PS 490 Informal Institutions Syllabus - Fall 2015jlg562/documents/... · 2016. 7. 14. · ! 2!...

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Political Science 490 Informal Institutions: Institutionalism for Developing Countries

Northwestern University

Department of Political Science Fall 2015

Wed. 9:00-‐11:50AM, Scott Hall #107 (Burdick Room)

Instructor: Jordan Gans-‐Morse Office Hours: Thurs. 12:30-‐2:30PM and by appointment Location: Scott Hall #203 Email: jordan.gans-‐[email protected] COURSE SUMMARY This course will examine informal institutions — rules and procedures that lack formal codification yet effectively structure political behavior. The first part of the course will provide an overview of institutional analysis. Existing institutionalist approaches focus primarily on formal institutions, yet in many developing and transition countries formal rules and procedures have a marginal influence on actual political practices. We will examine recent efforts to define, conceptualize, and empirically analyze informal institutions and informal politics more broadly. The second part of the course will consider informal institutions in the context of several areas of highly active research in contemporary comparative politics and political economy, including (1) clientelism, (2) institutions and economic growth, (3) corruption, (4) state building, and (5) institutions in non-‐democratic regimes. The study of informal institutions entails inherent methodological challenges, in that many of the practices we will examine are illicit and/or covert. Throughout the course we will focus on innovative methodological approaches, ranging from interviewing techniques to statistical tools, designed to overcome these challenges. The course is designed for graduate students preparing for the comprehensive examination in comparative politics or designing a dissertation prospectus for study of the developing world, but students from other sub-‐disciplines are welcomed and encouraged to enroll. COURSE REQUIREMENTS Participation Students are expected to complete all readings prior to each session and to attend every seminar. Seminar participation will count for 30% of students’ overall grade. In addition to unstructured contributions to the conversation, each week students will be assigned a reading that they should read with particular care and know especially well. When questions or

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disputes arise during discussions, the student responsible for the reading will be expected to take the lead in resolving confusion and sorting out divergent interpretations. Finally, students will be expected to post a discussion question on Canvas each week by 5:00PM on Tuesday. Assignments (1) Short essays: During some weeks, students will be asked to prepare a brief essay on a particular reading. Additional information about the content of these essays will be provided later in the quarter. The essays should be no more than two single-‐spaced pages and should be distributed by email to all seminar participants no later than noon on the day before the seminar meets. The aim of these essays is to introduce the rest of the group to as broad of range of material as possible while keeping the mandatory reading at a reasonable level. Students should be prepared to discuss and answer questions regarding their essay during seminar. The short essay assignments will count for 20% of the overall grade. With respect to the seminar’s primary assignment, students will have two options: (2a) Writing assignment option: The writing assignment may consist of a critical literature review, a research proposal, a conference paper, or a data analysis. My primary aim is that the assignment facilitates students’ preparation for the field exam(s), dissertation prospectus, and/or publication of a journal article. With this in mind, I am willing to tailor the assignment to individual students’ goals. Please come discuss your project with me no later than the fifth week of the quarter, and preferably sooner. The writing assignment will count for 50% of the overall grade. (2b) Exam/journal review option: In place of the writing assignment, students may elect to write two mock journal reviews on readings of their choice from the syllabus and take a written exam. The exam will be designed to simulate field exam questions. The reviews will count for 15% and the exam for 35% of the overall grade. Reviews must be submitted prior to the meeting in which we discuss the particular reading, and the two reviews cannot be done for the same week of readings. Deadlines: The exam will be held on Wednesday, December 2nd at 9AM and the paper will be due by on Wednesday, December 9th by 9AM. LEARNING OBJECTIVES By the end of the course, the aim is that students will:

• Possess a rigorous conceptual command of the institutionalist approach to political science.

• Be prepared to develop research focused on the role of informal institutions. • Be familiar with methodological tools for analyzing illicit or informal political behavior.

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COURSE MATERIALS The course draws on a wide range of sources, and there are no books that we will read in their entirety. Many of the readings are journal articles that are available in electronic form through the Northwestern library. For excerpts from books, I will make copies available via the course website on Canvas. That said, I encourage you to purchase the following books (listed in descending order of importance):

• Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, eds., Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006)

• Douglass North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: WW Norton & Co., 1981)

• Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press, 1990)

• Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, eds., Patrons, Clients, and Policies (Cambridge University Press, 2007)

• Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Harvard University Press, 1991)

• Jennifer Ghandi, Political Institutions Under Dictatorship (Cambridge University Press, 2008)

• Andrew Janos, Politics and Paradigms: Changing Theories of Change in Social Science (Stanford University Press, 1986)

Additionally, the following is a useful – but expensive – resource. I will provide copies of several of the essays in this volume.

• Thomas Christiansen and Christine Neuhold, eds. The International Handbook on Informal Governance (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2012)

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COURSE OVERVIEW Week 1: Alternatives to Institutionalism: Structuralism, Functionalism, Behavioralism Wednesday, September 23 Key questions:

• What are the alternative approaches to institutionalism? • How distinct are these different approaches? Is it productive to consider these

distinctions? • What are the strengths and weaknesses of each approach?

Readings:

• Andrew Janos, Politics and Paradigms: Changing Theories of Change in Social Science (Stanford University Press, 1986)

o Chapters 1-‐3 • Robert Adcock, “Interpreting Behavioralism,” in Modern Political Science: Ango-‐

American Exchanges Since 1870, Robert Adcock, Mark Bevir, and Shannon Stimson, eds. (Princeton University Press, 2007)

• Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978)

o Chapter 1

Further Background Reading:

• Ira Katzelneson, “Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics,” in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, Mark Lichbach and Alan Zuckerman, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 1997)

• James Mahoney and Richard Snyder, “Rethinking Agency and Structure in the Study of Regime Change,” Studies in Comparative International Development 34, 2 (1999): 3-‐32

• Robert Dahl, “The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest,” The American Political Science Review 55, 4 (1961): 763-‐772

• Andrew Janos, East Central Europe in the Modern World: The Politics of the Borderlands from Pre-‐ to Post-‐Communism (Stanford University Press, 2002) (see Chapter 1)

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Week 2: Varieties of Institutionalism Wednesday, September 30 Key questions:

• How do various scholars define the term “institutions”? What are the strengths and weaknesses of each definition?

• What are the strengths and weaknesses of institutionalist approaches? • What precipitated the trend toward institutionalism in political science? • What are the differences between the major approaches to institutionalism, and what,

if anything, do they share in common? • What is “institutionalization”? Is it a fruitful concept? • How do institutions form and evolve?

Readings:

• Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political Studies 44 (1996): 936-‐957

• Robert Adcock, Mark Bevir, and Shannon Stimson, “Historicizing the New Institutionalism(s),” in Modern Political Science: Anglo-‐American Exchanges Since 1870, Robert Adcock, Mark Bevir, and Shannon Stimson, eds. (Princeton University Press, 2007) (optional)


o Chapter 1 • Douglass North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: WW Norton &

Co., 1981) o Chapters 1, 3, and 4

• Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale University Press, 1968) o Skim pages 1-‐8, read pages 8-‐24, skim pages 78-‐92

• Steven Levitsky, “Institutionalization and Peronism: The Concept, the Case, and the Case for Unpacking the Concept,” Party Politics 4,1 (1998): 77-‐92

• Kathleen Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999)

o Skim pages 369-‐381, read pages 381-‐401 Further Background Reading:

• James March and Johan Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” The American Political Science Review 78, 3 (1984): 734-‐749

• James March and Johan Olsen, “Elaborating the New Institutionalism,” in Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, R.A. Rhodes, Sarah Binder, and Bert Rockman, eds. (Oxford University Press, 2007)

• Sue Crawford and Elinor Ostrom, “A Grammar of Institutions,” American Political Science Review 89,3 (1995): 582-‐600

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• Kenneth Shepsle, “Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 1 (1989): 131-‐147

• John Carey, “Parchment, Equilibrium, and Institutions,” Comparative Political Studies 33 (2000): 735-‐751

• Daniel Diermeier and Keith Krehbiel, “Institutionalism as a Methodology,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 15, 2 (2003): 123-‐144

• Ira Katznelson and Barry Weingast, eds., Preferences and Situations: Points of Intersection Between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism (Russell Sage Foundation Publications, 2005)

• Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” American Political Science Review (2000): 251-‐267

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Week 3: Conceptualizing Informal Institutions Wednesday, October 7 Key questions:

• What are informal institutions? • How are informal institutions different from informal practices, culture, networks, and

other related concepts? • Is the concept of “informal institutions” useful? • How do informal and formal institutions interact? • How do informal institutions form and evolve?

Readings:

• Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, “Introduction,” in Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America, Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, eds. (John Hopkins University Press, 2006)

• Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, “Introduction,” in The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio, eds. (University of Chicago Press, 1991)

o Read pages 1-‐2, 11-‐22 • Alena Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices that Shaped Post-‐

Soviet Politics and Business (Cornell University Press, 2006) o Chapter 1

• Leonid Polishchuk, “Misuse of Institutions: Lessons from Transition,” in Economies in Transition: The Long Run View, Gerard Roland, ed. (Palgrave, 2011)

o Read pages 1-‐10 • Mareike Kleine, Informal Governance in the European Union: How Governments Make

International Organizations Work (Cornell University Press, 2013) o Introduction and Chapter 1

Readings for Short Essay #1: Regionally Specific Analyses of Informal Institutions

• Anna Grzymala-‐Busse, “The Best Laid Plans: The Impact of Informal Rules on Formal

Institutions in Transitional Regimes,” Studies in Comparative International Development 45 (2010): 1-‐23

• Henry Hale, “Formal Constitutions in Informal Politics: Institutions and Democratization in Post-‐Soviet Eurasia,” World Politics 63, 4 (2011): 581-‐617

• Lily Tsai, “Solidarity Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China,” The American Political Science Review 101, 2 (2007): 355-‐372)

• Michael Bratton, “Formal versus Informal Institutions in Africa,” Journal of Democracy 18,3 (2007): 96-‐110

• Peter Siavelis, “Accommodating Informal Institutions and Chilean Democracy,” in Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America, Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, eds. (John Hopkins University Press, 2006)

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• Pepper Culpepper, “Institutional Change in Contemporary Capitalism: Coordinated Financial Systems Since 1990,” World Politics 57 (January 2005): 173–199

• Roberta Haar, “Informal Governance in the United States: Capitol Hill Networks,” in The International Handbook on Informal Governance, Thomas Christiansen and Christine Neuhold, eds. (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2012)


• Henry Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2015)

• Scott Radnitz, “Informal Politics and the State,” Comparative Politics 43, 3 (2011): 351-‐371

• Hans-‐Joachim Lauth, “Informal Institutions and Democracy,” Democratization 7,4 (2000): 21-‐50

• Michael Brie and Erhard Stolting, “Formal Institutions and Informal Arrangements,” in The International Handbook on Informal Governance, Thomas Christiansen and Christine Neuhold, eds. (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2012)

• Oliver Williamson, “The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead,” Journal of Economic Literature 38,3 (2000): 595-‐613

• Joseph Stiglitz, “Formal and Informal Institutions,” in Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective, Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin, eds. (Washington, DC: IBRD/World Bank, 2000)

• Alice Sindzringre, “The Relevance of the Concepts of Formality and Informality: A Theoretical Appraisal,” in Linking the Formal and Informal Economy: Concepts and Policies, Basudeb Guha-‐Khasnobis, Ravi Kanbur, and Elinor Ostrom, eds. (Oxford University Press, 2006)

Additional Regionally Specific Analyses

• Alena Ledeneva, “Russian Blat and Chinese Guanxi: A Comparative Analysis of Informal

Practices,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 50,1 (2008): 118-‐144 • Lowell Dittmer, “Chinese Informal Politics,” The China Journal 34 (1995): 1-‐34 • Kate Meagher, “Introduction to a Special Issue on ‘Informal Institutions and

Development in Africa’,” Africa Spectrum 42, 3 (2007): 405-‐418 • Patrick Chabal and Jean-‐Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument

(Indian University Press, 1999) (see Part I: The Informalization of Politics) • Guillermo O'Donnell, “Illusions about Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy 7, 2 (1996):

34-‐51 • Ignacio Arana Araya, “Informal Institutions and Horizontal Accountability: Protocols in

the Chilean Budgetary Process,” Latin American Politics and Society 55,4 (2013): 74-‐94

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Week 4: Enforcement, Compliance, and Institutional Change Wednesday, October 14 Key questions:

• How are weak institutions different than informal institutions? • What are the differences between enforcement mechanisms for formal and informal

institutions? • How are enforcement and compliance related to institutional change? • What factors underlie enforcement and compliance problems?

Readings:


o Chapters 5-‐7 • Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Harvard

University Press, 1991) o Introduction and Chapter 7

• Steven Levitsky and Maria Victoria Murillo, “Variation in Institutional Strength,” Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009): 115-‐133

• James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, “A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change,” in Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2010)

• Kellee Tsai, “Adaptive Informal Institutions and Endogenous Institutional Change in China,” World Politics 59, 1 (2006): 116-‐141

Readings for Short Essay #2: Recent Works Related to Compliance and Enforcement

• Steven Levitsky and Dan Slater, “Ruling Politics: Institutional Reforms in Developing Democracies,” unpublished manuscript, Harvard University and University of Chicago

• Alisha Holland, “Forbearance,” The American Political Science Review (forthcoming) • Jessica Pisano, “Rethinking Regime Hybridity: Risk Shift and Economies of Compliance

in Post-‐Soviet Space,” excerpts from Legitimizing Facades: The Politics of Post-‐Socialist Institutional Change, unpublished manuscript, The New School

• Jordan Gans-‐Morse, excerpts from Violence, Law, and Property Rights in Post-‐Soviet Russia, unpublished manuscript, Northwestern University

Further Background Reading

• Robert Ellickson, “Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County,” Stanford Law Review (1986): 623-‐687

• Tom Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Yale University Press, 1990) • Avner Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval

Trade (Cambridge University Press, 2006) (Intro and Chapter 1)

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• Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (Cambridge University Press, 1992) • Avner Greif and David Laitin, “A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change,” American

Political Science Review 98, 4 (2004): 633-‐652 • Avner Greif and Christopher Kingston, “Institutions: Rules or Equilibria,” in Poltiical

Economy of Institutions, Democracy, and Voting, N. Schofield and G. Caballero, eds. (Spring-‐Verlag 2011)

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Week 5: Clientelism Wednesday, October 21 Key questions:

• What is clientelism? • How is clientelism different than related concepts such as corruption, electoral fraud,

patrimonialism? • Is the concept of “informal institutions” fruitful for understanding clientelism? • How does clientelism affect the formal institutions of democracy? How do various

configurations of formal institutions affect the extent or type of clientelism? • How can illicit phenomena like clientelism be studied?

Readings:

• Susan Stokes, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco, Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2013)

o Chapter 1 • Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, “Citizen-‐Politician Linkages: An Introduction,”

in Patrons, Clients, and Policies, Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2007)

• Simona Piattoni, “Clientelism in Historical and Comparative Perspective,” in Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation: The European Experience in Historical and Comparative Perspective, Simona Piattoni, ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2001)

• Susan Stokes, “Do Informal Rules Make Democracy Work? Accounting for Accountability in Argentina,” in Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America, Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, eds. (John Hopkins University Press, 2006)

Readings for Short Essay #3: Methodological Approaches to the Study of Clientelism (All students should read Wantchekon and at least one other of the following)

• Leonard Wantchekon, “Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field

Experiment in Benin,” World Politics 55 (2003): 399-‐422 • Thad Dunning and Janhavi Nilekani, “Ethnic Quotas and Political Mobilization: Case,

Parties, and Distribution in Indian Village Councils,” American Political Science Review 107,1 (2013)

• Ezequiel Gonzalez-‐Ocantos, Chad Kiewiet de Jonge, Carlos Melendez, Javier Osorio, and David Nickerson, “Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias: Experimental Evidence from Nicaragua,” American Journal of Political Science 56, 1 (2012): 202-‐217

• Javier Auyero, “The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account,” Latin American Research Review 35, 3 (2000): 55-‐81

• Chin Shou-‐Wang and Charles Kurzman, “The Logistics: How to Buy Votes” in

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Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying, Frederic Schaffer, ed. (Lynne Rienner, 2007)

Readings for Short Essay #4: Regionally Specific Analyses of Clientelism (All students should read at least one of the following)

• Steven Levitsky, “From Populism to Clientelism? The Transformation of Labor-‐Based

Party Linkages in Latin America,” in Patrons, Clients, and Policies, Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2007)

• Timothy Frye, Ora John Reuter, and David Szakonyi, “Political Machines at Work: Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace,” World Politics (forthcoming)

• Ellen Lust, “Competitive Clientelism in the Middle East,” Journal of Democracy 20,3 (2009)

• Melani Cammett, “Partisan Activism and Access to Welfare in Lebanon,” Studies in Comparative International Development 46,1 (2011): 70-‐97

• Nicolas Van de Walle, “Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss? The Evolution of Poltical Clientelism in Africa,” in Patrons, Clients, and Policies, Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2007)


• Allen Hicken, “Clientelism, ” Annual Review of Political Science 14 (2011): 289-‐310 • James Scott, “Patron-‐Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia,” American

Political Science Review 66, 1 (1972): 91-‐113 • James Scott, “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change,” American Political

Science Review 63 (1969): 1142-‐1158. • Martin Shefter, “Party and Patronage: Germany, England, and Italy,” Politics and Society

7 (1977): 403-‐452 • Robin Theobald, “Patrimonialism,” World Politics 34, 4, (1982): 548-‐559 • Susan Stokes, “Political Clientelism,” Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, Susan

Stokes and Carles Boix, eds. (Oxford University Press, 2007) • Frederic Schaffer, ed., Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying

(Lynne Rienner, 2007) • Susan Stokes, “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with

Evidence from Argentina,” American Political Science Review 99, 3 (2005): 315-‐325 • Simeon Nichter, “Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret

Ballot,” American Political Science review 102, 1 (2008): 19-‐31 • Henry Hale, “Correlates of Clientelism: Political Economy, Politicized Ethnicity, and

Postcommunist Transition” in Patrons, Clients, and Policies, Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2007)

• Anna Grzymala-‐Busse, “Beyond Clientelism: Incumbent Capture and State Building,” Comparative Political Studies 41, 4-‐5 (2008): 638-‐673

• Philip Keefer and Razvan Vlaicu, “Democracy, Credibility and Clientelism,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 24, 2 (2008): 371-‐406

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Week 6: Institutions for Growth Wednesday, October 28 Key Questions:

• How do informal institutions affect economic development? • How do informal institutions interact with the formal institutions needed for economic

development? • When is formalization of informal practices beneficial for economic development?

When, if ever, is it detrimental? • How is law related to formal and informal institutions? • Are lessons from institutional development in the West applicable to developing

countries?

Readings:

• Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson, “Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-‐Run Growth,” in Handbook of Economic Growth, Philippe Aghion and Stephen Durlauf, eds. (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005)

o Skim pages 388-‐421 • Stephen Haber, Armando Razo, and Noel Maurer, The Politics of Property Rights:

Political instability, Credible commitments and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-‐1929 (Cambridge University Press, 2003)

o Chapters 1 and 2 • Kathryn Firmin-‐Sellers, “The Politics of Property Rights,” American Political Science

Review 89, 4 (1995): 867-‐881 • Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Harvard

University Press, 1991) o Introduction and Chapters 3 and 8

• John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff, “Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order,” Michigan Law Review 98 (1999): 2421-‐2458

• Saul Estrin and Martha Prevezer, “The Role of Informal Institutions in Corporate Governance: Brazil, Russia, India, and China Compared,” Asia Pacific Journal of Management 28, 1 (2011): 41-‐67 (optional)

Readings for Short Essay #5: Methodological Approaches to the Study of Informal Institutions and Growth

(All students should read Frye)

• Timothy Frye, “Promoting Property Rights: The Value of Private Solutions,” NCEER

Working Paper, 2009 • Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian

Capitalism (Cornell University Press, 2002) o Preface, Chapter 1, and pages 27-‐53

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• Timothy Frye and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, “Rackets, Regulation, and the Rule of Law,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 16, 2 (2000): 478-‐502


Background for Assigned Readings • Ronald Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” The Journal of Law & Economics 3 (1960)

On Institutions and Growth

• Douglass North and Barry Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-‐Century England,” Journal of Economic History 49, 4 (1989): 803-‐832

• Douglass North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981) • Stephen Haggard, Andrew MacIntyre, and Lydia Tiede, “The Rule of Law and Economic

Development,” Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008): 205–234 • Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of

Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review 91 (2001): 1369-‐1401

• Simon Johnson, John McMillan, and Christopher Woodruff, “Property Rights and Finance,” The American Economic Review 92, 5 (2002): 1335-‐1356

• Timothy Besley, “Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana,” Journal of Political Economy (1995): 902-‐937

• Timothy Frye, “Credible Commitment and Property Rights: Evidence from Russia,” American Political Science Review 98 (2004): 453-‐466

• C. Mantzavinos, Douglass North, and Syed Shariq, “Learning, Institutions, and Economic Performance,” Perspectives on Politics 2, 1 (2004): 75-‐84

• Gary Cox, “Predatory states and the market for protection,” unpublished manuscript • James Mahoney, Colonialism and Postcolonial Development: Spanish America in

Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2010) On Informal Institutions and Growth

• Steven Pincus and James Robinson, “What Really Happened During the Glorious

Revolution?” NBER Working Paper #17206 (2011) • Joel Mokyr, “The Institutional Origins of the Industrial Revolution,” in Institutions and

Economic Performance, Elhanan Helpman, ed. (Harvard University Press, 2008) • Philip Keefer and Mary Shirley, “Formal versus Informal Institutions in Economic

Development,” in Institutions, Contracts, and Organizations, Claude Ménard, ed. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000)

• Svetozar Pejovich, “The Effects of the Interaction of Formal and Informal Institutions on Social Stability and Economic Development,” Journal of Markets & Morality 2,2 (1999): 164-‐181

• Hernando de Soto, The Other Path: The Economic Answer to Terrorism (New York: Basic

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Books, 1989) • Basudeb Guha-‐Khasnobis, Ravi Kanbur, and Elinor Ostrom, eds., Linking the Formal

and Informal Economy: Concepts and Policies (Oxford University Press, 2006) • Franklin Allen and Jun Qian, “Comparing Legal and Alternative Institutions in Finance

and Commerce,” in Global Perspectives on the Rule of Law, James Heckman, Robert Nelson, and Lee Cabatingan, eds. (New York: Routledge, 2010)

• Jiahua Che and Yingyi Qian, “Institutional Environment, Community Government, and Corporate Governance: Understanding China’s Town-‐Village Enterprises,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 14, 1 (1998)

• Formal and Informal Institutions and Development, special issue of World Development 38, 2 (2010)

• Claudia Williamson, “Informal Institutions Rule: Institutional Arrangements and Economic Performance,” Public Choice 139, 3 (2009): 371-‐387

• Claudia Williamson and Carrie Kerekes, “Securing Private Property: Formal Versus Informal Institutions,” Journal of Law and Economics (2008)

On Private Property Rights Protection and Contract Enforcement

• Timothy Frye, “Private Protection in Russia and Poland,” American Journal of Political Science 46, 3 (2002): 572-‐584

• Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Harvard University Press, 1998)

• Vadim Volkov, “Violent Entrepreneurship in Post-‐Communist Russia,” Europe-‐Asia Studies 51, 5 (1999): 741-‐754

• Vadim Volkov, “Between Economy and State: Private Security and Rule Enforcement in Russia,” Politics and Society 28, 4 (2000): 483-‐501

• Avner Greif, “Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition,” American Economic Review 83, 3 (1993)

• Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry Weingast, “Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild,” Journal of Political Economy (1994)

• Stewart Macaulay, “Non-‐Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,” American Sociological Review 28 (1963): 1-‐19

• Simon Johnson, John McMillan, and Christopher Woodruff, “Courts and Relational Contracts,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 18, 1 (2002): 221-‐

• Avinash Dixit, Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance (Oxford University Press, 2004)

• Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1985)

• Hernando De Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else (New York Basic Books, 2000) (see Chapter 5)

• Kathryn Hendley, “Legal Development in Post-‐Soviet Russia,” Post-‐Soviet Affairs 13 (1997): 228-‐251

• Frank Upham, “Mythmaking and the Rule of Law Orthodoxy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Working Paper No. 30 (September 2002)

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• Stephen Haber, Noel Maurer, and Armando Razo, “When the Law Does Not Matter: The Rise and Decline of the Mexican Oil Industry,” The Journal of Economic History 63,1 (2003): 1-‐32.

• Kathryn Hendley, Peter Murrell, and Randi Ryterman, “Law, Relationships, and Private Enforcement: Transactional Strategies of Russian Enterprises,” Europe-‐Asia Studies 52, 4 (2000): 627-‐656

• Stanislav Markus, “Secure Property as a Bottom-‐Up Process: Firms, Stakeholders, and Predators in Weak States,” World Politics 61, 2 (2012)

• Regine Spector, “Securing Property in Contemporary Kyrgyzstan,” Post-‐Soviet Affairs 24,2 (2008): 149-‐176

• John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff, “Dispute Prevention without Courts in Vietnam,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15, 3 (1999): 637-‐658

• Ato Kwamena Onoma, “The Contradictory Potential of Institutions: The Rise and Decline of Land Documentation in Kenya,” in Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2010)

• David Clarke, “Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The China Problem,” American Journal of Comparative Law 51 (2003): 89-‐112

• Thomas Ginsburg, “Does Law Matter for Economic Development? Evidence from East Asia,” Law and Society Review 34, 3 (2000): 829-‐856

On Origins of Property Rights

• Ato Kwamena Onoma, The Politics of Property Rights Institutions in Africa (Oxford University Press, 2010)

• Gary Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights (Cambridge University Press, 1994) • William Riker and Itai Sened, “A Political Theory of the Origin of Property Rights:

Airport Slots,” American Journal of Political Science (1991): 951-‐969 • John Umbeck, A Theory of Property Rights: With Application to the California Gold Rush

(Iowa State University Press, 1981)

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Week 7: Corruption Wednesday, November 4 Key questions:

• What is corruption? • What are the various types of corruption and how, if at all, are they related? • Is an objective understanding of corruption a feasible goal, or is corruption a culturally

subjective concept? • How is corruption related to other types of informal institutions and informal practices

previously examined in this course? • What positive effects, if any, can corruption have? • How can illicit behavior, such as corruption, be studied?

Readings:

• James Scott, Comparative Political Corruption (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-‐Hall, 1972)

o Chapters 1 and 2 • Rasma Karklins, “Typology of Post-‐Communist Corruption,” Problems of Post-‐

Communism 49, 4 (2002): 22-‐32 • Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale University Press, 1968)

o Read pages 59-‐72 • Jakob Svensson, “Eight questions about corruption,” Journal of Economic Perspectives

19, 3 (2005): 19-‐42 • Daniel Treisman, “What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten

Years of Cross-‐National Empirical Research?” Annual Review of Political Science 10 (2007): 211-‐244

Readings for Short Essay #6: Methodological Approaches to the Study of Corruption (All students should read Kaufmann et al. and at least one other of the following)

• Daniel Kaufmann, Sanjay Pradhan, and Randi Ryterman, “New Frontiers in Diagnosing and Combatting Corruption,” World Bank PREMnotes No. 7 (October 1998)

• Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel, “Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets,” Journal of Political Economy 115,6 (2007)

• John McMillan and Pablo Zoido, “How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, 4 (2004): 69-‐92

• Benjamin Olken and Patrick Barron, “The Simple Economics of Extortion: Evidence from Trucking in Aceh,” Journal of Political Economy 117, 3 (2009): 417-‐452

• Marianne Bertrand, Simeon Djankov, Remma Hanna, and Sendhil Mullainathan, “Obtaining a Driver's License in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 122, 4 (2007): 1639-‐1676

• Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan, “Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effect of

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Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 123,2 (2008): 703-‐745

• Yuriy Gorodnichenko and Klara Sabirianova Peter, “Public Sector Pay and Corruption: Measuring Bribery from Micro Data,” Journal of Public Economics 91,5 (2007): 963-‐991

• Maxim Mironov and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, “Corruption in Procurement and Shadow Campaign Financing: Evidence from Russia,” unpublished manuscript

• Klaus Abbink, “Laboratory Experiments on Corruption,” in International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Susan Rose-‐Ackerman, ed. (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006)


• Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, “Corruption,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 3 (1993): 599-‐617

• Susan Rose-‐Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform (Cambridge University Press, 1999)

• Robert Klitgaard, Controlling corruption (University of California Press, 1988) • Daniel Kaufmann, “Corruption: The Facts,” Foreign Policy (Summer 1997): 114-‐131 • Benjamin Olken and Rohini Pande, “Corruption in Developing Countries,” Annual

Review of Economics 4,1 (2012): 479-‐509 • Pranab Bardhan, “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues,” Journal of

Economic Literature 35 (1997): 1320-‐1346 • Paolo Mauro, “Corruption and Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (1995):

167-‐195 • Nauro Campos and Francesco Giovannoni, “Lobbying, Corruption, and Political

Influence,” Public Choice 131, 1 (2007): 1-‐21 • Alena Ledeneva, “Russian Blat and Chinese Guanxi: A Comparative Analysis of Informal

Practices,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 50,1 (2008): 118-‐144 • William Riordan, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall (New York: Signet, 1995) • Arnold Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston, eds., Political Corruption: Concepts and

Contexts (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002) • Charles Blake and Stephen Morris, eds., Corruption and Democracy in Latin America

(University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009) • Miriam Golden and Eric Chang, “Competitive Corruption: Factional Conflict and

Political Malfeasance in Postwar Italian Christian Democracy,” World Politics 53, 4 (2001): 588-‐622

• Michael Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power and Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2005)

• Frank Anechiarico and James Jacobs, The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity (University of Chicago Press, 1996)

• Tomas Larsson, “Reform, Corruption, and Growth: Why Corruption is More Devastating in Russia than in China,” Communist and Post-‐Communist Studies 39, 2 (2006): 265-‐281

• Joel Hellman, Geraint Jones, and Daniel Kauffman, “Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture and Influence in Transition Economies,” Journal of Comparative Economics 31, 4 (2003): 751-‐773

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• Diego Gambetta, “Corruption: An Analytical Map,” in Political Corruption in Transition: A Skeptic's Handbook, Stephen Kotkin and Andras Sajo, eds. (Central European Press, 2006)

• Andrew Wedeman, “The Intensification of Corruption in China,” The China Quarterly 180 (2004): 895-‐921

• Donatella della Porta and Alberto Vannucci, Corrupt Exchanges: Actors, Resources, and Mechanisms of Political Corruption (Aldine, 1999)

• Jiangnan Zhu, “Why are Offices for Sale in China? A Case Study of the Office-‐Selling Chian in Heilongjiang Province,” Asian Survey 48, 4 (2008): 558-‐579

• Stephen Ellis and Beatrice Hibou, The Criminalization of the State in Africa (Indiana University Press, 1999)

• Patrick Chabal and Jean-‐Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (Indian University Press, 1999) (see Chapter 7)

• Daniel Gingerich, “Understanding Off-‐the-‐Book Politics: Conducting Inference on the Determinants of Sensitive Behavior with Randomized Response Surveys,” Political Analysis 18, 3 (2010): 349-‐380

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Week 8: State Building Wednesday, November 11 Key Questions

• Is the concept of strong and weak states useful? How does the study of informal institutions influence our understanding of state strength?

• In what ways do informal institutions support state building? In what ways do they undermine state building?

• How, if at all, does consideration of informal institutions aid in disaggregating the functions of the state? In disaggregating state actors?

• States are often defined in terms of a series of monopolies – on violence, on taxation, on the dispensation of justice. Are there certain spheres in which informal institutions play a greater or lesser role?

• Does the notion of formal vs. formal institutions hold meaning in the absence of a functioning state?

Readings:

• Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian

Capitalism (Cornell University Press, 2002) o Chapter 6

• Keith Darden, “The Integrity of Corrupt States: Graft as an Informal Political Institution,” Politics and Society 36, 1 (2007): 35-‐60

• Steffen Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia (Cornell University Press, 2011)

o Introduction and Chapter 1 • Lauren MacLean, Informal Institutions and Citizenship in Rural Africa: Risk and

Reciprocity in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire (Cambridge University Press, 2010) o Chapter 1

• Kathleen Collins, “The Logic of Clan Politics,” World Politics 56,2 (2004): 224-‐261 Further background reading:

• Gerald Easter, “Personal Networks and Post-‐Revolutionary State-‐Building: Soviet Russia Reexamined,” World Politics 48, 4 (1996): 551-‐578.

• William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998)

• Vladimir Gelman, “The Unrule of Law in the Making: The Politics of Informal Institution Building in Russia,” Europe-‐Asia Studies 56,7 (2004): 1021-‐1040

• Steffen Hertog, “Modernizing With Democratizing: The Introduction of Formal Politics in Saudi Arabia,” Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 3 (2006): 65-‐78.

• Tuong Vu, “Studying the State Through State Formation,” World Politics 62 (2010): 148-‐175

• Robert Wade, “The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian State is not Better at

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Development,” World Development 13, 4 (1985): 467-‐497 • Jiangnan Zhu, “Why are Offices for Sale in China? A Case Study of the Office-‐Selling

Chian in Heilongjiang Province,” Asian Survey 48, 4 (2008): 558-‐579 • Lauren MacLean, “Constructing a Social Safety Net in Africa: An Institutionalist

Analysis of Colonial Rule and State Social Politics in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire,” Studies in International Comparative Development 37,3 (2002): 64-‐90

• Anna Grzymala-‐Busse, “Beyond Clientelism: Incumbent State Capture and State Formation,” Comparative Political Studies 41, 4/5 (2008): 638-‐673

• Vladimir Gelman, “Subversive Institutions and Informal Governance in Contemporary Russia,” in The International Handbook on Informal Governance, Thomas Christiansen and Christine Neuhold, eds., (Edward Elgar, 2012)

• Melani Cammett and Sukriti Issar, “Bricks and Mortar Clientelism: Sectarianism and the Logics of Welfare Allocation in Lebanon,” World Politics 62, 3 (2010): 381-‐421

• Melani Cammett and Lauren MacLean, “Introduction: The Political Consequences of Non-‐State Social Welfare in the Global South,” Studies in Comparative International Development 46,1 (2011): 1-‐21

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Week 9: Authoritarian Institutions Wednesday, November 18 Key Questions

• How do institutions in authoritarian regimes differ from institutions in democratic regimes?

• Do informal institutions play a greater role in authoritarian regimes than in democratic regimes?

• Why do authoritarian regimes frequently create nominally democratic institutions (e.g., electoral systems, legislatures, courts)?

Readings

• David Art, “What Do We Know about Authoritarianism After Ten Years?” Comparative Politics (2012): 351-‐373

• Jennifer Ghandi, Political Institutions Under Dictatorship (Cambridge University Press, 2008)

o Introduction and Chapters 1, 2, and 7 • Milan Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge University Press, 2012)

o Chapters 1 and 2 • Jennifer Ghandi and Ellen Lust Okar, “Elections under Authoritarianism,” Annual

Review of Political Science 12 (2009): 403-‐422 • Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa, “Introduction: The Functions of Courts in

Authoritarian Politics,” in Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2008)

Further Background Readings

• Carles Boix and Milan Svolik, “The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-‐Sharing in Dictatorships,” The Journal of Politics 75,2 (2013): 300-‐316

• Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy 13,2 (2002): 51-‐65

• Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War (Cambridge University Press, 2010)

• Lucan Way, “Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine,” World Politics 57,2 (2005): 231-‐261

• Dan Slater, Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia (Cambridge University Press, 2010)

• Dan Slater, “Altering Authoritarianism: Institutional Complexity and Autocratic Agency in Indonesia,” in Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2010)

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• Jennifer Ghandi and Adam Przeworski, “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats,” Comparative Political Studies 40,11 (2007): 1279-‐1301

• Jason Brownlee, “Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies,” World Politics 59,4 (2007): 595-‐628

Authoritarian Electoral Politics

• Ellen Lust, “Competitive Clientelism in the Middle East,” Journal of Democracy 20,3 (2009): 122-‐135

• Ellen Lust-‐Okar, “Reinforcing Informal Institutions through Authoritarian Elections: Insights from Jordan,” Middle East Law and Governance 1,1 (2009): 3-‐37

• Ora John Reuter and Graeme Robertson, “Subnational Appointments in Authoritairan Regimes: Evidence from Russian Gubernatorial Appointments,” The Journal of Politics 74,4 (2012):1023-‐1037

• Lisa Blaydes, Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt (Cambridge University Press, 2011)

• Beatriz Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico (Cambridge University Press, 2006)

• Regina Smyth, Anna Lowry, and Brandon Wilkening, “Engineering Victory: Institutional Reform, Informal Institutions, and the Formation of a Hegemonic Party Regime in the Russian Federation,” Post-‐Soviet Affairs 23, 2 (2007): 118–137

Authoritarian Courts

• Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa, Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge University Press, 2008)

• Peter Solomon, “Authoritarian Legality and Informal Practices: Judges, Lawyers and the State in Russia and China,” Communist and Post-‐Communist Studies 43 (2010): 351–362

• Peter Solomon, “Courts and Judges in Authoritarian Regimes,” World Politics 60,1 (2007): 122-‐145

Authoritarian Constitutions

• Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo, “Dictators as Founding Fathers? The Role of Constitutions Under Autocracy,” Economics & Politics 24,3 (2012): 279-‐306

• Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser, Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge University Press, 2014)

• Henry Hale, “Formal Constitutions in Informal Politics: Institutions and Democratization in Post-‐Soviet Eurasia,” World Politics 63,4 (2011): 581-‐617

Authoritarian Institutions and Economic Development

• Scott Gehlbach and Philip Keefer, “Private Investment and the Institutionalization of Collective Action in Autocracies: Ruling Parties and Legislatures,” Journal of Politics 74,2 (2012): 621-‐635

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• Scott Gehlbach and Philip Keefer, “Investment Without Democracy: Ruling-‐Party Institutionalization and Credible Commitment in Autocracies,” Journal of Comparative Economics 39,2 (2011): 123-‐139

• Jennifer Ghandi, “Dictatorial Institutions and their Impact on Economic Growth,” European Journal of Sociology 49,1 (2008): 3-‐30

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Week 10: Part I: Student Presentations of Research Papers Part II: Revisiting the Concept of Informal Institutions

Wednesday, November 25 Key Questions

• What are informal institutions? • How are informal institutions different from informal practices, culture, networks,

weak institutions, and other related concepts? • Is the concept of “informal institutions” useful?

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