Motivation and Actions, Psychology of

Three sets of phenomena have traditionally been ofconcern for research on motivation and action: (a) theselection of a certain course of action, (b) its energiz-atton, and (c) its regulation. Taking this compre-hensive perspective, many different kinds of behavior(e.g., helping others, aggression, intergroup relations,achievement) can be analyzed from a motivationalviewpoint. In the following sections, selected conceptsare discussed that characterize present-day research0n motivation: (a) motives and needs, (b) expectations,attributions, and control beliefs, and (c) goal settingand goal striving.

1. Motiues and Needs

McClelland (1985) distinguished three basic groups ofmotives: the achievement motive, the power motive,and the affiliative motives. As food is the reward orincentive for hunger, so is improving one's perform-ance on a given task the incentive for the achievementmotive. The incentive of the power motive is havingmpact, control, or influence over another person. agoup, or the world at large. Finally, the incentives forthe affiliative motives extend to sexual pleasures(sgigal motive), being together with people (need foralhitation), and experiencing harmony, concern, andcommitment (intimacy motive). All of these motivesmay entail a fear or avoidance component. Trying tomeet a standard of excellence may not be motivatedsolely by hope for success, but also by fear of failure,and spending one's spare time affiliating with othersmay not be determined solely bv the anticioated

positive feelin_es of togetherness, but also by strongfear of rejection.

In principle, all humans share these variousmotives, although with different strengths. Motivestrength can be assessed by exploring both the array ofsituations a person interprets in terms of a givenmotive (e.g., a person high in need for power interpretsall kinds of situations as power-related) and theintensity of the anticipated affect associated withhaving acquired respective incentives. Commonly thisis done with the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT)which contains pictures of scenes loosely related to themotive measured. Recent research has linked theactivation of different motives to different hormonalresponses that in turn facilitate motive-specific be-haviors (McClelland 1995).

Scoring high on a certain motive implies a recurrentconcern for acquiring the respective incentives. Forinstance, people high on the affiliation motive performaffiliative acts frequently and energetically, readilyperceive affiliative cues in the environment, andquickly detect affiliative networks. Also, predictions ofthe professional success of managers are strikinglyaccurate, particularly if one considers the motivedispositions in achievement (high), power (high), andaffiliation (low) in concert. However, attempts topredict behaviors from motives commonly fail whenengagement in these behaviors is based on consciousreflection. When it comes to choosing between coursesof action, tasks of different difficulty, or persisting ona given task versus leaving the field, people deliberateon the feasibility and desirability of the alternativecourses of action.

2. Expectations, Attributions, and Control Beliefs

One of the first attempts to integrate cognitive aspectsof motivation was made by Atkinson (1957) in hisrisk-taking model. He proposed that the subjectiveprobability of success and the task's incentive valueconjointly affect task choice, both variables beinginfluenced by the perceived difficulty of the task.Whereas easy tasks lead to a high subjective prob-ability of success (direct function), they also possesslow incentive value (inverse function) because theanticipated affect associated with success (pride) islowest for easy tasks. The reverse is assumed fordifficult tasks. Atkinson suggested that multiplyingprobability of success and incentive value will give agood estimate of whether a person will choose to workon a task, especially when the obtained score isweighted by the approach (hope for success) andavoidance (fear of failure) components of the person'sachievement motive. Research supports the model forpredictions on task choice, but the model fails toaccount for the quantity and quality of task per-formance once people have started to work on the

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Motivation and Actions, Psychology of

Three sets of phenomena have traditionally been ofcancern for research on motivation and action: (a) theselection of a certain course of action, (b) its energiz­ation, and (c) its regulation. Taking this compre­hensive perspective, many different kinds of behavior(e.g., helping others, aggression, intergroup relations,achievement) can be analyzed from a motivationalviewpoint. In the following sections, selected conceptsare discussed that characterize present-day researchon motivation: (a) motives and needs, (b) expectations,attributions, and control beliefs, and (c) goal settingand goal striving.

1. Motives and Needs

McClelland (1985) distinguished three basic groups ofmotives: the achievement motive, the power motive,and the affiliative motives. As food is the reward orincentive forhunger, so is improving one's perform­ance on a given task the incentive for the achievementmotive. The incentive of the power motive is havingimpact, control, or influence over another person, agroup, or the world at large. Finally, the incentives forthe affiliative motives extend to sexual pleasures(sexual motive), being together with people (need foraffiliation), and experiencing harmony, concern, andcommitment (intimacy motive). All of these motivesmay entail a fear or avoidance component. Trying tomeet a standard of excellence may not be motivatedsolely by hope for success, but also by fear of failure,and spending one's spare time affiliating with othersmay not be determined solely by the anticipated

positive feelings of togetherness, but also by strongfear of rejection.

In principle, all humans share these variousmotives, although with different strengths. Motivestrength can be assessed by exploring boththe array ofsituations a person interprets in terms of a givenmotive (e.g., a person high in need for power interpretsall kinds of situations as power-related) and theintensity of the anticipated affect associated withhaving acquired respective incentives. Commonly thisis done with the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT)which contains pictures of scenes loosely related to themotive measured. Recent research has linked theactivation of different motives to different hormonalresponses that in turn facilitate motive-specific be­haviors (McClelland 1995).

Scoring high on a certain motive implies arecurrentconcern for acquiring the respective incentives. Forinstance, people high on the affiliation motive performaffiliative acts frequently and energetically, readilyperceive affiliative cues in the environment, andquickly detect affiliative networks. Also, predictions ofthe professional success of managers are strikinglyaccurate, particularly if one considers the motivedispositions in achievement (high), power (high), andaffiliation (low) in concert. However, attempts topredict behaviors from motives commonly fail whenengagement in these behaviors is based on consciousreflection. When it comes to choosing between coursesof action, tasks of different difficulty, or persisting ona given task versus leaving the field, people deliberateon the feasibility and desirability of the alternativecourses of action.

2. Expectations, Attributions, and Control Beliels

One of the first attempts to integrate cognitive aspectsof motivation was made by Atkinson (1957) in hisrisk-taking model. He proposed that the subjectiveprobability of success and the task's incentive valueconjointly affect task choice, both variables beinginfluenced by the perceived difficulty of the task.Whereas easy tasks lead to a high subjective prob­ability of success (direct function), they also possesslow incentive value (inverse function) because theanticipated affect associated with success (pride) islowest for easy tasks. The reverse is assumed fordifficult tasks. Atkinson suggested that multiplyingprobability of success and incentive value will give agood estimate ofwhether a person will choose to workon a task, especially when the obtained score isweighted by the approach (hope for success) andavoidance (fear offailure) components ofthe person'sachievement motive. Research supports the model forpredictions on task choice, but the model fails toaccount for the quantity and quality of task per­formance once people have started to work on the

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chosen tasks (see Group Decisiort fuIalcirtg, SocialPsycltologt, ofl.

Elaborations of the model (Heckhausen 1991)added furthel expectation-related concepts (e.g., theexpectation that successful task pelformance will leadto the anticipated incentives) and differentiated vari-ous incentives (e.-e., extrinsic side effects, such as w-henan achievement task has affiliative benefits). Atkin-son's model has also been elaborated by attributiontheorists (Weiner 1992) lvho attempted to understandchanges in expectations and incentive value in terms ofthe attributions made for past performances. More-over, Weiner discovered that the approach componentof the achievement motive (hope for success) isassociated with attributing failure to luck or lack ofeffort and success to ability, whereas the avoidancecomponent is linked to attributing failure to lack ofability and success to luck (see Acodemic AchieuementM otiuation, Deuelopnnent oJ).

Recognition of the motivational importance ofexpectations and attributions was the starting point ofthe cognitive revolution in the psychology of mo-tivation which also has introduced the concept ofcontrol beliefs. Self-efficacious individuals hold thefirm belief that they possess the potential to executethe kinds of behaviors that a given task demands(Bandura l99l). People acquire this belief by reflectingon their own relevant past behaviors, observing thebehaviors of similar others, being evaluated by sign-ificant others (e.g., teachers), and observing their ownphysiological reactions when challenged by a giventask. High self-efficacy beliefs are associated withchoosing aspiring goals; exerting strong efforts toattain these goals, and persisting in the face ofobstacles and hindrances (see Control Behauior: Psy-c holo gical P er spe c tiu e s).

3. Goal Setting

The most recent advance in the psychology of mo-tivation and action is research on goal pursuit.Research on goals addresses the question of how wellpeople translate their desires and beliefs into action.

3.1 Determinants of Goal Setting

Research on the determinants of goal setting dis-covered that people differ in their preference for settinggoals with certain structural features or contents. Forexample, people who generally think about theiractions in concrete versus abstract terms also prefer toset themselves concrete versus abstract goals, respect-ively. People who construe their self as an ideal (whichthey intrinsically desire to attain) set promotion goals(i.e., goals focusing on accomplishments and aspira-tions), whereas people who construe their self as anought which they feel compelled to reach set pre-vention goals (i.e., goals that focus on safety andresponsibilities, Higgins 1997). It also matters what

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kind of implicit theories people hold on the nature sf'personal attributes. If people believe that abilitv 1,flxed and cannot easily be changed, they chooseperformance goais (i.e.. goals that serve the purpose siflnding out how capable one is). If, holvever, p€oplgbelieve that ability can be improved, they choöselearning -eoals geared at finding out holv one cansuccessfully carry out the task at hand (Dweck 1999tPeople's needs, wishes, and higher order goals alsoinfluence the t) 'pe of goals thrt are set (Ryan et al.1996). Moreover, people's concept of what they couldpossibly become (i.e., the possible self) provrde5thematic conceptions of what future selves they ma!strive for.

3.2 Processes of Goal Setting

Recent research (Oettingen 2000) demonstrates tharthe perceived feasibility of goal attainment does noralways determine people's goal setting. When peoplefantasize about a desired future, they set themselvesgoals independent of perceived feasibility. Thus peoplewho indulge in fantasies about a desired future committhemseives to goals irrationally: they are too com-mitted when probabilities of success are low, and notcommitted enough when probabilities of success arehigh. Such irrational goal commitments are alsoobserved with people who are caught up in rumin-ations about aspects of the present reality that stand inthe way of reaching one's fantasies. Only when peoplementally contrast their positive fantasies with presentreality does their goal setting reflect perceived feasi-bility. Strong goal commitments emerge when per-ceived feasibility is high, and no goal commitment isfound when perceived feasibility is low.

Goals may also become activated outside oiawareness (Bargh and Chartrand 1999). Strong mentallinks develop between the cognitive representations ofsituations and the goals that people chronically pursuewithin these situations. As a consequence of thisrepeated and consistent pairing in the past, such goalsbecome automatically activated when the personenters the relevant situation. The automatically ac-tivated goal then guides behavior, without theindividual choosing or intending the respective goal-directed line of action (see Automaticity of Action,Psychology ofl.

4. Goal Striuing

4.1 Goal Content Effects

Successful goal striving is determined by how goals areframed and what contents they specify. The followin-sstructural features of goals are important: challenginggoals that are spelled out in specific terms lead to ahi-eher attainment rate than modest specific goals otchallenging butvague ('Do your best!') goals. Proximaleoals that relate to what the individual does in the near

nresent or will do in the futule are superior to distallnals that point far into the future. Promotion goals

ä.,, ' .4 at accomplishment faci l i tate goal pursLtit .ih.r.nt pret 'ertt lou goals geared at acquir ine security

hanper goal pursuit. I earnin-e goals lead to betternertormances than performance goals. as the formerItlotv for a more effective copin-e with failure than theiatter. Per-formance ,eoals are less detrimental, how-ver. tvhen they are framed as approach -eoals (e.g., Iivant to get good grades) as compared to avoidanceaoals (e.g., I do not want to get bad grades).-

Moreover, the thematic content of goals matters.Goals covering issues of autonomy, competence, andsocial integration are said to further intrinsic ,eoalpursuit which in turn promotes creativity, higherioenitive flexibility, and greater depth of informationoröcessing. Side-effects of intrinsic goal pursuits are anincreased subjective well-being and life satisfactionßee Intrinsic Motiuation, Psychology ofl. Effects ofeoals on subjective well-being are also influenced by[ow weli people's goal contents match the strengths oftheir motives of achievement, affiliation, power, andintimacy (Brunstein et al. i998).

Other parameters of goal content and goal structurehave also been found to relate to subjective well-being.Strong goal commitment, for instance, favors sub-jective well-being, but only when the probability ofsuccess is perceived as high. The strongest predictor ofpositive well-being is the proportion of intimacy goalsin the total of personal goals a person holds, whereasthe proportion of achievement and power goals tendsto be related to negative well-being. However, thestrcngth of these effects seems to be contingent onpositive and negative life events in domains relevant tothese goals. Moreover, the level of goal specificationalso affects subjective well-being. High-level goals(e.g., bring happiness to those around me) tend to beassociated with psychological distress (anxiety, de-pression). Low-level goals (e.g., get along with mybrother) on the other hand, have been linked to greaterlevels of psychological well-being, but also to morephysical illness. A high proportion of avoidance goals(e.g., not being late) as compared to approach goals(e.g., being on time) impedes psychological and physi-cal well-being. Finally, a lack of integration of themany goals people hold in terms of experiencing muchgoal conflict or a strong fragmentation of the self hasaiso been linked to low subiective well-beine (Emmonsiee6).

4.2 Planning

Having set a goal is just a first step toward goalattainment, commonly followed by a host of im-plemental problems that need to be solved. Researchon implemental mind-sets (Gollwitzer 1990) hasshown that planning the implementation of a set goalcreates a cognitive orientation that facilitates gettingstarted with goal-directed actions. Implemental mind-

sets prevent distraction bv irrelevant information andplomote processing of information related to theimplementation of set goals. Moreover, desirability-related information is processed partially. favorin_epros over cons, and the analysis of feasibility-reiatedinformat ion is opt imis t ic .

Set -qoals commit people to attaining the specifiedfuture (outcome or behavior). but they do not commitpeople to when, where, and how they want to attain it.Planning one's -qoal pursuit l ia forming implemcn-tation intentions that take the form of 'If I encountersituation x, I will perform the -eoal-directed behaviory' (Gollwitzer 1999) promote the attainment ofdifficult to reach goals (e.-e., healthy eating). As im-plementation intentions spell out links between situa-tional cues and goal-directed behavior, the control ofgoal-directed behavior is delegated to environmentalcues (e.g., good opportunities). The situational cuesspecified in implementation intentions are more easilydetected, remembered, and more readily attended tothan comparable nonintended situations. The goal-directed behavior specified in implementation in-tentions is initiated immediately and effortlessly in thepresence of the critical situational cues, withoutnecessitating a conscious intent. The task of planningcan also be approached in a more reflective way,however, as is entailed in mental simulations thatexplore possible routes to achieving one's goal (processsimulations, Taylor et al. 1998). If such processsimulations are applied repeatedly, they further theattainment of set goals.

4.3 Action Control Strategies

Successful goal attainment implies that a currentlypursued goal has to be shielded from competing goals(e.g., the goal of making a phone call from thecompeting goal of tidying up one's messy desk).Various control strategies can be differentiated (Kuhland Beckmann 1994), such as attention control oremotion control. Whether and how effectively thesestrategies are used depends on the control mode of theindividual. An action-oriented person concentrates onthe planning and initiation of goal-directed action;responds flexibly to contextual demands; and usescontrol strategies effectively. A state-oriented person,however, cannot disengage from incomplete goals andis thus caught up in persevering thoughts related toaversive experiences or future successes. Also, state-oriented individuals readily misperceive assigned goalsas self-generated, and the degree of such lalse self-ascriptions is closely associated with reduced enact-ment of self-chosen as compared to assigned goals.

Successfully resolving goal conflicts is not only anissue of shielding an ongoing goal pursuit fromcompeting goal pursuits (Cantor and Fleeson 1994).There is also the possibility of creative integrations,where new goals are formed which serve both of theconflicting goals (e.g., affiliation and achievement

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goais can be reconciled by taking on civlc responsi-b i l i tv ; . Moreover . in an at tempt to meet h i -sher order

-eoals (e.-e.. graduating from high school) people canstrategically link behavioral goals that on the surfaceappear in conflict (e.-e.. when affiliating with peopieand studyin-q are reconciled by studying in groups).

4.4 Mobili:arion oJ' EJfort

People can se'cure -eoal attainment not only by plan-ning and shieldin-s off distractions, but also by in-creasing effort. A person's readiness to exert effortturns out to be directly determined by the perceiveddifficulty of the task at hand (Wright 1996). As theperceived difficulty increases so does the person's effortexpenditure, unless the task is recognized as un-solvable. But there is a second limit to the linearincrease of effort expenditure in response to height-ened task difficulty: a person's potential motivation.

Potential motivation is determined by need-relatedvariables (i.e., strength of the related need or higherorder goal, the incentive value of the task, and theinstrumentality of task completion for need satis-faction or attainment of the higher order goal). If thelevel of potential motivation is low, people do not findit worthwhile to increase effort when an easy taskbecomes more difficult. This is because the upper limitof effort expenditure (suggested by the potentialmotivation) is low and thus reached quickly.

4.5 Disuepancy Reduction

Even when failure occurs people do not give up ontheir goal pursuits. Rather, they experience a dis-crepancy that needs to be closed. According toBandura (1991), goals only specify the conditions thatallow for a positive or negative self-evaluation. If theset goal is attained through one's actions, a positiveself-evaluation prevails; whereas staying below one'sgoals leads to a negative self-evaluation. The indi-vidual thus is seen as pushed by the negative self-evaluation associated with the discrepancy, and puiledby the anticipated positive self-evaluation that isintrinsically linked to closing the gap between thestatus quo and the goal (i.e., the performance stan-dard). This implies that goals stimulate effortful actiontoward goal attainment only when people recognize adiscrepancy between the status quo and the set goal.Bandura therefore proposes giving frequent feedbackas a powerful means of stimulating goal pursuit.

Carver and Scheier (1998) propose a differentdiscrepancy reduction theory of goal pursuit. Basedon cybernetic control theory, the central conceptualunit of their analysis is the negative feedback loop.Carver and Scheier highlight the hierarchical or-eaniz-ation of goal pursuit and thus assume a cascading loopstructure. Goal-directed behavior is usually regulatedat the middle level ('Do-goals') with action at higher

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levels ('Be-goals') suspended until the individual be.comes self-aware. When discrepancies on the 'g...

level' or the'Do-level' are discovered. iotver ler.el goal,or behaviors geared at discrepancy reduction rr.tr iggered. A posit ive affectir,e response as a con:r.quence of goal attainment is not assumed. nor is thedetection of a discrepancy assumed to be associnls,;with ne-sative affect. Rather. the speed of progress indiscrepancy reduction is seen as the source of positlior negative feelings.

Research on identity goals demonstrates. howereithat people do not necessarily have to move donn.wards (i.e., to lower level goals) when trying to closegoal discrepancies. When it comes to 'Be-goals'

tharspecify a desired identity (such as being a goodscientist) there are many different, alternative ways t0indicate to oneself and others that one possesses theaspired identity. If one has failed to attain an indicatoLor has discovered that an indicator is out of reach (e.q..having productive students), one can compensate [1striving for alternative indicators (e.g., presence 1[conferences).

5. Conclusion and Future Perspectiues

Research on motivation and action traditionaliy fi>cused on identifying the determinants of motivation.This search has moved from the affective determinantsof motives, needs, and incentives to more cognitivedeterminants, such as expectations, attributions, zrndcontrol beliefs. With the recent focus on goals (Goll-witzer and Bargh 1996), the volitional issue of thcregulation of goal-directed behavior has become pre"valent, and the human being is conceived as a flexibltstrategist. This perspective leads to a focus on theanalysis of reflective and reflexive psychological pro-cesses that guide the successful setting and imple-menting of goals (see Self-regulation in Adulthooctl.

Even though research on goals has won momentumin recent years, there is a host of issues that have notyet received much theoretical and empirical attention.One of these is the issue of goal conflict. FutuLeresearch will have to discover how goal conflictsemerge and how they affect thoughts, feelings, andactions. Moreover, different ways of resolving goalconflicts (e.g., creative integrations versus disengage-ment from bne of the conflicting goals) need to bedistinguished. It does not suffice to simply analyzernedeterminants and consequences of goal conflict res-olution. Observing that disengagement from goals tstriggered, for instance, by a lack of opportunities topursue the goal, or observing that any disengagemenilrom goals is accompanied by ruminative thought aswell ai frustrated anä depressed affect (Klinger 1975)'is an important flrst step. The next question is, Hcttcan people effectively self-regulate disengagemenifrom goa1s. As any self-regulation is taxing in the sensethat subsequent self-regulation becomes less effectl\'e'research on goals will need to discover self-regulator!

:i

!iIIIIt

IIIii

II

tII

)

strate-sies of goal setting, and goal implementation

that are eaSY tO PerIoIm' '

See also: Academic Achievement Motivation, Deve-

tnonr.n, of: Action Theory: Psychological; Activity

iü.o.y' Psychological; Attitudes and Behavior; Auto-

maticity of Action, Psychology of, Control Behavior:psvchological Perspectives, Group Decision Making,

Sotiof Psychology of; Intrinsic Motivation, Psycho-

logy of; Self-regulation in Adulthood

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