PSM/RMP WEBINAR SERIES · Process Plants: A Handbook for Inherently Safer Design. Boca Raton, Fla:...

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INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGN

Sara Willman & Jasmin Dhaliwal

Risk Management Professionals, Inc.(949) 282-0123(877) 532-0806

www.RMPCorp.com

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RISK MANAGEMENT PROFESSIONALS

Key Services• Process Safety & Risk Management

• Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)

▪ What-If? Studies

▪ Hazard & Operability (HAZOP) Studies

▪ Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)

▪ Safeguard Protection Analysis (SPA)

▪ Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Assessment & Verification

• Process Safety Management (PSM)

• Risk Management Program (RMP)

• California Accidental Release Prevention (CalARP) Program

• Nevada Chemical Accident Prevention Program (CAPP)

• Security Vulnerability Assessment (SVA)

• Inherently Safer Technology (IST), Hierarchy of Hazard Control Analysis (HCA), Safer Technology & Alternatives Analysis (STAA)

• Safety & Environmental ManagementSystems (SEMS)

• Damage Mechanism Review (DMR)

• Safety Case

Key Services (cont.)

• ERP Development & EmergencyPreparedness Training (NIMS-Compatible)

• Risk-Graph and Bow-tie Analysis

• QRA Services – FTA & ETA

Background

• Services to Process Industries, Utilities, & Government Since 1995

• International w/US Focus

Qualifications

• Extensive Experience

• Two Decades of Risk-Based Applications

• Engineering, Safety, Security, and Emergency Response Backgrounds

Locations

• HQ: Irvine, CA

• Houston ♦ Norfolk ♦ Walnut Creek

Contact

• [email protected]

• www.RMPCorp.com

• U.S. (877) 532-0806

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SUMMARY

• Overview ▪ Intensification

▪ Substitution

▪ Moderation

▪ Simplification

• Examples of Inherently Safer Design implementation

• Incorporating Inherently Safer Design into HAZOP studies

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INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGN

• Avoid hazards instead of controlling them

• Low level of danger even if something goes wrong

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INTENSIFICATION

• Minimization

• Decrease inventory of hazardous substances

• Benefits▪ Reduce number of process operations

▪ Fewer startups/shutdowns

▪ Containment of explosion overpressures

• Downsides▪ High pressures and temperatures

▪ Increase process complexity

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INTENSIFICATION EXAMPLES

• Storage▪ Use hazardous chemicals as soon as they are

produced or delivered

▪ Store fewer vessels as full as possible, instead of storing many partially filled vessels

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INTENSIFICATION EXAMPLES

• Distillation▪ Prioritize low inventory

▪ Combine multiple columns into one

▪ Utilize other methods of separation

▪ Reduce residence times

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SUBSTITUTION

• Use safer materials in place of hazardous ones▪ Safer nonreactive agents

▪ Materials that require lower temperatures and pressures

▪ Safer refrigerants or heat transfer fluids

• Downsides▪ Economics

▪ Efficiency

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SUBSTITUTION EXAMPLES

• Use soap and water for cleaning

• Less toxic solvents▪ Cyclohexene vs. benzene

• Ductile materials instead of brittle

• Dry powder and UV rays/electron-beam radiation for coatings instead of toxic solvents

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SUBSTITUTION EXAMPLES

• Ethylene oxide manufacture▪ Catalyst tubes cooled

by heat transfer oils− Kerosene boiled under

pressure

• Flixborough explosion caused by ignition of boiling hydrocarbons under pressure

• Water used in newly developed plants

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MODERATION

• Attenuation

• Using hazardous materials under the least hazardous conditions▪ Store chemicals as refrigerated liquids at

atmospheric pressure instead of under pressure at ambient temperature

▪ Store toxics in diluted solutions

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MODERATION EXAMPLES

• Phenol production▪ High risk of runaway reactions

− Water dump tank in place as safety system

▪ Increase in reaction volume could decrease temperature

• Storage and transport▪ Dilute solutions

▪ Less hazardous solution− Chlorine as sodium hypochlorite

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SIMPLIFICATION

• Decrease process complexity

• Benefits▪ Plant contains less equipment

▪ Provides fewer opportunities for human error

▪ Typically cheaper than complex processes

▪ Need less complex protective equipment

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SIMPLIFICATION EXAMPLES

• Ways to simplify▪ Stronger equipment can replace relief systems

▪ Resistant materials of construction can replace protective instruments

▪ Relocate equipment

▪ Avoid moving parts

• Examples▪ Equipment strong enough to withstand high pressures

▪ Materials that can withstand high or low temperatures

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OTHER ISD METHODS

• Limitation of Effects

• Avoiding the domino effect

• Making incorrect assembly impossible

• Making status clear

• Tolerance of misuse

• Ease of control

• Computer control

• Instructions and other procedures

• Life-cycle friendliness

• Passive safety

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PHILOSOPHY OF ISD

• ISD is a way of thinking

• Not every ISD method will be viable for every type of operation

• Safety culture

• Benefits, downsides, and trade-offs

• Mitigate severity of consequences should an accident occur

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ISD IN HAZOPS

• HAZOPs identify hazards and mitigate hazards through safeguards

• ISD eliminates or reduces hazards rather managing or controlling them

• Methods of incorporating ISD in HAZOPs: ▪ ISD Checklists

▪ Consider ISD alternatives to replace safeguards

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ISD CHECKLISTS

• Stimulate thinking of ISD

• Promote out of the box thinking

• Considers possibilities and then determines feasibility

• Checklists should be reviewed periodically

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ISD CHECKLISTS

Guide Word Checklist Question

Intensify/Minimize Is the storage of all hazardous gases, liquids and solids

minimized?

Can equipment sets be combined to reduce overall system

volume?

Can pipeline inventories be reduced by feeding hazardous

materials as a gas instead of a liquid?

Are just-in-time deliveries used when dealing with

hazardous materials?

Are all hazardous materials removed or properly disposed of

when they are no longer needed or not needed in the next X

days?

Are attempts made to completely eliminate raw materials,

process intermediates, or by-products?

Can process conditions be changed to reduce production of

hazardous wastes or by-products?

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Substitute Is it possible to substitute less hazardous raw materials?

Is it possible to eliminate hazardous raw materials, process

intermediates or by-products by using an alternative process

or chemistry?

Is it possible to use utilities with lower hazards?

Is it possible to substitute less hazardous final product

solvents?

Moderate Can potential releases be reduced via lower temperatures

or pressures, or elimination of equipment?

Is it possible to make reaction conditions less severe by

using a catalyst or a by using a better catalyst?

Is it possible to dilute hazardous raw materials?

Are all hazardous gases, liquids and solids stored as far

away as possible?

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Simplify Are equipment and procedures designed such that they

cannot be operated incorrectly or carried out incorrectly?

Are machine controls located to prevent unintentional

activation while allowing easy access for stopping the

machine?

Are all manuals, guides, and instructional materials clear

and easy to understand, especially those that are used in an

emergency situation?

Can equipment be eliminated or arranged to simplify

material handling?

Can DCS modules be simplified?

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Original Image Source: AcuTech http://www.nj.gov/dep/enforcement/tcpa/downloads/IST_workshop_sample_worksheets

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ISD ALTERNATIVES TO REPLACE SAFEGUARDS

Original Image Source: https://www.worksafebc.com/en/health-safety/create-manage/managing-risk/controlling-risks

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INCORPORATING ISD AT THE OVERALL PROCESS LEVEL VS. NODE LEVEL

• Overall Process Level ▪ ISD opportunities

are limited

▪ Stimulating ISD considerations is a challenge

• Node Level ▪ Smaller, more

important details are revealed

▪ Stimulating ISD considerations is easier

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CALARP PROGRAM 4

• 19 CCR Section 2762.13: Hierarchy of Hazard Control Analysis (HCA)

• HCA is required for/when: ▪ PHA scenarios that identify the potential for a major

incident▪ Management of Change (MOC) occurs▪ Incident occurs▪ Design/Review of new processes

• HCA uses the information provided by PHA/MOC/Incident and documents all inherent safety measures and safeguards related to the process safety hazard identified▪ Recommendations to eliminate hazards using first and

second order inherent safety measures are developed

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REFERENCES

• Kletz, T. A., & Amyotte, P. (2010). Process Plants: A Handbook for Inherently Safer Design. Boca Raton, Fla: CRC.

• U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Review Board (CSB). (2012). Inherently Safer: The Future of Risk Reduction.

• Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology, Council, N. R., & Division on Earth and Life Studies. (2012). The Use and Storage of Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) at Bayer CropScience. National Academies Press.

• Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) (2008). Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures: Third Edition. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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UPCOMING WEBINARS / CONFERENCES

WebinarMarch 27, 2018“Safeguard Protection Analysis (SPA) for CalARP Program 4” Presented by Steve

Maher, CSP PE and John Johnson

WebinarApril 10, 2018“The Importance of P&IDs and Labeling” Presented by Max Oppedahl

2018 IIAR National Conference and ExpoMar 18-21, 2018• Exhibitor

• Presentation by Stephanie Smith, PE

14th Global Congress on Process SafetyApr 22-26, 2018• Exhibitor

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QUESTIONS?

Sara Willman

Jasmin Dhaliwal

[email protected]

[email protected]

Risk Management Professionals, Inc.(949) 282-0123(877) 532-0806

www.RMPCorp.com

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

PSM/RMP WEBINAR SERIES · Process Plants: A Handbook for Inherently Safer Design. Boca Raton, Fla:...

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