Public Corp Case Digests (Amended Syllabus)

8/19/2019 Public Corp Case Digests (Amended Syllabus)

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PUBLIC CORP. CASE DIGESTS (AMENDED SYLLABUS)

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. v. JAC LINER, INC.

G.R. No. 148339 February 23, 2005

The true role of Constitutional law is to effect an equilibrium between authority

and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the

laws are enacted with due deference to rights.

FACTS: Two ordinances were enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena with

the objective of alleviating the traffic congestion said to have been caused by

the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city. City

Ordinance 1631 grants franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. to

construct, finance, establish, operate and maintain common bus- jeepney

terminal facility in the City of Lucena. City Ordinance 1778, on the other hand,

strips out all the temporary terminals in the City of Lucena the right to operate

which as a result favors only the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc.

The Regional Trial Court of Lucena declared City Ordinance 1631 as a valid

excercise of police power while declaring City Ordinance 1778 as null and void

for being invalid. Petitioner Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. filed its

Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Lucena then elevated it viapetition for review under Rule 45 before the Court. The Court referred the

petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) with which it has concurrent jurisdiction.

The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged orders of the trial

court. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, Lucena

now comes to the Court via petition for review to assail the Decision and

Resolution of the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to

attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and not duly

oppressive upon individuals

HELD: With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to a single

location, the subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney

terminals within Lucena, including those already existing, and allow the

operation of only one common terminal located outside the city proper, the

franchise for which was granted to Lucena. The common carriers plying routes

to and from Lucena City are thus compelled to close down their existingterminals and use the facilities of Lucena.

The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between

authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the

law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.


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A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful

formulation of solutions to societal problems.

From the memorandum filed before the Court by Lucena, it is gathered that

the Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic congestion to

be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses on the

streets of the city proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed

to the proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on the city streets.

Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic.

How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from

that franchised to Lucena, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve

the traffic problem, the Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack

adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unloadpassengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable

specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to

operate the same denied those which are unable to meet the specifications.

In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the

maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to

provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating

at all.

The Court is not unaware of the resolutions of various barangays in Lucena

City supporting the establishment of a common terminal, and similar

expressions of support from the private sector, copies of which were submitted

to this Court by Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. The weight of popular

opinion, however, must be balanced with that of an individual‘s rights.

BATANGAS CATV, INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE BATANGAS

CITY SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD and BATANGAS CITY MAYOR

G.R. No. 138810 September 29, 2004

FACTS:On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution

No. 210 granting petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV

system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is

authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein,

“provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval

of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Sometime in November 1993, petitioner

increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a result,respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit

unless it secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod,

pursuant to Resolution No. 210. Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7,

Batangas City, a petition for injunction alleging that respondent Sangguniang

Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV


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operators because under Executive Order No. 205, the National

Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate

theCATV operation in the Philippines.

ISSUE:May a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged byCATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction?

HELD: No.

The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above laws and E.O. No.

436, the NTC exercises regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion

of other bodies.

Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under thegeneral welfare clause. This is primarily because the CATV system commits the

indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses public properties in order to

reach subscribers.) The physical realities of constructing CATV system – the

use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the

parceling of large regions – allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over

CATV operators.

But, while we recognize the LGUs’ power under the general welfare clause, we

cannot sustain Resolution No. 210. We are convinced that respondents strayedfrom the well recognized limits of its power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210

are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the State’s

deregulation policy over the CATV industry. LGUs must recognize that

technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the exclusive

regulatory power of the NTC.

MACASIANO vs. DIOKNO

G.R. No. 97764 August 10, 1992

Facts:Respondent Municipality passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized the

closure of J.Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena

Streets and the establishment of a flea market thereon. This was passed

pursuant to MMC Ordinance No.2 and was approved by the Metropolitan

Manila Authority on July 20, 1990.

On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and Palanyag entered into a

contract agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain & manage the

flea markets and/or vending areas in the aforementioned streets with theobligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of

Parañaque.


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On September 13, 1990 Brig. Gen. Macasiano ordered the destruction and

confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz & Gabriel Street in Baclaran. He also

wrote a letter to Palanyag ordering the destruction of the flea market.

Hence, respondent filed a joint petition praying for preliminary injunction. The

trial court upheld the assailed Ordinance and enjoined petitioner from

enforcing his letter-order against Palanyag.

Issue: WON an ordinance/resolution issued by the municipal council of Parañaque

authorizing the lease & use of public streets/thoroughfares as sites for the flea

market is valid.

Held:No. J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets

are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public

properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the local government

devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control

of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority to control/regulate

the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by

Congress.

Sec. 10, Chapter II of the LGC should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already established by law.

The closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other

public property from public use when circumstances show that such property

is no longer intended/necessary for public use/service. Once withdrawn, the

property then becomes patrimonial property of the LGU concerned and only

then can said LGU use the property as an object of an ordinary contract.

Roads and streets available to the public and ordinarily used for vehicular

traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. The LGU has

no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private

persons.

Also, the disputed ordinance cannot be validly implemented because it can’t be

considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-

compliance with the conditions it imposed for the approval of said ordinance.

The powers of an LGU are not absolute, but subject to the limitations laid down

by the Constitution and laws such as the Civil Code. Every LGU has the sworn

obligation to enact measures that will enhance the public health, safety &convenience, maintain peace & order and promiote the general prosperity of

the inhabitants of the local units.

As in theDacanaycase, the general public have the right to demand the

demolition of the illegally constructed stalls in public roads & streets. The


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officials of the respondent municipality have the corresponding duty arising

from public office to clear the city streets and restore them to their specific

public purpose.

The ordinance is void and illegal for lack of basis in authority in laws applicable

during its time.

TATEL vs. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC

G.R. No. 40243 March 11, 1992

Facts:Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta.

Elena, Municipality of Virac. Complaints were received by the

municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca

bailing machine inside petitioner’s warehouse.

A committee was then appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from

its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the warehouse of

the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in the

neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal council

declaring said warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694

of the New Civil Code.

Tatel filed a petition for preliminary injunction to prevent council fromimplement such a resolution.

Respondent municipal officials contended that petitioner’s warehouse was

constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the

construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or

barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from

said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On

the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 is unconstitutional

and void.

Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac

in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal

corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of

local self-government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order

to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. Its

authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative

Code, which reads:

The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations,

not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge

the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem

necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the

prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of


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the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property

therein.

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of

the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure

prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well established

and basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that a

municipal ordinance:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive

(3) must not be partial or discriminatory

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and

(6) must not be unreasonable.

Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria.

Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance is discriminatory in that warehouses

similarly situated as that of the petitioner were not prosecuted.

The mere fact that the municipal authorities of Virac have not proceeded

against other warehouses in the municipality allegedly violating Ordinance No.

13 is no reason to claim that the ordinance is discriminatory. A distinctionmust be made between the law itself and the manner in which said law is

implemented by the agencies in charge with its administration and

enforcement. There is no valid reason for the petitioner to complain in the

absence of proof that the other bodegas mentioned by him are operating in

violation of the ordinance and that the complaints have been lodged against the

bodegas concerned without the municipal authorities doing anything about it.

The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have

not been substantiated. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound

government. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody toengage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in

the warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the

people residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there can

be no better policy than what has been conceived by the municipal

government.

STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs CA

G.R. No. 112526 October 12, 2001

Facts:Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation was the registered owner

of two parcels of land with a total area of 254.6 hectares. According to

petitioner, the parcels of land are watersheds, which provide clean potable


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water to the Canlubang community. Petitioner alleged that respondents

usurped its rights over the property, thereby destroying the ecosystem.

Sometime in December 1985, respondents filed a civil case with the Regional

Trial Court seeking an easement of a right of way to and from Barangay Casile.

By way of counterclaim, however, petitioner sought the ejectment of private

respondents. After the filing of the ejectment cases, respondents petitioned the

Department of Agrarian Reform for the compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC

property under the CARP. The landholding of SRRDC was placed under

compulsory acquisition. Petitioner objected to the compulsory acquisition of the

property contending that the area was not appropriate for agricultural

purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with slopes of 18% and above and

that the occupants of the land were squatters, who were not entitled to any

land as beneficiaries. The DARAB ruled against the petitioner. On appeal the

CA affirmed the decision of DARAB.

Issue: Whether or not the property in question is covered by CARP despite the fact

that the entire property formed part of a watershed area prior to the enactment

of R. A. No. 6657.

Held: Watershed is one of those enumerated by CARP to be exempt from its coverage.

We cannot ignore the fact that the disputed parcels of land form a vital part ofan area that need to be protected for watershed purposes. The protection of

watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations and the

control of flashfloods that not only damage property but cause loss of lives.

Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be

answered now.

AUSTIN HARDWARE COMPANY, INC., and ALL STEEL PRODUCTS, INC.

vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-41754 February 27, 1976– No digest found

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-41754 February 27, 1976

AUSTIN HARDWARE COMPANY, INC., and ALL STEEL PRODUCTS, INC.,

petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ELENITA H. MANZANO and

FRANCISCO INOCENCIO,respondents. Antonio Gaw & Associates and Edit Barot for petitioners.

Vicente Raul Almacen for private respondents.

ANTONIO,J.: The basic issue in this petition forcertiorariand prohibition is whether or not

the respondent Court of Appeals acted in excess of its jurisdiction in enjoining


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the respondent judge "from continuing with the proceedings in Civil Case No.

19233", (Austin Hardware Company, Inc., et al. vs. The Mayor of San Juan,

defendant, and Elenita H. Manzano, et al., intervenors) and the private

respondents (Austin Hardware Company, Inc., et al) "from continuing the

construction of a commercial house from maintaining a hardware business and

a factory for the manufacture of steel products at or in the vicinity of No. 115

L.K.. Santos St., San Juan, Rizal" and in declaring them in contempt for

disregarding such order.

The instant petition is premised upon the following allegations:

On September 9, 1969, the Mayor of San Juan, Rizal issued a business license

and/or permit authorizing petitioner Austin Hardware Company, Inc. to engage

in the business of general hardware manufacture at No. 115 Lope K. Santos

St., San Juan, Rizal. On July 7, 1970, said Mayor issued a business license

indorse permit authorizing All Steel Products, Inc. to engage in the business ofmanufacturing steel products, also at No. 115 Lope K. Santos St., San Juan,

Rizal. In accordance with the licenses thus issued, petitioners Austin Hardware

Company, and All Steel Products, Inc. have been engaged in the business

therein described, and to maintain the same they had, of the year 1974, in

good faith invested considerable amounts s capital.

On September 19, 1973, the Parents-Teachers Association of Pedro Cruz

Elementary School addressed a letter to the Mayor of San Juan, Rizal, alleging

that the operations of the two petitioners produce nuisance, by reason of the

facts that (1) Lope K. Santos being a very narrow street, the heavy trucks by

petitioners cause a traffic jam thereon and the blowing of horns disturbs the

classes going on in the school; (2) the unloading of steel bars creates much

noise detrimental to the pupils learning; (3) the shop already in operation emits

a foul odor, causing air pollution dangerous to the pupils' health; and (4) it is

possible that chemicals and other combustible materials are stored inside the

factory, which materials constitute fire lizards to the school and other nearby

residential houses.

On September 20,1973, a number of residents of L.K.. Santos Basa Streets andthe Fernandez Compound likewise addressed a letter of the same tenor to the

Mayor, further stating therein that the drainage system of petitioners'

compound is faulty thus causing seepage of liquid into the neighborhood, and

that the warehouse causes so much noise even at nightime, by reason of the

machineries therein installed, that restlessness is caused in the community.

On September 26, 1973, private respondent Elenita H. Manzano wrote a

similar letter to the Mayor, also complaining of the alleged nuisance.

The Mayor of San Juan, Rizal, acting upon the aforesmentioned complaints,

referred the matter to the Municipal Engineer and to the Municipal Health

Officer. The matter was likewise referred by the Mayor to the Municipal Council

for investigation, on the basis of its power "to declare and abate nuisances" in

accordance with Section 2242(h) of the Revised Administrative Code. In turn,

the Council, by Resolution No. 228, dated October 25, 1973, referred the same

to the National Pollution Control Commission for verification. In their reports


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dated November 27 and 28, 1973, the senior mechanical engineer and another

mechanical engineer of the Commission stated that, with respect to Austin

Hardware, the "noise level created by the loading and unloading of steel sheets

was 56db's, which is considered normal in a residential area", and that, with

respect to All Steel Products, Inc., "sampling the noise level conducted at the

complaint's house and located at the back of the firm's residential area." They,

however, remarked that "although at the time of the inspection, the noise level

was normal — it is apparent that the noise created during actual construction

would be above normal. Added to this would be the noise resulting from the

operation of the machine shop, mainly coming out from the building openings

at the upper walls of the All Steel Products Shop." They recommended that the

"municipality should be very careful in issuing building permits specially for

structures that will be used for industrial or manufacturing purposes, that will

be located in residential areas."

On February 13, 1974, the Municipal Council rendered its decision on the

matter, the dispositive portion of which decision reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Council in Session Assembled, holds;

1. That the license and/or permit to operate the Austin Hardware Co., Inc.

should be as it is hereby declared valid, legal and subsiiisting; and

2. That the Municipal Mayor should cancel and/or revoke the license and/or

permit to operate the manufacturing activities of the Austin Hardware Co., Inc.

and the All Steel Products, Inc. as the chief executive officer of the municipal

government pursuant to his duties under Section 2194 of the Revised

Administrative Code to see to it that the laws are faithfully executed.

Accordingly, the Mayor addressed a letter to the petitioners, advising them that:

By virtue of the Decision of the Municipal Council, dated February 13, 1974,

the licenses-permits issued in your favor to establish and, operate

manufacturing activities, at the premises complained of, to wit:

(a) Application for Business License of Austin Hardware Co., approved on

September 8, 1969, as general hardware manufacturer;

(b) Application for Business License of All Steel Products, Inc., approved on July 7, 1970, as manufacturer of steel products; and

(c) Permit to operate (No. JR-73-1145) issued to All Steel Products, Inc., dated

January 31, 1973, for steel manufacturing, is/are hereby cancelled and/or

revoked and, therefore, without force and effect, after five (5) days from receipt

hereof. Please be guided accordingly.

Two motions for the reconsideration of the revocation having been denied by

the Mayor, petitioners filed an ordinary action for injunction in the Court of

First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 19233), alleging among others, that the

revocation of their licenses or permits violated the requirements of procedural

due process because the investigation which led to the revocation of their

licenses/permits was not to determine the presence of a ground for revocation,

namely, violation of a zonification ordinance of San Juan, but an alleged

nuisance produced by their operations.


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Upon application of petitioners, the Court of First Instance, presided over by

Judge Gregorio G. Pineda, issued a restraining order enjoining the. Mayor of

San Juan "and all municipal officers, their agents, representatives and/or

persons acting upon their orders or in their place and stead from enforcing or

implementing the order of defendant Mayor revoking the building permit and

stopping the construction of Austin Hardware's warehouse or bodega at No.

115 L.K.. Santos Street ... or in any manner or form interfering with the

construction of said hardware or bodega" The writ was subsequently amended

to further restrain the officials concerned "from enforcing or implementing the

order of defendant Mayor revoking their business as hardware and steel

products manufacturers."

Private respondents intervened in the above-named case and filed therein a

motion to lift the restraining order but the same was denied by the court in anorder dated September 5, 1974. A motion for reconsideration of said order was

likewise denied. Thereupon, private respondents filed a petition for certiorari

and prohibition in the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03932-SP,

entitled "Elenita H. Manzano and Francisco Inocencio, etc. vs. Hon. Gregorio G.

Pineda, Austin Hardware Company, Inc., and All Steel Products, Inc.", praying for

a writ of preliminary injunction restraining respondent judge from continuing

with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 19233, and, after due hearing, declaring

the writ of injunction permanent, ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No.

19233, setting aside as null and void all the proceedings thereon, and such

other relief as may be just and equitable under the premises.

On March 17, 1975, in accordance with its resolution issued on the same day,

the Court of Appeals issued the writ of preliminary injunction complained of in

this petition, which enjoined "the respondent Judge from continuing with the

proceedings in Civil Case No. 19233, and the private respondents from

continuing the construction of a commercial house and from maintaining a

hardware business and a factory for the manufacture of steel products at or in

the vicinity of No. 115 L.K. Santos St., San Juan, Rizal, until further orders."

On March 19, 1975, private respondents filed a petition in the appellate, courtciting petitioners for contempt. The petition for prohibition and certiorari, as

well as the petition to cite petitioners for contempt, was orally argued on April

16, 1975. During the hearing, petitioners raised the issue that the restraining

order should not have included the stopping of their hardware business, since

Austin Hardware's license to operate a hardware store with storage facilities is

not involved in Civil Case No. 19233 because neither the Municipal Council nor

the Mayor of San Juan, Rizal, cancelled or revoked it.

The Appellate Court in its resolution of August 19, 1975, found petitioners'

contention devoid of merit, declared them guilty of contempt and imposed upon

them a fine of P500.00.

I

We find the petition without merit.

The Appellate Court's action is based on the following:


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Careful examination of their pleadings and annexes do not clearly bear private

respondents' pretensions. The maintenance of a hardware store is squarely

dismissed by defendants in intervention in the basic case (Par. 6, sub-par. 2,

Answer in Intervention, Page 31, Records), while the construction of a bodega

or warehouse or storage facilities was raised by no less than private

respondents themselves-in their 2nd cause of action (page 150, Records) in

Civil Case No. 19233, in their petition for the reconsideration of Exhibit '13', to

include the construction of a warehouse (p. 154, Records). Similarly, the

Annexes '2' to '7' and '9' to their Additional Comment found on pages 193-194

of Records refer to a Mayor's Permit but say nothing about a limit to operate a

hardware store. The Mayor's Permit which the records yield is that found on

page 87 of the records introduced as Annex to Intervenor's Motion for

Reconsideration which bears Permit No. 309-5-69, dated January 15, 1969,

expiring on December 31, 1969.

On their part, the petitioners opposed any amendment to the preliminary

injunction alleging that private respondents' claim of having a license to

operate a hardware store with store facilities from their interpretation of the

decision of the Municipal council. The fact, however, is that said decision

merely mentioned payment of a business permit from 1966, which was never

exhibited to the Municipal Council. Noteworthy also is the fact that license fees

for storage facilities began, as stated in same decision, only in 1970, thereby

supporting the petitioners' contention that Austin Hardware was using just one

permit — that one approved on September 8, 1969 — which was for a general

hardware manufacturer.

As we have stated, the Deputy Clerk of Court of the Division, Atty. Catalina C.

Buena, accompanied by the lawyers of both parties, was ordered to repair to

the premises to verify whether or not the steel production has been stopped

and report her findings to the Court. Here are the observations of the Deputy

Clerk of Court:

OBSERVATIONS —

1. More than twenty (20) machines still connected and plugged to power

source;2. All fuse boxes of said machines on 'ON' position indicating that machines

were ready for use;

3. Some machines had steel rods mounted on them indicating that machine

work was going on before we arrived;

4. Steel filings and copper filings, new — (evidenced lack of rust on steel and

shiny sheen of be the copper and steel filings;

5. One heavy drill had a piece of work mounted and the manager admitted they

had worked on that (in-Ride new building);

6. Acetylene and oxygen tanks inside new warehouse and inside the shop were

all plugged to electrical connections;

7. The stripper machine inside new warehouse had a steel plate mounted and a

stripped plate beside it and metal was still hot;

8. Steel bars on floor just Painted, smell of paint strong.

Questioned by undersigned were several laborers seated resting outside the

new warehouse, namely:


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1. Adolfo Ehen Dionisio Ng, Gomer Abad, who limited they were welding that

morning,

2. Alejandro Cabasa, Crispulo Colomba and Leodegario de los Reyes — helpers

and machinists in shop who admitted working on the shop in the morning,

3. Romeo de los Reyes — who claimed he was a the delivery truck.

xxx xxx xxx

At two (2:00) p.m., after lunch and before returning to the court the

undersigned requested Mrs. Manzano to bring her back to the premises. Upon

arrival at the compound, even while in the street yet, the undersigned heard a

loud disturbing noise she could feel a strong vibration coming from a machine i

the new warehouse.

Upon verification, she saw a forklift in operation, lifting the painted metal rods

and/or steel bars or metal bars and lowering them at another place. Whileoperating the forklift emanated a loud disturbing noise while the movement of

the forklift as well of the falling of the long bars on the place where its

transferred caused strong vibrations.

Inside the machine shop — at the back portion thereof, three laborers were

operating a machine attached to a big ' acetylene tank welding a big metal or

steel part; three (3) others were around another machine which was apparently

to start work thereon while a Chinese was tinkering with another machine

which was also plugged on.

The laborers in the middle bodega were just moving about to start work but

undersigned did not same the machine there being operated.'

xxx xxx xxx

On these findings the representative of the Court made the following remarks

in her report:

REMARKS

1. Definitely there is evidence that the steel manufacturing operations ofprivate respondents were being continued even up to the morning of the date of

'said hearing and were in the afternoon of said date;

2. That even the hardware business and bodega of private respondent cannot

be carried out without causing too much noise and disturbance AS the goods

stored therein are so huge that they cannot be moved without the use of big

machines like a forklift or enormous lifting chains (like those used by boats for

anchorage) which produces disturbing loud noises and strong vibrations while

in operation. The undersigned also notes that said parts and metals cannot be

taken in and out of the compound except in big trucks — for besides being very

heavy they are either very long or very wide.

The foregoing facts prove that notwithstanding the restraining order and the

injunction issued by this Court, private respondents did not stop altogether

operating their manufacturing business. The observations of Atty. Buena that

she found —


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1. About twenty (20) big machines were plugged in to electrical connections

with their individual switches open;

2. The presence of scrap of iron on the flooring of the cutting machines

showing recent use of said machines;

3. The presence of another machine for cutting and/or for boring holes in

metals in the middle of the bodega or warehouse and which was plugged into a

long extension electrical wire;

4. The presence of steel plates cut into strips with the use of acetylene and

oxygen cutters by the side of a stripper machine which was still connected with

acetylene and oxygen tanks nearby, and the steel strips still hot, showing that

laborers had just worked on them upon their arrival;

5. The fact that upon returning to the premises after lunch the investigator

heard a loud disturbing noise and could feel a strong vibration coming from a

machine inside the warehouse even while they were yet in the street;

6. The fact that a forklift was in operation lifting newly painted rods and/orsteel bars and lowering them at another place causing a loud disturbing noise

with strong vibration in the premises and inside the warehouse, a machine

attached to the acetylene tank welding a big metal was being operated by 3

laborers while 3 others around another while were about to start working on it,

and a Chinese was tinkering with another machine that was also plugged in;

show beyond doubt that private respondents have not complied with the

injunction issued by this Court.

Moreover, it is admitted that respondents have continued to operate a hardware

store with storage facilities. But as found out, machineries were also installed

in that store and warehouse which were undoubtedly in operating during the

ocular inspection. If in the operation of a hardware store private respondents

must also operate house machineries as found out, then with greater reason,

the order of injunction should apply to the said business. It must be noted that

the writ clearly enjoins the respondents ... from continuing the construction of

a commercial house and from maintaining a hardware business and a factory

for the manufacture of steel products ... .' This order is so worded specifically

mentioning a hardware business to be included in its restriction. The private

respondents tried to justify their continuing operation of a hardware store withstorage facilities with the excuse that the permit to run store was never

nullified by the decision of the Municipal Council of San Juan, Rizal. The

petitioners disagree and impute that private respondents were probably misled

by the wordings of the decision of the Municipal Council. Considering that no

separate permit for the operation of a hardware store was exhibited by private

respondents, and that the various receipts of payments presented by private

respondents do not show that they were in payment of a license or permit to

run a hardware store, we are inclined to agree with the petitioners. Moreover if

private respondents ever had a license to operate a hardware store, the new

zonification ordinance of the town of San Juan Rizal shall have nullified said

permit.

We therefore find that the petition to cite private respondents for contempt is

meritorious. They have not stopped running their store in which machines were

found in operation. They try to justify their operations by saying that their right


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to operate a hardware is not covered by the injunction. The injunction order

has been received them. If they failed to get the exact scope of the injunction,

they should have addressed themselves to this Court for a clarification of the

order, or for an amendment thereof, as they subsequently did. Instead they

have willfully disobeyed a legal order of this Court.

The afore-mentioned findings are neither based on speculation nor on a

misapprehension of facts, but on substantial evidence. This Court has

consistently respected, with some few exceptions, the findings of fact of the

Court of Appeals. Such exceptions do not obtain here.1

II

The power to license necessarily carries with it the authority to provide

reasonable terms and conditions under which the licensed business shall be

conducted. The authority which grants the license always retains the power to

revoke it, "either for cause of forfeiture or upon a change of policy andlegislation touching the subject.2 In the case at bar, the permit to the AustinHardware Company, Inc. and the All Steel Products, Inc. was granted subject to

the provisions of existing ordinances. Likewise, petitioners' permit to construct

a warehouse at 115 L.K. Santos St., San Juan, Rizal was subject to the

condition that its construction or use will not conflict with the provisions of the

zoning ordinance, otherwise the construction will be removed by the

government at the expense of the permitee or licensee.

It is not disputed that the business establishments of petitioners were situated within the residential zone and, therefore, the issuance of a license or permit in

favor of the petitioners appears violative of Section 2 of Municipal Ordinance

No. 90, Series of 1968, of San Juan, which provides that "No building permit,

business license, or any other certificate of approval shall be issued by the

municipality for commercial or industrial establishments which shall be

erected, operated, and maintained within any residential zone, unless the site

has been or so declared as commercial or industrial zone in the municipal

council." It is precisely for this reason that the Municipal Mayor of San Juan

cancelled or revoked (a) the business license of the Austin Hardware Company,

Inc. dated September 8, 1969 as general hardware manufacturer; (b) the business license of the All Steel Products, Inc. dated July 7, 1970 as

manufacturer of steel products; and (c) the permit to operate issued ' to All

Steel Products, Inc. dated January 31, 1973 for steel manufacturing. Since the

obvious purpose of zoning is the protection of public safety, health, convenience

and welfare, it would have been inconsistent with such purpose to have allowed

the operation of petitioners' manufacturing business in a residential zone.

It is true that petitioners insist that they have a separate permit to operate the

business of hardware store, but as found by the Court of Appeals, no separatepermit for the operation of a hardware store was shown by them and that the

various receipts of payments presented by petitioners do not show that they

were in payment of a license or permit to run a hardware store. On the

contrary, as shown by the joint manifestation of the petitioners and the private

respondents dated November 27, 1975, said parties admitted that in their

conference with the Municipal Mayor of San Juan, in the afternoon of


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November 22, 1975, "the Mayor informed them that he would maintain his act

of revoking the permits and/or licenses of the petitioners as hardware and steel

products manufacturers and thathe had not issued any Permit for the

hardware store with storage facilities."

WHEREFORE, the petition forcertiorariand prohibition is hereby dismissed

and, accordingly, the writs prayed for denied, with costs against the petitioners.

Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 100152 March 31, 2000

314 SCRA 315 – Political Law – Municipal Corporation – Proprietary Functions –

Police Power

FACTS: Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. applied for a business permit to operate in

Iligan City. After hearing the sides of local optometrists, Mayor Camilo Cabili of

Iligan granted the permit but he attached various special conditions which

basically made Acebedo dependent upon prescriptions or limitations to be

issued by local optometrists. Acebedo basically is not allowed to practice

optometry within the city (but may sell glasses only). Acebedo however

acquiesced to the said conditions and operated under the permit. Later,

Acebedo was charged for violating the said conditions and was subsequentlysuspended from operating within Iligan. Acebedo then assailed the validity of

the attached conditions. The local optometrists argued that Acebedo is

estopped in assailing the said conditions because it acquiesced to the same

and that the imposition of the special conditions is a valid exercise of police

power; that such conditions were entered upon by the city in its proprietary

function hence the permit is actually a contract.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the special conditions attached by the mayor is a valid exerciseof police power.

HELD:NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to operate its business and

not to practice optometry (the latter being within the jurisdiction PRC Board of

Optometry). The conditions attached by the mayor isultra vires hence cannot

be given any legal application therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither a

valid exercise of police power. Though the mayor can definitely impose

conditions in the granting of permits, he must base such conditions on law or

ordinances otherwise the conditions areultra vires. Lastly, the granting of the

license is not a contract, it is a special privilege – estoppel does not apply.

SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY, COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR

and CITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG CITY

G.R. No. 156684 April 6, 2011


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FACTS: The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 square meters

situated between Nueve de Febrero Street and Fernandez Street in Barangay

Mauway, Mandaluyong City. Half of their land they used as their residence, andthe rest theyrented out to nine other families. Allegedly, the land was their only

property and only source of income. Sangguniang Panglungsod of

Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize

then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal steps for

the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose of developing it

for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving cityinhabitants.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sangguniang Panlungsod abused its discretion in

adoptingResolution No. 552.

HELD:No. A resolution is upon a specific matter of a temporary nature while an

ordinance is a law that is permanent in character. No rights can be conferred

by and be inferred from a resolution, which is nothing but an embodiment of

what the law-making body has to say in the light of attendant circumstances. A

municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a

resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a law-making

body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanentcharacter, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are

enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for

a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian

members. In simply expressing its sentiment or opinion through the resolution,

therefore, the Sangguniang Panlungsod in no way abused its discretion, least of

all gravely, for its expression of sentiment or opinion was a constitutionally

protected right.

HEIRS OF SUGUITAN vs. CITY OF MANDALUYONG

G.R. 135087 March 14, 2000

Facts:On October 13, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City

issued a resolution authorizing Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos to institute

expropriation proceeding over the property of Alberto Suguitan located at Boni

Avenue and Sto. Rosario Streets in Mandaluyong City for the expansion of

Mandaluyong Medical Center. On January 20, 1995, Mayor Abalos wrote

Alberto Suguitan offering to buy his property, but Suguitan refused to sell.

Consequently, the City of Mandaluyong filed a complaint for expropriation withthe Regional Trial Court of Pasig. Suguitan filed a motion to dismiss. The trial

court denied the said motion and subsequently, it allowed the expropriation of

the subject property. Aggrieved by the said order, the heirs of Suguitan

asserted that the City of Mandaluyong may only exercise its delegated power of


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eminent domain by means of an ordinance as required by Section 19 of

Republic Act No. 7160, and not by means of a mere resolution.

Issue: WON the city of Mandaluyong has validly exercised its power of

expropriation.Held:NEGATIVE

Ratio: The Court ruled that the basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain

by local government units is Section 19 of RA 7160 which provides that: "A

local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to

an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose, or

welfare for the benefits of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just

compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent

laws; Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be

exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the

owner, and such offer was not accepted; Provided, further, That the local

government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the

filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the

proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the

property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be

expropriated; Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated

property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market

value at the time of the taking of the property. In the present case, the City ofMandaluyong sought to exercise the power of eminent domain over petitioners'

property by means of a resolution, in contravention of the first requisite. The

law in this case is clear and free from ambiguity. Section 19 of the Code

requires an ordinance, not a resolution, for the exercise of the power of eminent

domain. Therefore, while the Court remains conscious of the constitutional

policy of promoting local autonomy, it cannot grant judicial sanction to a local

government unit's exercise of its delegated power of eminent domain in

contravention of the very law giving it such power.

The law may delegate the power of eminent domain to local government units

that shall exercise the same through an ordinance. The local government unit

failed to comply with this requirement when they exercised their power of

eminent domain through a resolution. The Local Government Code’s

requirement of an ordinance prevails over the Implementing Rules and

Regulations requiring the issuance of a resolution.

LOURDES DE LA PAZ MASIKIP vs CITY OF PASIG

G.R. No. 136349 January 23, 2006

FACTS:Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land

with an area of 4,521 square meters located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan,Pasig City,

Metro Manila. The then Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig,respondent,

notified petitioner of its intention toexpropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petitionerhttp://maps.google.com/maps?ll=14.5872222222,121.061111111&spn=0.1,0.1&q=14.5872222222,121.061111111%20(Pasig)&t=hhttp://maps.google.com/maps?ll=14.5833333333,121.0&spn=1.0,1.0&q=14.5833333333,121.0%20(Metro%20Manila)&t=hhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Respondenthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eminent_domainhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petitionerhttp://maps.google.com/maps?ll=14.5872222222,121.061111111&spn=0.1,0.1&q=14.5872222222,121.061111111%20(Pasig)&t=hhttp://maps.google.com/maps?ll=14.5833333333,121.0&spn=1.0,1.0&q=14.5833333333,121.0%20(Metro%20Manila)&t=hhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Respondenthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eminent_domain


18/54

her property to be used for the sports development andrecreational activities of

the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance No. 42,

Series of 1993 enacted by the thenSangguniang Bayan of Pasig.

Again, respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose

was allegedly in line with the program of theMunicipal Government to provide

land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community. Petitioner sent

a reply to respondent stating that the intended expropriation of her property is

unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither

sufficient nor suitable to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors

of our community.

Respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation and

petitioner filed aMotion to Dismiss the complaint alleging that plaintiff has no

cause of action for the exercise of the power of eminent domain consideringthat: (1) there is no genuine necessity for the taking of the property sought to

be expropriated; and (2) plaintiff has arbitrarily and capriciously chosen the

property sought to be expropriated. The trial court issued an Order denying the

Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that there is a genuine necessity to

expropriate the property for the sports and recreational activities of the

residents of Pasig. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a genuine necessity for the taking of the property of

petitioner.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish

that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property. The

records show that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council

the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the

expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres

CompoundHomeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not theresidents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said

Association are desirous of having their own private playground and

recreational facility. Petitioner’s lot is the nearest vacant space available. The

purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has

not been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative facility

for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the

Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of

Caniogan. Therefore, the petition for review was granted.

Eminent domain is “the right of a government to take and appropriate private

property to the public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can

be done only on condition of providing a reasonably compensation therefor.” It

is the power of the State or its instrumentalities to take private property for

public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in government.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recreationhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sangguniang_Bayanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_governmenthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motion_(legal)http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homeowner_associationhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recreationhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sangguniang_Bayanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_governmenthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motion_(legal)http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homeowner_association


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This power is lodged in the legislative branch of government. It delegates the

power thereof to the LGUs, other public entities and public utility corporations,

subject only to constitutional limitations. LGUs have no inherent power of

eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute.

Sec. 19, LGC: LGU may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an

ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose or

welfare for the benefit of the poor and landless, upon payment of just

compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent

laws.

Provided:

(1) power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite

offer has been previously made to the owner and such offer was not accepted;

(2) LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing ofexpropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of

at least 15% fair market value of the property based on the current tax

declaration;

and (3) amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by the

proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the

property

There is already an established sports development and recreational activity

center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City. Evidently, there is no “genuine

necessity” to justify the expropriation. The records show that the Certification

issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council which became the basis for the

passage of Ordinance No. 4, authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the

intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowner’s Association, a

private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan.

DACANAY vs. ASISTIO

G.R. No. 93654 May 6, 1992

FACTS This is a petition for mandamus to the non-action of the city government of

Caloocan in accordance with the decision of the RTC to evict the occupants of

a flea market located in the streets of Caloocan.

On January 5, 1979 – Metropolitan Manila Commission enacted an ordinance

allowing the use of streets for the purpose of flea markets subject to several

conditions.

1987 – Mayor Martinez caused the demolition of the flea markets and the stallowners filed a case against such action.

RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the streets in questions (Heros del

'96, Gozon and Gonzales) are of public dominion, hence outside the commerce

of man.


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After the decision came out, there was a change in the city administration and

current mayor (Asistio) did not pursue the action of the previous mayor and left

the flea markets in the streets as is.

Dacanay, being a resident of Heroes del '96 filed a petition for mandamus to

remove the stalls in their street.

ISSUEMay public streets be leased or licensed to market stallholders by virtue of a

city ordinance or resolution of Metropolitan Manila Commission?

HELD:NO

1. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of

man. Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease orother contract

2. The vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were

intended to serve such as for traveling

3. Any executive order or city resolution cannot change the nature of the public

street because it is going to be contrary to the general law

1. Jurisprudence applicable to property of public dominion

The streets, being of public dominion must be outside of the commerce of man.

Considering the nature of the subject premises, the following jurisprudence

co/principles are applicable on the matter: (1) They cannot be alienated or

leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts.(Municipality of Cavite

vs. Rojas, 30 Phil. 602); (2) They cannot be acquired by prescription against the

state (Insular Government vs. Aldecoa, 19 Phil. 505). Even municipalities can

not acquire them for use as communal lands against the state (City of Manila vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 327); (3) They are not subject to attachment

and execution (Tan Toco vs.Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52); (4) They

cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement (2-II Colin & Captain 520;

Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phil. Vol. II, 1983 Ed. pp. 29-30).

2. Context of the ordinance of the Metropolitan Manila Commission as to the

establishment of flea markets on municipal streets, roads and open spaces.

Ordinance 2, s. 1979 of the Metropolitan Manila Commission is an ordinance“authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or municipal streets,

roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market

and/or vending areas, under certain terms and conditions, subject to the

approval of the Metropolitan Manila Commission, and for other purposes.”

Section 2 of said ordinance provides that “the streets, roads and open spaces to

be used as sites for flea markets (tiangge) or vending areas; the design,


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measurement or specification of the structures, equipment and apparatuses to

be used or put up: the allowable distances: the days and time allowed for the

conduct of the businesses and/or activities herein authorized; the rates or fees

or charges to be imposed, levied and collected; the kinds of merchandise, goods

and commodities sold and services rendered: and other matters and activities

related to the establishment, maintenance and management and operation of

flea markets and vending areas, shall be determined and prescribed by the

mayors of the cities and municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila where the

same are located, subject to the approval of the Metropolitan Manila

Commission and consistent with the guidelines hereby prescribed.” Section

6(m) of said ordinance provides that “in the establishment operation,

maintenance and management of flea markets and vending areas, the following

guidelines, among others, shall be observed: xxx (m) that the permittee shall

remove the equipment, facilities and other appurtenances used by him in the

conduct of his business after the close or termination of business hours.”

3. Related case, Municipality of Cavite; Return of rent

In the case of Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, it was held that properties for

public use may not be leased to private individuals. Such a lease is null and

void for the reason that a municipal council cannot withdraw part of the plaza

from public use. If possession has already been given, the lessee must restore

possession by vacating it and the municipality must thereupon restore to him

any sums it may have collected as rent.

4. Relate case, City of Manila v. Garcia; Ordinance legalizing the occupancy of

squatters of public land is null and void

In the case of City of Manila vs. Gerardo Garcia, 19 SCRA 413, it was held that

“The property being a public one, the Manila Mayors did not have the authority

to give permits, written or oral, to the squatters, and that the permits granted

are therefore considered null and void. As reiterated in the case of Baguio

Citizens Action Inc. vs. The City Council. 121 SCRA 368, “an ordinance

legalizing the occupancy by squatters of public land is null and void.”

5. Occupation of private individuals of public places devoted for public use a

nuisance

The occupation and use of private individuals of sidewalks and other public

places devoted for public use constitute both public and private nuisances and

nuisance per se, and this applies to even case involving the use or lease of

public places under permits and licenses issued by competent authority, upon

the theory that such holders could not take advantage of their unlawful

permits and license and claim that the land in question is a part of a public

street or a public place devoted to public use, hence, beyond the commerce of

man. (Padilla. Civil Code Annotated, Vol. II, p. 59, 6th Ed., citing Umali vs.

Aquino, IC. A. Rep. 339.).


22/54

6. Authority of the city mayor and the city engineer to order the demolition of

illegal structures

"The authority of the Municipality to demolish the shanties is mandated by PD

772, and Section1 of Letter of Instruction 19 ordering certain public officials,

one of whom is the Municipal Mayor to remove all illegal constructions

including buildings on and along esteros and river banks, those along railroad

tracks and those built without permits on public or private property

(Zansibarian Residents Association vs. Mun. of Makati, 135 SCRA 235). The

City Engineer is also among those required to comply with said Letter of

Instruction. Further, Section 185, paragraph 4 of BP 337(Local Government

Code) provides that the City Engineer shall (c)Prevent the encroachment of

private buildings and fences on the streets and public places, (j)inspect and

supervise the construction, repair, removal and safety of private buildings, (k)

With the previous approval of the City Mayor in each case, order the removal ofmaterials employed in the construction or repair of any building or structures

made in violation of law or ordinance, and cause buildings and structures

dangerous to the public to made secure or torn down, among others. Likewise,

the Charter of the City of Caloocan, RA 5502, Article VII, Section 27, paragraph

g, 1 and m, grants the City Engineer similar powers.

7. Public street cannot be made subject to a lease

A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man

(Arts. 420, 424.Civil Code). Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be

the subject of lease or other contract (Villanueva et al. vs. Castañeda and

Macalino, 15 SCRA 142, citing the Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, 30 SCRA

602; Espiritu vs. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, 102 Phil. 869,and Muyot vs.

De la Fuente, 48 O.G. 4860). The disputed areas from which the market stalls

are sought to be evicted are public streets, as found by the trial court in Civil

Case C-12921.

8. Lease or licenses null and void for being contrary to law

As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy

portions of the public street, the City Government, contrary to law, has been

leasing portions of the streets to them. Such leases or licenses are null and

void for being contrary to law. The right of the public to use the city streets may

not be bargained away through contract. The interests of a few should

not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose

health, peace, safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city

officials are under legal obligation to protect. The Executive Order issued by the

Acting Mayor authorizing the use of Heroes del '96 Street as a vending area for

stallholders who were granted licenses by the city government contravenes the

general law that reserves city streets and roads for public use. The Executive

Order may not infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets for

the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles

and pedestrians.


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BINAY vs DOMINGO

G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991

Facts:

Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No.

60 which extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross

family income does not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken

out of the unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro

Manila Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal

secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of

the program. However, the Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution

and the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof for the following

reasons: (1) the resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general

welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must bedisbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal protection

clause since it will only benefit a few individuals.

Issues:

1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the

general welfare clause

2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose

3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause

Held:

1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute ofsovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on

the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est

suprema lex. Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort

and convenience of the people.

Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before amunicipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid

delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the

inherent powers of the State.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause.

Pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and

issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the

responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and

proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintainpeace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general

welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the

protection of property therein.

2.Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-


24/54

expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future

where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible

response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be

commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of

the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as

may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a

broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal

government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially

occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general

welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal

with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of

the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to

everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of thecorporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition

which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.

Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a

limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the

Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards

state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general

welfare, social justice as well as human dignity and respect for human

rights." The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The

support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the

promotion of the common good.

3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may bereasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious

to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of

the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the

disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing

the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of

the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of ourgovernment towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of

pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful

experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by

such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President

Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This

decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal

for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate

dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.

DIOSDADO LAGCAO, DOROTEO LAGCAO and URSULA LAGCAO vs. JUDGE

GENEROSA G. LABRA and CITY OF CEBU

G.R. No. 155746 October 13, 2004

Facts:


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The Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. But then, in late

1965, the 210 lots, including Lot 1029, reverted to the Province of Cebu.

Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot 1029 by the City of

Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter to sue the province for specific

performance and damages in the then Court of First Instance.

The court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the Province of Cebu

to execute the final deed of sale in favor of petitioners. The Court of Appeals

affirmed the decision of the trial court.

After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to

discover that it was already occupied by squatters. Thus petitioners instituted

ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The Municipal Trial Court in

Cities (MTCC) ordering the squatters to vacate the lot.

On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCC’s decision and issued a writ ofexecution and order of demolition. However, when the demolition order was

about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters to the

MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground that the City

was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. Acting on the mayor’s

request, the MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition. Unfortunately

for petitioners, during the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod

(SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized

housing site pursuant to RA 7279.

Petitioners filed with the RTC an action for declaration of nullity of Ordinance

No. 1843 for being unconstitutional.

Issue: WON the Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the

expropriation of their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an

endeavor contrary to the concept of “public use” contemplated in the

Constitution.

Held:Under Section 48 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code

of 1991, local legislative power shall be exercised by the Sangguniang

Panlungsod of the city. The legislative acts of the Sangguniang Panlungsod in

the exercise of its lawmaking authority are denominated ordinances.

Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can

exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. By virtue of RA

7160, Congress conferred upon local government units the power to

expropriate.

Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of petitioners’ lot was

enacted by the SP of Cebu City to provide socialized housing for the homeless

and low-income residents of the City. However, while we recognize that housing

is one of the most serious social problems of the


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Petition DISMISSED.

The fundamental precept that underlies this case is that expropriation has no

binding legal effect unless a formal expropriation proceeding has been

instituted.

The Sangguniang Bayan, being a local legislative body, may exercise the power

to expropriate private properties, subject to the following requisites, all of which

must concur: 1). An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council

authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to

exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over

a particular private property. 2). The power of eminent domain is exercised for

public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.

3). There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article

III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4). A valid and definite offerhas been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be

expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

In the instant case, no ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of

Antipolo. In it instead were resolutions and it was emphasized in previous

decisions that a local government unit cannot authorize an expropriation of

private property through a mere resolution of its law-making body. These

resolutions cannot partake of a supervening event so as to suspend the writ of

execution in the ejectment proceedings. As to the suspension of ejectment

proceedings, the Commonwealth Act No. 538 applies only to cases where there

exist actual expropriation proceedings.

There is no dispute that a local government unit possesses the power of

eminent domain. But the taking of private properties is not absolute. The

power of eminent domain must not be exercised arbitrarily, even if purposed for

resolving a critical problem such as urban squatting. The safeguards afforded

by law require strict observance.

SEVERINO B. VERGARA vs. THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, SEVERINO J.

LAJARA, and VIRGINIA G. BARORO

G.R. No. 174567 March 12, 2009

FACTS:

1.The City Council of Calamba (City Council), where petitioner was a member,

issued Resolution No. 115, Series of 2001 which authorized Mayor Lajara to

negotiate with landowners within the vicinity of Barangays Real, Halang,and Uno, for a new city hall site. During the public hearing, the choice for

the new city hall site was limited to properties owned by Pamana and a lot

in Barangay Saimsin, Calamba.


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2.The City Council then passed Resolution No. 280, Series of 2001,

authorizing Mayor Lajara to purchase several lots owned by Pamana with a

total area of 55,190 square meters for the price of P 129,017,600. Mayor

Lajara was also authorized to execute, sign and deliver the required

documents.

3.The City Government of Calamba (Calamba City), through Mayor Lajara,

entered into the following agreements: MOA, Deed of Sale, Deed of Real

Estate Mortgage and Deed of Assignment of Internal Revenue Allotment

(IRA).

4.The above documents were subsequently endorsed to the City Council.

Petitioner, however, alleged that all these documents were not ratified by the

City Council, a fact duly noted by the Commission on Audit.

5.The respondents justified the absence of ratification by the City Council of

the MOA, Deed of Sale, Deed of Mortgage, and Deed of Assignment. They

cited Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) which spoke of prior

authority and not ratification. Respondents pointed out that petitioner did

not deny the fact that Mayor Lajara was given prior authority to negotiate

and sign the subject contracts. In fact, it was petitioner who made the

motion to enact Resolution No. 280.

6.The Ombudsman explained that ratification by the City Council was not a

condition sine qua non for the local chief executive to enter into contracts on

behalf of the city. The law requires prior authorization from the City Council

and in this case, Resolution Nos. 115 and 280 were the City Council’s

stamps of approval and authority for Mayor Lajara to purchase the subject

lots.

7.Aggrieved by the Ombudman’s findings, petitioner elevated the case before

this Court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether all the documents pertaining to the purchase of the lots should bear

the ratification by the City Council of Calamba.

HELD:

On the ratification by the City Council of all documents pertaining to the

purchase of the lots

Petitioner contends that all the documents, like the Memorandum of Agreement, Deed of Sale, Deed of Mortgage, and Deed of Assignment, do not

bear the ratification by the City Council.

In the assailed order, the Ombudsman held that the various actions performed

by Mayor Lajara in connection with the purchase of the lots were all authorized

by the Sangguniang Panlungsod as manifested in numerous resolutions. The


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lack of ratification alone does not characterize the purchase of the properties

as one that have unwarranted benefits.

In its Memorandum submitted before this Court, the Ombudsman, through the

Office of the Solicitor General, pointed out that the ratification by the City

Council is not a condition sine qua non for the local chief executive to enter

into contracts on behalf of the city. The law requires prior authorization from

the City Council and in this case, Resolution No. 280 is the City Council’s

stamp of approval and authority for Mayor Lajara to purchase the subject lots.

Section 22(c), Title I of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government

Code of 1991, provides:

Section 22. Corporate Powers.- x x x

(c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be enteredinto by the local chief executive in behalf of the local government unit without

prior authorization by the sanggunian concercerned. A legible copy of such

contract shall be posted at a conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the

city, municipal or barangay hall.

Section 455, Title III of RA 7160 enumerates the powers, duties, and

compensation of the Chief Executive. Specifically, it states that:

Section 455. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties and Compensation. – x x x

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of

which is the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section

16 of this Code, the city mayor shall:

x x x

(vi)Represent the city in all its business transactions and sign in its

behalf all bonds, contracts and obligations and such other documents upon

authority of the Sangguniang Panlungsod or pursuant to law or ordinance;

Clearly, when the local chief executive enters into contracts, the law speaks ofprior authorization or authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod and not

ratification. It cannot be denied that the City Council issued Resolution No.

280 authorizing Mayor Lajara to purchase the subject lots.

Resolution No. 280 states that:

RESOLUTION NO. 280

Series of 2001

A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE CITY MAYOR OF CALAMBA, HON.

SEVERINO J. LAJARA TO PURCHASE LOTS OF PAMANA INC. WITH A

TOTAL LAND AREA OF FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND SQUARE METERS (55,

000 SQ. M.) SITUATED AT BARANGAY REAL, CITY OF CALAMBA FOR A

LUMP SUM PRICE OF ONE HUNDRED TWENTY NINE MILLION

SEVENTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P 129,017,600),


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SUBJECT TO THE AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS, AND FOR THIS PURPOSE,

FURTHER AUTHORIZING THE HON. SEVERINO J. LAJARA TO

REPRESENT THE CITY OF GOVERNMENT AND TO EXECUTE, SIGN,

AND DELIVER SUCH DOCUMENTS AND PAPERS AS MAYBE SO

REQUIRED IN THE PREMISES.

WHEREAS, the City of Calamba is in need of constructing a modern City

Hall to adequately meet the requirements of governing new city and

providing all adequate facilities and amenities to the general public that

will transact business with the City government;

WHEREAS, the City of Calamba has at present no available real property

of its own that can serve as an appropriate site of said modern City Hall

and must therefore purchase such property from the private sector under

the terms and conditions that are most beneficial and advantageous tothe people of the City of Calamba;

NOW THEREFORE, on motion of Kagawad S. VERGARA duly seconded

by Kagawad R. HERNANDEZ be it resolved as it is hereby resolved to

authorize the City Mayor of Calamba, Hon. Severino J. Lajara, to

purchase lots of Pamana, Inc. with a total area of fifty five thousand

square meters (55, 000 sq.m.) situated at Barangay Real, City of

Calamba, for a lump sum price of One Hundred Twenty Nine Million

Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P 129, 017, 600) subject to the

availability of funds, and for this purpose, further authorizing the Hon.

Mayor Severino J. Lajara to represent the City Government and to

execute, sign, and deliver such documents and papers as maybe so

required in the premises.

As aptly pointed out by the Ombudsman, ratification by the City Council is not

a condition sine qua non for Mayor Lajara to enter into contracts. With the

resolution issued by the Sangguniang Panlungsod, it cannot be said that there

was evident bad faith in purchasing the subject lots. The lack of ratification

alone does not characterize the purchase of the properties as one that gaveunwarranted benefits to Pamana or Prudential Bank or one that caused undue

injury to Calamba City.

GREATER BALANGA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. MUNICIPALITY

OF BALANGA, BATAAN

G.R. No. 83987 December 27, 1994

Facts:• The case involves a parcel of land, Lot 261-B-6-A-3 located behind the

public market in the Municipality of Balanga, Province of Bataan. It is

registered in the name

Public Corp Case Digests (Amended Syllabus)

Documents

Transcript of Public Corp Case Digests (Amended Syllabus)