Journal of the Histow of the Behanioral Sciences 15 (1979): 203-204

PSYCHOLOGY’S CENTENNIAL YEAR BARBARA ROSS

The American Psychological Association has declared 1979- 1980 as the centennial year celebrating the founding of scientific psychology, based on the establishment of Wilhelm Wundt’s laboratory in 1879. In this centennial year, it seems appropriate to devote a special issue of JHBS to papers in the history of psychology which reflect con- cerns of earlier years and have some relationship to the present state of the discipline of psychology.

Many articles published throughout the years in a variety of journals demonstrate that some attention was devoted to the progress of the discipline or to evaluations of psy- chology’s direction.

James McKeen Cattell examined the “statistics” of American psychologists in 1903 and compared America’s progress with that of other nations. In the same year, Edward Franklin Buchner determined that there were two lines of influence on psychology from 1878 to 1903-the “speculative” and the “empirical.” The terms used by James Mark Baldwin when he published “The History of Psychology” in 1906 were “Naturalism” and “Positivism.” His impression was that the work of the nineteenth century,”. . . was most important . . . established the science . . . and set the direction of its future movement.”

Historical retrospects of American psychology from 1800 to 1885 were reconsidered by R. C. Davis in 1936; and in 1943 Samuel Fernberger reviewed the history of the American Psychological Association from 1892 to 1942. Additional information about the APA was provided by Wayne Dennis and Edwin G. Boring. These are just a few samples of earlier historical accounts.

The history of psychology has been the focus of recent articles as well. In 1976, Wilbert McKeachie published “Psychology in America’s Bicentennial Year;” an invited address given by Richard C. Atkinson, “Reflections on Psychology’s Past and Concerns About Its Future” appeared in 1977; “The Future and the Past in the Behaviorism- Humanism Dialogue” was the title of a 1978 article by Leonard Krasner; and, as recently as April, 1979, the lead article in the American Psychologist by John M. O’Donnell was “The Crisis of Experimentalism in the 1920s: E. G. Boring and His Uses of History.” We have arrived again at the point where younger historians examine earlier historians’ methods, as did Davis in 1936.

There were relatively few references of an historical nature in the literature over the years, and the history of psychology was not recognized as a major subject within the dis- cipline until recently. In 1960 Robert I. Watson, Sr. regarded the history of psychology as “a neglected area.” He pleaded for greater attention on the part of psychologists to the history of their discipline, and took a series of steps to legitimize a new area of specialization.

Drs. Watson and Eric T. Carlson, with the help of others, developed the History of the Behavioral Sciences Newsletter in 1960, which became the Journal of the Hislory of Behavioral Sciences with Dr. Watson as Editor from 1965 to 1974. The Journal provided a specific outlet for research in the history of psychology and other behavioral and social sciences. In 1965, the governing body of the American Psychological Association ap- proved the formation of the Division of the History of Psychology. Dr. Watson con- tinued his efforts to legitimize the new field of scholarship, and, in 1967, he established

203

204 BARBARA ROSS

the history of psychology as an area of specialization in the doctoral program at the University of New Hampshire. Dr. Watson’s article in the April issue of JHBS demonstrates a broadening application of his prescriptive theory. Articles in this special issue primarily examine some of the basic problems evolving from the psychological thought of Wundt’s time.

Wundt is generally viewed as the founding father of scientific psychology based on the beginnings of his experimental laboratory in 1879. It was not long, Kurt Danziger notes in “The Positivisit Repudiation of Wundt,” before younger psychologists rejected the central concepts of Wundt and moved toward a redefinition of psychology based on the positivist philosophy. Very early, then, there was disagreement about the basic assumptions underlying psychology as a scientific discipline. Danziger argues that Wundt’s central concepts were metaphysical, and that behaviorism represents a logical outcome of the emphases on sensationalism and processes “anchored” in the observable periphery of the organism.

David Leary continues the discussion, asking whether psychology is a natural science, a social science, or a hybrid of both. He examines Wundt’s conceptualization of psychology and places it in its historical context. Dr. Leary concludes that what may be considered a “crisis” in psychology is not new, and in fact, that psychology today, con- sidered broadly, does not particularly differ from Wundt’s program one hundred years ago.

The historical relationship between Wundt and today’s psychologists is further ex- plored by Thomas Leahey, who suggests that Wundt’s theory of attention is a viable alternative to recent formulations. Any differences between old and new theories are simply based on different paradigms. He concludes that it is most unfortunate that psy- chologists are generally ignorant of Wundt’s psychology, even when they approach positions compatible with those of a century ago.

It might be said that “everbody knows” Darwin had a profound influence on many facets of psychology. Historical accounts, however, frequently exclude his interest in and contributions to problems of the mentally ill. Sander Gilman clarifies Darwin’s role in helping to understand the realm of the insane.

Psychologists today are certainly aware of the issues of objectivity and value judgments in the study of psychology. Marion Steininger presents a case study of ap- parent differences between Thorndike and McDougall, and critically examines their “objectivities” and defenses. She concludes that their defenses, although flawed, are still used today by psychologists. Also, although values in psychology may differ today, and psychology’s approach to the matter of values has not changed, a value-free psychology is improbable.

Students in the history of psychology frequently learn about Titchener’s rigidity, which led to the demise of classical Structuralism, but they might not know of Titchener’s influence on psychologists and laboratories at Randolph-Macon Woman’s College. Frederick B. Rowe and Frank S. Murray provide some information about the “first” psychology laboratory to be established in the South.

It is my hope that this issue of JHBS contributes to the continuing interest in evaluating psychology’s direction and progress.