Public Perceptions of Security and the Militar in the Czech … · 1999. 1. 20. · 2 Content: 1....

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Public Perceptionsof Security and the Militar

in the Czech Republic

author: Štefan Sarvaš

NATO Research Fellowship for Democratic Institutions1996 - 1998

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Content:

1. Civil-military relations and the role of the public1.1. The triangle of civil-military relations1.2. Levels of the civilian and democratic control of the militar1.3. Players of the civilian control of the military1.4. The public, politicians and the military: Is the public controlled or controlling2. Attitudes toward security and the military2.1. Attitudes toward national defence2.2. Attitudes to the military2.3. Assessment of the professional soldiers2.4. Influence of the attitude toward NATO membership, and of thepolitical orientation towards security, the military and the professionalsoldiers2.5. A personal contribution to defence2.6. Military: And why?2.7. Changes in the military2.8. Problems of the military2.9.Influence of the selected military problems on confidence to the military, theMinister of Defence and on perception of changes in the military.2.10. Threats in the new world2.11. Feeling of threat2.12. What generates the feeling of threat?2.13. Feeling of the military threa2.14. Who is considered to be the military threat2.15. Acceptance of involvement in peacekeeping missions2.16. Opinions on participation in peacekeeping missions2.17. Attitudes to conscripti2.18. Opinions on conscription2.19. Conscription or the professional military?2.20. How long conscription should be?2.21. Performance of Conscription Service2.22. What is More Important for the Society – Military or CivilService?2.23. Who to decide on civil service?3. The Czech public and professional soldiers on NATO membership3.1. Support for admission to NATO3.2. Readiness to join NATO3.3. Knowledge about Admission of the Czech Republic to NATO3.4. Consequences of Admission to NATO3.5. Perception of NATO and the military of the Czech Republic by professionasoldiers3.6. Security risks and Admission of the Czech Republic to NATOConclusionsApendix

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1. Civil-military relations and the role of the public

1.1. The triangle of civil-military relations

Civil-military relations emerges from the interplay of a variety of forces. A verysimplified approach describes them as the interplay among the public, the military andpoliticians. In this perception the military is always described as an institution chargedwith defence, but also as an interest group following its own goals which must beclosely scrutinised. Politicians, especially those at the moment in power are representedas watchdogs of the military. The role of the public is described as watchdogs’watchdog.

In this model the main control function is carried out by the poli tical leadershipwho are considered the main civil component of democratic control. The maideficiency of this approach lies in the restriction to an institutional analysis which doesnot incorporate additional elements of society

A more complicated approach mixes all civilian actors the public, media andpoliticians who participate in control of the military. Direct formal control is carriedout by institutional actors but the other informal and non-institutional elementsinfluence the whole process in many ways. They do not only watch the watchdogs buprovide direct influence on the military as well1 Both these actors are simultaneouslycontrolling and guiding the military as well as influencing each other.

In reality there are more actors of civil-military relations and democraticcontrol the military than only these three. A high number of civil-military relations’actors mirrors the fact that civil-military relations have many dimensions not onlpolitical but also economic, environmental, moral etc.

This situation reflects that in most of general definitions of the civilian controlare rather vague and consider civilian control of the military as an instrument thesociety uses for management of its armed forces, for setting forth priorities for themilitary and ensuring the military and its means and equipment will not be misused forother than by society defined purposes as well as for ensuring that no economicawasting of resources allocated to the military will occur. Individual players throughformal and non-formal channels both at nation-wide and regional levels exercise thecivilian control

1.2. Levels of the civilian and democratic control of the military

The civilian control of the military has to be exercised simultaneously at thetwo levels:1) The formal level applies to control defined within the legislative framework of theConstitution and laws. At this level the jurisdiction of the national institutions towardsthe military should be unambiguously and clearly defined. Measures taken at thiformal level are the basis for existence of effective and transparent system odemocratic control.2) The non-formal level of civilian control reflects the fact the military and its membersare “anchored“ in a broad network of social interactions. The existence and working o

1 See for instance Rebecca L. Shiff, Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theoryof Concordance Armed Forces and Society, No. 1, 1995, pp. 7-24.

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such non-formal relations can affect negatively (for instance insufficient or falseinformation about situation within the military, communication blockade betweencareer soldiers and civilian personnel), or positively (development of civil expertise,transfer of skills from military to civil profession, and the like) the performance ofcivilian and democratic control.

1.3. Players of the civilian control of the militar

The players of civilian control represent a wide conglomerate of controversialforces, which in relation to the military follow their specific interests, and they drivethem at both levels. A part of players acts particularly at the formal level, the other partat the non-formal level. As major players of formal control of the military we canconsider the subjects of political a bureaucratic nature which role in relation to themilitary is explicitly defined in the Constitution and laws. It relates first of all to thePresident, Government, Minister of Defence, House of Deputies and the Senate andtheir committees for defence and security, political parties, but also the SupremeControl Office. The major players of non-formal control include subjects who have nospecifically defined role in advance but they are able to furnish their influence. This isthe case of the general public, journalists, academic public, non-governmental and non-profit organisations, but also civilian staff at the ministry of defence, conscripts andcareer officers.

Civilian and democratic control of the military must originate from appropriatelegislative framework. The basic issues of existence of the military, its justification,division of rights, duties and management powers and responsibility in a peacetime,crisis situations and in case of war should be set forth by the Constitution or by otherlaws. From the formal point of view control of the military must come out from clearand explicit division of responsibility among individual players who form the nationalsecurity system. And the rights and duties should be laid down in laws and legislativenorms beginning with the Constitution and ending with the military rules andregulations.

The major players of the control exercised through the formal cha nnels include:President: The President, usually the supreme commander of armed forces, has

a specific position in the control mechanisms. He represents primarily the symbolic andmoral authority. He influences the military either personally or through his militaryoffice. The uniqueness of the Czech Republic system is the fact that even thoughArticle 63 (c) of the Constitution sets the President is the supreme commander ofarmed forces he must, in some situation, to consult the Prime Minister (just as in caseof appointment and promotion of generals).

Parliament (Senate or other legislative body): It is one of the most importantplayers of democratic control. It decides over engagement of military in case of crisisor war as well as over foreign deployment of the military in peacetime. The Parliamentsupervises the government military-related activities and also directly supervises eventsinside the military, and it decides on allocation of funds for the military by means opassing the national budget. It is capable of affecting the size of the military budget orits structure as well as it can require solution of problems that may occur within thescope of the Minster of Defence.

Defence and Security Committee of the Parliament: It represent theparliamentary body which deals with security issues in all their width and deepness.This committee in particular should know best the challenges of security and military

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related issues, and it should not only control but also promote the military build-up iaccordance with the national interests. Through the defence and security committeesthe closest ties and interchange of information between the military and the Parliamenis exercised.

Government: It represents the top executive power in the state. In agovernment declaration it formulates its security policy implemented by othergovernment provisions. It is collectively held responsible to the Parliament what isextremely significant namely in the field of defence because the defence security policis not only realised by the defence ministry but it is shared by a number of otherdepartments (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, economic ministries andothers).

Minister of Defence: The common principles of democratic control of themilitary incline to opinion that the minister of defence should be a civilian who woultogether with his office represent a counterweight to the General Staff which isconsidered to be a military element. The Minister and the Ministry of Defencerepresent the political leadership of the department, the Minister being accountable tothe Government and the Parliament for execution of governmental policy in the field ofdefence. The General Staff represents military, professional expertise; it is responsiblfor command and training of the military in peacetime. The General Staff works ouprofessional experts´ reports and recommendations and the minister decides on themIn order to be able to decide with full quality and was not only spokesperson of theGeneral Staff the top management of the ministry must take part in a process odevelopment of basic documents, of acquisition and re-location of units plans.

Supreme Control Office: It ensures that no inappropriate manipulation withpublic funds allocated for the military through the military budget occurs as well asthrough other instruments for financing the military and its activities (for instance, thecosts of peacekeeping operations - IFOR, SFOR - are partly covered by other sourcesthan from the military budget).

Simultaneously non-formal players significantly contribute to the control ofarmed forces and they can act either directly or by mediation:

Political Parties: Armed forces should be out of political parties, they shoulnot be tied to any of them. To achieve this goal number of measures were taken inthe Czech armed forces. No political party is entitled to conduct a canvassing insidethe armed forces; officers and conscripts (during their active service) cannot bemembers of any political party. Political parties can influence the armed forces onlythrough the Government or Parliament. Governmental parties or coalition have ofcourse the decisive influence to formulation and realisation of security policy andbuild-up of the armed forces. In spite of this fact, in shaping the security policy thelong-term nature and importance should be considered, it should be formed on theconsensus basis of both governmental and opposition parties. The political parties,including non-parliamentary ones, transform interests of individual groups ofpopulation into political interests - what stands good also in relation to the military andsecurity in a broad approach - which are based on the definition of risks.

Non-governmental and Non-profit Organisations : Without deepunderstanding of complex military issues by the civil sphere it is impossible to conduceffective political control of the military. In forming independent viewpoints and inanalytic judgement of strategic issues the irreplaceable role is played by non-governmental and non-profit organisations. Abroad, there are and are widely usedindependent “think-tanks“, the organisations specialising in national security and

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defence issues and which develop independent data and analyses for governmentalbodies. These organisations together with the means of mass information significantlaffect public opinion. A community of engaged civilian experts is systematically built informing a strategic communities and groups of opinion leaders. Non-governmental andnon-profit organisations assist in education and training of such civilian experts. Theseorganisations at the same time balance the influence of the defence industry whichinvest huge sums into military research and production and often it is interested inaffecting strategic decisions to be taken in its benefit. Non-governmental and non-profit organisations are by their substance highly controversial. In their relation to themilitary they include a wide spectrum of opinions from pacifism, anti-militarism, andanarchism, denying justification of the military existence, up to trends which form andcultivate relation of citizen to the state, security and the military.

Profit Organisations: These are the institutions competing in the economicmarket which interest is to come into economic relations with the military. In ideal casethey closely observe the competition and adherence to the business ethics even inrelation to the military acquisition orders for service or equipment. At presenta perception has come up that ethical principles are not anytime the first ones what hasbrought negative influence to a capacity of the military in the society and enables thesituation that military inviting for public tenders is put in doubts on lack oftransparency.

Research Institutions: If decision-making process at ministerial, governmentalor parliamentary levels is to be effective and accountable, it needs good informationand a deep objective analysis. Professional, long-term analyses and predictions couldbe provided only by specialised research institutions. The informed media andindependent research organisations can therefore, positively affect the decision-makingprocess.

The media: The modern media exercise, withou doubt, an extreme influenceto forming the public opinion and political decision-making. Besides, they enable thepublic to form its own views on what are happening inside the armed forces and whatheir priorities are. They provide the public with tools enabling to influence conduct ofthe armed forces.

Conscripts: They represent a group of population that during their conscriptiservice gains a direct image on the military, on spending the public funds. In theiperception is considerably affected by low popularity of the conscription service and bits conditions.

Civilian Employees of the Ministry of Defence: They represent an importantgroup which is capable of good orientation in security policy issues and in some otherchallenges of the military life (for instance economic and social aspects, challenges ocommunication with the public, recruitment). Their involvement in structures of theMinistry of Defence together with professional soldiers represents a joint of militaryand civilian expertise.

Professional Soldiers: It is a group of population that increasingly integratesinto the society what applies especially to some highly specialised professions.Concurrently, due to the falling interest of the public in security and military issues, it,however, turns to marginalization of the Military as an institution. The career soldiersrepresent an important source of information that forms attitudes to the military andsecurity issues. Very important is also acceptation of democratic and social norms bprofessional soldiers because it prevents the radical group of politicians fromanipulation with the military. A conflict between social and communist values

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emerged even in the former socialist military where - as some experts point to – therewas evidently the lowest goodwill to engage in interest of objectives of the communisparty if compared with units of the Ministry of Interior and the People’s Militia. Alsotransformation of the military profession contributes to promoting importance of thecareer soldiers as a tool of the civil control. Charles Moskos speaks about a soldier-diplomat, a soldier-scientist, and the like, by which he expresses an idea thaprofessional soldiers now more often act as experts in relation to politicians but also toacademic institutions, non-governmental organisations and to the press, and that theymore often contribute to the discussions on military-related and security issues. Thistrend shows that professional soldiers are capable of overcoming a symbolic blockadebetween the military terminology and political or scientific discourse. Charles Moskosemphasises that career soldiers must present themselves as equivalent partners in orderto be able to defend frequently very reasonable proposals in a turbulent situation of thepresent world in their discussion with politicians (not in a sense of sharing power but ina sense of expertise). It means they must master a diplomatic way of negotiations andthey must free themselves from bureaucratic restraints of the institution they work in.Some authors think that readiness of the military management in the mentioned fieldwill provide against risks of a tendency of political elite to intervene into micro-management of military organisation, and it will legitimise professional autonomy ofthe military.

The public: The modern democratic military cannot exist without support ofthe public. The public must be convinced that the military serves the nation’s interests,and in case of need the military is capable of defending these interests and that thepublic can rely on it. It must be also convinced that budget allocated to the military isadequate, and money is spent legitimately. Public opinion in democratic society hasafter all the decisive and final control function. Its influence to the military is exercisednot only through elected representatives but also directly. The expression of civiliancontrol from the side of the public is its confidence in the military, and among others,the prestige of military profession in society. At present trend of strengthening socialties of the military family prevails. Spouses of professional soldiers are being lessdependent upon the military and they seek their jobs outside the military environmentThe military profession is in stage of considerable changes and some specializationsface disintegration of “esprit de corps“; the military experts identify themselves moreto their civilian peers than to a group of professional soldiers. The higher importance isgiven to the possibility of the professional knowledge transfer into civilian positions.This trend will gain in relation to enlargement of category of professional non-commissioned officers who will serve in the military only during the relatively shorttime of their active life. Very important tool of the civilian control is the perception orisks, which distinctively limits the allocation of funds for the military and decision-making of the Parliament on the military budget. Within this meaning it is possible tspeak about market environment in view of elimination of potential risks, or about a“market of security“. Setting apart funds for the military is highly limited by perceptionof risks and their topical relevance transformed into public interest. This way definedthe public interest (for instance, considerable worries about criminality and publicsupport to efforts to its elimination) affects decision-making of the political subjects inthe Parliament and it is also a considerable determinant of election support

It is obvious that interconnection of actions of all democratic control playerscommonly occurs through a network of both formal and informal relations and

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influence of the public can not be neglected. The public effect and is effected by aother actors of civil and democratic control of the military.

1.4. The public, politicians and the military: Is the public controlled ocontrolling?

As it has been shown civil-military relations create a web of relations betweenthe military and society on both the formal and informal levels. Their ultimate objectiveis „the harmonisation of values and belief, consensus about the proper place of armedservices in society and agreement on security policy and its cost to the state“.2

Restoration of distorted civil-military relations and establishing de ocraticcontrol belonged among principal tasks of the transitional period in the area of securityand military matters. From this point of view restoration of a new image of the militaryin society, improvement of its trustworthiness and accountability became an importantask in the whole process of military transition.

The role of the public in civil-military relations and especially civilian anddemocratic control of the military earned a lot of attention in the ongoing discussionson post-communist militaries.3 The new impact these discussions gave when NATOenlargement became a real process and public support for entry into NATO becameone of the most questioned issues of the whole process.

As a launching pod for further analysis the basic models of the role of thepublic in the process of civilian and democratic control relations should be considered.Generally, from the point of the role of the public there are four possible modes of therelationship between the public, politicians and the military. These interpretations arestem from estimation of power of the dominant actors of democratic control.

First, the public controls all other actors. Politicians obey the dictate of publicopinion. These premise is often refused those who argue that the public is usuallyapathetic toward security and military policy. Other scholars acknowledge a degree opublic interest and control but based on vast ignorance, only sporadic interest andcontrol. In this interpretation the dictate of public opinion may not be very strong, butdue to lack of interests as well as information very permeable and unstable.

Second, the public is not controlling but is controlled. Politicians as well as themilitary have instruments to shape public opinion and can persuade the population tosupport their policies. This situation is possible when the public show minimal interestin security and military matters.

Third, the public, on the one hand, and politicians and the military, on the otherhand, are irrelevant. Politicians and the military do not react according to publicopinion, but neither the public is manipulated by them. They go essentially separatways. 2 Martin Edmonds, Armed Services and Society. Westview Press, Boulder & SanFrancisco, 1990, p. 132.3 See for example Anton Bebler, The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Central and EasternEurope, NATO - revie , No.4, 1994, pp. 28-32. Rudolf Joo, The Democratic Control of ArmedForces, Chaillot Papers, no. 29. Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Realtions and NATOExpansion, McNair Paper, no. 39. Reka Szemerkényi, Central European Civil-Military Reforms atRisk. Adelphi Paper, No.306, 1996. Regarding Czechoslovak and Czech or Slovak specifics see OttoPick, Stefan Sarvas, Stanislav Stach, Democratic Control over Security Policy and Armed Forces, In:Laurent F. Carrel, Otto Pick, Stefan Sarvas, Andreas Schaer, Stanislav Stach, (eds.). Demokraticheund zivile Kontrolle von Sicherheitspolitik und Streikraften, Zurcher Beitrage zur Sicherheitspolitikund Konfliktforschung, No. 41, 1997.

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Fourth, the public, politicians and the military interact. They influence eachother and the dominant force depends on social, economic and political context. Thimodel imply a certain degree of public interests in military and security matters as weas a certain respect to public opinion among politicians and the military. 4

Democratic society is characterised b high segmentation of the public. Thismatters also as far as security and military issues are concerned. Empirical data in theCzech Republic confirm this as well as that these affairs are not central to publicopinion.

4 Concerning model of the role of the public in civilian and democratic control sBruce Russett, Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of NationalSecurity. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1990, pp. 87-88.

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2. Attitudes toward security and the military

The public is logically segmented in its attitudes toward securityand military issues. This segmentation is caused by many factors. Inthe following parts the stress is put on main tendencies in publicperceptions of security and the military in the Czech Republic as wellas identification of the main lines of the segmentation. All empiricalfindings presented in the study are drawn from representative poolscarried out either among the Czech public or in the military.

2.1. Attitudes toward national defen

Unclear attitude of the Czech population to national defence is anotorious fact for a long time. On the one hand, we note a relativelyhigh degree of conviction that the sovereignty of the state is necessaryto be defended at all costs. On the other, hand there are doubts onfeasibility of defence, there is considerable reluctance to spend moneyfor it, and first of all the conviction that powers will decide over thefate of the Czech Republic anyway. In comparison with recent yearswe note a decline in emphasis to necessity of defence. At the sametime another conviction takes more ground that it is futile to thinkabout national defence because such a small country, as the CzechRepublic is, will be decided over by Super powers. In this context it islogic that half inhabitants of the Czech Republic doubts theimportance of spending money for defence, and more than half ofrespondents doubts defence feasibility.

Table No. 1 Attitudes toward country’s defence - only approval with thestatements (%)

1992 1993 1994 II/1996 XII/1996

1997

states’ sovereignty must bedefended at all costs

86 89 80 87 82 77

defence expenditures are aburden for the state budget

53 55 45 52 50 50

in case of a military conflict weare not able to defence ourselves

62 65 48 67 57 55

it is futile to consider state’sdefence, because Super powerswill decide over its fate anyway

59 58 53 62 57 63

Inconsistency of the Czech population attitudes is anchored inthe conviction that each country must defend its identity, andmoreover, the need of the state sovereignty is part of the commonawareness when an alternative is thraldom and oppression. Eachcountry puts preservation of the sovereignty as the highest objective,

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and for its maintenance it builds and keeps the military up. Due tothe reason that necessity to defend the sovereignty represents apremise which is historically linked with existence of any stateformation is altogether logic that this opinion is accepted byconsiderable part of the Czech population. But at the same time thepremise on the necessity of defence is put in doubts by several trends.The following aspects contribute to setting this necessity of defenceinto relativity:

1) historical – these sources of doubts on the necessity of defencewere described many times. The fact is that the military was not usedin 1938 or in 1968. The citizen is not interested in political or militaryconsequences of decisions, which led to the loss of the sovereignty; heis interested first of all in the result. From the historical point of viewwe could go farther back to the past even till the battle on the WhiteMountain (Bílá hora) in 1621. Historical events, which formedhistorical awareness of the Czech nation, considerably put theconviction over feasibility of defence into relativity and create thenational myth of impossibility of defence;

2) international – politica - events, which led to the Munichdictate in 1938, to occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, they havetheir international and political circumstances that contribute toconviction that the fate of the Czech Republic has always beendetermined by the interest of a neighbour or a Super power. It is notnecessary to remind recent experiences when the formerCzechoslovakia was part of a pact which served to implementation ofgeopolitical ambitions of the Soviet Union. The feeling of a citizen ofthe “buffer zone” country which is somewhere between Germany andRussia, and therefore it is a toy in hands of these Powers, is deeplyrooted in national consciousness. Perception of other powers rolecontributes to doubts on the need to preserve sovereignty, and it isalso affected by international experience. As an example, the role ofFrance and Great Britain in time of the Munich crisis can serve. Wecan often hear that even the occupation in 1968 in principle onlyreflected relations of the Soviet Union and the U. S. A and the divisionof their spheres of influence.

3) global – new trends of information, economic and technologyglobalization have brought about also new view on the issue ofsovereignty. Opinions occur that at the present it is not important tolay stress on military aspects but more significant is to follow newtrends in information science, technology and economy. From theviewpoint of the state role in global society it comes to a decrease ofthe military capability importance while importance of economic,technological and information potential grows. Some authors insistthat current conflict among industrial countries is being transformedfrom the military level to the economic and technological one. They,for instance, argue by tension that chronically exists among the U. S.

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A., Japan and the EU in the economic sphere. An argument onexpenditure on intelligence and counter-intelligence is often usedwhere some re-distribution of expenditure was noted recently infavour of economic and technological intelligence and counter-intelligence respectively to the detriment of the military expenditure.The other significant dimension is the globalization in area of culture.The Czech Republic is being more distinctly involved into “globalnetworks”, what is being reflected also in attitudes of the Czech publicto the national security issues;

4) sociological – there are the trends that we are not sometimesconscious of, and we do not pay sufficient attention to. Sociologicalroots make attitudes of citizens to defence and sovereignty relative atthe sub-national and international level. In several recent decades wehave noted in the Czech Republic trends towards phenomenon whichsome authors identify as post-materialism or post-modernism. Trendsto the growth of individualism and hedonism are more considerablyfelt. In their consequence these trends mean weakening of relationbetween the citizen and the state. The importance of traditionalinstitutions, among which the military also ranks, is put in doubts.5

Also a distinct segmentation of the society into lots of relativelyindependent groups occurs, they interact, and do not feel any need forunifying element as the state is. At the international level there aresociologically identifiable trends that are closely tied withglobalization. People identify themselves with social groups, which bytheir nature have a global character – music trends, relevance tointernational companies (Shell, Volkswagen), and the like. It seemsthat big international concerns produce their own culture and therelation to an international company seems to be more important thanthe relation to a particular citizenship. Many of the comparativesociological researches show that the Czech Republic and Hungary arecountries of the former Eastern Block in which the sociological trendsleading to weakening of relation between the citizen and the state aregetting in strength together with doubts on importance of traditionalinstitutions as, for instance, the military, parliament, church, and thelike.

The illusive controversy of the Czech public attitudescorresponds with the nature of the human recognition in which wecan find acceptation of the “common truth”, that it is necessary toensure sovereignty of the country which is put in doubts at severalabove mentioned levels. Thoughts appear whether the Czech Republicis capable of defending itself at all due to the limited economic andmilitary potential. At the same time it is confronted with negativehistorical experience. The considerable role is played also by its

5 Viz Dalton R.J., Citizens Politics in Western Democracies: Public Opinion andPolitical Parties in the United States, Great Britain, West Germany and France.Chatham, New Jersey, 1988.

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increasing engagement into global economy and giving a priority toeconomic views in the Czech society. Probably even due to this reasonespecially in Prague, which is engaged into the global economy at theutmost, the greatest doubts on feasibility of national defence appear:68% of inhabitants of Prague think that if anything happens we wouldnot be able to defend ourselves anyway. In many cases the economicand military aspects are understood to be in opposition, and militaryexpenditure is thought to have a negative impact on economicprosperity. We cannot leave out even historical and internationalpolitical roots of negative attitudes to national defence. Especiallypersonal experience play an important role what is manifested bymore distinct approval with proposition that it is futile to think aboutdefence because the fate of such a small country will anyway bedetermined by the powers, what is supported by people in age over 60.This age category supports the above-mentioned proposition by 74%of respondents. These attitudes are transferred also to younger agegroups in a process of socialisation. Last but not least a clearsociological shift is felt especially among the youths, and this shift ischaracterised by low willingness to participate in national defence.Also higher acceptation of the civil service is put forth and preferenceof professional armed forces as well. It is logical that lower acceptanceof an opinion that sovereignty of the country is necessary to bedefended at all costs appears at the young people in age of 15 – 19, or20 – 24. These both age categories support the above-mentionedproposition by 68% of the respondents.

2.2. Attitudes to the military

Civil-military relations are determined by two basic imperatives:1) functional imperative – which expresses to which extend the militaryis ready to carry out its basic role; defence of the country, or defenceof allies and participation in peacekeeping missions;2) societal imperative – which expresses whether the military reflectsand understands the social trends, whether it is capable ofcommunication with the society and doesn’t enclose itself intoseparated and socially peripheral institution.6

At the Czech public, we note for a long time already the criticalattitudes to the military. Traditionally, the attitude of respondents ismore positive in assessing functional readiness of the military, andmore critical in assessing of civil-military relations.

Table No. 2 Assessment of the military - only approval with the statements (%)

The military 1991 1992 1993 1994 1996 1997is skilful in mastering 59 50 43 39 35 39

6 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil -Military Relations. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957.

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techniquehas support of citizens 46 38 41 22 27 35has good morale 29 18 21 10 12 16

In comparison with 1996 we note the growth of positive ratingsfor the opinion that the military has won higher support of thepopulation, and also a slight positive shift appeared in assessment ofreadiness, skilfulness of the military and its morale. In case of supportof the population, the growth is being noted for longer time. Astraditionally, the most distinct doubts exist in case of the moralewithin the military.

After comparing attitudes of particular demographic groups wefind out that the social level seems to be more controversial. While atthe functional level we do not note differences among differentsegments of the Czech populations. The evident differentiationappears in assessing support of the population and the morale of themilitary. People having more contacts with the current military aremore critical to it. An age group of 20 – 25 assesses the lowest supportof the public, when only 18% of them think that the public supportsthe military. In the 15 – 19 age group 21% of respondents identifythemselves with this opinion, and at the same time this age group ofthe Czech population assesses also the morale aspect very criticallywhen only 8% insist that the military has got high morale. The morecritical assessment of the public support prevails also among peoplein age of 30 – 34 (23%), and at the age category of 25 – 29 (27%). It issimilar also at men of whom only 27% think that the military has gotsupport of the population while at women this opinion is shared by41% of them. The morale of the military is more critically assessedalso by people in Prague when positive assessment was obtained fromonly 9% of the Capital inhabitants. The relevancy of sociologicaltrends we know from researches in the Czech Republic and abroad isverified also by the fact that the age category over 60 more distinctlythinks that the military has got support of the public (52% of them)and high morale as well (24% of them).

Attitudes to the military confirm some tendencies we indicatedabove, especially the relevancy of sociological but also historical rootsof negative or positive attitudes to the military.

2.3. Assessment of the professional soldiers

The attitudes to the career soldiers are the area where some changes occurredin comparison with recent years. In spite of the outlasted critical attitudes we can statethat the growth of the positive attitudes to professional soldiers is a trend that we canfollow for several years, but nevertheless, except for assessment of relation oprofessional soldiers to the democratic development, their assessment is still morenegative than at the beginning of the 90s.

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Table No. 3 Assessment of professional soldiers - only approval with thestatements (%)

Professional soldiershave good

1991 1992 1993 1994 1996 1997

professional skills 54 54 46 35 44 48physical fitness 57 43 33 24 35 42morale X X 29 15 29 32a positive relationtoward democraticdevelopment

24 33 33 22 34 39

Note: X - the question was not asked

Assessment of the career soldiers is not so controversial as aview on the military as a whole. Only inhabitants of Prague excludedthemselves from the average when they more negatively assessedprofessional skills of the career soldiers (only 40% of them assessthem positively), their physical fitness (positively assessed by 33% ofthe Prague inhabitants), and morale (24%). On the other handinhabitants of the South Moravia see the career soldiers morepositively what is manifested in better assessment of their physicalfitness (50% of them assess it positively), morale (44%) and theirrelation to democracy (50%). The more positive attitudes on the SouthMoravia territory may reflect also assistance of the military duringfloods in those regions. In case of the physical fitness assessment wenote more positive attitudes also at the young people in age of 15 – 19,when 56% of respondents in this age category insist that careersoldiers are well physically trained and prepared.

2.4. Influence of the attitude toward NATO membership, and of the politicalorientation towards security, the military and the professional soldiers

In connection with attitudes of the Czech public to security issues, the militarand the career soldiers, it is interesting to look at influence of attitudes towards NATOand political orientation for forming particular attitudes. By the use of correlationanalysis we have found out that the major determinant in this case is the attitudetoward NATO membership.

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Table No.4 Influence of the attitude toward NATO membership, and of thepolitical orientation towards security, the military and theprofessional soldiers.

Attitudes attitude towardNATO

membership

politicalorientation

politicalorientation

with exclusionof the attitudetoward NATOmembership


0,07 -0,08 -0,05


-0,28 0,13 0,00

in case of a military conflict weare not able to defenceourselves

-0,09 0,03 0,00

it is worthless to considerstate’s defence, because powerswill decide over its fate anyway

-0,16 0,14 0,07

is skilful in mastering technique 0,15 -0,05 0,03

has support of citizens 0,05 0,08 0,11

has good morale 0,06 0,02 0,05

professional skills 0,11 -0,08 -0,03

physical fitness 0,09 -0,07 -0,03

morale 0,06 0,07 0,03

a positive relation towarddemocratic development

0,08 -0,03 0,00

Note: The correlation coefficient indicates the strength of the relation. Positive correlation expressespositive attitude to admission of the Czech Republic to NATO and simultaneously higher preferencesof the stated attitude or more distinct inclination to the left. The negative correlation representsnegative attitude to admission of the Czech Republic to NATO as well as higher preferences of thestated attitude or more distinct inclination to the right-wing orientation. Statistically significantcorrelation data are printed in bold.

The part of the Czech population that agrees withadmission of the Czech Republic to NATO takes up more positiveattitudes toward security and military issues as well as nationaldefence. This group of respondents is more willing to expend moneyon the Military and less accepts nihilistic attitudes expressed byopinions that if anything happens we would not be able to resistanyway, or that it is futile to think about national defence because thepowers will decide over the Czech Republic’s fate. These respondentsexpress also more positive attitudes in their assessment of the careersoldiers especially with regard to their relation to democratic

17

development and professional competencies. If assessing the wholemilitary, there, nevertheless, were some difference in evaluation of itsskills and preparedness. In spite of these positive tendencies even at apart of the Czech population that approves the admission to NATO,among nihilistic attitude to security issues prevails in a whole. Alsoamong this part of the Czech population some critical attitudes to themilitary prevail, especially to its morale (see Appendix Table No. 1).

Regarding the political orientation there are interesting trendwhich shows that after comparison with the beginning of this decade aconsiderable decline from the political implication of attitudes to themilitary and to the career soldiers occurs. At the beginning of thisdecade people of the right-wing political orientation were traditionallymore critical toward the military and professional soldiers while theleft-wing oriented people shared more positive attitudes. Currently,with the only exception related to assessment of the public support,the attitudes to the military, career soldiers and the security issuesare only slightly affected by the political orientation. The more distinctconviction of people of the left political orientation that the militaryhas got the public support we can interpret as a “conservativeelement” when people in their minds did not accepted a shift that hashappened in the society, and therefore the part of the population withthe left-wing political orientation keeps still more distinct convictionthat the military has the public support because this group had beenexpressing higher support for the military in the past. Similarly,people of the right-wing political orientation did not accept yet thechange and they are more distinctly convinced of the low support forthe military by the public because it is about the attitudes which werein fact more distinctly shared by the right-wing part of population inthe past. Based on this development we can state that the military isconstantly and more distinctly accepted as a national institution anda view on it is being freed from political backgrounds known at thebeginning of the 90s.

2.5. A personal contribution to defence

A possible personal contribution to national defence is one of the factors thatindicate the readiness to participation. At the present situation this problem idiscussed predominantly by political scientists but also by sociologists andphilosophers. On the one hand we find a conservative approach laying stress on thenational defence as one of the foundation stones of national identity, and it iemphasised that participation in this activity is one of the most important values.7 Thesimilar approaches might be found in neo-liberalism, which puts to the front the valueof fairness.8 The liberal philosophers following Rawls understand the participation in

7 Morris Janowitz., The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, The FrPress, Glencoe, 1960 or Charles Moskos, John Chambers. (eds.), The NewConscientious Objection: From Sacred to Secular Resistance. Oxford UniversityPress,New York, 1993.8 Rawls J., Political Liberalism. Columbia University Press, New York, 1993.

18

defence as one of the tools forming common identity. On the other hand is the extremeliberalism, which emphasises an idea of absolute voluntariness.9

Although the Czech population lays the highest stress on active assistance incase of defence readiness of the state, it is evident that the less controversy activity, aleast at the population, is knowledge what the government, parliament, the military,and the like, had done. The issues of professional career in the military and work forthe military as civilian expert appear to be very controversial. In this respect it isinteresting also a considerable share of “don’t know” answers in case of willingness tocontribute to defence capability by paying taxes but also refusing possibility to work asa civilian expert in the military.

Among people working in self-governments there is higher emphasis towillingness to contribute to the national defence as taxpayers, and for the activeparticipation in case of defence readiness of the state or to receive information on whais being done for defence. In other questions they do not differ much from other peoplof the same age group. It seems that people who work for the state administration andself-governments feel higher need to declare activities, which relate to their positions.

Table No. 5 Participation in defence (%)

Population Localself-governments

Yes No diffe-rence

*

Yes No diffe-rence

*contribute as taxpayer 40 34 +6 56 23 +33active participation in case ofdefence readiness

50 18 +32 60 11 +49

keep informed what is being donefor defence by the government orparliament

45 9 +32 57 10 +47

serve compulsory military serviceand military training exercises

36 39 -3 40 37 +3

actively work in organisationscontributing to defence

15 43 -28 19 44 -25

work in the military as a civilemployee

13 57 -44 18 57 -39

become a professional soldier 9 65 -56 10 66 -56

*) Difference between the percentage of positive and negative answers.

Similarly as in all questions connected with the military and security issues, alsohere predominantly age and political differences are manifested. But also some otherinfluences. In analysing people who take up particular attitudes it is evident thatsupport for defence comes primarily from circles with university education and thosewho are better set up what is to a certain extent surprising because in many industriacountries just group of better educated people are bearers of anti-militaristic attitudes,although better situated people are more conservative in this issue. At the same time

9 Friedman L., The Republic of Choise: Law, Authority, and Culture. Cambridge,Mass., Harvard University Press, 1990.

19

we note an interesting development also in case of political orientation. It is a fact thapeople of the right-wing orientation identify themselves with positive attitude tdefence capability in a sense that they support professionalization, and they are willingto pay for it, but they are not willing to serve in the military as professional soldiers.People of the left-wing orientation hold rather the so-called civic attitude when theyare more willing to contribute to the security of the state by performance oconscription. Respondents with the centre-wing orientation hold a very reservedattitude to national defence what is being expressed also by a considerable size oindividualistic liberalism.

Based on personal willingness to participate in defence and to ensure nationalsecurity we can create a participation typology. Taking into account preferences oindividual ways of activities we can say that the lowest support is given to those waysof participation, which require personal activity. First, it is about work within themilitary organisation as a career soldier or civilian. The attitude to activities resultingfrom the Czech laws is a bit better, for example conscription service, and the like. Themost distinct is the preference of ways that do not need any participation and contactwith the military organisation as taxpaying and being informed.

Based on this knowledge we can both logically and empirically create fourtypes of respondents:1. active – this group prefers active participation and expresses its willingness tocontribute to at least five from seven ways of ensuring defence capability;2. legislatively active – here are the people who are willing to share those activitieswhich are required by the law. Even due to the reason that they are willing tundertake conscription service, or assist actively during defence readiness, we canspeak about the active attitude although strictly determined by requirements of laws.This group prefers three up to four forms of participation in ensuring national defence;3. passive – it is a group of people who are not willing to contribute actively toensuring national defence but yet they would contribute by paying taxes or they wouldat least inquire about situation in the military4. refusing – it is a group of people who refuse any form of participation in ensuringnational defence.

Looking at the distribution of the types we find out that population preferspassive attitude and people working in self-governments prefer legislatively activeattitude. In total, people from self-governments have more positive attitudes toensuring security what is due to several factors that we were already talking about (ageand share in functioning of the state apparatus). The representation of the refusing typeis also distinct, not only among population where it forms less than a quarter but alsoamong people working at self-governments where it forms less than a seventh.

20

The population tends to the fact that personally active attitude is moredistinctly shared by university educated segments of the population (what applies alsofor legislatively active attitude), and inhabitants of Prague. Refusing attitude is moredistinctly shared by the population with basic education, i.e. young people.

From a certain value and ideology orientation viewpoint it seems that people oparticular orientation support more distinctly the following attitudes:personally active – they lay higher stress on liberties of citizens but at the same timethey emphasise a strong role of both central and self-governments,legislatively active – they put stress on equality of citizens and they emphasiseorientation to the future,refusing – they hold very pragmatic attitude and they lay stress predominantly on whais beneficial today, and explicitly refuse any influence of strong institutions(government and self-governments).

Regarding the attitude of the Czech public as well as people working in self-governments to national defence the conclusion might be that they do not oppose theneed for defence but they do not want to be personally involved in these activities. Ifyes, they prefer to reduce their participation to basic requirements of laws.

Table No. 6 Typology of the public according to their view of personalcontribution to defence (%)

Types Population Localself-governments

active � ��

legislatively active ��

passive ��

refusing ��

21

2.6. Military: Why for?

Doubts about the usefulness of military form a long-lasting part of Czech publicopinion. On the one hand, the new international situation decidedly contributed tocasting doubts upon some missions of the military, and initiated deliberations onsignificance of the military for society. The optimistic expectations at the beginning othe 90s went to rack and ruin, and conflicts at the Near East and the Balkansconsiderably contributed to putting the expectations on a “warless society10 in doubtOn the other hand, the Military of the Czech Republic in time of floods in summer1997 considerably contributed to reducing negative impact of the natural disaster.

From the analysis of attitudes of the Czech public, feeling of the usefulness othe military definitely prevails, and that is in both contexts: international – becausenobody can guarantee the long-lasting peace development, and national – for use incase of natural disasters as, for instance, the floods are. Only slightly more than a tenthof the Czech population thinks that we do not need the military. The military is stillperceived as an institution, which should be used in cases of natural disasters or amassive immigration, what is also confirmed by the finding that its engagement in theseinstances is refused only by less than a third of the Czech population, and almost twothirds of respondents do accept the similar exploitation. No doubt, also engagement ofthe military during floods in 1997 greatly contributed to this conviction.

In a moderate contrast to the above mentioned attitudes, we record that in spiteof the general conviction of the usefulness of the military, more than a quarter of theCzech population cannot imagine which tasks should the Czech Military carry out.Only a bit more than half of citizens still keeps considering the military as a symbol othe Czech state independence.

Table No. 7 Usefulness of the military (%)

Yes No I do notknow

the use of the military during the 1997floods proved that there is a need tohave the military

85 9 8

the military is needed since nobody canguarantee the long-lasting peace

79 14 7

the military has always symbolisednational sovereignty

58 28 14

the use of the military during the 1997floods should be appreciated but in thefuture similar tasks (release in naturadisasters, immigration etc.) should becarried out by other institutions

32 60 8

I have no idea about potential tasks forthe military at the present time

28 48 24

the Czech Republic does not need an 13 80 7

10 Charles Moskos, Armed Forces in a Warless Society, In: Jurgen Kuhlmann,Christopher Dandeker, (eds.), Armed Forces after the Cold War, SOWI Forum, No.13, 1992.

22

military

As only one controversy question seems the view on the military as a symbol ofnational independence where age differences are markedly felt. The elders perceive themilitary as a symbol of national independence more often than younger generation. Inthis case, the relevancy of some sociological conceptions is fully confirmed. Inparticular of those which stress out lower importance of sympathy with the national(one-nation) state and its definition in the “military context” by young people.Speaking about the national state, the young people define it rather in economic,international and political terms.

Chart No. 1 The military as a symbol of national sovereignty and age

71

45

40

22

11

18

48

37

6666

47

25

39

129

1418

12

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

15-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60and

more

Yes

No

I do notknow

%

age

There are the males (18% of them) who more markedly agree with the opinionthat the Czech Republic needs no military as well as people living in Prague (19%).The role of the military during the floods is probably reflected also in lower support foropinion that it is necessary to reward the use of the military during the 1997 floods busimilar tasks should be performed by somebody else in future by people from southernMoravia. They express their agreement with the above mentioned only in 23% whilthis statement is disapproved by 66% of respondents from that region.

The attitude of the Czech population could be defined as a pragmat ic one. Thereason is that even though there are some doubts whether the military represents a

23

symbol of national sovereignty, it is, nevertheless, necessary for defence of the territorand inhabitants of the Czech Republic in case of both military threat and naturadisasters or environmental accidents.

2.7. Changes in the military.

The process of changes in the Czech military is a reflection of the twoconsequent trends:1) transformation from the totalitarian military to the democratic military. Thisdevelopment characteristic for all post-communist countries is accompanied bdepoliticization of the military, application of democratic control rules, and democraticcivil-military relations;2) transformation from the traditional military to the post-traditional or post-modernmilitary. This is the trend characteristic for all democratic countries reflecting the facthat following the end of the Cold War the considerable changes of tasks of themilitary occurred what reflected itself in changes of organisational structures, tendencto full or a higher professionalization, transformation of military careers, and the like.

Both trends merge into one process in the Czech Republic. It is logical that athe beginning of the 90s the stronger stress was put on issues of transformation fromthe “socialist type” military to the democratic one. During last years we have notedthat higher stress is put on structural changes, higher professionalization, capability ofthe military be involved into peacekeeping missions, and so on. These tendenciescharacterise a process of transformation from the traditional military to post-traditionalone, capable of carrying out new missions.

Table No. 8 Are you satisfied with progress of changes in the military (%)

1996 1997

satisfied 6 6

partly satisfied, partly not 23 23

unsatisfied 35 32

I do not know 36 39

In case of views of the Czech public on changes in the military there have beenfor a long time already the two consequent tendencies. On the one hand there is arelatively high discontent with the process and outcome of changes within the militarybut in comparison with 1996 we have found out a slight downtrend of this group orespondents. On the other hand a relatively high and slightly increasing unconcernabout the military is evident. These attitudes are reflected also in assessment ochanges within the Czech military.

In attitudes to changes within the military no considerable changes appear.Respondents who identify themselves with the right expressed a slightly more positiveattitude (12% of them is satisfied with changes within the military).

2.8. Problems of the militar

24

Any change is a reaction to existing problems, and at the same time the changegenerates the new problems. What are internal military problems? The list comprises abroad spectrum of potential problems from corruption up to the low prestige of themilitary profession. In developing the list the mass media topicality was taken intoaccount as the decisive factor and not a specification based on analysis of currensituation in the military, or the court findings (in case of corruption).

Table No. 9 Problems of the military as perceived by the public (%)

1996 1997 Diffe-rence1996 -1997

corruption in the military, deficiencies in runningmilitary tenders

73 71 -2

too extensive bureaucratic apparatus 71 70 -1

the low prestige of the military profession 74 66 -8

lack of morale and discipline 69 61 -8

exodus of young military professionals 51 61 +10

low competence of the politicians at the head of theMinistry of Defence

53 56 +3

out-dated military technique X 46 X

the low level of training 57 43 -14

social insecurity in the militar 40 43 +3

the authoritative style of management 45 42 -3

the low level of military education 27 26 -1

Note: X - the question was not asked in 1996

The aspects in which the mass media involve are by the citizens considered tobe the most distinct problems. It is especially about potential corruption in the militaryand too extensive bureaucratic apparatus of defence ministry. The low prestige of themilitary profession follows which was understood as the most distinct problem i1996. More than a half of respondents considers lack of morale and discipline, exodusof young professional soldiers and low competency of high-ranking politicians odefence ministry as the current problems of the military.

Very critical assessment of problems prevails but, nevertheless, in comparisonwith 1996 some positive judgements appear. They are the cases of improved level otraining, prestige of the military profession and the discipline in the military. The onlyone case of more negative assessment is a problem of young career soldiers’ exoduswhat confirms the influence of the media to perception of also other problems by thepublic. Just exodus of young professional soldiers and graduates from NATO schoolshas become a problem, which was extensively covered by the media in recent months,and consequently attracted more distinct reflection among the Czech public occurred.

25

2.9. Influence of the selected military problems on confidence to the military,the Minister of Defence and on perception of changes in the military.

In connection with judgement of problems within the military we can analyse indetail their influence on forming confidence to the Minister of Defence, the militarand on assessment of military transformation. Detailed analysis reveals that even heresome distinctions occur.

Table No. 10 Problems of the military and their impact on formingconfidence to the military, the Defence Minister and the view of

military transformation (1997)

Correlation

confidence to themilitary

confidence to theDefence Minister

the view of militarytransformation

1) corruption in themilitary andproblems wittenders (r=0,30)

1) low competence othe politicians atthe head of theMinistry ofDefence (r=0,25)


2) the low level oftraining (r=0,28)

2) too extensivebureaucraticapparatus (r=0,21)

2) exodus of youngmilitaryprofessionals(r=0,25)

3) lack of morale anddiscipline (r=0,26)


3) lack of morale anddiscipline (r=0,23)

4) the low prestigeof the militaryprofession(r=0,25)

4) the low level ofmilitary education(r=0,16)

4) the authoritativestyle ofmanagement(r=0,21)

5) the low level ofmilitary education(r=0,25)

5) social insecurity inthe military(r=0,15)




6) the low prestige ofthe militaryprofession(r=0,20)

7) too extensivemilitary apparatus(r=0,18)


7) too extensivebureaucraticapparatus (r=0,19)

26

Based on a correlation analysis we can state that confidence or no-confidenceto the:

Defence minister – is being formed predominantly by aspects that we can broadlyidentify as political competencies. It is especially about competence of leadingpoliticians of the ministry. As the second most important factor the size oadministrative apparatus of the ministry comes up what is probably understood by thepublic in relation to both the ministry itself and the General Staff. Corruption issuesrelating to military tenders occupy the third place. Issues of the military educationasystem follow accompanied by social uncertainty and the authoritative style omanagement. Only as the seventh factor the only military aspect comes up, and that isthe military training. In comparison with 1996, in case of defence minister, theinfluence of factors we can characterise as political ones has grown up whileimportance of the military aspects has declined;

Military – is being formed partly by different factors than the confidence of theminister. The emphasis is laid to functional and military aspects, first of all tocorruption in connection with the military procurement, to training and discipline. Alsoprestige of the military profession has an influence on forming confidence to themilitary together with the level of military education, style of management and the sizeof administrative apparatus. In comparison with 1996 we note lower influence of thepolitical aspects on forming credibility of the military;

Assessment of changes within the military – similar factors apply for assessment ochanges within the military as in case of forming credibility of the military. There is oneexception and that is the critical view of young professional soldiers’ exodus, what isthe factor, which gained the most distinct discontent, and which got proved as one ofthe most important criterion of the total assessment of changes within the military.

Comparing the problems that have affected confidence to the Minister oDefence, the military and the view on changes in the military, we find out theirconsiderable stability (see Appendix Table No. 2). At the same time we can state thaon the one hand the political dimension got deepened in attitudes towards defenceminister, and on the other hand the military dimension has gained in strength iattitudes to the military and changes within it. Also the influence of the mass media isclearly felt as well as high reflection of problems that are mostly covered by the media.

2.10. Threats in the new world

The idea that industrial societies were evolving toward greaterpacification has accompanied human thinking several centuries. Thedevelopment at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990sbrought a revival of the notion of a future without war.

It was clear that no serious observer could exclude regionalconflicts, internal wars within countries, ethnic strifes, and majorpowers interventions in spheres of influence. The ideal of a warless

27

society was based on an assumption that a major war betweendemocratic and industrial countries is improbable.11

The real development proved more complicated and broughtmany conflicts, but only few of them were inter-states. New militaryconflict were mainly small-scale and of ethnic or religious origin.Although, the clash of civilisations become a largely discussed idea.12

The end of the Cold War accelerated several consequenttendencies. Several authors speak about a world in anarchy.13 It isevident that the world become multiporal and multicivilizational. Thedanger of a massive two-bloc confrontation has disappeared and newthreats have come to the fore. It is possible to speak about diffusion ofpower and diffusion of threats. This tendency is valid not only formilitary threats, but also for those of social, economic and ecologicalorigin. Another tendency is evident as far as time and space isconcerned. The priority is flexibility and operationability. Managingthreats is limited by diffusion of authority and responsibility. Anotherimportant aspect become de-militarization of security.14

The last tendency is worth describing more closely. While in thepast security was defined in military terms, today the notion hasacquired new mostly non-military dimensions. In militaryconsequences deployment of troops is often not to win a war butprevent it. It is impossible to neglect the shift from military towardeconomic competition. Low profile of military threats and no evidentenemy in democratic countries shifted attention toward economic,social and ecological threats.

This is also a case of the Czech Republic which „faces noconcrete or visible enemy at present“.15 Non-existence of militarymenace is accompanied by amassing of economic and social threats.This logically leads to considerations that defence expenditures is aluxury, if not an outright and waste of money.

2.11. Feeling of threa

The concept of security is relatively broad and has got many aspects andmeanings. In recent time, this term has been getting still broader dimension and hasceased to be identified only with the military security or criminality. Trends connectedwith the so-called new movements reveal ever-deeper contents of the “security” terwhich is being enlarged also to environmental issues, feminism, human rights as well as 11 Charles Moskos, Armed Forces in a Warless Society. In: Jurgen Kuhlmann,Christopher Dandeker, (eds.), Armed Forces after the Cold War, SOWI Forum, No.13, Munich, 1992.12 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of WorldOrder, Simon and Schuster, New York 1996.13 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-firsCentury, Scribner, New York, 1993. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Pandaemonium:Ethnicity in International Politics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993.14 Concerning these points see Jiri Sedivy, The Nuclear Question in the CzechRepublic, Perspectives, no. 9, 1997/98, pp. 77 - 78.15 Adress by President Vaclav Havel on the Occasion of the National Day of thCzech Republic, Prague, October 28, 1996.

28

to social or economic matters and even to a family. These dimensions are understoodas highly acute and sometimes they are of highly emotional nature.

Also from the reason that we can define the term of “security” broadly, weasked the citizens about the feeling of threat from the current social and politicasituation. From the time viewpoint we can see a considerable growth of the threafeeling in comparison with recent years. It is likely a reflection of economic, social andpolitical problems that became ones of the central problems in the Czech Republic in1997, while a period of 1994 – 1996 could be characterised as time of economicgrowth and political stability.

29

Table No. 11 When you consider the actual social andeconomic situation do you feel secure or not? (%)

1994 1996 1997secure 51 57 44threatened 49 43 56

Higher feeling of security is for a long time evident among people with politicalorientation to the right centre (62%), younger people, primarily in age of (59%), or 20 – 29 (58%), and people with university education (58%). But also intheses categories there was a considerable increase of threat feelings in comparisonwith 1996 or 1994.16

The more distinct feeling of threat is constantly found out at the left-wingpolitical orientation supporters (79%) and the left centre (72%), people with agrammar-school education without GCE examination (62%), and people over 60(70%). Probably due to floods in summer 1997 also people from the South Moraviaexpress their higher feeling of threat (65%).

2.12. What generates the feeling of threat?

As it has already been indicated the feeling of threat has got lots of dimensions– social, economic, political, environmental, military, and the like. Some risks are ofthe long-term nature, the others of the short one. It is almost impossible to cover thetotal spectrum. Due to the development in recent decades a considerable changes in re-structuring of risks occur, and in connection with them, also of subjectively perceivedforms of personal threats. Military risks are being eliminated but economic, social andenvironmental and other risks gain more importance. At the same time, primarilythreats against property and life as well as organised crime and new forms ocriminality pose the most considerable and almost everyday security risks for anindividual. Global risks can not be neglected as well.

It is almost impossible to cover the whole spectrum of risks but in spite of thatwe have striven to define at least the basic risks that we can identify in the society.

We can refer to the similar tendencies also according to our research where wefind out high preference particularly of personal forms of threats as criminality andviolence are, together with economic forms of threats and pollution of environment.

16 For instance, among people of the central-right political orientation the feeling ofsecurity had expressed 72% of them and among the young people in age of 15-19 itwas 80 %.

30

Table No. 12 Sources of threats (%)

1994 1997violence in the society 90 85criminality 91 83the state of the Czech crown as acurrency

33 71

environmental pollution 87 70behaviour of politicians 41 64housing expenditures 61 58the market economy 42 54the living standard, I can afford 40 54the asylum right in the CzechRepublic

43 39

foreigners 33 39the situation in the former SovietUnion

60 35

my future in the Czech Republic 26 34strong and powerful government 29 32my job 21 23the Czech military 19 17my family and friends 5 3

In comparison with 1994 a considerable growth of fears of economic andpolitical nature was recorded – the state of the Czech currency, market economy,living standard and behaviour of politicians. It is a logical reaction to development othe economic situation and extensive coverage of this problem by the media in 1997.The decline was marked in case of environmental pollution and situation in the formerUSSR. The military contributes to the feeling of threat only among less than a fifth ofthe Czech population.

In more detailed analysis we can identify the two basic differentiating factors inperceptions of risks. The first is the age and the second the political orientation. Atlevel of the political orientation there is a clearly different view on economic andpolitical risks what logically bears on each other. Respondents of the left-wingorientation feel to be more endangered from the economic point of view, and theblame politicians for that. At the age level a different view on the market economyappears because it is being more considerably accepted as a contribution to security bthe young generation. The older generation expresses stronger fears of criminality andviolence in society, and it has got stronger fears of foreigners.

Table No. 13 The correlation of the age and the politicaorientation with sources of threats

age political orientatio1) violence in the society r=0,152) criminality r=0,143) the market economy r=0,12

1) the market economy r=0,292) the living standard r=0,263) housing expenditures r=0,21

31

4) foreigner r=0,12 4) my future r=0,155) behaviour of our politicians

r=0,156) my job r=0,13

A reaction of population to current risks of economic and social nature isevident. A more considerable unconcern can be then seen in relation to foreign policyissues, problems of the military and military security, or environmental risks.

2.13. Feeling of the military threat

The fall of communist regimes at the end of the 80s and the entire change othe international situation brought about also a different perception of the militarythreat. It resulted in a decline of fears of the military conflict. This attitude wasn’t moresignificantly affected even by unpropitious development on the Balkans. Withmarginalization of the military threat the new, till that time neglected risks came toforeground. The society started to focus first of all on elimination of economic, socialand environmental risks. The population at the same time expects also the payment ofthe so-called “peace dividend”, that is the re-distribution of funds in favour ofelimination of risks to which the population attaches a greater importance.

A possibility of the military threat in the future is supposed,similarly as in 1996, by only a third of the Czech population, whiletwo-thirds this possibility refuse.

Table No. 14 Do you think that the Czech Republic might be endangered militarily in the future?

1996 1997

probably yes 32 35

probably 68 65

The only one characteristic, which differentiates the attitude to apotential threat, is age when younger people consider the militarythreat to be less likely in the future.

Table No. 15 A possibility of the military threat according to age

Age 1996 1997

15 - 19 20 16

20 - 29 25 23

30 - 39 29 33

40 - 49 30 30

32

50 - 59 30 35

60 and more 42 56

Compared with 1996, there is a growth in generation differencesin a view to possibility of the military threat. We recorded a decline offears of the military threat in the future at people under 30. On thecontrary the growth of fears occurred at people over 50.

Even in the Czech Republic we note the trend that prevails inthe most of industrial countries which reads that the younggeneration doubts more significantly the possibility of the militarythreat. It is a problem that is considered by part of experts as a resultof distinct life experiences while other part points out especially theinfluence of a social change which occurred following considerabletechnology development and cultural, and even environmentalglobalization.

2.14. Who is considered to be the military threat

The feeling of non-existence of the military threat is confirmedalso by another question in reply to which 66% of the Czechpopulation expressed the opinion that they are unable to imagineanybody who could endanger the Czech Republic, or they are unableto respond to the question. The most considerable fears aretraditionally felt of Russia and Germany. Slovakia, Near East, and theBalkans including regions of the former Yugoslavia follow them. Incomparison with 1996 we note a considerable growth in numbers ofpeople who perceive Germany as a possible source of the militarythreat.

Table No. 16 Military threat and its sources (%)

Czech population people under 30 let people over 30 let

1994 1996 1997 1994 1996 1997 1994 1996 1997

I do not know,it does not exist

69,4 62,6 66,3 69,0 61,5 65,5 69,6 63,0 66,8

Russia 23,0 19,1 24,9 23,2 22,6 25,5 22,9 17,9 24,7

Germany 7,8 4,3 13,6 8,0 2,7 12,4 8,2 4,9 14,0

Slovakia 2,8 3,3 4,5 4,1 3,0 5,8 2,1 3,4 4,1

the Near Easand Arabcountries

5,6 3,3 2,3 3,4 2,9 2,2 1,9 3,4 2,3

USA 0,3 1,3 2,4 0,2 2,0 2,2 0,4 1,1 2,5

33

formerYugoslavia andthe Balkan

5,6 1,5 2,8 7,1 1,3 2,5 4,8 1,5 3,0

Ukraine 2,0 0,6 1,9 1,1 0,6 1,9 2,3 0,5 1,9

Note: The sum can exceed 100%, because the respondents could name at maximum 3 possible sourcesof the military threat for the Czech Republic.

At the younger part of the population we note for a longer timealready some increased fears of Russia and Slovakia. The senior partof the population rather often thinks that Germany represents thethreat. This slightly different generation view can be also a result ofdifferent personal experiences. “Fears of Germany” we record only at9% of respondents in age of 15 – 19, while at people in age over 60 thepercentage is 23%.

2.15. Acceptance of involvement in peacekeeping missions

Experts on security issues and civil-military relations expressedthe view that never in the last fifty years the military had performed somany tasks as it has done at present. At the same time theyemphasise that never in the past the performance of these tasks wasso considerably financially limited. The fact that the military, in timeof relative non-existence of direct military threat to the country, is verybusy institution comes from unprecedented extent of internationalpeace activities. The legitimacy of the so-called “new missions” is up tothe three players. They are the politicians, the media and the public.Interrelations of these players are very complex, and we cannotacknowledge that the public accepts all arguments of the politiciansand the media. In some cases the opposite is true and just evenattitudes of the public determine the attitudes of politicians andapproach of the media.17 The public support acts as important factorthat limits involvement into peacekeeping operations or theirtermination. As an example can serve the withdrawal of the U. S. fromSomalia or the “Srebrenica syndrome” which affects attitudes topeacekeeping missions in the Netherlands. The Czech participation inthe peacekeeping missions was not so far confronted with thesituation that could be characterised as a crisis of legitimacy (extremecasualties, not meeting expectations of the public in protection ofcivilians, and others), anyway it would be unhappy to underestimateinfluence of the public opinion. The new requirements for legitimacy ofinvolvement into peacekeeping operations result also from transitionsto the missions of the so-called “second generation” that lay higherstress on employment of the military force than it was in the past.18

17 John Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War, Chicago: University of ChicagoPress, 1994.18 Christopher Dandeker, James Gow, The Future of Peace Support Operations:��

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Involvement of the Czech soldiers in peacekeeping operations,as it is for instance participation in the former Yugoslavia, wassupported by half of the Czech population. Almost two fifths of therespondents were against it. More than a tenth answered it did notknow. In comparison with 1996 it did not come about to distinctchanges but only to moderate decline of a group of respondents whorefuse involvement of the Czech Republic into the peacekeepingactivities. This downtrend is within the framework of a statistic errorwhat holds also in case of moderate increase in a group of undecidedrespondents.

Table No. 17 Do you agree with involvement of Czech troops in peacekeepingoperations, as it for instance our participation in the former Yugoslavia? (%)

1996 1997

Yes 50 50

No 41 38

I do not know 9 12

After comparison of demographic and attitude characteristics ofindividual groups of respondents we found out that the group whichagrees with involvement of the Czech units in peacekeepingmissions is formed by part of population supporting admission toNATO (73% of them agree with participation in peacekeepingmissions) what means that they are people with university education(64%), secondary school education (57%), in a group age between 15and 19 (68%), or between 20 and 24 (62%). Respondents living intowns populated from 20 to 100 thousand (58%), supporting thepolitical right centre (70%), or the right (65%), express more distinctacceptance. The higher rate of acceptance is registered at males (57%).

The group which does not agree with involvement of thCzech units in peacekeeping missions consists of older people over60 (54% of them expressed their disagreement), living in townspopulated over 100 thousand (52%). Respondents supporting thepolitical left (65%), the left centre (49%), and the centre (47%) refuseinvolvement in particular.

The group which expresses undecided attitude is formedmostly people expressing undecided attitude to admission to NATO(24% responded “don’t know”), women (17%), and people supportingpolitical left centre (16%), and the left (21%).

Comparing with 1996 an interesting trend takes place. A moredistinct polarisation occurred of the responding groups supportingand rejecting involvement of the Czech units in the peacekeepingoperations. This polarisation is a consequence of the two consequenttrends:

35

1) groups of population more considerably inclining to supportour participation in peacekeeping activitie express a little moreexplicit attitudes, that is, they manifest higher acceptance withinvolvement of our units in peacekeeping missions than in 199619;2) parts of population more distinctly refusing the Czechparticipation in the peacekeeping missions maintained similarattitudes as in the past but this group is a bit smaller because a partof them moved to the “camp of those undecided”. This movement wasmanifested by increase of people of leftist orientation in a group ofthose undecided20.

This development indicates increase of attitude diversitybetween the groups of population accepting and refusing the Czechparticipation in the peacekeeping operations. The group, whichabandoned the so-called „hard core“ rejecting involvement intopeacekeeping missions, did not do it as a result of its conviction oncorrect positive attitudes, but more because it did not find sufficientarguments to convince the group about the correctness of refusingattitudes.

Finally, we can state that disunity of the Czech public maintainsthose attitudes to peacekeeping missions as in 1996. This trend canbe also a result of insufficient emphasis put on domestic legitimacy ofpeacekeeping activities when priority is in the knowledge what ourunits in peacekeeping missions do, what is the importance for theinternational position of the Czech Republic while it is considered amatter of course that the public knows why they do it. A considerablepart of the Czech public probably does not understand for the presentthe moral dimension of peacekeeping missions and participation inthem is considered first of all as an issue of international prestige ofthe Czech Republic.

19 The growth of support for participamongion in the peacekeeping missions wasnotable especially among people with university educamongion from 58% in 1996to 64% in 1997, among people with grammar-school educamongion f rom 52% to57%, among the youth in age of 15 – 19 from 50% to 68%, and among an agcamongegory of 20 – 24 from 57% to 62%.20 Among people with political orientamongion to the left centre we have recorded agrowth of “undecided” group from 8% in 1996 to 21% in 1997, and among peoplwho identify themselves with the left the growth was from 7% to 15%

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2.16. Opinions on participation in peacekeeping missions

In speaking about peacekeeping missions their legitimity shouldbe emphasised. In this context we can consider the three basicdimensions of legitimacy:1) international dimension – which expresses how the CzechRepublic participation is accepted by foreign players, and to whichextend it contributes to phenomenon that can be characterised asprotection of national interests of the Czech Republic;2) functional dimension – which reflects perception of multinationalmissions influence to remodelling the military to be able to carry outthe three basic groups of tasks: defence of the own territory, or use ofthe military in natural and environmental disasters; defence of theterritory of allies and participation in multinational peacekeepingmissions;3) moral dimension – which expresses the global responsibility of thedemocratic country for solving problems and conflicts in other parts ofthe world.

In analysing empirical data we can state that opinions onparticipation of the Czech Republic in peacekeeping operationsacknowledge the assumption that legitimacy of the Czechparticipation in missions comes from the emphasis to theinternational dimension of legitimacy and lay stress on nationalinterests of the Czech Republic. This dimension is manifested also byhigh approval with statements that participation in the peacekeepingmissions promotes image of the Czech Republic and increases itschances for integration in EU and NATO. After comparing attitudes topeacekeeping operations during 1996 and 1997 we find out that thefunctional dimension grows what expresses conviction thatpeacekeeping activities are at present one of a few ways on how to testreadiness of the military and at the same time to change it accordingto new requirements. This trend is manifested also by the growth ofacceptance with statements that foreign missions provide opportunityin forming a new type of a soldier who will be needed more often infuture. An issue of the moral legitimacy after comparison with theabove stated ones seems to be the most problematic. Knowledge fromother countries show that stable support to participation inpeacekeeping activities is ensured only in case when the so-calledmoral imperative works together with conviction that “something mustbe done”.21 This situation at least partially guarantees that nosignificant and sudden change of the public attitudes occurs due tounfavourable events – casualties, disability to protect civilians frommassacres and the like. Just in case of the moral legitimacy factor wefind out, even for the decline after comparison with 1996, considerableacceptance with a statement that our soldiers put their lives in risk

21 Christopher Dandeker, Ozbrojene sily v nových casech - naroky na lidske zdroje.In: Armady po ukonceni studene valk , Impuls, Praha 1995, p. 36.

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during missions which goals are not quite clear. Only half of theCzech public agrees with the opinion that participation in solvingproblems in crisis areas is a duty of the democratic country. Probablyalso economic factor contributes to unclear moral legitimacy wheredisunity of the public is manifested towards spending money fordeployment of our units to peacekeeping missions, and traditionallyamong the public prevails acceptance of the opinion that the onlyreason why soldiers enlist for missions is money.

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Table No. 18 Attitudes toward peacekeeping missions (%)

1996 1997Yes No I do not

knowYes No I do not

knowparticipation inpeacekeepingmissions promotesimage of the CzechRepublic

x x x 73 16 11

the only reasonwhy soldiers enlistfor missions ismoney

76 16 8 72 18 10

foreign missionsprovideopportunity to testquality of theCzech military

62 23 15 71 19 10

participation inpeacekeepingmissionsincreases chancesfor CzechRepublic’sintegration inNATO and EU

x x x 66 15 19

it is a duty of ademocratic stateto participate insolving problemsin crisis areas

x x x 52 31 17

missions provideopportunity informing a newtype of a soldier

44 30 26 52 23 25

Czech soldiers puttheir lives in riskduring missionswhich goals arenot quite clear

55 36 9 47 40 13

it is worthlessspendingtaxpayers’ moneyon sending ourtroops topeacekeeping

x x x 39 45 16

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missionsNote.: x - the question was not asked in 1996.

In a detail analysis of a group of people who express acceptancewith individual statements it is evident that especially the politicalorientation and attitudes to NATO membership are sources ofdifferences. People inclining more to the political right and with thepositive attitude to entry into NATO more prefer the statement thatparticipation in peacekeeping missions increases chances of the CzechRepublic for integration into EU and NATO as well as that theseactivities have positive influence to the image of the Czech Republicabroad. They prefer more distinctly the opinion that the peacekeepingactivities are one of the duties of the democratic country, and theyperceive more positively also the functional consequences, that is, thatthe peacekeeping missions represent a chance to form a new soldierand to check up the quality of our military. People refusing entry ofthe Czech Republic into NATO with inclination to the political leftmore often support opinions that spending money of taxpayers forsending our units into peacekeeping missions is futile and they moreconsiderably point out the faintness of goals of these missions as wellas that the sole reason the soldiers enlist for them is money.

Coming out from the above knowledge on attitudes of the Czechpopulation to the peacekeeping missions we can create a typology ofrespondents in which we’ll limit to definition of the three basic types:1) supporters – they are the people who express explicit positiveattitudes to the Czech participation in peacekeeping operations. Theyshare opinion that it is a duty of the democratic country to participatein solving problems in crisis regions; goals of missions the CzechRepublic participates in are clear and it is necessary to allocate moneyon deploying our units in these missions;2) opponents – it is that part of the Czech population that explicitlyrefuses participation of the Czech Republic in peacekeeping missions.It points out that it is not the duty of the democratic country toparticipate in solving problems in crisis regions; goals of missions theCzech Republic participates in are unclear, and this part of populationopposes spending money for these activities;3) neutrals - people who have no definite attitudes to peacekeepingmissions, and they are somewhere between supporters and opponentsof the Czech involvement into these missions.

The following shows diversification of the population in relationto the above stated definition:

Table No. 19 Typology of the Czech population according to its attitudes towardpeacekeeping missions (%)

supporters 24 %

40

neutrals 59 %

opponents 17 %

A majority of the Czech population takes no explicit attitude tothe peacekeeping operations. It is about the expected result becausewe can assume that it is a problem which is at the periphery of publicinterests. Neutral attitudes are taken especially by people of the centrepolitical orientation (71% from them), respondents in age over 60(69%), young people in age of 15 – 19 (69%). Only less than halfrespondents are quite clear about their attitude towards thepeacekeeping operations while a quarter of the Czech population takesup explicit positive attitude which is expressed by their perception ofthe missions as legitimate activities22. They are primarily the peoplewith university education (41%), with political orientation to the rightcentre (40%), or the right (36%). The Czech participation inpeacekeeping and humanitarian missions is explicitly withheld by lessthan a fifth of the Czech population23. They are the people withorientation to the left (48%), or the left centre (29%), and people in ageof 50 – 59 (27%).

Legitimacy of Czech participation in peacekeeping missions israther vague and stems from national interests, above all desires toenter Euro-Atlantic structures. Vague legitimacy reflects also the factthat Czech activities in these missions are at the bring of publicinterests and only a minority of the Czech population shares a clearattitude (supporting or opposing) toward them.

2.17. Attitudes to conscription

Conscription is a subject of discussion, and experiences thatyoung men get by the service completion form their attitudes to themilitary in a considerable way.24 In case of the attitude towardsconscription, the Czech population splits into two groups. Less than

22 To illustrate attitudes consistency of this part of the Czech population we canstate that 95% of them think that participation in peacekeeping and humanitarianmissions improves image of the Czech Republic, 95% of them assert that foreignmissions check up the quality of Czech military, 93% point out that participation inpeacekeeping missions increases chances of the Czech Republic for integration intoEU and NATO, 80% assert that missions are opportunity to form a new type of asoldier who will be useful more often in the future. At the same time even amongthem 50% think that the sole reason the soldiers enlist for missions is money.23 From this part of the population only 23% think that missions are anopportunity to form a new type of a soldier who will be useful more often in thefuture, 38% assert that participation in peacekeeping missions increases chancesof the Czech Republic for integration into EU and NATO, 40% think thatparticipation in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions improves image of theCzech Republic, 48% assert that foreign missions check up quality of our militaryand 96% think that the sole reason the soldiers enlist for missions is money.24 Jiri Hendrych, Vojenska zakladni sluzba jako socializacni faktor. In: StefanSarvas (ed.), Armada v moderni spolecnosti, Vesmir, Praha, 1997. pp.149-164.

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half of respondents has positive attitude to it, and more than a thirdshares the negative attitude. Less than a fifth of respondentsanswered “I do not know”.

Table No. 20 Attitudes toward military service (%)

1996 1997positive 42 44negative 43 37I do not know 15 19

The age and sex have the most decisive impact on the attitudetowards conscription. We can assert that the younger therespondent is the more often expresses negative attitude towardsconscription, what applies to males in particular. This knowledgeconfirms that also in this country the trends known from developedindustrial countries take advance in terms that conscription isperceived to be legitimate particularly by older people.

2.18. Opinions on conscription

In the past, conscription was perceived as a symbol of “entranceinto maturity”. In modern society, nevertheless, this character is beinggradually lost especially among the young people.25 More than half ofthe Czech population approves the statement that conscription doesmake men from boys, and it is a matter of honour to undertake it. Onthe other hand, the two thirds of the Czech population agree with thestatement that conscription poses the financial and time loss.

Table No. 21 Attitudes toward conscription (%)

1996 1997conscription makes men from boys 52 56it is a matter of honour to undertakeconscription

43 52

conscription poses the financial andtime loss for young men

74 67

In comparison with 1996, some rehabilitation of conscriptionoccurs. It is highly probable that this trend has a connection withoverall positive perception of the military within society than in thepast. Also in case of attitudes to conscription the most distinctivedifferences appear on the age basis. It has been confirmed again thatolder people and women more positively assess the conscriptionservice.

25 Janowitz M., Moskos Ch.C., Five Years of the All-Volunteer Force: 1973-1978.Armed Forces and Society, 1979, No.2, s. 171-2.

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2.19. Conscription or the professional military?

Currently, we witness a discussion on a future form of themilitary; in particular in developed industrial countries. Thediscussion comes from the idea of a “death of a mass military”,26 andit is focused on two options: preservation of a conscription militarywith a high degree of professionalization – particularly of non-commissioned officers´ (NCO´s) positions, or establishment of a fullyprofessional military. We register a considerable inclination to the fullprofessionalization in many countries currently. In the 90s, the fullprofessionalization was completed in Belgium and the Netherlands,and this step is being prepared in France. Similar trends can be foundalso in other countries, for instance in Argentina where a perspectiveestablishment of a professional military is discussed. This idea hasbeen worded also in a traditional bastion of a conscription type ofmilitary, as Germany is, and also Israel ruminates over higherprofessionalization of some NCO´s positions. Even here, in Israel,some voices have been raised calling for complete professionalizationeven though experts insist that due to the Near East security situationthese opinions cannot be taken seriously. This development could notescape notice of the Czech public, especially of the youth.

In comparison with 1996, we recorded a moderate decline ofsupport for preservation of the conscription conception with increaseof an undecided group. This tendency can mean that the mentionedproblem loses its interest for the public.

Table No. 19 Support for either conscription or theprofessional military (%)

1994 1996 1997to keep conscription 25 35 31professional military 57 48 46I do not know 18 17 23

Also in this case it has been manifested that the problem ofpreference of the conscription or professional military is a generationproblem when transition to the professional military is distinctivelypreferred by younger people and men.

2.20. How long conscription should be?

Since 1989, conscription service time has been cut down severaltimes to 12 months, and its duration is still under discussion amongthe youth. There are opinions that the Czech Republic should switchto the all-volunteer armed forces. As the most differentiating factor in

26 See for instance, Harries-Jenkins, G., From Conscription to Volunteer Armies.Adelphi Paper, No.103, Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 1973.

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assessing the lenght of conscription seems age as shown in thefollowing table.

Table No. 23 How long conscription should be (in months)?

Age Czech

population

15 -19

20 -29

30 -39

40 -49

50 -59

60and

moreaverage 11,1

(10,7)8,2 9,0 10,5 11,4 12,7 13,4

average without those whostated that conscription

should last 0 months (9,5% interviewed)

12,3(12,2)

10,0 10,5 11,8 11,9 13,2 14,4

Note: In brackets the average for 1996.

The most considerable deprecation of conscription can be found at a group opeople who have fresh experiences with it. At the same time, we find out that all agegroups consider the twelve-month service as the most ideal. The support for longerconscription service is being worded by older age groups while younger people thinkthat this service should be shorter. These attitudes are logically a consequence odifferent life situation and experiences.

Also in case of opinions towards the length of conscription onehypothesis is confirmed, what is that even though the younggeneration perceives it as a burden and thinks that it should be asshort as possible, we can consider it as a legitimate service in relationto relatively low deprecation of it. At the same time one fact isconfirmed that the most distinctive source of doubts on the need ofthe conscription service are experiences from its undertaking.

2.21. Performance of Conscription Service

Both abroad and in the Czech republic, discussions take placein order to find out whether it is possible to deploy conscripts intoforeign operations. In these discussions we find arguments which bothsupport and reject this approach. In our case, the responedents wereasked about their opinion where the young men should perform theirmilitary service and proposed several options ranging from foreignmissions down to a location as close as possible to their domicile.Attitudes to this issue have been relatively stable, and no distinctivechanges occurred.

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Table No. 24 Opinions on performance of conscription serv(%)

1996 1997to serve according to theneeds of the country andthe military, but on theCzech Republic’s territory

42 40

serve as close as possibleto the domicile

39 39

to serve according to theneeds of the country andthe military, includingforeign missions

12 13

I do not know 7 8

Also in this case some differences occur in preference ofindividual options based on age in particular. The younger peopleprefer conscription to be as close as possible to the domicile – 47% atthe age group of 15 – 19, and 50% at people of 20 – 29 years of age.Older population groups lay stress on performance of conscriptionaccording to needs of the country and military, but on the CzechRepublic’s territory only – 53% at people over 60 and 51% at people inage of 50 – 59 years.

The performance of conscription in accordance with needs of thecountry and military, including missions abroad, is more distinctivelydisapproved by people with left-centre-wing political orientation whenonly 5% agree with this alternative. The right wing and the right-centre-wing politically orientated people accept this alternative moredistinctively by 29% and 19% respectively.

2.22. What is More Important for the Society – Military or CiviService?

The civil service has a long tradition in many democraticcountries and a considerably high social significance. In case of theCzech Republic, this problem is relatively new. It was introducedshortly after the 1989 „velvet revolution“ when students raised thisissue among their main requirements. In the research we havefocused on perception of civil service in comparison with military onefrom the viewpoint of their social significance. When monitoringdevelopment of the Czech public’s attitudes to this problem, we findout a moderate increase of acceptance for significance of militaryservice. Opposite trend was recorded in case of civil service.

Table No. 25 Importance of civil and military service (%)

45

1994 1996 1997military service is moreimportant

29 30 33

civil service is moreimportant

16 18 13

booth are important 43 40 43both are unimportant 12 12 11

In detailed analysis, we find out higher preference of the opinionthat:military service is more important – at people inclining to the left(70%) and people in age of 50 – 59 years (50%), or 60 and more years(39%);civil service is more important – at young people in age of 15 – 19years (20%), or 20 – 29 years (21%), as well as at respondentsorientated to the right centre (19%);both are not important – at people in age of 15 – 19 years (17%) inparticular.

As the best solution is seen combination of both kind of service.Despite the fact that civil service is a novelty it has rather highlegitimacy, however, evidently higher legitimacy is expressed by Czechyouth.

2.23. Who to decide on civil serv ice

The problem of checking up those interested in the civil servicehas been discussed several times both among experts and in themedia, and therefore we have also paid attention to it in our poll. Itgoes to show that also here the attitudes are stable even though werecord a moderate shift to a lack of interest in these issues. Theopinion that the decision should be made by draftees shared half ofthe Czech public while only one third prefer a special commission.

Table No. 27 How to decide on civil service? (%)

1996 1997the reasons should bescreened by a specialcommission

33 32

the decision should bemade by draftees

53 50

I do not know 14 18

The age seems the sole differentiating criterion. People over 60(by 47%) lay stress on decision made by a special commission. Thedecision to be made by a recruit is preferred in particular by youngerpeople in age of 15 – 19 years (60%), 20 – 29 years (62%), and 30 – 39years (57%).

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3. The Czech public and professional soldiers on NATOmembership

3.1. Support for admission to NATO

Public support for NATO membership became one of the mostdiscussed issues in 1997. It attracted attention of politicians,journalists and experts. A very important role was played by foreignactors (politicians and experts) who criticised lack of public support.Simultaneously, this issue drawn attention of many Czech prominentswho otherwise resisted from being involved in political discussions. Itbrought about a dramatic increase of activities of NGO’s. The wholedebate on NATO membership contributed to the development ofdemocracy in the Czech Republic as well as to the increase of civilianexpertise in security and military matters.

The long-term trends, gained from the public opinion polls,describing changes are sometimes more important than individualresults. In case of our question, seeking consent with the admission toNATO, we have recorded, after comparison with previous poll, adecline of that consent. It is about a trend, which corresponds withthe last findings of IVVM (the Czech Public Opinion Poll Institute).

In development of attitudes of the Czech public toward NATOmembership several periods might be identified:1) for a short period of neutrality after the collapse of communism, the

option of neutrality as a mean of disengagement of the country fromthe Warsaw pact was overwhelming. Support for NATO was verylow.

2) between 1991 and late 1994 there was an increase in support forNATO membership. It resulted from fears of new conflicts, the Gulfwar, attempted coup in Moscow, collapse of the USSR, war in theformer Yugoslavia. A threat of the Muslim fundamentalism began tobe perceived.

3) In years 1994 the decrease of support was observed, It resultedfrom confluence of several factors: due to the lack of publicdiscussion caused by low interests of the political elite, thecrystallisation of opponent’s opinion (mainly the extreme rightAssociation for Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia orextreme left Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia or LeftBlock), the negative propaganda (nuclear weapons and foreign troopon the Czech territory) etc.

4) In 1995 and 1996, the low informational activity of the governmentand political subject supporting NATO membership kept a very highlevel of those sharing the negative or undecided attitudes towardNATO membership.

5) In the spring 1997 a certain reversal of the trend of low support wasidentified. It happened due to a marked intensification of the pro-NATO activities. While the number of opponents remained more or

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less same the camp of undecided has begun to shrink.27 This trendwas shortly interrupted in the autumn 1997 when due to politicalturbulence there was an evident decline of attention to NATOmembership which ensued in a short-lasting slip in support forCzech entry into NATO, however, it was not combined with a rise ofrejection. When the new Czech government was formed in January1998 the slow but continuous growth proved durable.

Table No. 28 Positive attitudes toward NATO membership of thCzech Republic (%)

1993 1994 1995 1996 IV/1997

V/1997

IX/1997

XI/1997

XII/1997

II/1998

III/1998

IVVM 47 34 39 38 42 45 47 43 53 54 54

USIA --- 59 59 51 --- --- 59 --- -- --- ---

Factu --- --- --- 40 40 50 --- --- 54 55 54

STEM 52 56 54 46 44 -- 51 --- -- 59 56

ResearcDepartment

--- --- --- 46 --- 55 --- 50 -- --- 58

Note: There are only positive attitudes depending on questions used by different agencies. IVVM„Should the Czech Republic make effort to enter NATO?“, USIA - „Would you support entry intoNATO, if your country would have such a chance“, when in September 1997 due to invitation thequestion was changed „Do you support entry of your country into NATO?“ Factum - „Would in theCzech Republic be a referendum on NATO membership would you vote for or against ?“, STEM -„Do you think that we should make effort to enter NATO?“, Research Department MOD - „Do youagree with entry of the Czech Republic to NATO?“

In November 1997, half of the Czech population over 15 years of agesupported admission of the Czech Republic to NATO. Against the admission, there isa less than a quarter of respondents (24 %), and more than a quarter (26 %) of themanswered it does not know whether it supports or refuses the admission to NATO.

The decline of consent with the admission was not accompaniedby increase of disapproval. Similarly to IVVM results, we have alsorecorded a growth of an undecided group.

Table No. 29 Do you agree with Czech Republ ’s entry intoNATO? (%)

XII/1996 V/1997 X/1997 II/1998I agree 46 55 50 58I do notagree

30 28 24 37

I do not 24 17 26 5 27 This trends identified on the base of the following sources: Central and EasternEurobarometer, no. 7, 1997, Postoje k clenstvi CR v EU a NATO, Factum, 1997, JiriSedivy, Security in Central and Eastern Europe: Problems - Perceptions - Policiesin Czech Republic, Institute of International Relations, 1997. Stefan Sarvas, Postojceske verejnosti ke vstupu do NATO, Mezinarodni politik , no. 3, 1997 and StefanSarvas, Pohledy ceske verejnosti a vojaku z povolani na vstup CR do NATO, Vyberstati, no. 8, 1997.

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know

Higher support for NATO membership is expressed by theprofessional corps. Among the professional soldiers 72 % of themexpressed support for NATO membership in May 1997. Among theCzech public it was 55 %. Simultaneously 66 % of the professionalcorps indicated that they would vote for NATO membership in case ofa referendum. According to the agency Factum only 50 % of the publicwould do so.

The groups of opponents and backers of the admission of CzechRepublic to NATO differ. The political orientation seems to be the mostimportant identification factor when the right-wing respondentssupport the admission to NATO more distinctively in comparison withthe left-wing ones. People with higher education express highersupport for the admission to the Alliance, and it is similar at theyouth and middle-age people. The group of undecided respondents isthe most interesting one because it has grown up compared with thelast findings. The fundamental characteristics of this group are thatthe press media pose lower impact on it. It relates especially towomen, older people and the youth in age under 20 years, as well asto people with centrist political orientation, so it is about the groupswith lower interest in political issues.

Table No. 30 Attitudes toward entry into NATO and demographic characteristic(November 1997)

I agree (50 %) I do not agree (24 %) I do not know (26 %)

centre-right politicaorientation - 74%

left political orientation -53 %

age at 15 - 19 - 37 %

university education - 73% centre-left politicaorientation - 39 %

the part of populatiwhich does not read thepress - 41 %

right political orientation -72 %

age at 55 - 59 - 37 % age over 60 - 40 %

age at 20 - 24 61 % age at 50 - 54 - 34 % centre political orientation -39 %

age at 30 - 34 let 61 % women - 37 %

age at 45 - 49 let 60 % basic education - 34 %

the part of population beinginformed by professionalsoldiers - 59 %

men 59 %

age at 40 - 44 - 58 %

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age at 35 - 39 - 56 %

secondary education - 56 %

age at 25 - 29 - 55 %

The characteristics mentioned above show that the group ofundecided people is less susceptible to the influence of the press, andit is likely disinterested in any discussion over the admission of CzechRepublic in NATO. The approach to this group requires specific formsof communication.

As in the past, it is re-confirmed now that the most importantfactor affecting a consent with the admission to NATO is the politicalorientation which then influences also other demographiccharacteristics as age and education are. Also other polls support thisconclusion.

The correlation analysis confirms continuity in the dominantinfluence of the political orientation. After eliminating a factor ofthe political orientation, we find out that importance of age differences– higher support to the admission to NATO by the young people – andeducation – higher support from better-educated groups of society –loses its significance.

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Table No. 31 Influence of political orientation on attitudes towar

Czech entry into NATO (November 1997)

Support for NATOmembership

Support for NATOmembership with

exclusion ofpolitical

orientation (partialcorrelation)

age 0,1990*** 0,0599

education 0,0902* 0,0386

father’s education 0,1511*** 0,0460

religious affiliation 0,0077 0,0026

gender 0,0477 0,0290

place of living (number oinhabitants)

0,0258 0,0155

political orientation (right-left)

0,4974*** xxxxxxx

Note: p indicates the statistical significance when * p<0,05, ** p<0,01, *** p = 0,00.Higher correlation indicates higher support for NATO membership. The positivecorrelation shows higher support among people with lower age, higher education,higher religious affiliation, men, right political orientation and bigger place of living.

The growth of support for NATO membership is bound to severaltendencies. First, politicians confronted with critical remarks offoreign officials and Czech journalists pointing to low public supportstarted paying more attention to this issue. Second, low capacity ofpoliticians to raise public support for NATO membership ensued in adramatic increase of activities of many NGO’s, prominents whootherwise would not like to be involved in politics and privatecompanies (for instance TV stations) aimed at campaigning for CzechRepublic’s entry into NATO. The debate on NATO membership turnedinto a lesson on democracy.

3.2. Readiness to join NATO

The attitudes of the Czech public towards the military, itsreadiness, and towards the career soldiers can be characterised asconstantly very critical. It is logical that it is reflected in a convictionthat the military is not prepared for the admission to NATO. Yet stillembarrassing is the considerable down turn of those who believe thatthe military is prepared enough for this step. The group of undecidedpeople grows. The respondents express their critical attitude also tothe readiness of the Czech Republic for the admission to NATO.

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Table No. 32 Assessment of preparedness to join NATO (%)

V/1997 XI/1997

Is prepared? Yes No I do notknow

Yes No I do notknow

Czech Republic x x x 23 46 31

Czech military 27 48 25 18 50 32Note: X - not asked

The attitude to the admission to the Alliance itself stands as themost distinctive determinant for assessment of the readiness for theadmission. Among supporters of the admission, the readiness of theCzech Republic is assessed positively by 44% and readiness of themilitary by 33% of them, taking into account that in both cases thenegative and undecided assessment prevails at more than half ofsupporters. As far as the opponents of the admission are concerned,in case of the Czech Republic it represents 3% and in case of themilitary 5%.

Although the professional soldiers are more keen to join NATOthey are also more critical to the military’s preparedness formembership. In May 1997 only 21 % of the professional corpsaccepted the opinion that the Czech military is well-prepared to joinNATO. Among the Czech public it was 27 % of the interviewed.

3.3. Knowledge about Admission of the Czech Republic to NATO

Only 21% of the Czech population over 15 believe they are wellinformed what the admission to NATO will mean for the CzechRepublic. Insufficient knowledge is returned by 59% of respondents,and 13% of them are unable to respond to this issue.

Particularly people with university education stand as they aremore informed (48% asserts they are well informed about theadmission to NATO), as well as part of the population which supportsthe admission (42%) followed by men (36%). It is worth taking intocognisance that also at the “best informed groups” of the society thereis rather prevailing opinion that they are not sufficiently informedabout the admission of the Czech Republic to NATO.

As the least informed people seem to be those who refuse theadmission (67% insist they have insufficient information), women(63%), that is the part of population with distinctively undecidedinclination, but surprisingly also people with a grammar-schooleducation (66%), what is the part of population with above-averagesupport for the admission to NATO.

3.4. Consequences of Admission to NAT

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In assessment of consequences of the admission of CzechRepublic to NATO the respondents agree that there will be increase ofcosts for armament, more rapid modernisation of military equipment,higher funds will be earmarked for the military, and that theprofessionalization of the military will be speeded up. Better securityoccupies only the third place. although among the supporters of themembership the first one, of the ladder in relation to theconsequences of the admission to the Alliance. The public expectspromotion of career soldiers´ qualities and better order within themilitary. At the end of the ladder there are the lost of independence ofthe country together with possibility of deployment of nuclearweapons on our territory. Only half of the respondents believes thatthis will increase prestige of the military within the society.

Table No. 33 Consequences of Czech Republic’s entry into NATO (%)

Assessment of NATOmembership’sconsequences

Attitudes towardconsequences (only theyes answers) accordingto the attitude towardNATO membership

Yes No I do notknow

Yes No I do notknow

more money for the military 76 11 13 80 80 65

rapid modernisation of themilitary

74 12 14 90 59 57

better security for the countr 70 16 14 94 37 55

better professional soldiers’squalities

68 17 15 84 49 55

better order within the military 67 15 18 84 49 51

rapid professionalization of themilitary

65 16 19 81 47 52

higher prestige of the CzechRepublic abroad

63 22 15 84 36 46

higher risk that the CzechRepublic could be drawn intosome military conflict

57 25 18 47 79 54

higher prestige of the military inthe Czech Republic

54 28 18 76 24 41

deployment of foreign troops onour territor

52 29 19 45 74 44

higher attention to the military 51 29 20 66 39 33

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among politicians

deployment of nuclear weaponson our territory

39 35 26 29 62 38

limitation of sovereignty of theCzech Republic

37 43 20 29 64 28

positive impact on Czecheconomy

25 44 31 44 7 5

Comparing the groups of supporters and opponents, the evidentdistinctions occur in expectation of the admission consequences. Thegroup of respondents with undecided attitudes is characterised alsoby its indecisiveness towards assessment of consequences of theadmission.

The supporters of the admission to NATO lay higher stress onmore rapid modernisation of military equipment, higher security,promotion of prestige of the Military of the Czech Republic at thepublic, promotion of prestige of the Czech Republic abroad, betterorder within the military, higher quality of career soldiers, more rapidprofessionalization of the military, higher attention to be paid bypoliticians to the military, and a positive impact on the economy.

The opponents of the admission to NATO point out obviouslyrather negative effects of that step, first of all the loss of independenceof our country, increase of risks that Czech Republic will be drawninto some military conflict, and a possibility of deployment of nuclearweapons on our territory, or possibility of deployment of foreign forceson our territory.

Also in this case, it is suitable to take into account the long-term development of the admission consequences assessment.

Table No. 34 Consequences of joining NATO (%)

1996 VI/1997 XI/1997

more money for the military xxxx 68 76

rapid modernisation of the military 70 66 74

better security for the countr 65 65 70

better professional soldiers’s qualities 63 x 68

better order within the military 60 x 67

rapid professionalization of the militar 66 x 65

higher prestige of the Czech Republicabroad

x 60 63

higher risk that the Czech Republiccould be drawn into some militarconflict

54 x 57

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higher prestige of the military in theCzech Republic

x 60 54

deployment of foreign troops on ourterritor

49 43 52

higher attention to the military ampoliticians

57 x 51

deployment of nuclear weapons on ourterritor

42 30 39

limitation of sovereignty of the CzechRepublic

x 29 37

positive impact on Czech economy x 29 25

Note: x - the question was not aske

After comparison with the previous polls, we can specify severalbasic trends:1) There is a growth of support for opinions that the admission toNATO will have a positive impact on the military performance, and willbe reflected in more rapid modernisation, promotion of the careersoldiers´ quality, better order within the military, and it will meanmore money from the State Budget for the military. In a whole, thistrend is demonstrated by the growth of conviction that better securityof the country will be ensured;2) At the same time, the expectation declines that the admission toNATO will be positively reflected in a sphere of the civil-militaryrelations. This trend is demonstrated by a decline of agreement withopinions that the admission to the Alliance will result in higherprestige of the military within the public, and that a higher attentionwill be paid to the military by politicians;3) A conviction grows that the admission to NATO will imposelimitation of sovereignty of the Czech Republic. Based on evaluation of long-term trends, we have recorded anexpectation that even though the quality of professional soldiers andreadiness of the military will be enhanced, the gap between themilitary and society will, nevertheless, keep widening, and the trend tomarginalization of the military will be reinforced.

3.5. Perception of NATO and the military of the Czech Republicby professional soldiers

Because it can be supposed the admission of the CzechRepublic to NATO will be a great change for the Czech militaryattention must be paid also to psychological aspects - namely toperception of a picture of NATO and the Czech military by theprofessional soldiers. In order to reveal deeper expectations thepsychological technique of the semantic differential tailored to ourneeds.

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Table No. 35 Perceptions of the Czech military and NATO bythe professional soldiers

the Czechmilitary

NATO

bad 3,98 4,80 good

unseemly 3,94 3,89 nice

cold 3,83 3,89 warm

traditional 2,87 5,52 modern

sad 3,25 4,16 cheerful

undemocratic 4,42 4,97 democratic

unimportant 4,47 5,56 important

passive 4,11 5,50 active

aggressive 5,90 4,49 defensive

unstable 3,39 5,53 stable

unattractive 4,05 4,74 attractive

useless 4,09 5,34 useful

bureaucratic 2,27 3,87 unbureaucratic

unpleasant 3,97 4,47 pleasant

foxy 4,02 3,33 frank

non-perspective 3,73 5,31 perspective

wrong 4,35 4,99 right

stagnating 3,05 5,34 developing

no-assistance 3,93 5,11 assistanceNote: Measure at the scale from 1 to 7 when the mark 1 meant the identification ofthe institution with the left feeling and the mark 7 meant the identification with thright expression. The mark 4 was the expression of the central position.Statistically significant at the level p<0,01 are all feeling having the mark lowerthan 3,4 or higher than 4,6.

After a more detailed analysis of attitudes we can say thatperceptions of NATO and the Czech military by the professionalsoldiers differ significantly. While the Czech military evokes rathernegative reaction, the echo to NATO is of more positive nature. Theprofessional soldiers have in their minds the very consistent picturesof both institutions. They characterise them the following way:• the Czech military according to professional soldiers representsunstable and bureaucratic institution that is in a period of stagnation.According to their opinion, the Czech military is defensive andtraditional, that is, no changes are being made here and it does notadopt new trends in sphere of the military science nor in society. Asa whole, it causes sorrow at minds of professional soldiers.

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• professional soldiers describe NATO as the prominent, modern andactive institution that keeps developing. They characterise NATO bystability, efficiency and with good prospects. The military professionalspoint out to NATO attractiveness. It is connected with democraticprinciples, assistance and solidarity respectively. Anyway, somewherein the deepest corner of their mind are some suspicious toward NATO,probably being shared by the whole Czech population. They ascribedto NATO a foxy character. In sum, they characterise NATO assomething what is right and good, and what produces rather positivepsychological stimuli.

In case of perception of the Czech military and NATO wetherefore found out a considerable homogeneity of professionalsoldiers´ attitudes. But at the same time it shows the fact that militaryprofessionals are very pessimistic in their view on the Czech militaryand due to that reason they can see NATO as a “light at the end ofa tunnel“. It sometimes results even to idealisation of thisorganisation.

3.6. Security risks and Admission of the Czech Republic to NATO

Support for entry of the Czech Republic to NATO is significantlyaffected by the risks issues – what means the risks in a broadmeaning.28 For support of NATO membership of the Czech Republicsome groups of risks have some positive and others on the contrarythe negative influence.

First of all the risks of the military nature fostering support ofNATO membership are international aspects and especially thesituation on the territory of the former USSR and geopoliticalambitions of Russia, situation on the former Yugoslavia territory, andthe like. As it has been describing in this study these are risks ondecline.

Our expectation might be demonstrated by a considerablegrowth of support for the admission after the unsuccessful putsch in1992. It is an expression of conviction that Russia and its ambitionscan considerably affect the security situation in the Czech Republic,and elimination of this risk can be made first of all by entry intoNATO. This fact is an expression of a conviction that elimination ofthis risk of military nature do require anchoring in the Alliance

Among risks which might foster support of NATO membership ofthe Czech Republic could be considered also increasing influence ofintolerable religious or other ideologies - it has been spokenpredominantly about the islamese fundamentalism.

The problem that keeps to be still more topical is the feeling ofthe Czech population that menace comes from Slovakia what is beingsupported by the political development in that country. Developmentin Slovakia can then be thought as a distinct stimuli for the growth of

28 See The Security Policy of the Czech Republic. The Institute of InternationalRelations, Prague 1996.

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support for admission of the Czech Republic to NATO - especially incase Slovakia would change its declared foreign political orientationdue to failure of its current aims for admission to EU and NATO and itwould re-orient to Russia.

The economic risks, risks of social or ecological nature posepredominately negative influence to support of admission of the CzechRepublic to NATO. These risks are perceived more acute and thereforegreater importance is attached to them and their elimination gains inseriousness. Activities aimed at elimination of these „new“ risks aremore understandable by the population what is reflected in itsapproval with allocation of public funds for their elimination.

These considerations support also empirical findings. Fromthem it is evident that support for NATO membership is closely boundto fears of military nature. Simultaneously rejection of entry into theAlliance is linked to threats of economic, political and social nature.

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Table No. 36 Perceptions of threats and their influenon the attitude toward NATO membership

higher support for NATOmembership

higher rejection of NATOmembership

∗ fears of development in theformer Soviet Union (r=0,13)

∗ the perception of Slovakia asa possible military threat(r=0,09)*

∗ the perception if Islam as apossible military threat(r=0,09)*

∗ fears of the market economy(r=0,31)

∗ the low living standard(r=0,24)

∗ behaviour of politicians(r=0,24)

∗ a strong government (r=0,19)∗ stability of the Czech crown

as a currency (r=0,17)∗ foreigners (r=0,15)∗ criminality (r=0,11)

Note: * - due to a low percentage only for orientation

In these consequences it is possible to define mutual relations by the term the“market of security” where the need to eliminate individual risks compete for attentionand allocation of economic sources. At the same time the judgement, support andexpenditure of money (in this case we understand the admission of the Czech Republicto NATO as one of the ways of excluding the danger of the military threat) areconditioned by topicality of the risk, political and public support of its resolution, thepresent achievements in fighting against it, readiness of strategies for its elimination,readiness of the public, or also of politicians to enforce sometimes not popularsolutions, and the like. If, from this point of view, it is about the admission of theCzech Republic to NATO, we note very low topicality of military risks in comparisonwith other risks, non-existence of strategies that would be presented to the public, non-existence of different options leading to the problem solution, insufficient volume ofcommunication, lack of clarity in issues of costs, and the like. All this affects attitudesof the public and its preference for elimination of certain sorts of risks. In effect otherkinds of risks attract lower attention and steps aimed at their elimination gain eitherlower support or higher rejection. This pertains to Czech entry into NATO as well.

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Conclusions

Based on the above analysis and other available studies, we can make severageneral conclusions:1. It is impossible to leave out the public and its impact on civil-military relations. Eventhough it is not the most important player of the whole process, attitudes of the publicaffect decision-making of politicians, and they have significant impact on a self-reflection process of the military;2. Actions of politicians are determined by attitudes of the public to some extent. Atthe same time it is evident that for the sake of healthy civil-military relations it isnecessary for the politicians not to become hostages of public opinion. Simultaneously,they should be able to carry out three basic tasks. First, to define the future vision ofthe military according to expected development of the security situation. Second, toensure implementation of civil and democratic control principles. Third, to make themilitary and its missions legitimised among the public;3. For achieving balanced relations between the military and society it is necessary forthe military to learn how to communicate with the public with language, the publicunderstands to. At the same time, due to marginalization of the military in society, iwill likely be its task to conduct educational activities towards politicians andjournalists as well;4. The discussion over admission of the Czech Republic to NATO has become asignificant factor, which affected civil-military relations. This discussion has focusedattention of the society to the military and its problems. At the same time it has shownthat responsibility for current, according to the public the critical, state is attributed toboth politicians and career soldiers. The public differentiates between political andmilitary responsibilities when responsibility for the morale and discipline within thearmy, training etc. is attributed to career soldiers while politicians are being maderesponsible for their professional qualities, structural changes in the army or legislativeproblems;5. In a question of support for admission of the Czech Republic to NATO, it turns outthat issue of military risk is inferior in comparison with issues of social, economic andenvironmental risks. A low feeling of military threat results in a pressure fordownsizing the armed forces, higher professionalization, and shortening or abrogationof the conscription service.6. Often criticised low support for admission into the Alliance by the Czech publicseems to be a result of several factors. First, non-topicality of the military threat thaleads to lack of interest in security itself. Second, the idea of political elite thaadmission to NATO poses a problem that is to be dealt by diplomats, and theirunconcern to gaining public support. Third, explicit determination of a group of thosewho oppose admission to NATO that are associated around political parties likeKSCM (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia), and SPR-RSC (RepublicanParty), while political subjects that support the admission into Alliance rather discussissues related to implementation of that step, for instance, a discussion over proprietyof referendum to the issue in question;7. Perception of security and the military related issues is burdened to some extent bpolitical differentiation and even in spite of apolitical approach to the military it isimpossible to avoid drawing politics into some problems, and to differentiation of theCzech public attitudes resulting from that;

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8. Dissatisfaction with functioning of political institutions can lead to a growthcredibility of the military or other state power institutions, for instance the police, as ihappened in time of political crisis in the Czech Republic in 1997. No doubt, thecredibility of the military is very important for ensuring sufficient legitimacy of itsmissions. On the other hand it is a question whether distrust in political solutionsshould be replaced by trust in solutions imposed by armed institutions that should noget in into politics;9. In spite of more significant interest in issues of security and the military, and due todiscussion over the admission of the Czech Republic to NATO, we note general trendtowards marginalization of the military. The military security and military itself arebecoming peripheral topics for politicians, journalists and the public as well, whatbrings a shift from actual control to a control through scandals;10. The Czech public accepted new missions of the Czech military and highlyappreciated its active participation during the floods in summer 1997. In case ofengagement into peacekeeping operations an unclear view prevails that prefersinterests of the Czech Republic and neglects the moral dimension of this problem;11. The generation drift is evident. The younger generation is more in favour of CzechNATO membership and simultaneously it shares more critical attitudes to the military.NATO membership is perceived as a vehicle to the final integration in the West as wellas to higher professionalization, the end of draft etc. In general, young people seemmore liberal in attitudes toward security and the military. Although, the oldergeneration is less enthusiastic about NATO membership it shares better attitudestoward security and the military. It is bound to its traditionalism and conservatism

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Appendix

Table No. 1 Influence of the attitude toward NATO membership on attitudestoward security, the military and the professional soldiers (%)

Attitude the Czecpopulation

the part of theCzec

populationsupporting

Czech entry toNATO


77 84


50 42

in case of a military conflict weare not able to defenceourselves

55 49

it is worthless to considerstate’s defence, because powerswill decide over its fate anyway

63 57

is skilful in mastering technique 39 47

has support of citizens 35 34

has good morale 16 17

professional skills 48 55

physical fitness 42 46

morale 32 36

a positive relation towarddemocratic development

39 48

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Table No. 2 Problems of the military and their impact on forming confidence tothe military, the Defence Minister and the view of militar

transformation (1996)

Correlation

confidence to the military confidence to the DefenceMinister

the view of militarytransformation

1) lack of morale and

discipline (r=0,28)

1) low competence of the

politicians at the head

of the Ministry of

Defence (r=0,47)

1) the low level of

training (r=0,34)

2) the low level of

training (r=0,27)

2) too extensive

bureaucratic apparatus

(r=0,28)


discipline (r=0,33)

3) corruption in the

military and problems

with tenders (r=0,26)


discipline (r=0,23)

3) low competence of the

politicians at the head

of the Ministry of

Defence (r=0,33)

4) too extensive


(r=0,20)

4) the low level of

training (r=0,25)


military, problems


5) the low level of

military education

(r=0,19)


military, problems


5) too extensive


(r=0,27)

6) law competence of

the politician at the

head of the Ministry

of Defence (r=0,17)

6) exodus of young

professional soldiers

(r=0,13)

6) the low prestige of the

military profession

(r=0,22)

7) the low prestige of the

military profession

(r=0,15)

7) social uncertainty in

the military (r=0,11)

7) the authoritative style

of management

(r=0,21)

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