations,alsomeasuredindifferentways,affirmsthatthisisan

importantbutlargelyunrecognizedcleavageinAmericanpolitics.Itisparticularly

significantthatactivesecularismplaysaroleoftenattributedtoreligiosity—the

effectsizessuggestithasastrongereffectonpoliticalorientationsthantheyhave

onit.Thus,peoplewithanactivelysecularworldviewareincreasinglyfoundamong

Democraticidentifiers,ideologicalliberals,andthosewithleft-leaningcultural

attitudes.Otherresearchdemonstratesthatactivelysecularpeopleareoftenhighly

engagedinpoliticalactivityandthatmanyDemocraticPartyactivistsholdactively

secularviews(LaymanandWeaver2016).

30

Thishistoricalmomentthusresemblestheemergenceofcultural

conservatives—ledbyevangelicalProtestants—asapoliticalforceinthe1970sand

1980s(Layman2001;WilcoxandRobinson2010).Whilesecularistsmayormay

notcreatethesamesortoforganizationalinfrastructureastheChristianRight,itis

likelythattheywillincreasinglymaketheirvoicesheardinthepoliticalarena.Given

theongoingpoliticizationofreligion—andsecularism—weanticipatea

continuationofculturalconflictinAmericanpolitics.

31

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34

Table1:ConfirmatoryFactorAnalysesofPassiveandActiveSecularism

Two-FactorModel

One-FactorModel PassiveFactor ActiveFactor

Indicators Coefficient Std.Error Coefficient Std.Error Coefficient Std.Error

PassiveSecularismReligiousattendanceReligiousguidanceFrequencyofprayerBeliefinGodViewoftheBible

1.001.301.15.92.85

—.04.05.05.04

1.001.301.15.89.83

—.04.05.05.04

_______________

_______________

ActiveSecularismFactualevidencesourceoftruebeliefsGreatworksbestsourceoftruthHardtolivebasedonreasonaloneFreemindsfromoldtraditions/beliefsValuesmoreimportantthanevidenceNon-religiousguidanceSecularidentity

.35.55-.34.42-.29.27.32

.03.03.04.03.03.04.03

_____________________

_____________________

1.001.39-.94.99-.84.84.75

—.11.10.09.09.10.08

Correlationbetweenlatentfactors ___ ___ .74

GoodnessofFitχ2(df)χ2scalingcorrectionfactorCFIRMSEA

476.25(53)

2.32.86.06

336.32(52)

2.29.90.05

Satorra-Bentlerdifferenceinχ2(df) ___ 86.94(1)

N=1,909

Note:Coefficientsareunstandardizedmaximumlikelihoodcoefficients.

35

Table2.VariationsintheExperimentalTreatments

NoReligion ModerateReligion HighReligion PersonalStatement

Republican

Mydeeprootsintheareawillhelpmerepresentthevaluesofthiscommunity.

Mydeeprootsintheareaandmyreligiousfaithwillhelpmerepresentthevaluesofthiscommunity.

MydeeprootsintheareaandmycommitmenttoChristwillhelpmerepresentthevaluesofthiscommunity.

Democrat

BeingalifelongresidentofMartinCountywillhelpmetodorightbythepeopleofthisdistrict.

BeingalifelongresidentofMartinCountyandamanofreligiousfaithwillhelpmetodorightbythepeopleofthisdistrict.

BeingalifelongresidentofMartinCountyandadevotedChristianwillhelpmetodorightbythepeopleofthisdistrict.

Issues Republican Americansareafreepeople.Government

muststopover-spendingandthreateningthatfreedom.Societyhashistoricallysaidthatmarriageisbetweenonemanandonewoman.Tochangethatdefinitionputstheinstitutionofmarriageatrisk.

--sameasnoreligion ThemoreIprayandreadtheBible,themoreIknowthatGodhasmadeAmericansafreeandfaithfulpeople.Governmentmuststopover-spendingandthreateningthatfreedom.Godsaysmarriageshouldbebetweenonemanandonewoman.Tochangethatdefinitionputstheinstitutionofmarriageatrisk.

Democrat Governmentmustcontinuetoprovidecrucialhelpforthedisadvantaged.Weshouldalwayshelpthoseinneed.WeneedtostopdiscriminatingagainstgayandlesbianAmericansandgivethemtherighttomarrythepersontheylove.

--sameasnoreligion Governmentmustcontinuetoprovidecrucialhelpforthedisadvantaged.TheBiblesaysthatweshouldalwayshelpthoseinneed.WeareallGod’schildren.WeneedtostopdiscriminatingagainstgayandlesbianAmericansandgivethemtherighttomarrythepersontheylove.

36

Endorsements

Republican MartinCountyChamberofCommerce

SummervilleIndependentBusinessAssociationCentralStateTaxpayersAssociationMartinCountyRealtorsAssociation

MartinCountyChamberofCommerceSummervilleIndependentBusinessAssociationChristiansfortheTraditionalFamilyMartinCountyRealtorsAssociation

ChristianFreedomCouncilSummervilleIndependentBusinessAssociationChristiansfortheTraditionalFamilyMartinCountyRealtorsAssociation

Democrat CentralStateTeachersAssociationSummervilleFirefightersAssociationMartinCountySanitationWorkersMartinCountyHopeFoundation

CentralStateTeachersAssociationSummervilleFirefightersAssociationChristiansfortheCommonGoodMartinCountyHopeFoundation

FaithAllianceforEqualitySummervilleFirefightersAssociationChristiansfortheCommonGoodMartinCountyHopeFoundation

Memberships

Republican MartinCountyDevelopmentAssociation

SummervilleRotaryClubUnitedWaySummervilleJaycees

MartinCountyDevelopmentAssociationOakStreetChristianFellowshipSummervilleRotaryClubUnitedWay�

OakStreetChristianFellowshipBrothersoftheCrossChristianCommunitySummervilleRotaryClubUnitedWay�

Democrat SummervilleEducationFoundationSummervilleKiwanisClubMarchofDimesCentralStateAchievementSociety

SummervilleEducationFoundationEastSideChristianChurchSummervilleKiwanisClubMarchofDimes

EastSideChristianChurchChristianMeninMissionSummervilleKiwanisClubMarchofDimes

37

Photos Republican

Democrat

38

Table3.ExperimentalResults:IdentifyingasaNone(Logisticregression)

DegreeofReligioninTreatment All Democrats Republicans

Democrat Republican

None High 1.49(.57) 1.88(.82) 1.01(1.03)

Moderate High 1.35(.56) 1.20(.83) .65(1.08)

High High .30(.62) -.41(.94) --

None Moderate -.19(.71) -.11(.99) --

Moderate Moderate .66(.59) .31(.89) .98(1.02)

High Moderate .24(.60) -.64(.96) .73(1.15)

Moderate None .65(.59) .39(.90) -.04(1.15)

High None .52(.63) .10(1.04) 1.07(1.03) NoReligiousAffiliation(Pre-Test) 4.44(.31) 4.89(.50) 4.12(.62)

Constant -3.89(.45) -3.61(.65) -4.17(.86)

N 965 414 311

Prob>χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000

PseudoR2 .43 .51 .33

Note:Entriesarelogisticregressioncoefficients.Standarderrorsareinparentheses.

39

Table4:StructuralEquationModelsofCross-LaggedEffectsbetweenPoliticalOrientationsandSecularOrientations

PoliticalOrientations

SecularOrientationsandModel PartyIdentification IdeologicalIdentification CulturalAttitudes

IdentificationasNone

StabilitiesPoliticalt→Politicalt+1Nonet→Nonet+1

.98(.02).90(.10)

1.00(.04).89(.10)

.95(.02).88(.03)

Cross-LaggedEffectsNonet→Politicalt+1Politicalt→Nonet+1

-.008(.01).032(.016)

.004(.013).047(.031)

.009(.009).071(.034)

GoodnessofFitχ2(df)CFI/RMSEA

188.09(30).94/.067

90.85(30).95/.042

1140.93(69).65/.115

PassiveSecularism

StabilitiesPoliticalt→Politicalt+1Passivet→Passivet+1

.98(.02).98(.01)

.96(.04).97(.02)

.92(.03).96(.01)

Cross-LaggedEffectsPassivet→Politicalt+1Politicalt→Passivet+1

.009(.017).021(.007)

.049(.024).024(.012)

.049(.021).037(.015)

GoodnessofFitχ2(df)CFI/RMSEA

845.06(269).94/.043

763.54(269).94/.040

1221.45(347).92/.046

ActiveSecularism

StabilitiesPoliticalt→Politicalt+1Activet→Activet+1

.97(.02).93(.03)

.95(.05).91(.03)

.93(.02).86(.04)

Cross-LaggedEffectsActivet→Politicalt+1Politicalt→Activet+1

.058(.037).021(.008)

.084(.051).038(.016)

.099(.038).081(.016)

GoodnessofFitχ2(df)CFI/RMSEA

1049.58(437).902/.035

1028.30(437).880/.034

1293.82(533).892/.035

Note:Entriesareunstandardizedmaximumlikelihoodcoefficients.Robuststandarderrorsareinparentheses.Allmodelscontrolforeducation,income,sex,age,race,region,andreligiousaffiliation.Thenumberofobservationsisbetween1,166and1,170forallmodels.

40

Table5:Cross-LaggedEffectsbetweenPartyIdentificationandSecularOrientationbyPerceptionsofEvangelicalPartisanshipandoftheAmountofReligiousTalkinPolitics

PerceivedEvangelicalPartisanship HowMuchTalkaboutReligioninPolitics?

Mainly

Democrats(N=80)

EvenMixofBoth

(N=389)

MainlyRepublicans(N=657)

NoneatAll(N=143)

ALittle(N=576)

ALot

(N=420)

PassiveSecularism

StabilitiesPartyIDt→PartyIDt+1Passivet→Passivet+1

.95(.06).98(.03)

.98(.03).97(.01)

.98(.01).99(.01)

1.04(.03).98(.02)

.98(.02).98(.01)

.96(.02).98(.02)

Cross-LaggedEffectsPassivet→PartyIDt+1PartyIDt→Passivet+1

-.05(.05).02(.03)

-.01(.03).01(.01)

.01(.01).02(.009)

.03(.04).01(.02)

.01(.02).01(.007)

.03(.02).03(.01)

ActiveSecularism

StabilitiesPartyIDt→PartyIDt+1Activet→Activet+1

.96(.05).95(.07)

.97(.03).99(.08)

.98(.02).92(.03)

1.03(.03).86(.09)

.97(.02).92(.05)

.95(.02).90(.04)

Cross-LaggedEffectsActivet→PartyIDt+1PartyIDt→Activet+1

-.04(.08)-.001(.02)

.18(.09)-.001(.01)

.03(.03).04(.01)

.17(.11)-.02(.02)

.11(.06).01(.01)

.05(.03).05(.02)

IdentificationasNone

StabilitiesPartyIDt→PartyIDt+1Nonet→Nonet+1

.89(.06).55(.08)

.90(.02).53(.07)

.95(.01).58(.05)

1.04(.03).99(.15)

.98(.02).82(.12)

.96(.02).95(.09)

Cross-LaggedEffectsNonet→PartyIDt+1PartyIDt→Nonet+1

-.06(.04)-.001(.05)

-.01(.02).03(.03)

-.002(.01).08(.03)

-.02(.02).03(.03)

-.004(.01).03(.02)

-.01(.01).03(.02)

Note:Entriesareunstandardizedmaximumlikelihoodcoefficients.Robuststandarderrorsareinparentheses.Allmodelscontrolforeducation,income,sex,age,race,region,andreligiousaffiliation.